Te a c h i n g D o s s i e r
Zachary C. Irving
November 30, 2014
Contents
1
Statement of Teaching Philosophy
2
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Evidence of Teaching Effectiveness: Minds and Machines
2.1 Student Survey Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Unsolicited Student Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Teaching Materials
3.1 Tutorial Plan: Neural Chauvinism . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Lecture Handout: What It’s Like to Be a Bat . . . . . . .
3.3 Examples of Exam/Essay Questions . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 Reference Materials: How To Write A Philosophy Paper
3.5 Tutorial Exercise: A Murder Mystery . . . . . . . . . .
3.6 Online Participation Opportunity: Aftermath of a Murder
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Statement of Teaching Philosophy
Good teachers understand not only their subject matter, but also the subjects in their classroom. My field
of research - the philosophy of cognitive science - helps me anticipate the psychological factors that shape
student experience. From my studies and mentors, I have learned the pedagogical import of persuasion, memory, skill acquisition, and neuro-diversity. My approach (I hope) creates an environment where students can
actively participate in their schooling, learning not only the material, but also how to think philosophically.
Persuasion
Psychology Professor Jordan Peterson, describing his teaching style to a graduate seminar, claimed that
teaching is an act of persuasion. The best teachers persuade students to take up their discipline in undergraduate studies or even graduate school. I do not, of course, endorse the sophistic misrepresentation of
a discipline to boost enrolment or provide “edutainment”. Rather, I believe that a teacher should present
students with a vivid picture of what excites her about the field. Such persuasion provides students with
the information needed to select a major (or graduate program) tailored to their passions and a model that
students can imitate to extract intrinsic value from their studies.
It is partly because I take the duty of persuasion seriously that my highest teaching evaluation subscale has
always been “enthusiasm” (§ 2.1). My tutorials emphasize that even if a philosophical text is dispassionate
and uninviting, philosophical activities such as constructing thought experiments can be exciting. It fascinates me that outlandish scenarios can topple great theories. I try to infect students with the enthusiasm I feel
when I search for, refine, and explore the implications of such scenarios. For example, in my tutorial on the
neural chauvinism/multiple realizability objection to mind-brain identity theory, I have students read Bission’s science fiction story “They’re Made Out Of Meat” (§ 3.1). Bission brings out the philosophically and
morally unacceptable consequences of what philosophers call “neural chauvinism”: the view that a creature
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with a very different brain from ours (e.g. a Martian or an octopus) could not have mental states like pains,
hopes, or fears.
Memory
Before Craik and Lockhart’s classic Depth of Encoding Theory, most cognitive scientists believed that information was committed to Long Term Memory through rehearsal (the more you think something, the better
you remember it). But contrary to the Rehearsal Theory, people often fail to recall information they have encountered many times. For example, most Americans cannot recall whether Lincoln is facing right or left on
the penny. To explain such results, Craik and Lockhart hypothesized that memories are encoded holistically:
not by isolated rehearsal, but rather by integrating new information into a network of related knowledge.
Given the holistic structure of Long Term Memory, teachers should emphasize how each lesson fits into the
overarching narrative of the course. As a philosopher, the narrative I weave concerns the development of
arguments, where the successes and failures of one theory precipitate the development of another. In tutorials
and a subsequent essay question (§ 3.3), for example, I ask students to evaluate whether functionalism (the
dominant view in Cognitive Science) avoids the “neural chauvinism” objection to mind-brain identity theory.
By doing so, I encourage students not to remember arguments and theories piecemeal, but rather to consider
how various theories spring from a common body of deep motivations and problems.
Skill Acquisition
In tutorials, philosophy students should develop the intellectual skills required to charitably yet rigorously
engage with another person’s arguments. Socially speaking, this is my most important pedagogical task. Too
often, my students have been exposed to disagreement that is either vicious and partisan or avoided entirely
(“don’t talk politics at dinner” or “you can’t question how I feel about this issue”). Philosophy provides
another way to disagree, but only for those who have trained their argumentative skills.
Cognitive science tells us that people acquire skills best in structured environments, which give students
three things: a) models to imitate (“this is how you hold your elbow when you shoot a pool stroke”); b) a
theoretical understanding of why skills are performed the way they are (“if you don’t maintain a supple grip
on the cue, your wrist will perturb your shot”); and c) the opportunity to practice while receiving detailed
feedback (“your wrist was perfect on that shot, but your elbow was at too wide an angle”).
I create this kind of structured environment within my tutorials. Before students write their first paper, for
instance, I give them a document I co-authored with a fellow TA: “How to Write a Philosophy Essay” (§ 3.4).
We identify the most common features of effective undergraduate philosophy, such as charitably reconstructing your opponent’s argument. Argument summaries (i.e. “explications”) should make perspicuous the logic
and motivation behind each argumentative move, rather than a) engaging only with a philosophers thesis or
b) providing a sort of “book summary” of a whole paper. To complement such abstract advice, I model my
suggestions in tutorial, constructing an outline for an hypothetical essay topic. I then provide (unusually) detailed feedback on student essays in writing, office hours, and tutorials (where I identify common pitfalls for
each essay), for which I have received complements unsolicited (§ 2.2 Comment 1) and on student surveys
(§ 2.1 Comment 1).
Neuro-diversity
My students vary widely in cognitive, emotional, and personality traits. Rather than play to the median
student, I therefore employ diverse methods of pedagogy and evaluation. For instance, last term I designed a
group exercise where students solved a murder mystery (§ 3.5). At the time, many students were struggling
to understand David Lewis’ abstract and technically sophisticated notion of theoretical identification. This
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problem was exacerbated by Lewis’ heavy use of predicate logic, which many students had not fully mastered
in their introductory logic course. Fortunately, Lewis offers an intuitive example of theoretical identification:
a detective solving a crime. Elaborating on Lewis, I concocted a murder mystery that students could solve
only through theoretical identification. My hope was to include students who prefer to think concretely,
rather than with abstract formalism. Afterward, one student emailed (unsolicited) to say that this exercise
“dramatically helped my understanding of the material. It’s a method that very few TAs (if any) do and I just
wanted to let you know that it works” (§ 2.2 Comment 6; cf. Comments 4 and 5).
Such tutorial exercises address another issue of diversity: philosophy professors typically apportion marks
for participation, as well they should. After all, philosophy classes should train intellectual skills and one
crucial skill is dialogue. Unfortunately, participation marks systematically discriminate against introverts and
students who are put off by the adversarial structure of philosophical discussion. To mitigate this problem, I
create diverse opportunities to participate: I make time for one-on-one office hours and run tutorial exercises
like the murder mystery. Students complete these exercises in small groups before discussing them as a class.
Afterward, I post follow up discussion questions that students can answer online. As expected, many students
who were usually silent in group discussion participated in tutorial exercises. One student, in particular,
emailed (unsolicited) to say, “I’m glad you have given us who are too shy to participate in lecture/tutorial
a chance to get some participation marks” (§ 2.2 Comment 4). Before the murder mystery, the student
who wrote me had never participated in class or tutorial, though he always seemed to attentively listen. He
participated in this exercise and, from then on, contributed regularly to class and tutorial. As a result, he
ended the term with a B in participation, rather than the D he was headed for.
My tutorials are populated with students, not student numbers. My students are not passive recipients of
knowledge; rather, they are psychological agents with some common needs and other unique ones. My
studies have helped me attend to these needs, creating a better environment for us to learn together.
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Contents
Evidence of Teaching Effectiveness: Minds and Machines
2.1
Student Survey Evaluations
Course
Instructor
Teaching Assistant
PHL240 - Minds and Machines, Fall 2013
Gurpreet Rattan
Zachary Irving
Enrolment
Respondents
Poor
Ineffective
Marginal
Adequate
Good
Very Good
Excellent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Question
30
26
Mean
1. Effectively directs and encourages discussion
2. Presents material in an organized, well-planned manner
3. Explains concepts clearly, with appropriate use of examples
4. Communicates enthusiasm and interest in the course material
5. Attends to students’ questions and answers them clearly and effectively
6. Is available for individual consultation, by appointment or stated office hours,
to students with questions and problems relating to the course
7. Ensures that student work is graded fairly, with helpful comments and feedback
where appropriate
8. Ensures that student work is graded within a reasonable time
9. All things considered, performs effectively as a teaching assistant
6.1
5.9
6.6
6.8
6.4
6.1
6.2
6.4
6.5
Student Feedback
1. “Zac has been an amazing TA. He is resourceful and consistently helps students whenever they need help. He is hands down the best TA I’ve ever had.”
2. “All those check marks were genuine [after all 7s]. Amazing TA.”
3. “Zac is an excellent TA. He is very engaging with the subject matter and really works
to promote discussion. GREAT JOB :)”
4. “Easily one of the best TAs I’ve had thus far.”
5. “Great TA. Very enthusiastic, highly knowledgeable.”
6. “Zac was a helpful, nice TA. He seemed genuine in his teaching”
2.2
Unsolicited Student Feedback
Date
Unsolicited Student Feedback
1. Email (Feb 4, 2014)
“I intended to send you an email of thanks for making Minds and Machines
an extremely interesting course last semester, but the holidays came in the
way…Your explanations in tutorials, office hours and feedback on essays
all not only helped me do well in a course that I had initially been planning to drop, but also enjoy the material a lot more than if I was left to my
own devices. Undoubtedly, your help and enthusiasm for the course was
infectious.”
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Unsolicited Student Feedback (Cont.)
Date
Unsolicited Student Feedback
2. Email (Dec 13, 2013)
“Anyways thank you so much. You were a great TA, very helpful, always
available for answering questions. I had a really great time with this course.
I hope to see you around at UTM in more courses over the next few years.
And good luck with your own academic pursuits.”
I just wanted to let you know that out of all the lectures this year the final
one [§ 3.2] was the most stimulating. It is unfortunate that you lectured on
the last day because I found you to be a more clear and coherent speaker
than Professor Rattan. That is not to diminish the professors skill, on the
contrary, the professor is very knowledgable and passionate about what he
lectures. However, that being said I found that you conveyed the arguments
of Nagel in a more coherent manner than the Professor. I hope that in future
classes you decide, if you are able, to lecture more frequently. I think the
students would greatly benefit from your lectures. That said I think that you
will make a fine professor one day, if that is what you choose to pursue. All
in all I just wanted to say that it was a pleasure to be under your tutelage and
that I hope that I happen to be a student of yours again in the future.
“Overall this [Online exercise § 3.6] is a fun exercise. I’m glad you have
given us who are too shy to participate in lecture/tutorial a chance to get
some participation marks.”
“This tutorial exercise [§ 3.5-3.6] was actually very helpful in clearing the
concept! Helped me understand better. Thanks so much for doing it!
“I just wanted to let you know that todays in-class exercise that we did regarding T-terms and O-terms [§ 3.5] dramatically helped my understanding
of the material. Its a method that very few TAs (If any) do and I just wanted
to let you know that it works.”
3. Email (Nov 30, 2013)
4. Email (Oct 26, 2013)
5. Email (Oct 28, 2013)
6. Email (Oct 22, 2013)
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Contents
Teaching Materials
Tutorial Plan: Neural Chauvinism1
3.1
Types vs. Tokens (Background): Roughly, types are general categories whereas tokens are particular instances or examples of a category. One example: human is a type (of creature) whereas
Zac is a token human. Another example: below there are three word tokens but one word type:
Razzmatazz
Razzmatazz
Razzmatazz
Now we can distinguish between two theses about the relationship between mind and brain:
Type Identity Theory: Every type of mental state is identical to a type of neural state
• Example: Pain = intense firing of the trigeminal system (iTGS)
Token Identity Theory: Every token mental state is identical to a token neural state
Type identity theory is logically stronger than token identity theory. That is,
Type ⇒ Token
• If pain = iTGS, then every token pain is identical to a token iTGS (a neural state)
Token ⇏ Type
• Suppose Zac’s pain is identical to a token of iTGS, whereas Bob’s pain is identical to a
token of CFF (C-fibres firing)
• Consistent with token identity theory: Zac pain and Bob’s pain are both identical to a token
neural state
• Inconsistent with type identity theory: not every pain is the same type of neural state
Type identity theory has important (and related) advantages:
Advantage 1: Type identity theory puts neuroscience on par with other sciences, which discover
type identities like the following:
• Water = H2 O
• Lightening = Atmospheric Electrical Discharge
Advantage 2: Shouldn’t neuroscience give us theories about pain in general (i.e. pain as a type
of thing) rather piecemeal theories about Bob’s pain, Zac’s pain, and Doug the dog’s pain?
However, type identity (arguably) suffers from a serious problem. ‘Neural chauvinism’ is a pejorative term
for one implication of type identity theory: creatures with very different brains from humans cannot have the
same mental states as us. The thesis of multiple realizability, in contrast, says that the same mental state
(e.g. pain) can be realized in many different kinds of physical states (e.g. iTGS, CFF). Terry Bisson’s short
story makes vivid some intuitive costs of neural chauvinism:
1
I do not give handouts in tutorial, since this would promote a lecture-style rather than a discussion-style tutorial. Yet I make
detailed plans (which I may abandon) for tutorials, because this allows me to facilitate discussions that are spontaneous, yet clear
and interesting. This handout is a representative example of a) how I prepare for tutorials and b) how a typical tutorial unfolds (with
a review of the material in the first half and a free-flowing discussion in the second).
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They’re Made Out of Meat By Terry Bisson
“We’re supposed to talk to meat.”
“They’re made out of meat.”
“That’s the idea. That’s the message they’re sending out by radio. ’Hello. Anyone out there. Anybody home.’ That sort of
thing.”
“Meat?”
“Meat. They’re made out of meat.”
“They actually do talk, then. They use words, ideas, concepts?”
“Meat?”
“Oh, yes. Except they do it with meat.”
“There’s no doubt about it. We picked up several from different parts of the planet, took them aboard our recon vessels, and
probed them all the way through. They’re completely meat.”
“I thought you just told me they used radio.”
“They do, but what do you think is on the radio? Meat sounds.
You know how when you slap or flap meat, it makes a noise?
They talk by flapping their meat at each other. They can even
sing by squirting air through their meat.”
“That’s impossible. What about the radio signals? The messages
to the stars?”
“They use the radio waves to talk, but the signals don’t come
from them. The signals come from machines.”
“Omigod. Singing meat. This is altogether too much. So what
do you advise?”
“So who made the machines? That’s who we want to contact.”
“Officially or unofficially?”
“They made the machines. That’s what I’m trying to tell you.
Meat made the machines.”
“Both.”
“Officially, we are required to contact, welcome and log in any
and all sentient races or multibeings in this quadrant of the Universe, without prejudice, fear or favor. Unofficially, I advise that
we erase the records and forget the whole thing.”
“That’s ridiculous. How can meat make a machine? You’re asking me to believe in sentient meat.”
“I’m not asking you, I’m telling you. These creatures are the only
sentient race in that sector and they’re made out of meat.”…
“I was hoping you would say that.”…
“No brain?”
“So we just pretend there’s no one home in the Universe.
“Oh, there’s a brain all right. It’s just that the brain is made out
of meat! That’s what I’ve been trying to tell you.”…
“And we marked the entire sector unoccupied.”
“Good. Agreed, officially and unofficially. Case closed. Any
others? Anyone interesting on that side of the galaxy?”
“Thinking meat! You’re asking me to believe in thinking meat!”
“Yes, thinking meat! Conscious meat! Loving meat. Dreaming
meat. The meat is the whole deal! Are you beginning to get the
picture or do I have to start all over?”…
“Yes, a rather shy but sweet hydrogen core cluster intelligence
in a class nine star in G445 zone. Was in contact two galactic
rotations ago, wants to be friendly again.”
“Omigod. So what does this meat have in mind?”
“They always come around.”
“First it wants to talk to us. Then I imagine it wants to explore the
Universe, contact other sentiences, swap ideas and information.
The usual.”
“And why not? Imagine how unbearably, how unutterably cold
the Universe would be if one were all alone …”
Discussion Questions
• Does Bisson’s short story bring out any intuitive problems with type identity theory? Ethical problems?
Is the ethical question relevant here?
• Intuitively, how do you think aliens established that humans have dreams, loneliness and other mental
states, given that our brains are very different from what the aliens saw before?
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3.2
Contents
Lecture Handout: What It’s Like to Be a Bat
Background
Phenomenal consciousness: There’s something it’s like to be a conscious organism, which
seems to disappear in a dreamless sleep. Call the qualitative or subjective character of experience
- the redness of red, the twinge of pain, the aching of grief, etc. - ‘phenomenal consciousness’.
Nagel’s Thesis: Scientific epistemology (as it is currently practiced) cannot lead us to discover whether
consciousness = body
• Nagel is not making the metaphysical point that consciousness ̸= body (he is not a dualist like Descartes)
• But Nagel is not simply objecting to one particular scientific research program. Rather, he thinks that
the scientific method (as it’s currently conceived) is ill-suited to the study of consciousness
Nagel’s Argument: First Pass
Claim 1: Phenomenal Knowledge is POV-dependent
1a Knowledge of what it’s like to be an organism is point-of-view (POV) dependent
1b Propositions about what it’s like for an organism can be understood only if we use our own POV to
imagine what it’s like to be that organism
• Why? Because the facts in question are themselves subjective, POV dependent
Nagel’s bat example supports 1a-b. Humans cannot know what it’s like to be a bat, nor understand propositions about this. Why? Our POV is so different than a bat’s (e.g. we can’t use
echolocation) that we cannot imagine what it’s like from a bat’s POV.
Claim 2: Scientific Knowledge is POV-Independent
2a Objective scientific knowledge is POV-independent
2b Scientific propositions abstract from how things appear to us to reveal their POV-independent reality;
thus, they can be understood by any rational creature, regardless of its subjective POV
Nagel’s lightening example supports 2a-b. The proposition that lightening is electrical discharge
can be understood by us, Martians, and super intelligent bats. Martians and bats needn’t have
seen lightening flash in the sky to understand what I mean by ‘atmospheric electrical discharge’.
“The Hard Problem”: Why Consciousness is Special
• Where Science Works
◦ Scientific identifications (e.g. lightening = AED) abstract from POV- dependent appearances
◦ The scientific approach works well when you’re trying to understand and know about things like
lightening (or perhaps, anything other than consciousness), which are distinct from how they
appear to us
• Where Science Breaks
◦ The Problem: Experiences are just appearances: there is no appearance-reality gap; phenomenal
consciousness is itself POV-dependent
◦ Thus, when you’re trying to understand and know about consciousness, scientific identifications
abstract away from what consciousness really is
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Nagel’s Argument: Getting Technical
Phenomenal vs. Objective Concepts
• Background
◦ Question: How do phenomenal propositions differ from scientific propositions, semantically
speaking?
◦ Answer: The latter concern facts that one can think about only if one uses (at least some) phenomenal concepts
• Phenomenal Concepts
◦ Examples: <Lightening> <Red> <EchoChair>
◦ POV dependent: Phenomenal concepts can be grasped only by organisms with a particular kind
of POV (e.g. <EchoChair> is a way of thinking about chairs using echolocation - this concept
can only be grasped by creatures that can echolocate)
• Objective Concepts
◦ Examples: <Atmospheric Electrical Discharge> <Spectral Radiance> <Chair>
◦ POV-Independent: These concepts can be grasped by any organism, independent of it’s particular
POV
• Abstraction
◦ Science always abstracts from phenomenal to objective concepts (e.g. from <lightening> to
<atmospheric electrical discharge>)
Nagel’s Argument (More Formally)
1. General point: To think about certain facts, we must first possess certain concepts; e.g. a pre-Socratic
philosopher lacks the concepts required to think that matter is energy
2. Specific point: To think about phenomenal facts (i.e. facts concerning what it’s like to be an organism),
we must possess the right kind of phenomenal concepts; e.g., to think about what it’s like to echolocate
a chair, we must possess the phenomenal concept <Echochair>
3. Problem: Science always abstracts away from phenomenal concepts, which means that we can’t think
about phenomenal facts scientifically
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3.3
Contents
Examples of Exam/Essay Questions
Sample Exam Questions
1. Give a general formula for identifying necessary a posteriori propositions. Give an
example of such a proposition.
2. According to Nagel, what is the fundamental difference between phenomenal and physical concepts?
Sample Essay Questions
1. Explain the neural chauvinism/multiple realizability objection to identity theory (be
sure to explain what it means for a mental state to be multiply realizable). Is this objection
convincing? How does Armstrong’s functionalism allow for multiple realizability?
2. Why does Ryle’s behaviourism imply that mental states do not cause behaviour? Is this
an advantage or disadvantage of behaviourism, compared to identity theory? Defend your
answer.
3. Explain the multi-tracking objection to Ryle’s behaviourism. Do you find this objection convincing? Does identity theory avoid the multi-tracking problem? Defend your
answers.
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3.4
Contents
Reference Materials: How To Write A Philosophy Paper
Overall Goals
Pith: Say only what is necessary for your argument
Thoroughness: Explicitly state each step in your explication and argument
Clarity: Structure and write your paper so that each step is obviously important
Introduction
• Keep the introduction to one short paragraph; don’t waste time on irrelevancies
• Provide background information only if necessary
• Summarize the structure of your explication and argument in thorough, pithy prose
Explication
• Explicate only important arguments that are
1. Relevant to your comparison with another philosopher or
2. Relevant to your own argumentation
• Explicate all the important steps of a philosopher’s argument
◦ Explain the logic behind each premise and how the premises entail the conclusion
◦ Don’t just state the philosopher’s position
• Don’t “straw man”
◦ If you build a weak version of an argument (a “straw man”) your objections will likely be uninteresting and easily dismissed by a stronger version of the argument
◦ If a philosopher’s argument appears weak
1. Think of what you might be missing
2. Fill in missing steps in his/her argument
Argument
• Roughly half of your paper should be original argumentation
• Clash with a philosopher’s argument, not her position
◦ Undermine the logic of a philosophers argument (Good: “Premise 3 of Descartes argument rests
on a mistaken metaphysical principle about the relationship between possibility and actuality…”)
◦ Don’t just give reasons why related positions are unappealing (Bad: “Descartes’ argument for
dualism is bad because souls are a construct invented to keep the populous in check!!!”)
• Develop the logic of your argument
◦ Don’t leave a promising argument unsupported
◦ Develop one to three arguments clearly and thoroughly (for at least one paragraph each)
• Consider counter-arguments
◦ How might the philosopher in question respond? Are these responses convincing?
Others Points
• Quotations
◦ Quotations should never take the place of analysis; quote only passages you directly analyze
• Citations
◦ Cite whenever you quote or paraphrase anyone, including lecture or tutorial
• Planning
◦ Have a well developed structure in mind before you write
◦ Talk to your professor, TA, friends, and/or family about your essay
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3.5
Contents
Tutorial Exercise: A Murder Mystery
Theoretical Identification: Removing The Mystery
Detective Dick Donovan proposed the following theory to explain the mysterious death of his good friend
Lady Marguerite Blakeney:
“Spring-Heeled Jack, Stardust the Space Wizard, and the Invisible Woman conspired to kill
the good Lady Marguerite. Together, Jack and Stardust released a noxious gas into Lady Marguerite’s manor; Jack provided the power and Stardust the fuel. Fortunately, Allan Quatermain
detected the gasses before they reached dangerous levels and alerted Lady Marguerite. The
Lady fearlessly confronted her aggressors, disposing of Stardust the Space Wizard and throwing Spring-Heeled Jack out onto the curb. Yet while Marguerite was distracted, The Invisible
Woman escaped from an enclosure. When our victim returned to her powder room, The Invisible
Woman was waiting, and electrocuted the poor Lady Marguerite Blakeney to death.”
1. Within your small group, list and define the theoretical terms2 in Donovan’s theory (from Donovan’s
perspective):
Answer: ‘Spring-Heeled Jack’; ‘Stardust the Space Wizard’; ‘The Invisible Woman’; ‘Allan
Quatermain’
Note: ‘Lady Marguerite’ is not a theoretical term for Detective Donovan, because he knew Lady
Marguerite (and presumably knew her name) before he formulated the theory.
After you are done, put up your hand. Before you flip the page, wait for the tutorial to discuss Question 1.
2
Theoretical terms are terms that one did not understand before he was introduced to a theory. Theoretical terms are defined
solely in terms of their causal relations to other terms within the theory (or, more precisely, the causal relations between the entities
to which the terms refer). The original exercise does not contain clarificatory footnotes (or answers), as students were introduced
to the relevant concepts in class and tutorial.
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Theoretical Identification: Removing The Mystery (Cont.)
2. Below are the potential realizers3 for Detective Donovan’s Theory on the morning of mysterious death.
State the unique realizer of each theoretical term you identified (e.g. “Allan Quatermain = Jeeves”).
Jeeves (the butler):
• Jeeves served Lady Marguerite spoiled dinner 14 hours before her death
• By the middle of the night, the dinner had begun to cause Lady Marguerite to feel ill
The toaster
• On the morning of Lady Marguerite’s death, her toaster burnt her toast, causing the smoke alarm to go
off
• Lady Marguerite removed the burnt toast and threw it away
Hernando
• Lady Marguerite spurned her beloved Hernando the night before her death
• After a night of drinking and a motel stay, Hernando returned to confront Lady Marguerite
The smoke detector
• Burning toast caused the smoke detector to go off on the morning of Lady Marguerite’s death, alerting
Lady Marguerite
• Lady Marguerite subsequently threw the burnt toast into the garbage
The toast
• The toaster burnt the toast, causing the smoke alarm to go off
• After removing the burnt toast, Lady Marguerite threw the smoking toaster onto the curb
The Bathwater
• Lady Marguerite ran the bathwater on the morning of her death
• While Lady Marguerite was downstairs, the bathwater overflowed and was electrified by a socket on
the floor
• When Lady Marguerite returned to take her bath, the overflowed water electrocuted her
Answer: Spring Heeled Jack = The Toaster; Stardust the Space Wizard = The Toast; Allan
Quatermain = The Smoke Detector; The Invisible Woman = The Bathwater
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Realizers for theoretical terms (if there are any) are entities that stand in the same causal relations as the entities described by
the theory. Realizers must be unique: a theoretical term is realized if and only if exactly one entity stands in the relevant causal
relations. So if a theory says ‘A killed B for his math homework’, Jack will be a realizer for ‘A’ if and only if Jack is the one and
only person who killed exactly one person for his math homework.
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Teaching Dossier
3.6
Contents
Online Participation Opportunity: Aftermath of a Murder
Theoretical Identification: Aftermath of a Murder
Above is the exercise from this week’s tutorial. Your mission, should you choose to accept it,
is to answer the question(s) below. To do this, you do not need to re-complete the whole
exercise. Your memory of the group work should be enough to answer the question(s). An
answer to the question(s) counts towards your participation marks (but is by no means
obligatory). Please email your answers to me at [email protected]
1. Suppose I modify the potential realizers as follows. While Lady Marguerite was downstairs attending
to the toaster/toast, two things happened: 1) her bathwater overflowed and 2) some exposed wires fell from
their case. When the good Lady returned to the bathroom, she simultaneously grabbed the exposed wires
and stepped in the electrified bathwater. She died after being electrocuted by both.
Does this affect the realizers for Donovan’s theoretical terms? If so, how?
Answer: Both the wires and electrified bathwater escape from their enclosure and electrocute
Lady Marguerite. Thus, we might be tempted to say that there are two realizers for ‘Invisible
Woman’. But realizers must be unique, so ‘Invisible Woman’ is unrealized.
2. Suppose that Dick Donovan, a hard-nosed detective in a hard-knock town, had no friends. He had therefore
never met Lady Marguerite (or heard her name) before the murder.
Does this add to the theoretical terms and/or realizers of Donovan’s theory? If so, how? (Your answer should
be at most three sentences).
Answer: Donovan does not know the name ‘Lady Marguerite’ independently of his theory, so
‘Lady Marguerite’ is a theoretical term. Therefore, Lady Marguerite is now a realizer of the
theoretical term ‘Lady Marguerite’.
3. (Bonus) Suppose that 1. and 2. are both true. How many theoretical terms are realized? Why? How does
this relate to the holistic nature of Lewis’ theoretical identifications? (This question is much more difficult
than the first two. If you are stuck, you can hand in the assignment without the bonus.)
Answer: No theoretical terms are realized! From 1., we know that ‘The Invisible Woman’ is
unrealized. But from 2., we know that ‘Lady Marguerite’ is a theoretical term, defined partly
in terms of the (unrealized) theoretical term ‘The Invisible Woman’. So ‘Lady Marguerite’ is
unrealized. But since all the other theoretical terms are partly defined in terms of the (unrealized)
theoretical term ‘Lady Marguerite’, none of them are realized. We get this weird result because
Lewis’ theoretical identifications are holistic, in the sense that each of the theoretical terms
within a theory are defined in relation to the other terms. Given this, if one theoretical term is
unrealized, all of the theoretical terms can become unrealized.
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When I give this exercise in the future, I will allow students to post their answers to a discussion board on Portal instead of
(or in addition to) emailing them to me. To retain anonymity and thereby encourage shy students to participate, I will have students
post their answers under their student number (not their name).
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