AnalysisNo.186,July2013
MANAGINGTERRITORIALANDDIPLOMATIC
DISPUTESINEASTASIA
MichitoTsuruoka
The existence of territorial and diplomatic disputes in East Asia raises serious concerns and, if
escalated,couldrisktheregion’sstabilityandprosperity.Focusingonthreeterritorialanddiplomatic
disputes involving Japan, the Northern Territories, Takeshima, and the Senkaku Islands, this article
exploreswaystomanagethosedisputessoastomaintainregionalstabilityandpreventthesituation
fromescalatinginconsistentwithinternationallaw,practiceandnorms.Themostbasicprinciplesto
beadheredinthisregardinclude,first,allowingtheotherparty(orparties)todisagree,andsecond,
maintaining the status quo not trying to change it by force. While these measures cannot by
themselves solve the disputes, we at least need to prevent the current tensions from escalating into
armedconflictsamongsttheinvolvedparties.
©ISPI2013 Michito Tsuruoka,
Dr Michito Tsuruoka is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for
Defense Studies (NIDS), Ministry of Defense, Japan. In 2013‐2014, he is also a Visiting Fellow at Royal
UnitedServicesInstituteforDefenceandSecurityStudies(RUSI),London.
*Theviewsexpressedinthisarticlearestrictlytheauthor’saloneandinnowayrepresentthoseofthe
NIDS,theMinistryofDefense,theGovernmentofJapanorRUSI.
1
The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI. The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Cariplo Increasing Concerns
One of the most unenviable features about East Asia is that the region is
full of unresolved or contested disputes over territories. While the region
is the home to some of the fastest growing economies and rising powers in
the world, the existence of various disputes raises serious concerns and
could risk the region’s stability and prosperity. Unintended escalation of
tensions could lead to the use of force and war. The persistence of
territorial disputes is certainly not new to the region. Given the increasing
importance of the region in the world and the rising level of tensions in the
South and East China Seas, however, it has become a global concern.
Recent developments in Northeast Asia, involving Japan, China and the
Republic of Korea, are of particular concern. Potential ramifications
cannot be contained within the region if an armed conflict erupts there.
Europe and other countries outside the region will inevitably be affected
from what takes place in Asia given the increasing level of
interdependence linking Asia and the world. Maintaining the freedom of
navigation, in particular, is a critical part of Europe’s and the wider
international community’s interest. Sharing those concerns, the main
purpose of this article is to explore the nature of the disputes in East Asia,
focusing on those involving Japan. It is true that every dispute is unique
in its origins and evolution. However, in terms of addressing those
disputes from a policy perspective, some generic conclusions can be drawn
as a way to maintain stability and prevent the situation from escalating.
This article argues for the need to allow the other party (or parties) to
disagree and to maintain the status quo – refrain from using force, in
particular – as a set of basic principles to manage the situation. While
these measures cannot by themselves solve the disputes, we at least need
to prevent the current tensions from escalating into armed conflicts
amongst the involved parties.
©ISPI2013 Another reason why this article focuses on those principles is to show that
even such basic principles of conduct and behaviour amongst actors have
yet to be established in some of the territorial and diplomatic disputes in
Northeast Asia. Due to this paper’s policy-oriented nature, it will not go
into details as regards the historical background. What is significant here
instead is how, under the current regional context, the countries involved
can behave in a responsible and restrained manner in managing the
situation, consistent with international law, practice and norms. In the
final section of this paper, Europe’s choices in approaching Asia’s
territorial issues will be briefly examined.
2 Allowing the Other Party(ies) to Disagree
First and foremost, the significance of the principle of allowing the other
party(ies) to disagree needs to be reiterated. This always constitutes the
necessary minimum level of mutual understanding between the parties
concerning any disputes, not only between states, but also in any human
relationships. It is an art of managing the existence of conflicting positions,
often referred to as ‘agreeing to disagree’. In East Asia, however, this
formula has yet to be embraced, which continues to characterize the
nature of territorial and diplomatic disputes in the region. Failing to do so
often causes unnecessary political controversies and heightens tensions
between the countries involved. Allowing the others to disagree, however,
does not require any formal or even tacit agreement between the parties.
It is rather an attitude that can be shaped unilaterally, the most
important element of which is to refrain from protesting against the other
parties’ verbal claims to which one disagrees.
©ISPI2013 The most extreme case of the inability to allow the other party to disagree
is the Republic of Korea’s position on the dispute over Takeshima Island,
which Seoul calls Dokdo Island. It is an island that South Korea occupied
in 1952 by President Lee Sung-man’s unilateral decision to draw a new
border line – called Lee Sung-man Line – over the sea between Japan and
the Korean Peninsula. Since then, Seoul has been controlling and
administering the island. Furthermore, successive South Korean
governments have constructed a national narrative on the critical
centrality of the island in Korea’s national identity. Since it is Japan’s
position that the island is an inherent part of its own territory, the
government in Tokyo has been consistently claiming it. As long as it is
controlled by Korea and given that Japan has absolutely no intention of
challenging the existing status quo by the threat or use of force, the only
action that Japan can take is to keep restating its position – mainly
through political leaders’ statements and speeches and government
publications, most notably the annual Diplomatic Bluebook and Defense
White Paper (Defense of Japan). Keep registering Japan’s position to
South Korea and to the wider international community is critical in terms
of maintaining Japan’s territorial claim. This is part of normal
international diplomacy.
However, Seoul refuses to accept this. Each time Japan – not only political
leaders, but officials and government publications as well – claim
Takeshima as part of Japan’s territory, South Korea reacts harshly and
issues formal protests at various levels. Consequently, Seoul’s protest
against the Diplomatic Bluebook and Defense White Paper has almost
become an annual event, which often causes disruptions – cancellations
and postponements of various meetings, events and projects – in bilateral
relations. The fact that Japan’s verbal claims cause such level of problems
3 ©ISPI2013 is not helpful and this makes any calm discussions between the two
countries on the issue next to impossible. In terms of not allowing the
territorial dispute to be part of a bilateral agenda, Seoul has been
successful. But in every other respect, it harms the country’s relations
with Japan, and more importantly, Japanese peoples’ perceptions on
South Korea. The cost of disagreeing to disagree is actually high in this
case, which does not seem to be fully understood in South Korea.
Furthermore, even if Seoul allowed Japan to disagree regarding
Takeshima, its advantageous position as a party that currently exercises
administration over the island would not change at all, since the Japanese
government has no intention of reclaiming the island by force. Allowing
the others to disagree, therefore, seems to be the most effective and
practical way to prevent the dispute from escalating and to normalise the
bilateral relationship. This has become even more urgent in terms of
addressing the ongoing North Korean crisis, where trilateral cooperation
between Japan, South Korea and the United States is increasingly
needed.
One might assume that South Korea’s position regarding Takeshima and
that of Japan on the Senkaku Islands are similar in the sense that both
countries do not recognise the existence of a territorial dispute. There is,
in fact, a significant difference between the two respective positions.
Whereas South Korea firmly disagrees to disagree and is not prepared to
allow Japan to even verbally claim the island as part of Japanese territory,
Japan generally allows China to disagree and to make its own verbal
claims with which Japan disagrees. To be sure, Japan’s official position is
that “there is no territorial dispute to be solved” over the Senkakus and
the government sees no reason to negotiate on the islands with China –
after all, China started to claim the islands only in 1971, seventy six years
after Japan officially incorporated those islands into Japanese territory in
1895. At the same time, the Japanese government always strongly
condemns intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters and air space by
China’s government ships and aircraft. However, protesting against
verbal claims and condemning actions of actual water and air space
intrusions are clearly very different. The Japanese government does not
normally protest against Chinese leaders’ statements or government
publications arguing that the Senkakus are part of China’s territory and
does not interrupt bilateral relations in retaliation to Chinese verbal
claims. While being short of officially acknowledging the existence of a
territorial dispute, the fact that Japan allows the Chinese to make their
verbal claims constitutes part of Japan’s restrained approach. This sets
the cases of the Senkakus and Takeshima on two different diplomatic
registers.
4 What is more, as a matter of principle, Japan accepts a possible future
involvement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if China decided to
take the issue to the ICJ1. Japan as a country that accepts the ICJ’s
compulsory jurisdiction is naturally prepared to make its own case before
the ICJ. Since the acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction is
reciprocal in nature, Japan would not be obliged to accept it vis-à-vis
China in legal terms as long as Beijing does not accept it by itself.
However, beyond such a technical aspect, Japan’s overall position is to
respect the rule of law in international relations and to call for other
countries to accept the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction as then Prime
Minister Yoshihiko Noda stressed in his address to the United Nations
General Assembly in September 20122. This marks another substantial
difference between Japan’s position on the Senkakus and that of South
Korea on Takeshima. Seoul has been strict in rejecting Japan’s proposal to
take the issue to the ICJ without giving much explanation why it cannot
accept it except that the country’s position is that there is no territorial
dispute to be solved. Japan has made a series of formal proposals to South
Korea since the 1950s to let the dispute be solved through the
international legal procedures at the ICJ.
One thing that needs to be clarified here is that allowing China to disagree
in no way suggests the existence of any agreement – formal or informal –
between the two countries. Contrary to mainly Chinese claims that there
was a tacit agreement between the Japanese and Chinese leaders to
‘shelve’ the issue of the Senkakus on the occasion of the normalisation of
diplomatic relations between the two countries in the early 1970s, the
Japanese government has been consistent in denying any such allegations.
The argument in this article on Japan’s attitude of allowing China to
disagree should not be seen as suggesting the shelving. It is rather
Japan’s spontaneous approach, which demonstrates the restrained nature
of Japan’s attitude on the issue.
The principle of allowing the other party to disagree is more or less
established in the dispute over the Northern Territories – which Russia
refers to as South Kuril Islands – between Japan and Russia. While
Russia (or the Soviet Union in the past) has taken, from time to time, a
position that there is no territorial dispute to be solved with Japan, the
two countries succeeded in negotiating the territorial issue at various
levels. The Russian authorities are generally prepared at least to discuss
the territorial conflict with Japan. Russia does not normally react to
©ISPI2013 1
As a party that currently controls the islands, Japan has no reason to initiate the ICJ
process. Normally, those who want to change the existing situation propose to take the issue
to the ICJ as in the case of Japan regarding Takeshima.
2
‘Address by H.E. Mr. Yoshihiko Noda, Prime Minister of Japan at the Sixty-Seventh
Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, New York, 26 September 2012.
5 Japanese politicians’ comments regarding the Northern Territories being
fully aware of Japan’s territorial claims and knowing that Japan does not
intend to change the status quo by physical means. Only when Japanese
leaders use the term ‘illegal occupation’ to describe the current situation,
the Russian government makes a diplomatic protest.
Maintaining the Status Quo - Challengers’ Responsibility
For the purpose of maintaining stability and managing tensions, another
fundamental principle is to keep the status quo, or more precisely, not to
try to change the status quo by physical means, most notably the threat or
use of force. Pursuing peaceful solutions of conflicts in accordance with
international law is at the core of this principle. Given that territorial
disputes in East Asia are mainly over islands, pursuing peaceful solutions
is in the interest of the wider international community for the sake of
maintaining freedom of navigation in the region on which a significant
portion of world trade depends.
Territorial disputes in general are almost always subject to an asymmetric
structure, because there is normally a party that controls the disputed
territory on the one hand and a party (or parties) claiming the territory
without control on the other. The position of the former is much stronger
than the latter, which is also recognised by the practice of international
law. Therefore, those who control the disputed territory in question
usually prefer the status quo, while those challenging aim at changing the
status quo, at least in the long term.
©ISPI2013 The responsibility of maintaining and respecting the status quo first lies
with those who do not control the disputed territories, the challengers –
Japan in the cases of the Northern Territories vis-à-vis Russia and
Takeshima vis-à-vis South Korea and China for the Senkakus vis-à-vis
Japan. Japan has never tried or intended to change the status quo by force
in either the Northern Territories or Takeshima. Tokyo’s position is clear
in that these disputes must be solved through peaceful means, namely
diplomatic negotiations. This position is highly unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future.
In contrast, China seems to be trying to change the status quo of the
Senkakus by repeatedly sending the government’s ships and aircraft into
Japanese territorial waters and air space. China’s intention seems to be to
demonstrate to its domestic audience, Japan and to the wider world that
there is indeed a territorial dispute between the two countries (something
Japan officially denies) as a first step and then to undermine Japan’s
control and administration over those islands. The latter involves a
significant issue of whether an armed conflict there – an operation to
defend the Senkakus – would invoke the Japan-US Security Treaty,
6 particularly the treaty’s Article 5 on US assistance to the defence of Japan.
The article states that the treaty provision would be applied to ‘an armed
attack in the territories under the administration of Japan’. Therefore,
whether those islands are under Japan’s administration or not is crucial.
The United States recognises that the islands are currently being
administered by Japan – it was the US that administered those islands
after the Second World War as part of Okinawa (used some of those
islands as a military exercise area) and returned to Japan together with
other islands belonging to Okinawa in 1972.
At the same time, the United States officially sticks to its position that it
does not take sides on territorial disputes in which the US is not a directly
involved party. The same applies for various disputes in the South China Sea.
However, not taking sides is not necessarily the same as remaining neutral.
Japan has been trying to have the US come up with a clearer position on the
Senkakus, in particular its position regarding the applicability of Article 5 of
the Security Treaty. To be sure, Washington does not want to get involved in a
military conflict with China over those islands. The current line of US
position, as reiterated in April 2013 by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on
the occasion of his meeting with Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori
Onodera reads: “The United States does not take a position on the ultimate
sovereignty of the islands, but we do recognize they are under the
administration of Japan and fall under our security treaty obligations”.
Furthermore, Hagel reiterated that “the United States opposes any
unilateral or coercive action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administrative
control” over the Senkakus3. What this shows is that regardless of the issue
of ultimate sovereignty, any ‘unilateral or coercive’ attempt to change the
status quo cannot be acceptable, a new position introduced in January 2013
by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
In the meantime, China’s various attempts to change the status quo
continue, which cause serious international concerns, not only in Japan
and the US, but also in the wider international community. Countries in
Southeast Asia which have their own territorial disputes with China are
closely following the Japanese-Chinese controversy over the Senkaku
Islands – both China’s actions and Japan’s response to them
©ISPI2013 Maintaining the Status Quo – Current Controllers’ Responsibility
The responsibility to keep the status quo also lies with those who
currently control the contested territories – Russia in the case of the
Northern Territories, South Korea for Takeshima and Japan for the
Senkakus. While this is not a legal obligation, it is still important to
3
‘Press Conference with Secretary Hagal and Defense Minister Onodera from the Pentagon’,
U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, 29 April 2013.
7 exercise self-restraint and to refrain from provoking the other parties in
diplomatic and normative terms. Those who control the contested
territories are in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the challengers of the
territorial status and should hence not consider it to be necessary to
change the status quo. In reality, however, some countries have
nonetheless changed the status quo mainly for domestic reasons.
Russia, despite acknowledging that there is a territorial dispute with
Japan, has recently accelerated the economic development on the islands
and appears to be upgrading its military presence in the Northern
Territories. This was culminated by then Russian President Dimitri
Medvedev’s visit to the islands in November 2010, the first visit ever by a
Russian leader to the islands. Again in July 2012, Medvedev, this time as
a Prime Minister visited the islands. There have also been other instances
of high-profile visits from Moscow. Those actions provoked Japan and led
to a deterioration of bilateral relations. The reason why Russia’s actions
raised serious concerns in Japan is that Russia appears to be trying to
change the status quo and presenting the new situation as a fait accompli,
which from a Japanese perspective makes the eventual return of those
islands to Japan more difficult and complicated.
The relationship seems to be improving under Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Abe visited Moscow in
May 2013, demonstrating Tokyo’s willingness to improve relations with
Russia. While very few people assume that the bilateral negotiations over
the Northern Territories will proceed smoothly, the two sides seem to have
succeeded in managing this territorial dispute, not least in preventing the
dispute from damaging other aspects of bilateral relations – unlike the
cases of Japan-South Korea and Japan-China.
©ISPI2013 When it comes to the idea of keeping the status quo, South Korea’s record on
Takeshima has been far from satisfactory. Seoul has been consistently
upgrading military and other facilities on and promoted touristic visits to the
island. This was accompanied by President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to the
island in August 2012, the first ever by the country’s President. These are all
part of South Korea’s attempt to consolidate the effective administration and
show it to the domestic as well as international audience.
Japan in contrast has been exercising a high level of self-restraint on the
Senkakus, thereby not provoking China – no one lives there and the
government has not put any police or Self-Defense Force presence or any
observation facilities there. Furthermore the government does not even
allow its own citizens to visit those islands, fearing that actions by visiting
Japanese nationalist activists could further complicate relations with
China. This restrained approach is substantially different from Russia’s
and South Korea’s occasional provocative behaviours. Again, Japan’s such
8 approach is a unilateral and spontaneous one taken for the sake of
regional stability and diplomatic considerations, and not the result from
any agreement – formal or informal – with China.
The Japanese government’s decision in September 2012 to purchase some
of the islands of the Senkakus needs to be seen in this context. The
government bought three islands including the biggest Uotsurijima Island
from a private Japanese citizen. What stimulated the government’s
decision was Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s sudden announcement
earlier in 2012 on behalf of Tokyo’s Metropolitan Government to buy those
islands. He announced to build a small port and other facilities there. The
central government led by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda feared that
Tokyo’s purchase would upset the already tense situation over the
Senkakus and decided, to buy those islands for the purpose of ensuring
their ‘peaceful and stable maintenance and management in the long
term’4. What the government intended, in short, was to maintain the
existing status quo under the current circumstances.
There was no doubt that the reason why the Noda government decided to buy
those islands was exclusively domestic in nature, which may not have been
fully understood by the outside world, most notably in China. Consequently,
Japan was in China accused of seeking to change the status quo by
purchasing those islands, regardless of the government’s intention not to do
so. There are a couple of significant points to be explored in this respect.
First, what was at stake was a ‘property’ issue – nothing to do with
sovereignty or territory. As long as the islands are administered by the
Japanese authorities, who owns the property is irrelevant, at least in legal
terms. As Japan is a country respecting the principle of private property,
even if a Chinese citizen buys an island in the Senkakus or elsewhere,
that would not change Japan’s territorial borders (while such a probability
would certainly cause political problems). Second, the Japanese
government had been leasing those islands from the private owner since
2002. The government’s purchase of those islands, therefore, did not
change anything on the ground. What has changed instead is China’s
behaviour around the Senkakus. As discussed above, Beijing now appears
determined to undermine Japan’s administration over the islands by
physical means – deploying vessels and aircraft into Japanese-controlled
waters and air space on a regular basis.
©ISPI2013 Choices for Europe
Europe – both as individual countries and as the EU as a whole– is not a
direct party to any of the territorial and diplomatic disputes in Northeast
4
‘Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (Excerpts)’, Tokyo, 10 September 2012 (PM).
9 Asia. Nor is it willing to get involved. Europe’s approach has been to call for
peaceful solutions without taking particular position on the disputes. This
approach is understandable and realistic. Furthermore, no European country
possesses any substantial combat capabilities stationed in Asia. However, the
lack of military capability and the absence of political will to get involved in
potential conflicts in East Asia do not necessarily guarantee that Europe can
always avoid hard choices if conflicts break out in the region. In this sense,
the often-repeated rhetoric that Europe does not have strategic stakes in Asia
and that its strength lies with the fact that it is a neutral player is not always
helpful. Europe has indeed strategic stakes in the region and it may not be
always able to defend its interests and values just by remaining neutral. The
meaning of neutrality, which is often understood as a position of not taking
side, may have to be re-examined.
Assuming that countries A and B were in conflict in Asia and country A
undermined the freedom of navigation and other principles that Europe
upholds in a manner inconsistent with international law and practice, it
would not be in Europe’s interest to remain neutral between countries A
and B. Instead, Europe would need to take side with country B in this case
(although the structure of an actual conflict is likely to be much more
complicated). While this is undoubtedly an extreme scenario and may not
be an immediate concern, it still needs to be stressed that if Europe is
serious about its engagement in Asia and Asian security, it cannot avoid
such hard questions at least in the long term.
©ISPI2013 In the meantime, Europe’s more immediate challenge is to define the
strategic interests it wants to defend in Asia, which needs to be
complemented by a realistic examination on what costs and risks it is
prepared to take in defending those interests. This does not have to
involve military means. There are a number of non-military roles that
Europe should be able to play – strengthening its emphasis on
international law is one of the most conceivable ways that the EU can take
as was demonstrated by the High Representative Catherine Ashton’s
declaration in September 2012 on the situation in the East China Sea5. In
determining Europe’s position, assessment of the involved parties’
behaviours in light of international law, practices and norms – including
principles such as allowing the other party(ies) to disagree, maintaining
the status quo and refraining from the use of force – as well as Europe’s
interests and values would be essential.
5
‘Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European
Union on recent developments in East Asia’s maritime areas’, PRESSE 399, Brussels, 25
September 2012.
10