MAKING THE INTANGIBLES TANGIBLE:
SOFT POWER AND ITS SUBUNITS
HENDRIK W. OHNESORGE*
Paper Presented at the
Emerging Scholars Forum at the
ISA West Annual Conference 2014
Pasadena, California, USA
September 26, 2014
Soft power, as introduced by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in 1990, has become one of the most popular
catchphrases in the study and practice of international relations alike. However, engagement
in the concept of soft power frequently reveals fundamental conceptual inaccuracies.
The paper takes these observations as a starting point and with the dissection of soft
power into different so-called subunits seeks to offer a remedy for these perceived conceptual
shortcomings. To this end, a dissection of the concept of soft power into four “soft power
subunits” (i.e., resources, instruments, reception, and outcomes) is proposed. To illustrate the
mechanisms and interplay among these subunits, a comprehensive schematic shall be
presented. Founded on the theoretical assumptions of soft power and taking into account
empirical data for each soft power subunit, the schematic offers a detailed step-by-step
elucidation of the mechanisms of a hitherto highly intangible – yet exceedingly valuable –
concept.
Keywords: International Relations Theory; Soft Power; Soft Power Subunits
CENTER FOR GLOBAL STUDIES WORKING PAPER:
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COMMENTS ARE MOST WELCOME!
* Contact Information:
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge, Research Fellow, Center for Global Studies, Chair
in International Relations, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Straße 3, D53113 Bonn, Germany.
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
Introduction
In 1990, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. introduced the concept of soft power.1 Originally
intended to contribute to the then-prevailing debate on U.S. national decline,
Nye elaborated upon the idea of soft power in a number of subsequent
writings. 2 Today, “soft power” has become one of the most popular
catchphrases in the study and practice of international relations alike and the
term can be found in academic publications and political speeches around the
globe. Nonetheless, although – or perhaps precisely because – many writers
and practitioners have adopted the idea of soft power, the concept frequently
reveals fundamental conceptual inaccuracies. These can partly be attributed
to the high level of vagueness in Nye’s own formulation of the concept, partly
to varying (and frequently defacing) understandings of soft power as put forth
by different commentators.
The paper at hand takes these observations as a starting point and seeks to
offer a remedy for the perceived conceptual shortcomings. In order to do so,
the paper – after briefly outlining the fundamental underlying ideas of soft
power as put forth by Joseph Nye – introduces four distinct categories to
deconstruct the concept of soft power into four so called soft power subunits.
These subunits (i.e., resources, instruments, reception, and outcomes) offer
theoretical specification and allow for a more precise examination of a hitherto
highly intangible – yet exceedingly valuable – concept. Bearing in mind
Goethe’s famous verses from Faust that “all theory is grey, and green the
golden tree of life” the paper seeks to elucidate each soft power subunit with
recourse to an empirical example found in historic or present-day international
relations.
1
2
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American
Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
Most prominently in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to
Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) and Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
2
Making the Intangibles Tangible
Soft Power in International Relations
Power constitutes one of the most fundamental concepts in International
Relations. At the same time, it remains one of the most contested and
controversial.3 It is in this vein that Joseph Nye argues, “Power is like the
weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it.”4
Mindful of this predicament, Nye saw need to elaborate and enhance the
traditional understandings of power in international relations, particularly as
the world saw the end of the Cold War and a fundamental resetting of the
international political landscape took place. 5 Against this backdrop, Nye
introduced the concept of soft power.
Mindful of the countless definitional approaches to be found in literature, Nye
offers his own definition of power as “the ability to influence the behavior of
others to get the outcomes one wants.”6 However, Nye argues, “there are
several ways to affect the behavior of others. You can coerce them with
threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt
them to want what you want.”7 With the recourse to coercion with threats and
inducements with payments Nye alludes to measures commonly subsumed
under the term of hard power. Joseph Nye refers to the two varieties of hard
power, i.e., (military) coercion and (economic) inducement, as “sticks” and
“carrots.”8 Nye, however, argues that there exists another form of power and
3
4
5
6
7
8
See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of
International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and its
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), 333; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International
Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 66; Steven
Lukes, “Power and the Battle for the Hearts and Minds,” Millennium:
Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 484.
Nye, Soft Power, 1.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Foreword,” in Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and
National Assets of Japan and the United States, edited by Watanabe
Yasushi and David L. McConnell, ix-xiv (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), ix.
Nye, Soft Power, 2.
Ibid.
Ibid., 5.
3
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
holds that a “country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics
because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that
produces such effects.”9 He elaborates upon this idea and argues that “[t]his
aspect of power – that is, getting others to want what you want – might be
called indirect or co-optive power behavior.” 10 This definition of a hitherto
neglected – yet not unknown – face of power presented in 1990 as “getting
others to want what you want” constitutes the integral part of the soft power
narrative up to this day.11 Though the concept of soft power has undergone
some elaboration since its introduction in 1990, Nye, in his pivotal writing on
the issue, takes on his prior definition of soft power almost word-by-word as
“getting others to want the outcomes you want.”12
In a nutshell, soft power thus refers to “the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”13 Instead of relying on
hard power “sticks” and “carrots,” soft power behavior, therefore, “is about
mobilizing cooperation from others without threats or payments.”14 In Nye’s
understanding soft power “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of
others” 15 and “[s]imply put, in behavioral terms soft power is attractive
power.”16
Soft Power Subunits
As has already been argued above, the idea of soft power has meanwhile
become a regular feature in academic, public, and political discussions on
International Relations and adjacent research areas. However, the concept of
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Nye, Soft Power, 31.
Ibid.
First predominantly labeled “co-optive power,” the term “soft power” as the
power to “getting others to want what you want” stuck in public, political,
and academic debate. While in Bound to Lead no index entry exists for
“soft power,” the publication of an eponymous article in Foreign Policy
heralded the ultimate triumph of the term, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft
Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (Autumn 1990), 153-71.
Nye, Soft Power, 5.
Ibid., x.
Ibid., 60.
Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 6.
4
Making the Intangibles Tangible
soft power itself is characterized by a high level of inherent vagueness and
calls for further specification. This observation is at least in part accounted for
by the fact that Nye himself gave ample scope for interpretation and over the
years has put forth different understandings of his own concept.
17
Additionally, many works by scholars and commentators on the issue of soft
power subsume varying aspects and mechanisms under the overarching
term. Some have even put forth understandings of soft powers which bear
little resemblance to the original idea as put forth bye Nye. All in all, a highly
inclusive approach to the concept of soft power has emerged, encompassing
everything and huddling together qualitatively different aspects under one
single, fashionable term. Therefore, the analytical capacity of the innovative
concept of soft power to a large extent gets lost due to imprecise framing and
consequently in-depth analyses of the mechanisms of soft power are often
deficient.
The introduction of four distinct soft power subunits shall help navigate this
observed dilemma and thus help to make the study of soft power more
feasible. Hence, I hold that future research and discourse should not be on
“culture as soft power” or “public diplomacy as soft power,” but rather (in order
to stick to these two arbitrarily chosen examples which shall be picked up in
detail below) on “culture as a soft power resource” or “public diplomacy as a
soft power instrument.”
The following illustration offers an overview of the four soft power subunits put
forth in this paper and depicts their distinctions as well as interactions. The
illustration shall serve as a guideline and reference point to elucidate the
different soft power subunits (i.e., resources, instruments, reception, and
outcomes) in the following. By building on the theoretical considerations put
forth by Joseph Nye and further elaborating them, each subunit shall be
underpinned by taking into account empirical data and examples.
17
Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, “Introduction,” in Soft Power and US
Foreign Policy. Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,
edited by Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, 1-3, Abingdon: Routledge,
2010, 2.
5
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
6
Making the Intangibles Tangible
Explaining the Illustration
Before going into detail regarding the four soft power subunits, Illustration 1
shall be presented in brief.
Horizontally, the illustration is divided in what Joseph Nye calls the active and
the passive approach to soft power.18 On the one hand, a nation may pursue
“active efforts to create attraction and soft power.”19 This may be achieved
through actively engaging in (political) programs such as, for example, public
diplomacy, cultural and educational exchanges, (international) broadcasting or
other media and information campaigns. Such instruments can actively
disseminate national soft power resources to an international public. On the
other hand, while the active form of wielding soft power draws upon the
pursuit of deliberately designed programs and measures, a second variety,
i.e., the passive form of soft power, rather feeds on attractive pull. In such
cases, the second soft power subunit (soft power instruments) may be
leapfrogged and soft power resources themselves develop a high level of
inherent attraction and charisma thus obviating the need for the employment
of (political) instruments. Referencing the famous biblical trope brought to
prominence by John Winthrop, governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in
the 17th century, Nye labels this variety of soft power the “passive city on the
hill effect.”20
Vertically, the illustration is divided into two major columns representing two
actors in the process of wielding soft power, Actor A and Actor B: Through the
wielding of soft power Actor A seeks to get Actor B to want the outcomes it
wants. To achieve this goal, Actor A has three major soft power resources at
its disposal: culture, values, and foreign policy. In order to communicate these
resources and if possible translate them into desired outcomes, Actor A may
resort to such instruments as, for example, public diplomacy, (international)
broadcasting or educational exchanges. These instruments do not constitute
18
19
20
Nye, Future of Power, 94.
Ibid.
Ibid., 98.
7
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
soft power resources in their own right; rather they serve as a transmission
belt, communicating resources to an (international) audience. Through these
instruments Actor A is able to create either attraction or repulsion on part of
Actor B, who is on the reception end of the soft power event chain. Depending
on whether attraction or repulsion was created, Actor B is acting either in
accord or discord with Actor A. Actor A – in the case attraction was created
and Actor B consequently acting in accord with Actor A – thus gets the
outcomes it intended. This sequence is a condensed and simplified depiction
of the fundamental workings of the active approach to soft power and the
interaction of its four subunits, which shall now be looked at in more detail.
Soft Power Subunit 1: Resources
Turning to the first soft power subunit and following Joseph Nye, three
overarching soft power resources can be identified. Nye hence presents a
tripartite classification with regard to the sources of soft power,
“The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture
(in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives
up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policy (when they are
21
seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”
Regarding all three sources, Nye points out in his parenthetical insertions that
soft power is highly dependent on the respective context and circumstances in
which it is set and frequently is subject to changes.22 Whereas hard power
rests on such resources as force and sanctions or payments and bribes, the
three most central resources on the soft power end of the power spectrum are
identified as (1) culture, (2) values, and (3) policies.
Culture
Nye identifies a country’s culture as the first of the three main sources of soft
power. The term of “culture”, of course, calls for further concretization and
definition. While definitions of culture are as manifold as those of power, Nye
defines culture as “the set of values and practices that create meaning for a
21
22
Nye, Soft Power, 11.
Ibid., 68.
8
Making the Intangibles Tangible
society.”23 Further elaborating upon the question of culture, Nye, following the
accepted convention, distinguishes between high and popular culture.
Whereas high culture encompasses art, literature, and education and is
predominantly
appealing
to
elites,
popular
culture
comprises
mass
entertainment such as (pop) music, movies, or even fashion items.24 Being
regularly distinctly non-governmental in nature but instead shaped by civil
society actors such as universities, companies, or foundations, culture
presents a rather inexpensive source of soft power and can be spread by
commerce, exchanges, personal contacts, tourism, or visits.25 In the age of
globalization and information, the private dimension of spreading culture is
likely to further gain in importance and governments should see that their
actions reinforce rather than subvert national soft power.26
As mentioned above, movies constitute famous examples of cultural soft
power resources that regularly reach a broad audience and develop
substantial leverage. A famous example in this regard is the 1957 Hollywood
movie 12 Angry Men staring Henry Fonda. The critically acclaimed movie,
adapted from Reginald Rose’s eponymous teleplay, is a classic courtroom
drama in which a jury is confronted with the task of discussing the guilt or
innocence of a young man accused of stabbing his father. The movie depicts
the American jury system in a highly critical fashion and on this account the
Communist government permitted it to be played in Czechoslovakia. Among
intellectuals, however, the movie had the opposite effect as intended by
Communist officials as Czech movie director Milos Foreman recalls, “If that
country can make this kind of thing, films about itself, oh, that country must
have pride and must have an inner strength, and must be strong enough and
must be free.”27 This episode exemplifies very well how movies can act as
(cultural) soft power sources.
23
24
25
26
27
Nye, Soft Power, 11.
Ibid.
Ibid., 13, 17.
Ibid., 17.
Quoted in Nye, Soft Power, 17.
9
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
Values
Following the enumeration presented by Joseph Nye, (political) values
constitute a second major soft power source and can thus be assigned to the
subunit of resources. Hence Nye argues that
“[t]he values a government champions in its behavior at home (for
example, democracy), in international institutions (working with others),
and in foreign policy (promoting peace and human rights) strongly affect
28
the preferences of others.”
In his concretization of the influence of (political) values as sources for soft
power, Nye distinguishes between three levels: domestic values, values
championed in inter-state cooperation, and values advocated in one’s foreign
policy. While on a domestic level, democracy is identified as a source of soft
power, subscribing to a multilateral approach in dealing with other states
rather than consistently pursuing unilateral solo runs constitutes a source of
soft power in interstate relations. Finally, espousing values like human rights
and democracy in one’s foreign policy represents the third level of soft power
deriving from (political) values. However, as Nye argues, merely evoking
values like human rights and democracy is not sufficient, rather governments
should live up to and bolster them by pursuing a legitimate foreign policy.29
(Foreign) Policies
Finally, politics championed by a government both at home and abroad
constitutes the third and final source of soft power identified by Joseph Nye.30
He argues that the soft power deriving from this source rests as much on the
substance, i.e. the content and goals, as on the tactics and style, i.e. the ways
and means in which a nation pursues its policies. 31 Nye argues that
“[d]omestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant,
indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national
interests can undermine soft power.”32 Therefore, just as government politics
can help create soft power, they can just as easily – and perhaps even more
28
29
30
31
32
Nye, Soft Power, 14.
Ibid., 55.
Ibid., 13.
Ibid., 68.
Ibid., 14.
10
Making the Intangibles Tangible
easily – squander soft power capital through rash, hypocritical actions guided
by self-interest. 33 In this regard, domestic and foreign policies are highly
interdepended in their effects on national soft power.
Soft Power Subunit 2: Instruments
As depicted in the illustration, soft power instruments constitute the second
soft power subunit. As has briefly been argued above, these instruments
include public and cultural diplomacy initiatives, (international) broadcasting,
educational and cultural exchanges, and various other instruments. These
instruments, frequently actively enhanced by national governments, serve as
a transmission belt designed to communicate soft power resources
(predominantly but not exclusively culture) to an (international) audience.
While on the underlying soft power resources themselves much work has
been done, systematically and empirically analyzing instruments applied by
nation states in order to translate soft power resources into desired outcomes
still remains a wide field for further research.
International broadcasting, for example, constitutes a prominent soft power
instrument. It can be defined as “a complex combination of state-sponsored
news, information and entertainment directed at a population outside the
sponsoring state’s boundaries.”34 The roots of international broadcasting can
be traced back to World War II, when particularly radio and newsreel were
used as propaganda measures. During the Cold War television became the
predominant medium and meanwhile – in the digital information age of the
21st century – online communication and broadcasting is on its way to replace
33
34
Nye, Soft Power, 14.
Monroe E. Price, Susan Haas, and Drew Margolin, “New Technologies
and International Broadcasting: Reflections on Adaptations and
Transformations,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 152-3.
11
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
traditional media.35 In recent years, as soft power has become a central topic
of public and political debate as well as academic research, international
broadcasting as a means to enhance national soft power has increasingly
gained center stage. Thus, via the soft power instrument of international
broadcasting a nation state is capable of spreading its messages throughout
the world. International broadcasting and media initiatives therefore serve as
a transmission belt in order to turn existing soft power resources into desired
outcomes (via attraction, see below).
A nation state that recently has stepped up its efforts in this area is the
People’s Republic of China. Thus, in recent years, Chinese rhetoric on the
importance of boosting national soft power (brought to prominence by thenPresident Hu Jintao who called for an enhancement of national cultural
activities in his much-noticed speech at the 17th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China on October 15, 2007) has been turned into
practice. Particular emphasis has been put on the soft power instrument of
public diplomacy and the associated internationalization of Chinese state
media.36 Thus, within the larger framework of China’s “Going Out Policy”, the
“Big Four” 37 in Chinese media landscape (Xinhua News Agency, Central
China Television, China Radio International, and China Daily) have each
undergone extensive restructuring and initiated globally-oriented programs to
spread Chinese culture and improve China’s image around the world. With
the creation and continual expansion of media outlets such as these, China
35
36
37
Lee Claire Seungeun, “China’s International Broadcasting as a Soft
Power Ma(r)ker: Its Market Formation and Audience Making,” ERCCT
Online Paper Series, EOPS No. 0027, November 2013,
http://www.ercct.unituebingen.de/Files/ERCCT%20Online%20Paper%20Series/Young%20Sc
holar%20Workshop%202013/EOPS27,%20Lee%20Claire%20Seungeun,
%20China's%20International%20Broadcasting%20as%20a%20Soft%20P
ower%20Ma(r)ker%20Its%20Market%20Formation%20and%20Audience
%20Making.pdf, (accessed August 1, 2014): 5-6.
Sergio Grassi, Changing the Narrative: Chinas mediale Offensive in
Afrika, Internationale Politikanalyse (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,
2014), 2.
David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 227.
12
Making the Intangibles Tangible
seeks to provide an alternative to the predominantly Western-dominated
media “by presenting China’s own version of issues and events happening
inside China, Asia and the world.” 38 These efforts constitute an excellent
example of soft power instruments and deserve – like comparable measures
taken by other actors in international relations – further scholarly attention.
Soft Power Subunit 3: Reception
Turning to the second major column of the illustration presented above, Actor
B is the receiver or target of the measures undertaken by Actor A in order to
enhance its soft power. Compared to the wielding of hard power, soft power is
marked by far greater reciprocity between actors involved since both the
agent and the target of soft power projection play a crucial role in its creation
and success.39 Thus, employing soft power tends to be less unilateral than the
recourse to hard power measures and positive reception, therefore, is highly
significant for the creation of desired outcomes through soft power.40 (Hence,
a two-way arrow is drawn in the illustration.) However, soft power resources
may at times not only fail to create attraction but instead may result in the
opposite of attraction, i.e., repulsion.41 Nye thus holds (think the parenthetic
inversion in Nye’s enumeration of soft power sources cited above: “in places
where it is attractive to others”) that soft power resources (and particularly
culture as such a resource) may have different and even contradictory effects
in different countries or even within a given society. For, as Nye argues, “a
given cultural artifact, such as a Hollywood movie that portrays liberated
women acting independently, may produce positive attraction in Rio but
revulsion in Riyadh.” 42 This observation once again illustrates the great
dependency upon the respective context when assessing the effectiveness of
soft power instruments. Thus, the resource of culture as an ingredient of soft
38
39
40
41
42
Zhang Xioaling, “Chinese State Media Going Global,” East Asian Policy 2,
no. 1 (2010): 43.
Nye, Future of Power, 92.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why
Washington Should Worry,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 3 (May/June 2004):
20.
Nye, Future of Power, 92.
Ibid., 92-3, see also Nye, Soft Power, 12-3, 52.
13
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
power being transmitted by soft power instruments is more likely to achieve
desired outcomes when the agent’s and the target’s respective cultures bear
at least some similarities. 43 Assessments whether a certain soft power
instrument evokes attraction on the one end of the spectrum or repulsion on
the other may be performed, for example, by the conduction of surveys or
opinion polls.
Regarding empirical evidence in regard of this soft power subunit, the
establishment of the meanwhile approximately 500 Confucius Institutes
around the globe over the last decade may serve as a brief illustration.
Evocative of comparable establishments like the British Council, the Alliance
Française or the German Goethe Institutes, the Chinese cultural institutes are
themselves to be classified as soft power instruments. As such, the Chinese
government
exerts
comprehensive
influence
over
the
establishment,
financing, and curricula of Confucius Institutes since their introduction in 2004.
Located at the campuses of universities all around the globe, these institutes
teach locals in Chinese language and culture.44 In many cases, the institutes,
offering a first hand perspective on Chinese culture and language, are
perceived positively as polls and surveys have demonstrated. However,
regarding the reception of these institutes the picture is highly diverging as
individual case studies on the subject have also demonstrated.45 A recent
report from the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), for
example, indicates that instead of creating attraction towards China by
establishing Confucius Institutes on U.S. university and college campuses, the
opposite is evoked in practice. The AAUP report from June 2014 thus
concludes,
“Confucius Institutes function as an arm of the Chinese state and are
allowed to ignore academic freedom. Their academic activities are under
the supervision of Hanban, a Chinese state agency which is chaired by a
43
44
45
Nye, Soft Power, 15-6.
Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is
Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 68.
See, for example, Yang Rui, “Soft Power and Higher Education: An
Examination of China’s Confucius Institutes,” Globalisation, Societies and
Education 8, No. 2, 235-45.
14
Making the Intangibles Tangible
member of the Politburo and the vice-premier of the People’s Republic of
China. Most agreements establishing Confucius Institutes feature
nondisclosure clauses and unacceptable concessions to the political aims
and practices of the government of China. Specifically, North American
universities permit Confucius Institutes to advance a state agenda in the
recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and
46
in the restriction of debate.”
This brief example demonstrates the importance of taking into consideration
the respective circumstances when assessing the perception of soft power
instruments in different contexts.
Soft Power Subunit 4: Outcomes
The final subunit, i.e., soft power outcomes, depicted on the far right column
in the illustration, is perhaps most difficult to grasp and examine among the
proposed soft power subunits. Following the illustration, soft power resources,
transmitted by soft power instruments (or – in the passive variety of soft power
– through the inherent charisma of the resources alone) may create either
attraction or repulsion. In the next step, this leads (in the case attraction is
generated) to desired outcomes, i.e., Actor B acting in accord with Actor A. In
the case repulsion is evoked, on the other hand, Actor B may oppose Actor A,
who thus would have failed to effectively convert his soft power resources into
desired outcomes.
However, albeit this process of achieving desired outcomes through soft
power may be convincingly illustrated on a theoretical level, it is far more
difficult to trace and prove it in practice. Consider, for example, the following
case. China, in accord with the plans laid out by President Hu Jintao in 2007,
46
American Association of University Professors, “On Partnerships with
Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes,” Prepared by the
Association’s Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure in June
2014, http://www.aaup.org/file/Confucius_Institutes_0.pdf (accessed
September 3, 2014).
15
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
seeks to globally “enhance culture as part of [Chinese] soft power.”47 To this
purpose, China opens a Confucius Institute in an African city, say Nairobi.
Within the first year a given number of students – for the sake of simplicity lets
say one hundred – attend classes taught at the Institute. A subsequent survey
among those who attended courses reveals that of those 100 students polled,
90 students state that they hold a positive image of China and are attracted by
Chinese culture. Does this mean that China successfully wielded soft power?
Unfortunately, it is not as simple as that.
The first question that arises from this example is whether or not the
attendance of classes in the Nairobi Confucius Institutes had any impact on
the 90 students who stated that they hold a positive image of China. In other
words – since power implies changing behaviors in others – did the
attendance of courses change the students’ reception of Chinese culture or
are those polled just stating their already previously existent attitude? This
difficulty could quite easily be worked out by conducting pre-post comparisons
among students before and after having attended classes thus allowing for an
examination whether and to what extent attitudes have changed.
The second question, however, is much harder to answer: How can we
assess whether or not the high level of attested attraction among African
attendees of classes at the Nairobi Confucius Institute results in desired
outcomes, i.e., outcomes intended by the Chinese officials who initiated the
Confucius Institute in Nairobi? Even assuming that the number of students
who are culturally attracted to China after having visited the Confucius
Institute has risen, do those Kenyan students (not to speak of Kenya as a
state) now – to paraphrase Nye – want what China wants (e.g., support its
policies regarding disputes in the South China Sea)?
47
Hu Jintao, “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately
Prosperous Society in all,” Report to the Seventeenth National Congress
of the Communist Party of China, October 15, 2007,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm (accessed
September 3, 2014).
16
Making the Intangibles Tangible
This dilemma presents one of the harshest points of criticism regarding the
entire concept of soft power. It becomes particularly glaring in contrast to hard
or command power instruments and the outcomes such instruments can bring
about: Invading a country and destroying a nuclear reactor by means of
physical destruction directly results – if successful – in the desired outcomes,
which is bringing to a halt a nation’s nuclear program. Trying to use soft power
to influence the minds of said state’s officials and thus attracting them to want
to end their nuclear program is far more difficult to achieve, if not impossible
at all. Nye himself does not turn a blind eye on this observation. In fact, he
argues that “[s]oft power is not the solution to all problems.”48 However, while
he holds that “[s]oft power alone rarely solves hard problems” he argues that it
“can create an enabling rather than an disabling environment for policy.”49 The
creation of “an enabling environment” indicates the long-term character of soft
power. Nye explicitly concedes that soft power instruments “sometimes take
years to produce desired outcomes.”50 In the case of the nuclear program, for
example, a nation may not have as long a time at its disposal and soft power
may thus prove to be unsuitable to get the desired outcomes.
Returning and applying these observations to the example of the Confucius
Institute in Nairobi introduced above, however, one might argue that the
probability of achieving desired outcomes in places where a country’s
(cultural) attraction has been enhanced is – if anything – potentially
increasing. Arguable, the causal chain between visiting a Confucius Institute
and supporting Chinese foreign policy is considerably longer than it may
regularly be the case in respect of hard power measures. Especially when
considering the difference between the private capacities in which of those
students attended classes and the governmental sphere in which foreign
policy decision are generally made. However, at least – but not exclusively –
in democratic governments, chains of legitimacy exist and public support for
48
49
50
Nye, Future of Power, xiii.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Good Start, Long Road,” The American Interest V, no.
3 (Winter 2010): 13.
Nye, Soft Power, 99.
17
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
the politics pursued by the government does play a role, a role which with the
advance of social media and other possibilities of participation is likely to
further increase in the future. It may be a considerably protracted process but
in some cases the students who had visited the Confucius Institute may find
themselves in positions to influence their country’s foreign policy and in doing
so, draw on knowledge about China conveyed at the Confucius Institute. In
fact, the long-term character of soft power outcomes applies perfectly to the
long-term policies regularly championed by the Chinese government. Finally,
not least the fact that China as well as countless governments around the
world, be they democratic or not, have in recent years stepped up their soft
power efforts, indicates the (growing) importance nation states ascribe to this
form of power and the positive outcomes they expect to draw from them.
An examination of how certain soft power instruments can be turned into
desired outcomes can only be conducted on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account the respective points of departure and circumstances and requiring
long-term analyses. This observation, as is the case with respective soft
power instruments themselves, lays out the road for further research to be
conducted with regard to this subunit as well.
Discussion
Soft power is among the most frequently and intensely discussed topics in
International Relations today. The concept of soft power is not only
deliberated extensively in academic publications but, as the brief empirical
examples referred to above demonstrate, it has also become a major
catchphrase for political programs as pursued by many countries around the
globe. Soft power instruments, for example, applied by nation states to
transmit their soft power resources to a global public have become an
observable reality today and in today’s information age are likely to rather gain
than dwindle in importance.
This observation calls for more structured academic assessments and
analyses than are hitherto frequently presented. Against this backdrop, the
soft power subunits put forth in this paper (i.e., soft power resources,
18
Making the Intangibles Tangible
instruments, perception, and outcomes) offer eligible points of departure for
two main reasons.
Firstly, the subunits help to deconstruct the often (too) broadly conceptualized
term of soft power into qualitatively different categories and thus contribute to
a sharpening of the concept of soft power from a theoretical perspective. The
separation into different subunits thus helps to better understand the basic
mechanisms of soft power and the interplay among its subunits as visualized
by Illustration 1.
Secondly, from a more practical perspective, the deconstruction of soft power
into different subunits allows for a step-by-step analysis of empirically
observable cases in which actors wield soft power. Thus, the proposed soft
power subunits help to outline an agenda for further research in this still
insufficiently chartered territory. For example, the proposed subunits can
serve as a guideline to assess Chinese efforts to enhance national soft power
by
analyzing
underlying
resources,
chosen
instruments,
identifiable
perceptions and resulting outcomes of said efforts. By this means, empirical
case studies on the success or failure of (national) soft power initiatives do not
only become more structured and comparable but also allow for a more
precise assessment of potential shifts in the global distribution of soft power.
Therefore, by conducting a variety of case studies along the lines of the
proposed soft power subunits, the question can be answered whether or to
what extent a global soft power shift can be observed in international relations
today.
19
Hendrik W. Ohnesorge
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