Diminishing Importance:
Historians’ Evolving Views on Yellow Journalism and the Causes of the Spanish-American War
Jacob Kolodny
History 297
Professor Ferrell
November 18, 2016
Abstract
When historians first began writing in the 1930s about what role yellow journalism played in the
events leading up the Spanish-American War, most agreed with the prevailing idea that yellow
journalism played a key role in causing the war. By the 1960s W. A. Swanberg shifted the focus
from the role of yellow journalism generally to the roles of the men who ran the yellow
newspapers. He wrote biographies about Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst that
furthered the idea it was Hearst who was primarily responsible with starting the war. At the same
time scholars began to write works that questioned the role of yellow journalism. But it was not
until 2001 that a work was released that defined the increasingly accepted idea that yellow
journalism did not cause the war.
Kolodny 1
The 1895 war of Cuban independence came at an incredibly opportune moment for the
newspapermen of New York City, as the battle between William Randolph Hearst’s New York
Journal and Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World had rapidly escalated. Hearst, by this point, had
hired numerous employees right from under the World. Through low newspaper prices and by
copying and further exaggerating the sensationalist journalism used by the World, the Journal
quickly attained almost an equal circulation. The Journal’s success resulted in the World and
other New York newspapers further exaggerate their sensationalism as well. Given the exciting
nature of war, it would make sense that these newspapers would extensively cover it using the
same techniques of exaggeration they had developed in their competition with one another.
The fact that many New York newspapers at the time engaged in incredibly sensationalist
journalism, or yellow journalism, with regards to the events leading up the Spanish-America War
is not particularly contentious among scholars. Almost all scholars agree that the stories
published by newspapers like the World and Journal often either exaggerated the events that
took place in Cuba or made them up entirely, with the intent to cause outrage at the actions of the
Spanish and support the cause of the Cubans. There has been a debate however, between earlier
scholars who argue that yellow journalism played a key role in causing the Spanish-American
War and later historians who argue that yellow journalism had very little or nothing to do with
the actual causes for the war.
Accordingly, only the early works were dedicated solely to yellow journalism and its
influence on the causes of the Spanish-American War. Much of the literature that even mentions
the topic is either focused on yellow journalism or on yellow journalists. Those books that do
focus on the role yellow journalism played in the lead up to the war with Spain were also the
ones that argued the importance of yellow journalism or the importance of the men in charge of
Kolodny 2
the newspapers that printed it. Later studies that focus more on the overall importance of yellow
journalism or the journalists themselves are also the ones that argued against the importance of
yellow journalism in causing the war.
The first of the books written solely about yellow journalism and its role in causing the
war was historian Marcus M. Wilkerson’s 1932 study Public Opinion and the Spanish-American
War. It was written as a response to Wilkerson’s belief that historians spent too little time
discussing the importance yellow journalism had regarding the Spanish-American War.
Wilkerson, who like many of the authors of the books regarding yellow journalism was himself a
journalist at one point, argues that “the American press played a large part in leading the United
States into a war with Spain” as it helped to influence the overall public until most people were
in favor of a war.1 Wilkerson’s belief that yellow journalism had been somewhat ignored did not
mean that historians thought that yellow journalism did not play a significant part in causing the
war, but rather the opposite. Reviews written about his book show that it was the widely held
theory when the book was published, with one review even criticizing him for not being that
original in his argument.2 The fact Wilkerson did not have that original an argument did not
mean that his book was not important with regard to the topic, as his book serves as a reference
for much of the literature that came afterwards due to his extensive use of primary sources such
as newspaper articles and government documents when making his argument.
Marcus M. Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War (New York:
Russel & Russell, 1932), 2.
1
2
Walter Millis, review of Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War: A Study in
War Propaganda, by Marcus M. Wilkerson, Journal of Modern History 5 (September 1933):
408-09; Elbert J. Benton, review of Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War: A Study in
War Propaganda, by Marcus M. Wilkerson, Mississippi Valley Historical Review 20 (June
1933): 159-60.
Kolodny 3
Two years later historian Joseph E. Wisan made a similar argument Wilkerson in his
1934 book The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898) but further
narrows down the blame for the war by arguing that it was Hearst who was its primary cause.
Wisan argues that if Hearst had never appeared on the New York newspaper scene then most of
the newspapers would not have devolved to publishing incredibly exaggerated stories about the
conflict in Cuba, meaning the public would not have demanded war as strongly as it did.3
However, even though Wisan uses the same newspapers and government documents as
Wilkerson to show how the press was involved in starting the war, Wisan’s argument that Hearst
was central to causing the war was “unproved and incapable of proof.” 4 The fact that Wisan’s
book was not heavily criticized for this lack of evidence was due to how widely accepted the
argument was when Wisan conducted his study. This is a huge problem for the literature, as
when later works use the same argument Wisan makes, the authors cite Wisan’s work. Since
Wisan does not provide any real evidence for his claims on Hearst, this means that those later
works that use Wisan as their only source do not have any evidence for their argument as well.
These historical studies were not the only ones done on yellow journalism. There were
also biographies written about Hearst and Pulitzer, and given their central role in causing the
circulation war between the World and the Journal it is no wonder that their biographers would
mention their impact on the causes for war.5 It was not until after Hearst’s death in 1951 that a
3
Joseph E. Wisan, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898)
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), 458.
Julius W. Pratt, review of The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (18951898), by Joseph E. Wisan, Mississippi Valley Historical Review 22 (1935): 127.
4
5
See James Wyman Barrett, Joseph Pulitzer and His World (New York: Vanguard Press,
1941) and Ferdinand Lundberg, Imperial Hearst (New York: Equinox Cooperative Press, 1936).
Kolodny 4
biography about him had the same level of importance as the works of Wisan and Wilkerson was
written by W. A. Swanberg, who's career prior to writing biographies was that of a newspaper
editor turned freelance writer. In his 1961 book Citizen Hearst Swanberg argues that Hearst was
man full of contradictions, so many in fact that it was almost as if he had two completely
different personalities altogether, with one always seeking “to gratify his overwhelming passions
for wealth, power and position” while the other was forever sympathetic to needs, wants, and
desires of almost everyone. 6
It is this argument that plays a key role in Swanberg’s view on Hearst and his
involvement in causing the war with Spain. Swanberg agrees with Wisan's argument that if it
was not for Hearst chances were that the war would have never happened. Unlike Wisan,
Swanberg further elaborates on the reasons for Hearst’s interest in not only covering the Cuban
revolution, but also directly supporting it. Swanberg argues that it was a combination of the two
sides of Hearst that made him lead the charge in demanding a war with Spain. One side saw the
situation in Cuba as source of thrilling stories that would allow the Journal to gain an advantage
over the World and other rival newspapers. The other genuinely sympathized with the plight of
the Cuban people and sought to help them in a variety of ways, whether that meant gifting one of
the Cuban commanders a jeweled sword or funding an attempt to rescue a Cuban revolutionary
held in prison.7 Swanberg's relies heavily on the works of Wilkerson and Wisan when writing
about the events leading up to the Spanish-American War, which would explain why Swanberg's
argument is so similar to the one made by Wisan in his book. This is a huge problem for the
6
W. A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961), 526.
7
Swanberg, 526.
Kolodny 5
literature, for as stated earlier Wisan did not really provide support for his argument made about
Hearst’s involvement in starting the war. The fact Swanberg did not question Wisan’s argument
can be explained by the fact that Swanberg himself did not view his work as being definitive. 8
Swanberg was not writing his biography as a scholarly work as he had neither the background
nor the desire to do so, meaning it would make sense that he did not feel the need to question the
works that came before him. But the fact that the book proved to be fairly successful meant that
it would be years before anyone reexamined the life of Hearst, meaning Swanberg’s unsupported
argument would not be questioned for a while. 9
Swanberg's later 1967 book Pulitzer repeats many of the same arguments made in Citizen
Hearst about the press’s role in causing the war, again saying that Hearst was the main cause for
the war due to the tactics he used when competing against Pulitzer’s dominance in the New York
newspaper scene. 10 This does not mean that Pulitzer did not play a role, however, as Swanberg
points out that many of the techniques used by Hearst and the Journal had been pioneered by
Pulitzer and the World. And if it had not been because of the fierce competition from Hearst
Pulitzer would have never allowed his newspapers to exaggerate and sensationalize the events
leading up to the war as much as they did. Swanberg had no doubt that Pulitzer's newspapers
would published articles sympathetic to the Cuban cause, as Pulitzer had sympathy with the
Cubans years before Hearst even came to New York. Swanberg merely concludes that the
coverage would just not have been nearly as hostile to the Spanish. But the fact that the overall
8
Swanberg, 538.
George Juergens, review of Pulitzer, by W. A. Swanberg, American Literature 40 (May
1968): 246.
9
10
W. A. Swanberg, Pulitzer (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967).
Kolodny 6
argument for the press’ involvement in causing the war is so similar to the one Swanberg makes
in Citizen Hearst is no surprise. Swanberg again makes use of Wisan’s and Wilkerson's works,
but additionally makes extensive references to Citizen Hearst itself. The fact that Swanberg
relies solely on Wisan’s and his own work when writing about Pulitzer and his involvement in
the lead up to the war means that again there is no real evidence for his argument. Pulitzer is
similar to Citizen Hearst in another way, as Pulitzer is also authoritative biography and
successful at what it set out to do that it was years before another biography. 11
Pulitzer was not the only work that discussed yellow journalism and the events leading
up to the Spanish-American War that came out in 1967, as that was the same year that Charles H.
Brown's The Correspondents' War: Journalist in the Spanish-American War was published.
Brown's book is distinctly different than the previously mentioned works for two reasons, the
first being that The Correspondents' War is about the lives of those journalists who covered the
events in Cuba from the start of the rebellion to the end of the war and not about the press overall
or lives of those men in charge of the newspapers. The second difference is that unlike the
previous works which all argue that the press played a crucial role in causing the war, Brown
argues that the true causes for the war lay in the "spirit of the times." 12 Brown believes that even
without the yellow press to encourage a war public opinion would have still demanded it and
congress would have still be in favor of it. He also points out that studies about public opinion
from around the time the book was written help to show that "it is not the easily malleable thing
postulated by those who see a simple answer to the question" of what caused the war with
11
12
Juergens, 246.
Charles H. Brown, The Correspondents' War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1967), 443.
Kolodny 7
Spain.13 However, Brown repeats the mistake of Wisan and never actually backs up this
argument in his book and was severely criticized for this lack of evidence. 14 The same review
that criticized him by George Juergens in fact agrees with the arguments made in the book but
says that due to the lack of evidence and other problems such as Brown's romanticization of the
actions of journalists left "much still to be done". 15
Not until 1989 was the role that journalists played in the coverage before and during the
war would be examined again with the release of Joyce Milton's work The Yellow Kids: Foreign
Correspondents in the Heyday of Yellow Journalism. 16 Milton's work “set out to reexamine the
role of the yellow kid correspondents in Cuba.” 17 This may have been a reference to the
problems of The Correspondents’ War given that it was the only work that Milton uses that focus
on explaining the role of journalists. The role of journalists is not the only thing that Milton
reexamines, as she also reexamines the supposed causes for the war. To Milton, the key turning
point was the court report issued after the destruction of the USS Maine which stated that “the
Maine had been destroyed by a submarine mine.”18 But the report did not further elaborate on
who could have done it, what kind of mine could have accomplished the task, or how it would
13
Brown, 443.
14
George Juergens, review of The Correspondent's War: Journalists in the SpanishAmerican War, by Charles H. Brown, Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 693.
15
Juergens, 692-93.
16
Joyce Milton, The Yellow Kids: Foreign Correspondents in the Heyday of Yellow
Journalism (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).
17
Milton, xvii.
18
Milton, 232.
Kolodny 8
have been used. Without any definitive answer as to who had actually destroyed the Maine,
blame automatically shifted to the Spanish, making the war inevitable as it gave the War Hawks
and Cuban sympathies in Congress the perfect excuse to declare war. 19 Milton also dismisses the
idea that yellow journalists played a role in the destruction of the Maine, which means that in
Milton’s view yellow journalism played no real role in causing the war with Spain. 20 Milton
ultimately succeeds in her goal of reexamining the role of journalists, with her work being called
by one reviewer “an invaluable contribution to the literature of the history of journalism.”21 By
reexamining the role of journalists, Milton also succeeds in reexamining the role of yellow
journalism in causing the war.
Still, no book truly attempted to thoroughly dispute the arguments made by the earlier
authors until W. Joseph Campbell’s 2001 work Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths,
Defining the Legacies.22 Like Milton’s work Yellow Journalism is also reexamination, but unlike
The Yellow Kids Campbell’s book reexamines the origins of yellow journalism as well as the
mythology and legacy of it. Campbell does this because he sees that most of the works about
yellow journalism were biographies that “[leave] a significant gap in the literature” which he
tries to address in his book.23 With a focus on mythology and legacy, it is no wonder that a large
19
Milton, 242.
20
Milton, 232-34.
Hazel Dicken-Garcia, review of The Yellow Kids: Foreign Correspondents in the
Heyday of Yellow Journalism, by Joyce Milton, Journal of American History 77 (September
1990): 693.
22
W. Joseph Campbell, Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001).
21
23
Campbell, 13.
Kolodny 9
part of Yellow Journalism is dedicated to looking at yellow journalism and its involvement in the
Spanish-American War. Campbell takes aim specifically at the arguments of Wisan, Wilkerson,
and Swanberg, arguing that the war was “the result of a convergence of forces far beyond the
control or direct influence of even the most aggressive newspapers.” 24 To dispute the arguments
made by his predecessors, Campbell makes extensive use of the Journal and other newspapers as
well as more recent studies about the diplomatic situation between Spain and the United States
before the start of the war. This is to show that not only were the yellow newspapers not as
focused on Cuba as previously indicated, but also failed to influence other major events from the
time period like the 1897 New York mayoral election, or government policy decisions. The
rivalry of the yellow journals also meant that newspapers would often either ignore major stories
from other papers or try to discredit them. These and several other points all help to call into
question those earlier authors’ arguments. 25 Of all the newer works that argue that yellow
journalism did not cause the Spanish-American War, Campbell’s is by far the most thought out
and well supported, clearly succeeding in casting doubt on the earlier narratives.
When Campbell made his argument against those early historians, the fact that his
primary source of information was the yellow newspapers themselves change in thinking attests
to the change in thinking that had taken place between when the first works on the topic were
being published and the turn of the millennium. Those first historians and biographers writing
about the topic did not really question the general consensus that yellow journalism was key in
starting the Spanish-American War, which culminated in the unsupported narrative that Hearst
24
Campbell, 97.
25
Campbell, 101-23.
Kolodny 10
caused the war. Beginning in the 1960s, as increasingly less importance was placed on figures
and like Hearst and Pulitzer and more on the yellow journalists, historians began to question the
persuasive power of the yellow newspapers portrayed by earlier works. This questioning
culminates in Campbell’s thorough reexamination of yellow journalism. In it his work, Campbell
specifies the problems with earlier arguments made by Swanberg and others and explains why
the argument that yellow press had little to do with the war became more accepted. In the end,
the argument against yellow journalism causing the war proved far more persuasive than the
argument in favor of it, and in doing so raises questions about what were the actual causes for the
war.
I have neither given nor received unauthorized help on this assignment.
Jacob Kolodny
Kolodny 11
Bibliography
Barrett, James Wyman. Joseph Pulitzer and His World. New York: Vanguard Press, 1941.
Benton, Elbert J. Review of Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War: A Study in War
Propaganda, by Marcus M. Wilkerson. Mississippi Valley Historical Review 20 (June
1933): 159-60.
Boothe, Leon E. Review of Pulitzer, by W. A. Swanberg. Journal of Southern History 34 (1968):
138-39.
Brown, Charles H. The Correspondents' War New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967.
Campbell, W. Joseph. Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies.
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001.
Dicken-Garcia, Hazel. Review of The Yellow Kids: Foreign Correspondents in the Heyday of
Yellow Journalism, by Joyce Milton, Journal of American History 77 (September 1990):
692-93.
Juergens, George. Review of The Correspondent's War: Journalists in the Spanish-American
War, by Charles H. Brown. Journal of American History 54 (December 1967): 692-93.
Juergens, George. review of Pulitzer, by W. A. Swanberg. American Literature 40 (May 1968):
246-47.
Lundberg, Ferdinand. Imperial Hearst. New York: Equinox Cooperative Press, 1936.
Millis, Walter. Review of Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War: A Study in War
Propaganda, by Marcus M. Wilkerson. Journal of Modern History 5 (September 1933):
408-09
Milton, Joyce. The Yellow Kids: Foreign Correspondents in the Heyday of Yellow Journalism.
New York: Harper & Row, 1989.
Pauly, John J. Review of Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myth, Defining the Legacies, by W.
Joseph Campbell. Journal of American History 89 (September 2002): 661.
Pratt, Julius W. Review of The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898), by
Joseph E. Wisan. Mississippi Valley Historical Review 22 (1935): 127-28.
Swanberg, W. A. Citizen Hearst. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961.
Swanberg, W. A. Pulitzer. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967.
Kolodny 12
Wilkerson, Marcus M. Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War. New York: Russell &
Russell, 1932.
Wisan, Joseph E. The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898). New York:
Columbia University Press, 1934.