Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
Who Said the Ranges were Over Stocked?
Authors:
Dr. Randy McFerrin
Assistant Professor of Economics
College of Business and Economics
New Mexico State University
Office: 505-646-1554
Fax: 505-646-1915
Email: [email protected]
Dr. Douglas Wills
Associate Professor of Finance
Milgard School of Business
University of Washington, Tacoma
Office: 253-692-5626
Email: [email protected]
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
Abstract
The historical account of the range cattle industry during the 19th Century is one of
overstocked and depleted ranges. This, combined with a particularly harsh winter,
triggered an event known as the “big die-off” in 1886/87 resulting in the downfall of an
entire industry. Yet, evidence exists, downplayed or ignored in the historical account,
suggesting that cattlemen perpetuated the myth to control entry onto the ranges and/or
mask financial mismanagement of their firms. Furthermore, other accounts call into
question the severity if not the validity of the big die-off. We argue based upon conflicting
evidence that the historical account rests upon surprisingly weak evidence and
acceptance of the historical account as settled cannot be justified.
Introduction
The story of the rise and fall of the open range cattle industry is an inextricable part of the
development of the American West. Tales passed down through popular culture and numerous
anecdotal accounts have evolved into a standard story where – cattle firms, in their quest for fast
profits, overstocked the public ranges. This pattern of unsustainable overgrazing given the
climatic conditions of the arid west contributed to massive cattle deaths after the drought and
hard winter of 1886/87. Widely referred to as the “big die-up” it marked the end of the open
range system and became a symbol of how uncontrolled growth leads to ecological disaster.
Perhaps Limerick best exemplifies this concept by writing that “In the 1880s,
overstocking and overgrazing had led to the disaster of 1887, in which the cattle, already
weakened by drought, died in massive numbers during a severe winter”. Donahue further
solidifies the concept when she states “…the fact of overstocking was, then as now,
uncontested,...” More recently, Weaver in his work on property rights in the western world
accepts the assertion, although without explicitly linking it with the disaster of 1886/87. So
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
firmly planted in American lore is the historical account, that today’s high school students learn
about it in history textbooks without any critical analysis. 1
However, we argue that evidence supporting the historical account is unacceptably weak
to justify its widespread acceptance. As we show, the foundation of the overstocking story is
primarily anecdotal eyewitness accounts, which are notoriously inaccurate. Further compounding
the issue is that any interpretation of an event built upon such evidence is sensitive to the weights
given conflicting accounts. With the evidence we present, one could write a very different
‘reality’ of the open range industry depending on the weight given these accounts. Consequently,
it is far from conclusive that overstocking occurred or the “big die-up” resulted from it and was
as severe as frequently described. In the process, we do not prove or disprove that overstocking
or the “big die-up” occurred. We only argue that the evidence is such that the need for a more
quantitative analysis concerning the open range system of the late 19th Century exists.
Overstocking, Overgrazing and Overcrowding
One issue concerning the interpretation of the evidence used in the historical account is
the multiple meanings of terms eyewitnesses use in describing the state of the open range
industry. Overstocking, overcrowding, and overgrazing all appear in eyewitness accounts and the
subsequent literature. Yet to individuals of the time, the terms did not necessarily have the same
implication as used today. With respect to the industry itself, overstocking frequently implied an
industry producing too much, thus flooding the market and suppressing prices by such an extent
that profits decline or even losses result. However, others clearly use overstocking to mean
degradation of the land with respect to providing insufficient forage. Yet even in this context, the
meaning is not always clear. This may stem largely from how the actual practice of open range
ranching, as it existed in the late nineteenth century, differed from the twentieth century idea of
efficient range management. 2
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
The open range system was a method of production adapted to the Great Plains region
whereby ranchers placed cattle on ranges to graze year round. Providing supplemental feed
during the winter or droughts was virtually nonexistent. For success, the open range system
relied on conserving enough range grass for cattle to survive the winter. In early historical works
and eyewitness accounts, overstocking seems to refer to cattlemen placing too many cattle upon
the ranges resulting in an insufficient amount of feed for cattle to survive the winter.
Compounding the situation is that rainfall fluctuations result in large year-to-year variations in
forage production making the optimal number of cattle hard to determine. What may be a normal
stocking rate in an average year may be too high during a drought. 3
In the context of modern range management, the term overstocking clearly refers to longterm damage resulting from heavy grazing that reduces a range’s ability to produce forage crops.
This appears as either a reduction in the density and height of a stand of native grass and/or the
increase in non-palatable plants. In either case, a permanent reduction in the tonnage of palatable
forage production reduces the maximum number of cattle sustainable on the range. Additionally,
it reduces the ability of a range to recover from abnormal weather patterns such as droughts. In
the evolution of historical works on the open range cattle industry, the terms seem to evolve from
ambiguous meanings into the modern range management interpretation. 4
Standard Story
The classic accounts of open range ranching is Osgood, Dale, and Webb. From these
works, cited as “…the products of historians thoroughly and rigorously trained in the methods of
historical scholarship”, the modern version evolved. Each begins the account with the diffusion
of the industry from Texas to the boom period between 1880 and 1885. Rapidly rising beef
prices rising during the early 1880s generated a speculative boom in investment, both foreign
and domestic. Osgood compared this event to the fabled cities of gold where, “The whole world
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
was urged to participate in the good fortune that the latest El Dorados offered.” Moreover, he
described the filling of the ranges “With a rapidity that could almost be measured in months
rather than years...” To him, ranchers were mere gamblers pitting cattle against the weather
rather than rational businessmen. 5
Likewise, Dale characterized it as a “…fever of excitement that swept over the country
that extended to Europe. Books and magazines … detailing in glowing and unmeasured terms
the immense profits of the business.” To him, it was a modern South Sea Bubble. Webb further
this image when he argued the growth was unparalleled in American history and it was “…the
first step in the progress to that dizzy height of speculation where men make money not out of
cattle or oil, but out of rising market and the folly of their fellow men.” All three clearly viewed
this period a classic speculative bubble destined to collapse. 6
In each account, the result was overstocked ranges. Webb is unambiguous about this,
“The high prices and the realization on the part of some of the wiser cattlemen that the days of
free grass and open range were nearing a close resulted in overstocking of the range.” Based
upon this he argued that the industry was on the brink of disaster waiting for a drought or hard
winter to send it over the edge. To him, overstocking was widespread, “The range had been
overstocked, and cattle had tramped down or eaten out all the grass near the river. Only in the
back pastures (the ranchman still called it the range) was the grass good.” Yet, it is not entirely
clear whether he is referring to overstocking in the modern range management sense or
exceeding the capacity of the range to sustain livestock over a twelve-month grazing cycle
without supplemental feed. However, implicit in his work is the idea of a carrying capacity and
he is clear that cattlemen exceeded its limits. 7
Osgood extensively used overstocked, overcrowded, and exceeding carrying capacity to
describe the actions of cattlemen. He argued that, “Testimony before the Public Land
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
Commission in 1879 had shown that the ranges were becoming overstocked and the grass was
playing out.” Furthermore, he described the flow of capital into the industry as having “…
rapidly brought the number of cattle up to the carrying capacity of the ranges.” He further argued
that western Kansas cattlemen experienced disappearing ranges resulting from overcrowding and
encroachment by settlers. Moreover, competition from sheepherders and grangers had
“…reduced the carrying capacity of the range” and “narrowed down the area where the range
cattle business could operate.” In concluding his discussion of the speculative period, he
explicitly introduced the notion of a “margin of safety” and that “Cattle were pushed into areas
where the grazing was poor or crowded into already overstocked pastures.” 8
The focus Osgood put on overstocking makes it is clear that he believed the industry was
not sustainable. Unfortunately, he seems to move between the early meaning and the modern
sense of overstocking when describing different situations. With respect to the testimony before
the Public Lands Commission, it is unclear whether “the grass was playing out” actually means a
reduction in the modern sense or a reduction beyond the twelve-month carrying capacity. In the
case of sheepherders, the term carrying capacity seems to imply its modern usage, but in other
passages, it is less clear. With respect to the Kansas settlement issue, he is clearly referring to a
physical disappearance of grassland, but it is unclear with respect to overstocking. Is it reducing
the availability of unused ranges or the disappearance of the grass upon the ranges? In context of
the sentence, it appears the former. If the case, it does not necessarily imply exceeding the
carrying capacity of the range in either the early or the modern meanings.
Dale echoes Webb and Osgood when he suggests that cattlemen not only overstocked the
ranges, but also were behaving recklessly by bringing in more and more cattle onto already
overcrowded ranges. “The result was that cattle in large areas by no means were in good
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
condition at the beginning of cold weather, which came early.” Here, Dale is using the term with
respect to not conserving enough winter feed. 9
Despite the contextual use of these terms, Webb, Osgood, and Dale clearly imply that
cattlemen exceeded some optimal number of cattle, however defined. While Webb does not
explicitly link overstocking to the big die-off, the one cannot say the same of Osgood or Dale.
Osgood states, “In the fall of 1885, the overcrowded ranges of western Kansas, Colorado, and
the Panhandle were burdened further by a flood of cattle arriving late in the season from Indian
Territory” just before the severe winter of 1885/86. The result was that “Starvation and the
blizzard did their work…” and some cattlemen suffered an 85 percent reduction in their herds.
He further argues that even with a mild winter, the summer drought of 1886 and overstocking
reduced the ranges so that precautions taken by plains cattlemen “…were eleventh-hour
measures and did not to any appreciable degree break the force of the disaster. Feed was short
and the animals approached the winter in a poor condition.” The aftermath of the storm was one
where “The sight of the ranges in the spring of 1887 was never forgotten, Dead were piled in the
coulees. Poor emaciated remnants of great herds wandered about with frozen ears, tails, feet, and
legs, so weak that they were scarcely able to move.” To these historians, the aftermath of the big
die-off marks the end of the open range system. 10
As a matter of logic, overstocking and the big die-up can be two independent events. One
does not necessarily lead to the other nor does the absence of one imply the absence of the other.
As a matter of practice, however, the literature inextricably links the two. Most authors use
evidence of the big die up as evidence of overstocking, albeit sometimes implicitly.
Each carefully constructs their story from eyewitness accounts, articles in trade
newspapers such as the Rocky Mountain Husbandman and government reports. For example,
Osgood wrote, “The Wyoming and Montana papers were full of reports of the disaster. The
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
above description has been written chiefly from them.” These accounts warned of the upcoming
winter and possible losses resulting from poorly conditioned cattle and lack of winter feed. The
following spring, they paint a grim picture of the disaster with estimates of winter losses.
However, newspaper derived the estimated losses from selective eyewitness accounts rather than
actual hard counts. Clay provides one such well-known eyewitness account. Dale describes his
work as “one of the best books ever published on the cattle industry of the southwest.” He
directly cites him regarding overstocking. Given the importance of Clay’s account, it is
instructive to examine what he said about the open range cattle industry with respect to the
culminating event of 1886/87. Clay recounts from memory the aftermath of the winter storm,
I got back the first days of August and for the first time heard of the terrific slaughter. It was
simply appalling, and the cowmen could not realize their position. From southern Colorado
to the Canadian line, from the one-hundredth meridian almost to the pacific slope it was a
catastrophe which the cowmen of today who did not go through it can never understand.
Three great streams of ill luck, mismanagement, greed, met together. In other words,
recklessness, want of foresight, and the weather, which no man can control.
Moreover, he compares the collapse of the open range cattle industry to other episodes of
speculation by saying “As the South Sea bubble had burst, as the Dutch tulip craze dissolved,
this cattle gold brick withstood not the snow of winter.” 11
Building on the foundations put down by historians, historians such as Jordon, Box,
Wheeler, and Sparks and Young expanded the analysis of the era. Interestingly Box, Wheeler
and sparks and Young use the original definition of overstocking as referring to not conserving
winter-feed. The latter link overstocking and the big die up explicitly when they suggest,
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
“Writers concurred” that cattlemen compounded the effects of the 1886 summer drought by
overstocking the ranges. Despite their meaning of overgrazing, they clearly believe this is a
settled issue. 12
Writing about West Texas, Box argues that cattlemen reduced ranges to a man made
desert in twenty years and by 1894, cattle died by the thousands on overgrazed ranges. Jordon
argues that climate maladaptation and overstocking due to speculation lead to the demise of the
open range industry. He states, “The free-grass policy permitted in the United States, except in
Oklahoma, greatly encouraged overstocking, as did a serious misreading of the pastoral capacity
of the fragile short grass plains and the speculation-fueled, hypercommercialized cattle boom of
the early 1880s.” This combination of ecological maladaptation and speculative frenzy lead to a
series of die-offs culminating in the disaster of 1886/87. Jordon explicitly links range
deterioration and the big die-up to overstocking when he agues that cattlemen “dumped”
livestock on the market because depleted ranges could no longer support them. This range
depletion was a contributory factor in the death of “…thousands of additional cattle”. Likewise,
Limerick clearly uses overstocking to refer to ecological deterioration of the ranges in the
modern sense when she argued that early range cattlemen had a spiritual reverence for the land,
yet this did not prevent them from damaging the ranges through severe overstocking. 13
Whether one reads the early or modern accounts of Limerick and Jordon, the essentials of
each story remain the same. The demise of the open range system was multifaceted and
cattlemen exceeded the carrying capacity of the range, however defined. In each account, the
demise was inevitable given the speculation of the early 1880s and the disregard for climatic
induced fluctuations in forage production. The final collapse occurred after the hard winter of
1886/87 wherein thousands upon thousands of drought weakened cattle perished from lack of
winter feed. Moreover, the meaning of the terms evolved from ambiguous meanings to an
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
unambiguous one where overstocking, overuse and overcrowding clearly mean one thing,
permanently damaged range forage production.
Counter Evidence
Reading the modern version of the story, one is to believe that a consensus about
overstocking and its causal role in the big die-up exists not only today, but then as well. Yet,
what is missing despite meticulous documentation of supporting evidence is mention of
contemporary eyewitness accounts that questioned both the state of the ranges and the severity if
not the existence of the big die-off. Some of these accounts argued that cattlemen perpetuated a
myth concerning overstocking to control entrance onto the ranges. Still, others suggest that
cattlemen exaggerated losses after the winter of 1886/1887 to conceal financial mismanagement.
Moreover, substantial evidence exists that contradicts the standard version of the big “die-off”.
Yet, this evidence is largely absent or given only a passing consideration in the historical
account.
Given conditions at the time and the methods of doing business, both arguments are
credible. Spreading tales of overstocking was one way to deter entry onto a range that a rancher
was unable to legally own. Furthermore, given that it was common practice at the time to
purchase ranches on a book rather than an actual count of cattle, it is quite possible the winter
storm provided cattlemen a way to reconcile inaccuracies in book counts or hide mismanagement
of ranch affairs. Additionally, newspaper and trade journal accounts from the era suggest that
cattlemen exaggerated the conditions of the range and cattle during the summer drought of 1886.
They also suggest that cattlemen exaggerated subsequent winter losses thereby undermining the
story of a big die-up.
One source of such evidence is letters and discussions contained in the Nimmo written in
1885, which directly challenge the claim of a consensus regarding overstocking. Not only are
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
they absent from the writings of Osgood, Dale, or Webb, the report is a full six years after
Osgood claimed the ranges were becoming overstocked. Nimmo himself questions the ability to
ascertain actual range utilization let alone the issue of overstocking when he states
It is impossible at the present time even approximately to estimate the proportion of the
available range land in the northern part of the great dry area which is yet unoccupied, or to
the extent to which the supply of grasses within the nominally occupied portions exceeds the
supply necessary for the sustenance and fattening of cattle now grazing thereupon.
While the focus of the report is to identify methods of increasing the carrying capacity of the
ranges through alternative water sources, this passage makes clear the degree of uncertainty on
the issue of range utilization that existed at the time. This stands in stark contrast to the standard
account. Equally important, the report contains articles that support the idea that cattlemen
created a myth with respect to overstocking. He goes on to write,
There appears a tendency on the part of those who have already occupied the ground to
promulgate the idea that the ranges are fully stocked, and that there is, therefore, no room for
additional herds. But intelligent observers who have prospected the different parts of the
great cattle area north of Texas assert that two, three, or even four times the number of cattle
now upon the ranges can be fed upon them.
Furthermore, E.V. Smalley added,
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
In nearly every section of the Northwestern cattle country the new comer, seeking for a good
opportunity to put in a herd, will be assured by the old stockmen that the range is already
stocked. Whether this is true or not he will only be able to ascertain by careful personal
investigation. Self-interest naturally leads to the present occupants of the territory to
discourage the bringing in of more cattle. They wish to preserve ample room for the increase
of their herds.
Further supporting this idea, Fletcher writing about the hard winter in Montana argued,
“It seems probable that some of the publicity given to the supposed overcrowding of the range,
especially in the earlier period, was the result of the more or less conscious effort of the
cattlemen already in possession to keep new herds off the range.” Such statements certainly
cloud the issue with respect to the standard story. Given high verification costs, claiming a range
as overstocked is appealing and potentially effective as an entry deterrence. Incredibly, the
aforementioned standard accounts make no mention of the possibility that existing cattlemen
may be responsible for creating the myth of overstocked ranges. Dale, Osgood, and Webb were
aware of the Nimmo report, as was Fletcher. However, none discusses this possibility. 14
Other accounts of range conditions in Montana contradict the assertion of widespread
range degradation. Cope writing in 1888 describes Montana as a place where overstocking was a
localized issue rather than statewide. He argued that Madison County is a place where there is
“considerable excellent farming and grazing land vacant in this valley, subject to location under
the several laws”. Furthermore, he contrasts Madison County with other areas that “….are pretty
fully stocked, and here and there may be found a district, as for example, some of the oldersettled valleys of Montana, where the grass has been ‘eaten out’ by overstocking.” 15
The “Big Die-Up”
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
As Limerick’s quote in the Introduction makes clear, the reason many link the damage
caused by the bad winter of 1886/87 to overstocking. A summer drought combined with
overstocking had so reduced range forage that cattle entered the winter in poor condition. As
such, they were unable to withstand its severity resulting in a massive die-off. However, the
existence and severity of what is now known as the “big die-up” is not necessarily evidence of
overstocking. Some have argued that the problem was inherent in the operation of the open range
system. Newly constructed barbed-wire drift fences prevented cattle from moving to protected
areas causing cattle to bunch up in exposed areas and greatly increased the number of deaths. A
similar disaster happened in 1885 after drift fences were constructed to prevent cattle moving
south during cold winters. McCallum writes,
Many of the animals that managed to avoid drift fences froze or died of thirst on the open
range, where there was nothing but snow and ice to eat and to drink, no shelter, no
protection from wolves and coyotes and cold. Because of these circumstances, losses on
the open range ordinarily exceeded losses caused by drift fences, but in the years 1885 to
1887, the opposite was true. Animals left to roam far from the protection of barnyards
and haystacks, outside of the occasional pasture fences, across the open plains where
nothing but natural instinct could help them, met with a worse experience that they
ordinarily would have encountered, because they were blocked from their natural routes
of retreat.
While certainly damming of the open range system McCallum argues that, the disaster was
independent of overstocking and the general condition of the grasslands. 16
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
Therefore, critical to linking overstocking to the carnage of the winter in the standard
story is the condition of cattle during the previous summer. Even here, the mixed evidence from
many contemporary eyewitness accounts paint a very different image regarding the severity of
the drought and the condition of the cattle. In August 1886, a reporter for the Chicago Board of
Trade spoke with several prominent ranchers to obtain opinions on the conditions of the ranges
for parties interested in the cattle trade. Mr. Moritz Rosenbaum told this reporter that “Our
advices in regard to all this territory and Texas and the Indian Territory are extremely
conflicting, so much so that the reading of forty letters from as many correspondents would leave
you or any one else entirely in the dark.” Mr. Rosenbaum’s cattle ran on ranges in Montana,
Wyoming, Texas, and the Indian Territory. 17
Furthermore, a report of conditions in Wyoming states, “There is no suffering among
cattle on account of drought in the western portion of Wyoming. On the contrary, the cattle are in
splendid condition, with abundant feed. It is believed the same can be said of the entire
territory.” In Texas, an eyewitness report states “Cattle are neither dying nor suffering for want
of grass or water in any part of Texas. The rains have stopped it…” Likewise, a letter from a Mr.
Zook suggests that, “In no part of the country has there been the same losses that are reported in
the press.” Furthermore, “The early summer was somewhat dry in Western Montana, but not
sufficiently so to do any injury to the cattle on the ranges. During the last month and up to now
rain has fallen almost daily over the entire cattle area west of the mountains, and the ranges are
in excellent condition-never better in Eastern Montana.” Finally, with respect to Colorado,
“Stockmen who reached the city to-day after an extended tour over the ranges from the Arkansas
Valley north to the state line are almost unanimous in their reports that the cattle are in good
condition and doing well.” While The Drovers Journal contains some accounts of severe drought
and cattle in poor condition, the eyewitness accounts presented here suggest a very different
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
picture of the condition of cattle and the ranges and the issues was not as settled as is usually
portrayed. 18
Accounts in The Drovers Journal, the primary trade journal of the cattle industry, also
contradict the standard story with respect to winter losses resulting from overstocking and the
summer drought. A Mr. Wier from Miles City Montana “says that the losses this winter will be
‘spotted’. Some localities will have a large percentage, while other localities will have a
comparatively small loss. The Powder River Company he says will have a small loss, as they
have good feed and plenty of wind.” An interesting story recounts that a Col. R. D. Hunter read
from letters in his possession that reports of the condition of the cattle in the Northwest are
exaggerated. He further says,
My son-in-law is in constant communication for me with the big cattle-growers in
Wyoming, Montana, and other localities. In the letters received from him today he tells me
the same thing that I have stated to you. The reports that come here about the destruction of
cattle come from the fact that travelers from the Northwest see large numbers of carcasses
along the lines of railroad, and take it for granted this represents the condition of affairs all
over the country, whereas it is only the result of the weaker cattle crowding the railroad
routes and there dying. 19
Additionally, local newspapers in Wyoming covering the cattle industry contain
substantial counter evidence as well. With respect to what the possible effects of the drought will
be on Wyoming stock, the Cheyenne Sun editorializes that the storm is a bad one but that the
idea that it will “… do an immense amount of harm to the cattle business is the most kind of rot.
Stock are in good condition to withstand this onslaught…” They attribute this to grass of higher
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
nutrient quality, even though it was short, given the lack of late rains that bleached out the
nutrients during the previous season. 20
With respect to winter losses the Cheyenne Sun reports that the manager of the Carey
Cattle Company after riding the range the following spring saw very little dead stock and
surviving cattle were in better than expected condition. Moreover, the Rawlins Tribune reports
that a prominent stockman reported, “… some weak and old cattle were dying; but that the
percentage of loss would not much exceed the average.” This stockman further states that he had
heard of only one or two cases of losses to any great extent and that “…even these had been
grossly exaggerated.” Furthermore, he states, “some people were always croaking. If the winter
happened to be a mild one without snow the howl would be raised that the range was destroyed
and there would be no grass. If the winter was a hard one every dead carcass was magnified to
ten and thus the howl kept up.” 21
Reports from Colorado and Montana echo conditions reported in Wyoming. Reports in
the Cheyenne Sun state that the Colorado Growers Association received reports from Montana to
the Gulf of Mexico stating that cattle wintered better than previous years. Moreover, a prominent
Montana cattleman reported, “It is expected that losses will occur in some portions of the
Territory, where grass is short, but the losses as reported by some eastern papers are greatly
exaggerated.” The Lander Mountaineer states that “Notwithstanding the unfavorable reports
which have been circulated” that cattle wintered better than several past winters. The report
further argues that despite isolated instances of large losses among cattle brought in late the older
and larger herds had wintered well. Furthermore, the Cheyenne Sun reports that cattlemen say
that losses were not as nearly as heavy as generally supposed and that cattlemen used the winter
storm to account for losses not reported in previous storms thus exaggerating the losses from the
1886/87 storm. 22
16
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
What is important is historical account relies on the same sources. However, these
contradictory accounts are absent leaving the reader with the impression that there existed a
consensus concerning overstocking, the summer drought and the subsequent big die-up. It is
evident that contemporary cattlemen believed that others perpetuated misinformation about the
true situation at the time. However, the idea that cattlemen may be responsible for the
misinformation to further their interests is absent from the standard story.
Furthermore, The Rocky Mountain Husbandman reports that in 1887, “There is now
upon the range more four-year old cattle than there has been since the Eastern market was
opened to us, and, owing to our splendid grass crop, our three-year olds this year will weigh as
heavy as the four-year olds did last year. …” The standard story attributes the recovery of the
ranges to above normal rains and the reduction of cattle after the die-up. However, Clawson
argues studies conducted during the early 1900s indicate that stocking rates affect a ranges
ability to recover after droughts. Under conservative grazing pressure, ranges recovered as
quickly or more quickly after a drought as did ungrazed lands. On the other hand, they indicate
heavy grazing pressure “greatly impaired” a range’s ability to recover during above normal
precipitation years. If cattlemen did overstock the ranges in the modern sense and to the extent
reported, then the probability that Montana would experience such a recovery in forage
production would be low despite the alleviation from any resulting die-off. 23
In addition to contradictory eyewitness accounts, there is very little hard statistical
evidence presented in the standard story to back up claims as to the extent of the winter losses.
Virtually all statistics are eyewitness estimates rather than systematic counts. The one instance
where hard statistics illustrate the devastation of the winter of 1886-87 occurs when Dale cites
decreases in cattle assessed for tax purposes. The Nimmo study also contains evidence that
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Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
creates doubt on the accuracy of cattle numbers from the period and, therefore, the issue of
overstocking or winter losses. E.V. Smalley writes,
There is no accurate data as to the number of cattle on the Northwestern ranges. Range cattle
are subject to local taxation and owners are required by law to make annual returns to the
assessors, but, as may well be supposed, a species of property that escapes in part even the
diligent search of its proprietors at the semi-annual round-up … is never fully listed. The
assessors have no way of verifying the returns of cattlemen and the cattlemen themselves do
not know, with any degree of exactness, how many animals carrying their brands may be
roaming over the ranges.
It is evident that Smalley believed self-reported numbers are suspect particularly when they form
the basis for one’s tax liability. Given the incentive to undercount for tax purposes, it is certainly
possible that individuals used the storm as an opportunity to overestimate their actual losses.
Fagersten articulates the idea that cattlemen manipulated cattle numbers when he stated,
It is evident that any report of the number of cattle in the Western States and Territories must
be very incomplete and unreliable, and any estimate based upon such reports only
approximately correct. After allowing for unintentional errors there remains an unknown
quantity, which may be expressed as the willful misstatement of the informant, so much the
more liable to occur in this case, where the unit represents a considerable sum of taxable
property.
18
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
Early historians such as Fletcher and Frink, and latter echoed by Sparks and Young, argue that
some companies may have inflated winter losses in an attempt to cover up mismanagement of
their concerns. An accurate count of range stock was next to impossible given the technology of
the era. This provided an opportunity for managers to inflate the value of the cattle concern and
an opportunity to correct inflated book figures using the storm of 1886-87. Pelzer gives an
indication of the extent of the discrepancy between book and actual counts when she states “The
Reel herd costing nearly $70,000 and appearing on the books at 2,000 was found by actual count
to contain only 672.” Determining the extent that losses were inflated is difficult at best, but the
fact it occurred undermines the credibility of building a story from suspect eyewitness
accounts. 24
The descriptions by Clay and Helena Smith of the aftermath of the winter storms are
astonishing and contradict the idea of a big die-up. Clay recalled, “I rode the range in those days.
Search it minutely and there was no sign of the tragedy. The carcasses withered up by the end of
August, a few bones grass-covered at wide intervals, and that was all. How the thousands of
weak cows and steers that died had left no trace is an enigma.” Likewise, Smith writes that the
“Biggest mystery of all, however, was what became of the cattle. For the carcasses counted as
they melted out from under the drifts, the carcasses which had rolled down with the spring
floods, the lost cattle known or guessed at which had gone into air holes and been swept down
under ice-none of this came anywhere near approximating the total loss.” Clay had impressed
upon readers that the disaster was of such magnitude that it precipitated a collapse of the open
range cattle industry. It is interesting, to say the least, that a disaster of such proportions could
simply vanish with little trace three to four months latter. 25
19
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
Statistical Evidence
Economists’ approach to history is, of course, very different from that of historians.
While the economic approach of testing modern theories using historical data or explaining an
event within some theoretical framework has its benefits, it also has inherent limitations. With its
focus on general testability, economists tend to ignore individual personalities and conditions
that flesh out the more nuanced historical accounts. For the same reasons useable evidence is
much more narrowly defined. Given that anecdotal and eyewitness accounts are not systematic
from a statistical standpoint, they are typically ignored. As clear from the above reported counter
evidence, without a random sample of data, the story constructed from the available evidence is
very sensitive to what is and is not included. If facts are not representative in a statistical sense,
then one cannot generalize about the whole from the sample.
Given the widespread acceptance by economists of the overstocking story, one would
assume they have produced supporting statistical evidence. However, a survey of the literature
demonstrates that economists have even less evidence than historians. The only reference to
evidence relating to the start of overstocking comes from Libecap when he writes, “Prior to
1880, informally made and locally enforced range land claims appear to have been effective
property rights arrangements.” However, the two sources used to support this claim that
overstocking began in the 1880s is Peffer and Gates. Unfortunately, both sources refer to data
that indicates overgrazing took place in the early twentieth century not the mid to late nineteenth
century. Peffer concentrates on policies from 1900 to 1950 and claims, “By 1890 the federal
range showed signs of serious overgrazing.” In Gate’s monumental work, all references to range
damage refer to the twentieth century. 26
It seems probable that, economists, as well as others, have accepted the story of
widespread overstocking for the same reason – the logic of the tragedy of the commons. Without
20
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
secure property rights and the ability to exclude others from using a natural resource, the pursuit
of one’s self interest will lead to overuse of that resource. Simply put, economists have been
willing to accept overstocking because, given the conditions, theory predicts it should have
happened. Other theoretical developments in economics have confirmed the prediction of
overstocking under similar conditions. However, theoretical prediction without empirical
confirmation is an empty shell. The history of economics is replete with examples where
economists have assumed something took place without empirical verification simply because
theory predicted it. Such appears to be the case here. 27
If overstocking, defined as a deterioration of the range in the modern sense, did occur
then one would expect evidence of such would be evident in statistics concerning the cattle trade
during the period. For example, one would expect that the average weight of marketable steers
would decline over time. This would indicate that cattlemen had indeed overstocked the ranges
after controlling for such compounding factors as weather fluctuations. Therefore, one source of
evidence to support the overstocking theory could be hard statistical evidence such as weight
gains. Unfortunately, if such data exists, then it is not readily available.
However, data does exist on the number of cattle on the western ranges. In fact, there are
two primary sources. The United States Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural
Statistical Service published data on the number of cattle and calf inventory as of January 1 each
year. In addition, the Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture published annual Reports of the
Statistician containing estimates of the number of cattle as of January. While not evidence that
overstocking did not occur, these numbers do weaken the argument that the big die-up was as
widespread and significant as previously claimed. How accurate the figures are from the
Agricultural Statistical Service is, of course, debatable. Yet, past historians consider them as
accurate as any available. 28
21
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
The standard account tells us that the disaster of 1886/87 due to overstocking was wide
spread and of such magnitude, that it precipitated the collapse of the entire open range industry.
To examine this claim, we collected data for four western states to analyze the changes in cattle
numbers over time. To simplify the presentation, we constructed an aggregate index using the
National Agriculture Statistical Service database with 1867 as the base year. Figure 2 presents
the aggregate index for the years 1867-1899. 29
Several interesting characteristics of the trend stand out. Cattle numbers increased rapidly
from 1867 to 1885 with a cumulative rate of growth of 1,245 percent. The agriculture statistics
indicate there were 271,000 cattle in 1867 while the number grew to 3,646,000 in 1885. This
certainly conforms to the standard story of a rapid increase in the open range cattle industry. On
the other hand, the trend in cattle numbers continues to increase until January of 1888 one year
after the disaster occurred. Furthermore, over the downtrend nowhere does the one-year decline
approach the estimates provided by eyewitness accounts. The highest reported decline occurred
between January 1888 and January 1889, a decrease of seven percent. Indeed, the cumulative
decline to 1895, the bottom of the trough, is only seventeen percent. As seen from the trend, a
dramatic one-year decline does not occur. In fact, the aggregate numbers are increasing over this
period. Cattle numbers did not begin to fall until after 1888.
However, aggregate numbers may mask trends in individual localities. To examine the
trends in each state separately, we constructed indexes for each state. Figure 3 presents the state
indexes for the years 1867 to 1899. As seen from the Figure 3, the Dakotas experienced the
highest rate of growth followed by Wyoming, Montana and Colorado. The trends depicted
closely match the overall aggregate trend. Two of the states experienced increases in cattle
numbers until after 1887. Only Wyoming experienced a decline in cattle numbers between 1887
and 1888. In either case, the decline is relatively mild compared to estimates provided in the
22
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
standard story. In Wyoming, the number of cattle declined 2.13 percent over this timeframe. The
largest one-year decline in Wyoming occurred between 1888 and 1889. Cattle numbers fell 17.5
percent, but this was fully one year after the storm. Furthermore, the decline in Montana
occurred between 1886 and 1887 during the winter storm, but this decline was only 5.68 percent.
In neither instance did the one-year decline approximate the reported declines. 30
Whether one examines the data from the National Agricultural Statistical Service or the
Report of the Statistician, the trends are the same. Cattle numbers indicate an overall increase
between 1867 and 1888. Only Wyoming and Montana experienced declining cattle numbers.
However, these declines were substantially smaller than the declines reported in the standard
story.
Conclusion
The historical of the open range cattle industry is one where cattlemen in their quest for
profits imposed an ill suited system on the Great Plains. This imposition resulted in overstocked
ranges and cyclical die-ups. Accordingly, the catastrophic storms and cold of 1886/87 provided
the culminating event that bankrupted many cattlemen after massive loss of cattle. This marks
the end of the open range system. Moreover, the evolution of the story leaves the modern reader
with the inescapable impression a consensus existed regarding the overstocking of the range and
the subsequent big die-up.
Unfortunately, however, as demonstrated in this paper, the story is incomplete and as
such leaves the reader with only one possible interpretation of the “true” state of the industry.
Trade journals and local newspapers contain many contradictory eyewitness accounts largely
absent or downplayed in the historical account. Clearly, cattlemen propagated misinformation
regarding actual range utilization and it is demonstrated that some used the opportunity of the
winter storm to inflate actual losses to cover inflated book counts, past mismanagement, and or
23
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
rectify unaccounted past losses. Furthermore, cattlemen, in an attempt to protect property rights
constructed fences that prevented cattle from drifting naturally during storms, which magnified
any natural losses from severe storms. While it is hard to judge the magnitude of these mitigating
factors, their presence reduces the ability to claim certainty regarding overstocking or the
subsequent big die-up written from eyewitness accounts. Yet, their presences illustrate the
methodological problems inherent when using eyewitness accounts. How does one decide which
accounts to include or exclude? Clearly, this decision has implications for the interpretation of
any historical episode.
So why have both historians and economists been so willing to accept the overstocking
story when the evidence for it is debatable? Foss probably explains it as clearly as possible,
….the “free land” had to result in overgrazing. Cattlemen and sheepmen could not be
expected to withhold stock from government range to prevent overgrazing when they
knew that other stockmen would get the grass they left. Overgrazing permitted an
accelerated rate of erosion by removing the forage that held moisture and soil. …
Overgrazing caused millions of acres of grassland to become desert.
In other words, the combination of the public domain with the unrestrained pursuit of profits
could only lead to the tragedy of the commons – no other outcome was possible. 31
For economists, however, the tragedy of the commons is only one possible result, albeit a
likely one. Therefore, their unquestioned acceptance of the story is particularly puzzling. It is
true that few, if any, economists have argued that overstocking led to the “big die-up” and they
have been vague on when it started. On the other hand, few, if any, have challenged the story.
The confidence that academics have in the existence of overstocking on the western public
24
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
domain in the 1880s and its causal impact on the “big die-up” is simply not justified by the
evidence presented. Not only is the evidence for overstocking anecdotal, selective, and
unreliable, irrefutable evidence exists that no consensus concerning overstocking or the big dieup existed at the time.
Whether or not there was widespread overstocking of the western ranges is important.
For historians it is a critical linkage in the development and eventual demise of an industry based
on “free government land” and plays an important role in the social development of the
American West. Furthermore, modern land policy governing the use of the public domain largely
hinges on the assumption that left unregulated cattlemen are incapable of not overstocking the
ranges leading to widespread environmental degradation. For economists it plays an important
role in understanding the conditions necessary for developing institutions to prevent the tragedy
of the commons. As demonstrated in this paper, at this point, it appears the evidence for
overstocking is not strong or unambiguous enough to support the stories and/or theories of either
historians or economists.
25
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
Figure 2: Total Cattle Index 1867-1899
2,000
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
1864
1866
1868
1870
1872
1874
1876
1878
1880
1882
1884
1886
1888
1890
1892
1894
1896
1898
1900
1902
Source: USDA: National Agricultural Statistical Service
Figure 3: Individual State Cattle Indexes 1867-1899
8500
8000
Dakotas
7500
7000
6500
6000
5500
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
Wyoming
1500
Montana
1000
Colorado
500
0
66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Source: USDA: National Agricultural Statistical Service
26
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
End Notes
1
Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest, 156. Debra Donahue, The Western Range Revisited, 31-32.
John Weaver, The Great Land Rush, 277. Boorstin, A History of the United States, and Cayton, America:
Pathways to the Present. http://www.historytextbooks.org/adoptions.htm
2
We will arbitrarily use the term “overstocking” in this paper.
3
For a map of the great plains region see: http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/geography/map10.htm
4
See Clawson, The Western Range Livestock Industry, 52-67.
5
Earnest Staples Osgood, The Day of the Cattleman, Chicago and London, 1970; Edward Everett Dale, The Range
Cattle Industry, Norman, 1960; Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains,. Don Walker, Clio’s Cowboys, Lincoln,
1981, 61: Osgood, The Day of the Cattleman, 83, 105, 216-17
6
Dale, The Range Cattle Industry , 80-81.Webb, The Great Plains. 234-35, 90. The South Sea bubble refers to the
infamous crash of England’s stock market in the early 18th century after many Britons had invested in the South
Sea Trading Company on the expectation of quick wealth.
7
Webb, The Great Plains.235, 237, 242. In modern range management, overstocking refers to the long term
degradation of a range’s ability to produce forage resulting in a reduction of its carrying capacity. However,
during the open range era, overstocking referred to not conserving winter feed. This does not necessarily imply
that the long term forage production or the carrying capacity of a range is reduced.
8
Osgood, The Day of the Cattleman, 91, 104, 113, 177, 189.
9
Dale, The Range Cattle Industry , 94.
10
Osgood, The Day of the Cattleman, 217, 221, 217-18
11
Osgood, The Day of the Cattleman, 221, fn 14: Dale, The Range Cattle Industry, 96: Dale, The Range Cattle
Industry , 194: John Clay, My Life on the Range, Norman, 1962.
12
For other similar works see Lewis Eldon Atherton, Cattle Kings, Bloomington, 1961; T.A. Larson, History of
Wyoming, Lincoln, 1990; Rodman W. Paul, The Far West and the Great Plains in Transition 1859-1900, New
York, 1988; Donald Worster, Under the Western Skies: Nature and History in the American West, New York,
1992; Karen Ruth Merrill, Private Spaces on Public Lands: Constructing State Sovereignty on the Western Range,
1900-1934, Dissertation University of Michigan, 1994; Paul F. Starrs, Let the Cowboy Ride, Baltimore, 1998:
James A. Young and Abbott B. Sparks, Cattle in the Cold Desert, Logan, 1985, 123.
27
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
13
Thadis Box, “Range Deterioration in Texas,”37: Terry G. Jordon, North American Cattle-Ranching Frontiers,
Albuquerque, 1993, 239: Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest, New York, 1987, 155.
14
Osgood, Day of the Cattlemen, 91: Joseph Nimmo, Report in Regard to the Range Cattle Business of the United
States. In Use and Abuse of America’s Natural Resources, New York, 1972, 19-21, 83-84: Robert Samuel
Fletcher, The End of the Open Range in Eastern Montana, Cedar Rapids, 1983, 188.
15
Cope, Statistical and Descriptive Report Upon the Mines, Farms, and Ranges of Madison county, Montana p. 60
& 84.
16
Henry De Rosset McCallum and Francis Tarlton McCallum, The Wire that Fenced the West, Norman, 1965, 13235.
17
18
The Drovers Journal, August 2, 1886.
The Drovers Journal: July 30 & 31: August 4, 13, 1886.
19
The Drovers Journal: March 5 & 8, 1887.
20
Cheyenne Sun, November 16, 1886
21
Cheyenne Sun: March 5 & 6, 1887
22
Cheyenne Sun: February 23, & 24, July 16, 1887
23
The Rocky Mountain Husbandman., August 6, 1887: Marion Clawson, The Western Range Livestock Industry,
New York, 1950, 62-63.
24
Dale, The Range Cattle Industry, 96: Nimmo, Report in Regard to the Range Cattle Business of the United States,
83-86: Frink, Jackson, Spring, When Grass was King: Contributions to the Western Range Cattle Industry Study.
Fletcher, “The Hard Winter in Montana,” 130. Young & Sparks, Cattle in the Cold Desert, 125: Pelzer, The
Cattlemen’s Frontier, Glendale, 1936, 146-7.
25
Clay, My Life on the Range, p. 185: Helen Huntington Smith, The War on Powder River, 46-47.
26
Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, 52: Louise E. Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain: Disposal and
Reservation Policies, 1900-1950, New York, 1972, 27: Paul Wallace Gates, History of Public Land Law
Development, Washington, 1978, 466.
27
Johnson and Libecap, Agency Costs and the Assignment of Property Rights; Hotte, Natural-resource exploitation
with costly enforcement of property rights. Coase, “The Lighthouse in Economics”; Cheung, “The Fable of the
Bees”. For a more complete list, see Spulber, Famous Fables of Economics.
28
Who Said the Ranges were Overstocked?
28
While some modern historians such as Jordon do not explicitly link the demise of the industry to a single event
such as the storm of 1886-87, many do. However, it is clear that Jordon believed that cattlemen did in fact
overstock the ranges: Frink, When Grass was King, 26.
29
The states examined were Colorado, the Dakotas, Montana, and Wyoming. Data on cattle numbers are located at
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Data_and _Statistics/Quick_Stats. The x axis refers to the date, i.e. 85 would be read as
1885. The y axis is an index number for a given year calculated by the following formula: Index1867 = (number of
Cattle in 1867 / number of cattle in base year)*100. Since 1867 is the base or comparison year, the index is 100.
The index for 1868 would be Index1868 = (number of cattle in 1868 / number of cattle in 1867)*100. Converting
raw cattle numbers into an index places each state’s time trend on a comparable basis.
30
The relevant period would be the change between 1887 and 1888. The data are measured at January 1 of each
year. Therefore, the losses resulting from the 1886-1887 storms would not show up until the January 1 of 1888.
31
Phillip O. Foss, Politics and Grass; the Administration of Grazing on the Public Domain, Seattle, 1960, 4. Italics
in original.
29