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INDIA, BRITAIN, AND THE GENEVA SETTHSMEHT OR INDO-CHINA
The termination of the Korean War appeared to create a thaw
in the relations among the Great Powers as far as certain problems
of the Par East were concerned. This was reflected in the decision
of the Berlin Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four
to agree to a discussion on 'the problem of restoring peace in
Indo-China* also at the Geneva Conference on Far East scheduled
to be held on 26 April 1954*
In this favourable background,Prime
Minister Nehru made on 22 February 1954 *a very earnest appeal'
for a cease-fire in Indo-China without the parties giving up their
respective positions or whatever they might consider their rights?
Hie said that it was a 'tremendous pity* that the war
conti­
nue when a serious attempt was going to be made to find a way out
of the Indo-GhJLna war at the Geneva Conference. At the same time,
Nehru made it clear that India had no desire 'to intervene in any
way or Intrude or involve* herself in the issue.
While the French Foreign Office received Nehru's proposal
with 'great interest* and the French Fwnrtga Prime Minister,
Joseph Laniel, expressed France's willingness to examine concrete
proposals before the Geneva Conference,^ the United States gave
the impression, during March and April 1954, of attempting to
make a ma^or military intervention in Indo-China* As this was
certain to torpedo the Geneva Conference, Britain asserted her
independence of action within the Anglo-American alliance and
thereby facilitated the convocation of the Geneva Conference and
its successful outcome* It deserves to be noted that the anti­
colonial character of the issue in Indo-China was recognised with
varying degrees of emphasis by both India and Britain.
The U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, made a
- 82 rather surprising speech cm 29 March. ^ In that speech, Dulles
urged his •Allies* to deal with the war in Indo-China by 'united
action', even though this might involve serious risks. On 4 April
President Eisenhower approved a proposal by Dulles to draw Britain
into a united front of the IB-french allies in order to oppose the
Communist forces 'on tins ground' in Indo-China, and Britain was
contacted to consider 'united action' on this basis.
Dulles
talked of 'massive and instant retaliation* | he was prepared to go
to the 'brink of war't possibly with the use of nuclear weapons.'’
It was in such a disturbing atmosphere that Britain firmly resis­
ted American attempts to extend the fighting in Indo-China. It
was no part of British policy to destroy the possibility of a
settlement at Geneva and create a fresh threat of a general war
in Asia. Anthony Eden, British foreign Secretary, undoubtedly
agreed with Dulles to examine the possibility of establishing a
'collective defence* within the framework of the US to 'secure
the peace, security and freedom of South-East Asia and the Western
Q
Pacific*.
But Eden took care to explain in the House of Commons
that 'the outcome of that examination will at least be greatly
influenced by what happens at Geneva*
further, Prime Minister
Churchill stated that the British Government was not agreeable
to give any undertaking about military action by Britain in IndoChina in advance of the outcome of the Geneva Conference.
All
this should stake it clear that British policy was against any in­
volvement in the military adventure in Indo-China. On this point
Britain differed with her American ally. Another point of AngloU.S. difference during the period wae that while Dulles wanted
immediate arrangements for a collective defence organisation,
44
Tgfler* preferred to vsdjt till the outcome of the Geneva Conference •
Thus, Britain stood for a negotiated settlement of the indo-Ghina
85
conflict. She did not share the American obsession with the proba­
ble consequences of the loss of Indo-China for the so-called free
world. Thus, Nehru* s appeal for a cease-fire met with a positive
British response of ensuring the success of the Geneva Conference.
Nehru followed up his cease-fire proposal by a vocal protest
against the contemplated extension of the Xndo-Ghina conflict. He
said that peace could not be established with threatsi in view of
the forthcoming Geneva Conference, it was not the time for provo/|p
cations and threats.
In line with her policy of non-involvement,
India did not permit any foreign troops and military supplies
bound for Indo-China to pass or fly through her territory. ^
When the threatened intervention in Indo-China did not mate­
rialise and the Geneva Conference was about to commence its busi­
ness, Nehru put forward a six-point plan for a peaceful solution
of the Indo-China problem.'***’ Introducing his plan, Nehru took the
opportunity of making a detailed analysis of the origin and nature
of the Zndo-£hlna conflict, and expressed the Government of India's
concern about certain recent developments arising from threats
about instant and massive retaliation leading possibly to *inter­
nationalisation of the war and its extension and intensification* •
It was explained that India's only interest was to maintain a
peace area and that she stood far 'a policy of non-alignment in
world tensions and wars'. Having stated India's basis approach to
the question, Nehru made the following six suggestions by way of
assisting the statesmen assembled at Geneva in their search for a
peaceful settlement t (1) In order to promote a 'climate of peace
negotiation*, the Government of India appealed to all con­
cerned 'to desist from threats, end to the combatants to refrain
from stepping op the tempo of the war* $ (ii) The item of a cease­
fire be given priority on the agenda of the Geneva Conference,and
- 84 a cease-fire group be constituted consisting of the actual belli­
gerents, i.e., Prance, the three Associated States of Vietnam,Cam­
bodia and Laos, and the Viet Minh; (iii) The Conference should de­
cide and proclaim, and the Government of Prance should make an
•unequivocal commitment* to grant complete independence to the
Indo-China states by terminating French sovereignty over them, (iv)
The Conference should initiate direct negotiations between the
parties immediately and principally concerned, i.e., the actual
belligerents listed under (ii) above { (v) A solemn agreement on
absolute non-interventio* among the United States, the Soviet Oni­
on, the United Kingdom and China should be brought about by the
Conference. The United Stations, to which the decisions of the Con­
ference should be reported, should be requested to formulate a
convention on non-intervention in Indo-China including in it pro­
vision for enforcement! and other States should be invited by the
UR to adhere to the convention! and, (vi) The good offices of the
UK for purposes of conciliation only should be sought*
Nehru's six-point plan for a peaceful settlement of the IndoChina conflict failed to attract any positive response from the
Western countries. As far as Britain was concerned, the plan was
received without much enthusiasm both in official and non-official
c i r c l e s H o w e v e r , when the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon,
India, Indonesia and Pakistan met at a Conference in Colombo,
i6
Anthony £den had taken the l i i i h t w initiative in kinking the
Colombo Conference with the Geneva Conference. None of the parties
to the Colombo Conference was represented at Geneva. ^
Yet, Eden
was convinced that any settlement for Indo-China to be reached at
Geneva could only be effective if Asian States Including an impor/ ID
tant country like India were associated with it.
Agreeably to
this approach, Eden cm 29 April sent from Geneva a cable to the
Prime Ministers of Ceylon, India and Pakistan in Colombo, He was
believed to have given an assurance to the three Commonwealth
Prime Ministers that the British Government did not wiih to be a
party to any decision likely to be reached at Geneva which would
conflict with the legitimate aims of Asian countries. Further, he
enquired of them whether they were prepared to participate in a
guarantee to
mux assure
the future of Indo-China if the Geneva
Conference arrived at an acceptable settlement. In his reply,
Bahru was reported to have stated that the Government of India
would be willing to participate in, or be associated with a gua­
rantee, if the Geneva Conference arrived at an acceptable deci­
sion and if India were invited to do so by both sides. Further,it
was emphasised that India would not be willing to consider as part
of her commitments the obligation to use force against any one
violating the terms of the settlement.^
The communique of the Colombo Conference of the Asian Prime
Ministers^0 substantially incorporated the points from Nehru's
six-point plan. Welcoming the attempt of the Geneva Conference to
find a peaceful solution, it advocated a speedy cease-fire and
direct negotiations between the parties principally concerned. It
urged the complete independence of the Associated States and re­
iterated the suggestion regarding the utilisation of the good offi­
ces and machinery of the ON, Though the
t#rm
*non-intervention'
did not appear in the communique, the Prime Ministers suggested
that the principal countries concerned, apart from the belliger­
ents, should reach an understanding to prevent a resumption of
conflict after the cease-fire.
2i
India's approach to the Indo-China problem, backed as it was
by the Colombo Conference, undoubtedly m m went a long way in
strengthening the hands of Britain at the Geneva Conference as
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86
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against the frankly adventurous policy of the United States. But
Geneva faced rough weather on the very eve of the Conference on
Indo-China. On 7 May 195** the French fortress of Dien Bien Fhu
fell to the Viet Klnh f o r c e s . ^ Here was Dulles's opportunity of
conducting parallel discussions on the subject of a South-East
Aslan defence organisation. With full knowledge of the views of
the Colombo Powers, Eden was naturally opposed to such a course
of action at that t i m e . ^ Further, Prime Minister Churchill re­
iterated the British Government's refusal to be a party to any
decision on a pact in South East Asia in advance of the Geneva
pa
talks*
This firm attitude as also the change of government in
France with the appointment of Mendes-France as the new Prime
Minister proved beneficial for the success of the Geneva Confer­
ence.
Though India was not represented at the Conference, the pre­
sence of V.K, Krishna Menem at Geneva, with his private top-level
meetings with representatives of different Powers, was an impor­
tant factor making for the success of the Geneva Conference.^
Speaking in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
acknowledged the fact that although Britain's Aslan partners
were not represented at the Conference, constant contact was
maintained with them at every stage, and that it proved to be
pc
•quite invaluable**
During the recess of the Geneva Conference, Chou En-lai,
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the People* s Republic of
China, visited Hew Delhi on the invitation of Kehru. Their joint
statement issued on 28 June recommend ed the application, of the
principles of FA5CH SHEELA to the solution of the Indo-China prob­
l e m s . ^ India contributed to success at Geneva through this form
as well. Judged by Eden's statement in the British Parliament,
87
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Britain whole-heartedly appreciated the Indian stand on the issue.
Irwrefreshing contrast to tfie American position, Eden acknowledged
that one result of the Geneva Conference had been an improvement
in Anglo-Chinese relations which, he knew, had been the subject of
criticism*in certain quarters*) continuing, he said i
but in
my opinion they have already proved of benefit to this country and
a real contribution to peaceful co-existence, which is still our
aim and object, with every country*.
It was this policy of peace­
ful co-existence of States which triumphed at Geneva,
The Geneva settlement*^ was mainly based on the separate
cease-fire agreements covering each of the three Indo-Chlna
States and a Final Declaration of thee Conference,^0 The cease­
fire agreements provided for three international commissions,
one each for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, composed of representati­
ves of India (as Chairman), Canada mid Poland, in order to control
and supervise the armistice agreements. The Pinal Declaration^
signed on 21 July 195^ took note of the clauses in the cease-fire
agreements »prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of foreign
troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds ef arms
and munitions' and also the declarations by Cambodia and Laos
not to allow their territories to be used for aggressive purpo­
ses | it agreed that no military base of a foreign State was to
be established in the Indo-Chlna states: and that they were not to
be utilised for the resumption of hostilities or *in the service
of an aggressive policy* $ it recognised that the military demar­
cation line in Vietnam (along the 17th parallel) was only provi­
sional and that it was no political or territorial boundary { it
was agreed that general elections would take place in Vietnam in
July 1956 under the supervision of an international commission,
composed of representatives of the same Member States serving in
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the International Supervisory Commission; it was provided that
consultations on the elections would he held between the compe­
tent representatives of the two Zones of Vietnam from 20 July
1955; the Declaration took note of the French declaration to
withdraw its forces from the three States and French recogni­
tion of the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Viet­
nam, Cambodia and loos; finally, the members of the Geneva Con­
ference undertook, 'in their relations with Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam, to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the
territorial
integrity of the above-mentioned States, and to re­
frain from any interference in their mutual affairs'.
On the very next day of the historic Geneva settlement,
Anthony Eden stated in the British Parliament t 'And as we form
Judgement upon these events, it is a fair comment to make that the
the only alternative to these agreements was continued fighting,
further misery and suffering, and the certainty of even greater
sacrifices in the end* * ^ Reciprocating these sentiments, Nehru
declared in the Indian Parliament t *The historic role of this
conference was that it was the alternative or the deterrent to
what threatened to lead to the third world war* This gives the
conference on Indo-China a memorable plaoe in history*
Anthony Eden expressed the hope that the Governments in
Southern Asia and the South-West Pacific would associate them­
selves with the Geneva settlement because it was the best settle­
ment ’that could have been contrived in the circumstances of each
individual case*
The Geneva settlement did secure the warm
support of the Colombo Powers* Extending their ’firm support* to
it, they recognised it 'as a notable contribution to the consoli­
dation of peace in South-East Asia*
Nehru had special reasons to be gratified with the Geneva
89
settlement. According to him, ‘the deliberations of the South-East
Asian Prime Ministers at Colombo had an essential and inescapable
role in the Geneva deliberations on Indo-China* ^
and the fact
was that the Colombo proposals were largely a reiteration of Neh­
ru's six-point plan. Shougfc. none of the Colombo Powers participa­
ted in the Geneva Conference , the correctness of Nehru's remarks
is obvious in view of the known stand of the British Foreign
Secretary at Geneva that any settlement on Indo-China must needs
be based cm the support of the Asian countries. Well might it be
conceded that India made important contributions to the Geneva
settlement through the instrumentality of the Colombo Conference
and Britain. Many countries, the USSB and China included, contri­
buted toward success at Geneva. Nehru made a special mention of
the mediatory role of the two oo-Chairmen of the Conference,Eden
and Molotov, and hailed the Geneva arrangements for Indo-China
as a 'truly negotiated settlement, where not any one of the
belligerents but peace has lean the victor*
Once, however, the Geneva settlement was reached, Britain
allowed the initiative in South East Asia to pass to the hands
of the more adventurous United States. During the recess of the
Geneva Conference in June, Britain still stood for 'some form of
permanent South-East Asia, defence organisation' largely on the
XQ
basis of understanding and support of the Colombo Powers.-'
Placed on the two horns of a dilemma between maintaining the
American alliance and retaining the support of Asian members of
the Commonwealth, Britain at that time refrained from any preci­
pitate move towards the formation of a NASO system in South-East
Asia. In his statement in the British Parliament on 23 June,Eden
spoke about the desirability of a mutual guarantee system of the
type of L o c a r n o , o r of a *defensive alliance such as the NATO
is In Europe, end, ••• such as the existing Chinese-Soviet
40
Treaty
provides for the Far East so far as the Communist
ft A
Powers are concerned1•
After the Geneva settlement it was Ame­
rican policy which prevailed with the result that the SEAI cA 2
came into being. Although India would have probably joined in a
kind of Locarno gunruhimi which Eden had earlier mentioned as a
possible alternative,^ she wholly dissociated herself from the
SEAIO proceedings because these were flikely to reverse the trend
j ij i
of conciliation released by the Indo-China settlement*.
In
India*s view, collective peace could only come by resolving glo­
bal tensions and developing a pattern of collective peace freed
from the bane of power blocs,
India believed that the Indo-China settlement would extend
the area of peace and stability. When responsibility was offered
to her, she accepted it as refusal would have meant ‘imperilling
the whole agreement* reached at Geneva
The International Control Commissions started functioning
from 11 August 1954. Coder India*s chairmanship, considerable
progress was made in the implementation of the Geneva Agree­
ments, The implementation of the military clauses of the cease­
fire agreements was largely completed by the middle of
1955*
But
the stalemate in Vietnam continued due mainly to the attitude of
the Government of South Vietnam f their position was that as they
did not sign the Geneva Agreement, they ware not bound by its
provisions and that they were opposed both to the Agreement and
the Final Declaration.
However, the International Commission
for Supervision and Control in Vietnam continued to discharge
their responsibilities of maintaining peace in the area. During
1960-61, on the basis of the recommendations of the es-Chairmen
of the Geneva Conference, it was decided to make a substantial
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reduction of the strength of the Commissions for Supervision and
Control in Vietnam and C a m b o d i a . ^ In I960, Laos presented diffi­
culties when the International Commission for Supervision and
Control in Laos had to be withdrawn in the wake of the overthrow
of the Government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. The real SEnsmi
reason for troubles in the countries concerned lay In the fact
that cold war polities still continued to haunt them.
If the Geneva Settlement were sincerely implemented without
the intrusion of SEATO and the consequent introduction of cold
war politics into the area, the post-Geneva deterioration of
relations among nations could have been certaihly avoided. The
increasing harmony between ititish and American policies in
South-East Asia after the Geneva settlement prevented the consu­
mmation of the Eden approach which played a tremendous role In
making the Settlement. Be that as it might be, the Geneva
Settlement stands out ae a monument of well-directed British
efforts with Indian support far a truly negotiated settlement
which Is India's approach to a solution of international dis­
putes.