Oct 14 2011
Nuclear Weapons Modernization in Russia and China:
Understanding Impacts to the United States
Chairman Michael Turner
The Strategic Forces Subcommittee held a hearing on “Nuclear Weapons Modernization
in Russia and China: Understanding Impacts to the United States.” Chairman Michael
Turner (R-OH) made the following opening statement as prepared for delivery:
“This hearing is very timely, because we’re currently faced with a highly uncertain future
regarding our own nuclear deterrent modernization program. Despite commitments from
many key leaders that modernization of our nuclear weapons stockpile, delivery systems,
and supporting infrastructure is critically needed, we’re on the verge of halting our
modernization program before it even begins. The FY12 Energy and Water
appropriations bills currently in Congress would make dramatic cuts to nuclear
modernization funding levels that were agreed to last year by the President and Senate
during consideration on the New START Treaty.
“In that context, it is important to understand if and how other countries—especially
China and Russia—are modernizing their nuclear forces, and how that modernization
should impact our decisions here in the United States.
“To help us explore these issues, we have before us several distinguished,
nongovernmental experts on nuclear weapons programs, strategy, and forces in China
and Russia. They are:
•
•
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Dr. Mark Schneider
Senior Analyst
National Institute for Public Policy
Mr. Richard Fisher, Jr.
Senior Fellow
International Assessment and Strategy Center
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis
Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies
“Based on your written statements, you all seem in agreement that Russia and China are
modernizing their nuclear forces. Dr. Schneider, you point out that “Russia is
modernizing every leg of its nuclear triad with new, more advanced systems,” including
new ballistic missile submarines, new heavy ICBMs carrying up to 15 warheads each,
new shorter-range ballistic missiles, and new low-yield warheads. You highlight a series
of disturbing statements by senior Russia officials regarding how Russia has come to put
increased emphasis on its nuclear weapons in military planning, including a possible
intention to use nuclear weapons first, in an attempt to end regional- or even local-level
conventional wars. Dr. Schneider, you also reference information that Russia may
possibly be violating the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. If true, this is deeply
disturbing. I hope you will discuss this in your summary remarks.
“Mr. Fisher, you point out that China is steadily increasing the numbers and capabilities
of the ballistic missiles it deploys, and is upgrading older ICBMs to newer, more
advanced systems. China also appears to be actively working to develop a submarinebased nuclear deterrent force, something it has never had. Your testimony also highlights
reports of a very large tunnel system China has constructed. A recent unclassified
Department of Defense report says this network of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000
kilometers, and is used to transport nuclear weapons and forces. An unclassified study
commissioned by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and conducted by Dr. Phillip
Karber at Georgetown, is about to be released which goes into even greater detail on this
worrying development. As we strive to make our nuclear forces more transparent, China
is building this underground tunnel system to make its nuclear forces even more opaque.
“Dr. Lewis, from your prepared statement it appears that while you agree with your
fellow witnesses that China and Russia are modernizing, you likely don’t agree with them
on what the implications of that modernization are for the United States and our
decision-making. But you do caution that some of the modernization efforts in China and
Russia could lead to instability in a crisis. In particular, I would appreciate it if, in your
opening statement, you would touch on the stability implications of deployment of a
heavy, multiple warhead, fixed-silo based ICBM in Russia, as well as China’s nuclear
force concept of operations—which requires arming their nuclear delivery systems in a
crisis.
“With all of this modernization going on in Russia and China—and every other nuclear
power—our own nuclear modernization program may never get past the “plan” stage.
Last December, President Obama and the Senate agreed to robust funding for nuclear
modernization efforts. In letters to the Senate, President Obama agreed to modernize the
strategic triad of delivery systems and accelerate key infrastructure projects at NNSA labs
and plants. The President also said:
•
“I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment for the long-term, in
addition to this one-year budget increase. That is my commitment to the Congress—
that my Administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for as long as I am
President.”
“The President came through on this pledge in his budget request, and then the House
supported full funding for NNSA in the FY12 Budget Act and the FY12 National
Defense Authorization Act. But now that commitment is falling apart—the FY12 Energy
and Water appropriations bills would cut NNSA funding by up to 10% from the budget
request, and the current continuing resolution returns NNSA to 1.5% less than FY11
levels.
“In the House, 65 Members signed onto a letter—one that contains gross inaccuracies
about the cost of sustaining and modernizing our stockpile—calling for $200 billion in
cuts to nuclear weapons funding over ten years. Considering that the budget for
sustaining, operating, and modernizing our nuclear weapons complex and nuclear forces
is on the order of $220 billion over the next ten years, these cuts would amount to
unilateral disarmament. I was disappointed to see so many of my colleagues sign onto
such an irrational proposal.
“But I am thankful that all of my majority colleagues on this subcommittee are standing
firm on the need for modernization. We recently sent a letter to four key Senate
appropriators, asking them to stand by a written commitment the senators made to the
President last December, in which they each pledged their “support for ratification of the
New START Treaty and full funding for the modernization of our nuclear weapons
arsenal.”
“No less an authority than the Secretary of Defense supports fully funding NNSA’s
nuclear modernization efforts. Just yesterday, in testimony before our committee,
Secretary Panetta said he “certainly would oppose any reductions with regards to the
funding for nuclear [modernization]”. This is a strong statement of support from a
Secretary who is under intense pressure to cut defense spending.
Secretary Panetta also said at yesterday’s hearing:
•
“With regard to reducing our nuclear arena, I think that is an area where I don’t
think we ought to do that unilaterally; we ought to do that on the basis of negotiations
with the Russians and others to make sure that we are all walking the same path.”
“I couldn’t agree more. That is why one of the New START Implementation Act
provisions contained in the House-passed FY12 NDAA link would ensure that we don’t
unilaterally reduce, and that any further reductions occur in conjunction with a formal
treaty or an act of Congress.
“Today, we are going to examine nuclear modernization efforts in Russia and China. We
need to understand what these countries are doing, in contrast to what we are doing. Our
nuclear modernization plan is just that—a plan. We are only beginning to embark on it.
Meanwhile, these other countries continue to advance the capability and reliability of
their nuclear forces. We need to understand the potential long-term consequences of
watching as Russia and China modernize their nuclear arsenal—while we sit back and
simply maintain our existing and aging nuclear forces.”
United States House of Representatives House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces
The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China
October 14, 2011
Testimony Prepared By:
Dr. Mark B. Schneider
Rayburn House Office Building
Room 2212
PREPARED STATEMENT
Nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear strike capability are the highest military priority of
the Russian Federation. Russia is modernizing every leg of its nuclear TRIAD with new, more
advanced systems. Under New START, Russia has declared 1,537 nuclear warheads and 521
and delivery systems. 1 However, since New START undercounts bomber weapons, the actual
number could be about 800 warheads higher. 2 The number of Russian weapons and delivery
vehicles will probably decline over the next five years, but Russia has vowed to build up to both
the New START limit on deployed warheads and deployed delivery vehicles by 2018 and 2028,
respectively.
1 In 2011, Russia announced a three-fold increase in nuclear missile production. Russian
press reports indicate plans to deploy 200-300 mainly MIRVed SS-27/RS-24 ICBMs. The new
Bulava 30 SLBM will be operational in 2012. Russia says it plans eight new Borey class
submarines to carry this missile. It is also reportedly developing a fifth generation missile
submarine to carry both ballistic and cruise missiles. An improved Sineva SLBM, the Liner with
up to 12 warheads, the Arbalet SLBM, probably another program to upgrade the Sineva and a
mystery missile called the Avangard (one Russian source suggested it may be a rail mobile
ICBM), were all made public in 2011. This year the Russian government announced the
deployment in 2018 of a new heavy ICBM which reportedly will carry 10-15 warheads. Russia
is also in the early stages of the development of a new bomber and is deploying a new very long
range nuclear cruise missile. In September 2011, Russia unsuccessfully tested an upgraded SS27/RS-24 with more throw-weight to allow for six warheads and missile defense counter
measures, new warheads and a new MIRV dispensing bus. Some Russian press reports have
suggested it is the Avangard. In 2016, according to the SS-27 designer, Russia will deploy new
warheads on the SS-27 variants.
In April 2011, Gary Samore, a Senior Director on the National Security Council Staff,
stated that Russia “probably” has “a few thousand [tactical] nuclear weapons” compared to a
“few hundred” for the U.S. 3 The Russian tactical nuclear force reportedly consists of short range
missiles, nuclear artillery, nuclear landmines, nuclear air defense missiles, nuclear naval missiles
and bombs, nuclear depth charges, antisubmarine warfare missiles, nuclear torpedoes, and
nuclear bombs and missiles of the Air Force’s and Navy’s non-strategic aviation. The new
Iskander short range ballistic missile and the new Su-34 fighter are reportedly nuclear capable.
2 There are reports in the Russian press that the R-500 ground-launched cruise missile of the
Iskander system has a range of 1,000-3,000-km, which is prohibited by the INF Treaty. 4
In 2005, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said Russia was developing and
deploying “new” types of nuclear weapons. Colonel General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, then-chief
of the Defense Ministry’s 12th Main Directorate which handles Russian nuclear weapons, said
Russia is deploying “new nuclear weapon complexes….that possess improved specifications
and performance characteristics…” 5 (Emphasis added). Former Russian Atomic Energy
Minister Viktor Mikhaylov stated in a 2002 Izvestiya interview that Russia was working on a
low-yield warhead to penetrate 30–40 meters into rock and destroy a buried target. The new
weapons reportedly range from small and light strategic weapons with a high yield-to-weight
ratio to “clean” nuclear weapons. On its SLBMs, Russia has reportedly deployed precision
nuclear weapons with yields of 50-200 tons of TNT. In April 2009, Vice Admiral Oleg Burtsev,
then-Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, stated that Russia could install low-yield warheads on
existing cruise missiles.
To develop new nuclear weapons, the Russian press reported that President Boris Yeltsin
authorized hydronuclear (very low yield) tests in 1999. Hydronuclear testing reportedly began as
early as 1994. According to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, hydronuclear tests “played
an important role in the analysis of the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons.” 6 (Emphasis
added). In November 2010, Alexei Fenenko of the Russian National Academy of Scientists
wrote that over the past 15 years, “significant progress” was made in hydronuclear testing.
These developments related to the new Russian nuclear doctrine that then-acting
President Vladimir Putin signed into law in the year 2000. It featured the lowest nuclear
weapons use threshold of the nuclear powers. In 2009, Russian National Security Council
3 Secretary Nikolai Patrushev revealed that the doctrine allowed for first use of nuclear weapons in
regional and local conventional war, which was not evident on its face.
In February 2010, Russia released a new military doctrine. Like the 2000 version of the
doctrine, it reserves the right of nuclear retaliation against nuclear, chemical and biological
attack. It also provided for the first use of nuclear weapons in conventional warfare. Last year
the public formulation of Russia’s nuclear weapons first use policy in conventional warfare was
changed. The condition of “situations critical for national security” was altered to read “that
would put in danger the very existence of the state.” On its face this would be a favorable
development, but this is not clear. In fact, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that on
nuclear weapons use the 2010 version does not differ from the year 2000 version. This may be
reflected in the content of the secret Russian document entitled “Basic Principles of State
Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020.” 7
Both the year 2000 and 2010 nuclear doctrines involve a nuclear escalation strategy in
which the first use of nuclear weapons is characterized as “de-escalation” of the conflict. There is
a dangerous assumption by Russian leaders that the use of a few nuclear weapons will
automatically end in conflict termination and a Russian victory.
Russia’s doctrine on the first use of nuclear weapons is dominated by more than
conventional military weakness. Russia sees the threat of first use of nuclear weapons as a
means to increase Russia’s political clout. The Russian press routinely reports that Russia is
conducting regional military exercises involving simulated nuclear weapons strikes against the
U.S., NATO and China. In December 2009, Lieutenant General Andrey Shvaychenko, thenCommander of the Strategic Missile Force, stated that, “In a conventional war, they [the
Strategic Nuclear Forces] ensure that the opponent is forced to cease hostilities, on advantageous
4 conditions for Russia, by means of single or multiple preventive strikes against the aggressors’
most important facilities. In a nuclear war, they ensure the destruction of facilities of the
opponent’s military and economic potential by means of an initial massive nuclear missile strike
and subsequent multiple and single nuclear missile strikes.” 8 In a major strategic exercise
conducted in 2010, Russia reportedly simulated hundreds of missile launches and one Russian
media report stated, “Throughout the world, the mushroom clouds rose skyward.” 9
Since February 2007, Russia has made unprecedented nuclear threats, including about 15
nuclear targeting and preemptive nuclear attack threats emanating from the highest levels of the
Russian government. Then-President Putin made four of them. Moreover, there have been
numerous threats to forward deploy nuclear weapons and nuclear capable Iskander missiles,
terminate arms control agreements, and launch an arm race. Notably, in 2007, Putin began
flying nuclear bombers into U.S., NATO and Japanese air defense identification zones as well as
occasional over-flights. The clear intent of these activities is nuclear intimidation.
If Russia’s missile programs are ambitious, China’s are even more so. The PRC is the
only nuclear power that is currently increasing its strategic nuclear forces, both qualitatively and
quantitatively. The Director of National Intelligence General (ret.) James Clapper has said that
China’s nuclear forces are a “mortal threat” to the United States. Indeed, China is preparing for
a war against Taiwan, which it believes may require it to fight the United States and possibly
Japan. While China would certainly prefer “winning without fighting,” Chinese generals have
threatened nuclear war over Taiwan. Moreover, Chinese objectives go well beyond Taiwan.
According to the Pentagon, China is deploying two new ICBMs (DF-31 and DF-31A), a
new SLBM (JL-2), and a new missile submarine and at least six will reportedly be deployed.
Today, according to the Pentagon report on Chinese military power, China has between 55-65
5 ICBMs. The extent of the deployment of multiple warheads (MIRVs) on its new missiles will
have an enormous impact on the size of the Chinese strategic force 10-20 years into the future.
According to the most recent Pentagon report on Chinese military power, the PRC may be
developing a new road-mobile ICBM, “possibly” capable of carrying a multiple independently
targetable warhead (MIRV). This is apparently the missile that is referred to as the DF-41 in the
Asian press. Jane’s reports it may carry up to 9-10 warheads. There are reports in the Asian
press that China plans to heavily MIRV its SLBMs -- as many as 576 warheads on six
submarines -- although no time frame is reported. Republican Senators on the Foreign Relations
Committee in the Committee report on New START estimated that the Chinese nuclear force
would grow to 500-1000 weapons in the next decade. In addition to strategic systems, China has
a variety of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Aviation Week reports that China
has announced that its new 4,000-km range ballistic missile will be nuclear capable.
Chinese nuclear doctrine is hidden beneath significant quantities of political propaganda,
most notably a pledge of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. A careful look at the Chinese
wording of China’s “no first use” policy reveals that it commits them to nothing. The Pentagon
report on the Chinese military states that “there is some ambiguity” over the conditions under
which China’s No First Use policy would apply, “including whether strikes on what China
considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or high altitude bursts would constitute a first
use.” 10 The Kyodo New Agency revealed that it obtained classified Chinese documents which
say that China “will adjust the nuclear threat policy if a nuclear missile-possessing country
carries out a series of air strikes against key strategic targets in our country with absolutely
superior conventional weapons…” 11 Chinese generals also threaten nuclear attacks against the
U.S. if it comes to the aid of Taiwan. China’s Arms Control Ambassador once said that “no first
6 use” does not apply to Taiwan. Chinese nuclear doctrine has evolved toward “active defense,”
which has a nuclear warfighting component.
China prepared for the cessation of high-yield nuclear testing by staging a series of tests
in the 1990s. A declassified June 1994 National Intelligence Daily article said that China was
developing new nuclear weapons that “may use more advanced concepts such as aspherical
primaries and possibly a type of IHE [Insensitive High Explosive].” 12 Xue Bencheng, one of the
most important scientists involved in the development of China’s neutron bomb, stated that the
July 1996 Chinese nuclear test was “a great spanning leap” because it solved the problem of
nuclear weapons miniaturization. China’s nuclear weapons technology has been augmented by
large scale espionage against the United States. It includes fairly advanced thermonuclear
warheads, enhanced radiation weapons, and other tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear
artillery and antiship weapons. 13
The House Intelligence Committee concluded that after the declared end of Chinese
nuclear testing, “nuclear tests related to development of the PRC’s next generation of
thermonuclear warheads may be continuing at the PRC test site at Lop Non Nor.” 14 In May
2006, Chinese Defense Today also reported possible “low yield nuclear tests” after the declared
end of testing.
While the number of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons differ greatly, there is
substantial similarity between Russian and Chinese nuclear strategy. However, there is little
similarity with U.S. nuclear strategy. Both China and Russia are improving their nuclear strike
capability and both of them are willing to use nuclear weapons first. In February 2007, thenDefense Minister, Sergei Ivanov flippantly told the Duma that, “As regard to use of nuclear
weapons in case of aggression, of course [it will use them in this case]. What else were they
7 built for?” 15 Russian commentator Alexander Golts points out that to the Russian leadership, “It
is fundamentally important that the partners would believe that the occupants of the Kremlin are
a tad insane and that they are ready to push the button.” 16 The core of Chinese strategy is even
worse because it is linked to Mao’s far more extreme views about acceptability of hundreds of
millions of dead. In 2005, Chinese Major General Zhu Chenghu threatened nuclear first use
against the United States in which, “We Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all
of the cities east of Xian….Of course, the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of
cities will be destroyed by the Chinese.” 17 No Western political or military leaders talk like this.
Will they act on such a basis in a crisis? I can’t get into their heads and neither can anyone else.
The current U.S. “modernization” plan involves essentially no significant nuclear
modernization for almost the next twenty years. Even if we remain at New START levels,
without modernization for 20 years, our deterrent and extended deterrence capability will decline
as our TRIAD ages. Worse still, senior leaders of the Obama administration are talking about
unilateral reductions in our nuclear weapons and eliminating a leg of the TRIAD. Yet, each
element of the TRIAD has different attributes which maximizes deterrence. ICBMs are the most
secure, alert (99%) and responsive, bombers the most flexible and missile submarines the most
survivable. Elimination of the ICBMs would reduce the number of U.S. nuclear targets for the
Chinese from 455 to 5. Without testing, the reliability of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons
may decline while Russia and China are apparently benefiting from hydronuclear testing.
With regard to Russia, there are a disturbing number of potential attack options where we
have no proportionate response capability due to the precision low yield and tactical nuclear
weapons asymmetry. In addition, the U.S. now has one of the weakest declaratory policies in the
world concerning deterrence of chemical and biological weapons attack which may in the long
8 run precipitate a proliferation cascade. There are safer national security strategies that the U.S.
could pursue.
1
“New New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” U.S. Department of State, June 1, 2011, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/164722.htm>. 2
Vladimir Zinovyevich Dvorkin, “Prague Treaty: Plus Times Minus Equals Plus: START Ratification Is to Russia’s Benefit,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, July 30, 2010. Translated by Open Source Center Doc: ID: CEP20100730358003. 3
Obama Advisor Gary Samore: “The Ball is Very Much In Tehran’s Court,” Radio Free Europe, April 14, 2011, available at: <http://www.rferl.org/content/interview_samore_russia_iran_us_policy/3557326. html>. 4
Ilya Kramnik, “The Iskander: a story of a new face‐off,” Ria Novosti, November 19, 2008, available at: <http:// en.rian.ru/analysis/20081110/118218596.html>.: Mikhail Barabanov, “Iskander the Great,” militaryphotos.net, June 6, 2001, available at: <http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?197506‐Russian‐Armed‐
Forces‐News‐amp‐Discussion‐thread/page29>. 5
“Interview with Colonel‐General Vladimir Nikolayevich Verkhovtsev, chief of RF Defense Ministry 12th Main Directorate, by Vitaliy Denisov, Krasnaya Zvezda,” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, September 4, 2009. Translated by Open Source Center Doc. ID: CEP20090905351001. 6
Ibid. p. 4. 7
Marcel de Haas, “Russia’s Military Doctrine Development (2000‐10),” in Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine, Stephen J. Blank ed., Carlisle Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2011, p. 48, available at: <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>. 8
“Russia may face large‐scale military attack, says Strategic Missile Troops chief,” Moscow ITAR‐TASS, December 2009. Transcribed by Open Source Center Doc. ID: CEP20091216950151. 9
Argumenty Nedeli and Yaroslav Vyatkin, “Imperceptible Nuclear War,” Moscow Argumenty Nedeli Online, November 10, 2010. Translated by Open Source Center Doc. ID. CEP20101112358002. 10
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 201, Washington D.C. U.S. Department of Defense, 2011, p. 34 11
“Chinese Military Yes Preemptive Nuclear Attack in Event of Crisis,” Kyodo News Agency, January 5, 2011, available at: <http://www.profesionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=31796>. 12
“China Nuclear Testing: Racing Against a Comprehensive Test Ban,” Joint Intelligence Memorandum, September 30, 1994, available at: <http://www.gwu.edu/ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB200/19940930.pdf>. 13
“Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China,” available at:<http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851‐html/ch2bod.html# anchor4309987>. 9 14
Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Volume I (unclassified), May 1999, pp. 69‐76 and 241. 15
“Russia Reserves Right to Preemptive Strikes,” Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Nosostey, February 7, 2007. Transcribed by Open Source Center Doc. ID: CEP200707950213.op. cit. 16
Aleksandr Golts, “Preemptive Madness,” Moscow Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, October 15. 2009. Translated by Open Source Center Doc. ID: CEP20091016358007. 17
Jonathan Watts ,”Chinese general warns of nuclear risk to US,” The Guardian, July 15, 2005, available at: <http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jul/16/china.jonathanwatts>. 10 Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces -- “Nuclear
Weapons Modernization in Russia and China: Understanding Impacts to the United
States,” October 14, 2011
Questions Regarding China’s Future Strategic Nuclear Capabilities
By Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center
Chairman Turner and Distinguished Members of this Committee:
It is a privilege to provide testimony to guide this Committee’s deliberations on one of the most
vexing challenges to the security of the United States: how to assess the future strategic nuclear
capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
and how to plan for U.S. strategic capabilities that will ensure deterrence of PRC nuclear
aggression and coercion against the United States, its allies and its friends. I would suggest to
this Committee that even considering the current dire budgetary environment, this is one
challenge that allows for no margin of error in the American response. After two decades of
massive military investments the PRC leadership may be entering a phase where its assessment
of an American relative decline could embolden new levels of aggression, perhaps against
Taiwan, against the U.S. strategic position in Asia, or in support of its gathering network of
client dictatorships – or all three of these.
Nuclear missile force modernization and growth in the PLA’s Second Artillery and PLA Navy
are occurring at the same time that the PLA is developing ballistic missile defense (BMD) and
space warfare capabilities, which hold the potential in the next decade to undermine the
credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrent forces. In this current decade, the growth of the PLA’s
medium range nuclear and non-nuclear missile forces, plus the PLA’s rapidly expanding
conventional air, naval and Special Forces strike capabilities, will place an increasing burden on
U.S. nuclear and conventional deterrent capabilities. It is also necessary to consider the potential
for Russia to join China in nuclear coercion strategies directed against the United States.
Furthermore, the United States could face new direct or indirect nuclear threats abetted by
China’s proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to North Korea, Pakistan and Iran. China
and its nuclear proxies have no interest in a “world without nuclear weapons” and deterring the
range of nuclear and missile threats they can generate will not be accomplished by an aging U.S.
strategic force of fewer weapons and fewer types of weapons.
Mr. Chairman, while it is most commendable that this Committee address these issues from an
open source perspective, it must be stated that these sources are largely insufficient to assemble
definitive conclusions about the PRC’s strategic nuclear force posture, modernization or the
strategies underlying their growth. It is understood that similar constraints inhibit the intelligence
community’s assessments on the subject as well. It is the policy of PRC government to deny
essential information about its nuclear strategic forces to all outsiders; it refuses to provide basic
government documents describing its nuclear forces or their modernization plans, and it also
refuses to engage in substantive discussions on its strategic nuclear intentions with the U.S.
government. Chinese government White Papers on National Defense provide only a minimum
understanding of PRC nuclear weapons policies and strategies. There is a much larger body of
“grey” data ranging from cryptic comments by Chinese officials, papers by or interviews of
1 unofficial Chinese academics on policy and technical matters, to a growing body of actual
imagery of strategic systems. This deficit of official open source data from the PLA means that
questions will dominate this testimony.
This aversion to transparency by the PLA is not limited to nuclear issues, but applies broadly and
is a key component of a centuries old Chinese strategic culture that prizes deception. It is in this
light that one should view China’s declared or described nuclear policies. Its oft-declared “No
First Use” policy for nuclear weapons should be compared to a large body military literature
favoring strategies of “preemption.” China’s at times vociferous diplomatic campaigns against
missile defenses and space warfare since the 1980s have not included admissions that China has
been developing both capabilities since the early 1990s. It is therefore reasonable to question
whether the PLA will always pursue what has been described as a “minimum deterrent” strategy
of a relatively small nuclear force. As the PLA seeks to fulfill new “Historic Missions” dictated
by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership to defend its international interests, by building
global power projection naval, air and airmobile army forces, why should the PLA maintain only
a “minimum” strategic nuclear force?
All of this serves to heighten the importance of declassified U.S. government assessments in
aiding the U.S. and international public understanding of the PLA’s strategic nuclear intentions.
Congressionally mandated annual Department of Defense reports on the PLA have become the
most credible source of facts about the PLA offered by any government, which is why the PRC
government regularly demands a halt to their publication. But these reports could do a far better
job of warning the Congress and the nation regarding developments in China’s nuclear and
conventional military capabilities. With due consideration for source protection, I would suggest
that this Committee to consider mandating that this report describe in far greater detail the
development of the PLA’s strategic nuclear capabilities. Denial of information only serves to
diminish the strength of a public discussion vital to the security of this nation.
The following are responses to issues of concern listed by this Committee as they pertain to the
future strategic capabilities of the People’s Republic of China:
Committee Concern One: The status and future direction of programs and activities in the
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to modernize, update, or
modify their nuclear weapons arsenals.
In general it can be assessed that the PLA has reached a technology threshold that will allow it to
begin to deploy greater numbers of long range ICBMs and SLBMs if it so choses, and to equip
its long range missile with multiple warheads. When this happens, annual growth in PLA
nuclear warheads could transition from double digits to triple digits. Regional IRBM/MRBM
forces of nuclear and non-nuclear DF-21A/B/C/D reportedly will be joined by a new 4,000km
missile family by 2015. The PLA’s arsenal of 1,500+ km range land attack cruise missiles could
be joined by similarly ranged air launched and sea launched cruise missiles. By later this decade
or early in the next decade this larger land and sea based missile force could be protected by a
growing ballistic missile defense (BMD) system and enhanced by multiple PLA space warfare
systems. It is also necessary to consider the impact on China’s strategic nuclear position of both
direct and indirect nuclear threats that could emerge from client states aided by China’s
2 proliferation of nuclear and missile technology, as it is necessary to consider the potential for
China to enlist Russian “support” in potential nuclear coercion activities against the United
States.
This section will first examine PLA missiles by broad categories: intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intermediate range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs), medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and ground launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs). Principle sources for data and numbers include Jane’s Strategic Weapon
Systems, the Department of Defense China Military Power Reports (CMP Report) and annual
Military Balance reports of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London. From 2005
to 2009 the CMP Report provided a breakdown in PLA missiles by individual missile system
and provided a range of estimates for missile numbers and launcher numbers. However, in 2011
the CMP Report did not list PLA missiles by individual type, but instead reported numbers in
less specific (and less useful) broad categories.
ICBMs and SLBMs
Estimated Growth in PLA ICBMs and SLBMs: DoD vs IISS (1)
2006
2008
2009
2010
ICBMs
DF-4 (CSS-3) 5,400km range; 1x 1-3MT warhead
16-24/ 20 15-20/ 20
10-15/ 10
NA/ 10
DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) 13,000km range; 1x warhead
20/ 20
20/ 20
20/ 20
NA/ 20
DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 3 ?) 13,000km range; 5-10 warheads (2)
DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) 7,200+km to 8,000km range: 1x
NA/ 6
<10/ 6
<10/ 12
NA/12
warhead
DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) 11,200+ km range; 1x warhead
NA/NA
<10/ NA
10-15/ 24
NA/24
DF-XX First seen in 2007; undesignated by DoD but
NA/ NA
NA/ NA
NA/NA
suspected of having multiple warheads; estimate 5-10
warheads
36-44/46 <55-60/ 46 <50-70/ 66 50-75/ 66
Total ICBMS
SLBMs (3)
JL-1 (CSS-N-3) 1,770+ km; 1x warhead
10-14/ 12 NA/ 12
NA/ 12
NA/ 12
JL-2 (CSS-NX-5) 7,200+ km to 8,000km range; 1x
NA/ NA
NA/ 24
NA/ 24
NA/ 24
warhead
10-14/ 12 NA/ 36
NA/ 36
NA/ 36
Total SLBMs
Sources: Department of Defense CMP Reports for 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011; International Institute for Strategic
Studies Military Balance for the same years. Reporting year represents assessment of previous calendar year.
1. DoD numbers in Roman type, IISS numbers in bold italics.
2. Reported MIRV variant, existence not confirmed by CMP Report or IISS reporting.
3. It is not clear that JL-1 and JL-2 have reached deployed status.
The above chart attempts to convey an estimate in the growth in the PLA’s ICBM and SLBM
force for the most recent 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), as offered by annual Department of
Defense China Military Power reports and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It
suggests that overall number growth ranges from a possible low of 36 missiles in 2006 to a
potential high of 75 by 2010. While these numbers are only illustrative, they should prompt
questions regarding the potential rate of growth in PLA ICBMs and SLBMs. This chart also
illustrates a transition from liquid-fueled ICBMs, which may remain in service for some time, to
3 a larger number of newer solid fueled missiles that are mobile and could in the future feature
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads.
DF-4 (CSS-3) Developed in the 1960s but not deployed until about 1980, the two-stage liquid
fueled, single warhead DF-4 also formed the basis for the Long March-1 family of space launch
vehicles (SLVs). At the height of its service about 25 were reported deployed, though numbers
are said to have fallen to about 10. The DF-4 is likely stored in cave bases, which raises
questions about its true number. Its longevity has likely been aided by the continued production
of the Long March-1 SLV and it stands to reason that inasmuch as its range has been increased
from early estimates of 4,750km (Jane’s Strategic Weapons) to 5,300+km (DoD), this missile
has also benefited from engine, reliability and guidance improvements developed for the Long
March-1. However, the DF-4 represents a vulnerable first generation ICBM that requires open
erection and lengthy refueling before launch.
DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) Reported to have entered service in 1981, in 2002 DoD reported that the
DF-5 would be replaced by the improved DF-5A by “mid-decade” or about 2005. The count of
“20” DF-5A ICBMs has been consistently reported by DoD and the IISS, which also notes there
are three brigades of this ICBM in the Second Artillery. The improved liquid-fueled DF-5A has
a reported range of 13,000km which would allow it to reach all of the continental United States.
These missiles are reportedly kept in concealed silos though evidence of cave storage should
raise questions about the ultimate number of these ICBMs. Jane’s Strategic Weapons has
reported on the possibility of some DF-5A ICBMs being armed with 4-6 MIRV warheads while
Asian military sources have mentioned to this analyst in 2010 that a MIRV warhead version may
be called the “DF-5B.” The 2011 CMP Report notes that by 2015 the PLA will have “enhanced
CSS-4s.” Could this mean with MIRV warheads? Inasmuch as the PLA has shown a penchant
for sharing warhead technology between different types of missiles, the development of MIRV
warheads for a future ICBM raises the potential for older DF-5 ICBMs to be fitted with MIRVs.
While there has been a tendency to expect that the DF-5A will be succeeded by new mobile solid
fueled ICBMs, the DF-5A may persist in service for some time as it can benefit from the ongoing
production line for and improvements developed for its derivative Long March-2 and Long
March-3 SLVs.
This 2006 image of what
appear to be DF-5 ICBMs
on horizontal carriages in a
storage cave should raise
questions about the
ultimate number of these
ICBMs. Source: FYJS
Web Page
4 DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) While its development reportedly extends back to the 1970s and it may
be derived from early efforts to develop the JL-2 SLBM, the sold-fueled and road mobile DF-31
reportedly was not tested successfully until 1995 and was not considered operational until 1999,
when it appeared publicly for the first time in the October 1 military parade that marked the 50th
Anniversary of the CCP regime. This parade featured three DF-31 ICBMs and by 2010 IISS
would report that 12 DF-31s or one brigade had been deployed, whereas up to 2010 DoD would
report this number as “<10.” Reported to be a three stage solid fuel missile with a single
warhead and a 7,200+km to 8,000km range, the DF-31 is carried in a smooth featured coldlaunch tube towed by a Hanyang HY 4301 truck. As such, it likely requires a network of paved
roads so as to avoid causing fatal cracks in its solid rocket motor. While a considerable technical
achievement for the PLA, the likelihood of there being only one DF-31 brigade suggests the PLA
was interested in moving quickly to larger ICBMs.
DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) Reports of a longer range solid-fueled ICBM at first referred to a new
missile called the “DF-41,” which according to reports was being assisted by Russia during the
1990s with PLA access to technology from the RS12M Topol (SS-25) road mobile solid-fuel
ICBM. Again, according to reports this program was not successful, but raises the possibility
that China learned enough to advance the development of a larger and longer range version of
the DF-31. The 2002 CMP Report mentioned that an “extended range” ICBM would be
developed from the DF-31 and by 2008 the CMP Report noted that DF-31A numbers were
“<10.” However, by 2010 the IISS was reporting that DF-31A numbers had grown to 24, or two
brigades. The 2011 CMP Report notes “additional CSS-10 Mod 2s” will appear by 2015. This
ICBM has a range reported as 11,200+km by CMP and as up to 10,000km to 14,000km by
Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems. The DF-31A is transported in a redesigned cold-launch tube
towed by new Hanyang HY 4330 truck, but the concept is the same as with the DF-31. There
has been considerable speculation that there may be MIRV warhead versions of the DF-31A,
with an Asian military source having suggested to this analyst in 2007 that the DF-31A could
carry three to four warheads. However, this has not been verified by U.S. government or other
reporting. In 2009 an image of the DF-31A third stage showed it featured generous maneuvering
thrusters and that there was enough space for multiple warheads or one warhead and multiple
decoys. All of these capabilities would be intended to increase the survivability of the warhead
bus.
The February 2009 issue of
PLA Pictoral included this
image of the third stage of
the DF-31A ICBM. It shows
multiple thrusters on the base
of the stage and the shroud
suggests there is space for
multiple warheads, or for one
warhead and multiple
decoys.
5 DF-XX (CSS-XX ?) In 2007, 2008 and 2009 there was a selective release of images on the
Chinese internet of a new larger road-mobile ICBM that has not yet been designated by Chinese
or U.S. sources. The distinctive feature of this ICBM is that it uses a 16x16 large-wheeled offroad transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) similar to that used by modern Russian road-mobile
ICBMs like the Topol (SS-25) and the Topol-M (SS-27). Despite the availability of imagery, not
until 2010 did the DoD CMP Report offer the comment, “China may also be developing a new
road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targeted re-entry
vehicles (MIRV).” It would appear that the near-term deployment of a much larger off-road
mobile and MIRV equipped ICBM would have justified a greater degree of public concern by
the Department of Defense, inasmuch as this ICBM has the potential to make annual growth in
deployed PLA nuclear warheads increase from double-digits to triple-digits. In mid-2010 an
Asian military source suggested to this analyst that this ICBM could carry five to ten warheads.
This would hold the potential for one brigade of 12x ICBMs to deploy 60 to 120 warheads. With
four or eight brigades of this ICBM the PLA conceivably may be able to deploy enough
warheads to threaten the 450 U.S. single-warhead Minuteman-III ICBMs deployed in stationary
silos in North Dakota and Montana. As such, it would appear justified for this Committee to
seek a greater degree of clarity from the Department of Defense on the status of this program and
its threat potential.
These images from 2008 (top) and 2009
show a new PLA road-mobile ICBM
similar in concept to modern Russian
road-mobile ICBMs. In 2010 the DoD
may have implied it may be MIRV
capable. Other sources suggest that it is.
The potential for this ICBM to rapidly
increase deployed PLA nuclear warheads
should justify greater clarity from DoD
regarding this program. Source: Chinese
Internet
6 JL-1 and JL-2 SLBMs Following on Mao Zedong’s 1958 decision that China should have
nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), just as United States and the Soviet Union,
what became the 4th Academy of the China Aerospace Corporation led the development of the
first solid-fueled long-range ballistic missile for the PLA, the Julang-1 (Great Wave-1, JL-1)
submarine launched ballistic missile. The first Type 092 (Xia class, US Navy designation) SSBN
was launched in 1981 and the JL-1 was not successfully fired from an underwater platform until
October 1982 and then from the Type 092 in 1988. Only one Type 092 SSBN is the PLA Navy.
It carries 12x 1,700km range JL-1s but its operational status is not clear. While the submarine
has been well photographed and appears in ceremonial displays it is not clear that it undertakes
deterrence patrols, though it could be deployed for combat missions. The 2011 CMP Report
states, “The operational status of China’s single XIA-class ballistic missile submarines
(SSBN)…remains questionable.”
However, the future of the PLA’s sea-based nuclear force rests with the second-generation Type
094 (JIN class) SSBN and its associated JL-2 (CSS-NX-5) SLBM program. Though the IISS
reports that at least two Type 094s have been commissioned, the 2011 CMP Report states, “the
associated JL-2 SLBM has faced a number of problems and will likely continue test flights. The
date when the JIN-class SSBN/JL-2 SLBM combination will be fully operational is uncertain.”
Previous CMP Reports have offered an estimate that the PLA will build up to five Type 094s,
which could result in an eventual force of 60 JL-2 SLBMs. While no U.S. source has indicated
the JL-2 may be equipped with multiple warheads, in 2007 an Asian military source suggested to
this analyst that it may carry three to four warheads. Images of the JL-2 in “pop up” tests show
blunt nose configuration that would be consistent with multiple warheads. But inasmuch as the
PLA Navy is developing a third generation Type 095 nuclear attack submarine, it is possible that
a third generation SSBN, sometimes called Type 096, may also be in development. It should be
expected that such a potential new SSBN will feature an improved capability SLBM, perhaps a
version of the JL-2 or even a new SLBM.
An April 2009 CCTV image (left) shows
a pop up test of the JL-2; note the blunt
nose cone. Below is an early 2009 image
of the Type 094 SSBN at Yalong Bay in
Hainan Island for a ceremonial visit by
CCP Chairman Hu Jintao. Source: CCTV
and Chinese Internet
7 Regional Nuclear and Missile Forces
Estimated Growth in PLA MRBMs and LACMs: DoD vs IISS (1)
2006
2008
2009
MRBMs
DF-3A (CSS-2 Mod ?)
DF-16 (CSS-?) 800km-1,000km range; IOC in 2011?
DF-21 (CSS-5) 1,700+km to 2,150km range; 1x nuclear
warhead
DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2) 2,500km range; 1x nuclear warhead
DF-21C (CSS-5 Mo) Terminal guided land attack, IOC 20052006 ? 2,800km range?; Non-nuclear warhead for now ?
DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod ?) Anti-ship ballistic missile, 2,800km
range ?: IOC 2010 or 2011 ? Non-nuclear warhead for now?
DF-XX New 4,000km range MRBM expected by 2015;
nuclear and non-nuclear armed versions possible
Total MRBMs
2010
14-18/
15-20/ 2
5-10/ 2
NA/2
40-50
NA/ 33
NA/80
NA/80
NA
NA/ 36
NA/36
NA
40-50
60-80/ 33
85-95/
118
75-100/
118
LACMs
DH-10 GLCM 1,500+km to 1,800km range; 1x non-nuclear
100 (2)
150-350
200-500
200-500+
or nuclear warhead
DH-10 ALCM 1,500+km range to 1,800+km rane; 1x nonNA
NA
NA
nuclear or nuclear warhead, IOC in 2011 ?
100 (2)
150-350
200-500
200-500+
Total LACMs
140-150
210-430
285-595
275-600+
Total Regional PLA Missiles
Sources: Department of Defense CMP Reports for 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011; International Institute for Strategic
Studies Military Balance for same years. Reporting year represents assessment of previous calendar year.
1. DoD numbers in Roman type unless otherwise noted; IISS numbers in bold italics.
2. From early 2007 Taiwan press report.
The PLA’s Second Artillery Corp missile force maintains medium range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) that are nuclear and non-nuclear warhead armed, plus land attack cruise missiles
(LACMs) that are non-nuclear armed, but could carry nuclear warheads. In addition the Second
Artillery maintains a growing force of 1,000-1,200 (DoD CMP Report 2011) short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs). The PLA plans to use its regional and short-range missiles in an integrated
manner for strategic strike and tactical support missions, as part of it developing multi-service
Integrated Joint Warfare strategies. This could include coordinated use of both nuclear and nonnuclear armed missiles. The above chart shows a substantial PLA investment in its regional
missiles forces, with U.S. government estimates provided by the annual CMP Reports showing
over the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), the possibility of a near 100 percent increase in
MRBMs and a near 5x increase in LACMs. While it is likely that older DF-21 MRBMs may be
replaced in the coming years, this family could be succeeded by a new 4,000km range family of
missiles, as LACM numbers grow due to their deployment by the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy.
MRBMs
According to open sources the PLA Second Artillery Corp is close to phasing out its 2,800km
range liquid fueled DF-3A, an improved version of the DF-3 that likely entered service in the
late 1980s. This family of MRBMs targeted U.S. military facilities in the Western Pacific and
represented a first-generation system that required lengthy open refueling before launch.
8 Currently the mobile and solid-fueled DF-21 family is the most important MRBM system for the
Second Artillery. IISS reports that there are five brigades of a nuclear warhead armed DF-21
variant, with DoD and IISS estimates of total numbers ranging from 50 to 80. This variant was
displayed prominently in the 1999 CCP parade and started the PLA practice of using a truck to
tow a cold-launch missile tube. It was derived from the JL-1 SLBM. In July 2002 the
Washington Times report noted the DF-21 was tested with multiple decoy warheads while a
February 2003 Yomiuri Shimbun report noted that a DF-21 was tested with multiple warheads in
December 2002. It has not been reported in open sources that the PLA has subsequently
modified some number of its early DF-21 with MIRV warhead.
Then in 2007 internet-source imagery began appearing of a new MRBM similar in size to the
DF-21 but using a new 10x10 wheeled off-road capable TEL. This missile was subsequently
identified as the “DF-21C,” though early images appears to show two potential variants, one with
a sharp pointed missile tube cover and one with a rounded missile tube cover. One of these
variants features a bi-conic maneuverable warhead similar in shape to the warhead stage used by
U.S. MGM-31 Pershing-II terminally-guided MRBM—which is also used by the DF-15B
SRBM. There is a direct relationship. After the Pershing IIs were dismantled as part of the 1988
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty with the former Soviet Union, in the 1990s Chinese agents
were able to obtain detailed information about this missile by purchasing trash from U.S. military
bases that had discarded Pershing-II parts and information. China’s version likely incorporates
more powerful radar and computers to achieve high accuracy. This MRBM allows to PLA to
threaten key components of the U.S. military facilities on Okinawa, as it would also be able to
target entrances to caves in Western Taiwan intended to shield its air force from early PLA
missile strikes. While this DF-21 version likely uses a non-nuclear warhead it is conceivable that
some could be nuclear warhead armed. The rounded tube cover version of this missile suggests
another version that may be equipped with multiple nuclear or non-nuclear warheads or one
warhead and multiple decoys.
These images from 2007 show what appear to be two versions of the “DF-21C” (left) and the DF-15B
SRBM with the terminally-guided warhead believed also used on a version of the DF-21C. Source:
Chinese Internet
9 China has also extended the Pershing-II concept into a terminally-guided anti-ship ballistic
missile (ASBM), currently known by the designator DF-21D. In February 2011 China’s Global
Times reported the DF-21D had a 2,800km range. Instead of dropping down fast on a target like
the DF-21C, it apparently uses maneuvers to both complicate interception and slow down the
warhead so that a combination of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and optical targeting systems in
the warhead stage can better home in on a large ship. This MRBM’s mission, however, depends
on the PLA’s ability to find a target by combining satellite, radar, electronic intelligence
(ELINT) and airborne sensors. The DF-21D is believed initially to be armed with non-nuclear
warheads that could include electro-magnetic pulse or flechettes that would achieve a “mission
kill” rather than sink a ship. However, there is the potential for it to be armed with “kinetic”
warheads that could do far more damage. Recent statements by U.S. Navy officials appear to
indicate that this missile is near to if not already entering service.
There are two other PLA regional missile programs of importance. In March 2011 the Taiwan
Legislature was told by a director of their National Intelligence Bureau that the PLA has started
deploying a new 800km to 1,000km range missile called the “DF-16.” While thought to be
designed to achieve higher speeds to evade Taiwan’s missile defense systems, an 800km range
would allow this missile to attack U.S. military facilities on Okinawa from many points in
China’s Zhejiang Province.
Then, in a rare public Chinese disclosure, on February 18, 2011 the Global Times cited a
“military source” that the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) was
developing “a medium- and long-range conventional missile with a traveling distance of as far as
4,000 kilometers." Furthermore, it could be ready by 2015. While such a new intermediate range
ballistic missile (IRBM) could eventually be nuclear armed, the Global Times appears to indicate
that it may succeed the DF-21D as a longer-range ASBM and non-nuclear precision attack
missile. This would be in response to the U.S. Navy’s plans to deploy long-range unmanned
attack aircraft on aircraft carriers by the early 2020s, which in turn was a response to the DF21D.
LACMs
The PLA has been developing advanced land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) since the 1970s,
devoting significant resources to develop new materials, micro guidance systems and small
efficient engines, while pursuing technology shortcuts by purchasing pieces of the U.S. BGM109 Tomahawk from Iraq and Afghanistan and purchasing Russian/Ukrainian Kh-55 LACM. It
appears that most advanced development and testing was completed during the 10th Five Year
Plan (2001-2005) as by 2006 the first reports of a Second Artillery LACM brigade emerged from
Taiwanese sources, with about 100 reported deployed by 2007. The 2011 DoD CMP Report
offers that the PLA had between “200-500” LACMs by 2010. This potential rapid buildup in
LACM numbers is due largely to their lesser expense compared to MRBMs or SRBMs.
The Second Artillery’s main LACM is called the “DH-10,” and has a range of 1,800km
according to Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems. It likely uses a combination of terrain following
and navigation-satellite based guidance systems and Jane’s notes that it could be armed with
10 either a non-nuclear or a nuclear warhead. Three DH-10 LACMs are carried on a truck-based
TEL which apparently can facilitate rapid reloads of DH-10 containers. The PLA Navy uses
500km to 600km range YJ-62 cruise missile, similar in configuration to the DH-10, as an antiship missile currently launched from the Type 052C destroyer and from land-based truck TELs.
It is expected that an anti-ship or land-attack variant of the DH-10 or YJ-62 could eventually
equip PLA nuclear powered and conventional submarines. Later this decade the PLA should be
expected to develop advanced variants of both cruise missiles, perhaps with greater range,
accuracy and supersonic dash capability.
The DH-10 LACM is now a major strike system for the Second Artillery; seen in the 2009 CCP
Parade (left) and a rare image of the DH-10 missile (right). Source: Chinese Internet
ALCMs and Future Bombers While not a main concern when examining the PLA’s nuclear
modernization, it is important to monitor the PLA’s potential to introduce advanced bomber
systems later this decade. In 2007 internet source imagery appeared of a new variant of the
venerable X’ian Aircraft Corporation (XAC) H-6 bomber, a development of the Soviet Tupolev
Tu-16 bomber that first flew in 1955. This program apparently was a response to Russia’s early
1990s refusal to sell the supersonic Tupolev Tu-22M Backfire bomber, a position that was
reversed early in the last decade, but the PLA had already committed to its less expensive
alternative. The “H-6K” was shown to have new more powerful Russian turbofan engines, a
redesigned nose section with a new radar and optical targeting system and a new four-crew flight
deck. But most significantly the H-6K was shown to be armed with six new air launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs) on wing pylons, with the option that more might be carried in the bomb bays.
By mid-2011 new imagery indicated that XAC may have started production of new H-6K
bombers. In 2007 an Asian military source told this analyst that the PLA could build up to 50 of
these new bombers. With its more powerful and efficient turbofan engines the H-6K likely has a
radius close to 3,000km, which combined with an ALCM with a range close to 2,000km, would
allow approaches to U.S. bases on Guam from several axis.
It would be important also to clarify if the XAC has been developing a new larger stealthy or
supersonic bomber to succeed the long-serving H-6. During activities to mark the 60th
anniversary of the PLA Air Force in 2009 a new China Aviation Museum display featured a
model of a large delta-wing subsonic bomber, which if realized might have intercontinental
11 range. In addition, since the 1980s the PLA has funded extensive research into advanced
supersonic and hypersonic speed technologies. In early 2010 researchers from the prestigious
Institute of Mechanics, a major center for hypersonic research, published a paper outlining a
concept for a Mach-3 speed waverider platform. This could represent a program to develop a
new unmanned platform, or it could also represent a new manned attack aircraft.
An apparent new-production H-6K
bomber seen outside the X’ian Aircraft
Co. factory in May 2011 (top). Source:
Chinese Internet
Advanced bomber concepts could include
new subsonic or supersonic platforms. In
early 2010 researchers from the Institute
of Mechanics published a paper reviewing
their concept for a Mach-3 waverider
concept (bottom), seen in one of the
Institute’s wind tunnels. Source: Journal
of Astronautics
Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD) and Space Warfare
Since the 1980s China has pursued a vigorous diplomatic and propaganda campaign against
space warfare and missile defense, especially U.S. missile defense programs. But historically for
the PLA, ballistic missile defense and space warfare are related pursuits. Mao Zedong ordered
the creation of China’s first BMD program in 1963, which became known as the 640 Program,
which eventually had a subsidiary anti-satellite (ASAT) program. Mao was apparently aware of
early BMD programs in the Soviet Union and the United States and also wanted a “shield” for
his ballistic missile “swords.” While Deng Xiaoping ordered a halt to the 640 Program in 1980,
it had produced one prototype interceptor missile and a large space tracking radar. Most 640
Program development work took place near the city of Korla, capital of the Mongol Autonomous
Prefecture of Xinjiang Province, and today Korla remains a key center for current PLA BMD
research and development.
The PLA’s most recent BMD and space warfare programs likely date to late 1980s following the
1986 establishment under Deng of the “863 Program” for funding intensive basic scientific
research and technology development to aid economic and military modernization. Initial efforts
to pursue space plane programs were justified by their potential military utility. And even
12 though space planes were delayed in favor of what became the Shenzhou space capsule,
practically every Shenzhou mission has been used for a military purposes. This includes
Shenzhou-7’s September 27, 2008 pass to about 45km (according to U.S. Strategic Command)
from the International Space Station, having just launched a micro-satellite, finely illustrating the
“dual use” nature of China’s manned space program: was it an advance for China’s space
technology or a practice “co-orbital” interception for the PLA? Inasmuch as the PLA controls
China’s space program it can be expected that the 60-ton space station expected by 2020, or a
100+ ton space plane expected about the same time, will be “dual use” as well, able to target
U.S. assets in Low Earth Orbit critical to its military activities. In late 2010 the PLA may have
tested a small space plane called Shenlong, similar in size to the U.S. X-37B.
Shenzhou-7’s Sept. 27, 2008 close pass by
the ISS illustrates the “dual use” nature of
China’s space program. China may
launch a reusable space plane by 2020
(right), a program also grounded in
military requirements. The U.S. should
expect that China’s dual use program will
target U.S. space assets that contribute to
America’s strategic nuclear warfighting
capability.
But today PLA counter-space and BMD programs remain related in missile programs producing
ASAT and BMD systems. In contrast to the 640 Program, it was the January 11, 2007
interception of a weather satellite that preceded the January 11, 2007 interception of a missile
warhead launched toward Korla, which now hosts a new missile interception radar. After its
2007 success the PLA ASAT system was designated “SC-19” by U.S. officials. The SC-19 was
likely derived from the KT-1 SLV program, which put two liquid fuel stages on the two solidfuel stages of the DF-21 MRBM. It is possible that a version of the SC-19 may have also been
used for the 2010 warhead interception. However, there are reports that the PLA is developing a
family of dedicated BMD missiles, building on its success in developing 4th generation surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs). In early 2008 an Asian military source indicated to this analyst that the
PLA could deploy a national BMD system by 2025. While there has been no official U.S. or
other assessments that acknowledge this possibility, due to its potential to affect the strategic
nuclear balance between the U.S. and China, such a development should be of great interest to
this Committee.
This image from a missile control room,
apparently showing a computer generated
depiction of a warhead interception,
appeared shortly after the January 11,
2010 warhead interception. Use of such
computer generated simulations is a
common feature of Chinese space launch
control rooms. Source: Chinese Internet
.
13 Major Questions about the PLA’s nuclear and strategic weapons development:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
When will the PLA begin deploying MIRV equipped ICBMs; how many warheads by when?
Will there be a third generation SSBN to follow the Jin-class and will it have a new SLBM?
Will the PLA deploy a new 4,000km range missile family as reported in the Chinese press?
What is the status of the PLA’s next generation bomber program—will it go supersonic?
How quickly will the PLA develop space warfare capabilities that threaten U.S. strategic space systems?
What is the projection for the PLA’s deployment of a national BMD system?
Committee Concern Two: The evolution, current state, and future direction of nuclear
weapons policy and strategy in Russia and the PRC.
"The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in
fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided
by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon" Mao Zedong, Little Red Book, 1946
China’s approach to nuclear weapons, from the earliest kernels of Mao Zedong’s thoughts about
them, have combined the intense desire to possess nuclear capabilities, the desire to achieve this
capability indigenously with the near equal desire to conceal or deceive in regards to ultimate
purpose. This later point is illustrated by the Mao’s famous 1946 bluff—three years before
taking power--that U.S. nuclear bomb was a “paper tiger,” that China’s masses were far more
powerful. But as the biography of Mao by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday (Mao, The Unknown
Story, Alfred A. Knopf, 2005) makes clear, Mao wanted nuclear weapons as soon as he heard of
their use against Hiroshima and devoted enormous energy toward their acquisition, first
imploring Stalin for them, and eventually convincing Khrushchev to begin the technical
assistance that greatly reduced Mao’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles, even though
Khrushchev woke up to Mao’s larger power ambitions and ended this assistance in 1960. For
Mao, achieving this ultimate power was among the highest requirements for preserving and
defending the CCP revolution from foreign threats and then for advancing his ambitions for
Communist world and then world leadership.
Perhaps the main insight to draw from these observations is that Chinese statements or
descriptions that pass for policy or strategy must be treated with appropriate skepticism,
especially in regards to China’s currently unfolding ambitions, first in Greater Asia and then
globally. In short the PRC government would like the world to view China’s nuclear policies
and goals as essentially “limited” to the needs of assuring “adequate retaliation” in the event of
attack, with the assurance it will not seek “nuclear superiority.” Nuclear weapons, in this view,
also are not intended for “offensive” military action. This “limited” posture then serves to justify
PRC calls that the U.S. and Russia “drastically reduce” their nuclear arsenals before Beijing
considers nuclear limitation agreements, and also justifies Beijing’s principled opposition to
“destabilizing” missile defense and space warfare schemes, especially by the United States.
For most of the PRC’s 62 year history such a strategy was made necessary by harsh economic
realities, many created by Mao’s paranoia and megalomania, which made building a large
nuclear arsenal impossible even considering the great economic burden of pursuing a limited
indigenous nuclear weapon, nuclear missile and nuclear missile submarine capability. During
the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and now Hu Jintao, conveying the notion of a
14 “limited” nuclear strategy advances the goal of allaying suspicions in the West and in developed
Asian countries in order to facilitate access to markets and technology. But even though the
1989 Tiananmen Massacre exposed anew the nature of the CCP regime, and even led to arms
embargoes by the United States and Europe, the PRC pursued a gradual nuclear force
modernization as it became far more adept at wielding its economic-political power to advance
its commercial and political goals.
But will a “limited” nuclear posture remain sufficient for the PRC? The Tiananmen uprising
warned the CCP above all others of its thin legitimacy and of the need to defeat internal threats
and then external threats, starting with what it views as an existential threat from the “Chinese”
democracy on Taiwan and preventing the fall of a pro-PRC dictatorship in North Korea. For the
CCP these challenges are directly connected to the larger problem of American strategic power
in East Asia and the further problem of Western dominance of rules, norms and markets that
increasingly affect CCP power at home. After twenty years of intense military investment since
1989, the CCP has put the PLA on a trajectory toward building the world’s second most
powerful power projection navy, amphibious navy, air force and airmobile army force after the
United States—assuming it can continue to afford superior forces. If the CCP leadership values
this level of “conventional” military power, then does it stands to reason that it would value a
much greater level of nuclear missile and associated military space power?
Assured retaliation Regarding specifics of PRC nuclear policy, the 2011 CMP Report states:
“Beijing’s official policy towards the role of nuclear weapons continues to focus on
maintaining a nuclear force structure able to survive an attack, and respond with
sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy. The new generation of
mobile missiles, maneuvering and MIRV warheads, and penetration aids are intended to
ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent…”
In addition to the listed weapon enhancements like MIRV warheads the PLA has constructed a
massive network of underground missiles shelters, perhaps extending to 5,000km. The 2001
CMP Report notes that despite the China penchant for nuclear “secrecy and ambiguity,”
releasing some information about these facilities serves the “credibility of its limited nuclear
arsenal.” The CMP Report does not pose an obvious question: has this vast tunnel network
allowed the PLA to conceal a much greater number of ICBMs, especially DF-4s, DF-5s and DF21s, than the numbers listed in CMP Reports in the last five years?
Furthermore, it is worth monitoring whether this notion of a retaliatory and “limited nuclear
arsenal” could change significantly depending on the number of new MIRV equipped missile the
PLA deploys in the coming decade. Should the U.S. view a potential PLA force of 500 to 1,000
warheads concealed in possible 5,000km long tunnel network as a “limited” capability? What if
in the next decade this force comes to be protected by a national BMD network and an array of
space weapons that can threaten the range of surveillance, deep space surveillance,
communication, navigation and weather satellites essential for the U.S. strategic nuclear
capability? Would this also be viewed as consistent with a “limited” nuclear capability?
15 “No First Use” (NFU) Pledge Since 1964 it has been PRC stated policy, “not be the first to use
nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances." The 2011 CMP Report notes the NFU
pledge has two components: the PRC will “never use nuclear weapons first against any nuclear
weapon state,” and “will never threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state or
nuclear free zone.” Despite some well know “ambiguities,” the CMP Report concludes there is
“no indication that national leaders” have amended the NFU.
Some analysts have noted that the NFU pledge was closer fit to Chinese nuclear strategies during
the early period when China truly had a limited nuclear force. But today the Second Artillery,
and perhaps soon, the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy will have an array of nuclear weapon
systems, and a larger array of long-range precision-attack non-nuclear weapons that could
achieve strategic effects without requiring a nuclear warhead. The PLA soon will not require
nuclear weapons to sufficiently diminish the utility of Kadena Airbase on Okinawa or a U.S.
aircraft carrier, to provide sufficient time to undertake a range of attack or coercive operations
against Taiwan. Will these new weapons increase the PRC’s temptation to use decisive force,
which following a conventional retaliation, could then justify an escalation to some level of
coercive or actual nuclear weapon use?
One of the “ambiguities” in the NFU noted by the 2011 CMP Report is whether the PLA would
use nuclear weapons against what it “considers its own territory,” most likely referring to
Taiwan. A recent example of this ambiguity was in the May 3, 2011 issue of Hong Kong’s proPRC paper Wen Wei Po which had a long article lauding the Second Artillery, with one passage
noting:
“With the focus on defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the SAC
[Second Artillery Corp] has promoted coordinated development of nuclear and
conventional missile troops since the Cold War. It has done this according to the strategic
requirement for combing nuclear and conventional weapons as an efficient deterrence.
The SAC has constantly enhanced its capability for dual deterrence and dual attack. The
corps has made significant contributions in critical periods towards safeguarding national
security, combating separatism, and promoting reunification of the country.”
“Combatting separatism, and promoting reunification” is a longstanding reference to Taiwan,
which raises the prospect that the phrase “dual deterrence and dual attack” could refer to
operational guidance that would anticipate SAC usage of both nuclear armed and non-nuclear
armed missiles in the event of a Taiwan conflict. At a minimum this might imply that the PLA
has integrated the use of nuclear weapons into a Taiwan war plan to a degree that may not be
expected in Taipei or Washington.
Major Questions about PRC Nuclear Policy
1.
2.
3.
What is the role of deception in PRC nuclear policy and strategy?
Are circumstances already gathering when the PRC will change its “limited” nuclear stance?
Should the U.S. assume that the PRC will use nuclear weapons early in a Taiwan campaign?
16 Committee Concern Three: The similarities and differences between U.S. deterrence of
Russia and U.S. deterrence of the PRC, as well as extended deterrence in Europe as
compared to Asia.
Today the United States faces very different challenges in deterring Russia versus deterring the
PRC. Nuclear competition with the former Soviet Union came to be tempered by an arms
control process, albeit a competitive process in the context of larger political struggles, which
nevertheless evolved into a firmer basis for confidence and security, especially following the end
of global military competition that was a result of the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party
dictatorship. Russia has struggled over the last two decades to maintain a “superpower” level of
nuclear and conventional military power and recent nuclear arms reduction agreement between
the U.S. and Russia have been driven to a large degree by Russian financial constraints as much
as any altruistic desire to reduce nuclear arsenals. Russian opposition to U.S. missile defense
plans to help defend Europe against future threats from Iran is at times irrational, but this has not
stopped Russia from investing in its own more advanced missile defense systems. Russia also
appears willing to invest in new space warfare capabilities to match PRC and US capabilities.
As for extended deterrence against Russia, as did the former Soviet Union, Russia today still has
to contend with the independent nuclear deterrents of Britain and France. An historic relaxation
in threat dynamics have allowed the United States to steadily drawn down its conventional
military presence in Europe and it no longer stations tactical nuclear weapons on U.S.Navy
warships. European states also have in some cases drastically reduced their conventional
military forces, which Russia has not exploited as it might have during the Cold War. While
Russia can at times be threatening, especially to the weaker Baltic states and some former
members of the Warsaw Pact, its international behavior is more opportunistic and ideology has
largely been replaced by a still problematic tendency toward criminality.
One potential deterrence challenge that bears monitoring is the potential for Russia and China to
add deeper operational layers to what is currently a largely a declining commercial military
relationship enhanced with what at times are competitive regional “alliances.” The most
prominent of these is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which now sees bi-annual multiservice military exercises which have been especially useful for the PLA to develop power
projection strategies and concepts. These exercises, a still vigorous commercial relationship in
military technology, and likely significant intelligence service and criminal network
relationships, do not yet constitute a full blown alliance. Russian popular anxieties about the
PRC’s growing power in Siberia, Asia and elsewhere are not reflected by Russian elites that
profit from the PRC. It bears watching whether Russia and China could enhance non-kinetic
military cooperation in the event of a Taiwan conflict. It is even prudent to consider that on a
nuclear level that Russia could join the PRC to “tilt” against the United States during a Taiwan
conflict, much as the U.S. and China tilted to deter Soviet nuclear threats against China in 1969.
Deterring the PRC, however, remains at a politically more primitive stage and holds the prospect
for becoming far more difficult in this decade and beyond. As a state hostile to democracy,
especially to the one on Taiwan, the PRC has ambitions to displace the United States as the
strategically dominant state in Asia. The PRC is also building toward a superpower level of
military strength to rival the U.S. globally. PRC hostility toward the U.S. has been less
17 concealed in recent years, even though deep economic interdependence pervades this
relationship. In addition, for over a decade the PRC has waged the most serious and costly
espionage and cyber warfare campaign against the United States.
The PRC has refused to allow the development of useful military confidence with Washington,
which the U.S. did build with Russia to a useful degree after the Cold War. Military-to-military
dialogue is regularly held hostage to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and it has not produced any real
Chinese advocates for better relations with the U.S., much as there are plenty of U.S. officials
who work for better ties with the PLA. Furthermore, the PRC’s refusal to consider nuclear
transparency or “strategic assurance” dialogues suggests it desires a far more powerful military
and strategic position before doing so. According to press reports, in June 2008 Chinese officials
refused to enter into discussions to answer U.S. questions about the size of the PLA nuclear
arsenal, and in January 2011 the PRC Defense Minister Liang Guanglie refused the request of
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to begin a dialogue on nuclear weapons. This followed
the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review in which the Obama Administration made a special case
for pursuing “strategic assurance dialogues” with the PRC.
Nuclear deterrence of the PRC is also made problematic by its history of engaging in “optional
wars.” Even during periods of significant military inferiority, the PRC has repeatedly
demonstrated a willingness to use military force, usually during a period when it was relatively
assured of victory, or at least a small chance of a concerted retaliation. The PRC was also ready
to use force when it perceived the opportunity to change a regional political balance in its favor.
Mao joined Stalin’s war to support Kim Il Sung in North Korea not just to show solidarity and to
teach Washington a lesson, but also because of the promise of a generous Soviet rearmament of
the PRC. Deng Xiaoping attacked Vietnam in 1979s because it was strategically overextended
in Cambodia, would not receive Soviet military support, and most importantly, expected that the
U.S. and Europe would reward him with commerce, technology and weapons. It is worth
considering that the PRC may have decided this past Spring that it could get away with rearming
Libya’s Gaddaffi after learning Washington was not going to lead the European military
coalition forming to take action against him. Such intervention in support of dictators could
become more frequent and effective after the PLA acquires an amphibious projection fleet and a
fleet of C-17 size jet transports.
The PRC’s penchant for strategic opportunism may carry into its next generation of leadership.
In 1979 the now imminent PRC leader Xi Jinping was an “intern” working for his relative, the
Chief of Staff of the PLA Central Military Commission. Xi likely received a unique tutorial in
Chinese stratagems and strategic timing, and then went on to develop a deep understanding of
Taiwan, serving in many positions in Fujian Province in the 1980s. Later this decade, Xi Jinping
will have an increasing level of military superiority on the Taiwan Strait that could be greatly
enhanced by effective use of deception and surprise. Will the PLA have enough strategic and
regional nuclear forces alone to “deter” a U.S. military response to PLA coercive military
operations against Taiwan? Or might a Russian nuclear “tilt” with the PRC against the U.S.
serve to seal Taiwan’s fate, and usher a reordering of power relations in Asia?
Xi may also decide to strike Taiwan if the leadership of the United States is diverted by a
significant disaster, perhaps consisting of multiple nuclear terrorist strikes. The deterrent
18 problem for the United States is that despite nearly 30 years of “discussions,” Washington has
failed to prevent Beijing from playing a major role in abetting the nuclear weapons ambitions of
Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, all of which have relationships with terrorist organizations
capable of undertaking attacks against the United States. In recent years it has been feared that
Taliban forces could capture some of Pakistan’s PRC-assisted nuclear weapons, but with U.S.Pakistan relations in a deep decline, what are the chances that a radicalized Pakistani official or
government might give the Taliban such weapons? In the future, Iran’s PRC-assisted nuclear
weapons could be given to Hezbollah, which today is working with Venezuelan and other antiU.S. forces and networks in Latin America. Should there be strikes against the United States or
its allies and interests by PRC-abetted nuclear weapons, what would be the appropriate U.S.
response toward the PRC? Furthermore, if the U.S. were to lead a multinational operation to
capture Pakistani nuclear weapons, would the PRC attack this force, or even replace any
captured nuclear weapons?
Given the PRC’s potential to engage in hostile acts, against Taiwan, or against U.S. allies like
Japan or the Philippines, putatively to impose maritime territorial claims, plus the danger of a
nuclear armed North Korea, the task of extending nuclear and conventional deterrence to Asian
allies and friends may become more difficult during this decade, not less. The expansion of PLA
regional nuclear and non-nuclear armed ballistic and cruise missiles may soon make a purely
“defensive” response insufficient, such as deeper investments in expensive regional BMD
systems. It may become necessary for the U.S. to consider a reintroduction of tactical nuclear
systems on U.S. ships or a new secure tactical nuclear system for U.S. submarines or a
redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to forward bases, to give the U.S. more flexibility in
deterring Pyongyang. As the PLA’s all around power increases, deterring North Korea may
become a higher priority as an outbreak of conflict on the Korean Peninsula may tempt the PRC
to move against Taiwan.
In addition Washington must consider how it can better remain ahead of the PLA in what is now
a blossoming arms race in Asia. One offensive-defensive cycle already mentioned is how a new
4,000km PLA IRBM may trump the U.S. Navy’s long-range unmanned strike aircraft that were
intended as a response to PLA ASBMs. It may be time to abandon the limits of the INF Treaty
and begin to develop multi-purpose MRBMs that can perform anti-ship, land-attack and anti-air
missions. In addition the U.S. may have to be far more flexible developing deterrent strategy for
space, developing several active weapons to be held in reserve as it pursues better “assured
access” to space and “resilience” in space systems.
Major Questions about Deterrence of the PRC:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Given the PRC’s internal insecurities should the U.S. anticipate a decade of increasing PRC hostility?
Has the PRC decided to forego confidence and transparency with the U.S. in the current period?
Will increasing nuclear and conventional military strength tempt future PRC leaders to attack Taiwan?
How should the U.S. pursue justice with the PRC regarding its possible abetting of a nuclear weapon that is
used in a terrorist attack against the United States?
Committee Concern Four: The impacts of the above on the U.S., including the
effectiveness and credibility of the U.S. deterrent and extended deterrent; programs to
19 modernize the U.S. nuclear stockpile, delivery vehicles, and supporting infrastructure; and
U.S. nuclear strategy, policy, posture and strategic relationships.
While this analyst is not qualified to respond to all of these concerns the following suggestions
are offered to this Committee:
1. At this stage in United States-PRC relations and given the power ambitions of the PRC
leadership, the prospect of any major budget driven U.S. unilateral disarmament could
prove destabilizing to U.S. security and U.S. security interests in Asia. Given the PRC’s
troubling instability and a resulting need for political/military scapegoats, future
“weakness” shown by Washington could result in near-term increases in threats to
Taiwan or other U.S. allies and friends in Asia. Furthermore, at this time, “negotiated
stability” or “parity” in nuclear weapons with the PRC may come at the cost of the U.S.
strategic position in Asia.
2. Given the potential for the PLA to develop a significantly larger strategic and regional
nuclear and non-nuclear missile arsenal, which in the next decade could be defended by a
BMD system and supported by a robust space warfare capability, it is suggested that this
is not a period to be considering any new reductions in the number of U.S. deployed
warheads or in the inventory of stockpiled warheads and warhead components. A
modern, survivable nuclear deterrent force of sufficient size may become a more
important component of America’s ability to deter PRC aggression. This may require
reconsideration of recent reductions in nuclear warhead numbers, the reduction of
Minuteman-III warheads from three to one, and the removal of a secure tactical nuclear
capability from the U.S. Navy.
3. While it remains necessary for the U.S. to expand missile defense development, and to
expand missile defense cooperation with key allies, it may now be necessary to consider
the development of a new family of U.S. MRBMs to deter the PLA’s expanding
capabilities in this area. The assurance that U.S. and allied ships could sink the PLA
Navy with their own ASBMs may be the optimal way to deter the PLA from using its
ASBMs. Nuclear deterrence in Asia can be greatly enhanced by keeping abreast of
conventional deterrent requirements. For example, the 2009 U.S. decision to end F-22 5th
generation fighter production and to refuse to sell this fighter to Japan is proving to have
been a great error given the PLA’s development of one or more 5th generation fighters
with capabilities near to or in excess of the F-22. This decision, and the more recent
decision not to sell Taiwan new F-16 fighters, serves to increase PRC temptations to use
force, which easily could escalate into U.S.-PRC nuclear confrontations.
4. It is decades overdue that the U.S. pursue a multinational strategy to explain the PRC’s
past nuclear and missile proliferation and devise a concerted approach to assign “costs”
for the potential use of PRC-abetted weapons by terrorists. The PRC likely understands
that the U.S. cannot build enough weapons to deter this kind of attack. But the PRC must
see that the U.S. can impose a significant price if the PRC does not seek to reverse its
past nuclear and missile proliferation.
20 Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
An affiliate of Middlebury College
Maintaining Stable Deterrence with Russia and China
Testimony
of
Jeffrey Lewis, Ph.D.
Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Before
the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
October 14, 2011
Testimony of Jeffrey Lewis, Ph.D.
Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program
Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies 1
It is an honor to testify before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces.
No country has used a nuclear weapon in anger since the end of the Second World War. The
United States has a strong and continuing interest in maintaining the norm against nuclear use.
The United States is undoubtedly safer with the end of the Cold War. Today, the principal danger
arising from the nuclear weapons possessed by Russia and China is not a deliberate surprise
attack or a “bolt from the blue.” The most plausible route to nuclear use is now an accident,
unauthorized use or miscalculation in a crisis. It is in the United States’ interest to drive these
risks as low as possible while maintaining its nuclear deterrent.
It is sometimes said that the United States is the only country that is not modernizing its nuclear
arsenal. This is not true. In some cases, vague phrases like “nuclear modernization” conflate the
modernization of bombers, missiles and submarines with the design of new nuclear warheads or
bombs. All the states with nuclear weapons – including the United States – are replacing or
modernizing nuclear delivery vehicles to some extent. 2 The United States triad of strategic forces
– ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy bombers – remains the
most-professional, most-capable and best-funded strategic force.
There are no countries producing “new” nuclear warheads today – although the United States,
Russia and China continue to manufacture nuclear warheads designed and tested before each
signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. 3
•
Russia regularly remanufactures its existing warheads as a stockpile maintenance
precaution.
1
The views expressed in this testimony are those of the witness and not necessarily those of the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies or the Monterey Institute of International Studies or any of their
sponsors.
2
The United States is undertaking extensive life extension programs for the D-5 SLBM and the Minuteman
III ICBM and has completed a life extension program for the Air Launched Cruise Missile.
3
Similarly, the United States in 2007 delivered the first newly manufactured pit, for the W88, since the
closure of the Rocky Flats pit production facility in 1989. The United States currently manufactures about
10 W88 pits per year. The United States also regularly “refurbishes” existing warheads by replacing
components with new ones, either because the new components perform better or because the old
technologies are no longer available.
2
•
China tested new nuclear weapons designs before signing the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty in 1996. China intended these warheads for missiles that are only now being
deployed, and is producing those warheads now.
Like the United States, both Russia and China are conducting “subcritical” experiments at their
former nuclear test sites, to support ongoing stockpile stewardship. Preparations for subcritical
tests, which are not prohibited under the CTBT, are difficult to distinguish from very low-yield
“hydronuclear tests” which are prohibited. 4 Russia and China could not, however, develop new
nuclear weapon designs with yields of greater than a kiloton without conducting tests large
enough to be easily detected by both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization’s
International Monitoring System (IMDS) and the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System
(USAEDS). 5 (A chart showing the purposes of testing at various yields follows the testimony.)
Overall, the United States is the best equipped of the three states for maintaining its stockpile of
nuclear weapons under either the current moratoria on explosive nuclear testing or the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. There is no one in the United States today who would
seriously propose “swapping” the US nuclear stockpile and the triad of delivery vehicles for those
of either Russia or China. There are no foreseeable scenarios under which either country could
initiate the use of nuclear weapons against the United States, our forces abroad or our allies
without suffering overwhelming destruction that would outweigh any possible gain. Deterrence
against deliberate nuclear attack from Russia and China today is extremely strong.
There are, however remote, plausible scenarios that may result in the use of one or more Russian
or Chinese nuclear weapons – non-deliberate scenarios in which Russian or Chinese leaders lose
control of their forces or act on the basis of incorrect information. The most pressing task for the
United States is to ensure that our nuclear forces, policies and postures provide for stable
deterrence during a serious crisis with either country.
Russian leaders, dating to the Soviet-era, have been deeply concerned about their ability to
command their nuclear forces during a crisis and have long feared a “decapitating” first strike by
the United States. These fears, however unreasonable, have outlasted the Cold War. The most
well-known case involved a false alarm in 1995, when Russian officials momentarily mistook the
launch of a sounding rocket from Norway for an American attack. Whether such fears are
reasonable or not, they explain a series of otherwise puzzling Russian behaviors. The Soviet
4
Hydronuclear tests produce small nuclear yields. Such tests would be prohibited under the CTBT, but are
unlikely to be detected by the International Monitoring System (IMS), which comprises 321 seismological,
hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound monitoring stations around the world.
5
Recent experience with the IMS suggests the threshold could be considerably lower than 1 kiloton, See
Raymond Jeanloz, “Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and U.S. Security,” in Reykjavik Revisited:
Steps toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford University Press, October 2007).
3
Union constructed a system, Perimeter (sometimes called “Dead Hand” or described inaccurately
as a “Doomsday Machine”), to ensure that Soviet nuclear forces could still retaliate in the event
that the leadership had been killed. The Russian Federation expressed concern about the
possibility that US missile defense interceptors in Poland might be fitted with nuclear weapons
and used in the same way that a Pershing 2 might have been during the Cold War. Russian
officials insisted that the New START Treaty prohibit parties from placing offensive missiles in
missile defense silos. Although Russian officials do not say so directly, their actions reveal a
continuing worry about their ability to command their nuclear forces in a crisis. Some of the
actions that they may take to ensure their ability to retaliate, like Perimeter, may be deeply
dangerous.
With China, the challenge is somewhat different. Chinese leaders appear to keep their limited
number of nuclear weapons in a state of “no-alert”, with the warheads stored separately. In a
serious crisis, according to some training materials for Chinese officers, they intend to place these
forces on alert to signal their resolve. As new mobile missiles have become available, this may
mean sending road-mobile missiles out into the field and flushing ballistic missile submarines
(which are not yet armed with operational ballistic missiles) into the ocean. It is not clear how an
American President might respond to such a “signal” – especially if the crisis were a serious one.
The recent history of US-China crisis management is not encouraging in this regard.
These challenges require not “more” deterrence, but continued attention from the United States
to ensure that our overwhelming capacity to deter Russia and China is both effective and stable.
I would be pleased to answer any questions.
4
Purposes and Plausible Achievements for Nuclear Testing at Various Yields Yield
Countries of lesser prior nuclear test
experience and/or design
sophistication
(including India and Pakistan)
Countries of greater prior nuclear
test experience and/or design
sophistication
(including Russia and China)
Subcritical testing
(permissible under a CTBT)
• Equation-of-state studies
• High-explosive lens tests for
implosion weapons
• Development and certification of
simple, bulky, relatively
inefficient unboosted fission
weapons
Hydronuclear testing
(yield < 0.1 t TNT, likely to
remain undetected under a
CTBT) • one-point safety tests (with
difficulty)
• one-point safety tests
• validation of design for
unboosted fission weapon with
yield in 10 ton range
Extremely-low-yield testing
(0.1 t < yield <10 t, likely
to remain undetected under
a CTBT)
• one-point safety tests
• validation of design for
unboosted fission weapon with
yield in 100-ton range
• possible overrun range for onepoint safety tests
• Limited improvement of
efficiency and weight of
unboosted fission weapons
compared to 1st generation
weapons not needing testing
• proof tests of compact weapons
with yield up to 1-2 kt (with
difficulty) • proof tests of compact weapons
with yield up to 1-2 kt
• partial development of primaries
for thermonuclear weapons • development of low-yield boosted
fission weapons
• eventual development and full
testing of some primaries and
low-yield thermonuclear weapons
• proof tests of fission weapons
with yield up to 20 kt
• development of low-yield
boosted fission weapons
• eventual development and full
testing of new configurations of
boosted fission weapons and
thermonuclear weapons
• development and full testing of
new configurations of boosted
fission weapons and
thermonuclear weapons
• development and full testing of
new configurations of boosted
fission weapons and
thermonuclear weapons
Very-low-yield testing
(10 t < yield < 1-2 kt,
concealable in some
circumstances under a
CTBT) Low-yield testing
(1-2 kt < yield < 20 kt,
unlikely to be concealable
under a CTBT)
High-yield testing
(yield > 20 kt, not
concealable under a CTBT)
Same as column to the left, plus
• limited insights relevant to
designs for boosted fission
weapons
• development and full testing of
some primaries and low-yield
thermonuclear weapons
• proof tests of fission weapons
with yield up to 20 kt
Adapted from Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Committee on Technical
Issues Related to Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Committee on International
Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, 2002) p.68. 5
James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Jeffrey Lewis, Ph.D.
Jeffrey Lewis is Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey
Institute of International Studies. He was Director of the Nuclear Strategy and
Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation until November of 2010.
Dr. Lewis is the author of Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in
the Nuclear Age (MIT Press, 2007), and is a research scholar at the Center for
International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy
(CISSM) and a contributor to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Dr. Lewis also
founded and maintains the leading blog on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation,
ArmsControlWonk.com.
Before joining the New America Foundation, Dr. Lewis was Executive Director of the
Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Previously, he served as a Research Fellow at the Center for International and Security
Studies at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy (CISSM), Executive
Director of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs, a Visiting
Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and with the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
Dr. Lewis received his Ph.D. in Policy Studies (International Security and Economic
Policy) from the University of Maryland and his B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science
from Augustana College in Rock Island, Ill.
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