Journal of Asian Network for GIS-based Historical Studies Vol.2 (Dec. 2014) 22-31
Economic Conditions in the Ferghana Valley
during the Critical Years, 1917–1929
Akira UEDA1
Abstract: This study applies the geographic information system (GIS) to historical studies of Russian
Turkistan. The historical evaluation of the anti-Soviet armed struggle in Turkistan following the
Russian Revolution (the “Basmachi” movement) changed drastically after the Soviet Union’s
disintegration. While Soviet historiography attributed the economic devastation in Turkistan to the
anti-Soviet movement, national histories in newly independent republics attribute the causes to the
Bolsheviks. Focusing on the Ferghana Province—a center of the anti-Soviet movement and the most
important economic center in Russian Turkistan—this study re-examines the causes of the economic
devastation by analyzing statistical materials. In particular, by analyzing such issues as demography,
food supply, agriculture, pasturage, and economic strategies of both sides, this historical geographic
research examines changes in the Ferghana Province’s internal and external economic relations. On the
basis of the statistical materials and archival documents, this study suggests that the Soviet authorities
promoted cotton monoculture without providing an adequate food supply. At the height of famine,
native farmers in the Ferghana Valley had no choice than to depend on the advance payment for cotton
planting. Without question, the anti-Soviet movement was also responsible for the devastation caused
by the civil war, but had no measure for alleviating the famine because its root cause was the stoppage
of grain importation from central Russia. There was no stable economic base outside the Ferghana
Province. Thus, conditions on both sides prolonged food shortages and famine in the 1920s.
Keywords: Ferghana, The anti-Soviet movement (the Basmachi movement), Cotton monoculture,
Food supply, Famine
1 Graduate student, the University of Tokyo. Research fellow, Institute of History of Academy of Sciences of Republic of Uzbekistan
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Journal of Asian Network for GIS-based Historical Studies Vol.2 (Dec. 2014) 22-31
1. Introduction
This study analyzes the socioeconomic history of Russian
Turkistan after the Russian Revolution in 1917 by using the
historical geographic information system (GIS). Russian
Turkistan was devastated by the civil war after the October
revolution. The historical evaluation of the anti-Soviet armed
struggle in Turkistan, following the Russian Revolution (the
“Basmachi” movement), changed drastically after the Soviet
Union disintegrated in 1991.( 1 ) While Soviet historiography
attributed the economic devastation to the anti-Soviet
movement,(2) national histories in newly independent republics
attributed the causes to the Bolsheviks and the Red Army.(3)
Outside the former Soviet Union, for example in France,
Germany, and Turkey, the historical evaluation of the anti-Soviet
armed struggle was generally positive. Some former participants
in the anti-Soviet struggle published articles in the Western
countries. For example, Zeki Velidi Togan (1890–1970) lived in
exile in Turkey and Mustafa Chokaev (1890–1941) in France.
They worked actively for the anti-Soviet movement and
published several articles about the war.
As for the economic conditions in Turkistan from 1917 to
1929, earlier studies mainly investigated the destruction and
recovery of cotton planting, the significance of the New
Economic Policy (NEP), land–water reform, and the
reorganization of the Central Asian local society by the Soviet
authorities. Qahramon Rajabov emphasized the importance of
economic destruction in Turkistan and the Soviet authorities’
compromises with Central Asian Muslims during the NEP
period as reasons for defeating the anti-Soviet struggle (Rajabov
2005: 336–340). Outside the former Soviet Union, Beatrice
Penati re-examined the relation between the anti-Soviet
movement and the Soviet authorities by analyzing the food and
refugee problems in the Eastern Bukhara region (Penati 2007).
This study relates the quantitative analysis of economic
statistics and political history by using historical GIS. In
particular, this study analyzes demography, agriculture, and
pasturage in the Ferghana Province—the most important
economic center of Russian Turkistan and one of the centers of
the anti-Soviet armed struggle (Figure 1). This study
re-examines the causes of economic devastation by analyzing
statistical materials and presents the Soviet economic policy’s
highly optimistic forecast as well as the economic incapacity of
the anti-Soviet movement. For these reasons, neither side could
resolve the food shortage in the Ferghana Province; thus, it was
consequently prolonged.
Figure 1. Russian Turkistan
A Russian source suggests that there was surplus grain in
the Ferghana Province in the early 1880s, and it was exported to
the
Syr
Darya
Province
and
Chinese
Xinjiang
(Статистический обзор… за 1884 г. 1889: 8). During the
Russian Empire era, the Ferghana Valley turned into a cotton
growing area. The Ferghana Province exported raw cotton to the
Russian Empire’s central provinces and imported grains from
other provinces in European Russia and Turkistan. Raw cotton
was imported to the Ferghana Province from Chinese Xinjiang
(Статистический обзор… за 1913 г.1916: 80–81, table 13).
At the same time, there was a great demand for livestock in the
Ferghana Valley—the most densely populated region in
Turkistan. Neighboring provinces such as Semirechie supplied a
great quantity of livestock to the Ferghana Valley.
In the peripheral mountainous area, Kyrgyz nomads lived
and supplied livestock to the Valley. The Valley and
mountainous areas had close economic relationships, for
example, through livestock trade and seasonal labor for cotton
fields. The Valley’s type of agriculture was mostly irrigated
farming. Irrigation water came from rivers flowing from the
mountainous area. In this area, the Kyrgyz nomads expanded
their rain-fed grain cultivation in order to secure food, but
settled Muslim people in the Valley depended on imported grain
(Ueda 2013a: 119–120).
However these external and internal economic relationships
collapsed after the outbreak of WWI (Figure 2).
2. Economic conditions in the Ferghana Province
before World War I (WWI) and the anti-Soviet
Movement
The Ferghana Province consisted of two areas—the central
valley (the Ferghana Valley) and the peripheral mountainous
area.
Figure 2. The Economic System of the Ferghana Province
before WWI
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Journal of Asian Network for GIS-based Historical Studies Vol.2 (Dec. 2014) 22-31
After the outbreak of WWI, the native people suffered from
increased taxes, expropriation of resources, and rapid price
increases. The Ferghana Province especially suffered food
shortages because it had exported cotton to the Russian
Empire’s industrial centers and imported grains from other areas.
Unseasonable weather in the spring of 1916 and locust plague
caused cotton and grain crop failures.
The edict on June 25, 1916, which ordered native males of
Turkistan and other areas to work at the rear of the Russian army,
provoked massive rebellions in Russian Turkistan. Although the
revolt in the Ferghana Valley was suppressed in July 1916, the
scale and spread of this revolt were unprecedented (Tursunov
1962: 278). Some rebels in the 1916 revolt escaped to the
mountainous area and participated in the anti-Soviet movement
after the October Revolution (Obiya 1992: 19, 27).
The Russian February Revolution in 1917 stimulated
Muslims to engage in political activities. After the October
Revolution, the Fourth Extraordinary Congress of Turkistan
Muslims declared the formation of a Turkistan autonomous
government, and the city of Kokand in the Ferghana Valley was
chosen to be the government capital. The Bolsheviks, however,
attacked the Turkistan autonomous government in February
1918 and destroyed the city of Kokand, killing tens of thousands
of local Muslims.
The brutality in Kokand precipitated the anti-Soviet armed
struggles in the Ferghana Province. The Soviet authorities and
historians called this movement the “Basmachi (bandits).” After
the Central Asian republics gained independence in 1991, this
movement came to be called the anti-Soviet armed movement or
the national independence movement.(4) The Soviet authorities
took offense in 1919. By 1925, most of the Ferghana Valley was
put under the Red Army’s control.(5)
The civil war worsened economic conditions in Turkistan.
In the Ferghana Province, the grain supply from other regions
ceased, and a severe famine spread throughout the province
from 1917 to 1923. War, unseasonable weather, and the locust
plague worsened the food situation. Not only the Red Army but
also the anti-Soviet movement requisitioned food and livestock
from native people. Food for the Red Army actually stationed in
the Ferghana Province was supplied to the cost of the native
people. Due to the need of supplying the army with food, the
Soviet authorities could not aid the starving local population
(TsGA RUz, F. R-17, op. 1, d. 947, l. 199).
On the other hand, the anti-Soviet movement attacked the
Red Army’s transport corps and plundered its food supplies
(Rajabov 1994: 116–117). In 1921, they intercepted certain
railway locations and stopped the food supplies from reaching
the city of Kokand, where the Red Army was based. The
destruction of the irrigation system caused water shortage and,
simultaneously, flooded cultivated lands (TsGA RUz, F. R-39,
op. 1, d. 436, l. 16 and ll. 89–90). For example, a flood in 1920
ruined many irrigation systems in the Namangan County and the
Kokand County, and the war interfered with the required repairs.
In 1922–23, the Soviet authorities had to send laborers and
guards to the ruined irrigation station at Sarikurgan—located at
the pivot of the delta of the Sox River under the anti-Soviet
army’s control—to stop the river’s repeated flooding. The city
of Kokand was located near this point. Furthermore, most
irrigation pumps constructed under the Imperial rule were also
ruined during the civil war. According to Soviet sources, these
pumps were destroyed due to the anti-Soviet movement, owners
of the pumps who were afraid of nationalizing their own pumps,
and the flood of Syr Darya in 1921 (TsGA RUz, F. R-215, op. 1,
d. 226, l. 1 and F. R-215, op. 1, d. 231, l. 40).
This study focuses on some important issues and analyzes
the magnitude of the economic destruction and its historical
significance.
3. Demography of the Ferghana Province
Komatsu, Goto (2009) conducted an earlier historical GIS
survey of the Ferghana Province. However, some data from the
1920s must be re-examined;( 6 ) the necessity of analyzing
regional differences in the Ferghana Province offered by
Komatsu, Goto (2009) is important.
This study analyzes statistical sources or materials, mainly
located in the National Central Archive of Uzbekistan to
reconstruct wartime demography.
By 1920, when the civil war had spread throughout the
Ferghana Province, population decline was the greatest in the
two counties (уезд) of Osh and Namangan, which had been in a
state of war since the 1916 revolt (Figure 3, Figure 4).
Although the revolt in the Valley was suppressed in July, revolts
in the foothills of the Namangan County, the Osh County, and
the Andijan County continued from July to late October. Kyrgyz
rebels led by Tarasbay Alybaev (?–1916) fought against the
Russian army in the mountainous area of the Namangan County
until the winter of 1916 (Usenbaev 1997: 73-75, 78). After
suppression of the 1916 revolt, a few rebels escaped into the
mountainous area and continued attacking the Russian
authorities (Obiya 1992: 19, 21). In the 1916 revolt, some
Kyrgyz nomads in the foothills escaped into Chinese Xinjiang,
and they could not return by the 1920s (Budyanskiy 2007:
52–60). The population decrease from 1914 to 1917 in the
foothills of the Namangan County was noticeable (Ueda 2013b:
39)(7).
On the other hand, in the most western county of Kokand,
less population declined. In some districts (волость) in the
Kokand County, the population increased even during the
wartime, despite intense battles occurring in these districts.
These districts were located to the west of the city of Kokand.
Because high mountains did not block it, this area was on the
main route to other regions from the Ferghana Valley. Through
these districts, refugees flooded into the western districts such as
the Samarkand Province (TsGA RUz, F. R-39, op. 1, d. 402, l.
38). In these western districts, the populations decreased in 1925,
as refugees returned to their homes (Figure 5–1). Although a
part of refugees could return, the population decline in the
province was extremely serious.
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Journal of Asian Network for GIS-based Historical Studies Vol.2 (Dec. 2014) 22-31
Figure 3. Demography of the Ferghana Province (Source:
Очерки хозяйственной жизни Туркреспублики,
1921: 66–67, Отчет Ферганского областного
экономического совещания Туркестанскому
экономическому совету за янв.-сент. 1922 г., 1923:
25.)
Figure 5–1. Demographics in the Kokand County in 1908, 1917,
1923, and 1925
Figure 4. The Ferghana Province (Source: Benyaminovich and
Tersitskiy ed. 1975: Figure “Ирригация Ферганской
долины 1928 г.”)
In the eastern province, the Andijan County, the population
increased in 1923 with refugees from the Valley. This district
was located on the route to Chinese Xinjiang. As we will see
next, Russian and Ukrainian farmers from other settlements took
refuge in the Kugart District. Some part of the increased
population from 1917 to 1923 might be these Russian and
Ukrainian refugees (Figure 5–2).
In contrast with these districts on the evacuation route, in
districts located north of the city of Kokand, population decline
reached a fatal level. Archive documents suggest that there were
not only battles but also the destruction of irrigation systems.
Notably, these districts were located at the end of the alluvial
fan, in other words, at the end of the irrigation systems (Figure 5
–1). Documents also show that numerous refugees flooded into
cities in the Ferghana Province (TsGA RUz, F. R-39, op. 1, d.
436, l. 91 and F. R-17, op. 1, d. 947, l. 200).
Figure 5–2. Demographics in the Andijan County in 1908, 1917,
1923, and 1925 (Source: Список населенных мeст
Ферганской области, 1909, Материалы всероссийских
переписей в Туркестанской республике, вып. 4, Сельское
население Ферганской области по переписи 1917 г., 1924,
TsGA RUz, F. R-39, op. 2, d. 250, l. 32, Список населенных
мeст Узбекской ССР и Таджикской АССР, вып. 3,
Ферганская область, 1925, Benyaminovich and Tersitskiy ed.
1975: Figure “Ирригация Ферганской долины 1928 г.”)
Note: This study uses elevation data created by the Ferghana
Project in the Islamic Area Studies Project. Cf., Komatsu, Goto
(2004).
In the foothills of the Andijan County and the Osh County,
there were villages of Russian and Ukrainian settlers. In
November 1918, the settlers organized self-defense regiments in
order to defend their villages from the native anti-Soviet
movement. First, they collaborated with the Soviet authorities
and the Red Army, but they were opposed to Soviet economic
policies, so-called wartime communism, especially the grain
monopoly that the Soviet authorities planned to execute in the
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Journal of Asian Network for GIS-based Historical Studies Vol.2 (Dec. 2014) 22-31
Ferghana Province. The settlers had heard the news about the
tragedies in other regions caused by the grain monopoly
(Alekseenkov 1927: 21–22, 40, 44). In September 1919,
eventually, the Russian and Ukrainian settler army commanded
by K. Monstrov (1874–1920) allied with the native anti-Soviet
army led by Madaminbek (?–1920). These united forces
succeeded in occupying the city of Osh and the old city of
Margilan in September 1919. After a series of military successes,
they established the Ferghana Provisional Government in
October 1919, but the Red Army launched a counterattack in
January 1920 and captured the fortress of Gulcha in February
1920. Monstrov surrendered to the Red Army and was executed
(Rajabov 1994: 94–105, Nishiyama 1991: 50–51, Tursunov and
Nazarov 1984: 9).
By 1922, most Ukrainian villages in the mountainous areas
of the Andijan County and the Osh County had been ruined by
the civil war, and many Ukrainian settlers flooded into cities and
villages in the Kugart Valley. They petitioned the Soviet
authorities to return them to their homeland, but their petition
was rejected (TsGA RUz, F. R-621, op. 1, d. 106, ll. 26–27).
Figure 6–2. Changes in cotton planting (%) (Source: Same as
Table 1.)
By using historical GIS, data compared from about 1900
(1890–1904) and 1929 reveal that cotton production in the
Ferghana Valley had been entirely reconstructed by 1929 and
was more intensive than that in the Imperial era (Figure 7–1a
and 7-1b).(8)
4. Changes in Agriculture and Pasturage
Crop areas in the Ferghana Province decreased sharply
after the outbreak of WWI, mainly because the exchange of
exported raw cotton and imported grain collapsed. Cotton fields
decreased most sharply and occupied less than 5% of all the area
under cultivation in 1922 (Table 1 and Figure 6-1 and 6-2).
Table 1. Changes in cotton planting (ha/%)
1890–1904
1914
1922
1923–24
1924–25
1926–27 (Kir) ＋1929 (Uz)
Cotton
121922
322425
15073
123770
138025
356863
Wheat
114256
336922
na
59667
na
143873
Rice
52296
60021
na
52391
na
38329
Total ％ of cotton ％ of wheat
628506
19.4
18.2
972040
33.2
34.7
322103
4.7
na
365700
33.8
16.3
450135
30.7
na
686290
52.0
21.0
％ of rice
8.3
6.2
na
14.3
na
5.6
(Source: Материалы для Статистического Описания
Ферганской области, Результаты Поземельно-Податных
Работ, 1897–1912, Статистический обзор Ферганской
области за 1914 г.1917: table 6–9, TsGA RUz, F. R-17, op. 1, d.
947, l. 212, F. R-88, op. 1, d. 605, l. 2 and F. R-111, op. 5, d. 34,
l. 201, Краткий обзор советского строительства и народного
хозяйства Киргизии, 1926: 35, Районы УзССР в цифрах,
1930: 116–123.)
Figure 6–1. Changes in cotton planting (ha) (Source: Same as
Table 1.)
Figure 7–1a. The rate of cotton growing in about 1900
(1890–1904) and in 1929 (Voronoi map)
Figure 7–1b. The rate of cotton growing in about 1900
(1890–1904) and in 1929 (point map)
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Journal of Asian Network for GIS-based Historical Studies Vol.2 (Dec. 2014) 22-31
For example, the eastern area, where during the Imperial
era rice was mainly planted, had shifted to cotton monoculture
production. In other areas also, the rate of cotton plantation
increased (Figure 7–2). The eastern area is somewhat higher
than the western, and its climate is cooler. This condition was
less suitable for cotton planting. As for exporting by railway, the
eastern area was at a disadvantage. Nevertheless, in the late
1920s, cotton monoculture also expanded in the eastern area.
Figure 7–2. The Scale of Sowing (Cotton, Rice, and Wheat) in
about 1900 (1890–1904) and 1929 (Source:
Материалы для Статистического Описания
Ферганской области, Результаты
Поземельно-Податных Работ, 1897–1912,
Районы УзССР в цифрах, 1930: 116–123.)
What caused this rapid reconstruction of cotton
monoculture? Ostensibly, the Soviet authorities made every
effort to make the area economically dependent. Throughout the
civil war, the Soviet authorities gained a monopoly for
supplying food, seed, and livestock to the Ferghana Province
from other regions. In fact, the Soviet authorities preferentially
supplied these resources to restore cotton planting. In 1923, an
official wrote that there was no prospect of the expansion of
food production in Turkistan because funds were exclusively
used to restore cotton planting. The Soviet authorities utilized
the advance payments (“аванс” or “авансирование”) of wheat
and the money for planting cotton to control the native farmers
in Turkistan; this measure began no later than 1923. Many
farmers who faced famine received the advance, and thus cotton
planting revived remarkably in 1923–24. In 1924–25, the total
advance payments in Uzbekistan reached over 20.9 million
rubles and more than half (10.7 million rubles) was lent in the
Ferghana Province. Cotton farmers enjoyed priority regarding
grain and livestock in the advance payment system. This policy
continued until total collectivization in the 1930s. Besides this,
cotton farmers were privileged to buy grain from the Soviet
authorities for lower than wholesale price. Meanwhile, an
American reporter, A. Strong wrote that rice farmers in
Turkistan were labeled as anti-revolutionaries only because they
did not plant cotton. (TsGA RUz, F. R-17, op. 1, d. 947, l. 203,
214, TsGA RUz, F. R-111, op. 5, d. 33, l. 4, Отчет… 1923: 106,
Современный…, вып. 5, 1927: 108, Strong 1931: 61).
The Soviet authorities, however, could not supply sufficient
grain to Turkistan when farmers gathered raw cotton and
received cash for it in 1923. They planned to supply 8 million
pud of grain (5 million pud from Russia and 3 million pud from
Central Asia) to cotton areas in Turkistan, but they could supply
only 6,565,000 pud (4 million pud from Russia, 1.5 million pud
from Central Asia, and the rest from various grain stocks).
Cotton farmers had to spend almost all the money from cotton
crops to buy extremely expensive grain in autumn (TsGA RUz,
F. R-111, op. 1, d. 993, ll. 134–135). Thus, even though cotton
planting revived, food shortages continued in the 1920s.
Although the advance payment system began to revive
cotton planting, it caused a contradiction in the communist
ideology’s class struggle: large landholders could use the
advance payment more easily than smallholders because
subscription for advance payment was determined according to
the scale of cotton planting. Some large landholders lent it to
their tenant farmers or smallholders. This problem was not
cleared until the land–water reform (TsGA RUz, F. R–88, op. 1,
d. 589, ll. 4–14).
In late 1925, the land–water reform (земельно-водная
реформа) in the Ferghana Province was an important factor for
changing the agricultural structure in Turkistan. This reform
came about with a series of Sovietization measures in the
economic and cultural spheres in Turkistan during the 1920s.
Land–water reform aimed mainly to abolish “the feudalistic
landownership.” The Soviet authorities confiscated lands and
draft animals from the large landowners and redistributed them
to small farmers, varying the standards of land confiscation with
each province. In the Ferghana Province, the Soviet authorities
confiscated all the lands of owners who did not engage in
agriculture and had over 40 desyatinas (43.6 ha) of irrigated
land and farmers’ lands over 7 desyatinas (7.6 ha) (Dzhamalov
1962: 192–193).
One purpose of the land–water reform was the expansion
of cotton production (Muminov ed. 1974: 355). In fact, just
before the land–water reform in the Balykchi District, the rate of
cotton from all plantings by large landowners who cropped more
than 1.5 desyatinas (1.6 ha) was 53.8%, and this rate was less
than that of smallholders who cropped less than 0.5 desyatinas
(0.5 ha): 75.4% (Современный… 1927: 41–42).
The anti-Soviet movement and Monstrov were opposed
to the Soviet authorities’ food supply monopoly. In negotiation
with the Red Army in 1921, the anti-Soviet movement under
Aliyorbek’s (?–1921) command demanded the abolition of the
Soviet food policy in addition to the enforcement of Sharia and
the election of independent qadis (Nishiyama 1991: 50, Rajabov
1994: 124).
In 1926, food shortages occurred in the Valley, while there
was a bumper crop of cotton. In the Imperial era, if there was a
bumper cotton crop, grain was delivered to the Valley, as in
1910 (Краткий обзор… 1926: 69, Статистический обзор…
за 1910 г.1912: 20, Ueda 2013b: 37). This comparison suggests
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Journal of Asian Network for GIS-based Historical Studies Vol.2 (Dec. 2014) 22-31
that the rapid recovery of cotton plantation, led by the Soviet
authorities, was implemented without sufficient economic
preparation and that a forced economic policy was one of the
causes of prolonged food shortages in the Valley. This problem
was not solved in the 1920s, and food shortages were repeated
in 1931 (TsGA RUz, F. R–88, op. 9, d. 554, l. 32).
Notably, in December 1918, the Soviet authorities
accurately recognized the root cause of the famine in Turkistan
as the stoppage of grain importation from Russia. For example,
in 1918, there was a bumper grain crop in Turkistan, but it was
not sufficient for the population’s demand (TsGA RUz, F. R-111,
op. 1, d. 181, l. 31). Nevertheless, Soviet authorities did not
attempt to improve the condition for food self-sufficiency in
Turkistan; instead, they promoted cotton planting in the
Ferghana Valley, thereby reducing food production, because
Turkistan’s raw cotton was an extremely important material for
the Soviet state’s economic independence. In 1923–24, the
Soviet Union had to secure 82,000 tons of raw cotton for 180
million rubles in the New York market (TsGA RUz, F. R–111,
op. 1, d. 181, l. 31). The Soviet authorities expected that cotton
production’s revival in Turkistan would reduce the outflow of
foreign currency. In 1924–25, 1109 tons of raw cotton had
already been sent to Moscow from Uzbekistan, 52% of it
gathered in the Ferghana Province (TsGA RUz, F. R-88, op. 1, d.
589, l. 40).
Needless to say, the other side of the civil war, i.e., the
anti-Soviet movement was also responsible for the devastation,
but it had no measures for resolving the famine. After all, its
root cause was the stoppage of grain importation from
Russia—as the Soviet authorities recognized. The anti-Soviet
movement in the Ferghana Province could obtain few resources
from other regions (Rajabov 1994:175).(9) Thus, they had to
procure almost all strategic materials inside the Ferghana
Province. Some tried to export raw cotton stock to Xinjiang.
Although the huge amount of imported raw cotton from the
Ferghana Province lowered the price in Xinjiang, this attempt
did not basically solve the insufficiency of funds (Отчет…
1922: 103). As mentioned, raw cotton from Xinjiang was
imported to the Ferghana Province before the Revolution, and
Xinjiang’s market did not provide a great enough demand to
consume the surplus from the Ferghana Province.
In the peripheral mountainous area, not only cotton
planting but also wheat planting was expanded at the cost of
millet and grass. This change might have been caused by the
destruction of pasturage (considered below). A certain amount
of wheat was supplied to the Valley, which was suffering from
food shortage (Краткий обзор… 1926: 69, table 6 and 7), and
the prolonged food shortage might have created expansion of
wheat planting in the mountainous area.
A total head of livestock decreased sharply from the
outbreak of WWI, in addition to the severe famine, because of
requisitioning by the Russian Empire, the Red Army, and the
anti-Soviet movement. The 1916 revolt stopped livestock trade
with the Semirechie Province and Xinjiang (Asmis 1941: 322).
In particular, from 1920 to 1922, the head of livestock declined
from 760,000 to 210,000. One document suggests that the main
reason was the occupation of the mountainous areas by the
anti-Soviet movement where the local population pastured
livestock every summer (Отчет… 1923: 30, Ueda 2013b: 37).
The former economic connections between the Valley and the
mountainous area were severed because of the civil war.
The Soviet authorities prioritized the recovery of cotton
planting in the Valley over the recovery of pasturage. They
preferentially supplied oxen as draft animals to cotton farmers.
The Special Committee for the Improvement of Agriculture in
Ferghana (Особая Комиссия Турцика по Улучшению
Сельского Хозяйства в Фергане) began supplying plow horses
and draft oxen to farmers in November 1922 (Отчет… 1923:
138–139). In 1925, 60% of the fund to buy livestock for cotton
farmers was allotted to the Ferghana Province. For example,
Soviet authorities provided plow horses to cotton farmers by
using part of the fund to restore cotton planting and, furthermore,
imported 10,000 plow horses from Xinjiang (TsGA RUz, F.
R-111, op. 5, d. 34, l. 32, 118, 132). Besides this, cotton farmers
themselves actively purchased draft animals in neighboring
provinces. In 1924, farmers from the Ferghana Province bought
30% of the draft animals in the Pskent region of the Tashkent
County and took them to the Valley (TsGA RUz, F. R-111, op. 5,
d. 43, ll. 40–41). Therefore, the percentage of cows and oxen
rose, whereas that of sheep and goats declined below the prewar
level (Figure 8-1 and 8-2).
5. Conclusions
In the Ferghana Valley, the cotton monoculture that came
about under Russian rule entirely collapsed during WWI and the
civil war after the revolution. The exchange of cotton and grain
did not function after the outbreak of WWI. The Ferghana
Province suffered from famines between 1917 and 1923.
Several refugees from villages, including Russian and
Ukrainian settlers, flowed into neighboring areas and cities
during the civil war. Especially, in the districts where irrigation
systems were destroyed, population declines were devastating.
The civil war broke the economic interdependence between the
Valley and the mountainous area. Mountain pastureland was
unavailable and irrigation systems from the mountainous areas
to the Valley were destroyed. Economic conditions in the
Ferghana Province collapsed in 1922–23 when the Soviet
authorities seized most of the Valley (Figure 9–1).
From the beginning, the Soviet authorities made efforts to
revive cotton planting in the Ferghana Valley and put all the
resources necessary, such as food, seed, and livestock, into it.
By 1929, the cotton monoculture in the Valley had advanced
more than that during the Imperial era. At the height of famine,
the Soviet authorities could force native farmers to plant cotton
by using the advance payment of wheat and money. The
land-water reform was also an effective measure for expanding
cotton planting. In other words, native farmers could not avoid
depending on advance payment, and by 1923, the famine made
the reinforcement of cotton monoculture possible. In 1926, for
example, there was “hunger export” from the Ferghana Valley
owing to cotton production. This example suggests that the
cotton planting revived by the Soviet authorities lacked enough
28
Journal of Asian Network for GIS-based Historical Studies Vol.2 (Dec. 2014) 22-31
economic preparation. This problem was not solved in the 1920s,
and food shortage continued into the early 1930s (Figure 9–2).
Without question, the anti-Soviet movement was also
responsible for the war’s devastation, but had no measure to
resolve the famine problem. Its root cause was the insufficiency
of grain importation from Russia. The anti-Soviet movement did
not have a rear area from which they could supply enough
resources to the front.
Figure 9–1. The Economic System of the Ferghana Province
from 1920 to 1922
Figure 8–1. The Change of Pasturage from 1894 to 1929 (%)
Figure 9–2. The Economic System of the Ferghana Province
from 1923 to 1929
Supplement: Concerning the Method of
Historical GIS
Figure 8–2. The Change of Pasturage from 1894 to 1929 (the
number of livestock) (Source: Обзор Ферганской
области за 1884 г., 1889: 7, Очерки хозяйственной
жизни Туркреспублики, 1921: 68–70, Отчет
Ферганского областного экономического
совещания Туркестанскому экономическому
совету за янв.-сент. 1922 г. 1923: 30, Вся Средняя
Азия: Справочная книга на 1926 хоз. год. 1926:
389, 654, Статистический ежегодник 1917–1923 г.
г., Т. 1, Ч. 3,1924: 20–25, Районы УзССР в цифрах,
1930: 116–123, Краткий обзор советского
строительства и народного хозяйства Киргизии,
1926: 35.)
Since Russian Turkistan was divided into republics under
the National Delimitation policy in 1924, it is difficult to
compare statistical data before and after 1924.
By using the historical GIS method, this study compared
district-level population data for 1923 to 1925. This comparison
was possible because district organizations continued to
function after the National Delimitation in 1924. As for the
changes in agriculture, this study uses data from 1900 and 1929.
Between these two data sets, the territorial units of statistics
differed. Therefore, this study posited statistical data on the
historical GIS map by using a Voronoi diagram (figure 7–1a)
and clarified the region’s progress in cotton monoculture. Thus,
this study made possible a quantitative economic comparison
between the Russian Imperial era and the early Soviet period.
This example shows that historical GIS has the potential to
reconstruct more meaningful information from historical
materials than existing quantitative analysis methods. In the
1930s, the Soviet authorities began to construct large irrigation
systems in the Ferghana Valley. These new irrigation systems
developed new cotton planting areas in the Valley’s central area.
29
Journal of Asian Network for GIS-based Historical Studies Vol.2 (Dec. 2014) 22-31
The historical GIS method can also prove an effective tool for
analyzing this new phase.
(1984). In fact, these countries gave some money and weapons to
the anti-Soviet movement but the quantity of these supports cannot
compare with the military supply of the Red Army imported from
Notes
Russia by the railway.
(1) As to the historiography of the anti–Soviet movement in Turkistan,
see Obiya (1998) and Ziyoeva (2000).
(2) For example, see Shamagdiev (1961) and (1975).
(3) For example, see Rajabov (1994), (2005), and Ziyoeva (2000).
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by a grant-in-aid from Mishima Kaiun
Memorial Foundation.
(4) See Rajabov (1994) and (2005).
(5) As to the course of political and military events in the civil war
between the Red Army and the anti-Soviet movement in the
Ferghana Province, the participants and witnesses of the war already
published reports and materials in the 1920s. These materials were
useful as primary historical resources. Soviet researchers continued
investigating the anti-Soviet movement in the Ferghana Province,
utilizing archive documents; however, some of their works, for
example Shamagdiev (1961) and (1975), were more ideological than
their predecessors. Shamagdiev (1961) generally denied the
responsibility of the Soviet authorities to the economic devastation
and the outbreak of the anti-Soviet movement in the Ferghana
Province, even negating the analysis by the Soviet participants of
the war at that time. In 1980s, some Soviet researchers such as E. Yu.
Yusupov and B. V. Lunin related the war against the anti-Soviet
movement to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After the
independence of Central Asian republics, the anti-Soviet movement
became one of the main themes for reconsidering their own national
history. In Uzbekistan, Q. Rajabov submitted a doctoral candidate
thesis about the anti-Soviet movement in the Ferghana Province.
Presently, the second chapter of his doctoral candidate thesis is most
comprehensive in the chronology of the political history of the
anti-Soviet movement in the Ferghana Province (Rajabov 1994:
81–169). Japanese researcher, Ch. Obiya who published a series of
articles about the anti-Soviet movement in Turkistan also recognized
the contribution of Rajabov’s chronology on the basis of the archival
documents in Uzbekistan (Obiya 1998: 82).
(6) Komatsu, Goto (2009: 99) and Komatsu, Goto (2004: 117) quoted
the population data of the Ferghana Province in 1920 from
Vaidyanath (1967: 270–271). Vaidyanath quoted that data from the
table of Статистический ежегодник 1917–1923 г. г., Т. 1, Ч. 3
(1924: 44–48). The data of the Ferghana Province in that table was
edited from the urban population in 1914 and the rural population in
1917 (Статистический ежегодник 1917–1923 г. г., Т. 1, Ч. 3 1924:
44). Vaidyanath, however, did not mention it in his book.
(7) The census of 1917 could not be taken in the Osh County because of
insufficiency of funds and political instability (Материалы
всероссийских переписей… 1924: I).
(8) In the Ferghana Province, land surveying to determine land tax on
agricultural income was conducted in the Andijan County from 1890
to 1893, in the
Margiran County from 1894 to 1896, in the Kokand
County from 1899 to 1902, in the Osh County from 1903 to 1904,
and in the Namangan County from 1897 to 1899 (Ueda 2013b: 43).
(9) While the articles published after 1991 generally emphasize the
spontaneity of the anti-Soviet movement, the Soviet researches by
1980s stressed the intervention and the support by “imperialist
governments” as Great Britain and the United States. See Khasanov
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31