Jakub J. Szczerbowski
Roman law as an instrument for
promoting equality in the Napoleonic
Code
Studia Prawnoustrojowe nr 25, 43-50
2014
UWM
S tu d ia P raw noustrojow e 25
2014
Jakub J. Szczerbow ski
Szkoła W yższa Psychologii Społecznej
w W arszaw ie
Roman law as an instrum ent for prom oting
equality in the N apoleonic Code
In tro d u ctio n
T he R om an law is oftentim es considered as a prototypical legal system
w h en it com es to considering inequality. T he m ost p ro m in e n t exam ple of
in eq u a lity in R om an law is th e in s titu tio n a liz a tio n of slavery. A n o th er oftenra ise d exam ple of a n in stitu tio n , w hich prom otes inequality, is th e pow er of
h u s b a n d over wife. T his stereo ty p e h a s to be p u t, how ever, in a h isto rical
a n d social context. R om an law becom es a n in te re stin g case because it did not
in te rfe re w ith m an y of th e social in stitu tio n s; it m erely re g u la te d in frin g e­
m en ts of social order; in o th e r w ords, m an y of th e legal ru le s w ere m irro r
im ages of th e social in stitu tio n s. T he q u estio n I w a n t to pose in th is artic le is
w h e th e r th e ru le s of R om an su b sta n tiv e law, a n d th e R om an style of la w m a ­
k in g w as a force, w hich prom oted e q u a lity in th e N apoleonic Code a n d o th er
codes, w hich w ere clearly influenced by it. E q u a lity h e re is m e a n t in both
form al a n d econom ic sense. E q u a lity is a concept, w hich is u su a lly th o u g h t of
as a s ta te of affairs in a given point in tim e. In h isto rical re s e a rc h it is m ore
u sefu l to th in k of eq u a lity not only as a s ta te of affairs, b u t also as a process
of becom ing m ore e g a lita ria n th ro u g h legal a n d social change. C learly Ro­
m a n law did n o t g u a ra n te e eq u a lity in a m o d ern sense, b u t th is is no t a n
in te re stin g question. R om an law h a s to be view ed as a n elem e n t of a n
an c ie n t world. A v ery in te re stin g elem ent, as it co n tin u ed evolving in la te r
ce n tu ries, beyond th e existence of th e sta te , w hich cre a te d it.
T his p a p e r is c o n c en tratin g on th e , so-called, p illa rs of th e N apoleonic
C ode1, i.e. concept of property, freedom of co n tract, a n d th e g en e ral clause of
1 J. Gordley, M yths o f the French C ivil Code, “American Journal of Comparative Law”
1994, no. 42, p. 459.
J a ku b J. Szczerbow ski
44
liab ility in delict. It is th ere fo re u sefu l to analy ze th e o rig in ality of those
concepts, a n d th e am o u n t of influence R om an law h a d in th e ir creation. By
th is in d ire c t m ean s it is possible to asse ss w h e th e r th e R om an law w as
p ro m o tin g equality. T he te x t does no t an aly ze th e in s titu tio n of m a rria g e , or
th e o th e r asp ects of fam ily law. L aw of property, law of c o n tra ct a n d th e law
of delict are also in te re stin g for th e q u estio n s th e y an sw e r are sim ple, y et
th e a n sw e rs a re com plex. J u s t like in m a th e m a tic s th e m ost b e a u tifu l p ro ­
b lem s a re sim ply s ta te d b u t difficult to solve. F am ous F e rm a t’s L a st T h e­
orem could be w ritte n in one lin e2, b u t proof of it elu d ed m a th e m a tic ia n s for
ce n tu ries. L ikew ise, property, c o n tra ct a n d to rt a sk sim ilarly sim ple q u ­
estio n s b u t th e an sw ers elude law yers for m illen n ia. P ro p e rty law is th e re to
an sw er: W h a t resources should be p riv a te a n d w h a t resources should be
public? W h a t a re th e lim its of exclusive a n d public u se of resources? C on­
tra c t law striv es to an sw e r q u estio n s such as: W h a t prom ises b etw een in d iv i­
d u als deserve enforcem ent by th e s ta te ? L aw of delict is concerned w ith the
q u estio n : How to m inim ize th e social cost of accidents a n d in te n tio n a l in ju ­
ries to body, m ind, a n d resources? Those qu estio n s w hile sim ple in w ording
are ex trem ely difficult to answ er.
1. S om e h is to r ic a l rem ark s
It is o ften said, t h a t every law y e r looks a t th e law by th e p rism of the
firs t leg al sy stem he learn s. T his problem w as no t alien to th e d ra fte rs of th e
N apoleonic Code. S hould th e y gone th e w ay of re c re a tin g th e in stitu tio n s
from th e b eg in n in g th ey w ould, m ost probably, still en d up tra n s la tin g th e
re v o lu tio n ary concepts into th e dogm atic of iu s com m une. If th e y w ere to
c re a te th e sy stem of p riv a te law from com pletely ex nihilo, th e n som e of th e
a n sw e rs R om an law gave to th e qu estio n s above. Some of th e an sw e rs w ere
incom patible w ith th e rev o lu tio n ary sp irit, b u t m ost of th e w ere valuable,
one w ould be te m p te d to say tru e , solutions to th e problem s of in te ra c tio n s
b etw e en actors of society.
T he Code Civil did n o t sh are th e s p irit of F re n c h R evolution for the
above reaso n s. A t th e tim e of th e d ra ftin g of th e Code th e te rrito ry of F ran ce
w as divided am ong v ario u s leg al system s. T he law in th e so u th of F ran ce
w as b ase d larg e ly on th e recep tio n of R om an law. R om an law w as th erefo re
n o t a n alien elem e n t in th e d ra ftin g process. The n o rth of F ran ce used
a v a rie ty of cu sto m ary law s, w ith th e Com m on L aw of P a ris as a m ost
p ro m in e n t ex am p le3.
2 It states that no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation
an + bn = cn for n > 2.
3 E. Stankovic, Influence o f R om an Law on N apoleon’s Code Civil, “Fundamina” 2005,
no. 11, p. 310.
R om an law as an in stru m en t for prom oting equality in the Napoleonic Code
45
T his division b etw e en two p a rts of F ran c e c re a te d a perceived n eed for
unification. T he F re n c h R evolution proved to be a h isto rical m om ent w hen
u n ificatio n w as possible. E quality, lib erty a n d fra te rn ity w ere th e values
aim ed to provide a n in d iv id u al w ith a fram ew ork to p u rsu e h ap p in ess in any
m an n er, re s tra in e d only by n eg ativ ely s ta te d p rinciples of society. T he revo­
lu tio n a ry v alu es w ere supposed to m ake it into th e Code, as it is difficult to
im ag in e th e rev o lu tio n ary v alu es come to life w ith o u t a p riv a te law, w hich
w ould e n sh rin e a n d p ro tec t them .
2. O bject a n d lim its o f p ro p erty rig h ts
T he R om an law of p ro p e rty ca n n o t be easily divided to th e p ro p e rty of
people a n d th e p ro p e rty of th in g s. T he division serves only to clarify th e
problem from th e m o d ern perspective. O n th e o th e r h an d s, R om ans w ere
perfectly aw are t h a t slaves are people. F o r R om an law slavery did no t m ean
th e red u ctio n of slaves to in a n im a te objects, or th e ir tre a tm e n t as anim als.
F o r R om an law slaves re m a in e d h u m a n s, a n d i t show s in th e legal sources,
e.g. th e In s titu tio n s of G aius m en tio n s slaves in th e c h a p te r ab o u t persons.
2.1. Slavery
T he R om ans did no t in v en t th e concept of slave ow nership. M any a n ­
cien t civilizations re lie d on slav ery as a n im p o rta n t p a r t of a n economic
system . Som e argue, th a t w hile h u m a n s are n o t subject to p ro p e rty rig h ts in
m o d ern system , econom ically m an y of th e social classes still play th e role of
slaves, h a v in g m in im al w ages a n d n o t being ow ners of th e h ousing they
occupy. T his opinions show, t h a t th e concept of slav ery h a s a n o rm ativ e lay er
a n d a n econom ic layer. It is th ere fo re n ec essary to exam ine b o th aspects
w hile th in k in g ab o u t R om an slavery.
F irstly i t is n ecessary to exam ine th e source of slaves in th e an c ie n t
Rome. As in m an y an c ie n t societies slaves w ere c a p tu re d d u rin g w a r4. Only
in la te r period a s u b s ta n tia l p a r t of slaves w ere th e d esc en d an ts of o th e r
slaves. T he ow ner could free a slave, a n d u su ally he w ould no t n eed any
p e rm it from th e a u th o ritie s. T his s ta n d s com pletely in co n trad ictio n w ith
m ore m o d ern system s of slavery. T his is u su a lly cau sed by th e connection
m ade b etw een race a n d social sta tu s. This association m ade it necessary to
lim it m an u m issions in legal system s such as L ouisiana. T he connection betw e­
en race a n d slave s ta tu s w as even pronounced by a presum ption. The S uperior
C ourt of th e te rrito ry of O rleans decided in Adele v. B eau reg ard (1809) th a t
4 J. Kelleher Schafer, R om an Roots o f the Louisiana Law o f Slavery: E m ancipation in
Am erican Louisiana, 1803-1857 , “Louisiana Law Review” 1996-1995, no. 56, p. 410.
J a ku b J. Szczerbow ski
46
M u latto es w ere p re su m e d to be free a n d N egroes w ere p re su m e d to be
slav es5. T his p re su m p tio n m ak es th e th e n A m erican law m u ch h a r s h e r th a n
th e R om an law, w here th e p re su m p tio n of freedom w as th e rule.
A n o th er im p o rta n t difference w as th e k in d of w orks done by th e slaves
in Rom e vs. th e slav ery of th e re c e n t cen tu ries. R om an slaves often w orked
as a rtis a n s , teac h ers, m u sician s etc. T his im plied, th a t th e s ta tu s of slave
w as n o t n ecessarily in d icativ e of m e n ta l deficits. A gain, q u ite c o n tra ry to the
law s of N o rth A m erica, w here slav ery w as b ase d on th e assu m p tio n th a t race
in d icates m e n ta l capacity, to th e point w here som e s ta te s en a cted leg islatio n
p ro h ib itin g ed u catio n of th e slav es6.
It is th ere fo re ju stifie d to say, th a t R om an law w as no t a ju stific a tio n for
m o d ern s sy stem s of slavery. T he R om an sy stem of slav ery w as j u s t in d ic a ti­
ve of th e a n c ie n t economy; th e y ju s t did no t develop th e u n d e rsta n d in g of
th e econom ics of labor, w hich allow ed for th e developm ent of eth ica l fra m e ­
w ork flow ing from th e re a liz a tio n t h a t slav ery is n o t a n econom ic necessity.
2.2. Property o f things
A rt. 544 of Code Civil is one of th e m ost often cited definitions of p ro p e r­
ty in th e w hole of legal history. It ex p resses a n in d iv id u a listic approach,
w hich en ab les th e ow ner to do w h a te v e r h e p leases w ith a th in g , u n less it is
c o n tra ry to law s or re g u la tio n s7. T his ap p ro ach is a g en e raliza tio n of the
ru le s, w hich form ed th e law of th in g s in th e a n c ie n t R om an law, a n d w as
a lre a d y fully developed in th e definition of B arto lu s, d o m u n i u m e s t i u s d e re
c o r p o r a li p e r f e c t e d i s p o n e n d i n i s i le g e p r o h i b e a t u r . T he w orks of B arto lu s are
j u s t a developm ent of R om an law feel for property, a conjecture on a p ro b a­
ble d efin itio n of th e concept in antiquity. It is often said R om ans did not
develop th e d efinition of p ro p e rty b u t it is m ore precise to say, t h a t th e
scarce sources of law th a t re m a in do not co n tain su ch a definition.
T he R om an law of p ro p e rty laid base to th e m o d ern th in k in g ab o u t it. In
th e classical R om an law th e re ex isted tw o k in d s of property, one “tr u e ”
p roperty, a n d th e o th e r “in bo n u m ” property. T he division d isa p p e a re d in th e
la te r law a n d th e re su ltin g sin g u la r p ro p e rty is th e so rt, w hich is in tu itiv ely
u n d ersto o d by us. D ifferent kinds of pro p erty are not alien to recen t legal
system s. A lthough we th in k of pro p erty as u n ita ry concept th e re exist m any
sim ilarities to th e R om an dual property. F or exam ple, th e ability of foreign
n atio n als in P oland to acquire la n d is g re atly lim ited. T he ru les w hich govern
th e process of such acquisition belong to th e re alm of ad m in istrativ e law,
however, functionally it is h a rd to reduce property rig h ts to a single definition.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem, p. 411.
7 J. Gordley, op. cit., p. 462.
R om an law as an in stru m en t for prom oting equality in the Napoleonic Code
47
The m a in developm ent of R om an law w as to s e p a ra te p ro p erty from
possession, a non-obvious trick , w hich m ade it possible to th in k of p ro p erty
as a rig h t a n d no t as a th in g . A n o th er a b stra c tio n w as th e concept of re s tric ­
te d p ro p e rty rig h ts, a n d in consequence - im proved econom ic flexibility of
th e concept of property. T his flexibility is often u n d e ra p p re c ia te d in th e
discussions ab out freedom a n d equality. R om an law u n d ersto o d p ro p e rty as
a tech n ical concept, no t as a political sta te m e n t. B eing a tech n ical (legal)
concept, p ro p e rty could be ad o p ted to th e conceptual n e t of th e Age of E n li­
g h ten m en t.
3. B o u n d a ries o f th e la w o f d e lic t
The law of delict in th e N apoleonic Code is m ost fam ous for its a rt.
13828. It is a g en e ral clause of liab ility in delict, a n d it im poses liab ility
b ase d on th re e p illars: fa u lt, ca u sa lity a n d h arm . T he n o rm of th e a rt. 1382
is a g en e raliza tio n of lex A quilia. R om ans u sed w ords delictum a n d m aleficium to signify a n illicit act. T he m ost im p o rta n t category of delict w as
co n tain ed in lex A quilia, w hich re g u la te d d e stru c tio n a n d h a rm done to
a th in g , in clu d ing slaves a n d an im als. Lex A quilia developed th e concept of
connecting th e am o u n t of dam ages w ith th e e x te n t of h arm . According to
Z im m erm an n , it w as a t th e tim e, th e m ost im p o rta n t law in th e an cien t
Rom e9.
The firs t c h a p te r of lex A qulia provided action for killing of a slave or a n
an im al: G. 3.210. D a m n i i n i u r i a e a c ti o c o n s t i t u i t u r p e r le g e m A q u i l i a m , c u i u s
p r i m o c a p i t e c a u t u m e s t, u t s i q u i s h o m i n e m a l i e n u m a l i e n a m v . q u a d r u p e dem quae pecudum
n u m e r o s i t i n i u r i a o c c id e r it, q u a n t i e a r e s i n eo a n n o
p l u r i m i f u e r i t , t a n t u m d o m i n o d a r e d a m n e t u r . It provides a ru le for a ss e s­
sing v alu e of th e destroyed th in g , w hich g u a ra n te e s t h a t th e ow ner can buy
a sim ila r th in g for th e dam ages.
The th ird c h a p te r of lex A quilia is even m ore im p o rta n t historically, it
allow ed for fu rth e r g en e raliza tio n s, a n d finally form ation of th e g en e ral
clause of th e a rt. 1382: D. 9.2.27.5 U lp ian u s 18 ad ed. T e r tio a u t e m c a p i t e a i t
e a d e m le x a q u i l i a : “c e t e r a r u m r e r u m p r a e t e r h o m i n e m e t p e c u d e m o c c is o s s i
q u is a lte r i d a m n u m fa x it, q u o d u s s e r it fr e g e r it r u p e r it in iu r ia , q u a n ti ea res
e r i t i n d i e b u s t r i g i n t a p r o x i m i s , t a n t u m a e s d o m i n o d a r e d a m n a s e s t o ”. The
th ird c h a p te r w as subject to la te r in te rp re ta tio n a n d allow ed for c reatio n of
new ty p es of liability. A lready in th e classical period, lex A qulia w as u sed to
8 Article 1382: Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause a autrui un dommage, oblige
celui par la faute duquel il est arrive a le reparer.
9 R. Zimmermann, The Law o f Obligations, Oxford University Press, New York 1996,
p. 953.
48
J a ku b J. Szczerbow ski
c re a te liab ility for w h a t we call today p u re econom ic loss. In th e frag m en t of
U lp ia n a n action is given to a n ow ner of a flat, who suffers loss b ecau se of
a th ird p a rty com m itting a delict for w hich he is liable: D. 9.3.5.4 U lp ian u s
23 ad ed. C u m a u t e m le g is a q u i l i a e a c ti o n e p r o p t e r h o c q u i s c o n d e m n a t u s e st,
m e r i t o ei, q u i o b h o c , q u o d h o s p e s v e l q u i s a l i u s d e c e n a c u l o d e ie c it, i n f a c t u m
d a n d a m e s s e la b e o d i c i t a d v e r s u s d e ie c to r e m , q u o d v e r u m e s t. p l a n e s i lo c a v e r a t d e ie c to r i, e t i a m e x lo c a to h a b e b i t a c ti o n e m .
T he co n tem p o rary law of delict, g re a tly in flu en ced by th e lex A quilia,
developed along th e lines of R om an cases. A lthough o th e r c u ltu re s m u st
h av e h a d th e sam e cases, i t w as th e m eth o d of th in k in g developed by th e
ju ris ts , w hich led to th e elab o ratio n of m odern law of delict. R om ans u n d e r­
stood t h a t th e pu rp o se of th e law of delict is no t only to p u n ish th e to rtfe ­
asor, b u t also to encourage p re cau tio n a t a n a p p ro p ria te level. T he p re c a u ­
tio n elem e n t allow s for th e developm ent of th e doctrines of objective a n d
subjective liab ility form h arm . U n d e rsta n d in g of th e n ecessity to stim u la te
p re cau tio n is a key fe a tu re of th e law of delict. T his fe a tu re allow s us to live
in a society w here accidents h ap p e n b u t, supposedly, th e cost of accidents is
m inim ized.
4. F reed o m o f c o n tra ct
T he g en e ral clause of freedom of co n tra ct is a n in te re stin g in stitu tio n . At
th e tim e of th e e n a c tm e n t of th e N apoleonic Code it w as a new in stitu tio n .
O n th e o th e r h an d , i t w as seen by m an y as a g en e raliza tio n of th e R om an
sy stem of co n tracts. D espite th e v ery b ro a d w ording of th e a rt. 113410, th e
concept of co n tra ct w as c o n stra in e d by th e re q u ire m e n t of causa. T his b a s i­
cally m ean s, t h a t th e p a rtie s to th e co n tra ct n eed to h av e com patible econo­
m ic goals. B u t still, freedom of co n tra ct allow ed for fu rth e r g en e raliza tio n s
tw o h u n d re d y ea rs later, w hen th e d ra fte rs of th e D ra ft Com m on F ra m e of
R eference decided t h a t th e re q u ire m e n t of ca u sa is no t necessary, i t w ould be
sufficient to a sc e rta in t h a t th e p a rtie s ag reed on a c e rta in co n ten t of th e
c o n tra ct a n d t h a t th ey w a n t to, or can re aso n ab ly be expected to w a n t to
e n te r in to a legally b in d in g re latio n sh ip .
D esp ite a new w ay of th in k in g ab o u t co n tracts, w hich cam e from th e
school of n a tu r a l law, i t is difficult to overlook th e influence R om an law h ad
a t th e sy stem of co n tracts co n tain ed in th e N apoleonic Code. T he m ain
a rg u m e n t is, t h a t th e freedom of co n tra ct is no t n ecessary for a sy stem of
10 Article 1134: Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont
faites. Elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou pour les causes
que la loi autorise. Elles doivent être exécutées de bonne foi.
R om an law as an in stru m en t for prom oting equality in the Napoleonic Code
49
co n tracts to prom ote freedom a n d equality. F reedom of co n tra ct m ean s the
legal sy stem s accepts aty p ical prom ises as v alid co n tracts. T his h a s not
re ally m u ch to do w ith freedom a n d its positive associations. In fact, freedom
of co n tra ct does no t n eed to be explicit. It can be h id d en in a different
dogm atic. T he R om ans from a v ery e a rly stag e h a d a u n ila te ra l co n tract
called stip u la tio n . U n d e r th is co n tra ct a n obligation to perform an y conside­
ra tio n could be created . M ost of th e econom ic re s u lts of la te r co n tra cts could
be achieved by two co n tra ry stip u la tio n s, e.g. one p a rty stip u la te s to give
a c e rta in am o u n t of money, a n o th e r p a rty s tip u la te s to give a c e rta in thing.
T his, of course, did no t solve all th e problem s re la te d to th e d etails of such
tra n sa c tio n , however, stip u la tio n provided a lot of e la sticity to th e R om an
law of con tract. A n o th er developm ent of in R om an law w as th e g ra d u a l
in stitu tio n a liz a tio n of p acts, i.e. inform al agreem ents.
C o n clu sio n s
It is difficult to conclude w h e th e r th e R om an law prom oted eq u a lity in
h isto rical perspective, however, I th in k th e g en e raliza tio n s of R om an in s titu ­
tions w here n o t prom oting e q u a lity to th e sam e e x te n t th e original did.
M any in d icate th e Age of E n lig h te n m e n t as th e m ost in flu e n tia l period w hen
it com es to pro m oting e q u a lity b u t still, th e e q u a lity cam e a t g re a t price. The
bloody rev o lu tion allegedly led to two w orld w ars. R om an law is b lam ed for
n o t abo lish in g slav ery b u t its defenders claim , th a t it w as u n th in k a b le in
A ntiquity. T his defense is no t convincing because it is easy to say a fte r the
fact t h a t th e in te lle c tu a l clim ate forbade th e change to hap p en . If th e F ren c h
revolution failed, some w ould come to th e sam e conclusion as th e y did w ith
th e R om an law. T his is p u re ly tautological. The defense of R om an law should
be b ase d on th e re le v an t issues. Those re le v an t in s titu tio n s are those, w hich
create th e conceptual b asis for a stable economic system .
One fe a tu re of R om an law w hich w as no t re ta in e d by th e codification
m ovem ent, a n d I th in k it is a m ost re g re tta b le fact, is th e ju ris tic m ethod
w hich allow ed for creatio n of th e w onderful rules of R om an su b sta n tiv e law.
The ju ris tic m ethod w as developed by elim in a tio n of m oral a n d p erso n al
arg u m e n ts from legal d iscourse11. T his om ission is one of th e m ost in flu e n ­
tia l facto rs sh ap in g th e legal system s of co n tin e n ta l E urope a n d o th e r legal
sy stem u n d e r th e ir influence.
11 T. Giaro, Knowledge o f Law as Knowledge o f Facts. The R om an Experience, [in:]
T. Giaro (ed.), Rom an Law a n d Legal Knowledge. Studies in Memory o f H enryk Kupiszewski,
University of Warsaw, Warszawa 2011, p. 215.
50
J a ku b J. Szczerbow ski
R esu m en
D erecho R om ano com o h erra m ien ta p a r a la prom ocion
de u g u a ld a d en el Codigo de N apoleon
Palabras clave: Derecho Romano, la igualdad, el código napoleónico, la economfa del derecho
privado.
El Código Napoleónico fue preparado en un perfodo de cambio social tumultuosa.
Nuevos conceptos y radical de la sociedad se transforman en realidad, entre otros, los
medios de la reforma legislativa. Curiosamente, en la época de la Revolución Francesa
hubo un “jugador” que no encaja en la imagen: el derecho romano. Era antigua, una
palabra despreciado por los revolucionarios. Permitió mantener los esclavos. ^Cómo es
entonces que la ley de los romanos sobrevivió en las normas del Código de Napoleón?
El papel del derecho romano derivado de sus instituciones, en especial de la ley de
propiedad y el derecho de las obligaciones. Los conceptos de posesión, propiedad,
derechos reales limitados, el contrato, la solidaridad, la responsabilidad en materia
delictual etc. resultaron tan util que seria muy poco prâctico para reinventar los conceptos de cumplir un capricho.
S tr e sz c z e n ie
P ra w o rzym skie ja k o n a rzęd zie p ro p a g o w a n ia rów ności
w K odeksie N apoleon a
S3owa kluczowe: prawo rzymskie, Kodeks Napoleona, ekonomia prawa prywatnego.
Kodeks Napoleona powstawał w okresie burzliwych zmian społecznych. Nowe
i radykalne koncepcje społeczeństwa zostały wprowadzone w życie za pomocą m.in.
reform prawnych. Co ciekawe, w okresie rewolucji francuskiej istniał jeden czynnik,
który nie wpisywał się w ogólny obraz sytuacji - prawo rzymskie, zezwalające np. na
posiadanie niewolników. Było ono „antyczne”, a samym tym słowem rewolucjoniści
pogardzali. Jak zatem doszło do tego, że przetrwało w normach Kodeksu Napoleoń­
skiego? Siła prawa rzymskiego bierze się z jego instytucji, zwłaszcza tych wykształco­
nych na gruncie prawa rzeczowego i prawa zobowiązań. Koncepcje posiadania, wła­
sności, ograniczonych praw rzeczowych, kontraktów, solidarności, odpowiedzialności
deliktowej itp. okazały się tak użyteczne, że byłoby skrajnie niepraktyczne opisywanie
ich na nowo tylko w tym celu, aby zaspokoić kaprysy ideologii.