WWW.IPPR.ORG
SocialNetworksand
PolishImmigrationto
theUK
EconomicsofMigrationWorkingPaper5
byMadeleineSumption
May2009
©ippr2009
InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
2
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Contents
Aboutippr ............................................................................................................................. 3
Abouttheauthor................................................................................................................... 3
Author’sacknowledgements ................................................................................................. 3
Foreword:Theeconomicsofmigration................................................................................. 4
Executivesummary............................................................................................................... 5
Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 6
Whyshouldwecareaboutsocialnetworks? ........................................................................ 7
Howdosocialnetworksaffectsocialandeconomicinclusion? ........................................... 8
RecentEUimmigrationtotheUK ...................................................................................... 11
Data:TheLabourForceSurvey ........................................................................................... 13
Theprevalenceofinformalreferrals.................................................................................... 14
WhatcausedtheincreaseinnetworkuseamongPoles?................................................... 15
EmpiricalresultsfromtheLabourForceSurveydata ......................................................... 16
Howdoesthiscomparetootherimmigrantgroups? ......................................................... 18
WhatdothefindingsimplyforotherEasternEuropeanimmigrants? ............................... 19
Conclusionsanddiscussion ................................................................................................. 20
Appendix1:Mobilityanditsimpactonempiricalresults................................................... 23
References ........................................................................................................................... 25
3
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Aboutippr
TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,producing
cutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.
Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Through
ourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepractical
solutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,
whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnerships
andinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.
ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected]
www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065
ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinMay2009.©ippr2009
Abouttheauthor
MadeleineSumptionisanAssociatePolicyAnalystattheMigrationPolicyInstituteinWashingtonDC,
wheresheworksontheLaborMarketsInitiativeandtheInternationalProgram.
MadeleineholdsaMastersdegreewithhonoursfromtheUniversityofChicago’sschoolofpublic
policy.Duringherstudiesshefocusedonlaboureconomicsandpresentedathesisonsocialnetworks
amongEasternEuropeanimmigrantsanditslabourmarketimplications.Herrecentpublications
includeMigrationandtheEconomicDownturn:WhattoExpectintheEuropeanUnion (co-authored;
MigrationPolicyInstitute); ImmigrationandtheLabourMarket:Theory,EvidenceandPolicy(coauthored;EqualityandHumanRightsCommission);andObservationsontheSocialMobilityofthe
ChildrenofImmigrantsintheUnitedStatesandUnitedKingdom (co-authored;SuttonTrust,
forthcoming).
MadeleinealsoholdsaFirstClassDegreeinRussianandFrenchfromNewCollege,Oxford.
Author’sacknowledgements
IwouldliketothankIoanaMarinescu,KerwinCharlesandtheMigrationTeamatipprforworkingwith
meonthispaper.IamalsogratefultoDanBlack,JeffreyGrogger,WesleyYin,DavidAtkin,Matthew
McFeeleyandFreddieSumptionfortheirhelpandcomments.
4
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Foreword:TheEconomicsofMigrationproject
Thisworkingpaperformspartofippr’sEconomicsofMigrationproject.Theprojectaimsto
shapethinkingaroundhowweunderstandtheeconomicimpactsofmigration,providenew
evidenceabouttheextentandnatureofthoseimpactsintheUK,andoffernewinsightsas
tohowpolicymightbestaddressmigrationtomaximiseeconomicbenefit.Wehopethatthe
projectwillcontributetoabetter-informedpublicdebateandamorepreparedpolicy
community,betterabletoevaluatemigration’seconomiccontributions,andtomanagethem
tothebenefitofall.
FiveyearsonfromtheaccessionofnewcountriestotheEuropeanUnionin2004,itis
importanttoconsidertheevolvingeconomicroleofmigrantsfromthosecountriesinthe
UK.ThisstudylooksathowPolishmigrantshaveincreasinglyusedsocialnetworkstofind
employmentintheUK.Althoughthishasallowedthemtomaintainveryhighemployment
rates,itbringswithitariskthatthesemigrantswillbe‘lockedin’tolow-skilledjobs,and
lessintegratedintothewiderBritisheconomyandsociety.Thepapersuggestschallengesfor
anintegrationpolicyagendathatisfocusedonlong-termsettlement:manymigrantsfrom
theEUcometotheUKforarelativelyshortperiodoftime,buttheireconomicandsocial
integrationisnonethelessimportant.Thiswillrequirepolicymeasuresthatcanbeeffective
immediately,suchasrapidrecognitionofmigrants’qualifications.
Wearegratefultothefundersofthisproject:BusinessforNewEurope,theCommissionfor
RuralCommunities,theTradesUnionCongressandtheUKBorderAgency(HomeOffice).
Theviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheauthoranddonotnecessarilyrepresentthoseof
ipprortheprojectfunders.
SarahMulley
TimFinch
ProjectCoordinator
HeadofMigration,EqualitiesandCitizenshipTeam
5
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Executivesummary
Socialnetworksplayanimportantroleinchannellingworkersintojobs.Thishasbenefits:
informalnetworksareoftenabletomatchworkersandemployersfasterandmoreefficiently
thanformalrecruitmentmechanisms.Butitalsohasdrawbacks,sincewidespreadrelianceon
socialnetworksinthelabourmarketcanleadtosocialstratificationbylimitingan
individual’sopportunitiestothosethathisorherpeergroupcanprovide.
Amongimmigrantsinparticular,relianceonsocialnetworksislikelytoindicatepoor
integrationamongindividualswhofacebarrierstoaccessingformalrecruitmentchannels,for
exampleduetolanguagedifficultiesorapoorunderstandingofthelocallabourmarket.A
trade-offemerges,therefore:socialnetworksarelikelytohelpimmigrantstofindjobsinthe
shortrun,butmaylimitopportunitiesforfullsocialandeconomicintegrationinthelonger
term.
Since2004,whenenlargementoftheEuropeanUniongavenationalsfromtheeightEastern
Europeanaccessionstates(knownasA8migrants)therighttoworkintheUK,thelargest
A8group–Poles–hasincreasinglyreliedonsocialnetworkstofindemployment.Empirical
analysissuggeststhatthisoccurredbothbecauseofthenaturaldevelopmentofsocial
networksovertimeduringaperiodofhugeexpansionandfluxinthePolishimmigrant
populationandbecauseofthechangingprofileofthePolishimmigrantspresentintheUK.
Polishimmigrants’useofsocialnetworksmightwellbeacontributortotheirlow
unemploymentandhighemploymentratesintheUK,sinceinformalrecruitmentisknownto
speeduptheprocessofmatchingemployersandemployees.Amoreworryingpossibility,
however,isthatitwillleadtosocialstratification,‘lockingin’Polishworkers’overrepresentationinlow-skilledjobs,despitetheirhigheducationlevels.
Implicationsforpolicymakers
ThefindingsofthispaperareconsistentwiththeviewthatPolishworkersfacebarriersto
fullsocialandeconomicintegration–afindingsupportedbyqualitativestudiesonA8
workers’experiencesintheUK.Theprimarychallengetopolicymakersishowtoease
integrationinthecontextofhighratesofreturnmigration.Themostpowerfuldriverof
immigrantintegration–thelengthofresidenceinthehostcountry–cannolongerberelied
upontoproduceresults.Forthisreasonpolicymakersareadvisedtofocusnotjuston
strategiesthatareeffectiveoverlongperiods(suchaslong-termtrainingstrategiesand
languageacquisition)butalsoonmeasuressuchascredentialrecognitionandthe
enforcementoflabourstandardsthatcanhaveamoreimmediateeffect.
6
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Introduction
Socialnetworksplayacrucialroleinmigration.Theyaffectimmigrants’decisionstomigrate,
theirchoiceofdestinationandtheiropportunitiesandintegrationinthehostcountryon
arrival.Thispaperfocusesonimmigrants’useofsocialnetworkstofindemployment:the
extenttowhichtheyrelyoninformalrecruitmentasopposedtoformaljobsearchmethods1.
Widespreadrelianceonsocialnetworkscriticallyaffectsimmigrants’successinthelabour
market,shapingthequalityandavailabilityofjobsaswellasopportunitiesforsocialmobility
overthelongterm.Relianceonsocialnetworksisalsointerestingasanindicatorof
immigrants’abilitytobecomeintegrated(economicallyandsocially)intothehost
community.
OverthefiveyearssincetheenlargementoftheEuropeanUnioninMay2004,theUKhas
experiencedwhatmightbe‘oneofthemostconcentratedvoluntarymigrationsintheworld
today’(Pollardetal 2008):thepopulationofimmigrantsfromeightEasternEuropean
accessioncountries(the‘A8’)residingintheUKisestimatedtohaveincreasedbyabouthalf
amillion(ibid)2,themajoritycomingfromPoland.ThePolishpopulationintheUKexpanded
roughlysixfold3 overafouryearperiod,movingfromthethirteenthtothefirstlargest
foreign-bornnationalgroup.Althoughthecurrenteconomicdownturnisthoughttobe
encouragingreturnmigration,itislikelythatoverthelongterm,Polishimmigrantswill
remainasignificantpresenceintheUK.
ThesizeandcompositionofimmigrantflowsfromEasternEuropearelargelybeyondthe
Government’scontrol.However,policyinterventionscanaffectA8immigrants’economicand
socialintegration,andtheirimpactonthecommunitiesinwhichtheylive.Thispaperaimsto
furthertheunderstandingofrecentimmigrants’labourmarketexperiences,withaviewto
informingintegrationpolicy.Thepaperdescribeshowovertime,asthePolishimmigrant
communityintheUKexpandedanddeveloped,Polesbecamedramaticallymorelikelyto
obtainjobsthroughsocialnetworks,withconcomitantimplicationsfortheiropportunities
andintegration.Empiricalanalysissuggeststhatmuchofthischangeisattributabletothe
increasingsizeofPolishsocialnetworks,withasmallerbutimportantcontributionmadeby
thechangingcompositionofPolishimmigrantsovertime.
ThisanalysisfocusesonPolesintheUK.SincetheycomprisethemajorityofrecentA8
migrants,Polishworkersclearlyformanimportantpartofanyattempttounderstandthe
natureoftherecentimmigrationfromapolicyperspective.Asthelargestnationalgroup
fromtherecentimmigration,Polishimmigrantsarealsothemostamenabletostudy.
StatisticalanalysisofthedatafromtheLabourForceSurveyhasmostvalidityforthisgroup;
andthetheoreticalpredictionsfortheiruseofsocialnetworksaremostclear-cut,sincethe
growthinthePolishcommunityislargeenoughtoallowthewidespreademergenceof
PolishsocialgroupsthroughouttheUK.Thatsaid,manyoftheconclusionsreachedarealso
relevanttootherA8nationals.
1.Throughoutthispaper,‘informal’recruitmentandthe‘useofsocialnetworks’toobtainjobsareused
interchangeably.Researcherstypicallyuse‘socialnetworks’torefertofriends,colleaguesandfamily
members,althoughitisimportanttonotethatagentsandlabourmarketintermediariescanalsoplaya
similarroleinthelabourmarket(forareview,seeElrickandLewandowska2008).
2.Blanchfloweretal (2007)estimateanupperboundofhalfamillionA8immigrantsbySeptember2006.
3.Basedon58,000Polesinthe2001Censusand458,000in2007asestimatedbyPollardetal (2008).
7
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Whyshouldwecareaboutsocialnetworks?
Itistypicallyestimatedthatabout50percentofalljobsareobtainedinformally,using
referralsfromfriends,relativesorothermembersofasocialnetwork(CahucandFontaine
2002,Montgomery1991,WahbaandZenou2005).Socialnetworks,therefore,arecentralto
theproperfunctioningofthelabourmarket.Whilemosteconomicmodelssuggestthat
usingsocialnetworksbringseconomicbenefits(toemployers,employeesandtheeconomy
asawhole),thisrosypicturecomeswithcaveats–includingthepotentialforsocial
stratificationandpoorintegration,aswellasincreasedvulnerabilitytoshocks.Thissection
discussestherelationshipbetweenimmigrants’socialnetworksandtheirexperienceinthe
hostcountry:theirshort-andlong-termlabourmarketoutcomes,andtheirabilityto
integratesociallyandeconomically.
Howdosocialnetworksinfluencelabourmarketoutcomes?
Economistsdisagreeastowhetheragivenjobseekerislikelytoobtainahigherqualityjob
byusingsocialnetworksthanbyusingformalchannels.Thedivergencelargelydependson
whetherweseesocialnetworksasaninformation-improvingmechanism,orasarecoursefor
thosewhocannotfindjobsbyothermeans.Inreality,thereislikelytobesometruthinboth
ofthesemodels.
First,asaninformation-improvingmechanism,informalreferralsarethoughttogive
employersknowledgeaboutajobcandidatethattheymightnotbeabletoelicitthrough
formalinterviewing:thecandidatecomeswitha‘sealofapproval’fromthepersonwho
referredher.Likewise,thejobcandidatecanobtainmoreinformationaboutthenatureof
thework,andhersuitabilityforit.Thiswouldmeanthatemployersandemployeesarebetter
matched(Montgomery1991,Munshi2003).Abetter-matchedemployeeismoreproductive
andshouldreceivehigherwagesandstaywiththeemployerforlonger.Inaddition,social
networkslowerthecostoflookingforajobforthejobseeker,becausejobsearchesusing
informalmethodshavebeenshowntoprovideahigherprobabilityofreceivingajoboffer
(Holzer1988,Frijtersetal 2003;althoughnotethatthelatterfindthatonlywhitenatives
[notimmigrants]experienceshorterunemploymentdurationwhenusinginformaljobsearch
methods).
Ontheotherhand,ifthemainreasonthatemployersrecruitthroughsocialnetworksisto
reducehiringcosts(suchasadvertisingandinterviewingexpenses),theimplicationsare
slightlydifferent.Informalrecruitment,underthisassumption,doesnotnecessarilyimplya
higherqualitymatch(andhencehigherwagesfortheworker).Indeed,aneconomicmodel
inwhichinformalrecruitment’smainbenefitisitslowcostcanleadtoreducedlabourmarket
efficiencyanddecreasedemployeewelfare,asshownbyCahucandFontaine(2002).
Thesecondmajorreasonthatsocialnetworkshaveimplicationsforjobqualityisthatthe
kindofworkerwhoobtainsjobsinformallymightdosobecausehewasunabletotake
advantageofformaljobsearchmethods.Inotherwords,informalrecruitmenttellsus
somethingabouttheworkerswhouseit.Immigrantworkersmaybeparticularlylikelytorely
onsocialnetworks,preciselybecausetheyfindformalrecruitmentchallenging,forseveral
reasons.First,languagebarriersmaymakeformalrouteslessaccessibleorlesssuccessful.
Muchoftheliteratureonrefugees,forexample,pointstothefactthatpoorlanguageskills
makeindividualsreliantonsocialnetworkswhichallowrecentarrivalstoaccessemployment
(Robinson1986).Second,recentimmigrantsmaylackknowledgeofthelocallabourmarket:
Marshall(1989)showsthatrefugeesseekingworkoftendidnotknowwhichwerethelarge
employersectorsintheUK(thisisparticularlyproblematicgiventhatmanyimmigrants
8
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
changeoccupationorindustrywhentheymove).Third,immigrants’foreignqualifications
mightnotbewidelyrecognisedbynativeemployers(Bloch2002,Kempton2002,Mesch
2002,BaileyandWaldinger1991)–aproblemalleviatedbysocialnetworks,eitherbecause
theenterpriseofferingajobisrunbyfellowcountrymen,orbecauseamiddlemancan
‘translate’thequalificationsandunderstandtheirrelevance.
Ifwecompareimmigrantswhoobtainedtheirjobinformallytothosewhodidnot,weare
likelytofindthattheformerareconcentratedinlower-payingjobs.Thisisprimarilybecause
low-skilledemployers,atleastintheUK,relymostoninformalrecruitment.Pellizzari(2004)
showsthatincountriessuchastheUK,whereformal recruitmentistheprimarymechanism
forfindingemployeesinmostwell-paidjobs,employersonlyrelyoninformalrecruitmentfor
thelowest-productivityjobs–thejobsforwhichemployersarelessworriedaboutmakinga
mistakeintheirselection.Ontheotherhand,incountrieswhereemployersuseinformal
recruitmentmorewidely,informally-recruitedworkerswerefoundtogainhigherwages,on
average.
Importantly,thecross-countrydifferencesinrecruitmentpracticesthatPellizzarihighlights
couldmeanthatimmigrantsfromcountrieswhereinformalrecruitmentisnotassociatedwith
lowerwagescouldsufferwhentheycometotheUK,iftheydonotrealisethatrecruiting
practicesherearedifferent.Marshall(1989)showsthat,atthetimeofhisstudy,jobhunting
normsvariedsignificantlybycountryandthatrefugeeswerelikelytobringwiththemthe
customofrelyingoncontactstofindajobdespitethefactthatthiswasan‘inefficient
method’forrefugeeswhosefriendsandrelativesoftenknewlittleaboutlocallabourmarkets
andwerequitelikelytobeunemployed.Inparticular,hearguesthathisgraduate
respondentswereusingjobsearchtechniquesmoreappropriateformanualorroutineclerical
jobs,becausetheydidnotunderstandjobhuntingmethodsintheUK4.
Howdosocialnetworksaffectsocialandeconomic
inclusion?
Whileimmigrantsmaybebetteroffintheshortruniftheyhavetheoptionofusingsocial
networkstofindemployment,anumberofimportantlong-termconsiderationscomeinto
play.Therelianceonnetworksisassociatedwith,andinsomecasesmaydirectlycause,poor
economicandsocio-culturalintegrationinthehostcountry.
Employment:doessizematter?
Intuitivelyweknowthatthemoreacquaintancesanindividualhas,thegreaterthelikelihood
thatoneofthemmaypassoninformationaboutanappropriatejob.Researchonthe
implicationsofnetworksizelargelybearsoutthisintuition,findingthatmembersoflarger
(ordenser)networksaremorelikelytohaveajob.IoannidesandLoury(2004)reviewthis
literature.
Munshi(2003)findsthatwhenMexicanimmigrants’communitiesintheUnitedStateswere
larger(andhencebetterequippedtoprovideinformalreferrals),thismademembersofthat
4.AtthetimeofMarshall’sstudy,forexample,theUKwasdistinguishedbyagreateruseofformal
applicationandinterviewproceduresthanthecountriesoforiginofrefugeerespondents.
9
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
communitymorelikelytobeemployed5.Anotherstudy,onthevariationinnetworksizethat
resultedfromtheplacementofrefugeesbyapublicagency,findsthatinthelongrun(afew
years)largernetworksimprovelabourmarketoutcomes(employmentprobabilityand
wages),especiallywhenthenetworkscontainworkerswithsubstantialjobtenure;butthat
intheshortrunlargernetworkgrowthcandecreasetheprobabilityofemployment,since
moreindividualscompetefortheavailablejobinformation(Beaman2008).Patacchiniand
Zenou(2008)studyethnicnetworksintheUKandfindthatemploymentratesforindividual
ethnicgroupsincreasewhenmembersaregeographicallyconcentrated.Thesestudies
suggestthat‘biggerisbetter’whenitcomestosocialnetworks,atleastintheshortrun.
Notethatthequalityofthenetworkalsomatters:networkswithhigheremploymentrates
havegenerallybeenfoundtobemoreuseful,sincememberscanpassonmorelabour
marketinformation.WahbaandZenou(2005),forexample,findthatanindividual’s
probabilityoffindingajobthroughfriendsorrelativesincreaseswithbothpopulation
densityandtheemploymentrateoftheareainwhichtheylive(theauthorsusepopulation
densityasaproxyforthesizeofanindividual’snetwork)6.
Socialstratification
Thisstrongevidencethatsocialnetworkscanimproveemploymentrates,however,mustbe
qualifiedbyapotentialside-effect:socialstratificationandvulnerabilitytoshocks.
Thefirstthingtonoteisthatthevalueofasocialnetworkdependsonwhoisinit.A
jobseeker’snetworkismuchmorevaluableifitsmembershaveinformationabouthighqualityjobs.Ontheotherhand,ifallofanindividual’scontactscanonlyprovideinformation
aboutlow-skilledorlowpayingjobs,andiftheindividualfacesbarrierstoparticipatingin
formalrecruitmentmechanisms(asdescribedabove),itbecomeslikelythathisorhersuccess
inthelabourmarketwillbeheldback.Thiseffectisborneoutbytheevidence:astudyon
refugeeplacementinSwedenfindsthatlivinginethnicenclavescanimproveanindividual’s
employmentprospectsiftheenclaveisahigh-incomeone,butcanreduceearningsifitis
populatedbylow-incomeco-ethnics(Edinetal 2003).Inotherwords,theuseofinformal
recruitmentislikelytoreducethevariationinthekindsofjobsthatmembersofagiven
groupcanaccess(Montgomery1991).Thismeansthathighly-qualifiedimmigrantsmayfail
tofindappropriatelydemandingjobsifmembersoftheirnetworkareinlow-skilled
occupations.Continuedrelianceonsocialnetworksinthelabourmarketwouldmakethis
effectself-perpetuating,suchthatmembersbecome‘lockedin’tolow-productivityjobs.This
isparticularlyrelevantinthecaseofPolishimmigrants,sinceweknowthatmanyofthem
‘downgrade’tolessskilledoccupationsoncetheyreachtheUK(Dustmannetal 2008).
5.Munshiusesanaturalexperimenttoprovideaveryrobustdemonstrationofthiseffect.Heuses
rainfallinMexicanagriculturalcommunitiesasaninstrumenttopredictthevolumeofreturnmigration
totheUnitedStates:whenrainfallissparseinagivenyear,immigrationtotheUSincreasesinawaythat
isexogenoustothelabourmarketconditionsinthehostcountry,allowingtheeconometriciantomeasure
theimpactoflargernetworkswithoutthebiascreatedbyself-selectionofimmigrantstocertainlocations
basedontheirunobservablecharacteristics.
6.Theyalsofinddiminishingmarginalreturnsand,afteracertainpoint,negativereturnstonetworksize,
whichtheyattributeto‘congestion’preventingtheefficienttransferofinformationbetweencontacts.
Theuseofpopulationdensityasaproxyfornetworksize,however,meansthatthisresultcouldarise
fromspecificcharacteristicsofverylargeorcrowdedcitieswhichareunrelatedtonetworksize(for
examplethequalityofcontacts).Tothebestofmyknowledge,nootherstudyhasfoundnegative
returnstonetworksize.
10
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Relianceonsocialnetworksforemployment,therefore,increasestheuniformityofthekinds
ofjobsavailablewithagiven(immigrant)group.Italsomakestheprobabilityoffindinga
jobwithinagiventimeframemoreuniform.Thisisbecauseindividualsrelyprimarilyontheir
employedacquaintancestohelpthemtofindwork:iftheemploymentrateishigh,therewill
bemoreinformationgoingaround;ifitislow,informationaboutvacancieswillbeharderto
comeby.Inotherwords,employmentbreedsfurtheremployment.
Essentially,thismeansthatatemporaryshocktoagroup’sunemploymentratecanhavea
contagioneffectwithinthegroupandbecomeself-perpetuating(Calvo-Armengoland
Jackson2004).Thiswouldmakeitdifficultforotherwiseemployableimmigrantstoaccess
jobopportunitiesiftheunemploymentrateintheirnetworkisalreadyhigh.Theresultis
confirmedbyTopa(2001),whonotestheeffectofsocialnetworksincreatinggeographical
concentrationofunemploymentthatcannotbeexplainedbyindividualorneighbourhood
characteristics.Hesuggeststhathighunemploymentinasocialnetworkbreedsfurther
unemployment,sinceitreducesthenumberofinformalreferralsavailable.SincetheUKis
nowinrecession,itisworthnotingthattheparticularlyhighrelianceonsocialnetworks
amongPolishimmigrants,documentedinthispaper,maywellbeprolongedbeyondtheend
ofthedownturn,forthisveryreason.
Finally,socialnetworkscanbreedsocialstratificationbyexcludingnon-members.The
extensivesociologyliteratureonethnicorimmigrantgroupsinthelabourmarketemphasises
thetendencyofgroupswithsharedidentityorsocialtiestoseektodominateaparticular
nicheandgaincontroloveritbyexcludingoutsiders(see,forexample,Waldinger2000).
Thereisanargument,forexample,thatacombinationofstrongsocialnetworksand
employerdiscriminationhasallowedAsianimmigrantsandHispanicstopushAfrican
AmericansoutofthemoredesirablemanufacturingjobsintheUnitedStates(Anderssonet
al 2005).However,thismustbeseeninthecontextofextensiveresearchshowingthat
immigrationdoesnotsignificantlyreducelocalworkers’wagesoremploymentratesinmost
cases(forareview,seeSomervilleandSumption2009).Inparticular,thefactthatPolish
immigrantsareoverrepresentedin‘undesirable’jobswithirregularhoursorworking
conditions(suchasagricultureandhospitality),suggeststhattheprospectofimmigrants
‘shuttingout’localsisnotamajordrawbackassociatedwiththeiruseofsocialnetworks,in
thiscase.
Integration
Relianceonsocialnetworksinthelabourmarketmaybeimportantasanindicatorof(and
potentiallyacausalcontributorto)poorintegrationintothehostcommunity.Asdescribed
earlier,immigrantsoftenusesocialnetworksinthelabourmarketbecausetheycannot
accessformalopportunities.Thismeansthatanimmigrantgroupthatreliesheavilyonsocial
networksinthelabourmarketmaybepoorlyintegrated.Mesch(2002)showsthatRussian
immigrantstoIsraelwhoworkedintheirownlanguage(manyofwhomwouldhaveaccessed
thesejobsthroughfellownationals)werelesslikelytohavesocialcontactswithnative
Israelis–anindicatorofassimilation.Montgomery(1996)alsofindsthatparticipationinan
ethnicnetworkisassociatedwithpoor‘subjectiveadaptation’(essentiallysatisfactionwith
lifeinthehostcountry).
Integrationis,ofcourse,acomplexandill-definedconceptthatcanrefertoanyorallof
economicwelfare,opportunitiesandmobility,socialtieswithnon-immigrants,acquisitionof
host-communityculturalnormsandpsychologicaladaptationtoliveinanewcountry(see
Montgomery1996).Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thatresearchersdisagreeastotheexact
relationshipbetweensocialnetworksandintegration.
11
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Totheextentthatthereisanacademic‘consensus’,itisthatnationalorethnicnetworks
easesettlementintheshortrun,butcanshelterimmigrantsfrommainstreamlifeinthehost
country.Hagan(1998)forexample,pointstotheshort-termbenefitsoforganisational
supportandinformationonhousingandemployment,butnotesthatstrongtieswithinan
immigrantgroupcanrestrictopportunitiesoutsideofthatgroup.BaileyandWaldinger
(1991)showthatethnicenclavesallowimmigrantstomakebetteruseoftheirskillsandto
develophumancapitalinthelongrun,withthecaveatthatsocialmobilityisoftenpossible
onlywithintheenclave.Networksmaydelaylanguageacquisitionnecessaryforsocial
integrationandthedevelopmentofhumancapital(Mesch2002),buttheyalsoenhance
economicintegrationbyprovidingjobs.Wemightexpecteconomicintegrationtoleadto
socialintegration(Borjas2006),althoughthisdoesnothavetobethecaseifjobsare
primarilypartofan‘ethnicsector’.(Notealsoadissentingopinionthateconomicandother
indicesofabsorptionarenotlinked[Carmon1981]).
RecentEUimmigrationtotheUK
a)National
Insurance
numbers
allocatedto
Polishworkers
b)National
Insurance
number
allocationsto
non-A8overseas
workers
Source:Department
forWorkand
Pensions(2008)
National Insurance Number Allocations,
Thousands
Figure1.
National Insurance Number Allocations,
Thousands
ThescaleoftheEasternEuropeanimmigrationintotheUKfollowingEUenlargementin
2004waslargeandunexpected.BetweenMay2004andDecember2007,thepopulationof
A8immigrantsintheUKisestimatedtohaveincreasedbyaroundhalfamillion(Pollardetal
2008).Overafour-yearperiod,Polesmovedfrombeingthethirteenthlargesttothefirst
largestnationalgroupintheUK.The2001Censusrecorded58,000peopleborninPoland
butbytimeofthefinalquarterof2007thatnumberwasthoughttobeapproximately
458,000(ibid).
250
200
150
100
50
0
2002/3
2003/4
2004/5
2005/6
2006/7
2007/8
2002/3
2003/4
2004/5
2005/6
2006/7
2007/8
500
400
300
200
100
0
12
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Figure1showsthegrowthinthenumberofimmigrantsfromPolandandfromnon-A8
countriespresentintheUK,asmeasuredbyNationalInsurancenumberallocations7.
Comparingthetopandbottompanels,itisclearthattheproportionalgrowthofthePolish
communitywasenormous,whilethenumbersofotherimmigrantsregisteringtoworkinthe
UKgrewmuchmoreslowly,andinfactfellbetween2003/4and2004/5.
Overthefirstyearsofpost-enlargementmigration,therefore,thepotentialsizeofPolish
socialnetworksgrewrapidly.Astimepassed,nationalnetworksmayalsohavebecomemore
organisedasthe‘firstwave’ofA8migrants8 settledanddevelopedmechanismsforthe
transferofinformation.Wemight,therefore,expecttheuseofsocialnetworksinthelabour
markettobecomemorewidespreadovertime,withmanyoftheconsequencesdescribed
above.
AsubstantialbodyofresearchnowaddressestheimpactofEasternEuropeanimmigrationin
theUK(seeforexampleLemosandPortes2008,Pollardetal 2008,Coombesetal 2007,
Ruhs2006),althoughitmaybesomeyearsbeforeflowstoandfromtheUKreachan
‘equilibrium’point,communitiessettle,andtheoverall,long-termroleofEasternEuropean
immigrantscanbeobjectivelyevaluated.
CharacteristicsofPolishimmigrantsafter2004
ThispaperdoesnotprovideafullreviewofthecharacteristicsofA8immigrants,whichhas
beendoneelsewhere(seePollardetal 2008).Itdoes,however,discusssomeoftheprimary
characteristicsthataffecttheiruseorrelianceonsocialnetworks.Theextensiveworkonsocial
networkssuggeststhatseveralindividualcharacteristicsaffectthelikelihoodthatanindividual
willusehisorhersocialnetworktogetajob,amongwhichtheprimaryfactorsareage,
gender,education,andoccupation.Asthroughoutthepaper,thefocushereisonimmigrants
fromPoland.ThedataistakenfromtheLabourForceSurvey(LFS)(seebox,p14).
Table1:Characteristicsofworkingagenativesandimmigrantsarrivingbetween2004and2007
Nationality
Medianage %Female %(ofemployed)in
Medianschoolleavingage
unskilled*occupations
Polish
26
43.8
63.6
19
OtherA8
26
45.0
62.9
18
Otherimmigrants 28
48.3
24.5
21
Natives
39
47.7
18.6
16
*Including:process,plantandmachineoperatives,assemblers,constructionworkers,transportand
machinedrivers;otherlabourers,porters,barandrestaurantstaffandcleaners
WhataretherelevantcharacteristicsofPolishimmigrantsoverthe2004–2007period?On
averagetheyaresignificantlyyoungerthannativesandslightlyyoungerthanother
immigrantsarrivinginthesameperiod,asshowninTable1.Theyaremorelikelybemale
thanbothnativesandotherimmigrants.AlongwiththeotherA8immigrants,theyaremore
stronglyrepresentedinlow-skilledoccupationsthannativesandnon-A8immigrants.
7.NationalInsurancenumberallocationsarenotaperfectmeasureofimmigrationinflows,sincesomeof
theimmigrantswhoreceivethemwillalreadyhavebeeninthecountryforsometime,perhapsworking
informally.However,forthecurrentpurposeofillustratingthegrowthofthePolishandotherimmigrant
communities,theyprovideausefulproxyforinflows.
8.NotethatmanywerealreadyacquaintedwiththeUKlabourmarket,havingmadeprevious
exploratoryvisits.
13
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
TheLFSdoesnotprovideeducationalqualificationvariablesformanyimmigrants.Dataon
theageatwhichanindividualleftfull-timeeducationprovideaproxyforeducation,subject
toimperfectionscreatedbygapsanddelaysinschooling.Whileoccupationalstatusoften
providesanindicationofskill,thisisproblematicinthecaseofrecentEasternEuropean
immigrantswhoarethoughttodowngradeintheUK,workinginoccupationsthatdonot
requiretheirlevelofeducation.Thisphenomenonisclearfromthedata:whilethe
educationalageproxysuggeststhatPolesandotherEasternEuropeansaremoreeducated
thannatives,theyarestillmuchmorelikelytobeemployedinlow-skilledoccupations.This
patterniscorroboratedbyotherestimates:Drinkwateretal (2006)estimatedthatPolish
immigrantsintheUKhadanaverageof13.6yearsoffull-timeeducation,comparedto11.9
yearsforotherA8nationals(althoughthequalityofthiseducationoritsrelevancetoUK
employersishardtogauge).Inthelightofthis,thepresentanalysisuseseducationalleaving
age,ratherthanoccupationalstatus,astheindicationofanindividual’sskilllevel.
Finally,immigrantsingeneralaremoregeographicallyconcentratedthannatives.Non-A8
immigrantsaremostlikelytolocateinLondonorthewiderSouthEast.Whiletheresidence
patternsofimmigrants(andespeciallytheA8)areinflux,Polesaremoredispersedthan
otherimmigrants,butlesssothannatives(42percentofnon-EUimmigrantsin2008were
inLondon,asopposedto26percentofA8,22percentofPolesand8percentofnatives)
(Salt2008).
Data:TheLabourForceSurvey(LFS)
ThefollowinganalysisusesdatafromtheUK’sLabourForceSurvey(seebox).TheLFS
includesinformationonhowindividualsobtainedtheircurrentjob,iftheyobtaineditwithin
thelast12months(orwithinthelastthreemonthsforsurveysconductedbeforespring
2005).9 Onepossibleresponseis‘hearingfromsomeonewhoworkedthere’.Thisvariableis
usedhereasanindicatorthattheindividualusedhisorhersocialnetworktoobtainthejob.
This‘network’variableonlycapturespartofthesocialnetworkeffect,sincepeoplemight
notgivethisresponseiftheyobtainedthejobthroughaninformalcontactwhodidnot
workatthecompany.Itseemslikelythatthisisthecase,sincetheproportionofpeople
obtainingtheirjobsinformallyislowerinthedatasetthantheestimatesdescribedabove:27
percentofallpeopleinthedatasetwhoansweredtherelevantquestionobtainedtheir
currentjobinthisway.Sincetheanalysisinthispaperconsidersproportionaltrendsover
time,wecanstilllearnagreatdealaboutthechangesinPoles’useofsocialnetworks,even
ifthewholeeffectisnotcaptured:theunderestimatethattheLFSproducesforthetotal
proportionofworkersobtainingjobsinformallyisnotproblematicsolongastherelative
numbersofpeopleobtainingjobsfromsomeonewhoworkedatthecompanyandfrom
someonewhodidnotworkatthecompanyareconstantovertime.
TheLFSislikelytounder-representmigrantworkers,inparticularthoselivinginpublicor
non-profitcommunalaccommodationandbusinessaddresses,fromwhichtheLFSdoesnot
sample.IfindividualshavedifferentpatternsofnetworkusefromPoleslivinginstandard
residentialaccommodation,theempiricalanalysiswillnotaccountforthem.However,this
willonlyonlybiastheanalysisinthispaperresultsifthechangeinbehaviourovertimeis
differentbetweenthetwogroups.
9.Alltheregressionsthatusethe‘network’variableinthispapercontainonlydatafromthesurveysin
whichthequestionwasaskedoverthe12monthperiod,inordertoensureconsistencyacrossresponses.
14
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
UsingtheLabourForceSurvey
Thispaperanalysesdatafrom15LabourForceSurveysbetween2004and2007
inclusive.TheLabourForceSurveyisapanelsurveyadministeredbytheUKgovernment
andusedtocalculatetheunemploymentrate.Eachquarterabout120,000individuals
areinterviewed,selectedatrandom.Onceselectedanindividualisinterviewedforfive
consecutivequarters,aslongastheyremainatthesameaddressandagreeto
participate.Forthisstudythesurveyswerecombinedtocreateanindependentcrosssectionaltimeseries:foreachindividualoneobservationistaken–thelastoneinwhich
theyappearinthesurvey–givingatotalofjustover600,000responses,0.4percentof
whicharefromPolishimmigrants.OfthePolishimmigrants,70percentwereemployed
atthetimeoftheirLFSinterview,and35percentansweredthequestionabouthow
theyobtainedtheirjob(theresthadbeenintheircurrentjoblongenoughthatthe
questionwasnotasked,undertheLFSprotocol).
Theprevalenceofinformalreferrals
HowheavilydoPolishworkersrelyonsocialnetworksinthelabourmarket,andhowdoes
thiscomparetoothergroups?Whenwecomparethenativestoallimmigrantworkersasa
group,employedimmigrantsaremarginallylesslikelytohaveobtainedtheircurrentjob
informally–26percentcomparedwith27percentfornatives(thedifferenceisnot
statisticallysignificant).WhenwecomparePolishimmigrantstonatives,however,the
differenceismuchlarger:32percentofPolesinthedatasetwhoobtainedtheirjobbetween
2004and2007(thedifferencewithnativesissignificantatthe1percentlevel).
Duringtheperiodstudied,theuseofnetworksbyPolishworkerssteadilyincreased.Figure2
showsthepercentageofPolishworkerswhousedanetworktoobtaintheircurrentjob,by
theyearinwhichthatjobwasobtained.Approximately26percentofPoleswhogottheir
jobsin2004usedasocialnetwork,comparedto36percentin2007–anincreaseofabout
40percent.
Figure2.
Networkuseby
Poles
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
Twofactorsareatworkwhichwillbeexploredinthispaper.First,thedatasuggeststhatfor
agivencohort(thosewhoarrivedinagivenyear)immigrantswhoobtainedtheirjobslater
weremorelikelytodosothroughtheirsocialnetwork.Second,forindividualswhoobtained
15
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
theirjobinagivenyear,theproportionusingasocialnetworkalsoincreases,themore
recentlytheyarrived(thiscouldbeattributedeithertothelengthofstayperse,orto
differingcharacteristicsoflaterimmigrants–tobediscussedbelow).
Table2displaysthesamephenomenonasalinearprobabilityregression.Thecoefficientof
0.046incolumnIimpliesthatforeachyearbetween2004and2007,theuseofnetworks
increasedbyapproximately4.6percentagepoints.Breakingdowntheresultsby‘old’and
‘new’immigrants(pre-andpost-2004)revealsaninterestingdetail:thephenomenonis
muchmoresignificantformorerecentimmigrants.ColumnIIshowsthattheyearlyincrease
goesupto5.2percentagepointswhenweconsideronlyPoleswhoarrivedin2004orlater.
ColumnIIIshowsthattheeffectforpre-2004immigrantsaloneisnotstatisticallysignificant.
Thisisprobablybecausethesamplesizeofpre-2004Polesistoosmalltoobtainrobust
results,althoughitcouldalsosuggestpre-2004Polishimmigrantsdidnotexperiencethe
sameexpansionintheuseofsocialnetworksoverthefirstfewyearssinceenlargement(for
examplebecausesociallinksbetween‘old’and‘new’Polesarenotwelldeveloped,withthe
earlierimmigrantsoccupyingdifferenttypesofjobsindifferentsectors).
Table2:Polishworkers’useofsocialnetworksovertime,2004–2007
(I)Allcohorts
(II)Recentimmigrants(2004+)
Yearjobobtained
0.046*(2.89)
0.052*(3.02)
R-squared
0.008
0.009
N
996
926
T-statisticsinparentheses.Samplecomprisesworking-agePoles.
*Significantat1percent
(III) Pre-2004cohort
0.015(-0.32)
0.01
70
Whatcausedtheincreaseinnetworkuseamong
Poles?
TheincreaseintheimportanceofsocialnetworksforPolesobtainingjobsbetween2004
and2007islargeandsignificant.Asoutlinedearlier,thetrendhasseveralimportant
implicationsforthewelfareofimmigrantsandtheircommunities.Whydidthischange
occur?Thefollowinganalysisexplorestwomajorhypotheses:first,that‘thesame’Poles
begantobehavedifferentlyovertime;andsecond,that‘different’PolesarrivedintheUK
whowerealreadydisposedtobehavedifferently.
Thesamepeoplebehavingdifferently
Accordingtothisscenario,theworkersweobservein2007(whoarrivedbetween2004and
2007)areessentiallysimilartothoseweobservein2004,buttheybehavedifferently
becausetheirenvironmenthaschanged,fortwoprimaryreasons:alargernetworkand
greaterintegration.
ThesizeofthePolishnetworkincreasedovertime,providinggreateropportunitiesforits
memberstodisseminateinformationaboutjobs.Theresearchreviewedearlierprovidesa
convincingpictureofthiseffect.Ifthisinfluenceisatwork,PolesintheUKshouldbe
expectedtousesocialnetworksmore,simplybecausetheyknowmorepeople.
Thechangeovertimecouldbeobservedevenwithoutachangeintheessential
characteristicsofPolesintheUK,becauseofintegration.Astimepassesbetween2004and
2007moreandmoreofthepeopleweobservehavebeenintheUKforlonger.Thismeans
16
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
theymayhavegainedabetterknowledgeofthelocallabourmarket,havegainedUKwork
experienceanddevelopedsocialties.Theamountoftimespentinthehostcountryis
probablythemostwidelyrecognisedfactorincreasingeconomicandsocialintegration(Bloch
2002,Carmon1981,Carey-Woodetal 1995,Kempton2002,Mesch2002).Totheextent
thatclosetieswithinimmigrantnetworksareassociatedwithpoorintegration,wemay
expecttheuseofnetworkstodecrease withtimeasimmigrantsbecomeintegrated.Onthe
otherhand,immigrantswhohavebeenresidentforlongerarelikelytoknowmorepeople,
andsomayfinditeasiertogainaninformalreferral.
Differentpeoplebehavingdifferently
Underthishypothesis,theconstantinflowofPolishimmigrantschangesthecompositionof
thePolishcommunityintheUK.Iftheaverage2004arrivalisadifferentkindofpersonto
theaverage2007arrival,patternsofnetworkuseshouldalsochange.Themostimportant
theorysupportingthisviewisthatofendogenousmovingcosts.Socialnetworksthemselves
affectthedecisiontomigrateandthedestinationchosen(KoserandPinkerton2002discuss
thisphenomenonforasylumseekers).Theyreducethecostsofsettlinginanewcountry,
providinginformationabouthousingandemployment.Thismeansthatalargernetworkcan
makemigrationworthwhileevenforlowerproductivityworkersexpectingrelativelylower
wages(Carringtonetal 1996,MasseyandEspinosa1997).Inotherwords,migrationisto
someextentaself-perpetuatingprocess(Massey1990),andweshouldexpectlessskilled
workerstomigrateinincreasingproportionsovertime.Iflower-skilledworkersalsouse
networksmorethanhigh-skilledones(andthereisstrongevidencethatthisisthecase–
seeforexampleHellersteinetal 2008),weshouldalsoexpecttheprevalenceofinformal
referralstoincreaseovertime.
Infact,someoftheobservablecharacteristicsofPolishimmigrantsdochangeoverthefouryearperiod,suggestingthatasimilarprocessmayhavetakenplace.
Table3:Changeincharacteristicsovertime,byyearofarrival,forPolishworking-ageimmigrants
Yearofarrival
2004
2005
2006
2007
Medianage27
27
26
25
Medianeducationleavingage
20
20
20
19
Percentfemale
37.8
41.6
46.7
51.6
Percentmarried
40.3
37.3
33.2
28.1
NotethatthesefiguresrepresentthecharacteristicsofA8immigrantsbyyearofarrival;theydonotshowthechangeinthe
overall
A8populationpresentintheUKinagivenyear
TheaverageageofPolishimmigrantsarrivingintheUKdecreasedslightly,meaningthatthe
averageimmigrantwouldhavelesslabourmarketexperience.Theeducationleavingagedid
notchangemeaningfully.Theproportionofwomenincreasedsubstantially,andthe
proportionthatwasmarrieddeclined.TheimpactofthesechangesonPoles’relianceon
socialnetworksisdiscussedinthenextsection.
EmpiricalresultsfromtheLabourForceSurveydata
Table4showstheresultsofamultiplelinearprobabilityregressionofnetworkuseonthe
yearanindividual’sjobwasobtainedandanumberoffactorsthatweexpecttoaffect
immigrants’relianceonsocialnetworks.Thisenablesustoexplorewhethertheincreasein
17
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
theuseofsocialnetworksovertimewaslikelytobeduetothechangingobservable
characteristicsofPolishimmigrants,orwhethertheeffectremainsevenwhenwecontrolfor
thesechanges.Italsoallowsustodeterminewhichcharacteristicshavebeeninfluentialin
Polishworkers’useofsocialnetworksoverthewholeperiod.ColumnIshowstheresultsfor
allPolishimmigrants;columnIIforimmigrantsarrivingin2004orlater.
Table4.OLSEstimatesforprobabilityofnetworkuse
(I)AllPoles
(II)Recentarrivalsonly
Yearjobobtained
0.049**(2.55)
0.048**(2.33)
YearsintheUK
-0.014(-0.18)
-0.016(-0.66)
Female
0.102***(2.75)
0.102***(2.68)
Married
0.019(0.0.45)
0.018(0.41)
Age
0.002(0.62)
0.003(0.90)
Educationleavingage
-0.002(0.16)
-0.001(-0.5)
Unskilledjob
0.075*(1.80)
0.085**(1.99)
R-squared
0.090
0.104
N
787
733
OLS=OrdinaryLeastSquares
T-statisticsinparentheses
***Significantat1%level**Significantat5%level*Significantat10%level
SampleincludesemployedPolesobtainingjobsbetween2004and2007.Regressionsincludecontrolsforallindustry
sections;13governmentofficeregionsandtwomeasuresofmobility(quartersinsurvey;whetherchangedjobsduring
survey).T-statisticscalculatedwithrobuststandarderrors.
Gender
Researchonintegrationsuggeststhatdifferentpatternsexistformenandwomen(Hagan
1998,Schoeni1998).Researchershavefoundconflictingresultsonwhetherwomen
integratemoreorlesseasilythanmen,andthecultureofthesourcecountryisdoubtlessa
veryimportantfactorinthisregard,sincelabourforceparticipationandoutcomesvary
stronglybycountryoforigingroup(seeMontgomery1996foradiscussion).Ontheother
hand,theeconomictheoryofsocialnetworksprovidesaclearerprediction–thatwomen
shouldbemorelikelytousesocialnetworksthanmen,inthepresenceofdiscrimination.
Thisisbecause,ifweassumethatinformalrecruitmentworksbyprovidingbetter
informationaboutcandidates,femaleworkerswhoseoutwardcharacteristicsmaybe
undesirabletoemployers(inthepresenceofstatisticaldiscrimination)butwhoseactual
abilityishighwillbenefitmostfromthetransferofadditionalinformation(Munshi2003).
Theempiricalfindingsconfirmthishypothesis:Polishwomenwere10percentagepoints
morelikelytohaveusedanetworktoobtaintheircurrentjobthanPolishmen,holdingall
elseconstant10.Theeffectisthesamewhenweconsiderrecentimmigrantsonly.Sincethe
proportionoffemalePolishimmigrantsincreasedovertheperiodstudied,thiswillhave
contributedtotheincreaseintheprevalenceofinformalrecruitment.
10.Note,however,thatthesametrenddoesnotholdfornativewomen,whoareonaveragelesslikelyto
usenetworksthannativemen.
18
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
LengthofstayintheUK
Asdiscussedearlier,economicandsocialintegrationintothehostcommunitytakesplace
overtime,asimmigrantsacquirelanguageskillsandworkexperience,andgettoknowthe
locallabourmarket.ThelengthoftimeintheUKisnegativebutnotstatisticallysignificant
inthisanalysis.Ifthenegativeeffectisgenuine,thissuggeststhatlongerresidencereduces
immigrants’relianceonsocialnetworks.
Education
Weshouldexpectthatlesseducatedworkerswillbemorelikelytouseinformalrecruitment.
First,theyaremorelikelytobeworkinginunskilledpositionsforwhichinformalrecruitment
ismorecommon(Pellizzari2004,Hellersteinetal 2008).Second,lesseducatedimmigrants
arethoughttofindintegrationharder(Bogueetal,forthcoming),andhencerelymoreon
theimmigrantnetwork(Kempton2002,Bloch2002,Montgomery1996).Inthisanalysis,
workersinunskilledjobswere7.5percentagepointsmorelikelytohaveusedasocial
network(8.5percentagepointsforrecentimmigrants)–consistentwithexpectations.On
theotherhand,theeducationalleavingageisnegative,butverysmallandnotstatistically
significant.ThismaybebecausedowngradingamongPolishworkershasreducedthereturn
oneducation,meaningthatlessdifferentiationoccursbetweenworkerswithmoreandless
education.
Ageandmarriage
Munshi(2003)suggeststhatolderworkersshouldbenefitmostfrominformalreferralsfor
thesamereasonthatwomenwould:employersarelesswillingtohirethem,soadditional
informationhelpsthosewhoseactualabilityishigh.Youngerimmigrantsarethoughtto
integratemoreeasilyintohostcommunitiesandhencemayhavelessneedfornationalsocial
networks.Inthisanalysis,theimpactofageisverysmallandnotstatisticallysignificant,
however.Theimpactofmarriageispositivebutalsonotstatisticallysignificant.Thepositive
effect,ifitindeedexists,couldoccurbecausemarriagegivesanindividualaccesstomore
acquaintancesthroughtheirspouse.
Yearthejobwasobtained
Foreachyearthatpassedbetween2004and2007,Polishimmigrantsbecame4.9
percentagepointsmorelikelytouseasocialnetworktogettheirjob,holdingconstantother
individualcharacteristics(and4.8percentagepointsmorelikelywhenweconsiderrecent
arrivalsonly).Inotherwords,evenwhenwecontrolforotherfactorsthataffecttheuseof
socialnetworks,thereisstillasubstantialincreaseintheirimportanceovertheperiod
studied.
Thissuggeststhatbothofthehypothesesdescribedearlierhavesometruth:different
immigrants(primarily,morewomen)arrivedovertime,increasingtheextenttowhichsocial
networkswereused;but‘thesame’immigrantsalsobegantobehavedifferently,relyingtoa
greaterextentontheir(potentiallyexpanding)network.
Howdoesthiscomparetootherimmigrantgroups?
TheempiricalevidencepresentedinthispaperdemonstratesasizeableincreaseinPoles’
relianceonsocialnetworksinthelabourmarket.Theresultsindicatethatboththegrowthin
thesizeofthePolishcommunityandthechangingcharacteristicsandbehaviourofPolish
immigrantsarelikelytohaveplayedarole.Howdoweknow,however,thatthechangein
theroleofsocialnetworkswasnotinfactduetoeconomy-widedevelopmentsinthelabour
marketoccurringatthesametime?
19
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Figure3showstheprevalenceofnetworkuseamongnatives,Polesandotherimmigrants
(excludingfromtheA8)obtainingtheirjobsbetween2004and2007.Itisclearthatwhilea
substantialincreaseintheuseofsocialnetworkscanbeseenamongPoles,othergroupsdo
notseethischange.ThisconfirmsthattherapidlychangingsituationforPolishimmigrants
wasinalllikelihoodduetospecificfactorsaffectingthatgroupduringatimeofgreat
changeinthenatureandcircumstancesofthePolishpopulation,ratherthandueto
underlyingchangesintheBritishlabourmarket.
Figure3.
Networkuseby
natives,Poles
andother
immigrants
40
30
2004
2005
2006
2007
20
10
0
Natives
Polish
Other immigrants
WhatdothefindingsimplyforotherEasternEuropean
immigrants?
WhilethispaperhasfocusedonPoles,muchofitsargumentshouldalsoapplytoother
EasternEuropeanimmigrants,albeittoalesserextent.Asdescribedearlier,Polishandother
A8immigrantssharecharacteristicssuchasyouthandthepropensitytobeemployedin
unskilledoccupations,aswellasbeingmoregeographicallydispersedthannon-A8
immigrants.Non-PolishA8nationalpopulationsintheUKalsogrewbetween2004and
2008,suggestingthattheyshouldhaveexperiencedsimilarphenomena:primarily,an
increaseintheavailabilityofinformaljobreferrals;anddecreasingcostsofmovingtotheUK
asthenationalnetworkofeachgroupincreased(assumingthattheyformseparatesocial
groupsratherthanone‘EasternEuropean’network).Ontheotherhand,thesheersizeof
thePolishpopulationallowseconomiesofscaleintheformationoforganisationsthat
facilitatesocialinteractionandinformalemployment–Polish-languagenewspapersinwide
circulation,Polishemploymentagenciesandwebsites,andcomplementaritiesbetween
workersatasinglefirmwhospeakthesamelanguage,forexample–thatismoredifficult
forthesmallerA8immigrantgroupsthatdonothavetheseadvantages.
TwogroupsotherthanPolesarelargeenoughtoobtainreliablestatisticsonoverallnetwork
useinthefirstyearssinceEUenlargement:LithuaniansandSlovaks(thesearethesecond
andthirdmostnumerousA8migrantstotheUK).Theresultsarevaried:37percentof
Lithuaniansinterviewedobtainedtheirjobthroughasocialnetwork,and25percentof
Slovaks;bycomparisontheotherA8nationalscombined(excludingPoles,Slovaksand
Lithuanians)didsoin30percentofcases(2004to2008inclusive).Whilesamplesizedoes
notallowadetailedexaminationofhowthischangedovertime,itisclearthatsubstantial
heterogeneityexists–asonewouldexpectgiventheexistenceofdifferentnormsand
practicesindifferentsourcecountrylabourmarkets.Inanycase,however,relianceonsocial
20
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
networksishigheramongtheA8asagroupthanamongnativeworkers.Thissuggeststhat
theconclusionsandpolicyimplicationsdiscussedinthefollowingsectionarerelevanttoA8
nationalsoutsideofPoland,andparticularlytoLithuanians,whoalsoappeartohaverelied
stronglyonsocialnetworksinthelabourmarket.
Conclusionsanddiscussion
Theanalysisinthispapersuggeststhatnetworkshaveactedasanincreasinglyimportant
mechanismforPolishworkerstofindemployment.Thisisperhapsnotsurprising,giventhe
growthofthePolishcommunityperse –growththatmayhavecreatedanenvironmentin
whichPoleshadmoreopportunitiesavailabletothemwithintheirownnationalnetwork,
andhencelessneedorincentivetolookforworkoutsideofthatnetwork.
Istheincreasinguseofsocialnetworksagoodthing?
Thegrowingimportanceofsocialnetworkshasbothpositiveandnegativeimplications.As
discussedearlier,informalrecruitmentisoftenbelievedtoimprovelabourmarketefficiency
byreducingthecostofrecruitmentandincreasingitsspeed.Byusingthismechanismmore
thannatives,therefore,PolesmayhavecontributedtoeconomicefficiencyintheUK11.
Intheshortterm,welldevelopedsocialnetworksmakeiteasierforimmigrantstofindjobs,
suggestingthatthetrendsdescribedinthispaperarebeneficialtoPoles.Economictheory
dictatesthathavingmoreoptionscannotbeabadthingintheshortrun–suggestingthat
immigrantsshouldbebetteroffwithdevelopedsocialnetworksthanwithout.Indeed,the
strongroleofsocialnetworkscould,inpart,explaintheverylowunemploymentandhigh
employmentratesthatPolishworkershaveenjoyedinrecentyears.Oneoftheconclusions
oftheliteraturereviewedinthispaperisthatevenifnetworksdonotalwaysleadtothe
most efficient matchesofemployerswithemployees,theydocutcostsandspeedupthe
matchingprocess–bothofwhichwouldbeexpectedtoreducefrictionalunemployment
(unemploymentthatisalwayspresentintheeconomy).
However,ifimmigrantsusesocialnetworksforthe‘wrongreasons’–forexample,theydo
notunderstandthatthisisnottheprimaryrecruitmentmechanismforhigh-productivityjobs
intheUK,incontrasttotheirhomecountry(Marshall1989)–theycouldendupwitha
lowerwagethantheymighthavedoneiftheyhadpursuedmoreformaljobsearchmethods.
Also,socialnetworksmayhinderlong-termopportunitiesandintegration;andtheymay
indicatethatPolesarehavingtroublefindinghigh-skilledemployment.
Asdescribedearlier,evidenceonthecausaleffectsofsocialnetworksoneconomicand
socialintegrationintothehostcommunityismixed.Itseemslikelythatthequestioninvolves
ashort-termversuslong-termtrade-off,withnetworkshelpinginitialsettlementbut
hinderingeventualsocialmobilityandintegrationandmakingthePolishcommunity
vulnerabletolong-lastingemploymentshocks.Relianceonsocialnetworksmaybe
particularlylikelytoreducesocialmobilityinthecaseofPolishworkersaswellasother
EasternEuropeans,becauseoftheirdocumentedtendencytodowngradetolower
11.Thisisnottheonlywaythatrecentimmigrationmayhaveimprovedlabourmarketefficiency.Borjas
(2001)arguesthatimmigrants‘greasethewheelsofthelabormarket’,sincetheyaremoresensitivethan
nativestoregionalwagevariations.Pollardetal (2008)showthatEasternEuropeanshaveoftenchosen
tolocateinareaswhereskillshortagesweregreatest,suggestingthattheyhavecontributedtolabour
efficiencyinthismanner.
21
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
occupationalstatusesthantheireducationallevelimplies.SinceA8workersareconcentrated
inlow-skilledindustries,itmaybedifficultforhighabilityworkerstoobtainhigherquality
jobs,iftheirnetworkisprimarilycomposedofotherA8migrants.
Inotherwords,thestrongrelianceonsocialnetworkshasthepotentialto‘lockin’someof
thedownwardmobilitythatEasternEuropeansexperiencewhentheycometotheUK.
Indeed,somecommentatorshavenotedthistrendwithconcern.AdrianFavell,forexample,
positsthattheA8statesareindangerofbecominga‘newVictorianservantclassforaWest
Europeanaristocracyofcreative-classprofessionalsanduniversity-educatedmums’(Favell
2008).
AstheUKmovesdeeperintorecession,itisworthemphasisingoneofthearguments
reviewedinthispaper:thattherelianceonsocialnetworksleadstoavulnerabilitytoshocks
inemploymentlevelsorwages.FreedomofmovementintheUKandPoland’sgeographical
proximitymakemigrationfromPolandpotentiallylesspermanentthanfromothercountries,
andsubstantialnumbersofPolesareexpectedtoreturnhomeasaresultoftherecession
(SomervilleandSumption2009).Ifthedownturnexacerbateslong-termsocialstratification,
thiscouldcausesubstantialintegrationdifficultiesevenaftertheeconomicrecovery.Itmight
alsomaketheUKalessattractivedestinationforPolishworkers(especiallyasrelative
conditionsimproveinPolandduetoEUinvestmentintheregion),suggestingthatthe
immigrantsmightnotseeareturntopreviousratesofveryhighimmigrationfromPoland
evenwhendemandforA8labourincreasesagain.
Onanothernote,ifrelianceonsocialnetworksisanindicatorofpoorintegration,the
findingsinthispapersuggestthatintegrationoftherecentwaveofimmigrantsis
problematic(thisconclusionissupportedbysomequalitativestudieswhichfind,for
example,thatA8migrantsoftenspendlittlesocialorworktimewithBritishpeople[Spencer
etal 2007]).Thismeansthatasocialinclusionstrategythatfullyconsiderstheneedsof
immigrantsisimportant.
Whataretheimplicationsforpolicymakers?
Thislastconsiderationraisesthewiderquestionastohowpolicymakersshouldconceiveof
integrationinthecontextofreturnmigration.IfthenewEasternEuropeanmigration
establishesitselfasasteadystreamoftemporaryimmigrants,oneofthemostpowerful
factorsaidingintegration–thelengthoftimespentintheUK–willbediminished.The
empiricalfindingsinthispapersuggestthattimespentintheUKhasonlyasmallrelative
effectontherelianceonsocialnetworksrelativetootherfactors.Ifthisaccuratelyreflects
theirintegration,itmeansthatthatthebenefitsofanymeasuresaimedattheeconomicor
socialintegrationofimmigrantscouldbereducedifprogrammesareeffectiveoverthelong
termonly.Initiativessuchasframeworksfortherecognitionofforeignqualifications,which
canhaveimmediateeffectanddonotrelyonlongstaysintheUK–forexampleeffortsto
improvetheeffectivenessofNARIC12 andextenditscoverageofvocationalqualifications–
couldthereforebemosteffective.
OtherpoliciesthatdonotdependonlongresidenceintheUKincludetheenforcementof
labourstandards(includingminimumwagesandworkingconditions),sothatimmigrants
whocomeforshortperiodstoworkinlow-skilledjobsdonotfindthemselvesexploited.The
12.Thenationalagencyresponsibleforprovidinginformation,adviceandopiniononvocational,
academicandprofessionalskillsandqualificationsfromover180countriesworldwide
22
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
provisionofcomprehensivemulti-languageinformationaboutworkers’rightsandavailable
publicservices(someofwhichiscurrentlyprovidedbyunions)mayalsobeusefulina
contextwheremanyworkerswillnotbeableorwillingtoinvestinlearningEnglishgiventhe
shortperiodtheyintendtostayintheUK.Atthesametime,policymakersshouldnot‘overcorrect’whenconsideringmigrantsastemporary:removingbarrierstoaccessforlanguage
tuitionandcreatingbetterincentivesforemployerstoprovidelanguagetrainingwillremain
importantforthesubstantialnumbersofimmigrantswhowillremainintheUKforsome
time,orwhowillreturnonsubsequentoccasions.
23
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
Appendix1:Mobilityanditsimpactontheempirical
results
TheLabourForceSurveysusedintheseregressionsonlyincludeinformationonhowan
individualobtainedhercurrentjobifshehasbeenemployedinthatjobforoneyearorless
atthetimeoftheLFSinterview.Thefactthattheanalysisonlycontainsimmigrantswho
obtainedtheirjobwithinayearofbeinginterviewedcouldaffecttheresultsifmobilityis
associatedwithrelianceonsocialnetworks,asfollows.
Suppose,forsimplicity,thatimmigrantscanbedividedintomobileandnon-mobiletypes,
wherethemobileoneschangejobsatleastonceayear,andthenon-mobileonesstayinthe
samejobforyearsonend.Considerasampleofimmigrantsinterviewedin2007whoarrived
in2004.Mobileoneswillanswerthenetworkquestion(sincetheywillhavechangedjobs
recently),whilenon-mobileoneswillnot(sinceweassumetheyhavebeeninthesamejob
since2004).Ontheotherhand,allindividualswhoarrivedin2007andareworkingwillhave
answeredthenetworkquestion,whetherornottheyaremobiletypes.Thismeansthatfor
laterimmigrants,thedatasetbecomesprogressivelymorelikelytoincludethenon-mobile
individuals.Iftheseindividualsusenetworksmore(eitherbecauseoftheirspecific
characteristicsorbecauseinformalrecruitmentmightleadtobettermatchandlonger
employmentduration),theuseofnetworkswillappeartogrow,duetotheincreaseinthe
proportionofnon-mobileindividualsansweringthenetworkquestion.
ThisappendixdiscussesthechangeinmobilityamongPolesovertheperiodstudiedandthe
relationshipbetweenmobilityandnetworkuse.Itconcludesthatwhilemobilitymayhave
changedovertime,mobilitydoesnotsignificantlyaffectnetworkuseinthedata,and
thereforedoesnotposeaproblemfortheanalysis.
Patternsofmobility
MeasuringmobilityiscomplicatedbythefactthatindividualstypicallyparticipateintheLFS
forfewerthanthefullfivequarters.However,ifweconsideremployedindividualswhowere
interviewedinallfivequarters,wefindthatforbothPolesandnatives,approximately11per
centofworkerschangedjobsatleastonce(veryfewindividualschangedjobsmorethan
once).TherearealsonosignificantdifferencesbetweenPolesandnativeswhenweconsider
peoplepresentinthesurveyforfewerquarters.
Changesinmobilityovertime
First,considermobilityasitcanbemeasuredbyexaminingindividualswhochangejobs
duringthesurveyperiod.TheproportionofPoleschangingjobsduringtheperiodinwhich
theyappearintheLFSdoesnotchangesignificantlyovertimeforgroupspresentforless
thanfivequarters.Forthosepresentfivequarters(aboutonethirdofthePolishsample)the
proportionswitchingjobsatleastonceincreasesbyapproximately1.6percentagepointsper
year(seeTableA1).
Switchingjobs,however,isnottheonlyindicatorofmobility.Mobilityisrelatedtoattrition
intheLabourForceSurvey.Sincethesurveyfollowshouseholds,notindividuals,peopledrop
outofthesurveyiftheychangeaddress.Ifpeoplemoveinordertochangejobs,attrition
mayleadustounderestimatemobility,sincewedonotobserveindividualswhentheyhave
justchangedjobs.TheaveragenumberofquartersforwhichPolesappearinthesurvey
increaseseachyearby0.18(basedonanaveragevalueof3.5overthewholeperiod–see
TableA2),comparedtoasmallerincrease(0.04)fornatives.Thismeasuresuggeststhat
Polesbecamelessgeographicallymobileovertheperiodstudied.Sincethetwomeasuresof
24
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
mobilitypointindifferentdirections,wecannotassertivelyconcludethatmobilityincreased
ordecreased.
Mostimportantly,mobilitydoesnotaffecttheprobabilityofusinganetwork,inthedata.
Thereisnostatisticallysignificantrelationshipbetweenswitchingjobsandnetworkuse,nor
betweenattritionfromthesurveyandnetworkuse(seeTablesA3andA4).Thissuggests
thatwedonotneedtoadjustthefindingsinthispaperinordertoaccountforchangesin
mobility.
TableA1:RegressionsofjobswitchingonLFSyear,bythenumberofquartersanindividualappearsinthe
survey,forPolishimmigrants
Numberofquarterspresent
2
3
4
5
LFSyear
0.006(0.67)
0.015(0.77)
0.014(1.04)
0.016*(1.65)
N
317
251
240
840
R-squared
0.0014
0.002
0.005
0.0032
T-statisticsinparentheses.*Significantat5%.Dependentvariable:jobswitchduringsurveyperiod
TableA2:RegressionsofnumberofquartersinsurveyonLFSyear,forPolishimmigrants
(I)AllPolishimmigrants
(II)Recentarrivalsonly
LFSyear
0.183**(4.84)
0.301**(6.01)
N
1975
1414
R-squared
0.012
0.025
T-statisticsinparentheses.**Significantat1%.Dependentvariable:numberofquartersinsurvey
TableA3:Regressionsofnetworkuseonnumberofquartersinsurvey,forPolishimmigrants
(I)AllPolishimmigrants
(II)Recentarrivalsonly
Numberofquartersinsurvey
-0.008(-0.70)
-0.007(-0.59)
N
736
684
R-squared
0.0007
0.0006
T-statisticsinparentheses.Dependentvariable:usedsocialnetworktoobtainjob
TableA4:Regressionsofnetworkuseonjobswitching,bythenumberofquartersanindividualappearsinthe
survey,forallPolishimmigrants
Numberofquarterspresent
2
3
4
5
Jobswitchduringsurvey
0.153(0.62)
0.019(0.11)
-0.075(-0.36)
0.067(0.87)
N
122
107
96
249
R-squared
0.0032
0.0001
0.0014
0.0031
T-statisticsinparentheses.Dependentvariable:jobswitchduringsurveyperiod
25
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
References
AnderssonF,HolzerHJandLaneJI(2005) MovingUporMovingOn:WhoAdvancesintheLowWageLaborMarket?NewYork:RussellSageFoundationPublications
BaileyTandWaldingerR(1991)‘Primary,SecondaryandEnclaveLaborMarkts:ATrainingSystems
Approach’AmericanSociologicalReview Vol56
BeamanLA(2008)Socialnetworksandthedynamicsoflabormarketoutcomes:evidencefrom
refugees,availableathttp://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~lab823/beaman_ethnicnetworks.pdf
BlanchflowerD,SaleheenJandShadforthC(2007)TheimpactofrecentmigrationfromEastern
EuropeontheUKeconomy IZADiscussionPaperSeries,February
BlochA(2002)Refugees’opportunitiesandbarriersinemploymentandtraining DepartmentofWork
andPensionsResearchreportNo.179,London:DWP
BogueD,LiegelGandKozloskiM(forthcoming) Immigration,InternalMigrationandLocalMobilityin
theUS ElgarPublishingCompany
BorjasG(2001)Doesimmigrationgreasethewheelsofthelabormarket?BrookingsPaperson
EconomicActivity,NewYork:BrookingsInstitution
BorjasG(2006)‘MakingitinAmerica:SocialMobilityintheImmigrantPopulation’TheFutureof
Children,Vol.16NewYork:BrookingsInstitution
CahucPandFontaineF(2002)Ontheefficiencyofjobsearchwithsocialnetworks,IZAdiscussion
paperNo.583,September
Calvo-ArmengolAandJacksonM(2004)‘Theeffectsofsocialnetworksonemploymentand
inequality’AmericanEconomicReview,vol.93,June
CarringtonW,DetragiacheEandVishwanathT(1996)‘Migrationwithendogenousmovingcosts’
AmericanEconomicReview, vol86,no.4.,September
CoombesM,ChampionTandRaybouldS(2007)‘DidtheEarlyA8InmigrantstoEnglandgotoareas
oflabourshortage?’ LocalEconomy,22:4
DepartmentforWorkandPensions(2008)NationalInsuranceNumberAllocationstoAdultOverseas
NationalsEnteringtheUK,2007/8, London:DWP,availableat
www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/tabtools/nino_allocations_0708.pdf
DrinkwaterS,EadeJandGarapichM(2006)Polesapart?EUenlargementandthelabourmarket
outcomesofimmigrantsintheUK Bonn,Germany:IZA
DustmannC,GlitzAandVogelT(2006)Employment,wagestructure,andtheeconomiccycle:
DifferencesbetweenimmigrantsandnativesinGermanyandtheUK.CentreforResearchand
AnalysisofMigration,CDPNo.09/06
DustmannC,FrattiniTandPrestonI(2008)Theeffectofimmigrationalongthedistributionofwages.
CReAMDiscussionPaperno.08/03
EdinP-A,FredrikssonPandAslundO(2003)‘Ethnicenclavesandtheeconomicsuccessof
immigrants–evidencefromanaturalexperiment’QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,February
ElrickTandLewandowskaE(2008)‘MatchingandMakingLabourDemandandSupply:Agentsin
PolishMigrantNetworksofDomesticElderlyCareinGermanyandItaly’JournalofEthnicand
MigrationStudies. Vol34,no.5,July
FavellA(2008)‘TheNewFaceofEast-WestMigrationinEurope’JournalofEthnicandMigration
Studiesvol34no5,July
FrijtersP,ShieldsMandWheatleyPriceS(2003)ImmigrantjobsearchintheUK:Evidencefrompanel
data. IZAdiscussionpapers902,InstitutefortheStudyofLabor
26
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
HaganJ(1998)‘SocialNetworks,GenderandImmigrantIncorporation:ResourcesandConstraints’
AmericanSociologicalReview, 63:55-67
HellersteinJ,McInerneyMandNeumarkD(2008)MeasuringtheImportanceofLaborMarket
Networks.IZADiscussionpaper3750,October
HolzerH(1988)‘Jobsearchmethodsusedbyunemployedyouth’IndustrialandLaborRelations
Review, July
IoannidesYandLouryLD(2004)‘Jobinformationnetworks,neighborhoodeffectsandinequality’
JournalofEconomicLiterature
KemptonJ(2002)MigrantsintheUK:Theircharacteristicsandlabourmarketoutcomesandimpacts
RDSoccasionalpaperno82,London:HomeOffice
KoserKandPinkertonC(2002)Thesocialnetworksofasylumseekersandthedisseminationof
informationaboutcountriesofasylumLondon:HomeOffice
LemosSandPortesJ(2008)NewLabour?TheImpactofMigrationfromCentralandEastern
EuropeanCountriesontheUKLabourMarketIZADiscussionPaper3756
MarshallT(1989)Culturalaspectsofjobhunting London:BritishRefugeeCouncil
MasseyD(1990)‘SocialStructure,HouseholdStrategiesandthecumulativecausationofmigration’
PopulationIndex56
MasseyDandEspinosaK(1997)‘What’sdrivingMexico-USMigration?ATheoretical,Empiricialand
PolicyAnalysis’AmericanJournalofSociology102
MeschG(2002)‘Betweenspatialandsocialsegregationofimmigrants:thecaseofimmigrantsfrom
theFSUinIsrael’InternationalMigrationReview,Vol.36
MontgomeryJD(1991)‘Socialnetworksandlabor-marketoutcomes:towardaneconomicanalysis’
AmericanEconomicReview, vol81
MontgomeryJR(1996)‘ComponentsofRefugeeAdaptation’InternationalMigrationReview, Vol.30
MunshiK(2003)‘NetworksintheModernEconomy:MexicanMigrantsintheUSLaborMarket’
QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,vol118
PatacchiniEandZenouY(2008)Ethnicnetworksandemploymentoutcomes. IZADiscussionPaper
Series.InstitutefortheStudyofLabor
PellizzariM(2004)Dofriendsandrelativesreallyhelpingettingagoodjob? CentreforEconomic
Performance,DiscussionPaper623,March
PollardN,LatorreMandSriskandarajahD(2008)FloodgatesorTurnstiles?Post-EUenlargement
migrationflowsto(andfrom)theUK London:InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch,availableat
www.ippr.org/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=603
RobinsonV(1986)Transients,SettlersandRefugees:AsiansinBritain Oxford:ClarendonPress
RuhsM(2006)GreasingtheWheelsoftheFlexibleLabourMarket:EastEuropeanLabour
ImmigrationintheUK COMPASworkingpaper38,availableat
www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/Working%20papers/WP0638-Ruhs.pdf.
SaltJ(2008)InternationalMigrationandtheUnitedKingdom.ReportoftheUnitedKingdomSOPEMI
CorrespondenttotheOECD,2008.London:MigrationResearchUnit,availableat
www.geog.ucl.ac.uk:8080/print-version/research/mobility-identity-and-security/migrationresearch-unit/pdfs/Sop08_fin.pdf
SomervilleW(2007) ImmigrationunderNewLabourBristol:ThePolicyPress
SomervilleWandSumptionM(2009)ImmigrationintheUK:therecessionandbeyondLondon:
EqualityandHumanRightsCommission
27
ippr|SocialNetworksandPolishImmigrationtotheUK
SomervilleWandSumptionM(2009,forthcoming)ImmigrationandtheLabourMarket:Theory,
EvidenceandPolicy London:EqualityandHumanRightsCommission
SpencerS,RuhsM,AndersonBandRogalyB(2007)TheExperiencesofCentralandEastern
EuropeanMigrantsintheUK York:JosephRowntreeFoundation
TopaG(2001)‘SocialInteractions,LocalSpilloversandUnemployment’ReviewofEconomicStudies,
vol68
WahbaJandZenouY(2005)‘Density,socialnetworksandjobsearchmethods:theoryand
applicationtoEgypt’JournalofDevelopmentEconomics,vol78
WaldingerR(2000)‘Whogetsthelousyjobs?’InKivistoPandRundbladG(eds.)Multiculturalismin
theUnitedStatesThousandOaks,California:PineForgePress