The Rhetorical Design and Theoretical
Teaching of Federalist No. 10'
ames Madison's essay No. 10 of The Federalist has come to be
regarded as one of the most important essays in American political
ought. Its significance transcends the pressing concerns of the
debate over ratification of the Constitution and it has become one of
the keys for interpreting the character of the American regime. Some
idea of the richness of Federalist No. 10 can be gained by considering
that it provides a basis for interpretations of the American regime as
different as those of Charles Beard and Martin Diamond. More
recently it has also been a primary source of interpretation for
Garry Wills.
Beard, who was the first commentator to pay serious attention to
Federalist No. 10, saw that much of his own analysis in An Economic
Interpretation ofthe Constitution of the United States "is based upon
the political science of James Madison, the father of the Constitution
and later President of the Union he had done so much to create." In
that political science, Beard sees that, after quoting from Federalist
No. 10 at great length, "we have a masterly statement of the theory of
economic determinism in politics.' Diamond saw in Federalist No.
10 "perhaps the most remarkable single expression of the `improved'
or new science of politics," and that Madison provides "a comprehensive statement of the way political science should address the pathology of democracy." Diamond also maintains that Madison's analysis in
Federalist No. 10 "anticipated and refuted Marxism. "2
More significantly for our purposes, while Diamond sees Federalist
°The author is grateful to the Horry County Higher Education Commission for its
generous support of the research and writing of this article.
1. Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
(New York: The Free Press, 1935), 14-15. See Douglass Adair, "The Tenth Federalist
Revisited, " in Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers, ed. Trevor Colburn (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1974), for a discussion of how Beard's selective quotations from
Federalist No. 10 distort Madison into the economic determinist that he is not.
2. Martin Diamond, "Ethics and Politics: The American Way, " in The Moral Foundations of the American Republic, ed. Robert H. Horwitz (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1977), 48-49; Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic Republic
(Itasca, Ill.: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1981), 73.
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No. 10
as a "search for a solution to the democratic problem" that led
Madison to envisage and help found the extended, commercial,
democratic republic," Beard presents the theory of that essay and The
Federalist in general as designed to break the force of majority rule"
by "making it difficult for enough contending interests to fuse into a
majority, and in balancing one over against another."' Following
Beard; Merrill Jensen argues that "Madison ' s essay No. 10 in The
Federalist is further proof that the founding fathers were consciously
at work to destroy what they recognized as democracy and its
evils." a
Yet for all the richness of Federalist No. 10 and for all the commentary that it has spawned, the rhetorical dimension of this essay has
been lost. As we will see, failure to consider this rhetorical dimension can distort our understanding of the theoretical teaching of the
essay. It is the intention of this article to recover the rhetorical design
of Federalist No. 10 and to show the relationship of that design to the
essay's theoretical teaching:
The American Constitution sought to establish a democratic republic on a larger geographical scale and more complex or diverse social fabric than had ever been done before. It is precisely this extended scale and diverse fabric that Federalist No. 10 undertakes to
explain and defend. This undertaking was to be a most formidable
task because it entailed a defense of a theory of republicanism that
was at great odds with the standard of republicanism that prevailed in
1787. As is well known to most students of American political
thought; republican theory as it stood in 1787 had maintained that
republicanism could survive only on a considerably smaller scale and
simpler social fabric than that which was to be the basis for the new
constitution. Opponents of the new constitution followed the argument made by Montesquieu that
in an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand
private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on ac cidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is more obvious,
better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen;
abuses have less extent, and, of course, are less protecteds
3: Diamond, "Ethics and Politics: The American Way," 55; Beard, An Economic Interpretation, 154, 158.
4: Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1940), 4, n. 2.
5. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Hafner
Publishing Co., 1949), Book VIII, Section 16, 120.
DESIGN AND TEACHING OF FEDERALIST
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195
According to this view, in a small republic the interest of the public
will be more obvious because of the greater homogeneity that will
likely exist in the small republic. Although Montesquieu is popularly
and appropriately thought of as the father of the idea of the small
republic, that idea had in fact a long tradition in the history of political
thought. The theory of the small republic can be traced back to the
political theory of the polis. In The Politics, Aristotle argues for an essentially small population for a healthy polis-certainly small when
compared to the modern nation-state. Aristotle maintains that experience shows that it is difficult, if not indeed impossible, for a very
populous state to secure a general habit of obedience to law." He
adds that "both in order to give decisions in matters of disputed
rights, and to distribute the offices of government according to the
merits of candidates, the citizens of a state must know one another's
characters.''' In Aristotle's view, citizens should be friends or at least
acquaintances. If a country is too large, the public interest will be lost
in the claims of Montesquieu's "thousand private views."
Further, in a country that is too large, governing authority may also
be seen as foreign by those who live great distances from the center
of government and do not know the personages of that authority.
There is more likely to be a psychological split between "us" and
"them," between citizens and those in authority. In the polls, and by
extension the small republic, each citizen's knowledge of those who
have been entrusted with governing authority would serve as a
check, perhaps the most important check, to insure the proper exercise of that authority. Citizen virtue then was seen as the primary
check upon power. Montesquieu defines virtue as "love of the
republic."' Such love will occur only when there are sufficient
grounds for feelings of intimacy. A large republic was thought to lead
not to feelings of intimacy, but to a sense of vagueness that would un-
of Aristotle, ed. Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press,
1958), Book VII 1326a-1326b, 291-92.
7. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book V, Section 2, 40. Montesquieu was not
alone among modern political philosophers in upholding the importance of smallness
and homogeneity to a sound republican government. See also jean Jacques Rousseau,
The Social Contract, Book II, Chapters VIII-IX. But also see David Hume, The Idea of
a Perfect Commonwealth, " in Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (Oxford
University Press, 1963), 513-15. Also see Douglass Adair, "`That Politics May Be
Reduced to a Science' : David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist," in
Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers for a consideration of the probable influence of
Hume on the form of the American republic.
6. The Politics
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dermine the virtue or love which was essential to maintaining a
republic.
The Constitution's sharp break with the traditional republicanism
on the crucial question of acceptable size for republican government
was, as we have already noted, one of the major issues of debate during the ratification period. An examination of the writings and
speeches of the Antifederalists shows the theme of the necessity of a
small republic emerging again and again. Typical of Antifederalist
thought on this point is "Centinel":
[I] f the United States are to be melted down into one empire, it
becomes you to consider whether such a government, however constructed, would be eligible in so extended a territory; and whether it
would be practicable, consistent with freedom? It is the opinion of
the greatest writers, that a very extensive country cannot be
governed on democratical principles, on any other plan than a confederation of a number of small republics, possessing all the powers
of internal government, but united on the management of their
foreign and general concerns. It would not be difficult to prove, that
anything short of despotism could not bind so great a country under
one government; and that whatever plan you might, at first, setting
out, establish, it would issue in a despotism. 8
The country established by the Constitution was a very extensive
country, designed to be governed on "democratical principles," and
it was not a confederation. As this quotation from Centinel indicates,
as do those that could be cited from other Antifederalist writers, the
issue of size was closely connected to the question of democracy or,
as it was more frequently called in the eighteenth century, republicanism. The adherents to the small-republic theory believed that,
whatever the intentions of the drafters of the Constitution, republican government could not survive in a large territory. The under8. "Centinel, " in The Antifederalists, ed. Cecilia Kenyon (Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Company, 1966). For similar arguments and strikingly similar language see the
"
Report of the Pennsylvania Minority " and " Agrippa " in Kenyon, 39 and 132-33. For
thoughtful secondary treatments of the question of the relationship between size and
republicanism in American political thought at the time of the ratification debates see
Kenyon's introductory essay to The Antifederalists, "The Political Thought of the Antifederalists," xxxii-xlvii; Martin Diamond, Winston Mills Fisk, and Herbert Garfinkel,
The Democratic Republic, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1970), 35-36 and 13335; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1969), 499-519; Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists
Were For (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 15-23.
DESIGN AND TEACHING OF FEDERALIST
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197
mining of virtue that they saw as inevitable would undo the attempt to
establish a republican regime. This belief was so strong that it was
seen as very nearly a law of nature. At worst then the Federalists were
deliberately attempting to subvert the American attempt at republican government and at best they were simply ignorant of history
and the political dictates of nature.
Much of the contemporary scholarly debate about the democratic
intentions, orlack of them, among the framers of the Constitution can
be traced to this issue. Most notably, historian Merrill Jensen has
spent his career giving a faithful rendition of the Antifederalist understanding of the 1780s and the American Constitution. Jensen
takes the Antifederalists at full-face value when they assert that the
Constitution is antidemocratic. Jensen's popular volume, The Articles
of Confederation, now nearly regarded as a classic, is based in large
part upon an uncritical acceptance of the perspective of the Antifederalists. Jensen thus claims that "the constitution which the
radicals created, the Articles of Confederation, was a constitutional
expression of the philosophy of the Declaration of Independence." 9
Jensen portrays those who were most instrumental in the writing of
the Constitution of 1787 as "conservatives" who did not represent
majority opinion or majority interests in the states. Of this group and
its intentions, Jensen writes:
By 1779 they had made some political gains, but since they were a
minority their control of a democratic government was bound to be
precarious. Recognizing this to be so, they turned more and more to
`nationalism' in the hope of gaining power and protection in another
political sphere. They became insistent upon the creation of a
`national ' government. '0
One point that Jensen fails to make clear is why, if the Federalists
or "conservatives" were a minority in each or most of the states,
should they suddenly become a majority at the continental level?
Since election was to be the path to power in the national governmentas it was in the state governments, why should Jensen's "conservatives" fare any better at the national level than they had been doing
9. Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, 239. Of course the Articles were " a constitutional expression of the philosophy of the Declaration of Independence." But Jensen treats them as though they were the only legitimate constitutional expression of
that philosophy. Or, at least he denies that recognition to the Constitution.
10. Ibid., 20.
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at the state level? This problem emerges for Jensen because he fails to
appreciate fully why the Antifederalists objected to the Constitution
as being insufficiently democratic (or republican). He sees the
charges and he apparently agrees with them, but he fails to see why
the charges were made. The Antifederalists believed that the Constitution was doomed to failure in spite of establishing elections as the
path to power because it was built upon too large a geographical scale
and too complex a social fabric. As the Antifederalists saw it, the success of republican government was tied in one crucial respect to size.
While Jensen, perhaps the greatest twentieth-century Antifederalist,
fails to consider this connection, it was perceived adequately by the
Federalists and treated with the seriousness and rigor appropriate to
its importance. Whether or not the Constitution and The Federalist
can be seen as faithful attempts at promoting democratic government
depends to a significant extent upon the integrity and theoretical accuracy with which this subject is addressed.
Given the fundamental importance of the concept of size (and its
related issue of complexity); the Antifederalist contentions had to
be confronted. The Federalist takes two approaches in regard to the
argument concerning size. The first argument is to suggest that while
a continental republic may indeed violate the maxims of Montesquieu, the individual states also exceed the size of territory that Montesquieu had in mind. Alexander Hamilton argues in Federalist No. 9
that "when Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics,
the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits
of almost every one of the States." Hamilton draws his reader to the
logical conclusion that if Montesquieu's ideas on the appropriate size
for a republican form of government are to be accepted then we
shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the
arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little,
jealous, clashing, tumultous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries
of unceasing discord and the miserable objects of universal pity or
" 11
contempt.
While Hamilton's argument may be persuasive logically, it is doubt
ful if it had much practical influence on the issue. One Antifederalist
thinker, "Cato," did take seriously the idea that the states exceeded
the limitations necessary to the maintenance of republicanism. Cato
suggests that several of the states as they then existed should be
11. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton
Rossiter (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), Federalist No. 9, 73.
DESIGN AND TEACHING OF FEDERALIST
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199
"
reduced into smaller, and more useful, as well as moderate ones.'
But Cato to the contrary, the American experience seems to have
been such that it evidently taught most Americans that the state
governments, while exceeding Montesquieu ' s suggested limits, were
nevertheless small enough and homogeneous enough to have withstood the apathy and undermining of civic virtue associated with
large republics. Thus, while Montesquieu's specific calculations, or
perhaps Hamilton's (not unreasonable) inferences from Montesquieu, proved inappropriate when applied to the American states,
the general thrust of the argument could still be seen as sound and, at
some specific geographical point, would apply to the American situation. The question, which Hamilton's argument does not really address at the level of experience, is whether or not the general thrust
of Montesquieu's teaching applied at the point of continental politi
cal organization. In spite of the logic of Hamilton's position, there was
still considerable feeling and thinking that Montesquieu's dictates
would apply if an attempt were made at creating a national American
republic. While Hamilton showed with considerable force that Montesquieu was wrong at the level of the American states, he had not
demonstrated that Montesquieu was wrong at the level of the
American nation. To demonstrate this would require a deeper, more
theoretical argument. This more theoretical argument is the second
approach taken by The Federalist with regard to the issue of size.
In an earlier passage in Federalist No. 9, Hamilton has prepared us
for this more theoretical argument. Federalist No. 9 is where Hamilton introduces us to the great improvements that have been made in
the science of politics. Hamilton lists five specific improvements that
have been made. The first four are listed in one sentence: separation
of powers, legislative balances and checks, tenure during good
behavior for judicial appointments, and representation. Of these
Hamilton says that they are means, and powerful means, by which
the excellencies of republican government may be retained and its
imperfections lessened or avoided. To these improvements, Hamilton ventures to add one more which, so it happens, has been made
the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution." This fifth improvement is the ENLARGEMENT OF THE ORBIT within which
such systems [popular systems of civil government] are to revolve,
either in respect to the dimensions of a single State, or to the con12. "Letters of Cato," in The Complete Anti-Federalist, 7 vols., ed. Herbert J. Storing
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), II1111.
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solidation of several smaller states into one great confederacy." 13 We
should note of Hamilton's discussion of the improvements in the
science of politics, that it is this last listed improvement, that of the
enlargement of the orbit, to which Hamilton at this point devotes the
most attention and handles most delicately. Of the first four, there
was no, or relatively mild, objection. Separation of powers and rep resentation were solidly established principles of American constitutionalism. Although tenure during good behavior for judicial appointments receives a full theoretical treatment in Federalist No. 78,
it was an institutional arrangement that was already embodied in
several state constitutions and, even with the notable objections of
the Antifederalist "Brutus," was not a source of widespread debate in
1787. This arrangement has created concern in more political scien tists of the twentieth century than it did in eighteenth-century Antifederalists. l' Legislative checks and balances, or bicameralism and
the blending of powers among the separated branches of government
that gives rise to a system of checks and balances, were a cause of
mild concern and were addressed in Federalist Nos. 47,48, and 51.
But the fifth improvement, the question of size, did represent a radical break with the American tradition. Hamilton freely acknowledges
that this particular improvement will appear novel to some. Its
novelty and its radical nature explain the fact that Hamilton sets the
fifth improvement off from the other four and this setting-off hints at
the beginning of what may well have been the toughest fight of all for
The Federalist.
It is at this point that Hamilton offers his suggestion that many of
the states already exceed the commonly-accepted limits for a successful republic. This discussion takes only three paragraphs and in
the third paragraph Hamilton informs his reader that "the examination of the principle itself" has been referred to in another place. That
13. Federalist No. 9, 73. Emphasis in the original.
14. To
the extent that there was debate on judicial review during the ratification
period, it roughly paralleled the debate on representation. "Brutus," the chief Antifederalist spokesman on the issue, did raise theoretical objections to the idea of judicial review in a free government. But Brutus's primary objection to judicial review was
its exercise under a national authority. On Brutus's understanding and critique of judicial review, see Ann Stuart Diamond, "The Anti-Federalist 'Brutus,"' Political Science
Reviewer VI (1976); Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, 50. Also see P. Allan
Dionisopoulos and Paul Peterson, "Rediscovering the American Origins of Judicial
Review," John Marshall Law Review 18 (1984), for a more general treatment of the
issue of judicial review at the time of the American founding.
DESIGN AND TEACHING OF FEDERALIST
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other place is Madison's famous Federalist No. 10 to which we will
now turn.
Madison begins his analysis with what might be called the typical
Federalist or pro-Constitution view of political life under the state
constitutions and the Articles of Confederation. Madison cites problems of "instability, injustice, and confusion." 15 He notes that in
spite of
the valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on
the popular models, both ancient and modern ... [c]omplaints are
everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens . . . that our governments are too unstable, that the public
good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice
and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.
These passages from the opening paragraph of Federalist No. 10 illustrate what Gordon Wood has aptly noted was the Federalist understanding of the politics.of the 1780s that "somehow the people
were both licentious and tyrannical.' The grave problems of the
1780s, according to Madison, "must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects
of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has
tainted our public administration."
Faction, then, is the great problem, and "the friend of popular
governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character
and fate as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous
vice." Madison understands a faction to be "a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community." While a faction may consist of
either a majority or a minority, it is clear upon considering Federalist
No. 10 as a whole that Madison is primarily concerned with the prob lem of majority faction. Only two sentences in Federalist No. 10 are
devoted to the problem of minority faction. The rest of the essay is
directly concerned with controlling or removing the mischiefs of majority faction.
15. Federalist No. 10, 77. All other quotations from The Federalist in this article are
from No. 10 unless otherwise cited.
16. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 412.
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Perhaps the most important word in Madison's definition is the
word "adverse." It has long been popular in political science to use
the word "faction as a synonym for the contemporary concept of interest groups." While this is not unreasonable and while our contem porary understanding of the functioning of interest groups in American politics is deepened by an understanding of Federalist No. 10,
such an identification can also be misleading. The phrase "interest
group " tends to enjoy a "value-free status. That is, interest groups
can be either good or bad. From the standpoint of Federalist No. 10,
factions are, by definition, inherently dangerous. They are to be
guarded against. By definition, factions pursue ends adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or, perhaps even more dangerously, they pursue ends adverse to the permanent interests ofthe community. Properly speaking, all factions are interest groups, but not all interest
groups are factions. When we consider the significance of the word
"adverse" to Madison's definition and that the primary thrust of his
analysis is in the direction of majority faction, it becomes clear that
another way of stating the problem of Federalist No. 10 is that it is the
problem of majority tyranny.
Madison states that there are two ways to cure the mischiefs of faction. One is to remove its causes and the other is to control its effects.
There are two ways to remove the causes of faction. One is to destroy
liberty which is essential to the existence of faction and the other is to
give to all citizens the same opinions, passions, and interests. Considering the problem of faction from a slightly different angle, we can
say that the causes of faction are liberty and the different opinions
men have or the different interests they may have. When men have
differing opinions, some (but not all) of those opinions may become
factious, i.e., dangerous to the rights of other citizens. This, Madison
17. Perhaps the most famous example of this use of faction is found in the first few
pages of David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1951). In his discussion, Truman quotes Madison ' s definition of faction, omitting that
portion of the definition that begins with the word "adverse." It is perhaps also worth
noting that chapter one of Truman ' s work is entitled "The Alleged Mischiefs of Faction" (emphasis added). More recently Austin Ranney has also given a soft reading to
the word faction while attempting to explain what Madison means by the concept. For
Ranney, factions come down to this: "Consequently, what favors one group disadvantages another, and what government does to help one is bound to harm another."(Ran
ney, Curing the Mischiefs ofFaction: Party Reform in America [Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975], 23.) Obviously, Ranney is correct as far as he goes, but he has
defined the problem in a way that is at best a mere shadow of the problem that concerned Madison.
DESIGN AND TEACHING OF FEDERALIST
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203
observes, is simply part of human nature: "The latent causes of faction
are thus sown in the nature of man." Men, as long as they have differing (or, perhaps more bluntly, unequal) faculties, will come to different opinions. They will also pursue different economic ends as a
result of their different faculties and this will lead them to have different interests. There is an additional psychological problem in that
there is a tendency for men to attach ahigh degree of self-love or personal identification to the opinions they hold. All of these factors
would make it difficult to give to all citizens the same opinions,
passions, and interests. In fact, as Madison suggests, it would go
against nature. Since men are naturally inclined toward different
opinions and interests, it would probably require, although Madison
does not say this explicitly, tyranny to try to give to all citizens the
same opinions, passions, and interests.
Where there is a high degree of liberty, that is, where men are free
to pursue their different interests and to advocate their different
opinions, there is a greater likelihood that factions will emerge:
"Liberty is to faction what air is to fire." Where men are free to discuss, debate, assemble, and organize, the dangerous and the foolish
will have the same opportunities as the moderate and the virtuous.
Liberty, as the Preamble to the Constitution indicates, is not an un mixed blessing and, accordingly, has its defects, including the potential rise of factions. Republican government in particular places a
high premium on liberty; thus republican government is particularly
susceptible to the rise of factions. This is one of the reasons that
Madison suggests that faction is a disease which is most incident to
republican government."
Madison makes it clear that modern society and non-tyrannical
government should be expected to live with the existence of factions.
They are simply a part of human nature. Thus Madison speaks of the
many different economic interests and notes that they "grow up of
necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes,
actuated by different sentiments and views. " Rather than attempt to
eliminate these factions or their causes, Madison observes that their
regulation "forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary
operations of government.'' These observations prepare us for Madison'sconclusion to the first half of Federalist No. 10: The inference
to which we are brought is that the causes of faction cannot be
removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controll ing its effects."
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Before we consider how the effects of faction are to be controlled,
we must consider another important element in Madison's discussion
of the causes of faction. He notes that there are many different
sources of faction, e.g., religion, politics, and ambition, but that "the
most common and durable source of factions has been the various
and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who
are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society."
The problem that Madison cites is that of the few vs. the many, the
rich vs. the poor. This conflict, as Madison writes in 1787 and Marx is
to observe a half-century later, has tended to dominate civilization.
The resulting question is: How can this conflict be muted or transformed, if not eliminated? In eighteenth-century America, there was
a considerable middle-class and ownership of property was widespread, so one might not expect the kind of economic and political
conflict in that environment that would emerge in a society where
the divisions between the few and the many would be sharper and
more rigid. But Shays' Rebellion became an important symbol indicating that perhaps America, even with its relatively favored
economic and social materials, was not immune to such conflict. It is
easy to suggest today that Madison and the other framers of the Constitution were alarmists. But it should be remembered that if this is so
then that alarm was widely held and particularly so among the most
politically sophisticated. It should also be remembered that the Constitution was ratified by a large proportion of the vote. Further, we
should take note that America has avoided the debilitating conflict of
the few vs. the many. Whether or not we can reasonably attribute this
to the Constitution (as opposed to a political culture somehow divorced from the Constitution as some of our American government
textbooks would have it) is perhaps a point of speculation, but such
conflict has been a rare occurence in American politics whatever the
cause of its rarity. The American experience has demonstrated that
such conflict need not be inevitable. And as Federalist No. 10 makes
clear, the Constitution, by establishing a republican form of government over an extended territory, was consciously designed to demonstrate this point.
Madison was hardly the first political theorist to note the significance of economic conflict for political forms. Such recognition is
found throughout Aristotle's Politics, and the stabilizing and moderating of this conflict serves as the basis for Aristotle's best polity. The
stabilizing and moderating of this conflict also served as the basis of
the English mixed regime. The solution of mixed-regime theory to
DESIGN AND TEACHING OF FEDERALIST
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205
the problem of faction was to give to each of the great classes a
branch of the government: in the case of England, the House of
Lords was the branch of the few and the House of Commons was the
branch of the many. The conflict between the few and the many
would then be institutionalized and each branch or class could check
the excesses of the other.
This mixed-regime solution was deemed unacceptable for America. The task of the American Constitution is to take republican
government, which is particularly susceptible to the rise of factions,
and significantly reduce the likelihood that the most dangerous factions will arise. Or to put it a slightly different way: the task is to take
republican government and make it, behave in certain crucial respects like a mixed regime, but, of course, without the various
mechanisms of class representation that are at the disposal of a mixed
regime. That this is at least how Madison perceived the task is clear in
the third sentence of Federalist No. 10 when he maintains that the
friend of popular government will not fail "to set a due value on any
plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached,
provides a proper cure " for the mischiefs of faction. Note the important qualification; "without violating the principles to which he is attached." Advocates of a mixed regime believe that the institutionalization of the conflict between the few and the many will
moderate that conflict and resolve the more severe problems of faction. But this solution violates the principles of popular government;
most notably it violates the principle of majority rule. So, at this point,
political realism dictates that we can neither eliminate the causes of
faction nor turn to the traditional non-republican solution to the
problem.
Just as there are two ways to eliminate the causes of faction, so, according to Madison, are there two ways of controlling its effects. The
first is to prevent the majority from having the same passion or interest and the second is to render a majority, by its number and local
circumstance, unable to carry out its schemes of oppression should it
possess a factious impulse.
After stating these two means of controlling the effects of faction,
Madison begins to move to the heart of his argument and to a conclusion which will be most difficult for a large number of his readers, if
not a majority of them, to accept. To soften the blow that will ultimately befall them, Madison engages in a masterful rhetorical ploy.
Madison has just told us the two means of controlling the effects of
faction. The next paragraph begins with the observation that "from
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this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy,
by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens,
who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of
no cure for the mischiefs of faction."
The question that should strike Madison's reader at this point, but
which seldom does, is: So what? Consider Madison's definition of
pure democracy. Who in 1787, or at any other time, was advocating a
pure democracy? It was impossible for any one of the thirteen states,
not to mention all of them together, to be a pure democracy. So why
does Madison drag in the concept of pure democracy and point to its
defects? In the paragraph that follows the discussion of pure democracy, Madison states that a "republic opens a different prospect and
promises the cure for which we are seeking." The apparent distinction is between a democracy and a republic. It is difficult to say how
many people were taken in by this rhetorical sleight-of-hand in 1787,
but it has certainly caused considerable confusion for Madison's
twentieth-century readers. This distinction between a democracy
and a republic is one of the bases for the charge that Madison and the
Constitution are antidemocratic or predemocratic. The notion is that
Madison and the other framers rejected democracy for the republi can form. And it is this distinction that leads Merrill Jensen to write
(as noted earlier): " Madison's essay No. 10 in The Federalist is further
proof that the founding fathers were consciously at work to destroy
what they recognized as democracy and its evils. In that essay
Madison demonstrates the advantages of a republic over a democracy."' In a similar vein, Vernon Parrington had earlier written: As a
means of securing a necessary balance between rival interests,
Madison approved a republican rather than a democratic form of gov ernment." 19 But, again, we need to consider the kind of democracy
Madison writes of in Federalist No. 10. What would be the point of
consciously working to destroy a form of democracy that was impossible to implement and that no one was advocating?
The reason that Madison discusses pure democracy is that ultimately his reader will see that the defects of pure democracy are
also the defects of a small republic. We have described Madison's dis tinction between a democracy and a republic as an apparent distinction. This distinction actually serves as a kind of a rhetorical smoke
18. Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, 4, n. 2.
19. Vernon Farrington; Main Currents in American Thought, 3 vols. (New York: Harcourt; Brace & World, Inc., 1927), I, 292.
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screen. The real distinction is between a large republic and a small
republic. Madison gently prepares his reader, who in 1787 had a
strong emotional and rational attachment to the concept of the small
republic. Rather than plunge directly into what he has every reason
to expect would be a heated consideration, Madison begins by discussing a form of government, pure democracy, to which his reader has
no attraction, and he can enable his reader to see the defects of that
particular form of government. If the reader will see that ' those
defects are indeed defects and that they characterize a small republic
as well as a pure democracy, Madison will have raised serious doubts
in the mind of his reader concerning the viability of a small republic
that might not be raised if Madison had confronted the real distinction at the outset in a more bold manner.
The paragraph that introduces the idea of pure democracy concludes with the second of two statements found in Federalist No. 10
that constitute a direct slap at the theory of the small republic.
Madison disparagingly states: "Theoretical politicians, who have patronized this species of government [ostensibly pure democracy],
have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect
equality in their political rights, they would at the same time be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions,
and their passions. " A pure democracy, Madison tells us, will have few
distinct parties and interests. That being the case, it is more likely that
a majority will be found of the same party. Because of its size, we can
expect a pure democracy to be a homogeneous society, just as we
would expect a small republic to be. Madison is saying that even
though a pure democracy (and by inference a small republic) may be
essentially homogeneous and even though it may have a paper commitment to a system of equal rights, for instance in the form of abill of
rights, these factors will not translate into an entirely homogeneous
society. There will still be differences of opinion. There likely will be
a division between the few and the many. What willbe homogeneous
will be the majority. Under the circumstances of a firmly-knit,
homogeneous majority, what is to protect the minority? Even small
societies will not be characterized by unanimity. That homogeneity
which was thought to be so essential to republican liberty is fine for
those who are members of the homogeneous majority, but what of
those who are part of the minority? Homogeneity, Madison is saying,
rather than being a source of liberty, can be a source of tyranny. This
lesson that a parchment commitment to equal political rights does not
translate into an undivided society with equality (or sameness) in
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opinions and possessions comes in the context of Madison's discussion of pure democracy, but it can be applied with equal validity to a
small republic and that is Madison's real concern.
As we noted, this statement is the second of two similar statements
in Federalist No. 10. In the paragraph that immediately precedes his
discussion of pure democracy, Madison maintains that if the majority has both the impulse and the opportunity to carry into effect
any schemes of oppression, "we well know that neither moral nor
religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control." When we
consider these two statements together, it can be seen that Madison is
arguing that a simple reliance on the virtue of citizens or a simple
reliance on the essentially homogeneous character of the people will
not be enough, either singly or together, to protect a regime of liberty
from faction. Virtue and homogeneity, the primary guards in the
theory of the small republic, are, according to Madison, inadequate. If
a homogeneous majority pursues oppressive ends, the tension that
exists between its factious intent on the one hand and the virtue that
it may have in more normal times on the other will be resolved in
favor of its factious intent.
Now we shall consider how Madison proceeds from his discussion
of the apparent distinction between democracy and republic to the
real distinction between a large republic and a small republic.
Madison notes that there are two great points of difference between a
democracy and a republic. The first difference is the representative
principle, or as Madison states it, the delegation of the government in
a republic "to a small number of citizens elected by the rest." As we
will see, it is the second point of difference that is crucial to Madison's
analysis. This second point is that as a result of introducing the representative principle, a "greater number of citizens and greater sphere
of country" can be brought within the scope of republican government. This second point of difference distinguishes a large republic
from a small republic as well as distinguishing a republic from a
pure democracy.
The effect of representation is "to refine and enlarge the public
views by passing them through a medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and
whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations." This, however, is a hoped-for effect of representation. Madison states that representatives "may best
discern the true interest of their country." There can be no guarantee
that they will in fact discern the true interest of the country. This con-
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ditional nature of the effect of representation is repeated in the
following sentence when Madison maintains that with representation
"it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good
than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the pur pose." That Madison fully understands that the effect of the representative principle is conditional is made clear by the next two sentences when it is noted that "on the other hand, the effect may be
inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister
designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people."
Clearly, representation by itself is not sufficient. It is also clear that
republican government possesses the same tendencies as democratic
government Since both are species of popular government, they
share the same root principle of majority rule, and they share the
same effects that are derived from that principle, including, most
notably, the tendency toward majority faction" If the people are
going to be factious when governing in person, what is to keep them
from being factious in electing others to govern directly for them?
Since representation by itself is not sufficient, "the question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are most favorable to the
election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly
decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations." For the
first time, Madison has put forth the real issue: large republics as opposed to small republics. Madison has gently prepared his reader as
best he could by arguing inferentially about pure democracies, but
now comes the real confrontation. Three of the next four paragraphs
present the argument that has already been applied to pure democracies but that will now be applied to small republics, and they do so
in a precise, logical, and forceful manner.
Each of the first two of these paragraphs deals with one of the "obvious considerations" that favor the large republic. The first consideration we could call the favorable fit argument-If we assume that
the representative assemblies of a large republic and a small republic
20. The genus-species relationship was used by Martin Diamond to clarify the understanding of the roughly synonymous terms democracy, republic, and popular
government. See Diamond, "Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the
Framers' Intent," American Political Science Review LIII (March, 1959). Also see Paul
Peterson, "The Meaning of Republicanism in The Federalist, " Publius: The Journal of
Federalism, (Spring 1979) for a defense of this usage in light of Paul Eidelberg's
criticism.
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would be about the same size regardless of the population size of the
two republics, it follows that the number of the citizens choosing representatives in the electoral districts of the two republics will be different. The districts that choose representatives in the large republic
will, of necessity, be larger than the corresponding districts in the
small republic. The ratio of citizens to representatives cannot be the
same in the two republics. If an attempt were made to use the same
ratio in the large republic that provides for a legislative assembly of
reasonable size in the small republic, the result would be an assembly
so large that it would lead to "the confusion of a multitude." If, on the
other hand, an attempt were made to base the assembly of the small
republic on the same ratio that provides for an assembly of reasonable
size in the large republic, the result would be an assembly so small
that it would lead to the cabals of a few." If it is assumed that each
republic has the same portion of "fit characters," i.e., those people
who would make responsible representatives, it follows that the large
republic would have a larger pool of talent from which it would be
drawing to fill the same size assembly that the small republic would
be filling from a smaller pool of talent. The large republic presents "a
greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice."
But it is Madison's second "obvious" consideration that is the more
crucial for favoring large republics. After all, if the people are of a factious nature, it is difficult to believe that the availability of a larger
pool of talent will prevent them from electing representatives who
will represent their factious interests. It might also be suggested that
just as the pool of fit characters will be numerically larger in the large
republic than in the small, so will be the pool of unfit characters. The
people will have to be of such a character so that they will choose the
fit over the unfit. It is Madison's second consideration that will make
the people more likely to make this choice.
The second consideration is, as we noted above, that the size of the
representative districts will not be the same and that the districts in
the large republic must be larger than those in the small republic.
Being larger, these districts will be comprised of more citizens and
more interests. That is, these districts will be more heterogeneous. In
such districts, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to
practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often
carried" and the people will be more likely to choose "men who
possess the the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters." In a representative district that includes a multiplicity of interests, the winning candidate will most likely be one
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who can find a common thread that runs through several of the interests in the district, if not all of them. He will have to be able to address himself to a number of concerns and be reasonably well-versed
on a number of issues. Victory would probably require a broad outlook.
If a district is small and homogeneous, a more narrow outlook and a
more narrow appeal would be sufficient to gain victory. In a small district, the more statesmanlike candidate who is capable ofmaking the
broader appeal would probably be at a disadvantage when confronted with the candidate who "speaks for the district, " the candidate who knows well the prejudices of the dominant interest of the
community and who plays to those prejudices. To place Madison's
analysis in a more contemporary context, we need only think of the
civil-rights legislation of the 1960s. The arena in which this legislation was worked out was the broader arena of the American Congress, not the more narrow arenas that were the legislatures of the
southern states. On the issue of equal rights for black citizens, the
dominant prejudices of the majority of voters in Mississippi, Alabama,
and other southern states were such that a broad appeal on behalf of
the rights of the black minority would have been to invite political
suicide. Gordon Wood has observed that, besides the probability
that in the larger representative districts of the large republic the victorious will be those who have made the broader appeal, excellence
will be gained because in a larger electorate the road to public honors
will be longer and the time required to travel that road will be longer,
leading to the consequence that "only established social leaders
would thus be elected by a broad constituency. "21 These are the same
people that Madison characterizes as possessing "the most attractive
merit and the most diffusive and established characters." The larger
constituencies then would likely lead to representatives of greater
national outlook, greater experience, and proven skills.
It is clear that Madison intended that the congress that would
21. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 512. Madison returns to this theme of
fitness in Federalist No. 57, although with more of an eye toward avoiding the evils of
democratic politics rather than securing excellence. Madison calculates that "each
representative of the United States will be elected by five or six thousand citizens;
whilst in the individual States, the election of a representative is left to about as many
hundreds." He asks if this difference is sufficient to warrant a fear of the federal
government. In answering this question, Madison states that "reason, on the contrary,
assures us that as in so great a number a fit representative would be most likely to be
found, so the choice would be less likely to be diverted from him by the intrigues of the
ambitious or the bribes of therich." (Federalist No. 57, 354.)
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result from such elections would not be a microcosm of the country.
As we have seen, it is Madison's intention that the republic be constructed so that the representative principle will refine and enlarge
the public view. This would lead to a congress that would filter the "fit
characters" from the population at large and provide an elevated
debate concerning the public interest. But the way in which this congress is to emerge has to be consistent with popular government. The
traditional means of elevating the level of debate was simply to reject
popular government. Allow the people one branch of the government and check their excesses in the other branches that are based
on other principles of government. But both houses of the American
Congress are to be derived from the people at large and no requirements are established other than those of age and citizenship
for holding office. This, of course, is true of the executive branch
as well.
The Federalist 's solution to the problem of faction does not remove
the people from choosing their representatives; it does not involve
the construction of branches of government upon principles of
government other than that of the rule of the many (although the
many in America were not seen as being poor); and it does not constitutionally draw its officers from any particular social or economic
class. The Federalist's solution relies on having the people, placed in
the right social setting, i.e., a large republic, choose their representatives from those who have demonstrated their capability and who
can make appeals on a broad, public-interested basis. The resulting
legislative body is a microcosm of the nation in the sense that
geographical, economic, and social interests of any reasonable weight
will be represented. But the level of debate that occurs when the representatives of those interests gather will be of an elevated nature.
For the most part, the incompetent and the mediocre will have been
filtered out. Those representatives who are elected may not be the
best, but they will at least be a reasonable approximation of the best.
As Madison sees it, a kind of natural aristocracy would be elected to
the offices of the national government, including the most directly
popular branch, the House of Representatives.
One of the Antifederalist fears concerning the Constitution was
that the representative districts under a national American republic
would be so large that representatives would be out-of-touch with
their constituencies. After stating the two considerations as to why a
large republic would be more likely to elect representatives favorable
to the public good than would a small republic, Madison briefly ad-
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dresses this fear, fully admitting that "by enlarging too much the
number of electors, you render their representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests." Contained within this admission is a warning to the advocates of the small
republic: "[A]s by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and
national objects." 22 Madison suggests that federalism supplies the
solution: "[T]he great and aggregate interests being referred to the
national, the local and particular to the State legislatures." Madison
can perhaps be seen here as tacitly admitting that the districts will be
too large for the representatives to be knowledgeable about all of the
local circumstances of their districts. But Madison is also saying that,
even if this is the case, it is not a matter for great alarm, as these representatives will not be concerned with strictly local matters and that,
in fact, the largeness of the districts that might render them unsuitable to represent the districts in some matters frees them from local
prejudice so that they can deal effectively and in a public-interested
way with matters of general concern for the nation. There is an
assumption to Madison's assertion, viz. that the concerns of government are as neatly divided as he suggests and perhaps a corollary
assumption that objects of national legislation will have negligible effects upon matters of strictly local concern. To the extent that either
of these assumptions is false, then this aspect of Madison's argument
is weakened.
After this attempt at allaying Antifederalist fears, Madison turns to
what has become one of the most widely cited paragraphs in
Federalist No. 10. All that we have been considering-the weakness
of the representative principle by itelf and the two considerations
that favor a large republic over a small republic-have come within
Madison's discussion of the first great point of difference between a
republic and a pure democracy, that point of difference being the
representative principle. Now Madison turns to the second difference: "the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which
may be brought within the scope of republican than of democratic
government." As we have noted above and as Madison now notes, "it
is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations
less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter." But in many ways
this paragraph is a foregone conclusion after what has already been
22. The fuller treatment of this particular objection to the Constitution is found in
Federalist Nos. 55 and 56.
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considered and is anticlimactic. Madison states that "the smaller the
society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it." Thus it will be more likely that a majority will be composed of one interest, and since the society is small, the more easily
will the majority concert and execute any plans of oppression. This is
almost precisely what Madison had stated earlier in his discussion of
pure democracy. If we consider the two ways of controlling the effects of faction-to prevent the existence of the same passion or interest in the majority or, if such a majority passion or interest does
exist, to render it by its number and local circumstance unable to
carry out its schemes of oppression-then it becomes clear that a
pure democracy offers no hope of controlling these effects.
But when the sphere is extended, a greater number of parties and
interests is taken in; it is less likely that a majority will be comprised of
a single interest or passion. It is more likely that a majority will be
made up of a coalition of interests uniting on those things (which are
likely to be few and moderate) which these interests have in common. Whereas a pure democracy provides neither of the two means
of controlling the effects of faction, an extended republic supplies
both. As we have seen, a majority is not likely to be comprised of a
single interest. But, if in spite of the existence of a multiplicity of interests a factious majority should emerge, then there will be natural
geographical barriers to communication among the members of that
faction that are not afforded by a pure democracy. If under the conditions ofa territorially large republic a factious majority should exist,
"it will be more difficult for all who feel it [the common factious motive] to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each
other." Thus a factious majority in a territorially large republic will be
"rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and
carry into effect schemes of oppression."
Concerning the first of the two quotations cited in the preceding
paragraph, Garry Wills has written that it
has received dozens of readings, most of them making little if any
sense. At the most foolish level, some suppose that extent of
territory offers a mere logistical block to evil combinations. This
view would derive human virtue from bad roads. And it would expose Madison's argument to refutation by the telegraph. Besides, as
[James MacGregor] Burns and others have argued, mere problems
DESIGN AND TEACHING OF FEDERALIST No. 10
215
of communication from sector to sector would impede good combinations as well as evil ones. 23
Wills, however, ignores the role of passion in communication. And
factions, given their character, are more likely to communicate passion and communicate passionately than are non-factious groups. An
extended republic will cause passion to dissipate should a factious
majority exist because the local situation of that majority is not local. It
is dispersed over a large territory. The role of passion is what Madison
is referring to when he observes that "neither religious nor moral
motives can be relied on as an adequate control ... on the injustice
and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to
the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy
becomes needful." In effect, Madison is here speaking of the psychology of mob rule. Individuals in a mob feed on each other to the point
where they cease to be individuals. As difficult as it may be to reason
with one unjust person, it is even more difficult to reason with a multitude of unjust persons. An individual can be reasoned with, a mob
cannot. Factions, which possess many of the characteristics of a mob,
are less dangerous when dispersed than when confined within
narrow borders. This is precisely why Madison says that in an extended republic if a factious majority exists, " it will be more difficult
for all who feel it to discover their own strength and act in unison with
each other." The American republic is designed so that reason can
rule. Its extent of territory tilts the political process in the direction of
reason and away from that of passion 24
23. Garry Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1981), 220.
24. Wills fails to consider this passage from Federalist No. 10: "Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the
number whose concurrence is necessary. " Thus, according to Madison, "mere problems of communication from sector to sector" would not "impede good combinations as
well as evil ones. " Or, more precisely, they may both be impeded, but it would occur in
different ways. And the impediment would be more harmful to the prospects for political success of evil combinations than of good combinations. While modern technology
has served to mitigate many of the geographical problems to communication posed by
an extended republic, Madison's central point about the role of passion in communication and how that passion dissipates over geographical distance still holds. Not unlike
romance, participation in politics through technological resources is not the same
thing as direct participation. And those who seek to communicate primarily through
passion are at the greatest disadvantage.
If the reader has grasped the implication of Madison's earlier
arguments, he is well prepared for this paragraph, which, we should
keep in mind, is dealing, at least putatively, with the distinctions between republics and pure democracies. And he is prepared for the inescapable conclusion which begins the next paragraph: "Hence, it
clearly appears that the same advantage which a republic has over a
democracy in controlling the effects of faction is enjoyed by a large
over a small republic-is enjoyed by the Union over the States cornposing it." The reader who has seen the weaknesses of pure democracy, a form of government to which the reader has no likely attach
ment, is now compelled to accept the conclusion that small republics,
a form of government to which he was likely in 1787 to have a significant attachment, are prone to the same destructive tendencies as
pure democracies. And they are so prone precisely because of their
smallness and homogeneity.
Whereas liberty was seen as the cause of faction, under the right
circumstances it also offers the cure. The liberty which allows a factious majority in a small republic easily to engage in oppression
against a minority compels the many interests that will be found in a
large republic to settle or mute their differences and emphasize their
common ground, which is likely to be non-factious, in the formation
of the governing majority. Resolving the problem of faction does not
require the destruction of liberty, but under the right social conditions liberty can be successfully manipulated to avoid its more destructive consequences. Unlike the pre-Constitution solutions to the
problem of faction, majority rule is not thwarted, but it is freely
guided along a constructive path.
Both Montesquieu and Madison seem to have recognized the same
phenomenon. Whereas Montesquieu feared that "in an extensive
republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views,"
Madison applauded the development of a thousand private views.
For Montesquieu the thousand private views would diminish an
easily-perceived public interest, thereby undermining the patriotism
necessary to citizen virtue. For Madison the easily-perceived public
interest of a small republic would be simply the felt desires of a
single-minded majority with little regard for minority desires and
needs, and such a public interest would be an illusion. Such a majority
would not be majority opinion tempered by the equal rights of the
minority, and there would be nothing "to check the inducements to
"
sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. For Montesquieu patriotism is based upon the recognition by the majority of
DESIGN AND TEACHING OF FEDERALIST
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citizens that the government represents their undiluted wants and
needs (although not wants and needs in the sense of the modern
welfare state). In the new American constitutional system, this connection would be lost among the competing thousand private views.
The argument of The Federalist seems to be that this connection will
be replaced by and patriotism will be gained as a result of a constitution that establishes an effective and stable administrative system that
protects the rights and interests of all citizens2 5 The narrow, and
potentially oppressive, public interest of the small republic which
gains the loyalty and support of the majority of its citizens and which
is not a genuine public interest is replaced by a broader, and perhaps
vaguer, certainly more abstract, public interest that replaces singleminded majority will with constitutionalism.
We should also consider again Charles Beard's comment that
Madison's political science sought to break the force of majority
rule" by "making it difficult for enough contending interests to fuse
into a majority, and in balancing one over against another." Madison
is not seeking to break the force of majority rule," rather he is seeking, as he puts it, to break and control the violence of faction." Beard
confuses majority rule with the rule of factious majorities. And there
is no difficulty in contending interests fusing into a majority. The fact
of contending interests fusing into a majority makes it difficult for
that resulting majority to be a faction:
In Federalist No. 14, Madison places the theory of the extended
republic in its historical and theoretical context. He writes:
[E]ven in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of
representation, no example is seen of a government wholly popular
and founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe
has the merit of discovering this great mechanical power in govern ment, by the simple agency of which the will of the largest political
body maybe concentered and its force directed to any object which
25. For example in Federalist No. 17, Hamilton writes: " [T]he people of each State
would be apt to feel a stronger bias toward their local governments than towards the
government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a
much better administration of the latter. " (119; emphasis added.) Hamilton and
Madison clearly anticipate that this superior administration at the national level will
occur, as it is at the national level that the effects of faction will more likely be controlled. See Martin Diamond, 'The Federalists View of Federalism" in George C. S.
Benson, Martin Diamond, Essays in Federalism (Claremont, Calif: The Institute for
Studies in Federalism, Claremont Men's College, 1961).
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the public good requires, America can claim the merit of making
2s
the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics.
The American republic was seen by its leading framers as a political
novelty. Unlike its European counterparts, which embodied the principle of representation in only one branch of the government, the
American republic, under its new Constitution, was to be unmixed,
that is to say, wholly popular. Its novelty was to be enhanced in that it
would also be an extended republic. These two concepts are advisedly brought together in this passage. The new republic could be
unmixed and still avoid the pitfalls traditionally associated with popular forms of government because it would be extensive.
University of South Carolina
Coastal Carolina College
26. Federalist No. 14, 100-101.
PAUL PETERSON