Meaning and Intention: A Defense of Procedural Individualism
Author(s): Mark Bevir
Source: New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 3, Philosophical and Rhetorical Inquiries (Summer,
2000), pp. 385-403
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20057611
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A Defense
Intention:
and
Meaning
of Procedural
Individualism
Mark Bevir
Many historians
of
authorial
they have
over,
of
meanings
of religion,
and other
literary historians,
have understood
their task to be the recovery
scholars
textual
the
In
intentions.1
taken
utterances.
relevant
such
recovering
to be
themselves
telling
The
more
intentions,
us something
about
of
intentionalism
such
the
schol
ars, whether
implicit or explicit, has been the subject of fierce theoreti
cal criticism over the last thirty years.2 Indeed, the criticism has been so
now has about it a definite aura of theoretical
fierce that intentionalism
of identifying
naivete. One strand of criticism centers on the difficulties
or
even
for
authors
postulating
certain
utterances?the
or
Bible
a
"keep
more
the grass" sign, for example. Another,
strand of
influential
various gaps between an author's intentions and the
criticism highlights
off
of
meaning
the space
one
which
too
often,
utterance:
relevant
intention
gaps
and
an
understand
might
mind
unconscious
All
the
between
of
the
it seems
for
associated,
and
utterance,
the
with
example,
the different
performance,
effects
in
ways
of
the
author.
to me,
the
are
criticisms
directed
at a caricature
to
Few intentionalists,
I suspect, want
intentionalist
position.
an utterance
the strong thesis that the only legitimate meaning
bear is fixed by the conscious,
prior purpose of its author. Anyway,
of the
defend
may
irrespective of what
defend a procedural
at
a
least
specific
any
other
with
meaning
person
intentionalists
individualism
or
an
would
according
a
temporal
abstraction
wish to argue, I want to
or
to which any meaning,
is either
existence,
based
on
such
a
meaning
meanings.
for
The
restriction of my defense of procedural
individualism
to mean
possible
a
concern
to
existence
reflects
with
avoid
debates
my
ings
temporal
about the possibility of divine or other metaphysical
Clearly
meanings.3
some Biblical
scholars want to treat the Bible as an atemporal,
divine
revelation.
Even
when
scholars
thus
postulate
New Literary History, 2000, 31: 385-404
will
atemporal,
metaphysical
allow that the relevant utter
existence
such that they have had
if
for
reader
within
time.
in
does not believe
So,
my
meanings
people
he
take
to
individualism
may
metaphysical
meanings,
procedural
apply
however,
meanings,
they presumably
ance or utterances
have a historical
386
NEW
LITERARY
HISTORY
to meanings
as such; but if he does believe
in such meanings,
he might
take it not to apply to them.
individualism will have four sections. In
My defense of this procedural
are intentional
the first, I will argue that all temporal meanings
in the
sense of being meanings
weak
for specific
More
abstract
people.
as
such
meanings,
intentional
argue,
semantic
meanings
against
and
ones,
linguistic
or they are
atemporal.
that
occasionalists,
can
we
are
either
In the second
such
individuate
on
based
Iwill
section,
inten
weak
to the individual for whom
solely by reference
they exist. In the
third section,
I will suggest that procedural
individualism
differs from
us
to
in
to the
intentionalism
that
enable
ways
strong
respond effectively
criticisms made of the latter by the New Critics, psychoanalytic
theorists,
tions
and
others.
individualism
Finally,
helps
difficulties
peculiar
I will conclude
how procedural
by exploring
us to make sense of cases in which there seem to be
in identifying who or what
is the author of an
utterance.
I
To begin,
exist only in
the mental
the
approaching
utterance
cannot
of
a
ments
has
of
question
for
a reader.
The
be its semantic meaning,
proposition,
whose
an utterance
because
semantic
sort
what
of meanings
have
by way of a study of the nature
is tangentially
existence
an
are intentional
I want to argue that meanings
in that they
are always fixed by
the minds of specific people. Meanings
(or intentional)
activity of a given individual. One way of
defined
elude
to a reader
cannot
be
an
temporal
utterance
to a reader
in terms of the truth-conditions
sometimes
readers
properties
of
meaning
a
of the meaning
them.
in
meanings
the meaning
find
state
Similarly,
its linguistic
meaning,
defined
of
in
of a
the usage
governing
particular
language,
statements
in
readers
sometimes
find
whose
because
meanings
linguistic
someone
an
More
when
elude
them.
understands
properties
generally,
a
to have
not
utterance
is
that meaning
necessarily
particular
meaning,
same
as the
the
conventional
the
truth-conditions
for, or
of,
meaning
utterance
the
instance
consid
that
abstracted
from
being
particular
terms
of
the
conventions
for example,
that Paul and Susan are walking
through
Imagine,
a corner,
over
a
turn
As
the East End of London
they
problem.
puzzling
to the problem,
the same
Susan suggests a solution
and, at exactly
sees a religious
for the homeless
staffed by women
hostel
moment,
whose uniform
that of the Salvation Army. Paul says
closely resembles
not know that "Hallelujah Lass" is
does
Because
Susan
lass."
"hallelujah
ered.4
a name
for a female member
of the Salvation
Army,
she takes Peter
to
MEANING
mean
387
INTENTION
what a brilliant
"well done,
of
ing
AND
utterance
Paul's
idea." In this case, Susan's
not
does
us
enable
to declare
understand
the
or
semantic
lass" to be "well done."
"Hallelujah
"hallelujah
linguistic meaning
but this tells
"well done" to Susan on a particular occasion,
lass" means
or linguistic properties
us little about the more
abstract
semantic
of
an
the
of
It
that
would
lass."
therefore,
appear,
"hallelujah
meaning
of
to a reader
utterance
is a
particular
The
an
of
meaning
to a reader
utterance
the meaning
of an utterance
or find in
individuals
particular
place
in
embodied
propositions
active
role
comparative
Because
than
readers.
this is the only difference,
to a
utterance
as
reader
by
however,
of
to play a
appear
to
to
speakers
grasp
we can classify
intentional
the
capture
that whereas
happen
and
semantic
want
might
saying
merely
a form
certain
have
similari
many
are meanings
the abstract
where
is that authors
one
reader
listeners
meanings,
has
Both
utterances,
Moreover,
the
of
passivity
to convey
intend
an
a more
not
person,
certainly
utterances
the
only difference
The
linguistic meanings.
of
that
to its author.
ties with
more
for
meaning
one.
abstract
meanings.
the meaning
meaning
provided
we can do so provided we
adopt a weak form of intentionalism;
our
an
of
intention
the
to convey
from
idea of wanting
concept
expand
a meaning
to embrace also the idea of happening
to grasp a meaning.
Because
the concept of an intention usually suggests a prior design to
we
intentionalism
do
something,
what
sively with
a weak
adopt
particular
utterances.
often
want
authors
their
intentionalism
crux
The
of
equate
to mean.
that
exclu
meanings
In contrast,
I will
with
the ways
understand
equates meanings
they be authors or readers,
whether
individuals,
to
appears
utterances
intentionalism
thus
becomes
the
idea
that
are ascribed
or mental
to objects by the intentional
meanings
activity of
to
rather
than
intrinsic
the
in
themselves.
individuals,
properties
objects
Weak
intentionalism
have no existence apart
implies only that meanings
from individuals. Utterances
have meanings
individuals
only because
take
them
so
to do.
The important point is that weak intentionalism
an utterance
has for any individual an intentional
an
utterance
meaning.
to
Once
any
we
reader,
accept
as well
this,
we
as
can
to
its
makes any meaning
one. The
of
meaning
is an
author,
redefine
what
is at
intentional
stake
in
the
are intentional. To argue that
all meanings
question of whether
they are
is to defend a principle of procedural
individualism. Weak intentionalism
have meaning
individuals whether
implies utterances
only for specific
authors,
readers,
or
even
scholars
themselves.
This
procedural
individu
alism does not presuppose
that have gone by
any of the other doctrines
the name of individualism;
it commits us, for instance, neither
to an
to
atomist individualism
which
individuals
could
exist,
grasp
according
388
LITERARY
NEW
or
meanings,
cal
to
referring
all
from
apart
nor
society,
we
to which
according
social
should
to a
methodologi
society without
study
wholes.5
a principle
To defend
that
actions
perform
individualism
HISTORY
or
meanings,
of procedural
at
all
least
one has to suggest
individualism,
are
meanings,
temporal
I
intentional.
an analysis of
this in two ways. In the first place, I will defend
to
ones.
them
that
and
reduces
intentional
semantic
meanings
linguistic
an
will
inductive
constitute
these
However,
argument
analyses
focusing
will do
on
semantic
there
and
I will
Thus,
meaning
If we
can
alism.
make
an
of
meaning
it to be
true.
would
some
existence
their
as
case
als,
on
based
an
of
they
a
share
ourselves,
including
the
would
accept
usually
we
is such-and-such,
utterance
exist apart from for
Semantic
we
are
meanings
say
a
imply
a set
within
only
meaning
When
are
frameworks
cannot
individual.
ones.
atemporal.
what
pure
perceptions,
true must
to
be relative
conceptual
a semantic
intentional
utterance
no
to be
meanings
acquire
or more
by one
held
abstractions
meaning
which
can
that any
to intentional
meanings
are
because
Thus,
be
individu
procedural
The
semantic
meanings.
to be
for
would
have
the case
utterance
semantic
Utterances
of concepts
an
there
to suggest
would
ones.
with
what
that
for
framework.
conceptual
from
I will,
ones
compatible
semantic
of
comes
utterance
held only by individuals,
individuals.
case
the
Assuming,
to be
the
have
an argument
linguistic
that
argue
might
to intentional
reduce
intentional
and
semantic
first
Consider
to
reduce
reduce
can
we
ones,
not
could
someone
cannot
these analyses with
support
we
so
meanings,
linguistic
we
type of meaning
is another
the
semantic
individu
of
group
framework
within
conceptual
as true
if such-and-such
is
the
case.
comes
a word
thus,
the
clear,
moreover,
natural
word
though
given
from
"bac"
the
meaning
that
the
linguistic
constitutes
any
the case of linguistic meanings.
now
Consider
of
its linguistic
some words might
concept,
of
"bachelor"
bond
between
thus,
than
rather
as
concept
in
cases
social
"bachelor"
seem
of
a word
and
convention
could
an
even
It seems
that
decree
man.6
apt expression
here
that
concept
one without
unmarried
to be a peculiarly
onomatopoeia,
the
conventional
to
refers:
conventionally
man.
unmarried
is an
refer
meaning
linguistic
it
is a purely
meaning
foundation:
The
to which
there
the
Al
for a
clearly
a different word to the relevant concept.
are purely conventional,
they are
linguistic meanings
Crucially, because
a
as
not accept
convention.
given simply by what individuals do and do
of
is a function
Their
existence
solely of the fact that a number
to refer to certain concepts.7 Linguistic
take certain words
individuals
ones. When we say the
are abstractions
based on intentional
meanings
we imply a group of
an utterance
is
of
such-and-such,
linguistic meaning
could be a convention
binding
certain
individuals
accept
to
such-and-such.
to
refer
389
INTENTION
AND
MEANING
conventions
under
which
it
they understand
that semantic and linguistic meanings
We can conclude,
therefore,
ones. Critics might
are reducible
to intentional
that
suggest, however,
that we cannot reduce to intentional
there is another form of meaning
such a criticism,
ones. To counter
we
so
not
could
reduce
would
I will argue
to be
have
that any form of meaning
now
From
atemporal.
on
I will
a single contrast between
an inten
by adopting
simplify my argument
an utterance
tional meaning,
defined as the meaning
has for a particular
as any meaning
defined
it might
individual, and a structural meaning,
have
we
that
meaning
us,
If we
want
as
a work,
way
particular
structural
meaning,
set of words,
pictures,
way or other,
To
that
In
to
know
on
set
an
structural
there
someone
in
the
or
spoken,
If we want
a
as
a
or
understood
to
text,
a
postulate
that
is, as
a
in some
given,
meaning
an
an utter
consider
or
utterance
sort of
structural
meaning
we will
possessing
we
of
meaning,
analysis
are
necessarily
atemporal,
texts
and
no
in
believe
of all people.
and so things of which
effect,
an
approach
on which
intentional
occasion.
or whatever
intentionalist
are
an
written,
particular
will
consider
meanings
we
not
meanings,
of words
a
we
or
can
We
ways depending
about
intentional
ones.
intentional
whether
independently
vindicate
objects,
better
is, a
that
a
in
or
on
based
abstraction
to
reduce
of two contrasting
interests
meanings.
ance
not
could
in one
utterances
we
structural
century
eighteenth
cannot
in this world
meanings
wrote
no
and
an
show
otherworldly
have knowledge.
texts.8
essay
to
have
containing
that
Imagine
a section
entitled "hallelujah lass." Ifwe try to study the essay as a text, we will have
to abstract
the words
and phrases
in it from
the occasion
of its
Moreover,
appearance.
The
structural
we
when
essay, we presumably
lass" can refer
"hallelujah
the
of
meaning
the
to the idea of a female member
text
the
does
not
exist
to
try
the
identify
structural
of
meaning
must
allow for the fact that the phrase
to a female member
of the Salvation Army.
text
of
the
essay
must
include
of the Salvation Army. Clearly,
in time?it
must
be
outside
of
our
world.
a reference
therefore,
After
all,
ifwe
to the structural
of the
try to ascribe a temporal existence
meaning
in the eighteenth
to
referred
text, we will find an essay written
century
an organization
that was not established
until
the late nineteenth
century.
We
In order
will
be
stuck
an
with
anachronism.
unacceptable
to locate a supposed
text in time, we would
outside of it, but as soon as we do this, we
to appeal to
switch
something
necessarily
our attention
text and its structural
from the supposed
to a
meaning
work and its intentional meaning.
we
one
two
that
have
essays,
Imagine
in the eighteenth
written
in the twentieth
century and one written
century,
containing
exactly
the
same
words
and
have
punctuation
in
exactly
390
LITERARY
NEW
HISTORY
the meaning
between
the same order. Any fact enabling us to distinguish
of the
occasion
of the two essays would have to refer to the particular
a
to
the
one
or
be
fact
it
about
would
have
of
of
other
them;
appearance
as works,
essays
surely
they
texts.
not
must
the
same
temporal
nisms.
We
As
our
focus
Once
to
cannot
as we
soon
do
an
on
its
as a historical
utterance
intentional
the meaning
a weak
is, given
utterance
had
of
version
for
a
object,
a work.
as
meaning
in history is to consider
way to fix an utterance
that
certain people. We might
say, for example,
because
the words they
have different meanings
and twentieth
in the eighteenth
things to people
an
"hallelujah
a
we
cannot
ascribe
therefore,
again,
texts without
into
unacceptable
falling
a historical
so because
texts do not
have
consider
attention
if
the
so
lass"
Army" is part of the supposed
of the
structural meaning
the supposed
must
of
the
mention
include
also
essay
of its text,
structural meaning
text of the eighteenth-century
Army.
existence
identical,
Thus,
meaning.
headed
section
are
essays
of the Salvation
that "a female member
Salvation
two
the
structural
a
contains
essay
twentieth-century
because
Moreover,
share
necessarily
The
obvious
To ask about
centuries.
group
to ask about
particular
existence.
we
it had for
the meaning
our two identical essays
contain meant different
of
intentionalism,
or
real
anachro
people,
the
however,
of
meaning
to people
in the eighteenth
various works. To ask what the essay meant
is to ask about
which
the essay,
is to ask how they understood
century
their
weak
intentions.
and
meanings
works
We
can
have
a real
or
that
therefore,
conclude,
intentional
only
existence.
temporal
to which
the
a weak
intentionalism
according
adopts
a
an
to any given individual becomes
utterance
of
species of
meaning
an
to
one
intentionalist
avoid
there is only
intentional
way
meaning,
one
Once
analysis
natural
without
of meaning
postulating
we
can
of which
realm
allegedly
some
sort
of
or
divine
knowledge.
acquire
super
must
One
as do
in history,
a language-x
with a meaning-x
existing
identify
individu
of
but existing independently
intentional meanings,
particular
some scholars have tried
als, as would metaphysical
meanings.
Although
to defend
akin
something
to
their
language-x,
endeavors
seem
doomed
the idea that temporal
to fail.9 Consider what is involved in abandoning
we
talk of a social language,
exist only for individuals. When
meanings
shared by
a set of intersubjective
we typically have in mind
meanings
a
female friend
two people
talk of
For example, when
various people.
of the Salvation Army by saying "Jane is a Hallelujah
who is a member
the language
which constitute
Lass," they share a set of meanings
they
we might
their shared
describe
use to communicate.
Thus, although
language
the claim
contrary,
as a social
structure,
that it exists
it exists
only
we
not
would
independently
because
they,
thereby
of particular
as
individuals,
commit
ourselves
individuals.
share
certain
On
mean
to
the
ings. Because
its
391
INTENTION
AND
MEANING
status
ontological
not
does
language-x
remains
this sort of intersubjectivity,
embody
It cannot
vague.
extremely
a concrete
be
an emergent
entity, since if it were itwould have to
entity; nor can it be
exist
about
individuals.
facts
from
Indeed,
emerge
language-x must
our
are
about
since
facts
human
of
us,
thoughts
thought,
independently
on our thoughts,
so if language-x depended
itwould not
for its existence
must be a Platonic
of us as individuals. Language-x
exist independently
a
an
must
real
and
be
with
it
abstract
form;
independent
entity
forms have had an honored
Platonic
existence. Although
place in the
a
of
modern
the
of
very possibility of
suspicion
history
(post)
philosophy,
the
truths makes a belief in them hard to defend. Moreover,
self-evident
a
face
since
difficulties
of
individualism
special
opponents
procedural
a
to
in
time
them
ascribe
in a language-x
belief
existing
requires
to a Platonic form. They must explain how a Platonic
temporal existence
can
form
some
for
exist
and
time
then
wither.
can
How
a Platonic
form
such as those of growth and decay? Surely
be subject to natural processes
that
finds
of
itself having to answer this question has
any theory
meaning
gone wildly astray.
All
are
meanings
temporal
either
for
meanings
or
individuals
abstrac
individu
for individuals. Here procedural
tions derived from meanings
an
us
It
the
of
of
with
alism provides
analysis
meaning.
beginnings
associate
that individuals
with
statements,
books,
meanings
implies
do
not
of
of
meanings
Because
books,
meanings.
understands
constructs
exist
always
meanings
we
that
implies
only
and
events,
films,
so
to do.
seem
might
for
ascribe
individuals,
like
some
this
Perhaps
uncontroversial,
idea has controversial
cannot
the
to mean
come
Objects
them
this uncontroversial
it
start,
statements,
human
being
if it does,
a
like:
embody
someone
because
but even
For
the
themselves
only
thing
idea
ies.
and
events,
films,
corollar
to
meanings
we
cannot
texts.
a
ascribe
a textual scholar
in itself. Unless
albeit
specifies,
meaning
or
a
text
for
the
he
thinks
had
whom
person
implicitly,
particular
people
a particular meaning,
we should assume he ismerely
us
how
he
telling
to a text
chooses
to read
we
text:
the
should
not
make
the mistake
of
he
assuming
us an interpretation
of the text itself; we might
is offering
enjoy his
to ask ourselves whether
it is true or
reading, but we should not bother
it seeks to give an adequate account.
false for there is no object of which
We
can
ask
is, the meaning
only
about
of
the
a work.
meaning
Moreover,
a
text
the
had
idea
or
that
has
for
meanings
that
so-and-so,
are
human
we must reject the
constructs
implies
possibility of a collective conscious
ness being greater than its individual constituents.
Itmakes sense to talk
or
of a Protestant
Hindu
fundamentalism
mentality
only if we aim
to
the
fact
of
various
individuals
certain
thereby
highlight
sharing
beliefs.
As
a matter
of principle,
we must
be
able
to translate
any
392
NEW
statement
about
a
about
collective
specific
a
into
consciousness
individuals.
can
LITERARY
statements
of
series
HISTORY
be
Meanings
intersubjective,
is just a result of specific individuals
meaning
intersubjective
to a given
the same meaning
an
but
attaching
object.
II
from intentions. This leaves an impor
All meanings
derive ultimately
a
can we identify and individuate
tant question
still to be answered:
about
the
whose
in
terms
intention
of
facts
person
solely
particular
individual
I was too quick to adopt procedural
it is? Perhaps
intention
on
we
can
focus
intentional
that
ism. I have established
exclusively
only
and
meanings,
not
does
this
me
allow
necessarily
to
conclude
we
that
to the individual whose
can fix an intention
intention
solely by reference
to
we
cannot
intentions
reference
if
individuate
it is.Moreover,
solely by
we
to
be
unable
will
intentions
whose
the individuals
they are,
specify
the
content
a
of
intentionalism.
reject
Utterances
obviously
refer
are
which
to, occasions
For
context
exist
some
facts
of
irrespective
says
"hallelujah
an
to,
reference
the
about
the
relevant
to
occasionalists
are
They
historically.
Peter
when
example,
and
with
of,
situated
of
that leads some
It is this line of argument
individual.
authors.
terms
in
solely
meaning
made
in,
intentions
he
lass,"
occasion
does
of
so
and
their
in the
of
composed
specific objects and events, including
hostel for the homeless. Occasionalists
and the
both Susan's suggestion
nature
of
argue that the situated
utterances
necessarily
implies
of
their
occasions
to
respect
us
invites
to
imagine
same
role
from
their
being
semantic
abstract
the
exactly
different
that
a
Most
made.
as water
Hilary
earth.10
earth
even
this
argue
for
called
though
water
Twin-earth
of
aspects
Putnam,
a substance
on
does
reflects
occasionalists
meanings.
where
twin-earth
on
water
meaning
instance,
"water"
plays
it is chemically
tastes,
looks,
the
with
sounds,
and behaves just like water, but it has the chemical
XYZ, not
composition
on
I
talk
about
twin-earth
and
if both my doppelganger
H20. Thus,
same
we
seems
but
belief
water in terms of the role it plays, it
express the
a
such
such
and
"water plays
refer to different
things. We both believe
to
concludes
he refers to XYZ, I refer
H20. Putnam
role," but whereas
beliefs
identical
that because
cannot fix reference.
content
only
to
a role,
and
will have grasped
anyone
refer
Clearly
meanings,
and I intend
doppelganger
such
semantic
abstract
can
on
correctly
to express
our
to different
Putnam's
not
ones.
particular
the idea that water
respective
our particular
earths
mental
things,
occasionalism
who
intentions.
applies
Both
my
plays such and
so understands
It is just
us
that the
MEANING
AND
393
INTENTION
of our utterances
treated abstractly as propositions
will
on
the abstract proposition
embodied
in my utterance
a
true if H20
role, the abstract
plays such and such
on twin-earth will be true ifXYZ
in his utterance
embodied
proposition
a role. Putnam
the
plays such and such
certainly does not suggest
enters
of an utterance
occasion
into the particular
intention
of its
author. On the contrary, he concludes
content does not fix
that mental
reference
because
he
thinks
the
occasion
of an utterance
precisely
or reference
enters
into its semantic meaning
but not its particular
truth-conditions
differ. Whereas
earth will be
or mental
meaning
does
content.
not undermine
Unfortunately,
procedural
however,
defend
we
a more
his
therefore,
Clearly,
semantic
occasionalism
individualism.
cannot
leave
the matter
there,
since
some
version
of occasionalism.
philosophers
aggressive
They
that
in
argue
group objects
ways which permeate
languages
together
content so as to preclude
our individuating
mental
thoughts, beliefs, or
not
do
that
derive
intentions,
They
individualistically.
deny
meanings
from intentions. They deny, rather, that we can individuate
intentions
to facts about the individuals whose
intentions
solely by reference
they
are. Tyler B?rge, for instance,
invites us to imagine a Ms. Patient who
to a community
that uses the word
"arthritis" to describe
belongs
rheumatoid
diseases of the joints.11 When Ms. Patient says to us "I have
to her that she is wrong
in my thigh" we explain
arthritis
because
arthritis occurs only in the joints, and she accepts that she was mistaken.
In this case, we would say that Ms. Patient believed
that she had arthritis
invites us to imagine a Ms. Patient* who
is
thigh. Next B?rge
to
and
Ms.
Patient
identical
she
to
physically
mentally
although
belongs
a linguistic community
the members
of which use the word "arthritis" to
describe
rheumatoid
diseases of the bones as well as of the joints. Ms.
us
to
"I
Patient*
have arthritis
in my thigh," but because
her
says
sense in the
utterance makes
we
of
her
language
linguistic community,
do not tell her that arthritis occurs only in the joints so she is wrong.
In
this case, we would
that
Ms.
a
Patient*
that
believed
she
had
say
in her
in her thigh, not that Ms. Patient* believed
rheumatoid
disease
that she
had arthritis in her thigh. B?rge concludes,
we
that
ascribe
therefore,
to Ms. Patient
different
beliefs
and Ms. Patient*
their being
despite
identical. More generally, occasionalists
such as
physically and mentally
us
two
with
individuals
who
differ
in
their
B?rge present
solely
linguistic
and who make
identical utterances
communities,
only for us to identify
as expressions
these utterances
of different
beliefs or intentions. They
we
cannot
an intention
that
individuate
conclude,
therefore,
solely by
to the individual concerned.
reference
To fix the particular
of
meaning
an utterance
for its author, we have to refer to the author's
linguistic
as a part of the occasion
understood
of its being made.
community
394
LITERARY
NEW
HISTORY
the import of their thought
such as B?rge misconstrue
so
to distinguish
do
because
fail
They
they
experiment.
properly
in human
between
the roles of particular
and linguistic meanings
Occasionalists
discourse.
Consider
case
the
again
of
Ms.
She
Patient.
"I have
says
she believes both that she has a rheuma
thigh" because
to
toid disease
in her
and
"arthritis" refers
that the word
thigh
rheumatoid
diseases of the bones. Because
these are her beliefs, when
she says "I have arthritis in my thigh," she intends to express the idea "I
have a rheumatoid
disease in my thigh," and anyone who so understands
her will have understood
intention. Occasionalists
correctly her particular
arthritis
such
as
in my
in contrast,
B?rge,
we
that
suggest
treat
would
as
utterance
her
an expression
of the mistaken
belief "I have arthritis in my thigh," and,
more
the
that she would accept our doing so. Nonetheless,
surprisingly,
fact
we
that
that
establish
treat
would
it
is
as
utterance
her
such-and-such.
we
When
such-and-such
treat
her
not
does
utterance
as
an
of a mistaken
belief, we treat it in terms of its abstract or
expression
not the meaning
it has by virtue of her particular
linguistic meaning,
of "I have arthritis in my
after all, the conventional
intention;
meaning
not
a rheumatoid
"I
in
"I
disease
is
have
have
arthritis
my
thigh"
thigh,"
in my
she
when
Similarly,
thigh."
our
accepts
treatment
of
her
utterance,
not its particular
she treats it in terms of its abstract linguistic meaning,
as
establish
for
her.
Occasionalists
such
only that we
B?rge
meaning
treat
sometimes
as
utterances
their
though
was
meaning
particular
given
that particular
linguistic meaning.
They do not establish
actually depend on linguistic meanings.
treat an utterance
whether
made
sometimes
do people
by
by their
intentions
Why
or
themselves
meaning?
someone
People
conventional
meanings,
whenever
appears
something
someone
else.
said,
a
has
usage
and
in
else
terms
treat utterances
certain
the distinction
we
talk
Whenever
defined
in
of
of
its
not
linguistic,
in this way because
authority.
between
someone
we
do
terms
of
The
them
having
we
this,
the
authority
said
authority
and
one
distinguish
of the
its
particular,
they recognize
of
linguistic
particular
and
thing
between
conventional
ones,
meant
what
or
in
defined
from what he meant,
of the utterance,
linguistic meaning
This distinction
of the utterance.
terms of the particular
meaning
two forms of discourse.
also between
should prompt us to distinguish
as the form of discourse
in
defined
On the one hand, we have dialogue
to
without paying homage
try to recover intentional meanings
we
have
the
On
other
of
hand,
authority
linguistic meanings.
as the form of discourse
in which we accept
the
defined
argument
we
we engage
want
in
When
of
dialogue,
authority
linguistic meanings.
so we typically
treat their utterances
to understand
other people,
even if doing so
intentions
charitably.12 We try to grasp their particular
which
the
we
MEANING
395
INTENTION
AND
to their words. When
involves our attaching an unconventional
meaning
we engage in argument, we want to show other people
to be mistaken,
so
we treat their utterances
to
to
the
We
hold
them
try
uncharitably.
even if
so involves our
of their utterances
linguistic meanings
doing
to
the
beliefs
intended
express.
particular
they
ignoring
Now we can identify the error made by occasionalists
such as B?rge.
Whereas
their
experiments
thought
in argument,
treat utterances
would
rely on our equating
would
linguistic
meaning,
If we
intentions.
their
our
on
rely
as we
utterances
treating
to how we
conclusion
purportedly
applies
in dialogue. Whereas
their thought experiments
the meaning
of an utterance
with
its abstract
their conclusion
to
purportedly
particular
applies
treat
Ms.
as
utterance
Patient's
a
an
to
contribution
we will hold her to the belief
in her
that she has arthritis
argument,
so
we
we
but
will
do
because
will identify the meaning
of her
thigh,
utterance
not her intentions.
with its linguistic meaning,
In this case,
the occasionalists
have no grounds for applying
their conclu
therefore,
to
sion
intentions.
if we
Likewise,
treat
Ms.
Patient's
as
utterance
a
we will concern
to a dialogue,
contribution
ourselves with her inten
we
will take the meaning
of her utterance
to be that she has a
tions, but
disease
in her thigh. In this case, therefore,
rheumatoid
there is no
we ascribe to Ms. Patient
difference
between
the beliefs and meanings
and those we ascribe to Ms. Patient*. Occasionalists
such as B?rge fail,
to establish
that we cannot
individuate
intentions
therefore,
solely by
to
reference
about
not
the
individuals
so because
individuals,
Imagine,
indicate
although
Salvation
not
refer
meanings
occasions
as
in
nature
occasions,
influence
to occasions
really
of
the
as
question
Army. She will understand
believes about the occasion.
true
they
are.
they
particular
as
or
are
as we
facts
objective
their meanings.
are
they
believe
They
perceived
them
do
by
to be.
for example,
that Peter
to
lass" in order
says "hallelujah
the presence
of a female member
of the Salvation Army,
to whom he refers is not in fact a member
the woman
of the
Susan
will
his
if
intention
she
he is
grasp
Army.
recognizes
the woman
describing
intentions
on
made
do not directly
the occasions
do
whose
are
utterances
Although
a female
member
of
the
Salvation
his
occasion,
intention
she grasps what
provided
Indeed, even if she does not recognize
even
if she
too
believes
the
woman
he
the
is a
member
utterance
of the Salvation Army, she still will grasp the
of his
meaning
she
as
understands
his
intention
it
provided
rightly
expresses
his view of the occasion. When we describe
an occasion, we fill out the
of an utterance
the
only in so far as the author perceived
meaning
as we
occasion
are
other
describe
it. We
can
conclude,
or abstractions
intentions
derived
as
or
such
the
economic
things,
linguistic
either
therefore,
from
that
meanings
intentions. When
context of an utterance,
396
NEW
enter
a meaning,
to such
into
relationship
tion. We
as
rather
therefore,
the
a weak
adopt
an
of
concept
inten
not as the prior purpose
an
meaning
utterance
has
or reader. The
he be its author
individual whether
is,
to
had
of an intention
to conceive
had
but
author,
we
HISTORY
so only indirectly by virtue of their
to justify
In order
this version
of
they do
intentions.
however,
intentionalism,
LITERARY
a
for
of the
particular
crux of intentionalism
individualism.
procedural
Ill
to procedural
derive from the
individualism,
According
meanings
intentions of specific individuals and can be individuated
exclusively by
to those individuals.
I can fill out further this weak version of
reference
intentionalism
by showing how it avoids the errors widely associated with
a stronger version.
sometimes
Strong intentionalists
imply that a text has
a meaning
of
of
virtue
the
will
its author, so to
only by
determining
understand
a
what
text
we
says,
must
recover
what
its author
meant.13
texts
The main difficulties
arise because
with this argument
it assumes
are right to insist
have temporal meanings.
The strong intentionalists
require the action of the will or mind of a specific individual.
meanings
Yet because
focus
of a text, they mistakenly
they look for the meaning
on
the
the
the
mind
of
fact
that
author, thereby neglecting
exclusively
the mind
a reader
of
respects,
also
can
strong
two
to distance
have
of
varieties
from
myself
misunderstood
a
to determine
should be aiming
to locate
their
I am
set out
their
with
intentions
a
to write
a sad poem;
poem
prior
incorporate
For
purposes.14
their
sadness,
expressing
thus, according
must
poems
man
concerned
less
critics
who
intentionalism.
and strong
Procedural
intentionalists
individualists
intentionalists
views of authorial
intentions.
Strong
authorial
other
straw
to disarm
than
intentionalists
a
like
their fire at weak inten
In distinguishing
target.
therefore,
intentionalism,
other
In most
meaning.
rather
to me
looks
constructed
by critics who
tionalism
but have failed
between
act
intentionalism
to strong
a notion
take different
prior
when
purpose
sadness.
authors
is to write
of
the meaning
intentionalists,
of
identify
typically
example,
In
this
way,
strong
of an utterance
with an authorial
identify the meaning
to it?first
the poets want to write a sad poem, then
antecedent
intentionalists
purpose
they
do
so.
Really,
to utterances,
utterances
however,
they must
have
for
their
authors.
authorial
only
Poets
to look on what
their poems will come
later to come
poem only
if this happens,
because
be related
are
purposes
contingently
might
set
antecedent
to the meanings
out
to write
a
sad
they are writing as joyous, and
to have a meaning
for them
AND
MEANING
397
INTENTION
different from their prior purpose. Thus, the New Critics are quite right
are related only
Prior purposes
to condemn
strong intentionalism.15
utterances
to
to
of
their
and this
the
authors,
meanings
contingently
cannot
of
the
be
constitutive
Consider
that
meanings.
they
implies
a
a
out
sets
to
of
write
sad
but
while
who
poem
poet
writing
example
comes to think of it as joyous. It would be a foolish scholar who insisted
we understand
of the poem to include a feeling of sadness
the meaning
of the author had been to write a
the
because
original purpose
simply
sad
More
poem.
generally,
purposes
prior
cannot
the mean
determine
for its author because
authors often change
their
ing of an utterance
are
act
in
the
of
minds about what they are doing while
they
engaged
no
on
Prior
have
the
necessary
purposes
bearing
meanings
writing.
utterances
let alone anyone else. They are merely
have for their authors,
facts about authors.
biographical
individualism
avoids the errors in strong intentionalism
Procedural
identified by the New Critics. It does so by equating authorial
intentions
an
utterance
for
has
its
author
rather
than
the prior
the
with
meaning
has two important components.
purpose of its author.16 This distinction
individualism
focuses on the final intentions
The first is that procedural
of
as
authors
of
purpose
an
make
they
authors
when
utterance.
they
It does
first
contemplate
not
consider
the
original
utterance.
an
making
if a poet set out to write a sad poem but during the course
For example,
came
to look on what he was writing as a joyous poem, then a
of writing
of the poem to its author must refer to the
of the meaning
description
a
final conception
of
joyous poem but it need not refer to the original
a
to alter
of
for authors
sad poem. Of course, it is possible
conception
of their utterances
their view of the meaning
long after they have made
never change
their minds.
them?few
But when
this happens,
people
to its author will be a meaning
to
the revised meaning
of the utterance
its
as
author
and
its author
beyond
a
a
not
reader,
the
purposive
prior
view
purposes
of authorial
tive beliefs of the author. Weak
to have a certain effect or
the
incorporate
ideas
as
that
the
author.
between
of the distinction
component
The
the meaning
of
its author
intentions
second
is that
the
the
actual
former
to embrace
intentions are not reducible
to bring about a state of
animate
important
of an utterance
content
of
the
to
goes
substan
to a concern
affairs.
the
They
utterance.
if a poet writes a poem describing
For example,
the sadness felt at the
death of a friend, the meaning
of the poem to its author might
include
not only a final intention
to express the idea of sadness but also beliefs
about the nature of sadness. Weak
intentionalism
implies that inten
tional meanings
to communicate
derive from the ideas authors hope
through
their
Procedural
utterances.
individualists
and strong
intentionalists
also differ
in their
398
NEW
accounts
of
the
nature
conscious
of
LITERARY
authorial
HISTORY
intentions.
Strong
intentionalists
intentions
with the con
identify authorial
exclusively
scious mind.17 They imply that authors have infallible knowledge
of their
own intentions,
not just a privileged
access to them. Authors must be
to them. What
is at issue here is
right about what their utterances mean
not
or
whether
not
we
should
every
accept
authors
pronouncement
make about their intentions. Authors might
lie deliberately,
and even
a lie.What
the most virulent intentionalist would not want to perpetuate
or not to know what authors
is at issue is, rather, whether
think they
intend is to know what they do intend. Strong intentionalists
argue that
it is. They reduce
to conscious
intentions
intentions.
Psychoanalytical
theorists,
consciously
author's
in contrast,
argue,
grasp the meanings
and
preconscious
not
that authors might
quite
rightly,
their utterances
have even for them. An
unconscious
can
mind
influence
he
what
writes without
his being aware of this happening.18
For a start, authors
can be ignorant of certain beliefs
and
by their utterances,
expressed
when
this is so, a scholar will have to modify
the self-understanding
of
the
in
authors
to
order
grasp
their
actual
For
intentions.
a
example,
to divorce
in a poem about
literary critic who found frequent allusions
an essential part
the sadness felt on the death of a friend might conclude
to its author consists of certain precon
of the meaning
of the poem
can be
scious beliefs
about divorce. More
still, authors
dramatically
wrong
a
about
scholar
order
will
to
the beliefs
their
grasp
that inspired
to overturn
have
actual
their work,
the
and when
of
self-understanding
For
example,
intentions.
a
this happens,
the
literary
in
authors
critic
who
that a poem about the sadness felt on the death of a friend was
conclude
the poet actually welcomed
the
actually a joyous poem might
to
death of his friend. Psychoanalytic
theorists are quite right, therefore,
found
condemn
strong
intentions
of
utterances
for
on
intentionalism
authors
do
themselves,
not
the
necessarily
let
alone
for
that
grounds
constitute
anyone
the
the
meaning
conscious
of
their
else.
Procedural
individualism
avoids the errors in strong intentionalism
identified by psychoanalytic
theorists.
It does so by equating
authorial
utterances
intentions
have for their authors,
and
with the meanings
are
of
the
whether
these
conscious,
open
leaving
question
meanings
preconscious,
or
unconscious.
Procedural
individualism
does
not
com
itself to any particular view of the awareness
authors have of their
meant
such and such to its
intentions.
After all, to say an utterance
or unconsciously
is still to say itmeant
author either preconsciously
such
a literary critic finds constant
and such to its author.
that
Imagine
to divorce in a poem ostensibly about the sadness caused by the
allusions
decides
these allusions
death of a friend, and after some consideration,
mit
reflect
certain
unconscious
beliefs
of the poet.
Clearly
the critic
is still
AND
MEANING
399
INTENTION
the ideas, and so weak
of the author. The
intentions,
describing
of the psychoanalytic
theorists do not impinge on procedural
arguments
are still
and unconscious
because preconscious
intentions
individualism
intentions.
and strong intentionalists
Procedural
individualists
disagree not only
the nature of temporal
intentions, but also about the relationship
to historical meanings.
of such intentions
argue
Strong intentionalists
to its author exhausts
of an utterance
that the meaning
its temporal
about
say authorial
They
meaning.19
constitute
alone,
must
trast, argue that temporal meanings
but not necessarily
for authors. According
can
utterances
ances
can
nonauthorial
nonauthorial
of greater
meanings
their
have
have
authors.
that
Imagine
an
because
utter
to possess
public
Moreover,
can
come
than the meanings
import
author
in con
exist for specific
individuals
to procedural
individualists,
they
meanings,
intentions
individualists,
meanings.
historical
authorial
Procedural
meanings.
temporal
and
intentions,
an
intends
they have
for
to mean
utterance
one
it to mean another. When
this happens,
thing but a reader understands
meant
will
utterance
the
individualists
that
what
the
say
procedural
so
it to mean,
reader understood
of
it
did
for
the
course,
although,
is important. Nonauthorial
reader, not the author. The qualification
still have to be meanings
for specific
individuals. We can
meanings
attribute
a nonauthorial
someone
did
really
meaning
understand
an
to
in
it
utterance
the
if we
only
relevant
way.
can
show
Moreover,
the
we give to show someone
evidence
it in the
really did understand
relevant way surely must be the writings, or just possibly
the actions, of
the
an
person
utterance
concerned.
had
therefore,
Generally,
a nonauthorial
we
must
on
an
meaning
base
argument
any
claim
that
about
the
authorial meaning
of one or more works by the person who understood
it in the way we describe. The attribution
of a nonauthorial
to
meaning
an utterance
on
an
of
the authorial meaning
typically depends
analysis
of at least one other utterance.
In this sense at least we might
say that all
meanings
are
to us
available
only
as
authorial
ones.
IV
a procedural
to which a
individualism
So, I have defended
according
a
must
a
be either
for
temporal meaning
meaning
specific person or an
abstraction
based
on
such
meanings.
we
Unless
we
are
to
postulate
atemporal,
should accept that meanings
meanings,
always derive
ultimately from weak intentions. Once we thus conceive of intentionalism
in terms of procedural
rather than the strong thesis with
individualism,
it has been associated,
which
then we can defend
it against the fierce
metaphysical
400
NEW
LITERARY
HISTORY
it. For a start, we can tie meanings
criticisms
levelled against
to the
or mental
intentional
we
can
In
of
individuals.
addition,
activity
specific
traverse all sorts of apparent
authorial
intentions
and
gaps between
such as that between
and performance
meanings?gaps
prior purpose
or
that
the
between
conscious
unconscious
and
mind.
I noted that intentionalism
had been criticized not
Earlier, however,
in
terms
terms
in
of
such
but
of the difficulties
also
of
gaps,
just
or even
as
utterances
authors
for
such
the
Bible,
identifying
postulating
or a
individualism
"keep off the grass" sign. Does procedural
provide us
to respond
resources with which
to these latter criti
with theoretical
I want
cisms?
to suggest
individualism
procedural
themselves
but only for specific
a
towards
distinction
conceptual
causes
it to
which
it does
indeed do so. In particular,
that texts do not have meanings
in
It clearly points,
individuals.
therefore,
that
insists
come
between
into
being?and
an
the
creator
of
the
author
of
object?that
utterance?
an
to the relevant object.
the person who first ascribes meaningful
content
we appreciate
this distinction, moreover,
individualism
procedural
that any utterance will have both a creator and
will lead us to conclude
an author but the two need not be the same.20 To fill out this abstract
I want to conclude
argument,
by seeing how it works in relation to the
to lack any author.
three types of utterance most commonly
thought
Once
Consider
utterances
first
a
with
or
author
composite
authors.
multiple
In these cases, we can distinguish
between
the creators of the individual
bits of the utterance,
and the author who first collected
these bits
together
in a
utterance.
single
the numerous
can
We
we
for
distinguish,
between
example,
an active
to have
role in the
suppose
played
people
oral tradition out of which the Iliad emerged
and the author or authors
to the particular
who first wrote down and attached a meaning
version
with
are
we
which
component
particular
to an author
other
for
example,
the Bible.
authored
part
the
therein
utterance,
of
St.
although
to all
the
that we ascribe
whether
it be
an author who
the
if we
course,
the
of
John's
was
we standardly
we
to just one
whole
or
our
not
also
the
ascribe
No
on
a
part
of
a
larger
doubt,
author
of
of a co
component
of them. Nonetheless,
a
attention
the meaning
focus
might
a
in
interested
turn
might
utterance.
whole
Gospel
authors,
are
we
utterance,
author
the
author
Similarly,
an
of
part
than
utterance
Of
concerned.
whole,
for each
we
can
to it.
first ascribed
meaning
postulate
next very simple utterances
that recur as, for instance, with
Consider
common public notices. Some scholars have argued that notices such as
"keep off the grass" do not have authors.21 Certainly we might allow that
after all, there is something
such notices often are created by machines:
odd about the idea that they could be created by someone who never
sees
them
nor
touches
them,
such
as,
say,
the
person
who
first
put
up
a
AND
MEANING
401
INTENTION
saying "keep off the grass" or the person who
a hundred
to produce
relevant machine
such notices.
notice
cannot
machines
also
that
ascribe
creators
the
to
meanings
such
notices
of
the
programmed
Because printing
we
moreover,
objects,
cannot
be
their
authors.
allow
might
Nonethe
that such notices do not have authors.
less, we still need not conclude
We can say instead that the author of such a notice
is the person who
to it. In this view, the notice
first ascribes meaning
exist as an
might
someone
for
sometime
a
as
before
constitutes
it
object
meaningful
As a meaningful
object. The notice as an object is created by a machine.
it is constituted
object, however,
by an author.
case
the
of
Consider
utterances
accidental
such as
finally
apparently
of the monkey
the imagined example
who types Hamlet.22 Clearly such
are closely analogous
utterances
to the notices just considered. We have
the
the
such
any
particular
manuscript
manuscript.
In most
cases
on
focusing
a
sustains
see
first
author
cannot
an
of
the
creator
the
creation.
with
authors
and
from
creation.
idea
that
the
In
this
author
the first reader
view,
of
an
of
author
as
the same way, and also
author
and
reader,
to ascribe meaning
this ascription
is
be,
might
and
to an
meaning
there
therefore,
nothing
not
In
to
the
some
to
the
in
a
it. Such
intentionalism
This
also
focus
equates
in contrast,
individualism,
ascribing
to distinguish
utterance
authors.
of
that
meaning
the utterance
ascribes meaning
if we follow strong
Procedural
readers
any
The
of
say
who
the monkey's
its creator.
be
ascribe
purposes
prior
between
will
can
to
not
does
only
conscious,
we
meaning
utterance
first
Shakespeare
as an author
suitable
Rather,
ascribes
its author.
be
distinction
rigid
authorship
much
being
and
manuscript
seems
neither
considered.
is the person who
will seem paradoxical
in
to
so
but
who
however,
and
conclusion
us
the
cases,
cases,
special
utterance
the Hamlet
utterance,
is the person
author
these
creates
who
monkey
made
first
allows
utterance
in
of meaning
paradoxical
its creator,
but
in the
rather
to it.
University
of
California,
in my
The Logic
Berkeley
NOTES
1
This
essay
reworks
and
1999).
(Cambridge,
2 One powerful
strand
most
extends
to this criticism
strong
intentions.
a sense
Such
of certainty.
of the History
of Ideas
I will not consider
which
is the skepticism
found
or
words are ambiguous
skeptics argue that because
we cannot
fix the meaning
or
of an utterance,
too
with
however,
skepticism,
equates
implicitly
knowledge
The fact that our view of an author's
intention
or
is uncertain
in deconstruction.
The
notably
are unobservable,
because
intentions
recover
arguments
402 NEW LITERARY HISTORY
open
to revision
objective
one.
not preclude
our having valid grounds
for holding
that view to be an
in my "Objectivity
discussed
these epistemological
in
issues at length
and Theory, 33 (1994),
328-44.
does
I have
History," History
3
I mean
So, by metaphysics,
outside
of our
world.
temporal
to acquire
the attempt
of things
knowledge
supposedly
a very different
to develop
It is possible,
of course,
our
historical
with
world.
for example,
R. G.
concerned
See,
metaphysics
temporal
An Essay on Metaphysics
1940).
(Oxford,
Collingwood,
4
I have argued
in my "The Errors of Linguistic
this point at length
Contextualism,"
History
5 On
and Theory, 31 (1992),
276-98.
see Steven
of individualism,
varieties
Individualism
Lukes,
(Oxford,
1973).
in General
of this point
is Ferdinand
de Saussure,
Course
exposition
tr.
eds.
Charles
and
Albert
Baskin
Wade
York,
(New
1966).
Linguistics,
Bally
Sechehaye,
are the products
7 That
of individuals
conventions
them has been
linguistic
adopting
6
The
classic
in the Philosophy
others,
Searle,
by, among
emphasized
John
Speech Acts: An Essay
of
1969), pp. 16-24.
Language
(Cambridge,
8 Contextualists
of assuming
of the dangers
otherwise.
See, most
rightly
complain
in the History
of Ideas,"
and Understanding
Skinner,
Quentin
famously,
"Meaning
and Context: Quentin
Skinner and his Critics, ed. James Tully
Mass.,
Meaning
(Cambridge,
1988), pp. 29-67.
see Michel
account
9 For something
as
Foucault's
of epistemes
very like a language-x,
free of subjectivity
in The Order of Things
"historical
that exist in time in a world
aprioris"
(London,
1989), pp. xx-xxii.
in Philosophical
10 Hilary
of Meaning"
Putnam,
"Meaning
Papers, vol. 2: Mind,
Language,
and Reality
1975), pp. 215-71.
(Cambridge,
in Midwest
11 Tyler B?rge,
Studies in Philosophy,
vol. 4:
and the Mental,"
"Individualism
Studies
in Metaphysics,
ed. Peter French,
Wettstein
Theodore
Jr., and Howard
Uehling,
1979), pp. 73-121.
(Minneapolis,
12 To say this is not to subscribe
utterances
In particular,
charitably.
account
to any particular
it is not to accept Davidson's
of how
we
should
treat
of charity, for
principle
"Belief and the Basis of Meaning,"
and Interpretation
(Oxford,
1984), pp.
see Donald
"Radical Interpretation,"
Davidson,
into Truth
and Talk," all in Inquiries
"Thought
and 155-70.
125-39,
141-54,
to
13 E. D. Hirsch,
(New Haven,
1967). Many critics have objected
Validity in Interpretation
of a strong intentionalism
famous defense
based on his claim that "if the meaning
Hirsch's
can possibly
to the
of the text is not
the author's,
then no interpretation
correspond
which
and
or determinable
of a text, since the text can have no determinate
(p.
meaning"
meaning
he has claimed
that "the nature of the text is to have no meaning
however,
5). Elsewhere,
an interpreter
"Three Dimensions
See E. D. Hirsch,
that which
wills into existence."
except
of Hermeneutics,"
New Literary History, 3 (1972),
246. If we take this latter claim as a gloss
on
I
the former,
looks remarkably
like the weak
intentionalism
then his position
actually
to him.
am defending
intentionalism
his critics ascribe
rather than the strong
seems to be the
source of an equation
14 One
of authorial
intentions
with prior purposes
effects authors
their works will have. See
interest of literary critics in the emotional
hope
I. A. Richards,
Practical Criticism
and Monroe
15 W. K. Wimsatt
1929), pp. 180-83.
(London,
inW. K. Wimsatt,
"The Intentional
C. Beardsley,
Fallacy,"
The Verbal Icon: Studies in theMeaning
Kent.,
1954), pp. 3-18.
of Poetry (Lexington,
an intention
a closely related distinction
in doing
has made
between
16 Quentin
Skinner
to do something,
where
the former, but not the latter, enters
and an intention
something
in particular,
and the
of an utterance.
his "Motives,
into the meaning
Intentions,
See,
Interpretation
between my
and Context, ed. Tully,
The difference
in Meaning
of Texts,"
pp. 68-78.
his
intentions
distinction
and his is that my weak
beliefs, whereas
incorporate
MEANING AND INTENTION
in doing
something
is not
of this difference
of an action,
17 Actually,
but
rather
on
center
also
intentions
basis
403
that Iwant
that I do not
the illocutionary
all desires
to exclude
think
enter
such desires
of an utterance.
the
The
intentional
aspect
the meaning
of a work.
of the preconscious
and
into
the importance
emphasize
in Interpretation,
Likewise,
Hirsch,
pp. 51-57.
Validity
authors
historians
could not overturn
any statement
initially argued
although
soon rejected
and Understanding,"
this
made
about their intentions?"Meaning
p. 40?he
not only of preconscious
to allow for the possibility
but also
view and began
intentions
and the Interpretation
of Texts,"
unconscious
Intentions,
ones?"Motives,
pp. 76-77.
unconscious.
often
force
from
intentionalists
See,
Skinner
for
example,
to hermeneutics
A currently
from Jacques
derives
influential
psychoanalytic
approach
in Psychoanalysis"
and Language
and Field of Speech
and "The
"The Function
or Reason
since Freud,"
in Ecrits: A Selection, tr.
in the Unconscious
of the Letter
Agency
18
Lacan,
and 146-78.
1977), pp. 30-113
(London,
concerns
to tie the
led many
that theological
theorists
early hermeneutic
an
utterance
to
terms of
in
correct
of
its
understood
meaning,
interpretation
original
its author alone or its author and his particular
See especially
either
linguistic
community.
Alan
Sheridan
19
It is true
Hermeneutics:
The Hand Written Manuscripts,
Schleiermacher,
Duke and Jack Forstman
(Missoula,
1977), p. 68. Nonetheless,
more
have been considerably
about such matters.
See,
circumspect
"Three Dimensions,"
p. 247.
Friedrich
tr. James
20
I am
considered
considered
creators
assuming
meaningful.
that
Of
the
definition
course,
but will
meaningful
but not authors.
be
there
of
an
in the future,
that texts have authors
For the claim
21
only
"What an Author
Nehamas,
ways, see Alexander
utterances
also would
22 Accidental
include
against
112.
p.
intentionalism
by George
Dickie,
utterance
be
could
includes
utterance-like
and
these
objects
ed. Heinz
Kimmerle,
later intentionalists
for example,
the
idea
Hirsch,
of
being
are not
objects
that
currently
would
have
in numerous
if they can be interpreted
83 (1986),
685.
Is," Journal
of Philosophy,
ones
the computer-generated
invoked
Aesthetics:
An
Introduction
(Indianapolis,
1971),