Some Recent Writings About East
Asia in the 1930s and the Origins
of W a r in the Pacific
IT is n o w m o r e than thirty years since the J a p a n e s e attack o n Pearl
H a r b o u r and, the e m o t i o n s aroused by the Pacific war h a v i n g subsided, a n e w generation of A m e r i c a n , J a p a n e s e and British historians
has b e g u n t o r e - e x a m i n e J a p a n e s e , C h i n e s e , British and A m e r i c a n
policy in east A s i a in the d e c a d e b e f o r e 1 9 4 1 . T h e recently released
British F o r e i g n Office records for the 1 9 3 0 s 1 and an increasing amount
of published and u n p u b l i s h e d J a p a n e s e material 2 h a v e p r o v i d e d n e w
s o u r c e s and an additional stimulus. T h e result has b e e n a reinterpretation of m a n y of the a c c e p t e d views of the e v e n t s w h i c h finally led
to t h e outbreak of war. T h e s e findings, w h i c h are fascinating for all
students of international history, h a v e particular interest for teachers
in N e w Z e a l a n d f a c e d with t h e m e s incorporating Japan's e c o n o m i c
d e v e l o p m e n t since 1 9 1 8 and the origins of the s e c o n d w o r l d war in
the p r o p o s e d s c h e m e for s c h o o l certificate history.^
Until relatively recently the literature about the s e c o n d w o r l d war
and the international crisis of the 1 9 3 0 s t e n d e d to be essentially E u r o p e centred in its approach. This bias led to the J a p a n e s e being seen in
the i m a g e of the N a z i s and, o n the assumption that J a p a n w a s Germ a n y ' s faithful friend, to its b e i n g regarded as responsible f o r the war
a n d its o w n tragedy. N o w h o w e v e r , historical writing about east A s i a
in the 1 9 3 0 s is e m p h a s i z i n g the very real c o m p l e x i t y of the east A s i a n
situation, and it indicates that there is a n e e d for a m u c h clearer perc e p t i o n of international relations as a w h o l e . It has b e e n pointed out
that, 'the m a n i f e s t act of aggression that t o o k p l a c e in 1 9 4 1 and the
barbarities of the J a p a n e s e "new order" that f o l l o w e d c a n n o t serve to
divorce Japan's policies u p to that point f r o m the attitudes, assumptions
a n d actions of the states that h a d d o m i n a t e d that area f r o m the middle
of the n i n e t e e n t h century'. 4 T h e argument challenges historians, as
A k i r a Iriye has put it, 'to v i e w the international crisis of the thirties as
it s h o u l d b e v i e w e d , internationally'. 5 It calls for the r e - e x a m i n a t i o n of
m a n y cherished m y t h s about the 'road' to Pearl Harbour.
154
RF.CENT WRITINGS ABOUT EAST ASIA IN THE
1930s
155
A t the War Crimes Trials conducted in T o k y o b e t w e e n 1 9 4 6 and
1948 the twenty-eight Japanese 'criminals' were accused of a conspiracy
to wage aggressive war with the object of securing Japanese d o m i n a t i o n
of east Asia, the western and south western Pacific O c e a n , and certain
islands in these areas. T h e idea of a 'conspiracy' m a d e it possible in
retrospect to regard the events at M u k d e n in 1 9 3 1 as the o p e n i n g shots
in a scenario which reached its inevitable climax with the outbreak of
war and presented the years 1 9 3 1 to 1 9 4 1 temptingly as an historical
unit.
T h e concept of a conspiracy by 'guilty men' in Japan, which w a s a
reflection of the judgement of the International Military Tribunal of
the Far East, dominated historical writing about the pre-war years in
the decade after the war. i n The Challenge
to Isolation,
1937-1940
and The Undeclared. War 6 which have b e c o m e the standard works for
the period, Langer and Gleason saw the conspiracy as that of a small
group of officials, mostly representatives of the military, w h o controlled
Japanese policy and were consistently expansionist in their aims. This
thesis f o u n d wide acceptance a m o n g historians 7 and the conspiracy
theory f o u n d its way into popular belief in the west. T h a t it has not
yet died has been demonstrated recently by its appearance in a n e w
form in D a v i d Bergamini's book Japan's Imperial Conspiracy.8
A s the
title suggests, for Bergamini the emperor is the villain of the piece. T h e
book has been attacked and discredited by the historians 9 but its appearance in paperback bears witness to the fact that its simplistic v i e w
strikes a more familiar and appealing note for a wider readership than
the more scholarly and objective works of the specialists in the field.
In fact, the conspiracy theory was challenged l o n g ago and, while the
view that the rigid diplomacy of the R o o s e v e l t administration forced
the Japanese to war in 1 9 4 1 never gained a c a d e m i c respectability, the
criticisms of historians like Paul W . Schroeder and William L. N e u m a n n
of the excessively high moral tone and the militant idealism which
characterized A m e r i c a n east A s i a n policy received considerable attention. 1 0 T h e case against Japan was further eroded in 1 9 6 6 with the
appearance of James B. Crowley's Japan's
Quest for
Autonomy.11
Crowley maintained that Japan's political and military leaders were
honourable men, loyal to the throne, w h o sought, as their predecessors
had sought, security and prosperity. T h e y neither were e n g a g e d in any
conspiracy nor thought in terms of a Pacific war.
T h e notion of Japan's sole responsibility for the war has b e e n questioned, therefore, for some time. A m e r i c a n historians h a v e serious
doubts about the w i s d o m of A m e r i c a n policy and have tried to assess
its contribution to the outbreak of hostilities. British historians have
been interested in the effect of Britain's consciousness of its w e a k n e s s
and of the impact of its world-wide commitments o n its policies towards
China and Japan. Japanese scholars, w h o s e researches reveal the very
156
ANN TROTTER
real divisions in the army, the n a v y and a m o n g diplomats, puzzle about
w h y the nation drifted into war in 1 9 4 1 .
F r o m all the sources it b e c o m e s clear h o w restricted w a s the A m e r i c a n or British understanding of east A s i a and h o w limited was the
J a p a n e s e or C h i n e s e p e r c e p t i o n of the m o t i v e s of Britain and the United
States. R e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n all these countries were m o s t o f t e n based
o n a series of distorted images, f t is clear, in retrospect, that the
e c o n o m i c pressures w h i c h affected every country as a result of the
d e p r e s s i o n h a d m u c h to d o with this distortion. M e a s u r e s taken by
regimes to maintain and c o n s o l i d a t e p o w e r in 'have' as well as 'have
not' countries contributed to international insecurity and t e n s i o n s . 1 2
Japan's e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in the 1 9 3 0 s , therefore, c a n n o t be c o n sidered in isolation f r o m the world trading pattern in w h i c h she sought
acceptance.
S u c c e s s i v e British g o v e r n m e n t s after 1 9 1 8 were p r e o c c u p i e d with
m a i n t a i n i n g international stability and the status quo in order to provide the best c o n d i t i o n s f o r the overseas trade o n w h i c h the British
e c o n o m y d e p e n d e d . T h i s conservative attitude has b e e n described as
appropriate to a w e a l t h y and c o n t e n t e d p o w e r with a larger stake in
the external w o r l d than it w a s in fact able to d e f e n d . 1 3 British c o n c e r n
f o r the status quo in China w a s b a s e d o n British w e a k n e s s , and a desire
to c o n c e a l this, rather than o n British ambition. Japan, China's biggest
trading partner, c o u l d scarcely be e x p e c t e d to appreciate this. A g a i n ,
the import duties introduced by Britain in 1 9 3 2 and the tariff agreem e n t s r e a c h e d at the Imperial E c o n o m i c C o n f e r e n c e at O t t a w a that
year were the British r e s p o n s e to the upsurge of e c o n o m i c nationalism
f o l l o w i n g the s h a r p e n e d trade rivalry arising f r o m the depression. C o m ing during the M a n c h u r i a n crisis, these m e a s u r e s w e r e received with
considerable hostility in J a p a n and, as q u o t a s o n J a p a n e s e imports were
introduced in a n u m b e r of British c o l o n i e s and in India in 1 9 3 4 and
1 9 3 5 , the imperial e c o n o m i c bloc c a m e to be regarded by the Japanese
as directed against t h e m .
T h e British w o u l d h a v e d e n i e d that their policy after the M a n c h u r i a n
crisis w a s in a n y w a y anti-Japanese. B u t the 'open door' which, in its
p o s i t i o n of w e a k n e s s , Britain w a n t e d maintained, and British cultivation of C h i n e s e friendship, the p u r p o s e of w h i c h was to protect British
interests a n d prospects in China, were obstacles to Japan's h o p e s for
a tripartite relationship b e t w e e n Japan, C h i n a and M a n c h u k u o in the
e c o n o m i c , political and cultural fields. British support for Chinese
n a t i o n a l i s m and C h i a n g Kai-shek h a d the effect of channelling Chinese
anti-imperialism against the J a p a n e s e . A s the J a p a n e s e s a w it, without
British e n c o u r a g e m e n t and assistance, C h i a n g Kai-shek w o u l d h a v e h a d
the alternatives of either yielding to the c o m m u n i s t s or accepting
J a p a n e s e h e l p in his political and military struggle against them. O n
the basis of this argument, the stumbling b l o c k to Japanese interests in
RF.CENT WRITINGS ABOUT EAST ASIA IN THE
1930s
157
China c a m e not f r o m C h i n e s e n a t i o n a l i s m but f r o m B r i t a i n . 1 4 A n
A n g l o - J a p a n e s e political a g r e e m e n t w o u l d h a v e w e a k e n e d t h e link
between Britain and the Nationalist g o v e r n m e n t and, as such, w a s a
possible solution to Japan's p r o b l e m s in China. T h i s w a s , n o d o u b t , o n e
reason f o r the persistent if tentative feelers f o r such an a g r e e m e n t in
the years b e t w e e n 1 9 3 3 and the outbreak of the S i n o - J a p a n e s e war in
1 9 3 7 . 1 5 A n alternative w a s to try t o break Chiang's links w i t h Britain
by a S i n o - J a p a n e s e agreement, a n d J a p a n m a d e persistent efforts t o
reach s u c h an agreement. British efforts to rehabilitate C h i n a , h o w e v e r ,
persistently h a n d i c a p p e d Japan. British support f o r C h i n e s e currency
reform in 1 9 3 5 - 3 6 f o r e x a m p l e , l o o k e d like a 'forward' British p o l i c y
to the Japanese w h o regarded it as the c l i m a x of a struggle b e t w e e n
Britain and J a p a n for the control of China's e c o n o m y . 1 6 W h e n , i n 1 9 3 7 ,
with his sounder financial base, C h i a n g K a i - s h e k himself a d o p t e d a
'forward' policy against the J a p a n e s e and the 'China Incident', u n s o u g h t
by the Japanese d e v e l o p e d into war, it is n o t surprising that i n J a p a n e s e
circles, Britain r e c e i v e d a large m e a s u r e of the b l a m e .
T h e U n i t e d States, like Britain, w a s interested i n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e
of the status quo in east A s i a b e c a u s e the existing order satisfied its
needs. T h i s m e a n t for the U n i t e d States, as f o r Britain, the c o n t i n u a n c e
of western rights and interests in China. T h e A m e r i c a n s ' v i e w o f t h e m selves as the saviours of the C h i n e s e p e o p l e a n d their belief in China's
democratic potential has b e e n described as 'an acute c a s e o f self delusion' and was antipathetic to J a p a n e s e interests. 1 7 A f t e r the M a n c h u r i a n
crisis, the A m e r i c a n s relied o n n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n t o u p h o l d the treaty
structure in east A s i a . 1 8 T h i s policy w a s d e s i g n e d to a v o i d war but, as
the Japanese g o v e r n m e n t c o m p l a i n e d , it e n c o u r a g e d a d e f i a n t C h i n e s e
attitude towards J a p a n and thereby obstructed J a p a n f r o m w o r k i n g o u t
its national aims. A solution for J a p a n w o u l d h a v e b e e n a n a g r e e m e n t
with the U n i t e d States w h i c h w o u l d e n d W a s h i n g t o n ' s c o m m i t m e n t t o
uphold China's territorial and administrative integrity. Japan's tentative
approaches to the U n i t e d States in the 1 9 3 0 s r e c e i v e d n o e n c o u r a g e m e n t . 1 9 Furthermore, the U n i t e d States increased duties o n all i m p o r t e d
g o o d s in 1 9 3 0 and introduced specific tariffs against a n u m b e r of J a p a n e s e g o o d s in the n e x t f e w years. A t t h e s a m e time A m e r i c a n i m m i g r a tion laws discriminated against the Japanese. Japan, like Britain, h a d
to export to survive, and w a s d e p e n d e n t b y the 1 9 3 0 s o n imports of
f o o d as well as raw materials. T h e i m p o s i t i o n of tariffs and q u o t a s e l s e where intensified the J a p a n e s e push in C h i n a w h e r e J a p a n h a d a direct
stake and where its i n v e s t m e n t w a s of relatively greater i m p o r t a n c e to
it than the investment of any other foreign p o w e r w a s to that p o w e r . 2 0
T h e Japanese felt genuinely threatened. G i v e n w o r l d trading c o n d i t i o n s
a n d the trend towards r e g i o n a l i s m and c l o s e d e c o n o m i c units, the
status quo did not satisfy Japan's n e e d s .
Japan's remarkably successful e c o n o m i c policy in the difficult w o r l d
158
A N N TROTTER
e n v i r o n m e n t of the 1 9 3 0 s has b e e n outlined by H u g h T . Patrick in an
important v o l u m e of essays b y A m e r i c a n and J a p a n e s e historians,
Dilemmas
of Growth
in Prewar
Japan.
H e describes the e c o n o m i c
e v e n t s f r o m the time J a p a n left the g o l d standard in 1 9 3 1 as 'one of
the m o s t successful c o m b i n a t i o n s of fiscal, m o n e t a r y and e x c h a n g e rate
policies the w o r l d has ever s e e n ' . 2 1 Patrick m a k e s the point that Japan
a n t a g o n i z e d the w e s t by its d e t e r m i n e d e x p o r t drive in a declining world
market. T h e alarmist rhetoric of s o m e groups of manufacturers and
n e w s p a p e r proprietors served to intensify anti-Japanese sentiment in
Britain and A m e r i c a . In fact, British and J a p a n e s e exports were to a
large extent n o n - c o m p e t i t i v e and, e x c e p t for c o t t o n textiles, there w a s
n o e v i d e n c e in the 1 9 3 0 s of a serious decline in British trade as a result
of J a p a n e s e c o m p e t i t i o n . 2 2 Total J a p a n e s e imports into the U n i t e d
States actually d e c l i n e d steadily b e t w e e n 1 9 3 0 and 1 9 3 4 but because
the price of silk, hitherto the major J a p a n e s e export to the U n i t e d
States, h a d s l u m p e d , the J a p a n e s e diversified their exports. T h e appeara n c e of these n e w articles r o u s e d the a n t a g o n i s m of A m e r i c a n m a n u facturers of similar p r o d u c t s . 2 3 E x p o r t e r s of capital g o o d s in both
Britain a n d the U n i t e d States w i s h e d their respective governments to
adopt a conciliatory policy b e c a u s e the opportunities f o r t h e m in J a p a n
and M a n c h u k u o were g o o d . Japan's b a l a n c e of trade with both Britain
a n d the U n i t e d States w a s unfavourable. T h e outcry against J a p a n was
c a u s e d by the fact that Japan's trade was increasing w h e n world trade
w a s shrinking and J a p a n e s e g o o d s were appearing in markets to which
J a p a n h a d n o t hitherto exported. F o r e i g n hostility h a d its i m p a c t o n
J a p a n e s e p e r c e p t i o n s and reactions. It is hardly surprising that Japan's
stance after 1 9 3 6 w a s towards e c o n o m i c self-sufficiency and that governm e n t e x p e n d i t u r e f o r military p u r p o s e s did not s l o w d o w n . 2 4
T h e J a p a n e s e military saw the issues primarily in security rather than
in e c o n o m i c terms. T h e y were c o n c e r n e d with Japan's relations with
C h i n a and with s t e m m i n g the a d v a n c e of c o m m u n i s m o n the mainland.
M u c h of the J a p a n e s e army's strategic planning w a s based o n the
a s s u m p t i o n that a conflict with R u s s i a w a s i m p e n d i n g , the Japanese
were c o n s c i o u s of the 'perilous threat' p o s e d by the Soviet U n i o n and
the author of a recent b o o k o n the S i n o - J a p a n e s e war c o n t e n d s that
there is n o d o u b t that m u c h of Japan's policy w a s d e f e n s i v e . 2 5
T h e absorption of the army in strategy rather than with politicoe c o n o m i c f o r c e s is also stressed by A k i r a Iriye i n an essay, 'The Failure
of Military E x p a n s i o n i s m ' in Dilemmas
of Growth
in Prewar
Japanfi^
and in m o r e recent w o r k b y A k i r a F u j i w a r a . 2 7 Fujiwara's study appears
in w h a t is u n d o u b t e d l y o n e of the m o s t important b o o k s about international relations in east A s i a in the prewar period to b e published in
recent years. Pearl Harbour
as History,
Japanese
American
Relations
1931-1941,
edited b y D o r o t h y B o r g and S h u m p e i O k a m o t o , consists
of t w e n t y - s i x essays presented by A m e r i c a n and J a p a n e s e scholars at a
RF.CENT WRITINGS ABOUT EAST ASIA IN THE
1930s
159
bi-national c o n f e r e n c e held at L a k e K a w a g u c h i , Japan, in 1 9 6 9 . 2 8 T h e
Japanese essays are particularly valuable to w e s t e r n scholars in that
they m a k e available in English facts and interpretations f r o m b o t h
Japanese archival s o u r c e s and f r o m the m o s t recent J a p a n e s e p u b l i c a tions. T h e a p p r o a c h in all the essays is institutional, the idea b e i n g that
A m e r i c a n and J a p a n e s e specialists s h o u l d w o r k a l o n g parallel lines
e x a m i n i n g the o p e r a t i o n of various g o v e r n m e n t a l institutions b e t w e e n
1 9 3 1 and 1 9 4 1 . W h i l e the aim of the organizers of c o m p a r a t i v e a n d
parallel studies m a y not always h a v e b e e n a c h i e v e d , t h e effect of the
collection is to throw n e w light o n the f e w institutions in J a p a n and t h e
U n i t e d States which have already b e e n studied a n d to d r a w to attention
the role of others of w h i c h , hitherto, little has b e e n k n o w n .
In his essay, 'The R o l e of the J a p a n e s e A r m y ' , F u j i w a r a d e m o n strates that their training p r o d u c e d J a p a n e s e army officers w h o w e r e
aggressive in character, s e l f - c o n f i d e n t and o f t e n illogical. T h e m i d d l e rank officer w h o wielded m o s t influence in the 1 9 3 0 s l i v e d in a narrow
world w h i c h s e e m e d to h a v e lost m a n y of its c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h reality.
T h e army h a d a t e n d e n c y to react to each n e w situation as it d e v e l o p e d
instead of formulating an overall policy and F u j i w a r a s h o w s that as
o n e event f o l l o w e d another the army's d e c i s i o n s were progressively influenced by m e n w h o a d v o c a t e d a n aggressive p o l i c y . 2 9 J a p a n e s e sources
indicate that the M a r c o P o l o bridge incident of July 1 9 3 7 t o o k p l a c e
w h e n Japan w a s in the p r o c e s s of retreat f r o m C h i n a . 3 0 F a r m o r e c o n cerned with Russia, e v e n after this war broke out, army officers r e m a i n e d
h o p e f u l that s o m e h o w the C h i n e s e w o u l d r e c o g n i z e a n d appreciate the
ideal of 'harmony and c o - o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n Japan, M a n c h u k u o and
China' so that the three c o u l d w o r k together in a joint struggle against
c o m m u n i s m . 3 1 Only in m i d - 1 9 3 9 w a s conflict with Britain e n v i s a g e d
as a possibility and then it w a s seen as likely t o d e v e l o p , n o t out of
the Sino-Japanese war, but f r o m c h a n g e s in E u r o p e a n politics a n d as
part of a global conflagration. T h e c o n s t a n t h o p e w a s that, with A m e r i can mediation, the S i n o - J a p a n e s e war might be brought t o a n e n d a n d
hostilities with the U n i t e d States w e r e not e n v i s a g e d at that stage. E v i dently w h e n the army m o v e d s o u t h w a r d s into n o r t h I n d o - C h i n a in
1 9 4 0 its m o v e w a s n o m o r e than a 'desperate effort' to e n d the stalemate in China and the a v o i d a n c e of war w i t h the U n i t e d States w a s
still believed to be a feasible a i m . 3 2 Instead, such a war p r o v e d t o b e
the undesirable b y - p r o d u c t of that desperate effort. F o r W a s h i n g t o n ,
the Japanese m o v e into Southeast A s i a shifted the issue f r o m c o n c e r n
for the treaty structure to w h i c h the U n i t e d States, Britain and J a p a n
were partners in China, to d e f e n c e of the east A s i a n b a l a n c e of p o w e r .
T h e A m e r i c a n attitude began to harden. By 1 9 4 1 the army h a d recognized that Britain and the U n i t e d States c o u l d not be dealt with
separately and that war against o n e w o u l d inevitably i n v o l v e the other.
E v e n then the overriding idea of the planners w a s that the n a v y w o u l d
160
ANN TROTTER
bear the burden of the war in the Pacific and the army frequently acted
as if the q u e s t i o n of h o w the war in the Pacific d e v e l o p e d w a s a matter
of little c o n c e r n . It planned, after establishing control in Southeast Asia,
to w i t h d r a w its f o r c e s there to M a n c h u r i a in anticipation of conflict
with R u s s i a . 3 3 T h e army's actions w e r e crucial in bringing about war
with the U n i t e d States but clearly they were not so intended. T h e army
w a s u n a c c u s t o m e d to calculate in realistic terms and ignored all but its
o w n interests.
T h e J a p a n e s e navy, of course, had f o r long envisaged the possibility
of war with the U n i t e d States. In his essay, 'The J a p a n e s e navy and the
U n i t e d States', S a d a o A s a d a describes the gradual b r e a k d o w n in the
1 9 3 0 s of J a p a n e s e naval tradition and the m o d e r a t e leadership which
inherited i t . 3 4 A s in the army, the middle-rank officers c a m e to wield
m o s t influence. T h e navy's policy w a s increasingly m a r k e d by highly
e m o t i o n a l m o d e s of thinking; by an o b s e s s i o n with the n e e d to r e m o v e
the inferior naval ratio i m p o s e d o n J a p a n by the W a s h i n g t o n treaties
of 1 9 2 1 - 2 ; by s y m p a t h y with G e r m a n y ' s bid for rearmament and suspicion of the A m e r i c a n naval build-up; and by e x c e e d i n g l y conservative
strategic c o n c e p t s b o u n d to big guns and big battleships. M e n like
A d m i r a l s Y a m a m o t o and I n o u e , w h o w e r e c o n v i n c e d of the importance
of m o d e r n t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s and w h o were anti-Axis politically, lost ground. It w a s the mental habit of Japanese naval officers to
v i e w t h e m s e l v e s i n a d e f e n s i v e role vis-a-vis
the U n i t e d States, but in
reality their war plans were predicated o n Japan's taking the offensive
at the outset. T h e p o l i c y of 'southward a d v a n c e ' f o r m u l a t e d in 1 9 3 6
was part of the rationale for fleet e x p a n s i o n and the e m p h a s i s o n the
p r o s p e c t of war with the U n i t e d States part of the navy's c a m p a i g n for
a larger share of the national resources. A s the U n i t e d States increased
its e c o n o m i c pressure o n J a p a n after 1 9 4 0 , the navy's attitude b e c a m e
progressively m o r e bellicose. A p p a r e n t l y naval planners underestimated
the risk of an all-out e m b a r g o by the U n i t e d States and did not attempt
to study its implications. W h e n this e m b a r g o materialized they t o o k it
as u n m i s t a k a b l e proof that the U n i t e d States w a s prepared to g o to
war. A s a d a c o n c l u d e s that, 'lacking in firm leadership and racked by
c o n f u s i o n and dissension', the J a p a n e s e n a v y 'simply drifted' into war
with the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 3 5 It is clear f r o m this essay and that of Fujiwara
that a r m y / n a v y rivalry w a s a f a c t o r in this drift.
T h e e v i d e n c e of Fujiwara and A s a d a and of U s u i Katsumi, w h o
identifies f a c t i o n s within the F o r e i g n Ministry and the g r o w i n g influence
of a 'China' and an 'axis' f a c t i o n in the f 9 3 0 s , demonstrates the ina d e q u a c y of the n o t i o n of a c o h e r e n t aggressive J a p a n e s e policy being
pursued single-mindedly in this p e r i o d . 3 8 T h e picture is far m o r e c o m plicated. In addition, other researches indicate h o w unsatisfactory is
the c o n c e p t of a single nation's responsibility f o r the outbreak of war
in 1 9 4 1 . In retrospect the d e c a d e s f r o m 1 9 2 0 to 1 9 4 0 can be seen
RF.CENT WRITINGS ABOUT EAST ASIA IN THE
1930s
161
to b e a p e r i o d w h e n the a n g u i s h i n g p r o c e s s of c r e a t i n g a n e w w o r l d
stability w a s t a k i n g p l a c e . T h e E u r o p e - c e n t r e d s y s t e m of p r e - 1 9 1 4 w a s
c r u m b l i n g a n d w a s to b e r e p l a c e d by the A m e r i c a - d o m i n a t e d o n e w h i c h
e m e r g e d after 1 9 4 5 . 3 7 T h e d e p r e s s i o n s p e e d e d t h e p r o c e s s . I n t h e
p e r i o d , the w o r l d w a s n o t r e a d y either to a c c o m m o d a t e J a p a n ' s p e a c e f u l
e x p a n s i o n or to tolerate its military a g g r e s s i o n . I n c r e a s i n g A m e r i c a n
e c o n o m i c p r e s s u r e a f t e r 1 9 4 0 w a s b a s e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n that s o o n
J a p a n m u s t b e c o m p e l l e d to d e s i s t f r o m its a t t e m p t s to u p s e t t h e status
quo. Britain a n d the U n i t e d States t o o k their s t a n d o n a treaty s t r u c t u r e
w h i c h h a d c e a s e d to h a v e m u c h r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y
realities of e a s t A s i a . C h i a n g K a i - s h e k b e n e f i t e d f r o m b o t h B r i t a i n a n d
A m e r i c a n s u p p o r t a n d w a s in n o m o o d to n e g o t i a t e .
T h e A m e r i c a n s b e l i e v e d that J a p a n w o u l d a v o i d w a r a n d t h e y t o o
s i n c e r e l y w a n t e d p e a c e . B u t it w a s to b e p e a c e o n A m e r i c a n t e r m s . 3 8
C a p i t u l a t i o n t o t e r m s i n v o l v i n g the s u r r e n d e r of J a p a n e s e g a i n s i n C h i n a
was totally u n a c c e p t a b l e to the J a p a n e s e . I n a n y c a s e s u c h t e r m s o f f e r e d
no relief f r o m t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s of J a p a n ' s f r u s t r a t i o n w i t h
the w o r l d t r a d i n g p o s i t i o n , its f e a r o f c o m m u n i s m in e a s t A s i a a n d its
belief that, in t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n J a p a n
a n d C h i n a m u s t exist a n d b e r e c o g n i z e d . A n a l t e r n a t i v e w a s to fight.
W i t h o u t rationally c a l c u l a t i n g t h e c h a n c e s of J a p a n e s e v i c t o r y a n d i n
the spirit of a d o p t i n g a drastic s o l u t i o n in t h e h o p e o f ' f i n d i n g a w a y t o
life o u t of a s e e m i n g l y fatal s i t u a t i o n ' 3 9 t h e J a p a n e s e e m b r a c e d the
p r o s p e c t of a P a c i f i c w a r i n 1 9 4 1 .
T h e m o s t r e c e n t w r i t i n g a b o u t e a s t A s i a i n t h e 1 9 3 0 s s u g g e s t s that
the drift there l a y t o w a r d s c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n
in J a p a n a c c e l e r a t e d this drift; that t h e d i p l o m a c y of n o n e of t h e p o w e r s
i n v o l v e d w a s g e a r e d t o t h e k i n d of c o m p r o m i s e w h i c h m i g h t h a v e p r o d u c e d a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n . I n spite of t h e a m o u n t o f r e s e a r c h w h i c h
h a s b e e n carried o u t in t h e U n i t e d States a n d J a p a n , h o w e v e r , t h e r e
r e m a i n q u e s t i o n s to b e a n s w e r e d a n d t h e r e are a r e a s y e t t o b e e x p l o r e d .
A s a d d i t i o n a l s o u r c e s are utilized, n e w light will, n o d o u b t , b e s h e d o n
s o m e of t h e i s s u e s o v e r w h i c h s c h o l a r s n o w p u z z l e a n d d i s a g r e e . It
s e e m s e v i d e n t , h o w e v e r , that there is n o s i m p l e f o r m u l a t o e x p l a i n t h e
c o m p l e x i n t e r a c t i o n of f o r c e s w h i c h m a d e t h e p e r i o d f r o m 1 9 3 1 to
1 9 4 1 s u c h a d i s t u r b e d d e c a d e f o r t h e n a t i o n s of e a s t A s i a .
ANN
TROTTER
University of Otago
N O T E S
1
In 1968 the fifty year rule was replaced by a thirty year rule and documents
for the 1930s became available at the Public Record Office in London.
- Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, ed., Taiheiyo senso e no michi (The R o a d to
162
A N N TROTTER
the Pacific War), 8 vols., Tokyo, 1962-3, is the most complete Japanese account
of the period. It concentrates on military matters.
3
The theme 'Economic Development' includes the study of Japan's economic
development, 1918-70. The theme 'International Relations' includes the Origins
of World War II, 1919-41.
4
Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League
and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933, London, 1972, p. 417.
5
Akira Iriye, 'Japan's Foreign Policies between World Wars: Sources and
Interpretations' in Esmonde M. Robertson, ed., The Origins of the Second World
War, London, 1971, p. 271.
6
William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation,
1937-1940, New York, 1952; The Undeclared War, New York, 1953.
7
For example, Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbour, Princeton, 1950;
Samuel E. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931 - April 1942, Boston,
1955; Basil Rauch, Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbour, New York, 1950.
8
David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial
Conspiracy, London, 1971; Panther
paperback, 1972.
9
See for example Shumpei Okamoto, Journal of Asian Studies XXXI, 2
(February 1972); James B. Crowley, New York Times Book Review, 24 October
1971.
10
Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American
Relations,
1941, Ithaca, 1958; William L. Neumann, America Encounters Japan, Baltimore,
1963.
11
James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy,
Princeton, 1966.
12 Waldo H . Heinrichs Jr., '1931-1937', in Ernest R. May and James C.
Thomson Jr., eds., American East Asian Relations: A Survey, Cambridge, Mass.,
1972, pp. 245-6 suggests that international relations in this period of national
autonomy might be profitably studied by way of domestic political histories, and
cites the disquieting effect on Japan of American naval programmes in 1933 and
1934 which were to a large extent a response to the problem of unemployment
in the United States.
13
F. S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant, London, 1967, p. 269.
14
for the development of this Japanese thesis see James B. Crowley, 'Intellectuals as Visionaries of the New Asian Order', in Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar
Japan, Princeton, 1971, pp. 337-42.
15
See Ann Trotter, 'Tentative steps for an Anglo-Japanese Rapprochement in
1934', Modern Asian Studies, VIII, 1, 1974.
16
Usui Katsumi, Nitchu Senso (Sino-Japanese war), Tokyo, 1967, p. 18. See
Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia 1933-1937 (Cambridge, forthcoming) for the
British side of the Leith Ross mission and Chinese currency reform.
17
Richard W. Leopold, 'Historiographical Reflections', in Dorothy Borg and
Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbour as History, Japanese American
Relations
1931-1941, New York, 1973, p. 19.
18
By the Nine Power treaty of 1921, Britain, Japan, the United States, France,
Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and China agreed that China's territorial and
administrative integrity would be respected and the open door maintained.
19
Norman A. Graebner, 'Hoover, Roosevelt and the Japanese', in Borg and
Okamoto, p. 34.
20
Britain's investment of £244.2 millions in China was the largest foreign
investment in that country but represented less than 6% of British overseas
investment. Japan's investment of £233.5 millions represented 81% of her investment overseas.
21 Hugh T. Patrick, 'The Economic Muddle of the 1920's', in Dilemmas of
Growth in Prewar Japan, p. 256.
22 See Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia 1933-1937. The decline in cotton
textile exports was, in fact, due as much to the growth of the local industry in
India and China as it was to Japanese competition.
23
Mira Wilkins, 'The Role of U.S. Business', in Borg and Okamoto, p. 342.
Japanese exports to the United States recovered to almost their 1931 level by
1937 and slumped dramatically after 1938. See Table I, p. 371, in Borg and
Okamoto.
24
See Yamamura Katsuro, 'The Role of the Finance Ministry', in Borg and
RF.CENT WRITINGS ABOUT EAST ASIA IN THE
1930s
163
Okamoto, pp. 287-302; Patrick, p. 262; James B. Crowley, 'A New Deal for
Japan and Asia' in James B. Crowley, ed., Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, New York, 1970, pp. 249-50.
- 5 John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War 1937-1945, Stanford, 1972,
pp. 34, 45.
Akira Iriye, The Failure of Military Expansionism', in Dilemmas of Growth
in Prewar Japan, pp. 107-38.
Akira Fujiwara, 'The Role of the Japanese army' in Borg and Okamoto,
pp. 189-95.
New York, 1973.
-'•' Fujiwara, pp. 189-95.
Akira Iriye, 'Japanese Imperialism and Aggression', in Robertson, The
Origins of the Second World War, p. 252.
si Iriye, 'The Failure of military Expansionism', p. 113.
Fujiwara, p. 191.
33 ibid., p. 195.
Sadao Asada, 'The Japanese navy and the United States', in Borg and
Okamoto, pp. 225-60.
ibid., p. 250.
3<i
Usui Katsumi, 'The Role of the Foreign Ministry', in Borg and Okamoto,
pp. 127-48.
•"•7 Geoffrey Barracloueh, 'Hitler and Hirohito' in New York Review of Books,
31 May 1973, p. 12.
38 Norman A. Graebner, 'Hoover, Roosevelt and the Japanese' in Borg and
Okamoto, pp. 25-52 contains a useful account of Roosevelt's policy and American
thinking.
3» Asada, p. 255.
The Journal of Pacific History
IX — 1974
Chiefly civil servants? Ambiguity
in district
administration
and the preservation
of a
Fijian way of life 1896-1940
Firearms and indigenous warfare: a case study
A question of origins: an exploration of some
oral traditions of the Enga of New Guinea
Francis Drake in Mindanao?
The conflict between the London
Missionary
Society and the Wesleyan Methodists in mid19tli century Samoa
Toward a reassessment of Gordon in Fiji
Cargoism and politics in Bougainville
19621972
Colonialism and Christianity: the Melanesian
Mission in the Solomon Islands
Charles Andrew Sharp (1906-1974)
T. J .
MACNAUGHT
K. R.
HOWE
RODERIC
LACEY
WILLIAM
JOHN
IAN
A.
LESSA
GARRETT
HEATH
E U G E N E OGAN
DAVID HILLIARD
J.
GOLSON
Sections on Current Developments, Notes and Documents and
Publications
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