Paper prepared for the 2016 ECPR Graduate Student Conference (Ta rtu)
Anita Samardzija
National cohesion: The EU for a better Serbia
Anita Samardzija
RMIT University, Australia
Abstract
In this presentation I will focus on Serbia’s European Union integration process from a
national identity framework. I will demonstrate how the EU does not fit the Serbian ethnonational imaginary and integration is thus framed as a need for Serbia. An emphasis on
Serbia’s ‘traditional’ and ‘hereditary’ national markers point Serbia away from Western
Europe, as does an alleged history of a tense relationship with great European powers.
Tradition, memories, language, the alphabet, and religion are only some of the markers
that push it to the Orthodox East region instead. Claims to primordialism are common,
suggesting fundamental and inherent differences between Serbia and Western Europe.
The image of the EU is one of a self-interested power, but also a symbol of modernity. Its
aims are seen as selfish and its alleged oppression of Serbs in the past raises suspicion.
The ‘Western’ processes of capitalism and democracy that Serbs have experienced have
so far been negative. Some citizens interpret it as drawing out negative, corrupt behaviour
in Serb society. Simultaneously, such perceptions point to images of a negative national
self-identity and an ideal West: ‘we’ are corrupt and backward, unlike the modern and
progressive Western Europe. In order to become ‘successful’ like the West, Serbia must
distance itself from its fundamental markers. Contemporary politics feed the identity
‘crossroad’ for Serbia, especially the tensions between Russia and other EU member
states and the pressure they are both putting on to the Serbian government.
Despite this, Serbian political elites are arguing in favour of EU integration. However, there
is no attempt to make Serbia part of the European imaginary by them, just an offer of a
better future. Membership is presented as a need for the state and its people.
Note: this is a preliminary version. Please do not cite or circulate without permission from the author.
Introduction
Serbia has been perceived as a state in which ethno-nationalist identity thrives. The Yugoslav civil wars
saw ultra-nationalist rhetoric spread in an attempt to mobilise a constituency and legitimise an ethnonationalist state. Familiar markers that indicated group membership were emphasised and
manipulated. The markers also attributed values and behaviours to members of the group, giving
meaning to a community. The context for Serbs today is different; the conflicts have ended, citizens
are dealing with repercussions from the wars, globalization is ever present, and Serbia has pledged
European Union membership. But the strength of identity appears to remain; nationalist rhetoric
continues and support for EU integration has been declining. Serbian citizens were initially eager to
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join the Union. There was enthusiasm after the ousting of Milošević and a new chapter seemed to be
on the horizon. After president Đinđić’s death, however, the community was reminded of the
hardships in their lives and cyclical problems in Serbian politics. The slow process of integration has
also marked a dent in support, with Serbs seeing their country in a state of stagnation an d the EU as
a plethora of empty promises. What’s more, some see the concessions required for membership as
drastic and a blow to national dignity.
That latter part of ‘national’ dignity evokes an identity debate in the context of EU integration. It is
precisely Serb identification with the West that has been a focus on some academic research (Spasić
and Cvetičanin 2013; Subotić 2011; Todorova 2009; Volčič 2005). The European Union is considered
as the embodiment of Western European values. After all, the ‘standards’ that are expect ed of
potential members are the values of the dominant existing members. A relationship with Europe thus
indicates a relationship with the EU. Identification with the EU, however, has been ambiguous for
Serbs. Volčič found that Serb citizens didn’t see themselves as a definite part of Europe. On a wider
scale, Todorova (2009) considers the view of Serbia and other Balkan states, and has concluded that
the countries are seen as not European by the West itself. Subotić (2010; 2011) argues that Serbia’s
lack of identity with Europe has resulted in undedicated integration process. It is as though EU
membership is not part of Serbia’s fate.
Nevertheless, EU integration dominates public discourse and the government has pledged
commitment to future membership. What the aforementioned debate alone tells us is that identity is
valued; it is perceived that identity is important in directing actions. And since identity is valued—and
has been used to legitimise a Serbian nation-state in the past—I asked whether a more ‘European’
Serb identity was being fostered. After all, theory does argue that a strong identity can be manifested
in the judicial and geo-political spheres. Identification with Europe, or at least a relationship with EU
member states, would theoretically encourage support for EU integration.
I thus decided to analyse what kind of identity is being projected in Serbia today. Taking the country’s
capital Belgrade as my ‘field’, I explored the image of Serbs that was being reproduced and positioned
it within the wider EU integration debate.
I explain my research process in detail in the literature review and methodology below. In them I delve
into the scholarly debates on Serbian national identity, how it has been measured in the past, and the
methods that I undertook to understand the community. The bulk of the paper is dedicated to my
argument though, which is separated into two main parts. The first is an analysis of the Serbian
imaginary; it is an exploration of the dominant reliance on claims to inheritance and antiquity, but also
the negative national self-identity of Serbs as corrupt. I then move on to discussing the way that
Europe—and ultimately the EU—is imagined. This means situating the understanding of the Serb
community in to the European imaginary. That is, I point out how the two seem incompatible. The
most dominant is the perception of Western European states as self-interested powers who exploit
weaker nations. Simultaneously, however, there also seems to be an acceptance of that power and
some see the EU as the only one that could bring about meaningful change. It was evident that the
lived experience of Serbs affected their view of integration, in which the pro-EU stance is therefore
being presented as a need for Serbia. That is, the potential benefits of joining the EU outweigh the
possibility of losing one’s national integrity.
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Literature review
Understanding the nation
To begin, let us consider how national identity is understood. For this I use the now classical theory of
the ‘imagined community’ by Anderson (2006), which he defines as an “imagined political community
– and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 2006, 6). The nation is therefore
a large collective whose members share feelings of belonging despite not all members knowing one
another. Community members believe they share characteristics that are unique to their group and
there are markers that have come to symbolise their community. Anderson’s definition of a nation
being both ‘limited and sovereign’ is significant. It is sovereign in that the collective has independence
and self-rule, but it is limited in that beyond it lie ‘other’ nations. Members of a nation therefore not
only have an image of their own community, but also of ‘other’ communities. Those who do not share
the characteristics of a community do not belong to it. Anderson’s use of the term ‘sovereign’
demonstrates his position as a ‘modernist’, in that nations have formed alongside modern political
formations; the ‘nation’ makes sense in the modern system of nation-states. National sovereignty is
thus valued and national self-determination becomes the epitome of the emancipation of the nation.
I now turn to Hearn (2006). He positions national identity as an integral part of nationalism, which is
also situated in the modern international state system. Hearn defines nationalism as “the making of
combined claims, on behalf of a population, to identity, to jurisdiction and to a territory” (Hearn 2006,
11). The claim to identity is the categorization of nations and an understanding of their ‘substantive
content’. By ‘categorization’ he means the naming and labelling of a nation, where it is seen as a
community separate from other communities. The latter, ‘substantive content’, are the supposed
peculiar characteristics of that community. These characteristics can range from symbols and
language, to religion and values. The claim to jurisdiction allows that identity to be implemented
legally. This is where sovereignty and national self-determination begin to take form; legislature is
used to secure identity, such as standardising a national language or opening a ‘national’ museum that
tells the history of the national community. However, the laws need a place to make them ‘real’; hence
the claim to territory. The territory is a physical area where the legal implementation of identity can
take place. The three claims can be uneven, as their importance depends on the context and
community in question. What Hearn stresses, however, is that the ‘packaging’ of the claims together
is what makes nationalism. And those who have the power to direct the claims are aware of that
packaging.
While I focus on national identity in my paper, Hearn’s theory allows me to point to claims of territory
and jurisdiction that are constant discourses in studies of national identity. As I wrote above, national
sovereignty is valued and is the ultimate manifestation of a national identity.
Members of a community are constantly exposed to an image of their nation, influencing the
understanding that they have of it. Markers of the community are reproduced en masse and become
familiar points of reference for citizens. They can be simple markers such as flags, national anthems
or atlases, or the standardisation of one national language. Billig (1995) refers to such symbols, images
and processes as ‘banal’ nationalism. They are banal in that they are treated and later accepted as
normal, familiar and necessary, nothing out of the ordinary. At times of crisis, the symbols can be used
to remind the citizenry of their national belonging and of their duty to the nation.
To return to Hearn, he argues that the claims to identity, jurisdiction and territory are made on behalf
of a population by a small group of individuals. These individuals are aware of the interdependency
between the claims and know to combine them in order for them to ‘work’. The individuals are a small
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group who have the power to direct the claims. I call these individuals ‘agents of meaning-making’, as
coined in the discourse analysis fields. Here I include van Dijk (1997) and his methodological process
of critical discourse analysis. Van Dijk sees reality produced through discourses. The discourses are
directed by those who have power over them and they work to normalise certain thoughts and
behaviour in the masses. He states that the repetition of arguments, or even style, draws attention to
preferred meanings and enhances “construction of such meanings in mental modes and their
memorization in ongoing persuasion attempts or later recall” (van Dijk 1997, 35). So if we consider the
‘banal’ images that Billig speaks of, the images become normal and familiar to a population. They can
later be used for mobilisation purposes, especially at times of crisis. Van Dijk names the power over
discourse as the ‘control of discourse’ specifically. With that he refers to the control of the minds of
the people. In the context of nationalism, the agents of meaning-making are those who have the
power to make meaning out of national identity among the masses. An example is those who have
the power to enforce the standardisation of a particular language.
Serbs as a nation
Scholarly works on national identity and nationalism in Serbia were made abundant during and after
the Yugoslav civil wars (Ramet 2005). The conflicts have been attributed to nationalism by ethnic
groups, of which Serb nationalism had culminated in committing genocide of other groups. Nationalist
mobilisation in the Balkans was rife following the death of Tito, and Serbs were mobilised on the basis
of being Serb. The mobilisation was an option because an image of the Serb nation already existed.
Other groups, such as Croats, Bosniaks and Macedonians were no exception. There were
understanding of what it means to be Serb, with markers used to differentiate them from other
groups. The markers—and the messages that came with them—were emphasized through the media,
political events and gatherings, and control of access to resources.
Duijzings (2000) analysed group identity in Kosovo and demonstrates how ethnicity, religion and
cultural tradition was combined to make group distinctions. He points to Serb Orthodoxy becoming a
key part of ‘being Serb’ and religious stories infiltrated folklore and traditional customs. Žanić’s (2007)
analysis specifically shows the growing connection between religion and politics in the Balkans. He
tells how political events were held on religious holidays and how religious martyrs were positioned
as part of a Serbian state agenda. Žanić considers the Saint Vitus Day celebrations of the late 1800’s
as a turning point in the Serb national story; the young Serbian state (monarchy) celebrated the story
of Saint Vitus as though their independence was a resurrection of an agenda. Žanić considers this as
an important moment as from then on, political demands were made by a group who shared a religion.
Religion as a core of national identity ‘sacralises’ the nation. It suggests that spirituality is in the
essence of the community’s members, that they embody the values of Orthodoxy. Consequently, a
religious framework also provides a good/evil dichotomy of groups, where the in -group is ‘doing the
good’ and the out-groups are not (Duijzings 2000). Following the Yugoslav conflicts, there has been
religious resurgence amongst the region’s national groups. We have seen a ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘reevangelization’ of discourse and space, with religious markers and customs emphasized (Ramet 2014).
Where religion is supposedly the foundation of a culture, different religious symbols and customs that
were once private become collective identity markers, and publically so. Religious markers are thus
incorporated into public space and collective rituals (Pantelić 2007). Radović (2013) analysed
cityscapes in former Yugoslav cities and in them saw the articulation of religion. The nati onal group in
power expressed their religion in the design of the towns and cities; religious monuments were raised
and places of worship built.
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Public rituals have also been infiltrated by folklore, another key marker for Serbs and other Balkan
groups. Lore ties in notion of shared biology and inherited historical experiences; traditional customs
and characteristics are supposedly passed down through generations of Serbs. The contemporary
community members are part of ‘tradition’ and part of an ongoing story. The history is used to justify
contemporary actions and legitimise the political elite. Žanić describes how folklore was incorporated
into political events in the 1980s and 1990s. Then, political events were held on religious holidays,
attendees wore traditional dress and epic political songs were sung along to the national instrument,
the gusle. Žanić argues that these acts were “above all to develop social solidarity and encourage
national identification, that is, to renew the common value system into which contemporary relations,
events and personalities will then automatically fit” (2007, 71). It appears that leaders of Serb
nationalist movements were aware of the potential of a cohesive community for political purposes.
What I mean by this is that agents of meaning-making took familiar images and clichés, and used them
for mobilisation at times of crisis.
Having a strong ethno-national identity consequently legitimized the fight for a Greater Serbia, for an
ethno-national state. This is precisely where Hearn’s emphasis on claims to identity, jurisdiction and
territory come together.
In a more contemporary context, Serbia’s slow EU integration process has been attributed to
nationalist identity. Subotić (2011) argues that ‘Europeanization’ was never a dedicated mission for
the Serbian government. It never fundamentally identified with Europe and its push for EU integration
was an excuse for obtaining different domestic goals, hence the slow and incomplete progress. For
Slovenia and Croatia, on the other hand, she interprets their EU membership as having been part of
an existing (and wanting) relationship with the West. Here we see value put on collective memories,
which is evident in the Serbia’s East/West identity debate. The function of national memories is to
help form a sense of national consciousness. They are used to direct contemporary thoughts, actions
and even policies. It is with this understanding that a lack of a European legacy explains the lack of
commitment to EU integration.
Some earlier works may help us understand this (Bakić-Hayden 1995; Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992;
Todorova 2009). These researchers used the framework of Orientalism to make sense of the image of
the Balkans, both within the region and outside. Bakić-Hayden and Hayden (1992) found an Orientalist
representation of cultures and societies amongst Yugoslav peoples based on geography. Within the
framework of Europe as ‘progressive’ and the East or Orient as ‘backward’ and ‘wild’, groups in
Yugoslavia were positioned in one of these camps based on the location of territories and national
homelands. For Yugoslavia, the republics were divided into progressive (north) west nations and
backward, barbaric (south) east nations. Croats and Slovenes were represented as more ‘European’,
while Serbs less so. Even though there were Serbs living in the Croatian territory, their homeland was
the backward Serbian territory. Todorova (2009) broadens the Orientalist framework to be that of the
Balkans region itself. She argues that ‘the Balkans’ is a label that is associated with perceived
assumptions of backwardness, wildness and exoticism of the Balkan peoples. The label refers to the
Ottoman legacy of the region. This Orientalist image of the Balkans exists amongst dominant
(Western) groups and the framework was projected on to the Balkan peoples. Todorova has labelled
this ‘Balkanism’. Interestingly, Volčič (2005) found that Serbs have, in a way, accepted the orientalist
view of the Balkans as being exotic, wild and mystical.
Methodology and methods
In order to capture the ‘European’ identity of the Serb national imaginary, I employed a mixed data
collection method. They were analysis of contemporary texts, structured observation of public spaces
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and twenty-two semi-structured interviews. The data was collected over two periods of fieldwork in
Belgrade, Serbia, in 2013 and 2014. Only the interviews were conducted in the 2014 period.
Each of the data items (such as an interview or a museum) is treated as a ‘text’ in this paper to suit
the critical discourse analysis that I conducted on the data gathered. That is, I analysed each text
collected on the ‘micro’, ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ levels. By this I mean that I analysed the text itself, the
agent who produced it and who it was produced for, as well as the wider context of power relations.
The methodology follows aforementioned van Dijk (1997) who argues that texts are parts of
discourses that create a certain ‘reality’.
Analysis of contemporary texts
I analysed eight history textbooks from the three final years of the Serbian primary school curriculum.
The eight textbooks were:
a) three from the sixth grade (Bubalo and Bečanović 2010; Mihaljčić 2011; Šuica and Radić 2012);
b) three from the seventh (Antić and Bondžić 2012; Bataković 2010; Bečanović, Jevrić, and
Petrović 2011); and
c) two from the eighth (Đurić and Pavlović 2010; Vajagić and Stošić 2011).
The sixth grade textbooks begin with the history of the Middle Ages and end with contemporary
history in the eighth grade publications.
The data from the media used were:
a) two popular Serbian newspapers Politika and Večernje Novosti from August-October 2013;
and
b) one article series from the newspaper Dnevni List Danas1
The Danas series consisted of eight articles under the umbrella title Why does Serbia need the EU?.
Published in June 2013, they were authored by government members, political elites and intellectuals.
In them the authors gave their opinion on Serbia waiting to receive the official date for the beginning
of EU integration negotiations. Although Danas is not the most widely circulated paper, the article
series was relevant to politics of identity and they were written by those in positions of power,
sounding the opinion of the government, intellectual community and organizations. Politika, on the
other hand, is a popular Serbian daily newspaper. It is circulated widely and is seen as reflecting views
of the government. Večernje Novosti is also popular, but it is a daily tabloid newspaper. I bought the
two hardcopy newspapers each day for five weeks and collected the articles that I deemed relevant
to my thesis. A link to the article’s online version has been added where possible.
Structured observation
Observation of the following public spaces was conducted: four Belgrade museums, one open-air
exhibition and two parks.
The four Belgrade museums that I observed were:
a) the National Museum of Serbia (Narodni muzej);
b) the Historical Museum of Serbia (Istorijski muzej Srbije) (IMS);
c) the Military Museum (Vojni Muzej);
1
I will refer to this newspaper as simply Danas from now on.
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d) the Ethnographic Museum (Etnografski muzej); and
Of the four, the National Museum was the only one of the institutions that did not have a permanent
exhibition. It has been under renovation and conservation for over a decade and only sections of the
building are open at a time. All others held temporary exhibitions alongside its permanent displays,
save for the Military Museum who collaborated with the IMS for temporary exhibitions.
The specific temporary exhibitions that were a source of observation were:
a) The following one held at the National Museum of Serbia in 2014
a. Light in the Darkness of World War One: the finest creations of the protagonists of
Impressionism in Serbia2
b) The following three held at the Historical Museum of Serbia
a. Imagining the Balkans: identities and memory in the long 19th century: travelling
exhibition in 2013
b. In the name of the people: political repression in Serbia 1944-1953 held in 2013,
c. Serbia 1914 held in conjunction with the Military Museum in 2014; and
c) The following one held at the Ethnographic Museum in 2014
a. Gusle: they speak when all else is quiet: gusle of the Ethnographic Museum in
Belgrade
I used exhibition catalogues where available to enriched the data, provide more details to the
exhibitions and give us a further insight into the curators’ interpretations of the displays’ meanings.
The open-air temporary exhibition observed was:
a) Gazed into the sky a 2013 installation on WWII on the Sava Promenade, Kalamegdan Fortress,
observed in September 2014
The installation was run by the ‘Belgrade Fortress’ committee, the Belgrade City Museum and the
Military Museum that is also in the vicinity (Beogradska Tvrdjava 2014). The displays were based on
the war diaries of famous Yugoslavian laureate Ivo Andrić. Quotes from his entries were accompanied
by images.
The two public spaces observed were:
a) Tašmajdan Park
b) Karađorđe Park
The two parks are in prominent locations of Belgrade and hold political and historical significance.
Tašmajdan Park stands on King Alexander Boulevard and is one of the biggest in Belgrade. It has been
extensively renovated after it was damaged in the bombing of the RTS building beside it by NATO in
1999. The area has a long history and is the place of the Old Belgrade Cemetery from the first half of
the twentieth century. Karađorđe Park’s location is on Liberation Boulevard and stands on Vračar Hill,
one of the highest points in Belgrade. The Saint Sava Temple and National Library are located there.
The Temple is said to have been built where the Ottomans had burnt the relics of Saint Sava during
their occupation.
2
The sub-title reads: In honour of the 170th anniversary of the foundation of the National Museum in Belgrade:
a cautionary reminder of 100 years since the outbreak of World War One
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Semi-structured interviews
The final method of data collection was semi-structured interviews. I conducted twenty-two
interviews with participants being from the following three industry groups: academic, arts
community, and cultural stall sellers. Seven interviews were conducted in the academic industry, nine
in the arts industry and six of cultural stall sellers. The art industry includes artists, art critics, curators
and art gallery workers.
The Serbian imaginary
My focus in this section is on the image of the Serb nation today. I was curious to find out whether the
claims to primordialism that were dominant during the civil wars have been replaced with symbols
and supposed characteristics that would enable Serbs to envision themselves as part of Europe.
However, my research instead pointed to a continuing reliance on claims to primordialism. The claims
provide an image of the Serb nation as one of tradition, inheritance, antiquity and morals. These are
all unique to the Serb peoples and differentiate them from other groups. At the same time, however,
negative perception of national self-identity also emerged; Serbs appear to self-prescribe corruptness
to their own community.
It is inherent
The dominant Serbian national marker in my data was that of Serbian Orthodoxy. While this is no
‘new’ finding, I show the presence of religion in the contemporary context. To begin, the school history
textbooks I analysed present religion as part of the history of the nation. The accepting of the religion
is presented as the beginning of the Serb nation, with one textbook even labelled the Slav adoption of
Christianity as the beginning of ‘civilisation’. All three sixth-year textbooks detailed the lives of Serb
Orthodox missionaries and their roles in cementing autocephalous status for the Serbian Orthodox
Church. They are portrayed as embodying the heavens, articulating God’s message. Serbian Orthodoxy
is therefore the language of God and national integrity their mission. The f igures are positioned within
a linear history of the Serb people, as though their actions were one of many in a line of many actions
that lead to contemporary Serbs. They are also heralded as protectors of culture, founders of
education and keepers of the faith. Tradition and progress are thus both attributed to them. It is the
duty of contemporary Serbs to show their gratitude to these figures by celebrating the feast day of
the relevant patron Saint. The celebration is called the slava. The patron Saint of education is Saint
Sava and all school institutions are to pay homage to him, as taught by the textbooks. In fact, many
‘sectors’ have their own patron saint.
The Ethnographic Museum of Serbia is one state institution that upholds Orthodoxy as part of its
being, and performs a public Slava ritual. In 2014, the Museum celebrated its own patron saint – the
Nativity of Mary – and posted images on its social media pages. In the images, Museum staff
participated in the religious ritual, with a priest and a religious choir in attendance. Combined with
the history textbooks, attributing the nation to Orthodoxy is portrayed as a significant, but regular
part of Serbian life.
The emphasis of national history was also evident in a temporary exhibition held at the Ethnographic
Museum. The exhibition focused on the national instrument gusle and the opening address repeatedly
called the gusle important for keeping the Serb national identity alive. The exhibition presented the
function of the instrument as one of passing on the story of the nation. Stories were told alongside
gusle playing and the catalogue describes how families gathered and sung about the ‘Kosovo tale’.
Prince Lazar, the protagonist of the epic myth, allegedly sent a mythical code through the gusle,
knowing that it would be passed down through generations. Serb descendants will therefore always
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be aware of history and ‘the truth’. This framing of the instrument “reaffirms the Kosovo myth as
establishing a historical continuity between the contemporary Serbian nation and the ‘Serbs’ of the
Middle Ages, suggesting a perennial nation” (Bieber 2002, 96). The gusle therefore tells the story of
the nation; it teaches Serbs where they had come from and the knowledge they inherited from their
ancestors. Kosovo as a significant territory is also reaffirmed and contemporary Serbs as part of Lazar’s
battle for freedom and sovereignty.
The discourse surrounding the gusle also points to Serbdom as essential, as something that is
hereditary and natural. The exhibition and catalogue both acknowledge that non-Serbs in the region
also play the instrument, but the author(s) argue that this is only because they are converted Serbs.
According to them, the instrument only ‘opens up’ to Serbs, to those who have the Serb essence in
them. So Albanian players, for instance, awoke the gusle with their ancient inherent Serb quality.
However, by converting to Islam, these communities also turned their back on the message of values
and of ‘doing the good’. They are no longer articulated the message of God. According to the Museum,
the gusle:
“have been the voice of public opinion, the internet of the past; they embody the moral principle of
epic poetry, always taking the side of those who do the good…[Their] social role has been to turn
people towards the good”
‘Those who do the good’ are Serbs since they have a spiritual relationship with the instrument. The
‘goodness’ that the gusle draws out are also values and morals that are ultimately timeless, allowing
them to be understood and embodied by people today.
The reliance on religion for Serb survival means that Orthodoxy needs to be allowed to thrive. Any
repression of Orthodoxy is thus oppression of Serbs the people, just as any oppression of the Serb
people is an oppression of Orthodoxy and ‘the good’. In the contemporary sense, the best way for
either to ‘thrive’ is in national state sovereignty. A history of conflict was dominant in my research,
and in these histories, the nation or religion were oppressed.
These exact narratives of oppression were dominant in two WWI-specific exhibitions: Serbia 1914 held
at the IMS and Light in the darkness of WWI held at the National Museum. Both exhibitions explain
Serbia’s involvement in the Great War as necessary. In the narratives, Serbs were forced to fight for
their survival and their right to sovereignty. Serbia 1914 tells the story of WWI through military
manoeuvres and battles. In the exhibition, Balkan peoples are portrayed as distressed and exploited
by Austro-Hungary’s ‘colonizing attitude’. Gavrilo Princip and other members of Young Bosnia were
“deeply aware of the necessity to resist Austro-Hungarian domination”, as the Empire’s actions
provoked “memories of the Kosovo oath and the Saint Vitus Day tradition” (one of where the
protagonist of the myth is a martyr for the Serb people). Similarly, Light in the darkness of WWI also
names Serbs as fighting for their divine rights. Curator Miljković focuses on impressionist artists in this
exhibition, many of them who became politically active in the war. One of the protagonists is famous
Serb painter Nadežda Petrović. Miljković positions Petrović’s actions in the Biblical stories of the Serb
heavenly nation and argues that the impressionists “did not love war, they loved their country…They
earned their place in the pantheon of the righteous, and defeated the evil of the war”. Once again,
the tie to religion makes the artists those who ‘do the good’ and their enemies ‘evil’, and to battle for
‘the good’ was not of their choosing.
Another museum that told the story of oppression and then bravery was the Military Museum. This
institution tells the history of the Balkan peoples through battles and conflicts through a permanent
exhibition. It is designed as a long and winding hallway that leads the visitor through a chronological
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and linear history. A major part of the Military Museum is dedicated to WWII in which there are three
main narratives: oppression by fascists and the Nazis, the rising up of brave resistance movements led
by the likes of Tito, and finally the liberation of Slavs by the Partisans. The chronology ends with the
‘Tito room’, in which his statue stands in front of images of happy, ‘liberated’ citizens. It is clear that
the museum was created with the aim of legitimising Tito’s socialist regime; the Balkan peoples were
on the verge of extinction before the Partisans saved them. This museum’s narrative therefore does
not fit the WWI exhibition discussed above. Although it demonstrates details of Serb oppression,
bravery is not sourced from religion. Instead, people found courage in brotherhood and unity. In the
context of this paper, therefore, this museum reinforces the image of a history of conflict and
oppression, but the source of liberation differs 3 .
The nation as the manifestation of a religious doctrine is symbolised in Belgrade’s public spaces.
Karađorđe Park, situated on the high Vračar Hill, is home to the grand Saint Sava Temple. So far it
stands as the tallest Orthodox structure in the world and has a prominent position in Belgrade’s
cityscape. At night it is lit up and visible from other parts of the city. The Park is named after Karađorđe,
the leader of the First Serbian Uprising who fought against Ottoman rule and for the establishment of
a Serbian monarchy. Karađorđe also founded the Karađorđević dynasty. A monument to Karađorđe
on a mound is in the Park’s vicinity. The statue stands tall and confident, as if recently victorious. He
is also stands guard in front of the Temple, however, warning any possible attackers. The image
projected is one of Karađorđe, a figure from the 1800’s, achieving what Saint Sava and other
missionaries started. It is as though his faith remained central to his cause. Although he fought for a
monarchy, the context of Serb independence today is one of sovereignty as a modern nation -state
with a representative government. Interestingly, during my fieldwork in October 2014, the media
reported of plans to move the urn of scientist Nikola Tesla to Karađorđe Park. It was the continuation
of a public debate that had occurred earlier in the year and saw much opposition by civil society.
Večernje Novosti (Dragović 2014; Večernje Novosti 2014) suggested that the move would allow Tesla
to join the two “Serbian giants” already there, to “join the Greats of the Serbian people”. Although
there continues opposition to the move of the urn, the symbolic gesture is to se e the marriage of
historic religion, the sovereign state and modernity in the form of technology.
The IMS’ permanent exhibition celebrates the leaders of the Serbian uprisings too. The new museum
was opened by president Nikolić in 2013 with an exhibition dedicated to the Karađorđević and
Obrenović dynasties. The exhibition has subsequently become permanent where the two families’
wealth is on display, referencing a royal Serb history and a rich history. At the opening ceremony,
Nikolić reportedly stated that the Museum’s task was to “preserve the memory of the people” no
matter what “the temptations are from globalization and its attempts to delete all ethnic heritage and
characteristics” (Blic Online 2013). His statement alone captures the dominant trend that I found: one
that responded to globalization and modernity by emphasising tradition. It is common for nations to
refer to ‘Golden Ages’ of their past. Serbia’s Golden Age has been the medieval Serbian Empire, of
which the Kosovo Battle has a place. The IMS’ permanent exhibition does indeed refer to a royal past,
but a more recent one (and one that is ‘fresher’ in the national memories). Just as with the Empire of
the Middle Ages, these royal houses were forcibly taken away.
3
A new section has been added to the Military Museum that focuses on Serbia’s involvement in UN peacekeeping missions and the Yugoslav conflicts. These are analysed further below, where I discuss victimhood in
the Serbian national imaginary.
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Anita Samardzija
Cohesion at times of crisis
We can see that in these histories of oppression, however, are brave Serbs who fought against it. Their
spiritual moral grounding, their ‘right’ to sovereignty, and their patriotism is taught as drawing out
that bravery. Spirituality, bravery and patriotism are all ‘timeless’ values that contemporary Serbs can
relate to. In the same sense, contemporary Serbs can pass on the same values to future generations.
The history of oppression and loss also drew out an image of Serbs as victims. They are victims of
powerful foreign states, victims of their own governments, and even victims of their own community.
I begin with the narrative of victimhood in the history textbooks analysed. In them Serbs are victims
of oppression by larger powers such as the Ottomans. Through the stories of WWI, Serbs are victims
of ‘colonial’ and ‘selfish’ powers who wish to exploit them. In WWII, they were victims of fascism and
Nazism. When the dissolution of Yugoslavia began, Serbs were victim of nationalism by other groups.
The textbooks point to two different triggers for the end of Yugoslavia. The Office for Textbooks
publication argues that ‘nationalist and separatist’ demonstrations by Albanians in Kosovo in 1981
began to destabilise Yugoslavia. The Klett textbook instead points to the 1974 constitution as causing
dissatisfaction amongst republics and nations as power was distributed unevenly. Both publications
present Serbia as attempting to keep unity amongst the republics and participated in conflict only
because they were forced into it. Serbs were victims of nationalism and hatred that came from Croats
and Albanians.
The Military Museum had a similar narrative. A new section was added to the permanent exhibition.
It is in in the room that is between the steps that descend from the ‘Tito room’ and before one exits
to the foyer. The exhibits in the new section focus on Serbia's involvement in UN missions and the
Yugoslav civil wars. The first displays in this section paint Serbs as keepers of the peace, putting
themselves at risk for the goodness of humanity. In the remainder of the displays, it appears as though
they were forced to fight. Although there is a section displaying the uniform and weapons of the
Serbian army, the artillery of the opposing armies is far greater. There is a section dedicated to
American/NATO displays, which are described as ‘arms and equipment of the American captured
soldiers’. There is no elaboration or contextualisation and the viewer is left to make sense of why
American soldiers were involved. Another section is dedicated to Croatian army displays with a short
piece of text stating: ‘Weapons confiscated from Croatian illegal army formations’. Croat soldi ers are
thus labelled as ‘illegal’, referring to the 1990’s rhetoric of Croats as rebels who began the conflict by
wanting independence. Serbs had to fight them, they were doing the ‘lawful’ and ‘right’ thing by
keeping the law. The final section is dedicated to Kosovo Albanian weaponry with no clear explanation
either. All of these groups were symbolised by national insignia such as flags on the uniforms and
weapons, or the Quran in the Albanian section. There are also images of Serbs as victims in the war,
one where soldiers are kicking a bloodied civilian lying on the ground. Just as the textbooks suggest,
the Military Museum presents Serbs as victims of nationalism and terrorism during the civil wars.
WWII as a time of victimhood for Serbs was evident in my data too, with the ‘oppressor’ depending
on the aim of the exhibition. As already discussed, the Military Museum’s permanent exhibition aimed
to legitimise the socialist regime. The exhibition discourse thus needed to create a sense of crisis and
desperation of the Balkan peoples, so much so that socialism was welcomed. So whilst Serbs were not
the sole victims in this narrative, they were part of the group who were attacked by large, selfinterested fascist and Nazi powers. An open-air exhibition based on the war diaries of Ivo Andrić, which
was held in conjunction with the Military Museum, did have a Serb-centric narrative of WWII. Titled
Gazed into the sky, the narrative is of Serbs as victims of constant bombardment by both the Axis
Powers and the Allies. Diary experts detailed the hardship of living in a city under fire , where the
introductory board refers to Belgrade’s history as marked by constant bombardments. The bombings
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Paper prepared for the 2016 ECPR Graduate Student Conference (Ta rtu)
Anita Samardzija
by all parties, including Western European states, are presented as equal and continual. Images
showed familiar Belgrade places having fallen to rubble or depict citizens fleeing. The IMS, on the
other hand, paints WWII as the beginning of Serbs as victims of their own state. In the In the name of
the people exhibition, the crimes committed by Tito’s regime were detailed. The curator claimed to
be ‘shedding light on the truth’, exposing the evil practice that was masked by claims to brotherhood
and unity. The exhibition did not name any Serbs as part of Tito’s regime, nor did they focus on other
ethnic groups as victims. It appeared that Serbs were the sole victims who suffered through
oppression.
Serbs as victims of their own state—their own government—was evident elsewhere. Beginning with
the Why does Serbia need the EU? articles series in the Danas newspaper, the authors wrote of Serbs
as victims of the dysfunction of the Serbian state. One politician accused the Milosevic regime of
having brought hardship to Serbs (Đilas 2013). Another argued that Serbs deserve better than they
have now, implying the current government unsatisfactory (Jovanović 2013). Another article from the
series, written by former president Vojislav Koštunica (2013), accused the current government of
constantly failing their citizens. Their push for the EU, in Koštunica’s view, was an extension of that
failure. Others wrote about corruption, again implying citizens were victim of a corrupt state (Bobić
2013; Miščević 2013; Svilanović 2013; Tabaković 2013). Ivica Dačić (2013), who held a high
government position at the time, spoke more broadly, urging Serbs to modernise. This time Serb
citizens were victims of their own shortfalls.
The Politika and Večernje Novosti papers ran many articles on issues that citizens face, showing the
hardships that they deal with. These were from facing issues caused by poor infrastructure or from
the cutting of pension benefits. In all, Serb citizens were encouraged to question government
institutions for not supporting them at times of hardship. Oftentimes the institutions ev en caused the
hardships.
We are corrupt
Corruption was also a major issue in my data. The Serbian government (the representatives of the
people) were considered corrupt, which in turn caused Serb society to be corrupt themselves.
Such sentiments were evident in my interviews. They saw themselves as victims of a corrupt
government, corrupt culture and even corrupt people. They spoke of corruption as the norm, Serbia
as a place in which merit does not lead to success. Of the academics I interviewed, only one spoke
directly of corruption. A political scientist at Belgrade University, Nebojša noted how his brightest
students are not those who go on to fill important political positions. Instead, it is those with poorer
grades who do so. Nebojša himself assumed that it was due to their having joined the political party
in power. Prior to my discussion, corruption in education had been a major issue in the public sphere;
it was found that politicians plagiarised their doctorates, as did even the rector of a major private
university (Grušić, Radeljić, and Tomić 2014; Radivojević and Milanović 2014). The ‘scandals’ support
Nebojša’s theory, as that is what he alluded to himself. The other academics that I spoke to, however,
did not expose major suspicions of the educational sector. One academic, Dragica, specified that her
students did not suffer low confidence in their future careers, suggesting that the perception of
corruption was not as widespread as anticipated.
The arts and cultural stall seller groups referred to corruption more. They spoke about what pushed
people to corruption. Some of the artists spoke of hardship and declining living conditions pushing
people to corruption. They also spoke how citizens work hard for little pay and often do not have the
time, money or patience to use the state system. It is the difficulties of their lives that also draws them
away from arts culture. Artist Goran spoke of a lack of appreciation for the arts amongst Serb citizens,
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Anita Samardzija
blaming it on a poor system of values. For Goran, Serb society had a broken moral compass and was
only interested in questionable entertainment. The artists, however, most spoke about corruption in
terms of government funding for the arts sector. They believed that connections and self-interests of
ministers directed funding in the industry, leading to weak infrastructure and low interest from the
citizenry. For the cultural stall sellers, they all spoke about corruption. They named the political elite
as corrupt and selfish, carrying about ‘their own pockets’. The sellers were also concerned about
corruption amongst the rest of society; they believed that merit and honesty did not lead to success,
but that savviness and wealth did. For them, in order to succeed, one must play the game of
corruption. Serbs were therefore victims of a corrupt society and system, and they are not to blame
for taking that behaviour on.
Those found who were against EU integration tended to blame corruption on the capitalist and ‘fake’
democratic system. They appeared to see a worsening system since the promises of democracy and a
market economy. It is therefore Western culture—political, economic and societal—that is perceived
to have negatively influenced a people who inherently ‘do the good’.
EU imagined
I now move on to perceptions of the European Union by Serbs. The EU is the institutional embodiment
of Western European values and the two communities thus have overlapping ‘substantive content’.
While smaller non-Western states such as Hungary and Bulgaria are member states, the Western
states hold the most power. They are also the most successful and prosperous, and thus symbolise
what it means to be European. I demonstrate here the two most common images of EU/Europe that
emerged: the EU as a powerful aggressor and the EU as a symbol of modernity.
The EU as a self-interested power
The European Union as self-interested and powerful was the most dominant image. The two WWIspecific exhibitions made this argument most explicitly. Both of the exhibitions portray the AustroHungarian Empire as selfish, provocative and inhumane. The National Museum’s Light in the darkness
of World War One argues that Serbs were ‘forced’ into war by the ‘economically powerful state’
Austria-Hungary. The curator labels the Empire as ‘evil’, ‘inhumane’, ‘selfish’ and having ‘colonial
aspirations’, connecting their actions to the ‘centuries-long chains of slavery’ imposed by the
Ottomans. It is an alleged historic tense relationship that Serbia has had with large powers. Similarly,
the Serbia 1914 exhibition described Austria-Hungary as merciless, selfish, and well-equipped. The
Empire allegedly put economic sanctions and practiced ‘military manoeuvres’ in order to block Serbian
independence. There are details of Serb civilians suffering at the hands of Austro-Hungarian troops,
with detailed depictions of war crimes committed by them. Although Austria-Hungary is not the EU
institution itself, what became of the Empire are now EU member states. Western Europe is
referenced, especially with Austria being closely tied to now dominant Germany. Austria is considered
a ‘successful’ country and is an established EU member. Hungary, although not so ‘successful’ or
‘Western’, is also a member, one which has overtaken former Yugoslav republics in the race to a
respectful position of former socialist states (Jansen 2012).
It is also important to note that Serbia 1914 focuses on war crimes committed by Austro-Hungarian
troops only. It is a highly selective memory-making here, as there is no mention of crimes committed
by Bulgarian forces, of which there were many. Scianna (2012) writes that Bulgarian actions had a
more ‘genocidal nature’ to them than that of Austro-Hungarian troops, yet these crimes are omitted
from the history telling. As such, a negative image of only a Western European community is
reproduced here.
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Paper prepared for the 2016 ECPR Graduate Student Conference (Ta rtu)
Anita Samardzija
Aggression by Western European states against Serbia was also evident at the open-air exhibition
Gazed into the sky. Based on the WWII diaries of celebrated laureate Ivo Andrić, the displays make the
aggression appear as a continuation. The introduction to the exhibits states: “During the twentieth
century Belgrade has been repeatedly bombed and almost completely destroyed. It was bombed by
the enemy, but also by the Allies in the war”. WWII was not just a time of fascist and Nazi occupation,
but also aggression by the Allies. One large image that was on display was of an aerial view of a
bombing. On it are the years that Belgrade was bombed that century, including 1999. This is a direct
reference to the US-led NATO bombing of Serbian targets. As NATO is another institution of ‘Western
values’ and the United States a leader in the democratic ideology, perceptions of the two can also
affect perceptions of the EU. The newer section of the Military Museum has the potential to do this
precisely, presenting Western nations as negative. They were on the ‘side’ of the nationalist and
‘illegal’ Croats and Albanians who disturbed conflict-free Yugoslavia.
To return to the Gazed into the sky open-air exhibition, the imagery used encourages viewers to
connect their personal narratives to the larger narrative of WWII (Rowe, Wertsch, and Kosyaeva 2002).
The familiar parts of Belgrade are recognized by viewers, but the spaces are in states of despair. The
attacks by the aggressors can therefore evoke personal sentiments.
An interesting point that is to be made from these exhibits is that they recognize the power of ‘the
West’. The power was framed in a negative way, as it was used to fulfil colonizing aspirations and
violent behaviour. The West allegedly had no respect for Serbs as a people or their right to sovereignty.
According to national memories, great powers suppressed Serbs, were exploitative and did not allow
them to fulfil their sovereign potential. If we remember the catalogue for the Nation Museum’s Light
in the darkness of WWI, the author writes of the ‘centuries-long chains of slavery’. Nevertheless, in
the process of creating the image of a victim Serbia, the narratives point to a powerful West, which
today is institutionally embodied in the European Union. And despite a Serbian national history of an
unfair relationship with great powers, the level of power is accepted and almost desired. If Serbs are
to have that power, they would use it to exercise their right to sovereignty, and would not have
‘colonial aspirations’ to lead them to attack weaker nations.
The EU as a self-interested power was also evident amongst my interview participants. Most of these
sentiments emerged when they discussed integration, capitalism or democracy. Majority support for
integration came from the academic and arts groups. The academics mostly spoke about the
discourses surrounding membership; while saying that it would be a positive thing, they saw the
agenda falsely advertised as a solution to all problems. One academic expressed concern that
concessions were too high, that Serbian integration should be made available without so many
obstacles. The artists, while also being relatively pro-EU, saw the EU as a self-interested power more
directly. Although they were suspicious of the EU’s ‘real’ intentions and concerned of the power it has
over small states, the cost was worth the possible outcomes. Two art gallery workers, Ana and Davor,
discussed the potential funding that the arts scenes may receive from integration. The Serbian
government alone was stretching its already thin funds. Yet neither Ana nor Davor expected the EU to
fund without any requests. They saw it normal for a funding body to have vested interests. These two
participants were the only ones who did not explicitly support or oppose integration. They simply
could not see how membership would necessarily solve Serbia’s problems.
Two others artists had similar views but supported integration. Musician Aleksandar broadened the
‘vested interest’ argument to the EU as a whole; he stated that the Union has exploited smaller
countries such as Hungary. He said to me, “the European Union comes in, takes all that it needs”.
Despite his suspicions though, Aleksandar was ready for membership. He decided that the risk of being
exploited was small in comparison to the ‘order’ that the institution may bring to a Serbia he sees as
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dysfunctional. Popular art critic Branislav made similar remarks. He believes that the EU expands only
for “sheer interest”, despite the institution making moral claims. Like Ana and Davor, he does not see
it strange for the EU to want to expand out of self-benefit, he just wished that the institution would
say it as such. And as with Aleksandar, Branislav thinks that the EU might be the authority required to
enforce necessary reforms.
As for the cultural stall sellers, five shared similar views. Jovana saw a future in Serbia only if it moved
toward progress and modernity; she saw the EU as ‘civilisation’. She finds Serbia corrupt and
degrading, beating you until the end. However, just as the artists, Jovana spoke negatively of the EU’s
power as well. She saw it as degrading towards smaller and weaker states, citing the process of
obtaining visas as a humiliating process. Four other cultural stall sellers were also suspicious of the EU,
but were decidedly against integration. They see exploitation as the main part of the Union. Here they
were referring to capitalism, an ideology that they have seen only the negative sides of. Economically
and politically on the margins, these stall sellers work long hours, success is subject to weather, and
stalls are expensive. They have been the losers in the capitalist game thus far and feel hard done by.
They may see a world in which money brings power and success, but this money that they do not
have. In short, they cannot participate in a capitalist society, as they do not have the economic capital
that will give them power. And they have also experienced people become crueller and more corrupt
with capitalism. While the prospect of EU integration may have been positive ten years ago, they have
seen no progress so far; there is no economic prosperity yet and the system remains corrupt. The
interview group evidently formed their opinion on integration based on their lived experiences.
It is orderly
Above I had written how the artists I spoke to were willing to put aside their suspicions of the EU in
exchange for membership. They view that the ‘exploitation’ that Serbia as a country may endure will
be worth it for the order that the Union may enforce. To them, Serb society had become corrupt and
its political system was no better. A powerful authority may be what is necessary to bring about
meaningful reform. The corrupt Serb politicians, the artists believed, could not continue when the EU
was their boss. The musician Aleksandar summarised this simply; he wished to see Serbia ‘cleaned up’
and functioning well, he wished “for there to be order”. His colleague Jovan also expressed hope that
the EU would bring about a functioning system. Though, he was extremely careful to say that he did
not wish for the globalization to come with it, as “globalization makes everyone the same”. Jovan was
thus treating ‘culture’ separately from economic and political practice, despite a political system being
a form of culture nonetheless.
What we see here, therefore, is an acceptable of EU’s power and a feeling that an authoritative
government would be better than corruption. Participants from the other groups expressed similar
perceptions of the West. The academics were weary of too-high expectations of the EU, but still saw
the institution as bringing positive changes to Serbia. The cultural stall sellers, although four out of the
seven were against membership, they had suspicions of the hegemonic West. That is, the West was
powerful enough to enforce its values, ideologies and behaviour on others.
Progress and modernity
There were also moments where an Orientalist framework was evident. The EU was considered
modern and functioning, while Serbs were not. They were corrupt, ‘wild’ and backward instead. Such
discourses were evident in articles written by the political elite. In the Why does Serbia need the EU?
articles in the Danas newspaper, six of the nine authors urged for a change in values, spirit and mind
amongst Serbs. Of them, former president Koštunica believed that the changes will come through
confidence of Serbs in their ability to run a sovereign state. Koštunica values sovereignty and speaks
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Anita Samardzija
of it as the ultimate evidence of national success, whereby EU membership would impede that
sovereignty. For the other authors however, they described the EU as the embodiment of the values
that Serbs should adopt. According to these authors, Serbs should adopt the characteristics of the
successful West, seeming that those characteristics have brought on success. Politicians Ivica Dačić
(2013) and Čedomir Jovanović (2013) both wanted Serbia to become a modern state and society. To
them, modernity was the source of EU power and wealth. Othe r authors referred to the EU as
‘developed’ and ‘normal’ (Miščević 2013), and even peaceful and prosperous (Bobić 2013). Others
suggested Serbia would see an end to corruption (Svilanović 2013) and become a place of high
employment (Tabaković 2013) if they were to become members. What we see in these articles is an
image of a successful West in way that it is deemed so in Orientalist frameworks: modern, developed
and progressive.
Of the Politika and Večernje Novosti articles that I analysed, the EU was reported on frequently. In
them the dominant image was, again, of a powerful and wealthy European Union. There was indeed
an attempt to portray the Serbian government as assertive in negotiations, such as both newspapers
reporting on Prime Minister Vučić ‘telling’ the EU “We respect the EU but will still export to Russia”.
Both articles are supported by an image of Vučić seeming stern, suggesting he has negotiating power.
It is though as they did not want the Serbian government to appear as a pawn that is manoeuvred by
the big powers, with whom they have had a tense relationship. The publications that I analysed also
spoke of a strengthening relationship with Russia’s Putin ahead of his visit to Belgrade, as well as
economic deals set up with Asian or Middle Eastern government. Despite this, the EU is still presented
as an ideal. One example is where Vučić is negotiating infrastructure deals with EU delegates. Although
he appears to have an input, the prospects of the infrastructure changes rely on membership. The
institution therefore still holds the power to direct Serbia’s future. It also has the infrastructure that
the Serbian government aspires to.
To return to my interviews, the EU as ‘functioning’ and being ‘in order’ are also views that fit within
an Orientalist framework. Artist Goran spoke of Serb tradition as ‘primitive’, indicating that they were
not a civilisation. To return to cultural stall seller Jovana, she was concerned that Serbs were ceasing
to exist. Despite suspicions of the EU, she saw the institution as ‘civilisation’, as something that her
community needs to be a part of in order to evolve. Even the history textbooks referred to the Slav
adoption of Christianity as a turn towards ‘civilisation’. The labels put on to Western Europe all suggest
that it is developed, orderly and progressive. It is doing what it can to move forward with the times. It
is not stagnating as Serbia is. One cultural stall seller, Ivana, wished to join the EU. For her, the entity
was one of ‘fair play’ and allowed individuals to make something of themselves. Even though she
spoke of capitalism and democracy (Western principles) in Serbia, she spoke of them as different to
the capitalism and democracy in Europe; Serbs have gotten into
“some this democracy, and the fact that, I don’t think, this… this is not capitalism… not the capitalism
that is [elsewhere]… It is as though we only accept the worst forms [of these ideologies and practices”
Ivana therefore differentiates between Serb capitalism and the ‘real’ capitalism. So despite having
negative experiences of Western ideological practices, she believes that the EU has ‘better’ versions.
Conclusion: Can there be a European Serbia?
Having explained how Serbia and the EU are imagined, the two seem incompatible. The ‘substances’
of the Serb nation are not the same as the substances that make up Europe. Serb markers point to
inheritance, antiquity and uniqueness. These characteristics are all highly value d and provide Serbs
with the ‘right’ to national sovereignty. Their morals lie in their spirituality and they are people who
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Anita Samardzija
‘do the good’. The negative perceptions of nation self-identity that emerged, also set them apart from
Western Europe. There were self-prescriptions of victimhood and corruption. Serbs have always been
victims, whether of other great powers or of their own governments. Their dysfunctional state system
has made them corrupt and self-interested. The corrupt democracy and exploitative capitalism gave
a small number of wealthy people with power and prospects of a better future. Others though, my
participants especially, were left behind to struggle. It therefore seems as though that negative
behaviour—and even characteristics—of Serbs are attributed to negative culture. For some, that
culture appears to be Western principles.
Despite being powerful and self-interested, the Western imaginary is still one of progress and
modernity. ‘Success’ is measured by perceived economic wealth and politi cal stability, and it appears
that being modern and progressive is what made the West successful. Therefore, in order for Serbia
to become successful, it must turn to modernity and progression. Yet these are not inherent qualities
of Serbs. Becoming European would mean rejecting the characteristics of their community, it would
mean distancing themselves from what makes them unique. An emphasis on modernisation and
Westernisation is opposite to the value of traditional ethnic customs that are seen as the articulation
of their Serbdom. Consequently, they can cease to be Serbs. Or at least, they may be influenced by
Western culture to be what they are not in their essence.
This identity debate—and placing value on identity—has made Serbia ‘stuck’ between tradition and
modernity. In this way it is also ‘stuck’ between claims to primordialism and a future in the EU. The
position assumes that cultures are static, that it is a choice between one or the other. The Western
European and Serb imaginaries are separate and incompatible. So even though the Serb government
is pledging commitment to integration, it is not attempting to forge an image of a European Serbia to
encourage support for integration. Instead, it is presenting the EU as a need for Serbia. My own
interviewees spoke in such a way; despite having suspicions of the EU’s ‘real’ motives, it is necessary
to make meaningful reforms. As such, we see here an acceptance of the negatives of Serb society and
the Serbian government, an almost internalisation of the Orientalist framework we have seen.
What’s more, national sovereignty is at stake in the Serbia-EU identity debate. Former president
Vojislav Koštunica expressed this concern in writing for the Danas newspaper. He articulated what
appears to be a common fear of loss of national integrity. He argued for the modern political system
of sovereign nation-states: where a national community is led by a representative government which
has the power to secure that identity over a given territory. As a member of the European Union,
Koštunica fears that this sovereignty will be lost. He sees the institution as taking away ultimate power
from the representative government, even though Serbs have allegedly fought for that sovereignty
over centuries. An understanding of a world of nation-states would consequently crumble.
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