Gumbo Politics: Unions, Business, and Louisiana Right-to-Work Legislation
Author(s): William Canak and Berkeley Miller
Source: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan., 1990), pp. 258-271
Published by: Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations
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GUMBO POLITICS: UNIONS, BUSINESS,
AND LOUISIANA RIGHT-TO-WORK LEGISLATION
WILJLIAM CANAK and BERKELEY
MILLER*
The authors examine business community involvement in rightto-work(RTW) campaigns in Louisiana during the 1940s, 1950s, and
1970s. They findthatthe entirebusinesscommunitysupported RTW in
the 1940s and 1970s. In the 1950s, some small businesses and major
corporations avoided public involvementdue to fear of retaliationby
unions or the Long governmentof that era, but those same companies
helped initiate and organize the campaigns of the 1940s and 1970s.
RTW campaign successes were linked to interunionconflictand social
conditions that weakened coalitions of unions and their allies. In each
decade, RTW campaigns were influencedby national and international
economic and politicalfactors.
debate in American labor
relations is over the relationship
between differentsectors of the business
communityand unions. Some observers
identityanl historicalaccord between major corporations and unions (Mills 1948;
Bell 1961; Bowles and Gintis 1982).1 They
ACENTRAiL
I~k
WilliamCanak is AssistantProfessorof Sociology
University,and BerkeleyMilleris Assistant
Professor of Sociology at Kansas State University.
The authors thank those who agreed to be interviewed for this sturdy.They also thank Daniel
Cornfield, 'Joel Devine, William Domlioff and
Thomas Ktsaniesforcommentson earlier versionsof
the paper. i his paper was originallypresentedat the
1986 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological
York.
Association,NewX
Company size is a continuous variable and there
are no necessaryclassifications.For purposes of this
paper. however, we distiniguishthree relatively
are those few
distinctcategories. Alajor corporations
thousand firms identified by publications such as
Fortuneand Forbesin the top categories of assets,
sales, or both. These firms typicallyemploy thousands of workers,produce a wide range of goods and
services,and have multi-divisionalstructures,multistate and international operations., and national
may share
union contracts.Large local corporations
many of these characteristicsof major corporations,
but are principallydependent upon production or
*
atTulane
argue that major corporations that once
foughtunions eventuallyaccepted themas
legitimatepartners in production, since
unions reduce uncertaintyand volatilityin
labor relations,clarifymanagementrights,
and encourage workers to police themselves. Local businesses, in contrast,are
characterizedas always anti-unionin.sentimentand activity.
An alternative position suggests that
there never existed an "historicalaccord"
between large corporations and uniolls
(Ratcliff and Jaffe 1981:96; see also
Forbes 1978; von Hoffmian1978; GaC1and
Hoerr 1978; Camneron.1978). Both sniaull
businesses and large corporations always
oppose unions; large corporations may
accept union organization as a p-agmntaC
recognitionof union strengthand political
reality, but are otherwise aggressively
anti-union.
Politicalcampaigns to pass right-to-work
(RTW) laws provide one of the best
services tied to local or state economies. Small
businessesare usuallyfamnily-run,
employ at most a
few hundred workers,and are tied to local markets.
Industrialand LaborRelationsReview,Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1990). '?3by Cornell University.
0019-7939/90/4302$01 00
258
GUMBO POLITICS
opportunitiesto adjudicate between these
two positions. Campaigns to pass RTW
legislation pit the business community
against organized labor in a struggleover
union security.In order to increase membership and dues income, unions seek
contractprovisionsrequiringemployeesto
join the union as a condition of employment. Right-to-work
laws make it illegal to
include such union securityprovisionsin
collectivebargainingagreementsand thereforeare supportedbyemployersto weaken
unions. To paraphrase Ratcliffand Jaffe,
ifmajor corporationsgenuinelyfeelunions
are legitimatepartnersin production,they
should avoid involvementin right-to-work
campaigns even if the labor movement
declines in strength.In contrast,if major
corporations hold "enduring antiunion
attitudes"and recognize unions only out
of pragmaticnecessity,theyshould "strike
out at unions where the prospects of
success seem good and the likelihood of
union retaliation seems slight" (Ratcliff
and Jaffe1981: 100).
Past research has demonstrated that
although the rhetoricof RTW campaigns
in other stateshas focused on the defense
of individual freedom, the campaigns
were initiatedand almost entirelyfunded
by business to reduce union strength
(Kuhlman 1955:455; Meyers 1955:78;
Shott 1956; Witney1958:507-8; Dempsey
1961:19; Miller and Ware 1963:55; Ratcliffand Jaffe 1981:97). The composition
of business support for RTW has changed
over time. Studies of the 1940s and 1950s
conclude thatmajor corporationswere not
active participants. Florida's 1944 campaign was led by two organizationsmainly
representinglocal business,the Associated
Industries of Florida and the Florida
Farm Bureau Federation. In Indiana, the
1957 RTW movement was organized by
small and middle-sized state businesses
and their industry associations and was
backed by the Indiana Farm Bureau.
Major corporationsfailed to participatein
the campaign, claiming they morally opposed right-to-workor that they feared
their public support of RTW would
antagonize unions and create difficulties
at the bargainingtable.
259
Ohio's 1958 RTW movementwas similar to Indiana's; it was backed by the state
Chamber of Commerce, the Ohio Manufacturers'Association,other local business
associations, and virtuallyall the major
newspapers in the state. Major corporations withheldpublic support for the law.
By the time of Missouri's 1978 campaign, however,the patternhad changed.
Major corporations initiated and supported the RTW campaign and were
joined by small and medium-sizedcompanies. National and multinationalcorporations that did refrain from participating
did so to avoid public and union retaliation.
These case studies suggest thatbusiness
has supported RTW, and some major
corporations that abstained from RTW
campaigns in the 1950s mayhave begun to
change their behavior by the 1970s. The
evidence is, however, limited. Because
they examine historicallyspecific RTW
campaigns, the case studies cannot thoroughly evaluate the composition of business support over time.
Louisiana, the subject of our study,
provides a unique opportunityto assess
whether major corporations' support for
RTW changes over time. The state's
legislaturepassed RTW laws in the 1940s,
1950s, and 1970s. A 1946 RTW law was
vetoed, and a 1954 law was repealed in
1956; the 1976 law was the only one
passed by any state between 1963 and
1983. Thus, Louisiana constitutesa critical
case for testing the historical accord
hypothesis,because itallows us to trace the
behavior of specific corporations over
time.
in the 1940s
Right-to-Work
National Opposition to
the Closed Shop
Businessopposed theWagner Act (1935)
because it legalized unionism and outlawed management interferencewith the
rightto organize. Even after the Wagner
Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in
1937, business devised numerous strategies for avoiding compliance. Nationally,
260
INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
thisopposition to unions and to pro-union
legislationwas led by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the National Metal Trades
Association,and the National Association
of Manufacturers(Millis and Brown 1950:
281-91; Tomlins 1985:282).
These leading anti-uniongroups representall thebusinesscommunity'ssegments:
rural and urban, small firms and major
corporations.The National Associationof
Manufacturers(NAM) membershipis composed of thousands of small and large
manufacturingfirms,but in practice it is
funded and controlled by a few major
corporations (Olson 1965:146-47). The
National Metal Trades Associationis similar to the NAM and for years (1918-31)
published the Open Shop Review, which
contained articles extolling management
rights and the "right-to-work"(Bendix
1974:269). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is a federation of local chambers
thatrepresentsmallerand locallyoriented
businesses, but some major corporations
hold individual memberships at the national level (Domhoff 1983).
The NAM and the Chamber of Commerce were supported by two national
organizationswithstrongregional orientations (Beecher 1943; Domhoff 1983). The
American Farm Bureau Federation represents successful commercial farmers and
rural businessmen from all over the
United States. In the 1940s it was concentrated in three cotton belt statesAlabama, Mississippi,and Arkansas-and
in three corn belt states-Illinois, Iowa,
and Indiana (Fortune 1944:159; Moore
1945:85-90; Olson 1965:146-47). In 1946,
the Farm Bureau argued against high
industrial wage rates and "urged the
prohibition of closed shop or union
agreements"(Davies 1946:30).
The Christian American Association
(CAA), headquartered in Houston, was an
hysterical right-winglobbying organization thatbitterlyattacked the labor movement, Jews, Catholics, and any other
liberal-orientedgroups (Riesel 1943; Davenport 1945). By 1945 CAA claimed to
have introduced RTW amendments and
otheranti-unionlegislationin 44 states.In
this effort, it was supported by rural
farmingand business interests,as well as a
few Texas oil men and some major
Eastern industrialists,including the Du
Pont family(Pearson 1944).
These organizations pressed a multilevel anti-union campaign between 1937
and 1947. They were able to coordinate
this multi-levelattack because they were
hierarchically
organizedwithnationalheadquarters,state offices,and local branches.
Nearly every state legislature considered
some form of restrictivelabor legislation;
at least 23 enacted laws regulating the
internal affairs of unions or restricting
strikes, picketing, and union security.
Most of these states were in the South or
Southwest, or the largely agricultural
statesof the Midwestand Far West,where
the Farm Bureau and ChristianAmerican
Associationwere strongest.
The 1942 and 1944
Right-to-WorkCampaigns
In Louisiana's firstRTW campaigns,the
Louisiana ManufacturersAssociation,the
Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation, and
the Christian American Association were
joined by the Southern States Industrial
Council, a regionalassociationof manufacturers,and trade associationsrepresenting
major corporationsand large local companies in Louisiana's chiefindustries-sugar,
oil, and lumber (Marshall 1967; Cook and
Watson 1985; O'Connell 1986; Morel
1986).
As elsewhere in the South, Louisiana's
labor movement was weak and divided.
Although aided by the Wagner Act and
World War II, overall union densitywas
well below the national level. (For unionization rates in the South, see Table 1.)
Membership was concentrated in New
Orleans, Shreveport, and Baton Rouge,
principallyin the building trades, maritime services,lumber,and transportation.
The state'slabor movementwas divided
by the same conflict between AFL and
CIO unions that marked the national
labor movement. The Louisiana Federation of Labor (LFL), often backed by
police and governmentofficials,worked
closely with employersto limitCIO orga-
GUMBO
POLITICS
261
Table 1. Unionization in the South for Selected Years, 1939-1982.a
State
1939
1953
1960
1975
1980
1982
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
16.7
13.4
11.9
7.2
23.5
9.8
6.8
4.4
4.2
15.9
10.9
13.4
25.0
21.9
16.5
15.1
25.3
19.7
15.0
8.4
9.4
22.6
17.4
17.8
17.3
14.3
13.1
11.8
25.0
18.4
11.9
5.3
5.8
18.8
15.1
11.5
23.9
18.4
15.6
14.4
24.6
19.8
12.6
11.0
6.8
21.7
16.0
14.4
18.1
14.5
9.7
13.1
20.7
14.9
9.5
8.8
6.2
17.5
12.9
10.6
18.2
13.2
9.6
12.7
20.4
13.8
9.3
8.9
5.8
17.3
12.5
10.9
United States
21.2
32.5
28.6
28.9
23.2
21.9
Percentage of nonagriculturalwork force.
Source:Troy and Sheflin (1985).
a
nizing (Cook and Watson 1985:224; Morel
1986). Toward the same end, the LFL
followed the national AFL's lead and
cooperated with local business to legislate
restrictionson the mass tacticsfavored by
the CIO. They did so in the name of
'states' rights" and antagonism toward
"outside agitators"(New YorkTimes1946b;
Davis 1980). This cooperation with business and governmentallowed the LFL to
dominate the state's labor movement,but
it did not produce real political power.
Although the labor movement gained a
few high-profileappointments,it did not
exercise veto rightsover anti-unionlegislation.
Despite labor's weakness,the 1942 RTW
campaign failed for two reasons. First,the
active coalition of business groups convinced the stateAFL tojoin forceswiththe
CIO, albeit temporarily (Bussie 1988).
Second, labor found a powerfulally in the
Catholic church. Catholic social action
organizations in Louisiana were strong
supporters of union rights because Leo
XII's encyclical, Rerum Novarum (1891),
committed the Church to uphold the
"dignityof labor." In addition,the catholic
Church and Catholic state legislatorswere
angered by the ChristianAmerican Association's inflammatoryrhetoricand intimidation tactics.When the coalitionof labor
unions, Catholic officials, and Catholic
legislators defeated RTW, the CAA labeled Louisiana the"Red Spot on the Gulf
Coast" and initiated a broad electoral
campaign attacking Louisiana legislators
who had not supported their bills (Marshall 1967:242; Becnel 1980:180-81; Cook
and Watson 1985:252).
At the national level, the continuous
barrage of anti-union legislation in Congress convinced the AFL and CIO that a
cooperativestrategywas necessary.Nevertheless, combined labor opposition could
not prevent Congressional passage of the
1943 Smith-ConnallyAct, which in part
strictly regulated wartime strikes and
prohibitedall union contributionsto political campaign funds. Business's success in
passing the Smith-Connally Act at the
national level encouraged the "open shop"
movement to renew its effortsin Louisiana in 1944. It failed in that legislative
session for the same reasons as in 1942.
The 1946 Right-to-WorkCampaign
Throughout the South, new organizing
and union violence reinforced hostilities
toward labor earlier bred by wartime
strikes and the reconversion strikes in
steel, coal, and the automotive industry
(Frank 1945; Hinton 1946b), leading to
the formationof new anti-union groups.
In Louisiana, local businesses organized
the Louisiana Citizens' Committee. Its
head, industrialistJohn U. Barr, called on
the people of the region to unite against
an "invasion" by outside labor agitators
(New YorkTimes1946a).
The committeeinitiated a media cam-
262
INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
paign to gain rural support for anti-union
legislation(Cook and Watson 1985). As in
an identical Arkansas organization, rural
vigilantes, aided by professional strikebreakers (from Arkansas), organized the
Veterans' Industrial Association "to handle 'goon squads' and 'labor agitators'who
seek to cause race troubles and class
troublesin the South" (Stark 1946). These
anti-union activities were supported by
nearlyall of Louisiana's newspapers,which
editorializedfor new legislationto curb an
"irresponsible"labor movement.
Because of these new social forces,the
anti-unionproponentswere more successful in 1946 than in earlier legislative
sessions. Legislators passed (1) the Cleveland RTW law; (2) the Goff bill, which,
like the Smith-ConnallyAct, restrictedthe
use of strikes and made it illegal for
unions to violate a contract, engage in
secondary boycotts, or use coercion or
violence to intimidateemployersor other
workers(1946 La. Acts No. 180); and (3)
the Pearce bill, which denied unemployment compensation to strikers(1946 La.
Acts No. 181). The RTW law, however,
was vetoed by GovernorJimmyDavis.
These bills were passed fora number of
reasons. First, the Christian American
Associationdid not campaign in the state,
thusremovingextraneousreligiousthemes
that offended the Catholic hierarchyand
Catholic legislators.Second, the Louisiana
ManufacturersAssociation,the Louisiana
Farm Bureau, and the Southern States
Industrial Council received support from
the state's newspapers and other citizens'
groups. The Louisiana Citizens' Committee and the Veterans' Industrial Association strengthenedthe anti-unionforcesby
mobilizing rural support as a way to
influencelegislators,most of whom came
from rural areas. Third, Operation Dixie
intensifiedinterunion conflict. Although
the CIO vigorouslyopposed all threebills,
evidence suggests that the AFL's fervent
oppositionwas reservedforthe RTW bill.2
2
As a craftunion federation,it naturallyopposed
any laws that restricted its ability to control the
supply of skilled labor. E. H. Williams,presidentof
the Louisiana Federation of Labor, claimed to
The AFL may have viewed the passage of
the Goff and Pearce bills as a convenient
way of limitingthe CIO's mass tactics.
When Louisiana's legislaturepassed the
RTW law, Governor Jimmy Davis, a
successful country music composer and
singer,intended to let the bill become law
without his signature (Hinton 1946b).
Davis "saw the light" after a late-night
delegationof union representativesthreatened his music royaltiesunless he vetoed
the bill (O'Connell 1986). When the Goff
and Pearce bills were sent to Davis a few
days later, similar pressures were not
applied by the AFL, and he signed both
pieces of legislation. Thus, the business
forces would have succeeded completely
in Louisiana without the fortuitousrelationshipbetweenthe musicians'union and
Governor Davis.
The evidence from Louisiana in the
1940s supports the positionthatanti-labor
legislationwas advocated by all segments
of the business community.Moreover,the
state'ssmall businessesand major corporations were affiliated with regional and
national business associationsthat pressed
for federal anti-unionlegislation.There is
no evidence from Louisiana that major
corporations reached an accommodation
withlabor in the 1940s.
Right-to-Workin the 1950s
The 1954 Right-to-WorkLaw
Those who argue forthe existenceof an
historicalaccord between organized labor
and major corporations claim that it
emerged following World War II. Yet,
major corporations, including "powerful
automotiveand steel interests,"continued
after the war to support the National
Association of Manufacturers, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, and the Ameristrongly oppose the Goff and Pearce legislation
(Healy 1946). But George Googe, Southern Director
of the AFL, implied that top leadership favored a
policyof non-interference
(Hinton 1946a) and, a few
months later, when the AFL approved its Southern
legislative policy, the policy did not include the
repeal of RTW and other anti-unionlaws passed in
recentyears (New YorkTimes1946b).
GUJMBOPOLITICS
can Farm Bureau Federation's battle for
the open shop and other legal restriction
on organized labor (Porter 1946:1; Davies
1946).
The passage of Taft-Hartley in 1947
reinvigoratedthe RTW movement; over
the followingdecade, nearlyeverystatein
the nation considered adopting a rightto-worklaw. In Louisiana, industryand
farm groups that supported RTW in the
1940s organized in 1953 the Louisiana
Council, later renamed the
Right-to-Work
Louisiana Free EnterpriseAssociation(Nation'sBusiness1956). Malcolm Dougherty,
president of the Louisiana Farm Bureau,
was the firstchairman and a leading force
in the r-enewed programto pass RTW and
other pro-businesslegislation.New union
organizing brought the labor movement
into direct confrontationwith Louisiana's
most powerfullocal corporations.
The most importantconfrontationsoccurred at the Calcasieu Paper Company's
pulp mill in Elizabeth, Louisiana, and in
the strawberryand sugar cane fields of
southern Louisiana. The companies involved were major Louisiana employers,
dominatingtheirlocal economies or industries. Calcasieu, a Virginia-based forest
products company, was the sole owner of
Elizabeth, an archetypal company town.
There, the AFL's International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite, and Papermill
Workers (IBPSW) competed with the
CIO's InternationalBrotherhoodof Paper
Makers (IBPM). When the AFL's IBPSW
won the NLRB election, the company
refused to negotiate in good faith and,
facing a strike, closed the plant. Time
lockoutwas marked by frequentbombings
and violentconfrontationsbetween unionistsand strikebreakersimportedby Calcasieu.
At about the same time, the Catholic
and the
Church's Social Action Comnmittee
AFL's National Agricultural Workers
Union (NAWU) began campaigns to organize small-scale strawberryfarmers and
sugar cane workers.The strawberryfarmers formed the Louisiana Vegetable Cooperative MarketingUnion, Local 312, to
break the control over wholesale prices
exercised by commissionagents and buy-
263
ers for chain-stores and big city retail
markets (America1954). Both organizing
campaigns attacked some of the most
importantbusiness interestsin the state.Based on a claim of "industry emergency," planters obtained a Louisiana
court injunctionprohibitingainyorganizational activities damaging to the sugar
industryon the grounds that such activities also threatenedthe general economic
welfare of the state. Sugar cane planters
responded to the unionization with such
alarm because it, coupled with earlier
union successes among sugar refinery
workers,directlyattacked their economic
interestsand the traditional rural social
order.
Many of the strawberryproducers and
sugar cane workerswere black; successful
organization would have produced a racially integrated counterforce to white
domination and unquestioned employer
privilege(Ryan 1953). This prospectdrove
large-scalecomme-rcialfarmers,major urban retailers,and local industryto forma
coalition to stop union expansion.
Prompted by the American Sugar Cane
League, the Louisiana Farm Bureau, and
the Louisiana Retailers'Association(LRA),
theLouisiana Right-to-Work
Council sponsored a right-to-workbill in the state
Senate. Attorneys for the Sugar Cane
League and Louisiana Right-to-Work
Council testifiedto their role in writing
the bill. The president of the Sugar
League, House floor leader Representative F. A. Graugnard, helped lead the
Business1956).
fight(Natioar's
Although publiclydefending individual
workers'rights,the LRA's vice president,
Louis Selig, clearly indicated the interest
of his organizationin RTW legislation:
The organizingcampaign among sugar workers,
for example, attacked Godchaux Sugars, a familyowned company thatcontrolledover 30,000 acres in
fiveparishes and operated two refineries.Godchaux
and other members of the Sugar Cane League
refused to deal with the union, leading to a
recognition strike of 1,500 fieldhands (Cook and
Watson 1985:260). Godchaux responded withstrikebreakers,evictionsfromcompanyhousing,denials of
credit,and coerced support fromotherlocal employers.
264
INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
In orderto meetthe oppositionof the labor
interestsin gettingour bill approved it is
necessarythatwe raisea budgetof $100,000.
. . .This is probablythe last chance thatwe
haveto getthisbillenactedand ifwefailwewill
have to bear the consequences.(Dempsey 1961:
19-20; emphasisadded)
When questioned by legislatorsregarding
the intereststhey represented, advocates
were unable to identify non-business
groups or individuals who had solicited
theirhelp.
Although all segments of the business
community supported the RTW campaign, some major corporations were
forced to refrain from open support.
Rapid industrializationafterWorld War II
brought many unionized petrochemical,
metals,and National Contractors'Association constructionfirmsinto the state. The
dominant position of American business
immediatelyfollowingWorld War II made
it possible for these companies to enjoy
fastgrowthand high profits.They feared
business interruptions more than high
wages and, therefore, avoided public
support for RTW so as not to foster
conflict with their unionized workers
(Nation'sBusiness1956; Lyles 1986; Steimel
1986; Flory 1986; Bussie 1988). These
firms included Cities Service, Texaco,
Kaiser Industries, General Electric, and
industrialconstructionfirmssuch as Bechtel and Parsons (Lyles 1986).
Once again the state labor movement
and the Catholic Church hierarchy opposed RTW. AFL and CIO unions formed
the United Labor Organizationsof Louisiana and sought support from leading
clergymen (Nation's Business 1956). The
Catholic Church's support, however, was
undermined by widespread lay Catholic
sentimentfavoring the RTW bill and a
numberof pro-segregationbillsbefore the
same legislature. The attempt by the
NAWU and the Church to unionize black
agricultural workers sparked the same
fearsin manylay Catholicsas it did among
the "sugar barons" and retailers, thus
linkingthe two issues.
Archbishop Rummel and Louis J.
Twomey, S.J., head of the Social Action
Committee, testifiedbefore the House's
Capital and Labor Committee regarding
the Church's long commitmentto labor
rights. Nevertheless,many powerful laymen, including legislators, openly opposed the Church hierarchyby forming
the Catholic Laymen's Committeeto support the RTW bill (Ryan 1954). The
Catholic Church's internaldisunityundermined organized labor's ability to resist
the 1954 right-to-work
campaign.
The bill passed 22 to 14 in the Senate
and 58 to 41 in the House. Legislators
opposing the bill came almost exclusively
fromthe more heavilyunionized parishes
such as Orleans (Louisiana OfficialJournal 1954:459; Louisiana LegislativeCouncil 1979). Governor Kennon, elected with
support from the coalition of large-scale
commercial farmers,major urban retailers, and local industry opposed to the
"Long machine,"signed the bill (Bass and
DeVries 1976:165). The bill passed because the business communitywas united
and the labor-Church opposition was
undermined by powerful lay Catholics'
racist fears. Although some major corporations did not openly support RTW,
neitherdid theyjoin labor unions to fight
the RTW campaign. There is no evidence
that major corporationshad a philosophical commitmentto union security.
The 1956 Repeal Campaign
Immediately after the passage of the
RTW law, the state AFL and CIO, joined
by representativesof the railroad unions
and other unaffiliatedunions, formedthe
Louisiana Legislative Committee (LLC).
In cooperation with the AFL's Labor's
League for Political Education, the CIO's
Political Action Committee,and the Machinists'Non-PartisanPoliticalLeague, the
LLC initiated a broad, grassroots campaign to defeat key RTW supportersand
elect officialssympatheticto labor's program (Nation'sBusiness1956).
Labor's electoralstrategypaid off,greatly
increasing its political influence. Former
Governor Earl Long was re-elected.
Twenty-seven of the 64 legislators who
had voted for the right-to-work
bill were
defeated, including virtually all of its
GUMBO POLITICS
sponsors,among then Sugar Cane League
president Graugnard (Nation's Business
1956).
These electoral victorieswere followed
by the officialmergerof the AFL and CIO
into the Louisiana State Labor Council
(LSLC), headed by Victor Bussie of the
Firefighter'sUnion. The LSLC then initiated a "divide and conquer" strategyto
law. Sympathetic
repeal the right-to-work
legislatorswere courted. More important,
the LSLC proposed a RTW law to cover
agriculturallabor, thus undercuttingunity
between agriculturalinterestsand urban
employers(Nation'sBusiness1956; see also
Jacobs 1956; Bussie 1988). Two bills were
introducedintothe legislature,one repealing RTW, the other restoring it for
workerson farmsand plantations.
This strategywas both pragmaticand a
rebuke aimed at the National Agricultural
Workers Union (NAWU). The Louisiana
State Labor Council held the NAWU directlyresponsible for passage of the 1954
RTW law. Accordingto a LSLC report,organizing drives in agricultureconstituted
"a direct challenge to a traditionalsystem
in one of Louisiana's oldest and mostbasic
industries. . . [and] . . . a flagrantinsultto
the men of statureand influencewho controlled the system"(Jacobs 1956:20). The
NAWU was accused of drivingthe "sugar
barons" intoa new anti-laborcoalitionwith
such traditionalopponents of organized labor as the Louisiana ManufacturersAssociation and the Associationof Small Business Concerns.
The LSLC's offer of an agricultural
RTW bill divided the business community
and weakened its opposition to the repeal
of the 1954 RTW law. The business
community was further divided by the
election of Earl Long. Governor Long's
support for labor's legislativeagenda led
local businesses dependent upon state
contractsto fear political retaliation and
support repeal.
As a result of the reconstitutedlegislature, labor's new unity and power, business's relative disunity, and Governor
Long's "arm twisting"on the House and
Senate floors, the 1954 RTW law was
narrowly repealed and the agricultural
265
RTW bill passed. The NAWU petitioned
the Executive Board of the AFL-CIO to
censor the LSLC for undercutting its
organizing efforts,but the International
rejected its petition.George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, supported the
Louisiana Labor Council's action as mandated by "economic expediency" (Cook
and Watson 1985:283) and argued that
the compromisewas "consistentwithwhat
labor has been doing for seventy-five
years" (Loftus 1956:20).
The evidence from Louisiana in the
1950s documents that the proponents of
RTW included businessassociationsrepresentingsome of the state'slargestlocal and
regionally owned agribusiness producers
and retailers,as well as small businesses.
Threatened by new organizingdrives,the
Louisiana Farm Bureau and its allies
attacked unions on the picketlines, in the
courts, and in the legislature. Those
companies that refrainedfromactive and
public support for RTW included both
major corporations and local enterprises.
They did so not because of "a firmpolicy
commitment"to labor, but out of "pragmatic necessity";theyfeared retaliationby
their unionized labor forces or the Long
machine.
in the 1970s
Right-to-Work
The Emergence of a Statewide
Business Community
In the 1940s and 1950s Louisiana
business was representedby a number of
trade and industryassociations,but lacked
a centralorganizationcapable of speaking
for the general interestsof business. This
fragmentationhelps explain the inability
of business to decisivelydefeat labor on
the right-to-work
issue. In 1975, however,
withthe foundingof the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry(LABI), all
segments of the Louisiana business community were brought together in one
organization.
LABI was founded to counteract the
considerable political power exercised by
the Louisiana State Labor Council. Beginning with their 1955 electoral success,
266
INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
VictorBussie and the stateAFL-CIO built
an effectivepoliticallobbythroughoutthe
state.Their keystrategieswere to support
for re-electionall state and local officials
who supported the council's agenda and
to maintaina full-timestaffof lobbyistsin
Baton Rouge (Bass and DeVries 1976:
181-83; Lyles no date:13-14). As a consequence, the state AFL-CIO was able to
secure improvements in unemployment
insuranceand workers'compensationstatutes, and to obtain legal protectionsfor
theirdemonstrationsand picketing.They
were perceived as the most powerful
politicalforce in the state.4
LABI evolved from earlier organizations formed in the late 1960s to counter
new labor organizing. During these years
the state AFL-CIO formed the Louisiana
Oil Field Workersand initiatedan organizinLgcampaign directedat the oil fieldsand
related oil services industries.This sector
of the oil industrywas dominated by small
independent entrepreneurs who were
fiercelyantagonisticto unions. The organizing drive met stiffopposition, leading
to intimidation tactics and violence on
both sides.
To co-ordinate this resistance, Brown
and Root, a major nonunion international
constructioncompany, helped employers
form the Louisiana Oilfield Contractors
Association(LOCA). Brown and Root had
extensive operations in the oil services
sector,but, like other nonunion construction firms,was preventedby union political power frombiddingon manyconstructionjobs in Louisiana (Lyles 1986). During
this union organizing campaign, Brown
and Root brought in Archie Lyles as
chargPoliticalAffairsDirector,specifically
ing him with the task of breaking union
political power.5 With Lyles's direction,
4 In 1973 Governor Edwards said of the dominant
politicalforcesin Louisiana, "There are none, except
to some extent Victor Bussie (President of the
Louisiana State Labor Council)" (Bass and DeVries
1976:183; see also Steimel 1986; Lyles 1986).
5 Lyles, a Louisiana native, is part of a selfdescribed politicalfamily.He was a page in the state
legislatureand later an upper level member of the
State Patrol, leading Troop D at the Elizabeth,
Louisiana, Calcasieu Mill strikein 1953. Brown and
the LOCA rapidlygrew fromits initial 12
founding members to more than 60
contractors.Lyles also set up the Louisiana
chapter of the Associated Builders and
Contractors(ABC), a national employers'
associationdedicated to controllingunions
in the constructionindustry(Lyles 1986;
Goldfield 1987).
Although LOCA and ABC stopped
labor's drive in the "oil patch," their
membersrealized thattheirtaskwas made
more difficultby the state AFL-CIO's
political influence among legislators and
local officials.For example, elected officials such as parish sheriffsand district
attorneysoften refused to interferewhen
labor unions interruptedcompany operations. During the 1969 legislativesession,
to "break labor's grip on the capitol," the
members of LOCA and Louisiana ABC
chapter formed, respectively,the Louisiana Political Education Council (LAPEC)
and the ConstructionIndustrvLegislative
Council (Lyles no date: 14).
Here is whatwe sail. All the problemsthat
businesshas ... [were] . eithercaused by
actionor inactionoflegislative
bodies.Justthat
and youchange
simple!Changethelegislature
conditions.
(Lyles1986)
By the end of 1970 LAPEC had raised
the modest sum of $36,000 for political
action. LAPEC's actions encouraged the
state Chamber of Commerce to form the
Louisiana PoliticalAction Committeeas a
second conduit for channeling business
monies into the 1971 elections. LAPEC
targetedspecificlegislatorsfor defeat and
claimed success in 80 percent of their
efforts.Thus, in the early 1970s, spurred
by labor strifein the oilfields, Louisiana
business began to establish coordinating
umbrellaorganizationsfor business lobbying and politicalaction.
Business's electoralsuccesses were aided
by the 1971 redistrictingof Louisiana's
Root hired him soon aftertojoin itsInternalSecurity
office and he spent much of the next 15 years
workinginternationally.He was reassigned to Loulsiana in the late 1960s as PoliticalAffairsDirectorfor
the company's Louisiana operations. "It was my job
to tryand open up thisstate.An-dthatwas what I was
going to do" (Lyles 1986).
GUMBO POLITICS
267
legislature. The reapportionment plan
Colorado Association of Commerce and
Industry.LABI representedan alliance of
was designed by Ed Steimel, who was
the Louisiana ManufacturersAssociation,
appointed "special master" by the federal
the Louisiana State Chamber of Comcourtafterthe legislaturefailed to develop
merce, and the Louisiana Political Educaa constitutional plan. From the early
1950s, Steimel directed the Public Affairs tion Council, among other organizations.
Ed Steimel left PAR to become LABI's
Research Council (PAR) and in the process "shaped PAR into a business-oriented executive director. LABI centralized the
voice of enlightened self-interestthat activitiesand resources of the state's most
importantemployersand business associaviewed public policyin broad terms"(Bass
and DeVries 1976:184; see also Colburn
tions.
1977). PAR served both governors and
legislators as the state's quasi-officialreThe 1976 Right-to-WorkCampaign
search organization,since the statedid not
have one of its own. Because of PAR's
In 1975 LABI succeeded in electing51
respected status, the court turned to
of
the 75 candidates it endorsed (Cook
Steimelto supervisereapportionment.His
and
Watson 1985). LABI then developed
plan reduced labor's electoralinfluencein
a long-term legislative agenda that inurban parishes. Under these new condicluded passage of a right-to-work
law. It
tions LAPEC and LAPAC were increasplanned
a
two-year
campaign
to
reshape
inglysuccessful: "By the end of the 1973
public opinion and gain legislativesupport
regular session of the legislaturewe were
for RTW. A Public Affairs Research
able to pretty much thwart any labor
(PAR) reportentitled"The Stalled Louisiunion legislative thrust" (Lyles no date:
ana Economy" argued that Louisiana's
15).
lack of a right-to-worklaw and union
In the followingyear, the overlapping
violence and corruptionwere to blame for
activitiesof LOCA, LAPEC, LAPAC, the
low industrialization.
state Chamber of Commerce, and PAR
LABI's RTW campaign was encouraged
were drawn together. A small set of
Governor Edwin Edwards. In public,
by
multinationalcorporationswith represenEdwards
stated that RTW was not an
tatives in these several organizations apfactor affectingindustrydeciimportant
proached Ed Steimel to set up a unified
sions to locate in Louisiana (Times-Picayune
business lobby in Louisiana (Colburn
1976a). His longstandingsupport for the
1977). They were motivated by their
labor movementwas strained,however,by
recent political success and, more imporhis opposition to public sector unions and
tant, by lower profits resulting from
strikes.During the early 1970s, AFSCME
increased foreign competition and the
lobbied for special taxes to increase state
of
Arab oil embargo. These were some the
workers'salaries, and teacher, police, and
same companies thathad been indifferent
fire unions pushed for collectivebargainto labor costs and right-to-workin the
ing
rightsand struck for union recogni1950s. Faced with a new international
tion (LaCour 1989). Edwards observed to
economic order, theywere worried about
LABI's Ed Steimel,
the relativelyhigh price of union labor in
the United States (Lyles 1986; see also
You don'tdeserveit,Ed, butit [right-to-work]
Bussie 1988). This core group included
willcometo you,and mostpeoplewillsaythat
you did it. People are tiredof pressurefrom
Kaiser Industries, Cities Service, Dow
Chemical, General Electric,Crown Zeller- laborunions;theyare tiredof hearingpublic
employeesunionize and threatento strike.
bach, T. L. James ConstructionCompany,
is high,and you can be sure
Unemployment
Brown
and
and Root (Colburn 1977;
thatlaborwillget the blame; theyare simply
Steimel 1986; Lyles 1986).
willcomeeasierthanyou
notaccepted.Victory
In 1975, the multinationalsformed the
imagine.(Colburn1977:88-89)
Louisiana Association of Business and
In fact,union violence sparked LABI's
Industry (LABI), patterned after the
268
INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
campaign. In January 1976,
right-to-work
jurisdictional disputes between the AFLCIO's buildingtradesunions and independent constructionlocals erupted into violence at the JupiterChemical Company's
plant, which was under construction in
Lake Charles. One pitched battle led to a
death, numerous injuries, and considerable propertydamage. This event served
to catalyze public opinion against unions
and encouraged LABI to push RTW in
the current legislative session (Colburn
1977; Steimel 1986).
LABI's hurried campaign involved intensive lobbyingand an expensive media
blitz,financed by $184,000 quickly raised
from its major corporate members. It
saturated the state for 15 days with
30-second televisionspots containing raw
news footage of the Jupiter Chemical
plant violence and graphic images of
Victor Bussie "manipulating" the legislature. The intentionwas to catch labor off
guard, to sway public opinion before the
stateAFL-CIO could react.
LABI's message was reinforcedby the
state's newspapers. As its post-campaign
analysis recognized, "no daily newspaper
opposed Right to Work, while several
carried numerous editorials in support"
(LABI 1977:17-18). Moreover, the press
ignored labor officials;they were denied
even the opportunityto presenttheircase
via lettersto the editor (Bussie 1988; Flory
1986; Bourg 1986).
Three days after the media campaign
began, LABI hosted a Legislative Issues
Conference in Baton Rouge. Business
leaders from all over the state arrived to
listento presentationsfocusingon LABI's
legislative initiatives, especially rightto-work,then were bussed to the state
capitol where theyurged theirrepresentativesand senatorsto vote for the bill.
In spite of LABI's unprecedented campaign, state AFL-CIO leaders did not
expect the effortto succeed (Crowe 1986;
Flory 1986). Even withthe defeat of many
labor-backed candidates in the previous
election,labor leaders assumed that their
influence among key legislators would
preventthe RTW bill from reaching the
House and Senate floors. And, in fact,
theywere able to have the bill referredto
a hostilecommitteein the House, where it
was reported unfavorablyto the floor.
Nevertheless, LAB I 's well-orchestrated
lobbying campaign overwhelmed labor's
parliamentary maneuvers; mail, phone
calls, and personal visits from business
owners and managers throughout the
state reassured uncertain legislators of
public support for RTW (Cook and
Watson 1985:294-95; Steimel 1986). Once
its parliamentarystrategywas defeated,
the state AFL-CIO was unable to mobilize
a last-minute,grassroots campaign. The
Louisiana State AFL-CIO's politicalpower
was based on the centralized lobbying
activitiesof VictorBussie and his staff,not
broad rank-and-filemobilization.Thus, at
a criticalmomentthe stateAFL-CIO could
not produce the mass of phone calls and
personal visits necessary to successfully
counter LABI's campaign.
As in the 1954 RTW campaign, organized labor's strengthwas undermined by
equivocal support fromits traditionalally,
the Catholic Church. In 1954, lay Catholic
support for RTW frustratedthe hierarchy'sopposition. In 1976, Louisiana Catholic leaders were themselvesdivided. Father Drolet, head of the Church's Social
Action Committee,issued a press release
urging state senators to vote against the
RTW bill; but Archbishop Hannan announced that"it [Drolet's statement]is not
the official position either of the Archbishop or the Archdiocese of New Or1976b).
leans" (Times-Picayune
House members overrode the committee's unfavorable report and passed the
bill by a vote of 59 to 49. Organized labor
was even less successful in the Senate,
where the bill passed 25 to 14 afterbeing
reported unfavorably by the Industrial
and Labor Relations Committee. Having
stated he would abide by the legislature's
decision, Governor Edwards signed the
bill on July9.
The evidence from Louisiana in the
1970s documents the participation by
major multinationalcorporations in antilabor legislative activities.Some of these
corporationshad avoided such activitiesin
earlier RTW campaigns out of fear of
GUMBO POLITICS
union retaliation.By the 1970s, however,
a changed world economyconvincedthem
that confronting organized labor was
necessaryforbusiness success; theyjoined
with small and large local businesses that
had pursued such anti-unionactivitiesall
along. Their participation in a plan to
unite all sectorsof Louisiana business in a
single organization was instrumentalto
the RTW campaign's success.
Conclusion
We began this study by contrasting
alternativehypotheseson the relationship
between differentsectors of the business
community and unions. Briefly, some
observers claim that major corporations
have accepted the legitimacyof unions
since World War II. Others argue that
major corporations accept unions only
when and where labor is strong. Proponents of both views concur that small
businessis alwaysand unalterablyopposed
to unions. The evidence from Louisiana's
1940s, 1950s, and 1970s RTW campaigns
indicates that both small businesses and
major corporations oppose unions, but
that some companies in both segmentsof
the business community do not attack
unions when they conclude that labor is
capable of effectiveretaliation.
In each decade, union organizingdrives
were a significant factor in mobilizing
anti-labororganizationwithinall sectorsof
Louisiana's business community;there is
no evidence that workers themselves
started,organized, or funded the Louisiana campaigns to pass RTW. In the 1940s,
postwar organizing, strikes,and violence
(often interunion violence) led to the
organization of the Louisiana Citizens'
Committee and the Veterans' Industrial
Association. In the 1950s, efforts to
organize workers in Louisiana's lumber,
strawberry,and sugar cane industries
encouraged the establishmentof the Louisiana Right-to-Work
Council. And, in the
1970s, organizingdrives in the "oil patch"
were confrontedby new employerassociations,culminatingin the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry(LABI).
Louisiana business associations in each
269
decade, mainlythe Louisiana Manufacturers Association and the Louisiana Farm
Bureau Federation, organized small businesses, large local companies, and major
corporations with operations in the state
and led the campaigns for passage of
right-to-work
legislation.These Louisiana
associationsalso linked the state'sbusiness
communityto national business associations and conservative lobbying groups,
which provided information,tactical advice, and other critical resources for
undermining union security. Through
these associations, all segments of the
Louisiana business community participated in RTW campaigns.
In the 1940s and 1970s, large local
companies and major corporationsplayed
a public role in organizing and financing
RTW. Only in the 1950s did some
companies not publiclyparticipate.These
included both major corporationsemploying unionized labor forces and small
companies competing for state contracts.
They refused to join because they feared
retaliationby national unions or the Long
administration.6We find no support for
the contention that major corporations
adopted a firmpolicycommitmentrecognizing unions as legitimate partners in
production.
The evidence from Louisiana suggests
that business's success in passing antiunion legislationwas linked to interunion
conflictand social conditions that mobilized anti-unionpublic opinion and weakened coalitions of unions and their allies.
For example, organized labor's most important Louisiana ally, the Catholic
Church,provided equivocal support in the
1950s and 1970s. Only when interunion
conflictswere resolvedand Catholicchurch
6
Although these companies refused to publicly
participatein RTW, they may have been participating through their memberships in the Louisiana
ManufacturersAssociation,Louisiana Farm Bureau,
or other business associations. One of the major
functionsof business associationsis to representthe
interestsof firmsthat cannot take public stands on
certain issues for fear of angering customers,
employee organizations,or public opinion. That is
why membership lists in business associations are
closelyguarded.
270
INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
support for unions was strong were
Louisiana's unions able to successfully
resistRTW campaigns.
In each decade, the origin, structure,
and outcome of RTW campaigns were
affected by national and international
economic and politicalevents. During the
1940s, interunion conflict between the
AFL and CIO, wartimeand reconversion
strikes, and the federal Smith-Connally
Act spurred RTW effortsin Louisiana. In
the 1950s, the United States' dominant
position in the work economy presented
some major corporations with incentives
to avoid open conflictswithunions. By the
1970s, structural changes in the U.S.
economy reduced jobs in those industries
where organized labor was strongest.
In addition, the decline of U.S. hegemony in the world economy meant that
large corporations faced uncertain product and capital markets,increased competition, political volatility,and unpredictable access to raw materials. They
perceived domestic labor costs as one
matter over which they could exercise
increased control (Bussie 1988). Finally,
the federal court-ordered reapportion-
ment of legislativedistricts,implemented
in 1971 in Louisiana, ended longstanding
advantagesfororganizedlabor and encouraged business groups to engage in new
legislativecampaign financingactivities.
Earlier research on RTW campaigns in
the 1950s found thatsuch campaigns were
led by small business coalitions. They
provided evidence that major corporations and national unions had established
an historicalaccord. A studyof Missouri's
1978 RTW campaign found, on the other
hand, thatsome major corporationsjoined
the RTW movement. And our longitudinal study of Louisiana indicates that all
sectorsof the American business communityhave supported RTW since the 1940s.
We believe, therefore, that the 1950s
studies examined a unique historicalmoment when some major corporations refused to openly attack unions for reasons
of pragmatic necessity.We conclude that
no "historicalaccord" existed, since these
corporations refrained from supporting
union resistance to RTW and, when
economic and politicalconditionschanged,
led the local business community campaign to pass RTW.
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