Brigadista: An Analysis of British and US volunteers during the contra war in
Nicaragua
By David Lewis
Student ID – 200597065
School of History, The University of Leeds
1
Contents
Introduction
---
5
Chapter One
Somoza, Revolution and the Contra
---
7
Chapter Two
The Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign and the British Volunteers
---
9
Chapter Three
Harvest and War; the American Volunteers
---
17
Chapter Four
The ‘Independent’ Volunteers
---
23
Chapter Five
Conclusions: The Solidarity Movement’s Legacy
--- 27
2
List of Spanish words and Abbreviations
Brigadista – A member of a brigade.
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.
CND - Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
FDN/Contra - Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense. Nicaraguan Democratic Front.
FMLN – Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacional. Farabundo Martí National Liberation party.
FSLN – Frente Sandinista Liberación Nacional. Sandinista National Liberation Front
Internacionalista – A member of the international community in Nicaragua.
NHF – Nicaragua Health Fund.
NSC – Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign
CSIAR – Centre for the Study and Investigation of the Agrarian Reform.
Guardia Nacional – Nicaragua’s National Guard.
All translations are the authors own.
Foreword taken from America/Sandinista; a film by Jason Blalock.
3
“What right do we have to be down there interfering? None, other than the fact that we
were welcomed by the people whose country it was. What is freedom if you don’t have
the freedom to go out and peacefully work for what you want to do because you believe
it’s a good thing?”
Donald Macleay, an American engineer working alongside Benjamin Linder
in El Cua before he was killed by the Contra.
4
Introduction
Nicaragua, the largest country on the Central American isthmus, has endured a turbulent
recent history. Military intervention, a dynastic dictatorship, revolution and a US-backed
counterinsurgency have all come to pass since the turn of the 20th century. During this civil
war, which began shortly after the successful Sandinista Revolution in 1979 and lasted until
their shock electoral loss of power in 1990, thousands of Left-leaning international volunteers
arrived in Nicaragua as ‘brigadistas.’ Their aims were to aid the struggling economy by
helping a population decimated by decades of oppression and war to bring in the coffee and
cotton harvests, and to raise global awareness and solidarity with Nicaragua. Academic
research has yet to turn its attention to these volunteers, and as such exact numbers of those
who went are hard to come by. It is known, however that volunteers mainly came from the
United States, while many European nations were also well represented.1 For example in the
years 1983 to ’84, 1575 volunteers arrived in Nicaragua, although these figures may be
unusually high due to interest surrounding the 1984 elections.2 Nevertheless, of these over
650 were from the United States, with the others coming from Italy, Germany, France,
Scandinavia and from regional countries such as Mexico.3
Around 850 people visited Nicaragua between 1983 and 1990 on study tours, brigades
and delegations organised by Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign. (NSC). The first two British
coffee brigades, each consisting of 30 people, went to Nicaragua in December 1985. NSC
continued to send on average four coffee, building and environmental brigades a year until
1990. In addition, an unknown number of independent volunteers travelled to Nicaragua
without being part of an official international brigade. These volunteers were never regulated
or counted, making it impossible to posit how many there were, however they are mentioned
in numerous first-hand accounts and so their numbers are likely to have been substantial.
This paper is one of the first to look in detail at the experiences of American
volunteers, and is the first to analyse both the British involvement and the role of independent
volunteers. By using a number of oral histories obtained via interviews with the author, along
with primary literature produced by the NSC and a number of memoirs by American
volunteers, this paper will analyse what motivated them, what their roles were in Nicaragua,
how they were received by Nicaraguans and finally what their legacy has been. Ultimately, it
will argue that their role was of a significant aid to the FSLN, and warrants further academic
study. It will conclude by suggesting ways in which the study can be taken forward. Perhaps
one reason why academic research has yet to focus on this area of history is due to the
limitations inherent to the available sources. The primary source to contribute to this paper is
a series of eighteen interviews with the author. These interviews were set up via the NSC, and
were conducted with volunteers, the majority of whom are British citizens who went on
organised brigades with the NSC to Nicaragua from 1985 until the early 1990’s. Notable
exceptions include one United States citizen who went on an organised brigade with the
1
Jeff Jones (ed.), Brigadista: Harvest and War in Nicaragua (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. xxvii.
Ibid., p. xxvii.
3
Ibid., p. xxvii.
2
5
Nicaragua Network, a similar organisation that organised brigades in the U.S., and two
British citizens who travelled solo to Nicaragua in 1983, before the NSC had begun sending
organised tours. Clearly, these interviews have their limitations. The issues that were
discussed are entirely subjective, and open to personal bias. Plus, at least 25 years has passed
since the event, and there is a strong possibility that some details may have been forgotten, or
have been remembered favourably/unfavourably due to the length of time since the
interviewee volunteered. It should also be said that these interviews cannot claim to be
representative of the hundreds of volunteers who went to Nicaragua; however they can
certainly be seen as a good start to understanding the motivations and experiences of a small
number of people. Furthermore, among these interviews are the views of numerous current
and ex-employees of both the NSC and the Nicaragua Network. These include Stella
Embliss, who has 30 years of experience working for the NSC and Chuck Kaufman, who is
the Co-Coordinator for the Nicaragua Network. These people offer a unique perspective of
the brigades, as they have first-hand experiences of both organising and participating in them.
Still, another limitation presents itself when looking at the primary resources produced by the
NSC as, due to their purpose, they carry a significant bias. They were produced as a means to
encourage solidarity and to present the Sandinista government in as positive a light as
possible. With this in mind they must be regarded with some caution, although they can at
least be deemed reliable as a source of statistical analysis.
To better evaluate the role that foreign volunteers played in the Contra War, it is
imperative to understand the context of the war in Nicaraguan history. For this reason, the
first chapter of this paper is devoted to a short account of the stages leading up to and
including the war.
6
Chapter One
Somoza, Revolution and the Contra
Soon after the beginning of the 20th century, Nicaragua experienced a military intervention by
the United States. The United States would be central throughout Nicaragua’s development,
and their diplomatic relationship with Nicaragua is cited as a major influencing factor for
many of the British and US citizens who volunteered in the brigades of the 1980’s.4 Apart
from setting the foundations for US interest in Nicaragua, another important development
that occurred during the United States’ military occupation was the emergence of Augusto
César Sandino. Between 1927 and 1933 Sandino waged guerrilla warfare against the United
States, commanding a force of up to 3000 soldiers and employing jungle warfare tactics to
evade capture.5 Sandino presented his struggle against the United States as not only being in
defence of Nicaragua, but of Latin America in general. He routinely worked alongside other
Latin American anti-imperialist figures, notably Farabundo Martí of El Salvador. Despite
being massively outnumbered and fighting with rudimentary weaponry, Sandino continued to
oppose U.S. presence in Nicaragua up until their withdrawal in 1933.
The US withdrawal from Nicaragua, mainly due to economic pressures enforced by
the Great Depression, did not end U.S. interests in the country. After overseeing the election
of Juan Bautista Sacasa as president, the US installed the Guardia Nacional (National Guard)
as a military wing of the government. This remained firmly in the control of U.S. officers,
and was run by General Anastasio Somoza García who would later seize the presidency in a
military coup. Sandino recognised Sacasa as president, however remained deeply opposed to
Somoza and the Guardia Nacional due to their links with the United States.6 A year later,
Sandino was assassinated under the direct orders of Somoza in an attempt to consolidate
power amongst senior Guardia Nacional officers.7
By attempting to unite Latin America against US imperialism, Sandino endeared
himself to the Nicaraguan people and to leftist revolutionaries around the world. So much so
that in 1961 the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation
Front) (FSLN) was created in his memory. It was this guerrilla organisation that in 1979
would overthrow the Somoza dynasty and install a radically progressive left-wing
government that promoted literacy, health care and gender equality.8 It was this government
that the British and American volunteers of the 1980’s pledged their support to.
The Somoza family maintained absolute control over Nicaragua for over 40 years. The
family rose to power in 1937, when Anastasio Somoza García used his position as director of
the Guardia Nacional to forcibly remove President Sacasa and install himself as president.9
4
Jones, p. xviii.; Michael Johns, The Education of a Radical: An American Revolutionary in Sandinista
Nicaragua (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), p. 17.
5
Tim Merrill, (ed.), ‘US Intervention, 1909-1933’, in Nicaragua: A Country Study (Washington: Library of
Congress, 1993), p. 2.
6
Ibid., p. 2.
7
‘Nicaragua: Murder at the Crossroads’, Time Magazine, 5 March 1934, p. 3.
8
Robert A. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 24.
9
Thomas W. Walker, ‘Introduction: Revolution in General, Nicaragua to 1984’, in Nicaragua: The First Five
Years (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. 17.
7
Somoza immediately began consolidating his power and increasing his personal wealth at the
expense of the national treasury, and the nation’s poor.10 Furthermore, by 1953 Somoza had
negotiated military, economic and political concessions from the U.S., citing communist
movements in neighbouring Costa Rica and nearby Guatemala as posing threats to Central
American security.11
Following Somoza García’s assassination in 1956, power shifted to his two sons.
They continued to rule Nicaragua as their father had done, until the death of first-born Luis
Somoza in 1967 left sole power to Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Somoza Debayle began a
period of increased corruption and brutality, using his Guardia Nacional to deadly effect to
eliminate political opposition.12 Despite these blatant human rights infringements, Somoza
Debayle was able to cultivate strong friendships with the United States, and in particular with
the State Department.13 Internal opposition to Somoza began to mount during the 1970’s, as
Sandinista operations gained the support of both urban and rural sectors.14 In 1974 Somoza
unleashed a wave of terror upon the population, declaring a state of siege and enforcing a
total crackdown on press censorship. Opposition to Somoza grew steadily over the next 5
years, characterised by repeated instances of opposition and repression, escalating into civil
war, and eventually culminating in the Sandinista victory in 1979.15
After the Sandinista victory, the U.S. initially began a process of rapprochement;
however by 1980 it had become obvious to Washington that the FSLN would not moderate
their Left-wing policies. They began withdrawing support for the Sandinistas and began
funding the largest counterrevolutionary rebel group, the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense
(Nicaraguan Democratic Force) (FDN). In contrast to their name, these rebels aimed to
overthrow the Sandinistas by targeting the economy and terrorising the population. As
Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, U.S. policy in Nicaragua moved further to the
right, and in December 1981 the CIA began covertly providing the Contras with arms,
equipment and money.16 The CIA would continue arming and training the Contras despite
being explicitly banned by Congress. According to Nicaraguan government sources, 30,000
contras, Nicaraguan military personnel and civilians were killed in the war. However, other
sources state that the number to have been around 10,000.17
10
Ibid., p. 17.
Ibid., p. 4.
12
Pastor, p. 36.
13
Ibid., p. 18.
14
Ibid., p. 5.
15
Ibid., p. 20.
16
Ibid., p. 120.
17
Michael Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures,
1500-2000 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co Inc., 2002), p. 323.; Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts: A
Comprehensive Guide to World Strife Since 1945 (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 1999), p. 267.
11
8
Chapter Two
The Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign and the British Volunteers
As the Contra War gained international attention, the NSC grew significantly as opposition to
the U.S. and United Kingdom’s governments spurred anti-imperialist sentiments across the
country. By 1990, NSC had over 60 groups in towns and cities around the British Isles, which
co-ordinated solidarity efforts such as leafleting outside train stations, hosting guest speakers
and promoting the work of previous volunteers.18 Furthermore, these NSC groups were very
important for recruiting new volunteers.19 Potential volunteers were required to pass a
number of stages before being accepted onto a brigade, as they had to demonstrate not just
the physical ability to withstand up to 7 weeks of physical work in extreme conditions, but
also that they were significantly motivated to help the cause.20 This was paramount to the
brigades to successfully maintain the endorsement of the Sandinista government. For the
Sandinistas, the brigades offered an opportunity to promote the message of international
solidarity, and it was hoped that the volunteers would continue to raise awareness and
ultimately grow large enough to influence their government’s policies.21 For this reason, the
NSC promoted the idea of global solidarity from the outset.22
Between the months of November to February the NSC were most active in sending
brigades, as these were the months that the FSLN requested additional hands for the coffee
harvest.23 Coffee is Nicaragua’s largest export, and accounts for almost a fifth of its foreign
exchange earnings.24 Damage left from the revolution, combined with the effort of fighting
the contra forces left Nicaragua’s foreign exports in ruins, as exports fell from $508m in 1981
to $236m in 1988.25 During this time, up to a fifth of the population had to be mobilised for
the army or into militias.26 Particularly affected by this labour shortage was the coffee
harvest, as the areas most cultivated for coffee production are to the north, near the border
with Honduras. This made them the target for Contra groups residing across the border, as
well as being strategically significant to the Contra’s efforts to disrupt the economy.27 The
FSLN’s approach to combatting this labour shortage was to form co-operative farms which,
alongside a small amount of permanent plantation staff, were helped by hundreds of brigades
from the cities. Alongside these urban workers brigades came the internacionalistas. In 1986
it was estimated that 30,000 additional workers were sent to the coffee farms, including up to
18
The authors interview with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15]
The authors interview with Helen Yuill, [04/01/15]
20
The authors interview with Jon Heal, [22/01/15]
21
Johns, p. 89.
22
Dakin, p. 1.
23
Nicaragua Today, 22 (London: Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign, Spring 1986), p. 3.
24
Observatory of Economic Complexity, <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/nic/> [accessed
26/04/15]
25
‘Regional Surveys of the World’, in South America, Central America and the Caribbean, 10 (Kentucky:
Psychology Press, 2001), P. 593.
26
Nicaragua Today, p. 3.
27
Timothy C. Brown, The Real Contra War: Highlander Peasant Resistance in Nicaragua (Oklahoma:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), p. 11.
19
9
1000 international volunteers.28 Once there, the average coffee brigade organised by the NSC
would spend between 2 to 4 weeks on a farm, harvesting coffee.29 There remained a distant
threat of Contra attack; however there were no attacks on farms staffed by NSC brigades
while the international volunteers were there, although numerous volunteers have spoken
about seeing the evidence of fighting in the streets, and nearly all heard stories from their
Nicaraguan colleagues of fighting in nearby areas.30 During this time, the volunteers would
be expected to live like Nicaraguans, waking at 5am to go to the fields whatever the weather,
sleeping with host families and eating only rice and beans three times a day.31 Following their
work on the coffee farms, the brigades would later spend up to a week on a tour of the
country organised by the FSLN. They would be shown evidence of various government
projects including literacy and health campaigns as well as individual projects such as
hydroelectric plants under construction.32
Following the NSC sending coffee brigades in 1986, they later expanded the mission
of their brigades to focus on other methods of providing solidarity when the coffee harvesting
season had ended. In 1987 the NSC began to send environmental brigades, mainly focusing
on reforestation projects but occasionally they would address individual targets, for example
in 1990 they sent a brigade specifically to focus on soil and water conservation.33 These
brigades followed a similar plan to the coffee brigades, as the international volunteers would
spend up to 4 weeks planting trees or digging trenches before being given a tour of nearby
government projects. They were designed to help the environment which had been badly
damaged by deforestation, and to combat the effects of soil erosion.34 In addition to these
brigades, the NSC also worked alongside other organisations such as the Nicaragua Health
Fund (NHF) to help organise more specific tours. These were separate entities to the
brigades, as they tended to be made up of smaller groups of professionals specialising in
areas such as health, trade unions, parliamentary delegations, human rights organisations and
construction groups.35 These groups would be often be run as study tours, allowing groups of
British professionals to see how the Sandinista policies functioned with the intention that they
would spread positive news about them when they returned. This is very different to the
general aims of the brigades, which, although they too were largely concerned with how the
volunteers spread news of the revolution back in Britain, they allowed unskilled people to
contribute to large-scale issues such as helping bring in the coffee harvest, or helping with
reforestation.36
28
Nicaragua Today, p. 3.
The authors interview with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15]
30
The authors interviews with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15], Christopher Baird, [03/02/15], Jon Heal, [22/01/15],
Jane Ferrie, [21/01/15], Gay Lee and Phil Sutcliffe, [30/01/15] and Keith Doyle, [24/02/15]
31
Nicaragua Today, p. 3.
32
The authors interviews with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15], Christopher Baird, [03/02/15], Jon Heal, [22/01/15]
and Keith Doyle, [24/02/15]
29
33
The authors interviews with Shelagh Kavanagh, [08/02/15], Brian Woodward, [28/01/15] and Jon Heal,
[22/01/15]
34
Ibid.
35
The authors interview with Helen Yuill, [04/01/15]
36
The authors interview with Jon Heal, [22/01/15]
10
Nearly every volunteer agreed that despite their best efforts, the British contribution
to the Nicaraguan economy through coffee harvested or reforestation projects completed was
minimal.37 As the vast majority of volunteers had no agricultural experience, and due to many
falling sick from traditional travel sicknesses, they seriously struggled to keep up with their
Nicaraguan counterparts. The extent of the disparity between the international harvest and the
traditional pickers’ harvest was so large that it is questionable whether or not they picked
enough to cover the costs of feeding them.38 Because of this, the most important part of the
volunteers’ work for the FSLN was what they did upon their return to the United Kingdom.
As part of the agreement to take part in one of the brigades, it was often stipulated that the
volunteers would take part in some form of recruitment or awareness campaign once they had
completed the brigade.39 This was accomplished by many different methods; including
newspaper articles, radio interviews, photo exhibitions and public speeches.40 Many who took
part in the brigades would later go on to participate in another, or would seek a more handson role within the NSC.41 Another common aspect of a volunteer’s contribution after
returning home was to help fundraise money or send equipment towards individual projects
that they saw while in Nicaragua. For example, after returning from a coffee brigade in 1986,
Carolyn Squire and other members of her brigade helped fundraise enough money to install
an improved water system for the area where they had stayed.42 Finally, returning volunteers
began producing booklets and leaflets through the NSC. These publications were used for
recruiting for new volunteers, appealing for donations and providing a supportive source of
information about the Sandinista state.43
So, what was it that motivated these people to volunteer for the benefit of a country
as small and far away as Nicaragua? It seems that the people who volunteered fall into three
motivating categories; anti-imperialist solidarity with the FSLN, an interest in travel and
adventure, and an interest in specific areas of FSLN policy that tied into the volunteers career
or life at home. This is not to say that each person’s motivations were rigidly defined by one
of these categories, as there may have been numerous reasons that combined to persuade
them to volunteer. Furthermore the very nature of the question makes it a hard one to answer,
especially so long after the event. For this reason, the views expressed in this piece of work
should be seen as only the first step to understanding what motivated volunteers to join the
brigades.
Arguably the most important factor that caused people to volunteer was a genuine
sense of solidarity with the Sandinistas. A large majority of volunteers came from left-wing
37
This was a recurring theme throughout the interview responses with the author.
Johns, p. 89.
39
The authors interview with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15]
40
Ben Gregory, Afar I See the Day is Coming: Wales, Nicaragua and the Future of Internationalism (Wales:
Hackman Print, 1998) p. 13.
41
Chuck Kaufman, Jon Heal, Keith Doyle, Gill Holmes, Christopher Baird, Steve Lewis and Stella Embliss all
either took part in more than one brigade, or became actively involved with the NSC or the Nicaragua Network
after participating on a brigade.
42
The authors interview with Carolyn Squire, [29/01/15]
43
Examples of these leaflets are Nicaragua Must Survive: A History of U.S. Destabilisation (London: Nicaragua
Solidarity Campaign, 1985); Heath Hunt, Julie Scott and Geoffrey Sheridan, eds., ¡Nicaragua Libre! (London:
Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign, 1984)
38
11
political backgrounds, for example fifteen out of the eighteen interviewees had been actively
involved in leftist movements before volunteering. These ranged from simply being members
of the Labour Party to more radical groups. For instance, four out of the eighteen were
involved in either Anti-Apartheid or Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) movements,
while others were members of trade unions and both anarchist and feminist groups.44 For
these people, the conflict in Nicaragua was a way of expressing their political beliefs, and to
stand up against what they perceived to be unwarranted U.S. aggression.45 The United States’
foreign policy in Latin America is a major factor for the sense of solidarity amongst leftists in
both the United Kingdom and the United States itself, as many felt that the Reagan
administration was attempting to ‘bully’ the Sandinistas. It was felt on both sides of the
Atlantic that Reagan’s support for the Contras was not only illegal but also deeply unethical
given the acts of terror being perpetrated.46 Furthermore many of the British volunteers felt
compelled to become involved with helping the FSLN due to the stance of the Margaret
Thatcher government.47 Thatcher’s was the most supportive of all of Europe’s governments,
strongly allying herself to Reagan’s policy of anti-communism whilst they were engaged in
the Cold War.48 As Brian Woodward, a member of a reforestation brigade in 1987 states;
“there was a feeling [amongst British volunteers] that [the British government] was not being
critical of the hypocritical, illegal activity of the US government that had resulted in the
deaths of many innocent Nicaraguans” and another volunteer labels Thatcher’s refusal to
support Nicaragua as “appalling.”49 What this shows is that opposition to Thatcher and
Reagan’s ‘special relationship’ had the effect of galvanising support for the Sandinistas, as it
portrayed them as a small, left-wing government defying two of the most powerful leaders in
world politics.
Another reason for the large solidarity movement with the Sandinistas has its roots in
U.S. diplomatic policy in Latin America. Many of the volunteers who went to Nicaragua in
the 1980’s remembered previous instances where the United States had been actively
involved in opposing left-wing movements.50 For example in 1973, just five years before the
Sandinista revolution there was a coup in Chile that was widely regarded to have been
significantly influenced by the United States.51 There, the democratically elected leftist
President Salvador Allende was forcibly removed by the armed forces and national police.52
National Police Chief Augusto Pinochet would later rise to power and, while enjoying strong
support from the U.S., formed a brutally repressive military junta.53 Other examples include
44
The authors interviews with Keith Doyle, [24/02/15], David Nicol, [10/02/15], Jane Ferrie, [21/01/15], and
Shelagh Kavanagh, [08/02/15]
45
The authors interviews with Chuck Kaufman, [31/03/15] Brian Woodward, [28/01/15], Gay Lee and Phil
Sutcliffe, [30/01/15] and Tony Corden, [06/01/15]
46
Ibid.
47
The authors interviews with Gay Lee and Phil Sutcliffe, [30/01/15] and Brian Woodward, [28/01/15]
48
James Fergusson and Jenny Pearce (eds.), The Thatcher Years, Britain and Latin America (London: Latin
American Bureau, 1988), p. 6.
49
The authors interviews with Brian Woodward, [28/01/15], Phil Sutcliffe, [30/01/15]
50
The authors interviews with Steve Lewis, [01/02/15], Gay Lee and Phil Sutcliffe, [30/01/15] and Stella
Embliss, [11/03/15]
51
Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (New York: South End Press, 1992), p. 68.
52
Peter Winn, A Century of Revolution (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 239.
53
Ibid, p. 242.
12
support for the Guatemalan government during the Guatemalan Civil War in the 1970’s, and
the U.S. training and funding that the military government of El Salvador received during
their civil war in the 1980’s.54 What is important here is that in all three cases, the
governments that were being supported by the U.S. were right-wing military regimes, all of
which were guilty of significant human rights abuses.55 This meant that the Sandinista victory
was seen across the world as an important victory against the United States and imperialism.
As the brigadista Gay Lee said “it was like everywhere the Americans were trying to take
over…and here was the one example of where they’d failed. So [it was an opportunity] where
we could make a contribution against the American state.”56 Furthermore, the repressive state
governments in Chile, Guatemala and El Salvador significantly helped the Sandinistas to
present themselves as radically progressive. Campaigns to educate the poor, to improve rural
healthcare and to economically advantage the working classes all helped to foster
international support.57 Ultimately, when attempting to evaluate how important antiimperialism was as a motivating factor, perhaps it was best said by Brian Woodward, as he
reflects that;
“By going on a brigade I thought it was the best way to show that other
people across the world were supporting the progress that had been made in
Nicaragua, especially in giving people access to health and education facilities,
land rights and progress on environmental issues. Also, at that time it looked as
though the FMLN in El Salvador (Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacional
(Farabundo Martí National Liberation party)) were on the point of having a
successful overthrow of their government and they were being encouraged by the
progress that had be made in Nicaragua, so, I hoped the Nicaraguan
brigades would give indirect support, encouragement, and publicity to
the FMLN cause.”58
Not every volunteer went to Nicaragua solely due to a political agenda. Another
motivation that has been cited by a number of volunteers was the lure of travelling to a
country that at that time, people in Great Britain knew very little about. Even politically
aware volunteers also acknowledged that Nicaragua appealed to them because of the
‘romanticism.’59 That is; travelling thousands of miles away from their family to take part in
a leftist revolution, and in a country that the media was reporting to be highly dangerous
(regardless of whether or not the volunteers were ever going to be in actual danger). One
reason why this sense of adventurism was so strong amongst the volunteers was that during
the 80’s, there were not as many opportunities to travel as there are today.60 Furthermore,
there was a distinct lack of available information about Nicaragua and about the revolution.
54
Noam Chomsky, Turning the Tide (Boston: South End Press, 1985), p. 154.; Thomas Conrad, ‘The Aid for El
Salvador is Nonlethal’, New York Times, 15 June, 1980, p. 12.
55
Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin America’, Journal of Peace Research, 44, 4,
(2007) 427-445 (p. 433).
56
The authors interview with Gay Lee, [30/01/15]
57
Jones, p. 45.; The authors interview with Tony Corden, [06/01/15]
58
The authors interview with Brian Woodward, [28/01/15]
59
The authors interview with Christopher Baird, [03/02/15]
60
Ibid.
13
People only had access to two polarising opinions regarding the Sandinistas; either the
government’s line that they were terrorists, or the leftist view that they were a revolutionary
progressive government intent on helping the poor.61 This meant that for those who were
already interested in the revolution, and for those who enjoyed travelling, Nicaragua became
an interesting destination due to the fact that they had to physically go there in order to
understand what was happening in the country.62 The nature of the brigades meant that the
kind of people who would volunteer tended to be adventurous anyway. This is reflected by
the fact that out of the eighteen interviewees, ten said that they had extensive experience of
travelling, with four having previous experience of living and working abroad.63
Lastly, a small number of people volunteered because they were interested in a
specific aspect of Sandinista policy.64 This motivating factor is seen in numerous ways. For
both Frank Chalmers and Helen Peters, the decision to volunteer reflected their careers in
Great Britain. Chalmers’ job as a health journalist was given as a primary influence in his
decision to join a brigade, as it enabled him to experience first-hand the Sandinistas’
healthcare reforms that previously he had only been able to read about in other people’s
work.65 For Peters the opportunity to volunteer represented her interest in global education.
At the time, she was working in a secondary school, and so by participating in a
reforestation/literacy campaign brigade in 1986, she was able to further her interests and use
the experience as the focus for series of talks upon returning to Britain.66 Alternatively for
people like Carolyn Squire, who was brought up on a farm the opportunity to combine travel
with coffee picking, an activity she was interested in, greatly helped to motivate her.67 Lastly,
many volunteers partly attributed their decision to volunteer on their support of the
Sandinista’s stance on gender equality.68 In both revolutionary Nicaragua and El Salvador
women were seen to be valued with greater importance and equality than in the Western
world, as they participated heavily during the revolutionary conflicts, and were often seen on
a par with their male counterparts.69 Following the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, women
were well represented in government, with almost 20% of FSLN parliamentary candidates in
1984 being female.70 Both Stella Embliss and Steve Lewis alluded to being impressed by the
FSLN’s gender equality during interviews, and both mentioned it as being part of their
reasons for volunteering.71 It should be added though, that all five of the volunteers
61
The authors interview with Jon Heal, [22/01/15]
The authors interviews with Christopher Baird, [03/02/15], Shelagh Kavanagh, [08/02/15], and Frank
Chalmers, [29/01/15]
63
Christopher Baird, Shelagh Kavanagh, David Nicol, Jane Ferrie, Jon Heal and Carolyn Squire all had travel
experience, while Steve Lewis (Ecuador), Stella Embliss (Kenya and Germany) and Gay Lee and Phil Sutcliffe
(Seychelles) had all lived and worked abroad.
64
The authors interviews with Frank Chalmers, [29/01/15], Carolyn Squire [29/01/15], Helen Peters, [14/01/15]
and Stella Embliss, [11/03/15]
65
Chalmers specifically gave reference to the book; Richard Garfield, Health and Revolution: Nicaraguan
Experience (London: Oxfam Professional, 1984)
66
The authors interview with Helen Peters, [14/01/15]
67
The authors interview with Carolyn Squire, [29/01/15]
68
The authors interviews with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15], and Gill Holmes, [22/01/15]
69
Ilja A. Luciak, ‘Gender Equality and Electoral Politics on the Left: A Comparison of El Salvador and
Nicaragua’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 40, 1, (1998), 39-66 (p. 39).
70
Ibid, Table 2, p. 53.
71
The authors interviews with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15], and Steve Lewis, [01/02/15]
62
14
mentioned here also gave other reasons for wanting to volunteer, either as part of their wish
to demonstrate anti-imperialist solidarity or as part of a sense of adventurism. So, although
this has been based on only eighteen out of the thousands of volunteers, we can see some
strong patterns emerging. The vast majority were from left-wing backgrounds, and nearly all
attributed their desire to volunteer either as a response to U.S. aggression or as a means to
travel. A small number can be seen to have volunteered partly due to specific FSLN policies;
however these few also were motivated by one of the other more influential factors.
Another important aspect of the brigadista experience was the relationship between
the international brigades and ordinary Nicaraguans. The FSLN leadership were very aware
of how important international solidarity was for the revolution’s survival. We can see this
due to their complete endorsement, and indeed active search for international brigades, and in
numerous public speeches where both individual volunteers and solidarity campaigns were
explicitly mentioned and encouraged. An example of this can be seen in Comandante Daniel
Ortega’s public address on the fifth anniversary of the revolution, July 19th, 1984. Ortega
explicitly thanked “the people of the world who have helped Nicaragua,” and told them that
“this revolution is also yours.”72 This message seems to have been successfully understood by
a large percentage of ordinary Nicaraguans, as for the majority of brigadistas the relationship
was a positive one, with many reflecting that the communities in which they stayed were
“very welcoming and hospitable.”73 For most volunteers, it seemed as if the Nicaraguans that
they lived and worked with highly valued their presence, and showed that they understood
the importance of global solidarity.74
However, despite the large-scale positivity reported by British volunteers, a small
number of interviewees took a more measured stance, and by analysing these responses we
see some elements of fracture within the relationship. Perhaps the most important factor to
consider is that most British volunteer’s experiences were regulated and planned by the
FSLN. What this means is that the NSC worked closely with the FSLN government in order
to arrange and plan the brigades, and as such it is very likely that they would be assigned to
pro-Sandinista areas.75 It is important to remember that not all Nicaraguans were supporters
of the Sandinistas. For example the transition to collective farming greatly threatened large
plantation owners, as it was common practise for the FSLN to confiscate the property of
those who criticised them, or from those who failed to reinvest their profits in a manner
deemed appropriate.76 There were also members of society who deeply distrusted the
Sandinistas, either due to their dislike of communist ideology or because they felt that the
FSLN intruded too far into their lives.77 Anti-Sandinista feeling grew throughout the 1980’s
as more people became disillusioned with the revolution, as it struggled and eventually died
72
Jones, p. xxvii.
The authors interview with David Nicol, [10/02/15]
74
The authors interviews with Brian Woodward, [28/01/15], Christopher Baird, [03/02/15], Frank Chalmers,
[29/01/15], Gill Holmes, [22/01/15], Gay Lee and Phil Sutcliffe, [30/01/15], Helen Peters, [14/01/15], Jane
Ferrie, [21/01/15] and Jon Heal, [22/01/15]
75
A small number of interviewees alluded to this, for example Gay Lee and Phil Sutcliffe admitted that the farm
to which they were sent was “pro-Sandinista.” Similarly Jon Heal said that on his brigade “everything was
organised though the FSLN.”
76
Johns, p. 65.
77
Ibid, p. 104.
73
15
in the 1990 elections.78 It is telling, therefore that the only responses that detailed instances of
hostility towards internacionalistas came from those who volunteered towards the twilight of
the Sandinista period. Shelagh Kavanagh, who volunteered as part of an environmental
conservation brigade in 1990 remembers “the situation on the ground was complex, as not
everyone was pleased to see us.”79 As the situation deteriorated due to imposed economic
restrictions alongside continued attacks by Contra forces, more and more people began to see
international volunteers as an extension of the problem, which on rare occasions led to
violence against them. Keith Doyle, for example recounts the occasion that an international
member of his brigade had stones thrown at him whilst walking through the streets of
Managua in 1989.80 It should be mentioned that Doyle himself suffered no direct hostility.
Despite these isolated instances of negativity to the international presence, on the
whole the relationship between the brigades and ordinary Nicaraguans was a positive one.
Similarly, while it is almost certainly true that the British brigades were specifically posted
within areas of Sandinista followers, this should not diminish the importance that the
Nicaraguan people placed on international support. The Sandinistas were supported by the
majority of the population at least until 1984, as shown by the election results, and it is
unlikely that they would have lost significant support until around 1989/1990 when the
people eventually grew impatient with prolonged warfare.81 For this reason, it could be
argued that the relationship between international volunteers and ordinary Nicaraguans
directly helped to keep morale high, and helped to withstand the pressures of constant
economic and military attacks from the United States and the Contra. As Gay Lee says, “[the
people on her farm] welcomed the solidarity aspect. The people really understood why we
were there, and they were really, really grateful.”82
Chapter Three
78
Giaconda Belli, The Country Under My Skin: A Memoir of Love and War (New York: Anchor Books, 2003),
p. 8.
79
The authors interview with Shelagh Kavanagh, [08/02/15]
80
The authors interview with Keith Doyle, [024/02/15]
81
Johns, p. viii.
82
The authors interview with Gay Lee, [30/01/15]
16
Harvest and War; the American Volunteers
Due to the limited nature of this paper, only one out of the eighteen interviews that were
conducted was with an American volunteer.83 In light of this limitation the paper will instead
draw from the work of Jeff Jones, a former volunteer who brought together over sixty voices
into an extremely valuable collection; Brigadista: Harvest and War in Nicaragua.84 This
difference in methodology has its strengths and weaknesses, of course. By using the work of
another researcher there is a lack of focus upon the specific factors that this project is
considering. Furthermore these views reflect only those of volunteers from the years 1983 to
1985, which means there is a narrower perspective across the Contra War. On the positive
side, the collection was created much closer to the event, as it was published only one year
after the volunteers returned to the United States, giving the work a fresher perspective of the
volunteer’s views. Combined, the work conducted by both the author and by Jones can
interlink effectively to create an overarching analysis of both British and American
volunteers.
In place of the NSC, the American organisation that began to work alongside the
FSLN and organise the brigades was called the National Network in Solidarity with the
Nicaraguan People, later renamed the Nicaragua Network.85 The Nicaragua Network formed
in 1979, shortly before the triumph of the revolution, and by 1980 had grown to about fifty
member organisations.86 One significant difference between the two organisations was that
although both tended to send four brigades a year, the Nicaragua Network was able to recruit
and send brigades with significantly higher numbers of people than was possible for the NSC.
As has already been discussed, the Nicaragua Network was able to send around 650
volunteers a year, which is comparable to how many British volunteers were sent in total.87
An example of how many volunteers took part in the brigades is the Maura Clarke coffee
harvest brigade in 1984, when 152 brigadistas took part.88 Interest was so great for the
brigades that in late 1984 the Nicaragua Network created a new office specifically to recruit
and organise brigades, called the Nicaragua Exchange.89 This office continued to run the
brigades up until a lack of funding forced it to close in 1987, thus handing responsibility back
to the Nicaragua Network.90 The gulf in participation is hardly surprising given how much
larger the American population was to Great Britain’s, as well as the relatively easy journey
when compared to a trans-Atlantic flight. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect there to have
been a higher number of interested volunteers from an ideological perspective, given both
83
The authors interview with Chuck Kaufman, [31/03/15]
Jones, p. 64.
85
Roger Craft Peace, A Call to Conscience: The Anti-Contra War Campaign, (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2012), p. 108.
86
Hector Perla, ‘Heirs of Sandino: The Nicaraguan revolution and the U.S. – Nicaragua Solidarity Movement’,
Latin American Perspectives, 6 (2009), pp. 80-100 (p. 85).
87
Jones, p. xxvii.; The authors interview with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15]
88
Ibid., p. 45.
89
Perla, p. 98.
90
Perla, p. 98.
84
17
that it was their own government that was most actively engaged with helping the Contras,
and the higher Latino presence in the United States when compared to Great Britain.
These large numbers of volunteers also allowed the Nicaragua Network and the
Nicaragua Exchange to organise a broader variety of brigades than were possible for the
NSC. In their first year, the Nicaragua network organised four brigades all with different
focuses; cultural, reforestation, construction and the harvests.91 For those who went to pick
coffee, the experience was very similar to the British volunteers. They would be transported
to a farm in the northern coffee growing provinces of Matagalpa and Jinotega where they
picked coffee for a number of weeks.92 Where the experiences of harvest brigades differ, is
that there were a significant number of American brigades that picked cotton instead of
coffee.93 These cotton picking brigades, for example the Martin Luther King Brigade in
January 1984, again followed a similar structure, however what this shows is that the
brigades organised by the Nicaragua Exchange were able to assist with more aspects of the
Sandinista survival.94 This is also apparent when looking at the scope of the environmental
brigades. Whereas the NSC sent small numbers of people to plant trees, dig trenches and
conduct soil and water conservation projects the Nicaragua Network was able to mobilise
vast numbers to tackle more ambitious projects. For example, between September and
October, 1984 the Marvin Jose Lopez Reforestation Brigade was large and diverse enough to
be split into three separate projects.95 Sesshu Foster, who was part of this brigade reflects “the
first site we worked at was Asosoca lagoon, one of many water filled volcanic craters […]
overlooking Managua. […] Our reforestation efforts were aimed at preventing run-off and
erosion of chemicals into the lagoon, as it was the capital’s main water supply.”96 This is an
example of the scope of the North American brigades.
Another aspect of the American solidarity movement with Nicaragua was the
introduction of cultural brigades. For three weeks in August 1984, a small group of ten artists
and eleven musicians made up the Artists’ Brigade for the New Nicaragua, who travelled
around Nicaragua under the supervision of the Sandinista’s ministry of culture.97 Culture in
Nicaragua has always been revered, with special status being reserved for important murals
depicting social messages or commemorating historical moments, and the government itself
was made up of a large number of artists and poets.98 Furthermore, the revolutionary support
from both the poetry of Rubén Darío and the singer Carlos Mejía Godoy has gained huge
popular appreciation, so much so that Darío’s body is buried within one of the country’s
largest cathedrals in León.99 For this reason, the ministry of culture tasked this brigade not
91
Craft Peace, p. 109.
Johns, p. 22.
93
Ibid., p. 5.
94
Ibid., p. 5.
95
Ibid., p. 98.
96
Ibid., p. 98.
97
Ibid., p. 69.
98
Ibid., p. 70.
99
Ibid., p. 71.
92
18
just with performing shows, but also to transfer their skills to a number of Nicaraguan artists
who would continue their work, buoyed by improved techniques and equipment.100
Alongside these cultural, environmental and construction brigades, the most common
brigade remained for the coffee harvest. This was because although culture, reforestation
projects and construction were valued by the FSLN, there was an immediate and consistent
need for more hands to bring in the coffee, such was the pressure put on manpower by the
Contra war, and the harvest’s importance to the economy.101 In similar fashion to the British
volunteers the vast majority of Americans were inexperienced pickers, which meant that the
amount they were individually able to contribute barely covered their rations.102 Again the
most important and successful factor of the American brigades was their work once they had
returned home. Similar to returning British volunteers, in February 1984 American
brigadistas published the first issue of a newsletter named the Brigadista Bulletin.103 This
was used by the solidarity campaigns to keep in touch, raise awareness and recruit new
volunteers, however perhaps its most important function was to serve as a voice that
supported both the Sandinistas and the solidarity movement itself.104 Throughout the 1980’s
the conflict in Nicaragua was among the leading news stories covered by mainstream media,
at its peak in 1987 receiving more than 3,500 articles from the five leading national
newspapers.105 The vast majority of this coverage was heavily influenced by a public
campaign by the Reagan administration to portray the Sandinista government as
undemocratic, illegitimate and most importantly a communist puppet for the Soviet Union.106
Reagan himself would often include this rhetoric in his public speeches, referring to
Nicaragua as a “communist beachhead in Latin America”, and going so far as to call the
contra forces “the moral equivalent to our founding fathers.”107 The administration also
attempted to discredit the solidarity movement, as they portrayed groups such as the
Nicaragua Exchange to be agents for the FSLN.108 In the face of such a large scale negative
campaign, the work of returning volunteers became very important to the solidarity
movement. Publications such as the Brigadista Bulletin along with educational talks and
rallies allowed the spread of news and support to contradict what was being reported in the
mainstream media, and offered an outlet for the movement to reach potential new volunteers
or financial donors.
In many respects, the motivation for many Americans to volunteer was of a similar
nature to what motivated the British brigadstas. Both the opportunity to travel and specific
interest in FSLN policy helped attract a large number of volunteers however, as was also the
case in Britain, the primary factor for the volunteers was a genuine belief in supporting the
revolution. This shared feeling was further reinforced by the fact that it was their own
100
Ibid., p. 69.
Craft Peace, p. 109.
102
Johns, p. 89.
103
Craft Peace, p. 109.
104
Perla, p. 7.
105
Ibid., 7.
106
Ibid., p. 7.
107
Lou Cannon, ‘Reagan says U.S. owes ‘Contras’ help; conservative gathering hears emotionally charged
speech’, Washington Post, 2 March, 1985, p. 13.
108
Perla, p. 7.
101
19
government that were threatening the survival of what the revolution had created.109 As Bill
Bailey, an American volunteer in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade reflects “[we were] hundreds
of men and women who [were] appalled and disgusted with the murderous policy of our
government. I feel a sense of pride knowing that my fellow men and women have accepted
the challenge to defy the administration’s policy of hostility towards a friendly people.”110
Another volunteer, Sox Sperry of the Maura Clarke brigade wrote to her family and friends
in 1984; “I decided to go to Nicaragua to participate in the harvest in response to the
Nicaraguan government’s request for assistance. This action struck me as an active and
nonviolent way to oppose the Reagan government’s war-making in the region, to support the
Nicaraguan people’s right to determine their own future, and to gain first-hand knowledge of
the situation in Nicaragua.”111
The Nicaragua Exchange staff made a conscious effort to recruit “as many different
kinds of people as possible, not just long-term Nicaragua activists.”112 For example Kit Miller
remembers that on her brigade “there were farmers, union folk, computer workers, war
veterans, professionals, older people and students,” although she goes on to say that “most
[were] doing something in their home states to stop U.S. intervention.”113 What this shows is
that the decision to oppose U.S. policy in Nicaragua was not limited to social status, age or
1profession. Clearly however, this narrative sits within the traditional political discourse of
left vs. right, and it is certain that the overwhelming majority of American volunteers would
place themselves firmly on the left of the political spectrum. A possible reason for such widereaching support for the Sandinistas has been suggested by Hector Perla, a senior research
fellow at the University of California. Perla argues that the high level of media coverage kept
Nicaragua in public consciousness, which enabled the narrative of a “revolutionary mística”
(mystique) to develop.114 As solidarity movements raised awareness of the FSLN, the
revolution built a strong level of domestic legitimacy. The democratic nature of the
Sandinista organisational structure (the large female presence, for instance) contrasted hugely
to the “brutal violence of the Contras, especially against civilians.”115 The FSLN were seen as
the moral option, defending the interests of the poor against the tyrants of the Reagan
administration, and gave them the credibility needed to attract support from a large sector of
the U.S. populace.116
Although the primary motivation for volunteers from both Britain and America was
anti-imperialist solidarity, an important difference between them is that the FSLN
significantly favoured their American relationship.117 Although the Sandinistas welcomed
support from nations across the globe, they had no doubt as to which country’s people they
wanted most. The commitment to maintaining a strong relationship with the American people
109
Jones, p. xvii.
Ibid., p. xvii.
111
Ibid, p. 36.
112
Craft Peace, p. 109.
113
Jones, p. 58.
114
Perla, p. 86.
115
Ibid., p. 86.
116
Ibid., p. 86.
117
Ibid., p. 86.
110
20
is reflected by the Directorate of International Relations, as they saw “the solidarity
movement [as] an integral part of [their] multifaceted resistance strategy.”118 It is not hard to
understand their reasoning, as not only was the United States a large available resource of
manpower but more importantly the opposition of its people was one of the most persuasive
reasons that held back the Reagan administration from increasing military operations in the
country.119 For this reason American volunteers were highly motivated to continue the
solidarity struggle, as they genuinely believed that they could make a difference. The FSLN
did all that they could to encourage these volunteers, as they believed that “only the North
Americans could stop their government’s aggression.”120
It is interesting that this sense of solidarity with the American people was not
restricted to educated members of the FSLN government, but was seen throughout the
country in ordinary people’s interaction with the brigades.121 The responses of numerous
American volunteers indicate that the vast majority of Nicaraguans identified a distinct
difference between the American government and its people. This was despite the fact that a
number of Sandinista slogans and songs made reference to the ‘Yankee’ enemy. For example
the Sandinista anthem, the Himno de la Unidad Sandinista (Song for Sandinista Unity)
includes the line “luchamos contra el yankee […] enemigo de la humanidad” (we fight
against the Yankees, the enemies of humanity).122 This disparity between the official line on
America and the welcoming nature of FSLN supporters created a number of awkward
moments. Richard Levy, a member of the Nica Noel Brigade in 1983, recounts how during
the brigades’ welcome meeting, “everyone started to sing the Sandinista anthem. Part way
through a murmur started going around the room… Seconds before [the contentious line] was
reached, one person said “don’t worry, they’re not Yankees, they’re Americans.””123 This
story is echoed by other brigadistas, suggesting that despite these revolutionary slogans the
message was intended for the American government, and not at its people.124
Throughout brigadista’s comments in Harvest and War, there are references to
positive relationships with the Nicaraguan people. Elaine Myrianthopoulos for instance,
writes “the people in the barrio are wonderful – enthusiastic about us being here, warm and
generous above their means.”125 However, the same reservations in terms of which areas the
brigades were sent to persist from the British brigades. Myrianthopolous herself goes on to
say that the barrio in which she stayed was “a lesson in the benefits of the revolution,” and
that it was strongly represented in FSLN marches in Managua.126 Another volunteer, Joe
Richey reflects that “all in all, barrio Bello Amanecer is FSLN territory, as is most
118
Ibid., p. 86.
James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (North Carolina:
Duke University Press, 1996) p. 64.
120
Sergio Ramirez, ‘U.S. Working People can Stop Intervention’, in Bruce Marcus, ed., Nicaragua: The
Sandinista People’s Revolution, Speeches by Sandinista Leaders (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1985), p. 59.
121
Jones, p. 100.
122
Carlos Mejia Godoy, ‘Himno de la Unidad Sandinista’, in Guitarra Armada (Managua: FSLN, 1979) [On
CD]
123
Jones, pp. 7-8.
124
Johns, pp. 75-76.
125
Ibid., p. 110.
126
Ibid., p. 110.
119
21
everywhere I have seen so far.”127 These, along with many others, demonstrate the selective
nature of who the FSLN wanted the brigadistas to interact with. This is not intended to
suggest that the freedom of the brigadistas was tightly restricted, only that the FSLN made an
effort to post them with their own supporters. As was also true for British brigades, the FSLN
were careful not to send their U.S. allies into hostile areas, although these did certainly exist.
It is therefore unsurprising that so many brigadistas reflect positively on their relationship
with the people they encountered.
Still, in the same vein as the experiences of the British brigades the overall
relationship between the brigadistas and the Nicaraguan population was positive. There are
limited reports of tension, and very few instances of violence or dissent. Regardless of
whether they were sent to areas that offered a ‘sheltered’ perspective of the revolution, the
areas to which they were sent welcomed them with open arms. Countless volunteers from
both Britain and America have spoken of the Nicaraguans that they encountered as being a
primary reason to continue volunteering for the solidarity movement, which was exactly what
the FSLN were hoping for.128 Michael Johns’ observations, from a position within the FSLN
as a researcher for the Centre for the Study and Investigation for Agrarian Reform (CSIAR)
present a clearer understanding of what the brigades meant for the Sandinistas;
“As inexperienced harvesters, they would not be able to pick enough coffee to
cover the costs of the rice, beans and tortillas they were eating, never mind the
cost of transporting them to and from the collective farm in a rugged and isolated
part of northern Nicaragua. The sandalistas (a phrase often used to describe
international volunteers) had come instead to harvest what Enrique (an employee
of the CSIAR) called a ‘revolutionary experience.’ And the FSLN were happy to
provide it – so the American sympathisers would go home more committed than
ever to stopping their imperialist government from harassing the revolution.”129
Chapter Four
127
Ibid., pp. 108-109.
The authors interviews with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15], Steve Lewis, [01/02/15], Christopher Baird,
[03/02/15] and Chuck Kaufman, [31/03/15]; Jones, pp. 15, 72, 192.
129
Johns, p. 89.
128
22
The Independent Volunteers
Firstly, it is important to clarify exactly what is meant by an ‘independent’ volunteer. These
were people who travelled to Nicaragua with the intention of helping the revolution, but did
not go through an international solidarity movement from their home countries. Many of
these volunteers arrived in the early 1980’s before international groups had begun to send
organised brigades, although individuals continued to travel independently to Nicaragua
throughout the decade.130 It is almost impossible to present a reliable figure for how many
people travelled independently to help the revolution, as without being affiliated to an
organisation they were never counted. This paper uses interview responses from Stella
Embliss and Steve Lewis, the written memoirs of Michael Johns and Deb Olin Unferth and
the documentary film American/Sandinista to present the first steps towards evaluating the
experiences of independent volunteers.
The people who travelled to Nicaragua independently have often been viewed as
hippies, moving around the revolutions of Central America hoping to find “war jobs” but
without offering any valuable skills.131 These volunteers have been accused of being
unwilling to fully commit to the difficulties of a true revolutionary role, and were instead
more preoccupied with cultivating their appearance of being a revolutionary.132 An example
of this criticism is the phrase ‘Sandalista.’ The phrase invokes the image of Birkenstock
sandals which are stereotypically worn by left-wing feminists and hippies.133 Unferth’s
memoir of her experiences in 1987 offers a valuable insight in regards to this type of
volunteer, as although her and her boyfriend George went to “help the revolution,” they
offered no valuable skills and, after failing to find work within the timespan of their visas,
were “told to leave.”134
Unferth and George made their way into Nicaragua after trying and failing to help the
FMLN in El Salvador and, following their failure in Nicaragua, continued travelling in
Central America looking for ways to help leftist movements, equally without success. This is
representative of a number of independent volunteers, as they tended to be motivated more by
supporting a people’s revolution in Latin America as a whole than by a specific belief in any
of the individual revolutionary groups. This is supported by Steve Lewis, a British volunteer
who travelled to Nicaragua in 1984 having been working in Ecuador. Lewis’ reason for
volunteering in Nicaragua was inspired by the Cuban example and was not restricted to
Nicaragua specifically. Lewis was part of a movement that had seen the US destabilisation of
the Chilean socialist regime in 1973 and had read the evidence of CIA covert actions in the
1975 book Inside the Company by Philip Agee. His trip to Nicaragua therefore was part of
his ideological motivation to oppose the U.S. “imposing its will” in the region.135 He
130
Deb Olin Unferth, Revolution: The Year I Fell in Love and Went to Join the War (New York: Henry Holt and
Co. 2011), p. 3.
131
Ibid., p. 35.
132
Ibid., p. 45.
133
Florence E. Babb, ‘Recycled Sandalistas: From Revolution to Resorts in the New Nicaragua’, American
Anthropologist, 106, 3 (2008), pp. 451-555 (p. 457).
134
Unferth, p. 4.
135
The authors interview with Steve Lewis, [01/02/15]
23
explains; “I knew about a lot of other instances where the USA was imposing its will and
covertly assassinating people and destabilising unions… My motivation to go to Nicaragua
was because of the ‘big stick’ that Reagan was waving and trying to destroy the Latin
American experiment.”136 Lewis himself later attempted to join the FMLN in El Salvador,
however was also unsuccessful.
Despite this pan-Latin American leftist movement, Nicaragua was the most important
of all the conflicts for the internationalistas. The situation in Nicaragua at the time was
unique among so many other left-wing revolutions, as it was the only one to have
successfully overthrown the kind of repressive military dictatorships that were still in power
in neighbouring countries.137 What this meant for internacionalistas was that in Nicaragua
there was a genuine opportunity to contribute, as the FSLN held authority over the country
and were funding health, education and construction projects as well as the harvest brigades.
These opportunities did not exist in neighbouring revolutions, as those countries were still
war-torn and rife with human rights abuses by secret police networks.138 Unferth reflects “In
El Salvador there hadn’t been anyone like George and I […] In Nicaragua there were
hundreds of us, thousands […] all trooping around, looking for ways to help the
revolution.”139 What Unferth is alluding to is that a percentage of these volunteers offered no
practical use to the Sandinistas, as the jobs they were creating required trained professionals.
For instance, Unferth recalls a group of jugglers who would travel from village to village,
juggling. She says “we were walking across their war, juggling. […] The Nicaraguans wanted
land, literacy, a decent doctor. We wanted a nice sing-a-long.”140 This anecdote reflects how,
although ideologically in favour of helping the revolution, not all the independent volunteers
offered practical skills to aid the functioning of a newly-formed state.
However, it would be wrong to suggest that the independent volunteers made no
meaningful contribution to the FSLN cause. On the contrary, some individuals performed
roles that were very highly valued. For instance, Michael Johns’ study for the CSIAR was an
in-depth agricultural evaluation of how to improve the harvest brigades, commissioned by the
Sandinistas and highly regarded once completed.141 There was a significant difference
between volunteers such as Johns and the Sandalistas, as they were willing to commit
themselves to the hard labour, difficult conditions and dangers that came with true ‘revolution
jobs.’ Furthermore, many of the independent volunteers brought expertise in teaching,
healthcare or engineering. Roles undertaken by these individuals would often require a
significant sacrifice, both in terms of the time they needed to be completed and in the level of
risk to their lives they might face. For this reason the volunteers willing to undertake such
roles strongly believed in the value of the revolution. They were very highly motivated to
stand against the spread of imperialism, and were often openly supportive of Marxist
ideology.142 The risks that these volunteers took were very real, for example a number of
136
Ibid.
Unferth, p. 82.
138
Ibid., p. 82.
139
Ibid., p. 83.
140
Ibid., p. 87.
141
Ibid., p. 107.
142
Ibid., p. 3; Unferth, p. 65.
137
24
American citizens purposefully lived within the strike-zone of important economic sites.143
By doing so they presented a powerful factor that dissuaded the U.S. from attacking these
sites for fear of killing or injuring their own citizens.
There was one occasion when the Contras were directly responsible for the killing
of an American citizen; an engineer named Benjamin Linder.144 Linder had heard that the
FSLN needed trained specialists in electrical engineering to help construct their planned
hydroelectric projects.145 After graduating with a degree in mechanical engineering he
travelled to Nicaragua in 1983, with the intention of using his skills to help bring electricity
to the poorest sections of Nicaraguan society.146 In 1986, Linder and a small group of
internationalists along with local Nicaraguan engineers began a project in El Cuá, a village in
the northern department of Jinotega and very close to the Honduran border where he, along
with two Nicaraguans were killed by a Contra ambush in 1987.147 His death received huge
media attention, coming at a time when U.S. support to the Contras was being debated by
Congress in light of the Iran-Contra scandal. Opponents to the Reagan administration used
Linder’s death to denounce the U.S.’ connections with the Contras, and it is very likely that
his death directly contributed to Congress’ decision the following year to withdraw the
Contras’ funding.148 Linder’s sacrifice gave the FSLN an opportunity to reinforce their
positive relationship with foreign volunteers, as President Ortega personally gave the eulogy
at Linder’s funeral service. The service was attended by hundreds of ordinary Nicaraguans, as
well as the international press to hear Ortega’s words; “”¿por quién doblan las campanas?”
escribía Hemingway en medio fuego que incendiaba el pueblo Español. ¿Por quién doblan
las campanas, aquí en Nicaragua por Benjamin Linder? El sabía de los riesgos de trabajar
en Nicaragua, para contribuir con sus conocimiento, con su dedicacion, con su ejemplo a
mejorar las condiciones de vida de la gente del campo.”149 (“For whom do the bells toll?”
wrote Hemingway in the midst of a war that enveloped Spain. For whom do the bells toll here
in Nicaragua for Benjamin Linder? He knew the risks of working in Nicaragua to contribute
his knowledge, his dedication and his example; to improve the quality of life for people in the
countryside.) Ortega likens the international volunteers in Nicaragua to those who travelled to
Spain in the Civil War, creating a link between the two demonstrations of leftist solidarity.
Every volunteer who took on a genuine war job without the protection of an FSLN
sponsored brigade were risking their lives, even those who performed the same roles. As has
been mentioned, international harvest brigades made up only a small percentage of the
brigades organised to bring in the coffee and cotton.150 One of the most popular contributions
that independent volunteers made was to join these Nicaraguan harvest brigades. Both Steve
Lewis and Stella Embliss joined such a brigade in December, 1983, picking coffee alongside
143
The authors interview with Christopher Baird, [03/02/15]
Perla, p. 6.
145
Joan Kruckewitt, The Death of Ben Linder: The Story of a North American in Sandinista Nicaragua (New
York: Seven Stories Press 1999), p. 14.
146
Ibid., p. 36.
147
Ibid., p. 3.
148
Ibid., p. 86.
149
Jason Blalock, American/Sandinista (Astoria, NY: Indiepix Films, 2008), [On DVD]
150
Nicaragua Today, p. 3.
144
25
Nicaraguan students and workers from Managua.151 Their experiences were markedly
different to the British volunteers who would later pick coffee through the NSC. Both Lewis
and Embliss, along with a small number of fellow internacionalistas were required to
undergo weapons training with an AK-47 assault rifle, and would take their turns guarding
the farm through the night against Contra attack.152 These brigadistas did not enjoy the
protective status that was placed on the international brigades, and could be sent into the most
dangerous parts of the warzone if necessary. Furthermore, once on a brigade these volunteers
were given no special treatment. They would be dispersed amongst regular harvesters and
were required to handle rifles while working. There was also added pressure to produce, as
those who could not harvest enough to cover their costs would not be tolerated.153
151
The authors interviews with Steve Lewis, [01/02/15] and Stella Embliss, [11/03/15]
Ibid.
153
The authors interview with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15]
152
26
Chapter Five
Conclusions: The Solidarity Movement’s Legacy
This paper has attempted to present the experiences of both British and American volunteers,
those who travelled as part of an organised brigade and those who went individually. Finally,
it will look at the brigadista’s legacy, to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each
section of the solidarity movement.
One of the primary objectives for the organised brigades was to help economic
growth, by alleviating the pressure that had been put on the harvests due to the dispersion of
harvesters to fight the war.154 In this respect, they were ineffective. The inexperienced and
untrained workers were not able to pick coffee, plant trees or dig trenches as fast or as
skilfully as Nicaraguans. Both British and American volunteers suffered from illness,
dehydration and in some cases lacked the required level of effort to spend hours toiling in the
fields.155 This assessment has been echoed by volunteers from both British and American
brigades, almost without exception.156 There is an argument that by virtue of sheer numbers,
the combined total of internacionalistas’ efforts might have provided a meaningful figure for
foreign trade, however when the costs of transporting them to and from their farms and
projects, plus the time and energy spent by FSLN co-ordinators is detracted from their output,
any economic gains must surely have been minimal to non-existent.
However, what little they achieved while in Nicaragua, they made up for in the work
they did once they had returned home. As the Brigadista Bulletin explains; “brigadistas have
a special role as witnesses to the daily reality of the war against Nicaragua.”157 This is exactly
what the FSLN hoped they would be; a voice of witness. By sacrificing their time to travel to
Nicaragua they not only demonstrated the extent to which the international community
supported what the Sandinista revolution stood for, but they also gained invaluable first-hand
knowledge and experience of Nicaragua’s situation. This gave them the legitimacy to form
meaningful solidarity movements and denounce U.S. imperialism. As Jon Heal says, “people
thought we were going to plant trees, but […] the solidarity was always going to be the
important bit.”158 The FSLN knew this, and so was willing to support the brigades despite
their meagre economic output. In light of this, the real legacy of the brigades is the
continuation of global solidarity connections. Both the NSC and the Nicaragua Network still
exist today, albeit in smaller capacities, and at least seven British cities are still actively
involved with twinning associations with Nicaraguan towns.159 One of the most important
reasons for the survival of solidarity organisations were the brigades, as they would not have
154
Dakin, p. 2.
The authors interviews with Christopher Baird, [03/02/15], Gay Lee, and Keith Doyle, [24/02/15]
156
Ibid.; Johns, pp. 1-204.
157
Eric Fried, Brigadista Bulletin, no. 24 (April 1986), p. 4.
158
The authors interview with Jon Heal, [22/01/15]
159
Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign < http://www.nicaraguasc.org.uk/solidarity/twin-towns/> [accessed
26/04/15]
155
27
survived were it not for the work done by those motivated by their experiences while in
Nicaragua.160
It must be said however, that the U.S. brigades were more successful at changing the
course of the conflict than the British. For example, there is evidence that the action of
returning brigadistas directly influenced the decision of Vermont congressman James
Jeffords, in 1984.161 These former brigadistas included in their efforts a state-wide
conference to showcase their opposition to U.S. policy in Latin America, and it is telling that
their efforts convinced Jeffords, a Republican, to vote against his own party. Jeffords would
later go on to record in his memoirs, “I knew that I had the support of many Vermonters; a
score of towns had gone so far as to voice opposition to U.S. military intervention in Central
America at their traditional town meetings.”162 Furthermore, the level of public outcry after
the death of Benjamin Linder, coupled with outrage after the Iran-Contra scandal greatly
strengthened the position of U.S. solidarity organisations. The level of media attention gave
them a platform from which they could project their message, a level of access to the public
that British organisations were never party to.163 This is not to say that the British solidarity
campaigns were not effective, only that they had fewer opportunities to meaningfully
influence the conflict. The British government was never more than an accomplice to
Reagan’s initiatives, which meant that despite any positive effects the NSC had they were
never in a position to actively influence policy. Furthermore, the British influence was never
going to be at the same level as that of the Nicaragua Network. This was due to numerous
factors, including the FSLN’s preference towards the U.S., a significantly smaller Latino
influence, which kept the conflict far from the front pages and the geographical distance,
which made the journey both very expensive and difficult. In the United States however, the
conflict enjoyed much greater exposure which, along with the geographical proximity and
direct link to its government made it far easier for the Nicaragua Exchange to attract support.
Another important conclusion is that both the organised brigades and the work of
independent volunteers were effective, but in different ways. As the organised brigades sent
so many people, the number that participated positively for the defence of the revolution
almost certainly dwarfs that of those who travelled independently and had a lasting impact.
Furthermore, the brigades united people with a common goal, and were supportive
environments for ideologically like-minded people who would return to continue the
solidarity movement.164 But as has been noted earlier, in terms of actual achievements on the
ground, they were not as effective. On the other hand, those who travelled independently to
Nicaragua and had valuable skills to offer were very highly regarded by the FSLN for what
they could accomplish while in the country.165 Benjamin Linder, for example offered
something that the brigades could not; long-term, highly-skilled guidance on hydroelectric
plants, the legacy of which can be seen today as the villages around El Cuá are still benefiting
160
The authors interview with Stella Embliss, [11/03/15]
Craft Peace, p. 109.
162
Sen. James M. Jeffords, An Independent Man: Adventures of a Public Servant (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2003), p. 184.
163
Perla, p. 7.
164
The authors interview with Christopher Baird, [03/02/15]; Jones, p. 58.
165
Johns, p. 107; Blalock, 2008.
161
28
from his work.166 Indeed, the growth of organisations such as the NSC was directly
influenced by independent volunteers. By travelling solo before the organised brigades began
to be sent, they showed the FSLN that they were not alone, and acted as the example to which
all following brigadistas were to follow. Independent volunteers were not without their
problems, and the image of the sandalistas was routinely used by the anti-revolution press to
portray internacionalistas as lazy or self-interested.167
Ultimately, the brigades were highly beneficial to the FSLN and were one of the
primary factors that contributed to the Reagan administration’s decision not to invade. While
it can by no means be said to be the only factor, insider reports from the administration reveal
that the huge international support and certain public backlash that an invasion would have
prompted caused the decision to escalate military ventures to be deemed “off limits.”168 The
Reagan administration were willing to support military incursions in Latin America, as
proved by their 1983 invasion of Grenada. This suggests that the decision to refrain from
another Latin American invasion was in part a reaction to the support for Nicaragua. Another
major accomplishment of the solidarity movement in the U.S. was that it was the only
instance throughout Reagan’s term in office when Congress refused to grant the funds that he
requested, a direct result of the pressure put on them by the solidarity movement.169 Other
cases where he was granted the full sum include his foreign policies regarding Afghanistan,
Angola and Cambodia.170 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Sandinista revolution
withstood the force of the United States, with Reagan’s policy ultimately being defeated.171
The Contras were never able to achieve the goals that Reagan wanted; to overthrow the
FSLN government by force and politically cripple the democracy that they had implemented.
Instead, rather ironically it was this democracy instead that proved to be the FSLN’s undoing
as they lost the 1990 elections. Despite their loss, the FSLN remained the largest opposition
party in Nicaragua, and have since returned to power after their re-election in 2006.
The international solidarity campaigns are too often overlooked by the academic
community, as instead they have focused on the reasons for their 1990 electoral loss, and
their subsequent splintering. This paper argues that the role of the brigadistas is fully
deserving of further academic research. A study that focuses on the role of the British
solidarity movement’s ability to affect UK policy would be especially enlightening to the
debate. Other areas that would benefit from further attention are the U.S. brigades after 1984,
and a thorough study of the role of independent volunteers in general.
166
Blalock, 2008.
Jones, p. 100.
168
Richard Sobel, Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), p. 116.
169
Perla, p. 95.
170
Scott, pp. 34-35.
171
Perla, p. 95.
167
29
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