International Journal of Public Opinion Research Vol.  No.  © World Association for Public Opinion Research
; all rights reserved
OUR LONG ‘RETURN TO THE CONCEPT
OF POWERFUL MASS MEDIA’—
A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARATIVE
INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF
CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE
Jochen Peter
A B ST RA C T
Consonant media coverage, i.e. a very similar presentation and evaluation of issues in all
media of a particular country, is usually considered to bring about powerful media
effects. Though plausible, this notion has hardly been put to the test. This study investigated whether consonant coverage affects support for European integration. The study
linked, at the individual level, content analytic measures to survey data in  European
countries. If the media in a particular country evaluated EU representatives consonantly,
then positive evaluations increased people’s support for further European integration,
while negative evaluations decreased it. This effect was boosted by the visibility of EU
representatives. Conversely, if the media in a particular country evaluated EU representatives dissonantly, then no effect of the coverage emerged. Cognitive selection
mechanisms did not protect EU citizens from the influence of consonant media coverage, which indicates powerful media effects. The findings suggest that media effects
research may benefit from the ‘concept of powerful mass media’.
‘Return to the concept of powerful mass media’—this is the programmatic title
of an article that Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann published about  years ago. Along
with Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien’s () study on the knowledge gap
hypothesis and McCombs and Shaw’s () article on agenda-setting, NoelleNeumann’s () publication is often considered the turning point in the development from the notion of limited media effects to the rediscovery of powerful
mass media (e.g. Donsbach, ; McQuail, ; Severin & Tankard, ). In
Noelle-Neumann’s article, a concept called consonance plays a central role for the
emergence of powerful media effects. By consonance, Noelle-Neumann ()
This article was first submitted to IJPOR February , . The final version was received September ,
. A preparatory version of this article with a somewhat different focus and different analyses has been
published in German (Peter, a).
AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE

means ‘a large extent of similarity in the presentation of certain material in all the
media’ (p. ). The basic idea is that, if all media depict and evaluate an issue
similarly, citizens hardly have a chance not to be exposed to that information.
According to Noelle-Neumann, this presents an ideal situation for the media to
exert powerful effects.
However, so far neither Noelle-Neumann herself nor other scholars have adequately tested whether consonant coverage does indeed enhance media effects.1
The few existing studies do show that consonant coverage is conducive to media
effects (Noelle-Neumann, ; indirectly also: Knoche & Lindgens, ).
However, if one wants to demonstrate clearly that consonant media coverage
increases media effects, one needs to compare the effects of consonant coverage
with the effects of dissonant coverage (for the general importance of comparison
in scientific designs, see King, Keohane, & Verba, ). Only if consonant coverage of a particular issue brings about effects while dissonant coverage of the
same issue does not, is there evidence of consonance being conducive to media
effects. Thus, the first goal of this study is to investigate, in a cross-nationally
comparative setting, whether consonant coverage as opposed to dissonant coverage helps to produce effects of media coverage on citizens’ opinions about a
particular issue.
More specifically, this study investigates whether the tone of EU coverage in
terms of the evaluations of EU representatives affects citizens’ opinions about
European integration. Due to its transnational character, EU coverage lends
itself to cross-nationally comparative studies. The term EU representatives
refers both to EU officials (e.g. members of the European Commission) and to
people who are clearly associated with the EU (e.g. national ministers when
they are members of the EU’s council of ministers). Research has shown that
the coverage of political actors plays an important role in shaping citizens’
opinions about political issues (e.g. Cappella & Jamieson, ; Valentino,
Beckmann, & Buhr, ).
Intuitively, one would presume that consonantly positive coverage of EU representatives leads to favorable opinions about European integration while consonantly negative coverage leads to unfavorable opinions about European
integration. Equally intuitively, however, one would presume that the potential
influence of a consonant tone towards EU representatives increases with the visibility of EU representatives. Noelle-Neumann () does not elaborate on
whether greater amounts of coverage enhance the impact of consonant reporting.
Therefore, the second goal of this study is to test whether the visibility of EU
representatives (i.e. the number of EU representatives covered) moderates the
1
This may also be the reason why the concept is not mentioned in a recent publication on ‘powerful media
effects’ (Rogers, ). There is, however, some content analytic research on the consonance of various types of
coverage (e.g. Eilders, ; Knoche & Lindgens, , Weiß, ). For a reinterpretation of existing media
effects studies in the light of the consonsonance concept, see Noelle-Neumann & Mathes ().

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
effect of the (consonant) tone of coverage on people’s opinions about European
integration.
Noelle-Neumann’s () reasoning about powerful media effects of consonant coverage rests upon the assumption that consonant coverage deters people
from selectively exposing themselves to media messages. The concept of selective exposure as a protective mechanism against media messages entails a lot of
important antecedents and ramifications and is difficult to investigate (for
reviews see: Donsbach, ; Zillmann & Bryant, a). However, due to the
general lack of research on selective exposure and consonant coverage, it may be
worth studying the relationship between the two concepts in the context of
media effects on opinions about European integration. Thus, it is the third goal
of this study to test whether EU citizens’ protective mechanism of selective
exposure is skirted when EU coverage is consonant.
W H A T W E A L W A Y S W A N T E D T O K NO W AB O UT M E D I A
E F F E C T S , B U T NE VE R C AR E D T O I NV E S T I GA T E
SHORTCOMINGS OF PREVIOUS EVIDENCE
To date, there has been little research investigating to what extent consonant media
coverage does indeed exert the powerful influence it is presumed to exert. Judged
from today, Noelle-Neumann’s () own empirical evidence is methodologically
and statistically problematic. Methodologically, content analysis and survey data
were loosely linked at the aggregate level. Statistically, no control measures were
included. The association found may thus be spurious. Along with the fact that
Noelle-Neumann did not investigate media effects when coverage was dissonant,
the methodological and statistical shortcomings also impede causal reasoning.
The problematic methodological translation of the idea leads to a second,
more conceptual problem. The compelling demonstration of media effects
requires that the analysis be conducted at the individual level to rule out the possibility of ecological fallacy (Robinson, ). Noelle-Neumann () changes
unsystematically between the individual and the collective level—she reasons at
the individual level, but analyzes at the collective level. However, if one accepts
the primacy of the individual level of analysis in media effects studies, then the
concept of consonance has to be slightly specified. No individual is exposed to
the entire media coverage in a given country. He/she will only use particular
outlets. As a result, the consonance of coverage has to be conceptualized as a
‘surrounding’, contextual factor. The basic question is whether the coverage of a
particular outlet, when it is received by an individual, exerts a stronger effect on
this individual if the ‘surrounding’ coverage as a whole (i.e. the coverage of all
the media in a country) is consonant. More specifically, this study asks whether
the particular tone of coverage that individuals get from the outlet(s) they use
AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE

affects opinions more strongly if the tone of the coverage in the country as a
whole is consonant with the tone of the particular outlet. Tackling this question,
this study focuses on the effects of television news coverage as being potentially
conditional on the consonance or dissonance of the ‘surrounding’ entire coverage
(also including newspaper coverage). Television was chosen because EU citizens
consistently name television as the most important source about EU affairs
(Eurobarometer –). News coverage was selected because it can be assumed
that an institution such as the EU is predominantly covered in the news.
A third more theoretical limitation of Noelle-Neumann’s idea may come from
conceptually related research on the effectiveness of propaganda and persuasive
messages. The power of propaganda is usually rather presumed than empirically
demonstrated. Furthermore, the ‘success’ of propaganda may result from the
fact that propaganda is typically received in situations of high social control,
coercion, or even terror (see Bramsted’s  analysis of Nazi propaganda).
Empirical studies of propaganda or, more generally, of the effects of persuasive
messages on opinions and attitudes have shown that propaganda is ‘contingently
effective rather than invariably effective’ (Brown, , p. ). Early studies
(e.g. Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, ) as well as more recent investigations (e.g.
McGuire, , ; Petty & Cacioppo, ) suggest that the power of media
depends on a variety of situational and personal factors. More importantly, the
various studies point out that people may learn the basic information presented
in the messages, but may not change their opinions, attitudes, or even behavior
accordingly (for review, see Perloff, ).
T HREE G OALS OF
THE
PRESENT STUDY
If one transfers these findings to the idea of powerful media effects of consonant
coverage, it becomes clear that such effects should not be taken for granted.
Although Noelle-Neumann () does not elaborate on it, it is important to point
out that her idea implies that people do not only learn from the media, but also
adjust their opinions to the tone of coverage. Concerning potential effects of the
tone of coverage of EU representatives on opinions about European integration,
this means that it is crucial to demonstrate two points. First, the tone of television
coverage of EU representatives influences citizens in countries where coverage of
EU representatives as a whole is consonant, while the tone has no or very little influence on citizens in countries where coverage is dissonant. Second, citizens surrounded by consonant coverage adjust their opinion about European integration to
the tone of coverage of EU representatives. If the coverage is consonantly positive,
opinions about European integration will be more positive than in countries where
coverage is consonantly negative. Technically speaking, I expect an interaction
between the (contextual) consonance/dissonance of coverage as a whole and the
tone of coverage in the particular outlets that individuals are exposed to.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
The second goal of this study centers upon the question of whether higher visibility of EU representatives enhances the effect of the tone of coverage. Because
there is no research to build expectations upon, I start with some basic assumptions. If the tone of coverage of EU representatives positively affects people’s
opinions in countries with consonant media coverage, then this effect will
become stronger as EU representatives become more visible. However, the less
visible EU representatives are, the weaker the effect of the tone on opinions will
become. Put differently, there is no homogenous effect of the tone of coverage of
EU representatives on opinions about European integration. The impact of the
tone of coverage of EU representatives rather depends on the visibility of EU
representatives. Greater visibility of EU representatives will boost the effect of
the tone of coverage, while lower visibility will impede this effect. Technically
speaking, this presents a three-way interaction effect between the individually
received tone of coverage of particular outlets, the consonance/dissonance of the
coverage as a whole, and the visibility of EU representatives.
The third goal of this study is to investigate, in a tentative first step, whether consonant coverage circumvents selective barriers (Noelle-Neumann, , a, b).
Noelle-Neumann’s reasoning concerning the power of consonant television coverage
is very much linked to the particular situation in Germany in the late s and
early s with only two public-broadcasting networks and highly politicized public
debates (see especially her reasoning in a). Moreover, the barriers of selective
processes are more complex than conceptualized by Noelle-Neumann (e.g. a,
b), ranging from selective exposure via selective attention/perception and selective
comprehension/interpretation to selective retention (e.g. Donsbach, ; Zillmann
& Bryant, b). The variety of selective barriers renders it difficult for messages
to get through unfiltered. Given, however, the striking lack of research, NoelleNeumann’s basic idea nevertheless deserves attention.
It will hence be investigated whether the selective barrier of an individual’s support for the EU is surmounted by media messages in a consonant media environment. Support for the EU is only a proxy for the more complex selective
mechanisms described above, but studies from diverse research areas consistently
document that support for politicians, parties, or political groups determines
whether and how media messages are received (e.g. Moy, Pfau, & Kahlor, ;
Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, ). Generally, people seek information consistent
with their opinions (for review see: Cotton, ). As a result, one would expect
that EU supporters are influenced by a positive tone toward the EU, while EU
opponents are affected by a negative tone. However, if the tone of EU coverage is
consonantly negative or consonantly positive across media, EU supporters may
permanently be confronted with negative messages and EU opponents may
permanently be confronted with positive messages. Therefore, EU supporters
and EU opponents will not differ in their reaction to the particular tone of coverage. Both EU supporters and EU opponents will show increasing support for EU
AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE

integration if the tone of coverage is consonantly positive. Both EU supporters
and EU opponents will show decreasing support for EU integration if the tone of
coverage is consonantly negative. Technically speaking, I expect that individual
EU support will not moderate the cross-level interaction between the tone of EU
coverage of particular outlets that individuals are exposed to and the consonance
of the coverage as a whole. In other words, there will be no significant three-way
interaction between these two variables and individual EU support.
METHOD
PROCEDURE AND DATA
As a secondary analysis, this study links surveys carried out in all EU member
states immediately after the European elections to a content analysis of the television news coverage of the June  European election campaign.2 The content analysis was conducted for a two-week period preceding election day. Units
of investigation were, per country, the main evening news outlet of both the most
widely-watched public broadcasting and private networks.
Because Belgium consists of Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking
Wallonia, the content analysis included the evening news of the two most widelywatched Dutch- and French-speaking Belgian channels. Private channels do not
exist in Austria or were insignificant in Ireland in . As a result, only the public
broadcasting channel with the largest reach was included in these two countries.
Because only a minority watches the Greek public broadcasting channel, ET, a second private channel was analyzed in Greece. Due to its limited reach in comparison
to networks in other countries, the Luxembourg channel was not part of the analysis.
Portuguese coding of a crucial category deviated in a non-explainable way from coding in other countries. As a precautionary measure, Portugal was hence excluded
from the analysis.3 For further information on the outlets investigated see Table .
The unit of analysis was the single news story (defined as semantic entity with
at least one topic delimited from another story by a change of topic). Overall,
, stories were screened; , of them were political stories (defined as stories explicitly mentioning politics and/or sufficiently depicting political actors).
Of the political stories, , were analyzed with respect to visibility and evaluation of EU representatives.4
2
The surveys are part of the  European Election Study (EES). The original collectors of the data bear
no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations published here.
3
Including Portugal in the analyses presented in this study would render the effects found stronger.
4
Because stories about the Kosovo war heavily dominated the period of investigation and because the focus
of the content analysis was on the coverage of the European election campaign, Kosovo stories were only coded
if they were linked to the EU. This explains the difference between the total sum of political stories (n = ,),
which includes all Kosovo stories, and the reduced sample of , stories, which includes Kosovo stories only
if they clearly referred to the EU. The figures refer to the sample without Portugal.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
This study focuses on the effects of television coverage. To receive a more
encompassing notion of the dissonance or consonance of the coverage as a whole, it
also includes the coverage of the most prestigious newspapers.5 For each country,
the front-page of the most prestigious newspaper was analyzed. The front-page
presents the most important part of each newspaper and gives a good overview of
what a particular newspaper considers important. The most prestigious newspaper
was chosen because it can to some extent be seen as representative of a country’s
newspaper coverage and may moreover affect the coverage of other newspapers
(Dearing & Rogers, ). The newspapers analyzed are documented in Table .
The news stories were coded by  native speakers, who were trained during the
six weeks before coding, tested for inter-coder reliability, and supervised throughout
the whole coding period. For each country, the stories were randomly assigned to the
coders. The majority of the coding was done at the University of Amsterdam to keep
the coding as comparable as possible. For the reliability test, coders of all country
groups had to code at least  randomly selected television stories per channel. Further information on the coding procedure can be found in Peter (b).
To assess citizens’ support for further European integration along with a number
of control variables, the (identical) surveys carried out in the EU member states
immediately after the European elections were used. The computer-assisted telephone interviews were conducted between June  and July ,  and were based,
in each country, on a nationally representative random sample of people older than
 years of age. The sample size was at least , respondents in Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK and at least  respondents in
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, and Sweden. The response rates varied
between  percent in Greece and  percent in Denmark (see Table  for detailed
information).6 These low response rates may not necessarily bias the results, as
Keeter, Miller, Kohut, Groves, and Presser () have recently demonstrated.
MEASURES —DEPENDENT AND KEY I NDEPENDENT V ARIABLES
People’s opinion about European integration was gauged with the question
‘Some say European integration should be pushed further. Others say that it has
5
In contrast to the impact of television coverage, the effects of the tone in newspaper coverage were not
investigated for two reasons. First, television is the leading medium for information about EU affairs
(Eurobarometer –). Second and more importantly, the potentially moderating impact of visibility of EU
representatives cannot be investigated for both television and newspapers. The appearance of EU
representatives in television bulletins means something else than their mentioning in a newspaper article. The
effects reported in this article remain the same if the analyses in which the visibility variable is not involved
include newspaper coverage (Peter, a).
6
In Italy, an internet panel with , respondents was used. The Spanish sample was a quota sample. The
computation of the response rates is based on a conservative definition of the net sample, which includes the
relatively high amount of losses of respondents who could not be contacted at all. The fact that no contact at all
was made with the person to be interviewed might, however, also indicate corporate lines, fax numbers etc., i.e.
quality-neutral losses.
AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE

already gone too far. What is your opinion?’ Response categories ranged from 
(unification has already gone too far) to  (unification should be pushed further).
The average support for European integration in the various countries investigated can be found in Table . More information about the political situation and
the contentiousness of the EU in the countries is available in Peter (b).
Visibility of EU representatives was measured as the number of their appearances in different stories. Up to six actors could be coded per story, but the same
actor was coded only once per story. To qualify as a story actor, a person, group,
or institution had to be either depicted and mentioned at least once, or quoted
and verbally mentioned, or mentioned verbally at least twice. If more than six
actors qualified in a news story, the actors to be coded were selected in terms of
their importance for the story (operationalized as amount of information given
about a particular actor, frequency of being mentioned, visibility, and quotes by
a particular actor). For each actor, it was coded whether the actor was, as an individual or group, related to the EU on any other level (e.g. regional, domestic, or
world level). For the analysis, the individual and the group code for both EUrelated and EU-unrelated actors were collapsed. For the coding of the actors as
EU-related or EU-unrelated, the average inter-coder agreement was ..
Evaluation of EU representatives and of other actors was assessed by coding
explicit judgments of story actors. The coding categories were  (neutral),  (unfavorable),  (mixed), and  (favorable). I computed, for every outlet, the difference
between the number of favorable and the number of unfavorable evaluations of EU
representatives. The evaluation differential is based upon absolute figures because
the absolute number of evaluations was sometimes very low and percentages would
grossly distort the outcomes. The evaluation differential was also preferred to the
mean evaluation. Kepplinger and Maurer () have recently demonstrated that
the evaluation differential is more comparable to people’s perceptions of evaluative
tendencies in the media than the mean evaluation and seems, thus, more appropriate for effect-oriented studies. The inter-coder reliabilities, measured as the average agreement between the coders, was .. Both measures, the tone of coverage of
EU representatives and the number of EU representatives covered, were centered
around their mean to avoid multicollinearity problems in the analysis of interaction
effects (Aiken & West, ; Jaccard, Turrisi, & Wan, ).
People’s general support for the European Union as proxy for more complex
selective mechanisms was assessed with the question ‘Generally speaking, do you
think that <your country’s> membership of the European Union is a good
thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?’ Recoding of the response categories
led to a scale where  equals a bad thing,  equals neither good nor bad, and  equals
a good thing. For the analysis of whether consonance skirts selective barriers, the
support variable was centered around its mean.
Whether the coverage was consonant or dissonant in its tone towards EU representatives was assessed by checking, per country, the direction of the tone in















−
−
−
−
−
−
+
−
−
−

−
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
+
−
−
Antenna ‘Ta Nea Tou’ (pr)
Mega ‘Kentriko deltio’ (pr)
ET ‘News’ (pb)
Belgium–
Flanders
Belgium –
Wallonia
VTR ‘Het Journaal’ (pb)
VTM ‘Nieuws’ (pr)
La Une ‘JT Meteo’ (pb)
RTL ‘Le Journal’ (pr)
TV ‘TV-Avisen’ (pb)
TV ‘Nyhederne’ (pr)
Yle ‘Finish News’ (pb)
MTV ‘News’ (pr)
TF ‘Le Journal’ (pr)
F ‘Le Journal’ (pb)
ARD ‘Tagesschau’ (pb)
RTL ‘RTL Aktuell’ (pr)
ORF ‘ZiB’ (pb)

Evaluation Number
EU representatives
in TV news
+
TV Channels analyzed
Austria
Country
TABLE  Background information and figures

−
Frankfurter
Allgemeine
Zeitung
Kathimerini
−

−

−

No
No
Yes (–)
No
Yes (–)
No
Yes (–)
No
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Mean
Evaluation Consonant
coverage support for
of EU
European
representatives
integration
in newspaper
Le Monde
Morgenavisen.
Jyllandsp
Helsingin
Sanomat
La Libre Belgique
De Standard
Die Presse
Newspaper analyzed
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Response
rate
survey

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
Note: (pb) = public broadcasting; (pr) = private
UK
Sweden
Spain
Netherlands
TVE ‘Telediario’ (pb)
Tele ‘Telecino’ (pr)
TV ‘Rapport’ (pb)
TV ‘Nyheterna’ (pr)
BBC ‘Nine o’clock news’
(pb)
ITV ‘News at .’ (pr)
RTE ‘News (.)’ (pb)
Rai Uno ‘TG’ (pb)
Canale ‘TG’ (pr)
NOS ‘Het Journaal’ (pb)
RTL ‘Nieuws’ (pr)
Ireland
Italy
TV Channels analyzed
Country
TABLE  (continued)

100









−
−
+


+
+
−
+

+
Evaluation Number
EU representatives
in TV news
Guardian
Dagens Nyheter
El Pais
NRC
Handelsblad
Corriere della Sera
Irish Independent
Newspaper analyzed
Yes (+)
No
No
−
−
No
No
Yes (–)
+
−

−
.
.
.
.
.
.
Mean
Evaluation Consonant
coverage support for
of EU
European
representatives
integration
in newspaper
.
.
Quota
sample
.
.
Internet
panel
Response
rate
survey
AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
three outlets—in the main evening news of the most widely-watched publicbroadcasting and private networks and in the most prestigious newspaper. If the
direction in all three outlets was identical (i.e. either positive, neutral, or negative), the coverage in the particular country was defined as consonant. If one of
the three outlets deviated in its tone from the tone of the remaining two outlets
(e.g. two outlets are negative, one is neutral), the coverage in the particular country was defined as dissonant (see Table  for further information).
CONTROL VARIABLES AND MISSING V ALUES
A number of control measures were included in the analysis to rule out the possibility of spurious media effects on citizens’ opinions on European integration.
Research on the antecedents of opinions about European integration and on
alternative explanations of media effects suggest that the following variables
should be controlled for: utilitarian motives (e.g. Gabel, ); party cues (e.g.
Franklin, Marsh, & McLaren, ); left–right position (e.g. Budge, Robertson,
& Hearl, ); satisfaction with domestic democracy (e.g. Anderson, );
political interest (e.g. Anderson, ; Holtz-Bacha, ); interpersonal communication (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, ; Schmitt-Beck, );
media exposure and media attention (e.g. McLeod & McDonald, ); and
demographics (e.g. Anderson, ; Janssen, ; Gabel, ). As outlined
above, the evaluation of EU representatives is computed with absolute figures,
and this operationalization might be affected by how frequently particular outlets
cover EU representatives. In order to preclude spurious effects, the number of
EU representatives covered was controlled for in the models in which visibility
of EU representatives did not present a moderating variable. Additionally, I
controlled for EU support in the models in which this variable does not have a
moderating function because opinions about European integration may not
present consistent entities (Saris, ). Because EU citizens typically lack
knowledge about EU affairs (e.g. Anderson, ; Janssen, ), they may
rationalize and render consistent the little they know about European integration
(for general information on this problem, see e.g. Zaller & Feldman, ). The
operationalization of the control variables is available from the author upon
request.
In order to prevent a large number of cases being lost due to missing data
(when using listwise deletion), I replaced missing values by valid scores derived
from other, related, responses.7 Remaining missing values were replaced either
7
For example, if a respondent had not placed himself/herself on the left–right scale, but had indicated the
likelihood of voting particular parties, his/her left–right position could be concluded from where he/she had
placed the particular party on the left–right scale. Similarly, political interest was concluded from people’s
participation in political events, attention to European news was deduced from people’s exposure to European
election news, news exposure from media use, etc.
AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE

by mean substitution (for metric variables) or by the modal value (for dichotomies). In order to minimize the danger of arbitrary data modification, the
dependent variable and the measures of general support for the European Union
and satisfaction with domestic democracy were excluded from this procedure
because they are hard to impute.
DATA A NALYSIS
Because the survey sample sizes varied across countries, the data had to be
weighted. The total sample (without Luxembourg and Portugal) was ,
respondents. Due to its bicultural character, Belgium was split in its Flemish and
Wallonian part resulting in an overall figure of  ‘systems’ for analysis. The
samples of each of the  systems were weighted such that each system had the
same sample size while the original total sample size was preserved.
Per system, the particular evaluation and visibility of EU representatives were
added to each respondent who regularly watched one or both of the two news
outlets that were content analyzed. For example, in Britain, those respondents
who watched the BBC  o’clock news, or ITN’s News at :, or both, were
assigned the EU coverage measures. This means that, per system and per measure, three different values were assigned. Not all respondents regularly watched
one or both of the outlets. As a result, the overall sample sized reduced to ,
respondents. However, the selected sample did not meaningfully deviate from
the original sample. Additionally, each respondent in a particular system
received a value indicating whether he/she received information in a media environment where the tone towards EU representatives in the coverage as a whole
was consonant (coded as one) or dissonant (coded as zero).
In regular OLS regressions, the standard error of cross-level interactions is underestimated. In this study, this implies an increased risk of a type-I error with respect to
the expected cross-level interaction between the country-level factor consonance/
dissonance and the individually received tone of coverage. Therefore, the standard
error was corrected with the so-called ‘sandwich’ estimation of the standard error
(Huber, ; White, ). This correction entails that the critical t-values are
assessed on the basis of  degrees of freedom (i.e. number of systems minus one; for
a more detailed explication of this problem and for a discussion why multi-level
modeling is not appropriate for the data at hand, see Peter, b). Besides the
correction of the standard error, the data analysis differed from ordinary regression
analyses in a second aspect. The expected two-way and three-way interactions were
post hoc probed for significant difference of the simple slopes from zero.8 This
8
By simple slope the slopes of the focal independent variable (i.e. tone) as conditional on the values of the
first-order moderating variable (i.e. consonance/dissonance) and, in a three-way interaction, of the values of
the second-order moderating variable (i.e. visibility) are meant.
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
procedure has been suggested by Jaccard et al. (, pp. –, –) and by Aiken
and West (, chs  and ).
R E S UL T S
DOES CONSONANCE ENHANCE MEDIA EFFECTS?
The first goal of this study was to establish whether media effects are more powerful if coverage is consonant than if coverage is dissonant. More specifically, the
tone of television coverage of EU representatives was expected to affect people’s
opinions about European integration only if the overall tone of coverage was consonant with the specific tone of coverage an individual receives. It was further
presumed that, in this case, citizens would adjust their opinion about European
integration to the tone of coverage. Model  in Table  shows a significant interaction between the tone of coverage of EU representatives and consonance/
TABLE  Impact of various cross-level interactions on support for European
integration
Key variables
Tone of coverage
Visibility of EU
representatives
EU support
Consonance
Two-way interactions
Tone X Consonance
Visibility X Consonance
Tone X Visibility
Tone X EU support
EU support X consonance
Three-way interactions
Tone X Consonance
X Visibility
Tone X Consonance
X EU support
Constant
R square
Model 
(n = ,)
Model 
(n = ,)
Model 
(n = ,)
−. (.)
−. (.)
. (.)
−. (.)
−. (.)
. (.)*
. (.)**
. (.)
. (.) #
. (.)
−. (.) #
−. (.)
. (.)*
. (.)
. (.)
. (.)*
−. (.)
−.
.
−.
.
−.
.
#
= p<.; * =p<.; ** = p<.
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized multiple regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in brackets.
All models were controlled for demographics, respondents’ position in the labor force, subjective social
class, interpersonal communication, party cues, left–right position, satisfaction with domestic democracy,
political interest, attention to EU news, TV and newspaper exposure, the number of TV channels and of
newspapers used, EU support (Models  and  only), and the visibility of EU representatives (Models  and
 only). R squares refer to the fully specified models.
AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE

dissonance of coverage (b = ., p < .). Plotting the interaction reveals that, as
predicted, the tone of coverage affected opinions about European integration
positively if the overall tone of coverage within a particular country was consonant (see the line with positive slope in Figure ). A more positive tone of coverage of EU representatives was associated with more favorable opinions about
European integration. Conversely, a more negative tone of coverage was related
to less favorable opinions about European integration. The line with the negative
slope in Figure  suggests that, when coverage was dissonant, a more positive
tone of coverage was associated with less favorable opinions about European
integration. Before further elaborating on these findings, it seems advisable to
post hoc probe the two slopes of whether they differ significantly from zero.
The post-hoc probing for significance of this two-way interaction is based
upon the following procedure: first, the simple slope is computed (one for consonant and one for dissonant coverage) by substituting the unstandardized multiple regression coefficients of Tone of coverage and of the interaction Tone X
Consonance from Table  in the regression equation. Next, the pertinent standard errors are computed by using formulas documented in Aiken and West
().9 By dividing the slope by its standard error, the pertinent t-value is
obtained. This gives the following t-values (the subscript c =  means dissonance
and the subscript c =  means consonance):
tc= = −./. = −. (n.s.)
tc= = ./. = . (p < .)
FIGURE  Cross-level interaction between consonance/dissonance and tone of coverage
on support for European integration
Note: To compute the values the control variables were set to their mean
9
Note that the computation of the standard error of the simple slopes requires data obtained from the
estimated variance/covariance matrix of the regression coefficients. Due to limitations of space the data cannot
be documented here, but may be obtained from the author upon request.
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
The statistical post-hoc probing shows that the effect of tone of coverage only
significantly differs from zero if the coverage as a whole is consonant. Conversely, if the coverage as a whole is dissonant, the effect is not significantly
different from zero. The tone of television coverage of EU representatives, then,
exerted more powerful effects under conditions of consonance than under conditions of dissonance.
DOES V ISIBILITY FURTHER M ODERATE THE I NTERACTION BETWEEN
CONSONANCE AND THE T ONE OF C OVERAGE?
To recapitulate, it was expected that greater visibility of EU representatives
would boost the effect of the tone if coverage as a whole was consonant. Model 
in Table  indicates a significant three-way interaction between the tone of coverage, consonance/dissonance, and the visibility of EU representatives (b = .,
p < .). In order to specify the meaning of the three-way interaction, first the
simple slopes are computed for all combinations of the variables visibility and
consonance/dissonance by replacing the variables in the regression equation
with the substantive values from Model  in Table . Because visibility of EU
representatives covered is a metric variable, I computed simple slopes at all values of this moderating variable.10 Subsequently, for each of these simple slopes,
standard errors were computed (for the formula, see Aiken & West, , p. )
and finally the t-values.
Figure  visualizes the results. The simple slopes are plotted across the whole
spectrum of the (second-order) moderating variable (i.e. the visibility of EU representatives). This is done separately for the (first-order) moderating variable
consonance/dissonance of coverage. Note that the y-axis indicates simple slopes
(i.e. the influence of the tone of coverage on opinions about European integration). For reasons of computational consistency, the x-axis indicates the centered
visibility of EU representatives. Thus, zero indicates the mean number of EU
representatives across all outlets in the analysis. Negative values indicate that the
number of representatives was below the sample mean, positive values indicate
that the number of EU representatives was above the sample mean.
We know from Figure  that, if the coverage as a whole is consonant, a positive
tone is associated with more favorable opinions and vice versa. If the visibility of
EU representatives indeed moderates this effect in line with the above mentioned
10
Metric variables as moderators create the problem of which values of such a moderating variable to choose
to compute the simple slopes. Jaccard et al. () and Aiken and West () suggest selecting three values of
the moderating metric variable—its mean, and one standard deviation below and above the mean—and to test
the interaction at these three values for significance. This is a pragmatic solution, yet it introduces an arbitrary
moment to the post-hoc statistical probing of the interaction term. As one can easily imagine, the specific
interaction may become significant or not significant at other values of the moderating metric variable (e.g. two
standard deviations below or above the mean). In other words, with a little bit of creative reasoning, findings
may easily be made significant. The procedure suggested in this article prevents such arbitrariness.
AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE

FIGURE  Influence of tone of coverage on support for European integration as function
of consonance/dissonance and visibility of EU representatives
expectation, the effect (i.e. the simple slope) should be smaller at low numbers of
EU representatives covered and should increase as the number of EU representatives becomes larger. As Figure  shows, this was indeed the case. The influence
of the tone of coverage was very close to zero if the coverage as a whole was consonant and if EU representatives were hardly visible. However, as the number of
EU representatives increased, so did the impact of the tone of coverage. This
suggests that greater visibility of EU representatives augmented the effect of the
tone of coverage towards EU representatives, while low visibility diminished it.
However, this pattern was not significant across the whole spectrum of the
moderating variable (visibility). As can be seen in Figure , only in an area
between − and + was the positive influence of tone of coverage on opinions
about European integration significant.11 Within a certain area of the visibility of
EU representatives, increasing visibility of EU representatives boosted the ‘positive’ effect of tone of coverage of EU representatives on support for European
integration if the media coverage was consonant. In other words, if EU representatives were consonantly evaluated in the coverage as a whole and if the
11
Two methodological remarks are in order here. First, the determination of significance is based on a
critical t-value of +/− . at , degrees of freedom and thus an alpha level of .. The critical t-value would
be +/− . when setting the degrees of freedom to  (number of systems minus one) as done in the overall
analysis in Table . The range within which visibility of EU representatives moderates the effect then extends
from − to +. However, this procedure does not appropriately take into account the conceptualization of
effects as individual-level effects as outlined above. Second, Jaccard et al. () point out that the computation
of multiple t-tests (one for each simple slope) introduces the problem of inflated type-I error rates across the
multiple tests. This can be alleviated by using a Bonferroni procedure, i.e. dividing the alpha level of . by the
number of tests performed. Given that there were  different values of the moderating variable EU
representatives,  t-tests were performed resulting in an alpha level of (./) or roughly . (for reasons of
visualization, Figure  presents the slopes across the whole range of the visibility variable although only 
values indeed occurred). Note that, in the case of the Bonferroni correction for  t-tests, the significant area
extends only from − to +. However, Jaccard et al. (, p. , fn ) themselves note that this approach is
conservative. Moreover, it should be taken into account that there is not only a type-I error, but also a type-II
error in empirical research and that there is little existing knowledge about the subject of this study.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
number of EU representatives covered was neither very low nor very high,
greater visibility of EU representatives enhanced the impact of the tone of coverage of EU representatives on opinions about European integration while lower
visibility reduced this impact. The more (the less) EU representatives were
covered, the more (the less) strongly both a positive and a negative tone shaped
peoples opinions about European integration (note that the interpretations refer
to simple slopes with a positive sign). When the tone was negative and a lot of
EU representatives were covered, the impact of the tone of coverage on opinions
was stronger (i.e. opinions were less favorable) than when the tone was negative
but when not so many EU representatives were covered. Conversely, when the
tone was positive and a lot of EU representatives were covered, the impact of
the tone of coverage on opinions was stronger (i.e. opinions were more favorable)
than when the tone was positive but when only few EU representatives were covered. Outside the specified area, the number of EU representatives did no longer
significantly augment or diminish the impact that the tone of coverage exerted on
opinions about European integration. At very low or very high numbers of EU
representatives, the extent to which the tone of coverage affected opinions about
European integration no longer depended on the visibility of EU representatives.
With respect to dissonant coverage, a positive effect emerged (roughly) below
the mean number of EU representatives covered and a negative effect occurred
above the mean. Figure  also shows that the number of EU representatives
moderated the impact of the tone of coverage on opinions about European integration if coverage as a whole was dissonant and if the number of EU representatives exceeded .12 Put differently, if coverage was dissonant, high numbers of
EU representatives increased the negative effect of the tone of coverage on opinions about European integration. That is, a positive tone was associated with less
favorable opinions while a negative tone was associated with more favorable
opinions.
DOES C ONSONANCE SKIRT THE P ROTECTION OF SELECTIVITY?
The third goal of the study centered upon the question of whether the protective
mechanism of selective perception is circumvented when coverage as a whole is
consonant in its tone towards EU representatives. More specifically, it was
expected that EU supporters and EU opponents would not differ in their
response to the tone of coverage. As Model  in Table  shows, there was no significant three-way interaction between the tone of coverage, consonance/dissonance of coverage, and individual support for the EU (b=−., n.s.). The
originally found impact of the tone of coverage if coverage was consonant applied
12
If the Bonferroni correction for the alpha level is used (see above), these simple slopes are no longer
significant.
AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE

to EU supporters and EU opponents alike. EU supporters and EU opponents
reacted in the same way to the tone of coverage in a consonant media environment: the more positive the coverage, the more favorable (or less unfavorable)
the opinion about further European integration. Conversely, the more negative
the coverage was, the more unfavorable (or less favorable) the opinion about
integration turned out to be.
D I S CU S SI O N
From a cross-nationally comparative perspective, this study has addressed one of
the core issues of communication science, the debate about minimal (Klapper,
), not-so-minimal (Iyengar, Peters, & Kinder, ), or powerful effects
(Noelle-Neumann, ; Rogers, ). The study provides evidence that consonant coverage is conducive to powerful media effects. Only if the tone of EU
coverage was consonant did EU citizens adjust their opinions about European
integration to the coverage. If the coverage as a whole was dissonant, the tone of
coverage did not affect citizens’ opinions. Moreover, greater amounts of coverage
enhanced the impact of the tone of coverage. Of course, in the  countries of the
sample, this does not imply coercion or indoctrination. Nevertheless, it seems to
be difficult for citizens in countries with consonant coverage to escape from the
omnipresent tone of coverage. In line with this impossibility of selective exposure, there was evidence that EU supporters and EU opponents reacted in the
same way to the tone of coverage. No matter what people generally thought
about the EU, they were, by and large, equally susceptible to the tone of coverage—a more positive tone led to more favorable opinions and a more negative
tone led to less favorable opinions about European integration. Selective exposure and selective perception may serve as protection against undesired messages
if the coverage as a whole is dissonant. However, if the coverage is consonant,
selective processes may be circumvented.
These findings are simple and may run counter to results based on more complex models of media effects advanced throughout the past decades. However,
just because Noelle-Neumann’s () basic idea has never been adequately
tested, it might be that we have lost track of simple, but parsimonious explanations of media effects. To avoid any misunderstandings, neither the findings nor
the reasoning presented here advance a crude stimulus-response model. The
emphasis is on the conditions (like consonance) under which media messages
affect opinions more easily. As the results have shown, there is no evidence whatsoever that a positive or negative tone always and everywhere results in a positive
or negative opinion about European integration—it simply depends on, for
example, the consonance of coverage. Undoubtedly, there may be much more
complex processes involved than those that could be investigated in this study,
particularly with respect to the acceptance and rejection of information.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
However, that said, the findings tentatively suggest that media effects research
might not only benefit from refined and complex individual-level concepts of media
effects, but also from paying attention to the context of mass communication—
for example the consonance of coverage.
The findings also have implications for research on public opinion. Consonant
coverage may strongly shape people’s perception of the climate of opinion (NoelleNeumann, ; Noelle-Neumann & Mathes, ). This perception of the
majority’s opinion may, in turn, influence people’s willingness to publicly stand
up for their convictions. The resulting spirals in public opinion eventually reinforce the effects of consonant coverage. Because of their dimension, such processes may be of interest to both applied and fundamental research. Applied
research may be provided with helpful tools to analyze significant real-word
developments, for example the dynamics of support for European integration in
the old EU member states and the Central and Eastern European states that will
enter the EU soon. Fundamental research may gain interesting new insights
through the cross-fertilization of media effects and public opinion theory.
This study demonstrates that the interaction between the consonance of the
coverage as a whole and the tone of coverage that individuals are exposed to
depended on the visibility of EU representatives. It is worth noting that a floor
effect occurred at very low numbers of EU representatives covered, while a ceiling
effect emerged at very high numbers of EU representatives. Apparently, virtually
invisible EU representatives do not significantly decrease the effect of the tone of
coverage nor do very visible EU representatives enhance this effect. If coverage as
a whole was dissonant, a negative effect of the tone of coverage occurred at very
high numbers of EU representatives. Two aspects should be kept in mind. First,
the simple slopes found were only marginally significant at better than the  percent
level. Second, no effect emerged for dissonant coverage with respect to the two-way
interaction between tone and consonance/dissonance of coverage as a whole.
Therefore, one should regard this effect with some caution.
The fact that, within a certain area, higher numbers of EU representatives
boosted the effect of the tone of coverage in consonant media systems may have
curious, yet important consequences for the future communication policy of the
EU. It can be seen in Table  that, across EU countries, the overall tone towards
EU representatives is most of the time slightly negative. Further, in consonant
media systems, a more negative tone of coverage leads to less favorable opinions
about European integration. If, finally, more visible EU representatives enhance
this effect, it can—ironically—be concluded that the communication deficit of
the EU (e.g. Meyer, ) may not necessarily be bad for the future of European
integration. In other words, if support of European integration is to be secured, a
communication policy that aims at a general increase of media visibility of EU
representatives may be counter-productive, particularly in countries whose
media tend toward consonantly negative coverage of the EU. Without a doubt,
AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSONANT MEDIA COVERAGE

EU citizens must have the chance to inform themselves adequately about EU
matters via the media, particularly on television. However, this desirable request
may, in some countries, come at the cost of declining public support for the
European enterprise.
This study has three shortcomings. First, the consonance or dissonance of
coverage was measured with only three outlets and consonance/dissonance was
operationalized as a dichotomous variable. With only three outlets, it seems inappropriate to operationalize consonance/dissonance as a metric variable. More
importantly, Noelle-Neumann () defines consonance as ‘a large extent of
similarity . . . in all the media’ (p. , emphasis added). However, future research
should carefully check whether consonance can meaningfully be conceptualized
other than as dichotomy and should accordingly choose different operationalizations.
Measuring consonance with only three outlets does not rule out that the
remaining outlets within a particular media system were dissonant. However,
it should be taken into account that the most important news bulletin of the
most widely-watched public and commercial channels and the most prestigious newspaper were content analyzed. It is unlikely that other news outlets
within a particular channel deviate from the outlets analyzed. Moreover, the
public and the commercial channel selected represent the television landscape
and its coverage characteristics fairly well (European Journalism Centre,
). As to the representativeness of the most prestigious newspaper, research
has documented a process called intra-media agenda-setting (Dearing &
Rogers, ). Prestigious newspapers set the agenda and presumably also the
tone for other outlets. In sum, it would have been desirable to include more
outlets per country in order to determine the consonance or dissonance of the
entire coverage. However, in a -country study, this quickly collides with the
feasibility of a study.
A second shortcoming of the effect analysis concerns the fact that the design
might not provide internally valid evidence that the tone of coverage indeed
changed the opinions about European integration. A baseline measure gauged
before the assessment of the media coverage would have been helpful. Strictly
speaking, the findings allow for comment only on an association between the
tone of coverage and opinions about European integration. To gain internally
valid evidence, experiments are most appropriate, but it is virtually impossible to
investigate macro-level variables such as the consonance of the entire coverage in
experiments. Moreover, there is neither a strong tradition of studying the interplay of variables at different levels of analysis nor any proper research of the
consonance-powerful media effects idea. A lot of effect studies rely on media
exposure measures instead of linking survey data to the actual content recipients
receive. This study presents, conceptually and methodologically, an advancement on previous research, although future studies clearly need to tackle the
problem of internal validity.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
A third deficit of this study may relate to the investigation of whether individuals’ selective exposure and perception is circumvented when coverage is consonant. Individual support for the EU can only be considered a proxy for the more
complex selective mechanisms that take place when individuals are confronted
with new information. Even if one accepts this qualification, one may ask
whether the lack of differences between EU supporters and EU opponents in the
effects of the tone of coverage really prove the circumvention of selective mechanisms. Support for the EU may simply be a weakly developed and incoherent
opinion accompanied by a lack of knowledge about EU affairs. In its extreme,
people might be unable to recognize that information contradicts their predispositions (see for a detailed discussion, Zaller, ). Studies demonstrating low
levels of knowledge about EU affairs and easy susceptibility to persuasive information about the EU support such reasoning (e.g. Anderson, ; Janssen,
; Saris, ). In sum, although the findings in this study seem to confirm
Noelle-Neumann’s () idea of the circumvention of individuals’ selective
mechanisms in consonant media, it cannot be ruled out that the specific topic of
this investigation was conducive to the results.
More than thirty years after what is considered a turning point in media
effects research—the ‘return to the concept of powerful mass media’—there is
now initial empirical evidence of the power of media if coverage is consonant.
Admittedly, the current technological infrastructure facilitates a study linking
content analysis and survey data in  European countries. Nevertheless, it is
striking that our return to one of the key concepts of powerful media influence
has taken such a long time. This study shows that the concept of consonance
may be more important to media effects research than is reflected in current
academic practice. Moreover, the study makes a plea not to forget the simple
conditions that may enable media to exert powerful effects. In this respect, the
context may be as important as the individual. Without a doubt, much of what
has been presented in this study needs to be refined and replicated. However,
we should not wait another  years to do so.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Jochen Peter is a postdoctoral research fellow in the Amsterdam School of Communication Research ASCoR, University of Amsterdam. His research interests focus on media
effects and cross-national comparative research.
Address correspondence to Jochen Peter, Amsterdam School of Communication
Research ASCoR, University of Amsterdam, Kloveniersburgwal ,  CX Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, E-mail: [email protected]