Leasing, Law and Land Tenure: Measuring the Impact of the
Long-Term Leasing Act of 1955 on Indian Land Holdings
Dustin Frye
University of Colorado, Boulder
December 11, 2012
Keywords: property rights, land tenure, native americans, leasing, heirship,
public law 280
JEL Classification: D02, K11, N42, N52, P48
The author would like to thank Terry Anderson, Dominic Parker, Murat Iyigun, and several
seminar contributors at PERC for their valuable suggestions and guidance.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2181724
Abstract
An increasing focus of contemporary Native American economic development literature concentrates on the role of institutions. Land tenure arrangements are an important part of the
institutional structure on reservations because several reservations rely on agriculture and resource extraction. The 1950s and 1960s were characterized by a series of policy interventions
targeting Native Americans. One such policy, the Long-Term Leasing Act (LTLA) of 1955,
reduced bureaucratic oversight and altered the composition of Native American trust land. The
policy extended the possible term of leases on trust lands, increasing economic opportunities,
lowering transaction costs, and increasing the discounted present value of retaining land in trust
status. Using a new panel dataset on land tenure, this paper finds that the LTLA significantly
diminished the flow of land to fee-simple (private ownership) and tribally owned land held in
trust, leading to a higher rate of retention in individually owned land held in government trust.
I extend the empirical framework to determine whether reservations under state jurisdiction
experienced additional changes in land tenure due to the ability to more credibly commit to
leasing contracts or whether legal uncertainty over land-use and expanded credit access led to
increased transfer to fee-simple. The results suggest that reservations under state jurisdiction
continued transferring land to fee-simple, which supports the legal land-use uncertainty and
suggests the expanded credit access impacted purchasing more than leasing. To examine the
degree that heirship is influencing the results, I estimate the model by allotment date groups,
where allotment dates proxy for heirship. Results indicate that reservations allotted earlier,
which have more fractionated ownership, responded more to the Long-Term Leasing Act. Shifts
in land holdings induced by the LTLA reinforce the importance of reducing transaction costs
associated with trust land for Native American economic development.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2181724
1
Introduction
Native Americans consistently rank as one of the poorest socio-economic groups in United States.
In 2011, median household earnings of American Indians were 30 percent lower than non-Native
households.1 Measures of income, health and education all point to a lack of economic development
on reservations. An increasing focus of contemporary Native American economic development
literature has shifted to the role of institutions (Anderson and Parker 2009; Cornell and Kalt
2000; Dippel 2012). Most reservations are located in rural areas, making agriculture and resource
extraction important components of the local economy. Successful management of these resources
relies on the property rights structures on Native American reservations.
Property rights influence economic development by defining the criterion for using resources and
capturing rents, exchanging goods, and establishing investment and production incentives (Libecap
1986). A great deal of attention has focused on the benefits of secure and well-defined property
rights in development and economic growth.2 In agricultural areas, secure property rights have led
to greater investment (Besley 1995; Goldstein and Udry 2008) and land improvement (Abdulai,
Owusu, and Goetz 2011). Established land rights should promote investment by strengthening
claims to returns on investments, increasing capital access, allowing for gains from trade, and
providing freedom to innovate (Fenske, 2011). Property rights have also led to increased credit
access (Field and Torero 2006), increased household investment (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010),
and increased labor supply (Field 2007).
Returning to the case of property rights on Native American reservations, reservation land
is organized under several different land tenure types: fee-simple, individual trust, tribal trust,
and federal trust.3 Different regulations associated with each land tenure type have important
1
According to the 2011 American Community Survey median household earnings for American Indians and Alaska
Natives was $35,192 compared to national median household earnings of $50,502.
2
See: (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Alston, Libecap, and Schneider 1996; Besley and Ghatak 2010; De Soto 2010;
Engerman and Sokoloff 2008; Libecap 2007; North 1981).
3
Fee-simple is the typical private ownership structure found in common law countries. Individual trust land is
where the owner is the beneficiary of the land but the land is managed in trust by the federal government. Similarly,
tribal trust land is managed by the federal government but the tribe is the beneficiary of the land. The federal
1
consequences for contract costs and agricultural productivity (Anderson and Lueck 1992). On
Canadian aboriginal lands, similar land tenure structure combined with federal involvement leads
to increased transaction costs, which ultimately attenuates economic development (Alcantara 2007).
Native American land tenure is also associated with scale differences between Indian and non-Indian
ranchers in Eastern Montana (Trosper 1978).
Despite the recognized value of agriculture and resources on reservations, little is known about
the evolution of these land tenure systems through time. Using a new panel dataset spanning from
1939 to 1974, this paper elucidates the trends and distributional shifts in tenure that occurred in
Native American land during the 20th century. Congress enacted several policies over the mid-part
of the twentieth century as part of the ‘Termination Era’ with the intent of incorporating Native
Americans into the same economic, educational, and legal structures as mainstream Americans.
One policy targeted at land tenure was the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act (hereafter LTLA) of
1955. This act increased lease lengths, reduced administrative oversight and lowered the transaction
costs associated with leasing Native American trust land particularly on fractionated individual
trust land. As a result, the flow of land tenure changed as trustees were more willing to retain
their land in individual trust. This change in land holding behavior suggests that benefactors of
individual trust land faced improved economic outcomes due to lower transaction costs and less
uncertainty regarding the expected stream of rents available from leasing.
This paper makes several contributions to the Native American economic development literature
as well as the general literature on property rights and transaction costs. It offers the first empirical
analysis of the LTLA at the national level, as well as examines the consequences of Public Law 280
(hereafter PL280) on land tenure holdings, using PL280 status as a natural experiment to identify
whether state jurisdiction translated to differential land holding behavior. The paper also highlights
the institutional problem of fractionated land ownership structures by examining differential land
holding behavior by reservation allotment date. This is the first paper to apply panel data to
government is both the beneficiary and manages the trust on federal trust land.
2
the issue of Native American land tenure and to provide the first measure of land tenure patterns
through time. The paper also provides insight into leasing and selling decisions of durable assets
under regulated, collective ownership structures and intergenerational transfers.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief history of Native American land and
property rights institutions prior to 1934. Section 3 discusses Native American land tenure and
the heirship problem on Native American reservations. Section 4 introduces key legal changes from
the 1950s and relates them to land tenure. Section 5 discusses the data, summary statistics and
provides a description of land tenure patterns through time. Section 6 empirically tests the effect of
the LTLA and PL 280 on changes in land tenure. Section 7 discusses the role of heirship in changing
land tenure. Section 8 compares the results from a variety of different empirical specifications and
Section 9 concludes.
2
History of Native American Lands and Property Rights
Following the establishment of reservation systems, bureaucrats and activists sought to save Native
Americans from extinction by helping them assimilate into American society (Bobroff 2001). Both
Indian reformers and Congress considered land allotment as a requisite element of the assimilation
process (Otis & Prucha 1973). After a decade of failed allotment bills, Congress passed the General
Allotment Act, commonly known as the Dawes Act, in 1887. The act allowed Indian reservations
to be divided into individual parcels and assigned property rights to Native Americans.
The allotment structure of the Dawes Act provided each head of household one 160 acre parcel,
single individuals older than 18 received 80 acres and each child under 18 received an allotment of
40 acres.4 The government placed allotted lands in a trust for 25 years in an attempt to preserve
ownership. The trust did not allow the land to be sold, leased or willed. Under certain conditions,
land would be alienated and allottees would receive the title for a fee at the end of the 25-year
4
These values were proportionally adjusted based on the size of the reservation.
3
period.5 The Dawes Act was amended several times after it’s introduction. The amendments
provided more leasing opportunities, changed how parcels were willed and relaxed the restrictions
on keeping land in trust status. The government made the unallotted land available as surplus
land to buyers outside of the reservation. Proceeds from surplus land sales were deposited in trust
accounts managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Public sentiment shifted against the Dawes Act following a negative report from the Institute of
Government Research.6 The report, known as the Meriam Report, drew attention to the reduction
in Indian owned land during the Allotment Era and the lack of instruction and capital equipment
provided to Native American farmers. In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) effectively ending the allotment era. The government allowed unalienated land to be transferred into individual or tribal trust land to be held by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Acreage
estimates following the allotment era suggest over 64 million acres were ceded either by treaty or
for surplus purposes by 1934 (BIA 1935). Nearly 41 million acres of land were allotted and over
23 million acres of that were alienated and declared fee-simple land, much of which was owned by
non-Indians. Over 17 million acres were for individual trust, approximately 34 million were set
aside as tribal trust and a small fraction was held in federal trust (BIA 1935).
The allotment era and passage of the IRA introduced property rights institutions for Native
American reservations that persist today: fee-simple, individual trust, tribal trust and federally
owned. Individual and tribal trust lands are subject to federal restrictions and oversight from
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) regarding alienation, leasing, inheritance, and encumbrance.
Changing or updating prior land-use arrangements as well as enacting new agreements requires
BIA approval at several different administrative levels. As a result, altering or instituting an
agreement often takes several months to complete and can be very costly.
5
Indian Agents determined these conditions at their discretion. Most featured residence and assimilation effort
requirements.
6
The Institute of Government Research is known today as the Brookings Institute.
4
3
Native American Land Tenure
3.1
Land Transactions and Government Organization
Land can be legally transferred between any of the tenure types as long as it obtains approval at
the local and national level. Local interests involve a tribe or tribal agency.7 Following the Indian
Reorganization Act, tribal charters and constitutions were responsible for defining each tribe’s role
in managing their land (Sutton 1975). Several tribes established formal corporate arrangements,
called Tribal Land Enterprises (TLEs), in the 1940s to help manage and administrate leasing and
sales of trust land at the local level. Tribes without TLEs typically rely on committees within a
tribal council to perform many of the same functions.
Federal oversight is provided at the agency level by a designated Superintendent who reports
directly to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of Interior. Every transaction that alters
the trust status of reservation land requires final approval from the Secretary of Interior. Glenn L.
Emmons, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1958, defined the Bureau’s position on transfers
particularly concentrating on movement from individual trust.
While the Bureau recognizes the competent Indian’s undeniable right to ask for and
receive a fee patent, it also keeps in mind its continuing trust responsibilities to the tribal
group and to other Indian landowners whose holdings may be affected. Consequently, if
there is any real possibility that the disposal of a particular allotment might adversely
affect other Indian lands in trust the Bureau will take the initiative in consulting with
the Indians concerned and will give them every possible assistance in working out a
satisfactory solution to the problem. In some cases this will involve purchase of the
patented allotment by the tribal group, in other cases it will involve other various types
of arrangements. (BIA, 61,1958)
7
Agencies were organized geographically to allow for the sharing of administrative resources, often amongst smaller
reservations. In some instances, like in California, there are as many as 30 tribes organized into a single agency,
whereas in Montana most tribes serve as their own agency.
5
The Commissioner’s statement suggests the Bureau’s official position is to seldomly reject applications requesting land in trust be redesignated as fee-simple.8 However, in the same memo,
while discussing the Bureau’s position on potentially adverse fee patents, Emmons declares that
“the issuance of fee patents may be delayed in some cases.” According to a 1958 survey, several
tribes refered to their members outstanding applications (BIA 1958). Both statements lend support
for tribal acquisition of individual trust land as opposed to alienation. However, many reservations
cited a lack of resources and financing available for purchasing land and occasionally used property
exchanges, where land along the reservation fringe is exchanged for a parcel in the reservation interior. Some reservations cited issues with favoritism, R.E. Miles the acting Superintendent over the
Blackfeet Agency in 1958 noted the “influences that a political body, such as the Blackfeet Tribal
Council is subject to. In very few instances have sales or conveyances been consummated without
some show of favoritism.” He goes on to say that “the Blackfeet Tribal Council must associate with
all members and derives its support from constituents, which does not lend to developing a fair
and unbiased land-acquisition program” (BIA, 315, 1958).
Several legal options are available for transferring trust land to fee-simple. Indian Land Transactions (74-75, 1958) describes each method available to individuals or the tribe. Based on transactions between 1947 and 1957 the most common methods of transferring land from trust status
were, Sales in Fee, Patents in Fee, and Certificates of Competency. Sales in Fee transactions occur
when trust land is sold conditional on the issuance of the fee patent accompanying the sale. Patents
in Fee and Certificates of Competency similarly remove the restriction placed on trust land and
transfer it to fee-simple and face similar application processes. From Indian Land Transactions it
appears Patents in Fee are most useful in multiple ownership situations, particularly when minors
with guardians are involved. Certificates of Competency were issued by the Secretary of Interior
after an applicant established himself “capable of managing his own affairs and transacting his own
business.”9
8
9
I am still looking for a source with information regarding applications and rejections.
I am still looking for a more precise description of the specific characteristics or actions an applicant needed to
6
The Bureau employed appraisers to determine the land value. These values were used for every
land transaction. In cases where too much time had expired from the appraisal until the application,
approval a new appraisal was required to update the value to reflect the current market value (BIA,
315, 1958). The process from submitting a completed applications to receiving a fee patent could
take several months (BIA 1958).
Instituting a leasing agreement requires approval from the same local and national authorities
that determine fee patents. The major difference between approving a leasing agreement and
issuing a fee patent is the Secretaries authority when partial owners cannot or will not sign the
applications. In the case of leasing, the Secretary has the authority to authorize a lease in cases
where a minor or incompetent individual without a guardian is a partial owner or nearly all major
shareholders agree to the terms of the lease. Fee patent applications require signatures from every
owner regardless of the ownership share. According to a survey in Indian Land Transactions, the
Secretary rarely exercises this ability. Most tribes cited consensus amongst owners as a major issue
hindering both leases and sales.
3.2
Heirship
Heirship made owner consensus increasingly difficult. When the original individual trust owners
died their ownership interests were divided between their heirs. With each subsequent generation
the fraction of ownership for any single individual fell exponentially. Reservations with shares of
individual trust land claimed between 50 and 60 percent of individual trust land was fractionated.
On the Blackfeet reservation, ownership shares were so diluted that the annual return on a one
year lease was only a few cents (BIA, 303, 1958).
In 1958, most reservations reported difficulty reaching agreements regarding leasing or sales of
multiple owner trust land. The Superintendent of the Shawnee expand on several techniques used
by owners to undermine the negotiation process (BIA, 289, 1958). Partial owners would simply
demonstrate to qualify for a Certificate of Competency.
7
refuse to sign proposed agreements for a variety of reasons. Payment extraction from the other
owners was typical. Partial owners occasionally moved onto the land, which due to regulations
made it unleasable. Owners, especially those with insignificant shares, would fail to sign due to
sentimental reasons. Superintendent reports indicate owners would often pursue their own deals
and disagree about potential buyers or lessees. One major legal problem was that owners had
no legal recourse against another owner (BIA, 290, 1958). In many cases, potentially beneficial
land consolidation is administratively infeasible due to the ownership structure and the tract size
(Williams, 712, 1970)
Several agency Superintendents mentioned Indian emigration and ownership among minors as
serious issues affecting heirship. Following World War II, a large number of Native Americans
migrated from reservations. One consequence reported by several agency Superintendents was difficulty obtaining signatures from these migrants (BIA, 193, 1958). Reports often claimed that
request were returned due to incorrect addresses or not returned at all (BIA, 352, 1958). In some
instances, minors received ownership shares in individual trust land. Court appointed guardians
were required to sign any applications or agreements regarding the trust holdings of minors. Numerous reservations cited the expense of appointing guardians as a major hindrance. In instances
when the ownership share of the minor is small, income from leasing or sales is often not enough
to offset the cost of obtaining a guardian (BIA, 224, 1958).
The Superintendent of the Fort Belknap Agency reported that finalizing an application or
leasing agreement took over a year simply due to difficulty collecting ownership approval (BIA,
352, 1958). These complications diminished the market value of leases or sales (BIA, 303, 1958)
and made some potential lessees hesitant to lease fractionated land (BIA, 320, 1958).
8
4
Legal Changes in the 1950s
4.1
Public Law 280
Congress passed two significant laws in the 1950s in the midst of the ‘Termination Era’ that affected
land holdings; Public Law 280 and the Long-Term Leasing Act of 1955 (Wilkinson & Biggs, 1977).
Public Law 280 (PL 280) moved the jurisdiction of criminal offenses and civil disputes from federal
and tribal courts to the state courts. Altering the jurisdiction of civil disputes was of secondary
importance, but matters for the resolution of disputes in leasing agreements. Public Law 280 was
passed in 1953 and applied to nearly all reservations in Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon and Wisconsin.10 Some states and reservations were added later, including Washington,
Kansas and the Flathead reservation in Montana.
Parker (2012) highlights two features that make PL 280 a suitable natural experiment for
identifying the effect of a legal institution on credit and contract enforcement. First, the law was
imposed on reservations; they were not allowed to select in or opt out. The selection into PL
280 treatment was determined at the federal level and reservations were chosen based on crime,
not for economic reasons. Second, PL 280 was instituted immediately and changed the legal
systems governing disputes in a clear manner (Parker 2012). However, ambiguity remains on the
interpretation of PL 280 for land-use activities. Chambers and Price (1973) highlight the lack
of absolute direction put forth by Congress, leading to varied interpretations of statutes in state
courts.
Several papers examine different outcomes relating to land and credit access that followed from
Public Law 280. Anderson and Parker (2008) use PL 280 as a natural experiment to examine the
effect of stable contracting on per capita income. They argue that transferring jurisdiction from
tribal to state courts limited the ability of tribes to alter contracts ex-post and selectively enforce
contracts. Therefore, the law allowed tribes and tribal members to convey ‘credible commitment’
10
Exceptions include Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota, Warm Springs reservation in Oregon and Menominee
reservation in Wisconsin. Only Red Lake reservation is in my final sample.
9
to potential investors. Their results suggest that PL 280 reservations experienced 30 percent more
per capita income growth between 1969 and 1999 than non-PL 280 reservations, with much of
the gain occurring before 1980. Parker (2012) finds that PL 280 reservations experienced a sharp
increase in per capita credit access following the implementation of PL 280. He suggests differences
in credit access between PL 280 and non-PL 280 reservations are due to a combination of weaker
creditor rights and more uncertainty regarding creditor rights under tribal jurisdiction.
4.2
Indian Long-Term Leasing Act of 1955
The Indian Long-Term Leasing Act (LTLA) of 1955 (25 U.S.C. 415 [August 9, 1955]) was another
significant federal change that impacted Native American reservations. Prior to the LTLA, leasing
arrangements on individual and tribal trust land were subject to a maximum lease length of 5
years. The LTLA increased the maximum lease length from 5 years to 25 years and allowed for
one additional renewal of 25 years subject to BIA approval.11 The legislative history of the LTLA
indicates that Congress sought to promote economic development by expanding market participation on indian lands and encouraging long-term development through long-term commercial leases
(Chambers & Price, 1074, 1973).
Additionally, instituting a new lease or renewal required BIA approval at several different administrative levels, which greatly increased the transaction costs associated with leasing. The
combination of short lease lengths and high transaction costs for lease renewals also reduced the
incentive of outside investors to develop long-term projects. The LTLA lowered transaction costs
by increasing the term length of leases and reducing federal oversight. Theoretically, lower transaction costs should result in increased economic development on trust land (Alcantara 2007; North
1984).
Given the perceived benefits of the LTLA, the economic impacts of the Long-Term Leasing
11
Some reservations update their leasing policies to allow for longer leases up to 99 years. My final sample includes
seven reservations that allow for these longer leases. The empirical results are robust to dropping these seven
reservations.
10
Act are less established in the literature. Akee (2009) looks at the effect of the LTLA on the
housing market on the Agua Caliente Reservation in Palm Springs, CA. He finds that Agua Caliente
landowners were constrained because trust land could not be used as a sole source of collateral
to secure bank financing. Akee shows that the LTLA in conjunction with the Agua Caliente
Equalization Act of 1959 (25 U.S.C. 951 [September 21, 1959]), which relaxed trust land restrictions,
led to a significant investment in housing on trust land. He also shows that home construction levels
and property values on trust land converge to those found on fee-simple land.
4.3
Heirship and the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act of 1955
Every leasing agreement or application for a fee patent had heirship related costs. Superintendent
records in Indian Land Transactions indicate that the time and financial cost of collecting owner
signatures was substantial. Drawn out procedures required additional appraisals and likely required
the renegotiation of terms. Guardian costs and fees to Tribal Land Enterprises added to the expense
of transacting a land deal. These costs were borne for each leasing agreement or sale of land. For
owners making a decision to continue leasing or try to sell, increasing future costs, due to increased
fractionation, may make selling more attractive in the current period. Therefore, for a first empirical
prediction, I expect land to move from individual trust to fee-simple through time.
The Indian Long-Term Leasing Act (LTLA) of 1955 does not change the upfront cost of any
single land transaction, however it potentially changes the discounted present value of these costs
by distributing them over a longer time horizon. The LTLA extended the possible duration of a
lease and required the owners to bear the upfront transaction costs less frequently. Allowing for
longer term leases also alters the discounted present value of rents for minors, making the hiring of
a guardian more likely. By distributing the costs over a longer time horizon, the LTLA increases
the discounted present value returned to owners leasing individual trust land. The LTLA does
not alter the cost structure for filing an application for a fee patent and transferring land to fee
simple. All else equal, the discounted present value for transferring land to fee simple and selling it
11
should not be any different under the LTLA. Therefore, increasing the discounted present value of
individual trust land, while holding the discounted present value of transferring land to fee simple
constant, should motivate individuals that would have moved land from individual trust to fee
simple to keep their land holdings in individual trust. As a second empirical prediction, following
the LTLA I expect land flows from individual trust to fee simple to slow following the LTLA.
5
Data on Land Tenure Through Time
5.1
Land Tenure Panel Dataset and Summary Statistics
The U.S. Department of Interior, in conjunction with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), maintains records regarding Native American land tenure. I found and recorded reservation level land
tenure acreages for ten years dating back to 1939. The Office of Indian Affairs published Statistical
Supplements to their Annual Report for 1939, 1941, 1942 and 1944, which contain land tenure
information for most reservations nationwide. A published senate report from 1958 contains information for over 80 reservations regarding land tenure in 1947 and 1957. The Bureau of Indian
Affairs published another statistical supplement, which contains population data, limited demographic information and land tenure information for all reservations in 1963. In 1971 and 1974,
the BIA contributed reservation level land tenure information for U.S. Department of Commerce
publications on economic development on Indian reservations. My final source for reservation level
land tenure information comes from a 1978 report published by the U.S. Department of Interior.
The final panel dataset of land tenure information contains 60 reservations, measured at ten points
in time, spanning from 1939 to 1978.12 This information is supplemented with initial allotment
information from a report on land tenure published by the Office of Indian Affairs in 1935.
Table 1 indicates the 60 Indian reservations remaining in the sample with land tenure and
allotment information. For each agency, the table reports the state where the majority of reservation
12
See the Data Appendix for more details regarding the construction of the panel dataset and selection of the final
sample.
12
land is located, the administrative area office of each agency, whether the reservation adopted Public
Law 280, the primary allotment date within the agency, and the total acreage that was allotted as
of 1935. The 60 reservations in my sample are geographically varied, coming from 19 states, mostly
in the west and midwest. Figure 1 maps the location of each agency and color codes the area office
regions.13 Twenty-two reservations in the sample eventually adopted PL 280.
5.2
National and Regional Trends in Land Tenure
Panel A of Table 2 presents unweighted descriptive statistics for the full sample of 60 Native
American reservations. To understand land tenure changes through time, the outcomes of interest
are the shares of each land tenure type and the percentage change in the share from the previous
period. These measures effectively look at the levels and changes of each land tenure. Comparing
the tenure shares, there is considerable variation in how reservations are organized. The minimum
and maximums of each tenure category show some reservations can be predominately composed of
one type or another. On average, the reservations in the sample have a higher share of fee-simple
land than individual trust and tribal trust.
Figure 2 visually depicts the national pattern in land tenure shares from 1939 to 1978. Between
forty and fifty percent of reservation land is designated as fee-simple land, with this share peaking
in the early 1970s. The share of tribal trust land starts increasing in the mid-1940s at the expense
of individual trust land. Federal trust represents a relatively small share of overall land tenure and
is ignored in further analysis. Figure 3 graphs the share in each area office by land tenure type.
The national level pattern is consistent across most area offices. Shares of both fee-simple land and
tribal trust land increase throughout the period for nearly every area office and individual trust
declines in most area offices.
13
The Bureau of Indian Affairs has nine area offices to facilitate regional administration.
13
5.3
Changes in the Shares of Land Tenure
Average year to year percent changes in the share of land tenure provide information about the
short-term responsiveness, which can be particularly useful for analyzing response to policy changes.
The second set of outcomes in Panel A of Table 2 show summary statistics for the percent change
in land tenure shares. On average, the share of land in both fee-simple land and tribal trust
land experience positive percent changes, as indicated by the increases in their shares in Figure 1.
Comparing the unweighted means, it appears that the share of tribal trust land grew faster than
the share of fee-simple land. This is supported by stronger changes in the distribution of tribal
trust compared to fee-simple land as well. Panel A indicates that the average percentage change
in individual trust is negative, implying a decreasing share of individual trust land through time.
This was also supported in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 4 presents a scatterplot of the average annual percentage change of each land tenure
type through time where each data point is a reservation. Each panel of Figure 4 also plots the
estimated bivariate regression separately for before and after the Long-Term Leasing Act. The
fitted regression lines for both fee-simple and individual trust land change sharply following the
LTLA. Consistent with the prior empirical predictions, the average growth rate into fee-simple
was increasing and positive prior to the LTLA and is diminishing after the LTLA. Similarly for
individual trust, land was being redesigned away from individual trust status at an increasing rate
prior to the LTLA, and the pattern similarly reverses following the LTLA. The scatterplot for tribal
trust land reveals growth in tribal trust both before and after the LTLA. The following sections
explore this observed bivariate relationship more explicitly.
14
6
Understanding the Impact of the Long-Term Leasing Act of
1955 on Changes in Land Tenure
6.1
Empirical Specification
As outlined in Section 4.3, increasing the discounted present value of individual trust land, while
holding the discounted present value of transferring land to fee simple constant, should motivate
individuals that would have moved land from individual trust to fee simple to keep their land
holdings in individual trust. This theory is empirically testable by examining whether the LTLA
significantly changed the flow of land between the types, specifically looking at whether it increased
the retention rate of trust land and diminished the flow to fee-simple land.
To empirically test for a structural break in the flow of each outcome around 1957, I examine
the following model using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression, allowing for the error terms to be
correlated across the regressions.
T enureP ctChangei,t = β0 + β1 Y eart + β2 LT LAt + β3 (LT LAt x Y eart ) + Xi0 γ + ρi + i,t
(1)
The outcome, T enureP ctChange, is the percentage change from period t − 1 to t for a given
land tenure type. The indicator LTLA is equal to one if the year is after 1957.14 The coefficient
β1 gives the average year to year percentage change prior to the LTLA. Similarly, the coefficient
β3 is the average percentage change from one year to the next after the passage of the LTLA.
The null hypothesis of interest tests whether or not the Long-Term Leasing Act is associated with
changing the pattern of land tenure, mathematically denoted β2 +β3 ∗Y ear = 0. This model exploits
variation at the reservation level, i, across ten years, t from 1939 to 1978. The specification includes
a reservation fixed-effect, ρ, to account for time invariant factors at the reservation level.15
14
In order to include the values in 1957 in both the pre-LTLA period and post-LTLA period I duplicate the 1957
data and assign it to 1958.
15
In the robustness section, I replace reservation fixed-effects with area office fixed-effects and linear time trends
15
The vector, X, contains allotment era, land demand and political controls. The allotment era
was a formative period for Native American property rights. Several papers and books examine
the political and economic environment that contributed to the Dawes Act and influenced the
allotment era. McChesney (1990) looks at political factors associated with introducing and aborting
the allotment era. Carlson (1981) examines how agricultural conditions contributed to earlier
allotments for reservations. Frye (2012) shows that both demographics and land characteristics
surrounding reservations were responsible for earlier allotment dates. Anderson & Parker (2012)
show resources were important for reshaping Native American reservations during the allotment
era. To account for changing land demand conditions, the model controls for the average value of
agricultural land per acre in the state containing the majority of reservation land in year t. The
model also includes a proxy for mortgage rates by controlling for the discount rate in year t. To
allow for philosophical and policy differences for the Secretary of Interior, I control for the political
party of the executive branch.
The model tests for a structural break around 1957, but I would prefer to use 1955 to coincide
with the LTLA, however due to data constraints this is not possible. Table 3 shows the number of
transactions disposing of individual trust land by area office from 1948 to 1957. The data indicates
there was not a strong decrease in the number of transactions immediately after 1955, so it does
not appear that the LTLA induced immediate changes in the quantity of land transactions. Given
it can take several months and even years for land to be transferred between types, it is not entirely
unexpected that the LTLA would not immediately alter the flow of land between tenure types.16
6.2
Results of the Long-Term Leasing Act on Changes to Land Tenure
Tables 4 presents the results from the Fixed-Effects Seemingly Unrelated Regression (FE SUR)
specification described in equation 1. Each column presents coefficient estimates for a different
however the results do not change.
16
The large increase in transactions in the Aberdeen area office in 1951 is the result of the dam construction on
the Standing Rock reservation. I am still unsure why there is a rise in the volume of individual trust land disposal
transactions starting in 1953, prior to the LTLA, this increase is something I need to explore further.
16
land tenure type, with t-statistics in parenthesis. The coefficients on Y ear indicate the trend in
the flow of land tenure prior to 1957. The signs of the coefficient estimates on the interaction term,
(LT LA X Y ear), report the slope of the marginal effect and support the predicted effects suggested
in Section 4.3. Both follow the empirical predictions outlined in section 4.
Figures 5 through 7 plot the marginal effects of the Long-Term Leasing Act in each year, for
each land tenure type, along with the 90 percent confidence intervals.17 These figures reveal when
the marginal effects become statistically different from zero. Figure 5 plots the marginal effects
for the impact of the LTLA on the percent change in individual trust land. The figure shows the
positive effect through time and indicates a statistically significant difference approximately four
years after the passage of the LTLA. Figure 6 plots similar marginal effects for fee-simple land. The
results indicate the LTLA had a negative effect on the growth rate of fee simple land. This effect
is statistically different from zero about six years after the passage of the LTLA. Figure 7 plots
the marginal effects of the LTLA on the percent change in tribal trust land. The results indicate
the LTLA had a positive effect on tribal trust land accumulation, although it is not statistically
different from zero prior to 1978. These results support the hypothesis posited in section 4.3, which
suggested increasing returns to the discounted present value of individual trust land compared to
fee-simple land should induce more land retention in individual trust land.
6.3
Incorporating Public Law 280
The impact of the Long-Term Leasing Act may vary by the quality of the other legal institutions
present. Public Law 280 could influence land holdings through similar mechanisms to those described by Anderson and Parker (2008) and Parker (2012). The ability to credibly commit to a
leasing contract and access credit are both important features that could work in conjunction with
the Long-Term Leasing Act. Additional term lengths translate to longer commitments, which may
be more beneficial under state jurisdiction because outside investors want to know any dispute will
17
Confidence intervals are calculated based on the joint
p significance between the intercept and slope term. More
specifically, the standard error of the marginal effect is V ar(β2 ) + V ar(β3 ) ∗ year2 + 2 ∗ Cov(β2 , β3 ) ∗ year.
17
be handled in court they are more familiar with. However, Chambers and Price (1973) highlight
the legal uncertainty of PL 280 regarding land use activities. This uncertainty may not translate
to benefits for the leasing market but may make sales of fee-simple land more attractive. The
expansion of credit access may also translate to more purchasing power leading to more sales as
well.
To disentangle which of these two effects dominates, I fully interact the previous specification
with an indicator for whether a reservation was ever designated as a Public Law 280 reservation,
to empirically test whether there are differences in land flow behavior from being subject to state
jurisdiction.18
T enureP ctChangei,t = β0 + β1 Y eart + β2 LT LAt + β3 (LT LAt x Y eart ) + β4 (P L280i x Y eart )
+ β5 (LT LAt x P L280i ) + β6 (LT LAt x P L280i x Y eart ) + Xi0 γ + ρi + i (2)
The null hypothesis of interest tests whether or not Public Law 280 reservations experienced different changes in the patterns of land tenure following the Long-Term Leasing Act, mathematically
denoted β5 + β6 ∗ Y ear = 0.
6.4
Results from Incorporating PL 280
Tables 5 present the regression results for the FE SUR model outlined in equation 2. The coefficient
estimates on the interaction term, (LT LA X Y ear), are similar between Table 4 and Table 5. The
coefficient estimate on the triple interaction term, (LT LA X P L280 X Y ear), is not statistically
different from zero in any of the three specifications. Figures 8 through 10 plot the marginal effects
of PL280 on the different land tenure types following the LTLA. Figure 8 shows a positive difference
in the growth rate of individual trust land for Public Law 280 reservations compared to non-Public
Law 280 reservations, however it is not ever significantly different from zero. Figure 9 plots the same
marginal effect for fee-simple land and indicates a positive difference in growth rates between PL280
18
Figure 1 distinguishes the PL 280 reservations and non-PL 280 reservations on the map.
18
and non-PL280 reservations, which becomes significantly different after approximately seven years.
This suggests that PL280 reservations continued transferring land to fee-simple, which supports
the legal land-use uncertainty promoted by Chambers and Price and suggests the expanded access
to credit impacted purchasing more than leasing.
7
Heirship
Reservations with earlier allotment dates were granted property rights earlier and have had more
time to accumulate heirs. Therefore, allotment date serves as a useful proxy for heirship conditions.
Comparing the marginal effects of the Long-Term Leasing Act within allotment date groups indicates whether or not there were differential responses to the LTLA by heirship conditions. Recall
from section 4.3, that more heirs, increases the transaction costs for signing or renewing a lease.
Longer term leases distributed these costs over a longer time horizon and increased the discounted
present value of leasing compared to transferring land to fee-simple. So reservations with more
heirs would be more likely to benefit from the Long-Term Leasing Act.
Table 6 presents results from a FE SUR model described in equation 1 for different allotment
date groups. Panel A examines the effect for unallotted reservations. There is no clear expectation
for the sign of the marginal effects for unallotted reservations because there is uncertainty regarding
the number of heirs. The coefficient estimates in Panel A, support the uncertain sign by indicating
the LTLA had no significant effect on the unallotted reservations in the sample. Panels B and C
present the coefficient estimates for reservations allotted before 1900 and after 1900 respectively.
The sign and magnitude of these estimates are similar to the original estimates in Table 4. However,
for individual trust land, the magnitude on the interaction term, (LT LA X Y ear), is larger for
reservations allotted earlier. This supports the prior that reservations allotted earlier respond more
to the Long-Term Leasing Act. Figures 11 through 13 plot the marginal effects for each heirship
group. Comparing the early and late allotment groups, we see a more abrupt changes to the flow
of individual trust land and fee-simple land for reservations allotted before 1910.
19
8
Robustness
To check the sensitivity of the estimates to different specifications I estimate six different models
varying the controls, fixed-effects and weighting. The base model does not include any controls
for land value, interest rates or political party indicators or any fixed-effects. The controls are
introduced in the second specification. The third model includes area office fixed-effects to account
for time invariant factors at the area office level. The fourth specification expands these fixed-effects
to include an area office linear time trend, which accounts for unobserved factors that change linearly
through time. The fifth specification replaces the area office linear time trend with reservation level
fixed-effects. The final specification is a weighted OLS with reservation fixed-effects, weighted by
reservation size. Aside from the base specification the coefficients estimates are very robust across
the specifications. The weighting does increase the coefficient on the interaction term for both
individual trust land and tribal trust land.
9
Conclusion
In order to measure the economic impacts of land tenure on Native American reservations it is
important to understand the evolution of land tenure through time. The origins of land tenure on
Native American reservations trace back to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The 1950s and
1960s were characterized by a series of policy interventions targeting Native Americans. One such
policy, the Long-Term Leasing Act of 1955, had a large impact on Native American trust land. The
policy extended the possible term of leases on individual and tribal trust lands, increasing economic
opportunities, lowering transaction costs and increasing the present value of retaining land in trust.
As a result, the pattern of land movement shifts away from transfers to fee-simple and tribal trust
and results in more land retention in individual trust.
I extend my empirical framework to determine whether reservations under state jurisdiction
experience additional changes in land tenure shifts due to the ability to more credibly commit to
20
leasing contracts or whether legal uncertainty over land-use and expanded credit access lead to
increased transfer to fee-simple. The results suggest Public Law 280 reservations continued transferring land to fee-simple, which supports the legal land-use uncertainty and suggests the expanded
credit access impacted purchasing more than leasing. To examine the degree that heirship is influencing the results I estimate the results by allotment date groups, where allotment dates proxy
for heirship. The results indicate that reservations allotted earlier, which have a more pronounced
heirship problem, responded more to the Long-Term Leasing Act. The strong shifts in land induced
by the Long-Term Leasing Act suggests that similar policies aimed at decreasing transaction costs
associated with Native American land tenure offer an alternative means of promoting economic
development on Native American reservations without sacrificing tribal sovereignty.
21
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24
A
A.1
Data Appendix
Data Source Guide
Statistical Supplement to the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Fiscal
Year Ended June 30, 1939 (1939)
Statistical Supplement to the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1941 (1941)
Statistical Supplement to the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1942 (1942)
Statistical Supplement to the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1944 (1944)
Indian land transactions: memorandum of the chairman to the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, United State Senate. An analysis of the problems and effects of our diminishing
Indian land base, 1948-57 (1958)
U.S. Indian Population (1962) and Land (1963) (1963)
Federal and State Indian Reservations: An Economic Development Administration Handbook
(1971)
Federal and State Indian reservations and Indian Trust Areas (1974)
Annual Report of Indian Lands by the Bureau of Indian Affairs & the Office of Trust Responsibilities (1978)
A.2
Data Composition and Restriction Guide
Fee-simple land amounts are calculated by subtracting the sum of tribal trust, individual trust
and federal trust land from the given reservation size following Anderson and Lueck (1992). The
percentage change in the share of a given land tenure was calculated as the difference in the share
between year t and t − 1 divided by year t − 1. I dropped the top and bottom five percent of
land tenure changes from my sample to remove outliers. Indian Land Transactions (1958) does not
contain information for federal trust land for 1947 and 1957. I chose to replace the missing federal
trust acreages in 1947 with the 1944 levels and the 1957 acreages with 1963 acreages. In most cases
these values were consistent between 1944 and 1963.
25
26
Figure 1: National Map Indicating Sample Reservations, Area Offices and PL 280 Status
.5
.4
.3
.2
.1
0
27
Share of Fee-Simple
Share of Federal Trust
1970
Share of Tribal Trust
1960
Year
Share of Indiv. Trust
1950
Verticle line represents the passage of the Long-Term Leasing Act in 1955.
Sources: See Data Appendix
1940
Shares of Native American Land Tenures
1939 to 1978
Figure 2:
1980
28
Andarko & Muskogee
Minneapolis
Gallup
Phoenix
Billings
Sacramento
Portland
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Year
Aberdeen
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Year
1
.2
0
Share of Indiv. Trust
.4
.6
.8
Verticle line represents the passage of the Long-Term Leasing Act in 1955.
Sources: See Data Appendix
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Year
1
Share of Fee-Simple
.2
.4
.6
.8
0
Shares of Land Tenures By Area Offices
Figure 3:
1
Share of Tribal Trust
.4
.6
.8
.2
0
10
5
0
-5
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Year
Fee-Simple
Tribal Trust
Post-LTLA
Fitted Post-LTLA
Fitted Pre-LTLA
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Year
Pre-LTLA
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Year
Individual Trust
Changes in the Shares of Land Tenure by Type
Figure 4:
Verticle line represents the passage of the Long-Term Leasing Act in 1955. Bivariate regression is
unweighted. Sources: See Data Appendix
-10
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
40
30
20
10
0
29
Figure 5:
-4
-2
Marginal Effects
0
2
4
Marginal Effects of LTLA on Individual Trust Pct Change
-20
-10
0
Years After LTLA
Marginal Effect
Lower Bound
10
20
Upper Bound
Figure 6:
-4
-2
Marginal Effects
0
2
4
Marginal Effects of LTLA on Fee Simple Pct Change
-20
-10
0
Years After LTLA
Marginal Effect
Lower Bound
30
10
Upper Bound
20
Figure 7:
-6
-4
Marginal Effects
-2
0
2
Marginal Effects of LTLA on Tribal Trust Pct Change
-20
-10
0
Years After LTLA
Marginal Effect
Lower Bound
31
10
Upper Bound
20
Figure 8:
-2
Marginal Effects
-1
0
1
2
Marginal Effects of PL280 on Individual Trust Pct Change
Following the LTLA
-20
-10
0
Years After LTLA
Marginal Effect
Lower Bound
10
20
Upper Bound
Figure 9:
-2
Marginal Effects
0
2
4
Marginal Effects of PL280 on Fee Simple Pct Change
Following the LTLA
-20
-10
0
Years After LTLA
Marginal Effect
Lower Bound
32
10
Upper Bound
20
Figure 10:
-4
-2
Marginal Effects
0
2
4
6
Marginal Effects of PL280 on Tribal Trust Pct Change
Following the LTLA
-20
-10
0
Years After LTLA
Marginal Effect
Lower Bound
10
20
Upper Bound
Figure 11:
-2
Marginal Effects
0
2
4
Marginal Effects of LTLA on Pct Change
in Individual Trust by Allotment Date
-20
-10
0
Years After LTLA
Unallotted
Allotted After 1910
33
10
Allotted Before 1910
20
Figure 12:
-4
Marginal Effects
-2
0
2
4
Marginal Effects of LTLA on Pct Change
in Fee-Simple by Allotment Date
-20
-10
0
Years After LTLA
Unallotted
Allotted After 1910
10
20
Allotted Before 1910
Figure 13:
-4
Marginal Effects
-3
-2
-1
Marginal Effects of LTLA on Pct Change
in Tribal Trust by Allotment Date
-20
-10
0
Years After LTLA
Unallotted
Allotted After 1910
34
10
Allotted Before 1910
20
Table 1: Reservation Summary
Agency Name
Blackfeet
Camp Verde
Chemehuevi
Cheyenne River
Cocopah
Coeur D’ Alene
Colorado River
Colville
Consolidated Chippewa
Crow
Crow Creek
Flathead
Fort Apache
Fort Belknap
Fort Berthold
Fort Hall
Fort McDowell
Fort Peck
Fort Totten
Fort Yuma
Gila River
Great Lakes
Havasupai
Hoh
Hoopa Valley
Kickapoo
Kiowa
Lower Brule
Lummi
Makah
Mescalero
Navajo
Nez Perce
Nisqually
Northern Cheyenne
Omaha
Osage
Ozette
Pine Ridge
Port Madison
Potawatomi
Puyallup
Quillayute
Quinaielt
Red Lake
Rocky Boy’s
Salt River
San Carlos
Santee
Shoalwater
Skokomish
Spokane
Squaxin Island
Standing Rock
Swinomish
Uintah & Ouray
Umatillah
Warm Springs
Wichita
Winnebago
Source: See Data Appendix
State
Area Office
PL280
Primary
Allotment
Date
Final
Allotment
Acreage
Montana
Arizona
California
South Dakota
Arizona
Idaho
California
Washington
Minnesota
Montana
South Dakota
Montana
Arizona
Montana
North Dakota
Idaho
Arizona
Montana
North Dakota
Arizona
Arizona
Wisconsin
Arizona
Washington
California
Kansas
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Washington
Washington
New Mexico
Arizona
Idaho
Washington
Montana
Iowa
Oklahoma
Washington
South Dakota
Washington
Kansas
Washington
Washington
Washington
Minnesota
Montana
Arizona
Arizona
Nebraska
Washington
Washington
Washington
Washington
South Dakota
Washington
Utah
Oregon
Oregon
Oklahoma
Iowa
Billings
Phoenix
Phoenix
Aberdeen
Phoenix
Portland
Phoenix
Portland
Minneapolis
Billings
Aberdeen
Billings
Phoenix
Billings
Aberdeen
Portland
Phoenix
Billings
Aberdeen
Phoenix
Phoenix
Minneapolis
Phoenix
Portland
Sacramento
Andarko & Muskogee
Andarko & Muskogee
Aberdeen
Portland
Portland
Gallup
Gallup
Portland
Portland
Billings
Minneapolis
Andarko & Muskogee
Portland
Aberdeen
Portland
Andarko & Muskogee
Portland
Portland
Portland
Minneapolis
Billings
Phoenix
Phoenix
Aberdeen
Portland
Portland
Portland
Portland
Aberdeen
Portland
Phoenix
Portland
Portland
Andarko & Muskogee
Minneapolis
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
1913
Unallotted
Unallotted
1906
Unallotted
1909
1915
1886
1889
1907
1890
1908
Unallotted
1921
1910
1914
Unallotted
1921
1892
1912
1887
Unallotted
Unallotted
Unallotted
Unallotted
1895
1901
1900
Unallotted
1910
Unallotted
Unallotted
1893
1884
1932
1882
1906
Unallotted
1904
Unallotted
1906
Unallotted
1929
1907
Unallotted
Unallotted
1913
Unallotted
1882
Unallotted
1885
1910
1889
1905
Unallotted
1905
1899
1887
1901
1887
1441992
0
0
1261926
0
102569
8410
414974
873101
2054055
284732
836261
0
539448
605875
347271
0
1422172
129504
8150
97595
307287
0
0
0
19132
544457
233373
12309
3723
0
708746
175445
4717
233120
135495
1465350
0
2380195
7248
77268
0
15
193291
0
0
25223
0
99704
0
4973
65063
1494
1366731
7170
113027
156252
162948
152715
110204
35
36
2410643
114.2
3.087
1902
336573
0.4264
0.3056
638
638
638
435
638
638
638
13700000
153.5
2.499
12.44
546475
0.3862
0.461
0.3275
0.2376
0.3572
1.75
1.595
4.359
282522
60
2.157
1905
99704
0.2943
0
0.427
0.1394
0.1007
0
-0.04152
0
Median
Panel C: Public Law 280 Reservations
Outcomes
Share of Fee-Simple
241
0.407
0.3028
0.365
Share of Indiv. Trust
241
0.2243
0.248
0.1288
Share of Tribal Trust
241
0.3667
0.3767
0.09751
Percent Change in Share of Fee-Simple
216
0.3893
1.699
0
Percent Change in Share of Indiv. Trust 216
-1.052
1.934
-0.006717
Percent Change in Share of Tribal Trust 216
0.8416
2.659
0
Controls
Reservation Size (acres)
241
314122
539650
29515
Average Land Values ($/acre)
241
163.1
169.5
116
Average Discount Rate
241
3.042
2.452
2.157
Primary Allotment Date
147
1898
13.77
1889
Acreage Allotted by 1934
241
133731
247249
7170
Initial Share of Allotted Acreage
241
0.4504
0.3844
0.4076
Reservation Never Allotted
241
0.3568
0.4801
0
Source: See Data Appendix
Panel B: Non-Public Law 280 Reservations
Outcomes
Share of Fee-Simple
397
0.4851
0.3386
0.4687
Share of Indiv. Trust
397
0.2227
0.2313
0.1513
Share of Tribal Trust
397
0.2844
0.3415
0.1007
Percent Change in Share of Fee-Simple
355
0.1314
1.776
0
Percent Change in Share of Indiv. Trust 355
-0.8299
1.344
-0.05214
Percent Change in Share of Tribal Trust 355
2.145
5.065
0
Controls
Reservation Size (acres)
397 3683343 17300000
548079
Average Land Values ($/acre)
397
84.5
134.8
42
Average Discount Rate
397
3.115
2.53
2.157
Primary Allotment Date
288
1903
11.29
1905
Acreage Allotted by 1934
397
459709
634893
152715
Initial Share of Allotted Acreage
397
0.4118
0.3871
0.2622
Reservation Never Allotted
397
0.2746
0.4469
0
0.4556
0.2233
0.3155
0.229
-0.9137
1.652
638
638
638
571
571
571
N
Mean
SD
Panel A: Full Sample
Outcomes
Share of Fee-Simple
Share of Indiv. Trust
Share of Tribal Trust
Percent Change in Share of Fee-Simple
Percent Change in Share of Indiv. Trust
Percent Change in Share of Tribal Trust
Controls
Reservation Size (acres)
Average Land Values ($/acre)
Average Discount Rate
Primary Allotment Date
Acreage Allotted by 1934
Initial Share of Allotted Acreage
Reservation Never Allotted
Variable
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Public Law 280 Status
0.9982
0.8099
1
8.399
1.598
19.66
1934654
914
7.875
1929
873101
0.9757
1
443
7
1
1882
0
0
0
124000000
1331
7.875
1932
2380195
0.9922
1
825.8
5
1
1882
0
0
0
0
0
0
-10.16
-8.492
-1.699
0.9972
0.8249
1
8.046
1.45
35.36
124000000
1331
7.875
1932
2380195
0.9922
1
0.9982
0.8249
1
8.399
1.598
35.36
Max
0
0
0
-10.75
-7.806
-1.27
443
5
1
1882
0
0
0
0
0
0
-10.75
-8.492
-1.699
Min
37
167
195
86
0
0
0
4
34
44
530
Aberdeen
Anadarko
Billings
Gallup
Minneapolis
Muskogee
Phoenix
Portland
Sacramento
Total
873
428
149
176
0
0
0
5
41
74
1949
620
158
121
140
12
0
0
1
40
148
1950
2225
1459
122
179
7
37
0
1
82
338
1951
721
141
111
248
14
3
0
0
95
109
1952
1362
176
143
640
4
173
0
4
90
132
1953
2136
569
207
956
1
249
0
3
84
67
1954
1815
240
179
721
0
422
0
2
162
89
1955
1725
348
331
269
1
486
0
1
171
118
1956
2071
347
468
490
1
421
0
4
288
52
1957
Source: Table was duplicated from Table 1 in Indian Land Transactions (78, 1958).
1948
Area
14088
4033
2026
3905
40
1791
0
25
1087
1171
Total
1407.8
403.3
202.6
390.5
4
179.1
0
2.5
108.7
117.1
Average
Table 3: Bureau of Indian Affairs, Area Totals, Individual Indian Land Disposal Transactions
Table 4: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results of the Long-Term Leasing Act on the Percent
Change in Reservation Land Tenure
Year
Long Term Leasing Act
LTLA X Year
Avg Interest Rate
Avg Land Value
Sec. Interior is a Democrat
Individual Trust
Fee-Simple
Tribal Trust
-0.153***
(-7.91)
-0.0250
(-0.10)
0.143***
(5.17)
0.138
(1.37)
0.000476
(0.76)
-0.716***
(-4.49)
0.0888***
(3.69)
0.218
(0.68)
-0.133***
(-3.85)
-0.0388
(-0.31)
-0.000277
(-0.35)
-0.0661
(-0.33)
0.182**
(3.18)
-2.135**
(-2.79)
0.0417
(0.51)
-0.514
(-1.72)
0.00238
(1.27)
1.691***
(3.56)
Observations
571
571
571
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Year is normalized to 0 in 1955.
SUR specifications include reservation level fixed-effects.
Sources: See Data Appendix
38
Table 5: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results of the Long-Term Leasing Act and Public Law
280 on the Percent Change in Reservation Land Tenure
Year
Long Term Leasing Act
LTLA X Year
PL280 X Year
LTLA X PL280
LTLA X PL280 X Year
Avg Interest Rate
Avg Land Value
Sec. Interior is a Democrat
Individual Trust
Fee-Simple
Tribal Trust
-0.148***
(-6.93)
0.149
(0.50)
0.128***
(4.22)
-0.0119
(-0.48)
-0.460
(-1.16)
0.0400
(1.25)
0.139
(1.39)
0.000437
(0.65)
-0.708***
(-4.40)
0.114***
(4.30)
0.0507
(0.14)
-0.163***
(-4.33)
-0.0672*
(-2.19)
0.445
(0.90)
0.0778
(1.96)
-0.0371
(-0.30)
-0.000254
(-0.30)
-0.0656
(-0.33)
0.208**
(3.27)
-2.245*
(-2.53)
0.00993
(0.11)
-0.0682
(-0.93)
0.301
(0.25)
0.0825
(0.87)
-0.514
(-1.72)
0.00245
(1.23)
1.687***
(3.52)
Observations
571
571
571
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Year is normalized to 0 in 1955.
SUR specifications include reservation level fixed-effects.
Sources: See Data Appendix
39
Table 6: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results of the Long-Term Leasing Act on the Percent
Change in Reservation Land Tenure By Allotment Date Groups
Panel A: Unallotted Reservations
Individual Trust Fee-Simple
Year
Long Term Leasing Act
LTLA X Year
Observations
-0.0968**
(-3.12)
-0.333
(-0.81)
0.117**
(2.68)
0.0542
(1.31)
0.453
(0.83)
-0.0879
(-1.51)
0.140
(1.60)
-1.733
(-1.50)
0.0349
(0.28)
174
174
174
Panel B: Allotted Before 1910
Individual Trust Fee-Simple
Year
Long Term Leasing Act
LTLA X Year
Observations
Long Term Leasing Act
LTLA X Year
Tribal Trust
-0.214***
(-7.27)
0.158
(0.40)
0.173***
(4.17)
0.111***
(3.35)
0.130
(0.30)
-0.172***
(-3.68)
0.190*
(1.99)
-2.574*
(-2.03)
0.0695
(0.52)
283
283
283
Panel C: Allotted After 1910
Individual Trust Fee-Simple
Year
Tribal Trust
-0.0857*
(-2.40)
0.0342
(0.07)
0.109*
(2.00)
0.0961
(1.61)
0.0652
(0.08)
-0.109
(-1.19)
Tribal Trust
0.228*
(2.49)
-1.564
(-1.25)
-0.0221
(-0.16)
Observations
114
114
114
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Year is normalized to 0 in 1955.
SUR specifications include reservation level fixed-effects and controls.
Sources: See Data Appendix
40
41
571
0.00991
(0.23)
-1.548*
(-2.25)
0.116*
(2.12)
Controls
Base
0.201**
(3.09)
-2.294**
(-2.62)
0.0419
(0.44)
571
571
0.0899***
(3.51)
0.210
(0.61)
-0.134***
(-3.64)
Area Office FE
571
0.201**
(3.20)
-2.252**
(-2.67)
0.0312
(0.34)
Area Office FE
Panel C: Tribal Trust
571
0.0903***
(3.48)
0.217
(0.62)
-0.139***
(-3.69)
Controls
-0.149***
(-6.92)
-0.0567
(-0.20)
0.146***
(4.68)
571
Panel B: Fee Simple
-0.141***
(-6.37)
-0.114
(-0.38)
0.150***
(4.66)
571
571
0.0879***
(5.33)
0.290
(1.09)
-0.150***
(-7.06)
Base
-0.0842***
(-5.64)
-0.260
(-1.07)
0.111***
(5.77)
571
571
0.206**
(2.96)
-2.243**
(-2.66)
0.0308
(0.34)
Area Office
Time Trend
571
0.0781**
(2.76)
0.190
(0.56)
-0.132***
(-3.59)
Area Office
Time Trend
-0.159***
(-6.71)
-0.0319
(-0.11)
0.144***
(4.66)
571
571
0.182**
(3.18)
-2.135**
(-2.79)
0.0417
(0.51)
Reservation FE
571
0.0888***
(3.69)
0.218
(0.68)
-0.133***
(-3.85)
Reservation FE
-0.153***
(-7.91)
-0.0250
(-0.10)
0.143***
(5.17)
571
Reservation FE
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Year is normalized to 0 in 1955. Sources: See Data Appendix.
Observations
LTLA X Year
Long Term Leasing Act
Year
Observations
LTLA X Year
Long Term Leasing Act
Year
Observations
LTLA X Year
Long Term Leasing Act
Year
Base
Panel A: Individual Trust
Area Office
Controls Area Office FE Time Trend
571
0.128**
(2.92)
-2.296***
(-4.19)
0.237***
(4.03)
Weighted
Reservation FE
571
0.0228
(1.28)
0.400
(1.80)
-0.0959***
(-4.03)
Weighted
Reservation FE
-0.157***
(-10.43)
-0.617**
(-3.29)
0.258***
(12.79)
571
Weighted
Reservation FE
Table 7: Various Specifications of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results of the Long-Term Leasing Act on the Percent
Change in Reservation Land Tenure