REINTERPRETING AFRIKANER NATIONALISM,
c.1850-1900
by
Hermann Giliomee
Introduction
To a r e a l extent the old approach towards nationalism had t o die before the new
i n t e r e s t could be born. I n the eyes of nationalist historians, nationalism was
an organic process i n which ethnic groups were awakened o r aroused t o become a
nation. Nationalism was thus an expression of n a t i o n a l i s t feelings. The explanatory
value of t h i s largely tautological interpretation i s obviously limited. (1) New
approaches t o the phenomenon of nationalism f i r s t l y try t o locate i t within a broad
sociological framework. For Tom Nairn i t i s a response t o uneven c a p i t a l i s t
development (21, Anthony Smith connects i t with the r i s e of the rationalized,
bureaucratic modern s t a t e ( 3 ) , and John Brieully sees nationalism as a form of
p o l i t i c s which t r i e s t o combine the incompatible concerns of modernity and
tradition. (4)
It i s generally accepted t h a t the beginnings of Afrikaner nationalism
must be sought i n the l a s t quarter of the nineteenth century. There is, however,
no agreement on the context i n which i t developed o r the relationship between
Afrikaner nationalism and B r i t i s h imperialism. For Robinson and Gallagher, the
s t i r r i n g s of ltproto-nationalism" i n northern and southern Africa sparked off the
spectacular imperial intervention. (5) Deryck Schreuder, anlaysing B r i t i s h policy
towards southern Africa i n the period 1881 t o 1885, concludes t h a t Afrikaner
nationalism was "perhaps no more than a mirage, a shadow, a spectre". B r i t i s h
fears i n t h i s respect were groundless: "the Afrikaner unity movement w a s
temporary1'. (6) I n a recent reappraisal of the scramble f o r Southern Africa
covering the period 1877 t o 1895, Schreuder changed h i s position. He writes t h a t
it was the strategies of the Imperial Factor i n the i n t e r i o r which had provoked
i n t o vigorous l i f e the new sense of Afrikaner group consciousness. "In particular,
the f e d e r a l i s t policies of the 1870s, culminating i n the Transvaal annexation and
revolt, appear to have pressed Afrikanerdom i n t o a new common bond against B r i t i s h
overrule i n South Africa." (7)
P. A. van Jaarsveldl S The Awakening of Afrikaner
Nationalism, 1868-1881 takes a similar view. His thesis i s t h a t the b i r t h of
Afrikaner national consciousness was a reaction t o the extension of B r i t i s h control
over the Basutoland, the diamond f i e l d s and the Transvaal State. Without this
intervention "the c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of [Afrikaner] national consciousness i s
unthinkablet1. Without B r i t i s h intervention "the Afrikaans-speaking section would
i n a l l probability have been absorbed gradually i n t o the Ehglish stream, and
Afrikaans-Dutch would probably have disappeared, a s had been the case with the
Dutch language i n America. But a f t e r 1881 Afrikaner nationalism became a factor i n
South African politics". (8)
A Model f o r the Primary Phase of Afrikaner Nationalism, c.1869-1915
This model f o r explaining the primary phase of Afrikaner nationalism (9) i s
comprised of the following parts: (a) the c h a n ~ i msituation of the DutchAfrikaners i n the colonial economy, (b) changes i n the p o l i t i c a l and
administrative framework, (c) generational and c l a s s cliff erences i n a colonial
dialectic, and (d) the relationship of local nationalism t o the global
context.
(a)
The chawina s i t u a t i o n of the Dutch-Afrikaners i n the colonial economy
Recent analyses see the "new imperialismll as having s t a r t e d i n the 1870s
and 1880s and as being related t o B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i v e decline, which
prompted a more aggressive search f o r markets i n A s i a and Africa. (10) South
Africa was turned i n t o a growth area f o r B r i t i s h investment and trade a s a r e s u l t
of the mineral revolution following the discovery of diamonds and gold. While the
northern republics languished, the Cape economy expanded rapidly between 1854 and
1874. The value of exports (including diamonds) increased eight times, t h a t of
imports three times, and the revenue f i v e times. Economic growth created new
demands, particularly f o r developing the diamond f i e l d s , constructing railways and
other public works, and waging w a r against Africans. An analysis of the period
1870 t o 1885 shows t h a t keeping up the flow of c r e d i t was vital f o r any Cape
government which wished t o maintain i t s e l f i n power and f o r the fortunes of
landowners, commercial farmers, local businessmen and commercial middlemen and those
active i n the import-export sector. (11)
While farmers struggled to adapt to the quickening of the economic pulse,
the search f o r land and labour became desperate i n the quarter of the nineteenth
century. By the 1870s the land f r o n t i e r had closed i n South Africa. Previously,
subsistence f d n g could be practised on an extensive scale by enlarging the size
of the grazing lands o r trekking further i n t o the i n t e r i o r instead of using an
occupied area more intensively. Now, however, poorer farmers, particularly bywoners,
faced an ever sharper squeeze from t h e i r richer landlands and neighbours, and had
t o move on i n search of whatever limited vrygrond (freeland) remained. (12) The
Orange Free State (13) and Transvaal (14) no longer constituted an escape hatch f o r
t h i s class. Labour w a s the other crucial problem confronting the Dutch-Afrikaner
f d n g class. A l l over South Africa, African labour steadily became concentrated
i n the hands of the richer farmers.
Overlaying these demands f o r more land and labour was the Dutch-Afrikaner
insistence on a native policy t h a t would impose unquestioned white dominance over
Africans. During the 1870s and 1F180s B r i t i s h imperial intervention was instrumental
i n helping t o t i p the balance of power i n South Africa i n favour of the white
colonial societies against the African chiefdoms. (15) Yet, f o r Dutch-Afrikaners,
particularly i n the Cape and Transvaal, t h i s dominance w a s not yet complete. A t
the Cape the Afrikaner Bond and i t s newspaper organ, De Zuid-Afrikaan, demanded t h a t
the Xhosa lands be thrown open f o r colonization and development and t h a t independent
peasantries be pushed out t o create a mass black labour force. Influenced by l a t e Victorian r a c i s t thought, the Zuid-Afrikaan i n the 1880s produced a spate of
e d i t o r i a l s i n which it, f o r the f i r s t time, spoke i n grandiose terms of the mission
of the "Teutonic race" and of the need t o achieve a complete victory f o r the "great
and noble race" over African society. (16)
Opposed t o these demands w a s the Cape l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n which, a s Stanley
Trapido has shown, drew support not only from missionaries, editors and
administrators but also from a merchant class with an i n t e r e s t i n the survival of a
f r e e peasantry. (17) The Zuid-Afrikaan realized t h a t i n some respects there were
incompatible i n t e r e s t s a t stake. In an e d i t o r i a l of 1885 i t wrote: "Do the
farmers who want land and cheap native labour have the same i n t e r e s t a s merchants
who see i n the native consumers? Indeed not
.l1
(18) Yet the Zuid-Afrikaan
..
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advanced the argument t h a t ultimately there was indeed a larger common i n t e r e s t
between the Dutch-Afrikaner farming class and the English commercial and
professional classes.
The Colonial population have, despite that which
disturbs t h e i r unity, a common sense of purpose and
common i n t e r e s t s which can triumph i n the long run
over division. Not only are there i n t h e i r hearts
m a q t i e s which make them i n t o one people (volk) but
the great majority prefers B r i t i s h t o Dutch rule,
and the great majority must r e a l i z e t h a t they ought
t o toe one l i n e i n the struggle f o r existence
against the natives. (19)
U)
It w a s t o t h i s I1people"
t h a t the term Africander o r Afrikander was
applied by leading p o l i t i c i a n s of both Dutch and English descent. Changing
economic conditions have thus l e d t o an expression of volk i d e n t i t y i n terms of
common i n t e r e s t s and ideology rather than of common descent and h i s t o r i c a l
memories. James Rose-Innes, a leading Cape l i b e r a l , acknowledged this when he
observed t h a t he would have considered himself an Africander had he not subscribed
t o different views about the native question. (20) I n the Transvaal, the
apparently irreconcilable clash between burghers and outlanders l e d t o the concept
Africander being defined naxcowly and i n a way which differed sharply from the
Cape definition. I n a F i r s t Volksraad debate of 26 June 1895, F. G. Wolmarans
(ex-chairman of the F i r s t Volksraad) expressed the view t h a t "those reared i n N a t a l
and the Cape Colony were t o be distrusted a s much a s men of other nations
A man
might be an Africander i n name, and by b i r t h but not i n heart and soul". (21) The
Chairman of the Volksraad, Schalk Burger, declared t h a t "the word Africander
should be interpreted a s Transvaaler. Everyone from beyond the borders of the
Republic must be viewed as a stranger, no matter i f he came from the Free State,
the Colony, Ehgland o r Holland, etc." (22) The Jameson Raid and the South African
w a r meant the eclipse of the Cape definition of Africanderhood. Subsequently,
Afrikaner i d e n t i t y would increasingly be couched i n terms of descent and cultural
tradition. However, the goal of gaining effective control over African land and
labour would remain the same. This formed a base upon which the p o l i t i c a l platform
of Afrikaner nationalism would be b u i l t i n the twentieth century.
...
The closing of the f r o n t i e r together with the complete English dominance
of trade, industry and government jobs meant that the economic opportunities f o r
Dutch-Afrikaners were f a s t shrinking by the end of the nineteenth century. Some
found work i n the mines, but on the farms a large and growing c l a s s of poor whites
was developing. ltPoor whites" i s perhaps a misnomer, f o r very often these people
an underclass that, i n
were destitute, i l l i t e r a t e and unable t o find any work
M m ' s terms, was "passively r o t t i n g away". Ignorant and i l l i t e r a t e , they were
equipped only f o r farm work. But i f they entered the service of a farmer f o r wages
a s low a s ten s h i l l i n g s a month they were despised by the blacks and considered
pariahs by t h e i r own peopIe; (23)
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The 'south African w a r showed how f a r the c l a s s cleavages had developed
within Dutch-Afrikaner society. By the end of the w a r more than a f i f t h of the
Afrikaners i n the f i e l d were f i & t i n g at the side of the British. Of the roughly
5,000 "joiners" i n this war, the vast majority had been bijwoners (tenant farmers).
I n an important sense t h e i r treason was a rebellion against c l a s s exploitation. A
recent study c i t e s evidence of seribus pre-wax bijwoner discontent. I n the 1880s
and 1890s they often had t o go on commando against Africans without any recompense
t o defend the property of landholders, while t h e i r own families were destitute.
The Joiners of the Boer W a r c l e a r l y hoped t h a t the B r i t i s h would o f f e r them a b e t t e r
dispensation. (24)
(b) The political context
The political context of the 1850s and 1860s can be described as that of
merely nominal representative government. In the Transvaal and Orange Free State
the predominance of subsistence farming and weak tax base produced factionalism
and largely powerless political centres. Attempts to create a spirit of nationality
were largely the work of outsiders. In the Cape Colony the political centre was
m c h stronger but in Dutch-Afrikaner eyes there existed no real arena for power
contests. Power was effectively in the hands of the British governor and
Parliament was seen as a transient English institution where the conflicting claims
of Cape Town and Grahamstown-Port Elizabeth were being thrashed out. In the rural
areas the impact of government laws and institutions was hardly felt. Fieldcornets still performed a large part of government fhnctions. Merchant capital
was steadily extending its economic control and with it British cultural influence
but it was not necessarily a revolutionary influence. It did not aim at
transforming productive relations and tended to form alliances with or act as
political spokesman for the dominant class in the rural areas. (25) It is in this
context that one must understand the ambivalence of the Zuid-Afrikaan which at
times resigned itself to the gradual assimilation of the Dutch nationality and
language to English and at other times vigorously protested against British
cultural pretensions and called for Dutch-Afrikaner grievances to be redressed.
The expanding Cape economy and growing government revenue,particularly as
a result of the development of the Diamond Fields, dissolved the Dutch-Afrikaner
political apathy of the preceding decades. The politicization of latent ethnic
ties was the result of the need to put a political movement together which could
promote especially f d n g interests, which were under-represented in Parliament.
Why no Anglo-Dutch farmers1 party was formed has not yet been fully investigated.(26),
but it seems important that the Dutch-Afrikaner farmers in the east were relatively
poorer in having switched less successfully to wool farming and that they were not
involved in the Eastern Province separatist movement of the 1860s which had cleft
Cape politics. In societies where class and ethnic ties tend to coincide rather
than cross-cut, it seems almost inevitable that political entrepreneurs who seek to
establish or maintain a following rely on primordial ties to distinguish between
~
~ and
~ "them".
~
t
l(27)
It is in this connection that the so-called discovery of Cape DutchAfrikaners' ties with the republics in the north mst, in the period 1869-1881, be
seen. Citing several statements from Dutch papers, Van Jaarsveld argues that "the
Cape Afrikaners found the road to themselves via the Republic". (28) Yet these
statements expressing indignation about the annexation of Basutoland and the
Diamond Fields were mostly made in the mid-1870s, long after the events. And the
reason why these events were built as a grievance seems less related to any
discovery of an ethnic identity than to the need to mobilize local political support
for entry into Cape politics.
The annexation of the Transvaal and the successful burgher rebellion of
1880-81 were successfully utilized for local political mobilization, especially by
the Afrikaner Bond. Hofheyr, who in 1881 was quick to forgive and extol the British,
took control of the Afrikaner Bond in 1883, which gave him a firm political base.
The proportion of the Dutch-Afrikaner representatives in Parliament increased from
an average of 32 to 36 per cent for the period 1854 to 1884 to just under 50 per
cent in the last sixteen years of the century. From the mid-1880s this bloc
dominated Cape politics. Yet Hofheyr clearly subordinated ethnic or cultural
demands to the material objectives of his supra-ethnic Afrikaanderdom and to Cape
colonial interests. Despite the Bond's predominant position in the Cape Parliament
and despite its commitment to promote the unity of all Afrikaners, it did not help
to ease the financial plight of the republics by getting the Cape government to
pay out their share of the custom duties or to enter into a customs agreement with
them as proposed by both Kruger and Brand. (29)
The advent of Responsible Government also put the amendment of the Cape
constitution on the agenda. Andre du Toit recently traced the evolution i n the
p o l i t i c a l thinking of the Dutch-Afrikaners since the 1850s when t h e i r spokesmen
accepted the low non-racial franchise. (30) I n the f i r s t stage the popular
franchise was supported a s something essential f o r the attainment of the goal of
representative self-government t o replace colonial "despotism". Two arguments were
advanced f o r having equal and shared voting r i g h t s i n a plural society. The f i r s t
was t h a t i t may serve t o counteract what the Zuid-Afrikaan called "the f i c t i t i o u s
inequality of wealth". A low franchise would favour the Dutch-Afrikaners and would
prevent the wealthy from looking "with contempt on the poor, because he depends on
him f o r t h a t which wealth alone cannot providet7. (31) The second argument was t h a t
non-racial popular representative i n s t i t u t i o n s would serve a s a necessary safety valve,
which w a s considered more important than asserting social and ethnic prejudices.
From the mid-18609, however, disillusionment with the low franchise and
the constitution gained the upper hand. The Zuid-Afrikaan no longer believed t h a t
the constitution would counteract economic inequalities. Furthermore, non-white
electoral support f o r English "merchants and traders" gave r i s e t o expressions of
anti-democratic sentiments, strong r a c i a l prejudices and an insistence t h a t the
constitution be changed. (32) Self-government from now on became an exclusive
It basically related t o whites
notion discussed i n terms of Afrikaanderism.
but the Cape Coloureds were not quite excluded, and the Zuid-Afrikaan at times
found it necessary t o point out t h a t the demands of Afrikaanderism concerning the
Dutch language would benefit the Dutch-speaking Coloureds too. (33) Afrikaanderism,
a s enunciated by Hofmeyr and h i s organ, the Zuid Afrikaan, w a s concerned with
limiting African representation, which increased sharply i n 1884 when the Cape
annexed the greater p a r t of the Transkei t e r r i t o r i e s . The b i g constitutional
question, according t o the Zuid-Afrikaan i n 1889, was t o weld the Dutch-Afrikaners
and the B r i t i s h fellow-colonists i n t o an Afrikaner nation and t o incorporate the
Africans i n t o colonial s o c i e t y but t o exclude them from t h a t nation. (34) The
constitutional amendments of 1887 and 1892-3 sharply reduced the African share of
the t o t a l poll. It considerably curtailed the Bond's h o s t i l i t y t o the non-white
franchise. With the help of the Cape l i b e r a l s i t succeeded, i n 1898, i n a t t r a c t i n g
a considerable number of African votes. By the turn of the century, Trapido
concludes, non-white representation was becoming part of the p o l i t i c a l culture of
the Cape, accepted by both p a r t i e s a s a necessary safety valve allowing f o r the
controlled release of p o l i t i c a l energies.
To an important extent the absence of p a r t i e s i n the republics (neither
the Progressives i n the Transvaal nor the Afrikaner Bond i n the Free S t a t e can be
viewed a s parties i n the modern sense of the word) shaped the populist s t y l e of
p o l i t i c s i n the two republics. Through memorials, opposition w a s whipped up
i p foreign merchants had on the
against the construction of railwa~rs, the
economy, the w w t h of English i n schools cromoted by wealthy farmers), and
the lack of government sympathy f o r popular demands. Several well supported
memorials also requested the unification of the two republics. However, there were
no paxties which could turn these populist demands i n t o a p o l i t i c a l strategy.
Memorials often involved Afrikaner nationality i n support of l o c a l demands, but the
effect was t o prop up l o c a l nationalisms rather than a sustained pan-Afrikaner
movement.
(c)
Changes i n p o l i t i c a l generations
I n the period 1850 t o l9lO distinctions appeared among three different
generations within the broad framework of ethnic p o l i t i c s . The f i r s t generation,
of which Hofmeyr, Brand and Burgers were the main representatives, can be seen as
l i b e r a l modernizers trying t o reconcile traditional Dutch-Afrikaner society t o
B r i t i s h imperialism. The second generation, represented by S. J. du Toit, Ihwger
and F. W. Reite, rebelled against the way i n which the f i r s t generation allowed
traditional society t o be undermined. It sought t o conserve traditional society
while pursuing modernization on t h e i r own rather than B r i t i s h terms. The third
generation of Hertzog and Smuts (before 1907) were secular nationalists who sought
t o achieve a synthesis between conserving traditional society and responding t o the
demands of c a p i t a l i s t development i n a modern s t a t e .
I n pushing the claims of the Dutch language, Hof'meyr did not work with
the concept of any absolute r i g h t s o r see Dutch as embodying the s p i r i t of the
people. Dutch was simply a tool by which a unilingual, culturally backward people
could be induced t o improve t h e i r l i t e r a c y , reading habits and general background.
Ultimately the goal was t o put together a p o l i t i c a l constituency i n which the
Dutch-Afrikaner population, i n a vague sense, could claim p a r i t y with Englishspeakers and be reconciled t o both the English-speaking colonists and the B r i t i s h
empire. Once reconciliation and a "sane feeling of nationality" had been achieved
i t would matter l i t t l e i f Dutch as a language disappeared.
I n the l a t e 1870s Hofmeyr's approach was challenged by a new generation
headed by S. J. du Toit and expressing i t s e l f i n Diepatriot. A new stratum of
teachers and clergy, w h a t Seton-Watson c a l l s the language manipulators, whose
livelihood depended on mastery of a language (36), sensed t h a t the f i g h t f o r Dutch
was a losing struggle because i t had become a s much a foreign language as English
f o r the great majority of Dutch-Afrikaners.
To counter the headway English w a s
making i n schools and among IBC members, the spoken language of Afrikaans had t o
be elevated t o a national language, a close connection had t o be established
between language and nationality, an& a distinctive Afrikaner outlook had t o be
cultivated. Moreover, the secularist trend of the education ordinances of 1839 and
1865 had t o be reversed and the Churchos influence over the minds of the young had
t o be restored b securing the principle of confessional religious instruction i n
the schools. (377 Du Toit also wanted t o build a coalition on a base different from
Hofmeyrqs. Hofmeyr cleazly had a coalition between the Afrikaner landholders and
well-disposed English colonists i n mind
he once said t h a t he would r a t h e r have
f i v e English colonists join the Bond than a hundred Dutch-Af'rikaners. (38) Du.Toi-l;, on
the other hand, had i n m i n d the mobilization of all "nationally inclined1'
Afrikaners, including lower c l a s s Afrikaners. The upper c l a s s scorned Du Toit's
strategy and his championing of Afrikaans. Du Toit's P a t r i o t was denounced i n the
Zuid-Afrikaan with the words: '!Brandy and the P a t r i o t have this i n common t h a t
they are enemies of civilisation." I n the Orange Free State a correspondent of the
Friend reported that, as news, the P a t r i o t was "not only read by the lowly
bijwoners amongst u s but by c i v i l i z e d people a s well". (39) Clearly seeing .
Du Toit as a threat, Hofmeyr successfully manoeuvred t o get control of the
Afrikaner Bond.
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I n the Free State, Brand was succeeded by Reits, seen by some as the
f i r s t Afrikaans poet. I n reaction t o the growth of English influence under Brand,
Reitz vigorously promoted the Dutch culture and republican independence. I n the
Transvaal, the rebellion of Kruger against the Burgers government did not so much
represent the advent of a new generation a s a throwback t o t r a d i t i o n a l f r o n t i e r
sooiety. The t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s rejected the modernization of the s t a t e under Burgers
and e s p e c i d l y his introduction of seculax education. Whatever s t a t e education
and they did not want much
had to be based on religion and taught
there w a s
only through the medium of Dutch. The t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s were also uncompromising i n
t h e i r demand f o r a Transvaal-Afrikaner s t a t e , r e s i s t i n g citizenship not only f o r
English outlanders but Cape Dutch-Afrikaners as well.
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(d)
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Local nationalism and the international context
For both treasury and military reasons Great Britain i n the second half
of the nineteenth century created an empire of association i n South Africa r u n by
local c l i e n t s and collaborators. (40) Winning the Cape Dutch-Afrikaners over t o
the r o l e of sub-imperial agents was the touchstone of this policy. It has often
been sugg-ested, both by contemporary p o l i t i c i a n s and by historians, t h a t the
Jameson R d d , together with growing Transvaal economic independence, irrevocably
destroyed this strategy. Quoting Chamberlain, Robinson and Gallagher concluded
t h a t Afrikaner n a t i o n a l i s t s a l l over South Africa were coming together again, a s
they had i n the f i r s t Transvaal w a r of 1881, i n defence of republicanism. The
nationalist reaction had s e t the p o l i t i c s of South Africa against imperial federation
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and i n favour of a republican future. Only d i r e c t intervention could now prevent
South Africa from d r i f t i n g out of the empire and weld i t i n t o a B r i t i s h
dominion. (41)
Leaving aside the issue whether Britain entered the w a r t o restore
traditional B r i t i s h supremacy o r t o construct a modern policy i n South Africa (42),
the question i s whether Afrikaner nationalism stood poised f o r victory a f t e r the
Jameson Raid. Certainly the Raid severely dented the image of B r i t a i n and i t s
local agents, but i t i s remarkable how l i t t l e Hofmeyr, apart from breaking with
Rhodes, changed h i s collaborationist course. I n the p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s preceding
the w a r Hofmeyr and Schreiner put all the pressure on the Transvaal t o make
concessions. (43)
Even the two Afrikaner republics did not rush i n t o each other's m s
a f t e r the Jameson Raid. Between 1889, when a p o l i t i c a l and trade t r e a t y between
the Free State and the Transvaal was signed,and 1895, relations between them
deteriorated. Disweements l e d Reitz of the Free S t a t e t o the conviction t h a t
Kruger w a s deliberately trying t o f r u s t r a t e the ideal of republican unity. After
the Raid, President Steyn of the Free State, i n a l e t t e r of 13 June 1896, proposed
t h a t negotiations be opened about the unification of the two republics. A s the
Free State was t i e d t o the Transvaal by a defensive treaty, Steyn w a s keen t o
acquire a moderating influence over the T r a n s d . To Steyn9s disenchantment
the Transvaal waited more than eight months to respond t o his overtures. A recent
analysis suggests t h a t i t w a s only a f t e r Chamberlain, i n January 1897, attacked
Krugerls handling of the Outlander grievances t h a t Kruger decided t o pursue closer
unity with the Free State. (44) Merriman, i n October 1899, was convinced t h a t i t
was only the unyielding demands of Milner i n the preceding year that converted the
i n t o s t e r n and determined
Free Staters, "our best and firmest friends
foes". (45)
...
Undoubtedly the existence of an increasingly independent Transvaal s t a t e
would, a s Milner feared, promote the growth of Afrikaner nationalism throughout
South Africa. (46) Yet so strong were the conflict of i n t e r e s t s between the s t a t e s
and colonies, the pull of local nationalisms and the divisive e f f e c t of imperialism
and capitalism t h a t i t was only Milner's determination t o crush Afrikanerdom t h a t
produced a measure of pan-Afrikaner unity t h a t never existed before. Britain's
grand i l l u s i o n was not so much restoring imperial supremacy (47); i t w a s
anticipating a full-blown Afrikaner nationalism i n the Raid's aftermath.
Conclusion
Among the colonists of Dutch, German and French descent ethnic sentiments, as
d i s t i n c t from those of c l a s s o r caste, were slow t o develop despite a high degree
of endogamy and shared culture. Even the name Afrikaner went through several
permutations i n the eighteenth and the nineteenth century. T h i s fumbling t o find
and define an ethnic name gives some indication of how d i f f i c u l t i t was t o put a
nationalist movement together. Certainly p o l i t i c a l impulses, such a s the Transvaal
rebellion of 1880-81, produced protests, which suggests t h a t feelings of nationality
Taking a l a r g e r view, one can conclude that p o l i t i c a l and
were present.
economic structures described i n the previous section provided the potential f o r
nationalist mobilization. Yet t o a r e a l extent the development of nationalism had
t o await both w a r and the f u l l e r development of capitalism a s a social as well a s
an economic system. Merchant capitalism could not break the parochial mould of
subsistence farming. Education, a small-scale operation, was l a r g e l y the concern
of the rich, who even i n the republics demanded t h a t p r i o r i t y be given t o
instruction i n English. Only by the 1890s did Dutch-Afrikaner leaders become aware
of the f u l l impact of c a p i t a l i s t development on t h e i r people. The poor-white issue
leaped i n t o prominence i n the Transvaal, the Free State and the Cape. I n the
Transvaal s t a t e , absentee owners held more than half of the land and they were
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making inroads i n the Free State, particularly i n the northern and eastern parts.
It i s significant t h a t i t w a s Steyn, one of the f i r s t n a t i o n a l i s t leaders i n the
modern sense of the word, who issued a d n g t o the Free Statera t h a t t h e i r
sons would i n due course become tenants on t h e i r fathers' land. I n 1898 Steyn
remarked t h a t the struggle of South Africa was not between Dutch and English but
between individualism and capitalism, which w a s robbing the workers of t h e i r
l i v i n g and identity. (48)
The w a r produced a much greater sense of ethnic community than ever
before existed. But as important was the advent a f t e r the wax of a modern,
c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e i n South Africa. (49) Of particular significance was the
introduction of compulsory education f o r whites. I n the race f o r power i n the new
s t a t e no p o l i t i c a l leader could afford t o remain indifferent about the s t a t e of
education and the language of instruction. For controlling the schools and
building a p o l i t i c a l constituency a separate language would be an excellent device.
But t h a t language had t o be vigorous. The hour of the predikanten, the teachers,
the poets and the historians had come.
Notes
(1)
I n his biography of D. F. Malan, the historian H, B. Thom gives t h i s
n a t i o n a l i s t account of the nationalism of his subject. "Ons het h i e r t e doen
met i e t s w a t baie diep 16: i n In mens s e a f s t d n g , i n die diepte van die
gees, van w a a r d i t die rasionele denke be9nvloed en dikwels beslissend daarop
inwerk. S6 w a s d i t ook met dr. Malan. I n die diepte van sy s i e l w a s hy
ware nasionalis."
(H, B. Thom, D. F. Mdan [cape Town, 1980]), p. 11.
(2)
Tom N a i r n , The Break-UP of Britain:
(3)
Anthon;y Smith, Theories of Nationalism
(cambridge, 1981).
(4)
John Brieully, Nationalism and the State (Manchester, 1982).
(5)
Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the
Victorians on don, 1961); R. E. Robinson and J. Gallagher, "The P a r t i t i o n
of Africa" i n F. H. Hinsley (ed), The New Cambridge Modern History (cambridge,
1962) PP. 595-6400
D. M. Schreuder, Gladstone and Kmger: Liberal Government and "Home Rule",
1880-1885 ondo don, 1969), p. 476.
c r i s i s and neo-nationalism
ondo don,
ondo don,
1977).
1971), and The Ethnic Revival
,
(6)
(7)
D.M. Sc'kreuder, The Scramble f o r Southern Africa, 1877-1895:
p a r t i t i o n reawraised (Cambridge, 1980), p. 51.
(8)
F. A. van Jaarsveld, The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1868-1881 (cape
Town, 1961), p. 215.
(9)
I a m indebted t o John Lonsdale of Cambridge University who, i n a lecture,
the p o l i t i c s of
constructed such a model of West African nationalism. He should not be held
accountable f o r my application of the model t o
l a t e nineteenth century
South African history.
(10)
P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, "To p o l i t i c a l economy of B r i t i s h expansion
overseas1', Economic History Review, XXXIII (1980), p. 23.
(11)
This paragraph i s based on Shula Marks, "Scrambling f o r Africa", Journal of
African History, 23 (1982), p. 100, which d r a w s on A. Purkiss, IvThe P o l i t i c s ,
Capital and Labour of Railway Building i n the Cape Colony, 1870-1885" (DPhil
thesis, Oxford, 1978)
.
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(13)
P. J. van der Merwe, Trek (cape Town, 1945), P. 60.
John Noble, The Cape and South Africa (cape Town, 1878), p. 210.
(14)
C. W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor i n South Africa (cambridge,
(12)
1937), p. 184.
(15) A. Atmore and S. Marks, "The Imperial Factor i n South Africa i n the Nineteenth
Century1', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 111, No. 1 (1974),
pp. 105-108.
(16)
See i n t e r alia, Zuid-Afrikaan e d i t o r i a l s i n i s s u e s of 12 February 1882,
See a l s o J. H. Hofmeyr, 2
Life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr (cape Town, 1918), pp. 470-72.
1 4 April 1885, 16 March 1889, 23 March 1889.
(17)
Stanley Trapido, "The Friends of the Natives: merchants, peasants and the
p o l i t i c a l and ideological s t r u c t u r e of liberalism i n t h e Cape, 1854-1910" i n
S. Marks and A. Atmore, Economy & Society i n P r e i n d u s t r i a l S. Africa ondo don,
(18)
Zuid-Afrikaan,
(19)
Ibid.
(20)
James Rose Innes, Autobiomaphy (cape Town, 1949), p. 3.
(21)
C. T. Gordon, The Growth of Boer Opposition t o Kruger, 1890-1895 (cape Town,
19701, P. 10.
(22)
Ibid.
(23)
P h y l l i s Lewsen, John X. Merriman:
Haven, 1982), pp. 156-57.
(24)
Die rasionaal en
A. M. Grundlingh, Die l'Hendsoppers" en "Joiners".
Thomas Pakenham,
verskynsel van verraad ( ~ r e t o r i a ,1979), pp. 232-36;
Boer W a r ondo don, 1979), pp. 566-68.
(25)
Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone (eds), I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and Social Change i n
South Africa in on don, 1982) ; Geof f r e y gay, Development and Underdevelopment:
a Masxist analysis ondo don, 1975), pp. 104-05.
(26)
T. R. H. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond: the h i s t o r y of a South African
p o l i t i c a l party, 1880-1911 (cape Town, 1966), p. 27.
(27)
Aristide R. Zolberg, l ' P o l i t i c a l Conflict i n the New S t a t e s of Tropical Africa",
American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, Vol. 62 (1968), p. 74.
(28)
V'an Jaarsveld, op. c i t . , p. 104.
(29)
(30)
Lewsen, op. c i t . , p. 127.
1 4 April 1885.
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19801, PP 247-274.
l
paradoxical South African statesman ( ~ e w
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Andre du Toit, "Constitutional P o l i t i c s :
paper.
franchise and racef1, unpublished
(31) Zuid-Afrikaan, 6 October 1853.
(32) Ibid., 3 M a y 1866.
(33) Ibid., 4 November 1882.
(34)
Ibid.,
21 February 1889.
(35)
Stanley Trapido, "White Conflict and Non-White P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the P o l i t i c s
of the Cape of Good Hope, 1853-191OW, PhD d i s s e r t a t i o n , University of London,
p. 461.
(36)
Hugh Seton-Watson, "The History of Nations", The Times Higher Education
Supplement, 27 August 1982, p. 13.
(37) Davenport, op. c i t . , p. 32; van Jaarsveld, op. c i t . , pp. 106-13.
(38) Hofmeyr, op. tit., PP.. 43-44, 374.
(39)
Zuid-Afrikaan, 23 April 1879, p. 407; S. F. Malan, P o l i t i e k e Strominge onder
d i e Afrikaners van d i e Vwstaatse Remblick (Durban, 1982), p. 92.
(40)
Schreuder, The Scramble f o r Southern Africa, 1877-1895
(41)
Robinson and Gallagher, w i t h Denny, Africa and the Victorians.
(42)
Atmore and Marks, loc. c i t . ,
pp. 127-132.
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(43) Lewsen, op. cit., pp. 210, 261.
(44) Malan, op. cit., pp. 277-78.
(45) Lewsen, ov. cit., p. 216.
(46) J. S. Masais, The Fall of KrugerPsRepublic (oxford, 1961), p.
(47) Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 461.
330.
(48) W a n , op. cit., pp. 238-39.
(49) For a new evaluation of MilnerfsReconstruction, see Shula Marks and Stmley
Trapido, "Lord Nilner and the South African Statei1,in History Workshop 8,
19799 PP. 50-81.