0
THE PHENOMENON OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Motivations of Foreign Combatants in the Middle East
Elizabeth Masten
Undergraduate Honors Thesis
Department of Political Science
Indiana University
May 2015
Professor Michael McGinnis (Thesis Advisor)
Professor Marjorie Hershey (Second Reader)
Professor Marjorie Hershey (Honors Program Director)
THE PHENOMENON OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Motivations of Foreign Combatants in the Middle East
Elizabeth Masten
Honors Thesis
Submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for Honors Notation
Indiana University -- Bloomington
May 2015
Thesis Advisor: _______________________________
Second Reader: _______________________________
Director of Honors Program: _______________________________
Date: __________
Acknowledgements
Completing this work would not have been possible without the help several instrumental people
whom I would like to thank.
Firstly, I would like to thank Professor Marjorie Hershey for reassuring me that it was possible to
take on this project, even though I started months after everyone else.
I also want to thank Professor Mike McGinnis for agreeing to take me on as a last-minute advisee,
despite his own busy schedule.
Lastly, I wish to thank Professor Dina Spechler, who inadvertently sparked my interest in this topic
by having me give a guest lecture in one of her classes about the Islamic State. Without this
opportunity, I would have not stumbled upon the world of foreign fighters.
ABSTRACT
There has been a vibrant discussion on the motivations of terrorists in the Middle Eastern
and North African region, but much less attention has been paid to foreign fighters. This paper
seeks to address the motivations of these individuals by analyzing this phenomenon in the context
of two conflicts: foreign al-Qaeda fighters in the Iraqi insurgency in 2007 and foreign Islamic State
fighters in the crisis in Iraq and Syria in 2014. This paper will attempt to give insight into the
phenomenon of foreign fighters by analyzing data from 6 independent variables, framed from a
state-centric level of analysis as well as on the individual level. The first level attempts to answer
the question: does democracy promote or discourage a country’s foreign fighter contribution? The
second level considers the fact that the phenomenon of foreign fighters is, ultimately, highly
individualized. Thus it is comprised of the five variables: Internet availability, urbanization,
secondary and tertiary education, and youth unemployment.
My subsequent findings suggest that a country’s level of democratization has a significant
impact on their contribution of foreign fighters, but this result may be more subject to political
shifts rather than a constant trend. This is indicated by findings which suggest that before the Arab
Spring, greater levels of democracy were correlated with less foreign fighters, while after the Arab
Spring, greater levels of democracy were correlated with more foreign fighters. On a more
individual level, Internet availability and urbanization had significant yet opposite outcomes in
2007 and 2014, possibly reflective of an evolution in fighter recruitment. The education variables
were not statistically significant in my model overall, therefore further study is required in order
to draw any conclusions. Lastly, youth unemployment remained the most robust variable for both
years, suggesting that the phenomenon of foreign fighters is highly motivated by dissatisfaction at
the individual level.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I: THE PHENOMENON OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..…………......1
Research Question………………………………………………………………………………...………...5
Foreign Fighters in Iraq circa 2007……………………………………………………………..…………..6
Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria circa 2014………………………………………………………..…….9
Comparing the Sources of Data……..………………………………………………………….................12
A Note on MENA Foreign Fighters……………………………………………………………................14
II: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Independent Variable 1: Level of Democratization
The Historical Promotion of Democracy.....................................................................................................16
Democratization as a Motivator for Terrorism……………………………………………….…………...18
Motivations of Foreign Fighters as an Analogue to Terrorism……………………….…….……………..20
Data and Methodology…………………………………………………………………..……… ……….21
Independent Variable 2: Internet Access
The Growing Importance of Social Media………………………………………………………………..23
Data and Methodology……………………………………………………………………………………25
Independent Variable 3: Urbanization
Urbanization as a Facilitator to Recruitment Coordination………………………………….. …………..26
Data and Methodology………………………………………………………………………….................27
Independent Variables 4 and 5: Secondary and Tertiary Education
Education and Foreign Fighters……………………………………………………………….. ................28
Data and Methods…………………………………………………………………………………………30
Independent Variable 6: Youth Unemployment
Youth Unemployment in the MENA Region……………………………………………………………..33
Data and Methodology…………………………………………………………………………................34
III: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Youth Unemployment and Freedom…………………………………………………………………..…..35
Multivariate Regressions……………………………………………………………………….................41
IV: CONCLUSION
Foreign Fighters: an Unintended Consequence of the Arab Spring……………………………................42
Internet and Urbanization: A Counterintuitive Trend……………………………………………………..45
The Saliency of Youth Unemployment……….…………………………………………………………..48
Implications……………………………………………………………………………………………….49
Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………………….................51
Appendices………………………………………………………………………………………………...55
List of Graphs, Figures, and Tables
Graphs
Graph 1: Number of Foreign Fighters in Iraq, 2007……………………………………………..8
Graph 2: Foreign Fighters per Capita in Iraq, 2007……………………………………………...8
Graph 3: Number of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria, 2014…………………………………11
Graph 4: Foreign Fighters per Capita in Iraq and Syria, 2014………………………………….11
Graph 5: 2007 Freedom Coefficient Predicting Foreign Fighter Contribution…………………37
Graph 6: 2014 Freedom Coefficient Predicting Foreign Fighter Contribution…………………38
Graph 7: 2007 Youth Unemployment Coefficient Predicting Foreign Fighter Contribution…..40
Figures
Figure 1: Normal Q-Q Plot of Foreign Fighters per Capita (log), 2007………………………...13
Figure 2: Normal Q-Q Plot of Foreign Fighters per Capita (log), 2014………………………...14
Tables
Table 1: CTC Harmony Project: Foreign Fighters in Iraq, 2007………………………………..7
Table 2: Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq by Country, 2014………………………………….10
Table 3: Level of Democratization vs. Percentage of Total Reported Foreign Fighters………..22
Table 4: Internet Availability vs. Percentage of Total Reported Foreign Fighters……………...25
Table 5: Urbanization vs. Percentage of Total Reported Foreign Fighters……………………..28
Table 6: Secondary School Enrollment vs. Percentage of Total Reported Foreign Fighters…...31
Table 7: Tertiary School Enrollment vs. Percentage of Total Reported Foreign Fighters……...32
Table 8: Total Youth Unemployment and Foreign Fighters…………………………………….34
Table 9: 2007 Freedom Coefficient: OLS Regression Predicting FF Contribution (log)………35
Table 10: 2014 Freedom Coefficient: OLS Regression Predicting FF Contribution (log)……..36
Table 11: 2007 Youth Unemployment Coefficient: OLS Regression Predicting FF Contribution
(log)………………………………………………………………………………………………39
Table 12: Bivariate and Multivariate Nested Coefficient Table, 2007 and 2014……………….41
1
I. The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters
Introduction and Historical Context
Insurgencies, due to their generally disadvantaged position in asymmetric conflicts, 1 target
outside groups that they expect to be sympathetic to their cause. Sometimes, this support comes in
the form of foreign governmental aid. Other times, this support comes in the form of non-state
actors who share a certain ethnic, religious, or ideological connection. 2 In recent history, the
manifestation of these non-state actors on an individual level has become known as the
phenomenon of foreign fighters.
These foreign fighters, defined here as an unpaid individual who is actively fighting in a
movement in a country in which they do not hold citizenship, are generally individuals who are
thought to be marginalized or disenfranchised in some sense by their society. These feelings,
coupled with a perceived existential threat to the recruit’s most salient transnational identity being
actively battled in a foreign locale, provides a “rationale for participation” in a foreign conflict. 3
However, this phenomenon has gone largely understudied. Political Scientist David Malet
has noted that there isn’t even a universally recognized term in political science literature to
describe it. 4 Rather, the term “foreign fighters” that is used today was normalized by media
outlets. 5 As for the literature that is available, Stenerson noted that it tends to focus on international
terrorism rather than local insurgencies. 6 This focus has driven a lot of research on bleedout, or
1
Mendelsohn, Barak. 2011. “Foreign Fighters- Recent Trends.” Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign
Policy Research Institute. Spring 2011. p. 191
2
Malet, David. 2010. “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspective and Solutions.” Elsevier Limited on behalf of
Foreign Policy Research Institute. Winter 2010. p100
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid. p. 106
5
This information can be demonstrated by a LexisNexis Database search.
6
Stenerson, Anne. 2011. “Al-Qaeda’s Foot Soldiers: A Study of the Biographies of Foreign Fighters Killed in
Afghanistan and Pakistan Between 2002 and 2006.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Vol. 34, Issue 3. p171.
2
the transnational impact of foreign fighters once they leave the foreign insurgency and use their
newly developed skills elsewhere. 7 This limited scope is problematic when attempting to further
the discussion on foreign fighters because these individuals generally join localized movements
and do not operate in a transnational theatre. I believe that the motivations that drive these
individuals to become activated as fighters are more revealing about the phenomenon of foreign
fighters as a whole than just analyzing the impact that these fighters have.
That being said, while bleedout does not answer the question of why individuals leave their
countries (therefore it is not the focus of this paper), you can’t understand why the phenomenon
of foreign fighters is important until you understand the implications of bleedout. It is perhaps the
most obvious impact that foreign fighters have both regionally and internationally, thus it remains
the main motivator for academic study of this topic.
These fighters do not generally have a major impact on the outcome of a conflict. They are
often untrained volunteers with few applicable skills, and sometimes their foreignness makes them
unattractive co-combatants for the native fighters. However, these individuals often become
significant not while they are on the battlefield, but by what they do once they leave it.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in how the foreign fighters in the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan went on to shape nearly all subsequent conflicts in the Middle Eastern and North
African (MENA) region. These fighters, dubbed the Arab Afghans, contributed to the phenomenon
of bleedout, where they took the skills they developed while battling the Soviets and utilized them
to found organizations like al-Qaeda. Therefore, in order to understand today’s Middle Eastern
foreign fighter, you not only have to understand bleedout, you also have to become familiar with
the historical background of the conflicts that allowed for their evolution.
7
Mendelsohn 2011, p191
3
The Mujahideen in the War in Afghanistan
The first major conflict that drew a large number of foreign fighters to a Muslim country,
and that set the norm for current foreign fighters in the Middle East, began when the Soviets
invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979. By 1984, a recruitment mechanism was in place that
funneled an estimated 20,000 (mostly Arab) volunteers into the country in an effort to defend the
Ummah, or the transnational community of Muslims, against secular Communism as well as to
defend Islam against a larger, symbolic attack perpetrated by “infadels.” 8 This conflict is often
cited as the benchmark by which we measure levels of foreign fighters in modern history. The
organization we now know as al-Qaeda began during this war, starting out as logistical support for
foreign fighters entering Afghanistan. 9
After the Soviets left, many fighters could not return to their countries of origin because
their governments either refused them re-entry or imposed hefty prison sentences for returners.
The fighters, now a band of nationless radicals, did not give up their idea of “defensive
mobilization,” 10 or protecting the Ummah against the infidels. They began looking for other
conflicts and found them in many locations, thus making al-Qaeda the transnational terrorist
syndicate it is known as today.
Mujahideen Bleedout and al-Qaeda in Iraq
The Jordanian-born al-Zarqawi set out to join the Anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan
in 1989. He entered the fighting on the heels of the Soviet withdrawal, so he spent the next decade
Malet 2010. p106
Encyclopedia Britannica. “Al-Qaeda.” Last updated 6-4-2014.
10
Ibid p107
8
9
4
bouncing between terrorist training camps and extremist movements throughout the Middle East,
ending up in Iraq. 11 By 2003, he set up the organization called Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (The
Party of Monotheism and Jihad).12 This party found success in recruiting fighters against the USled occupation of Iraq, and by 2004, it was operating under the auspices of al-Qaeda. 13
This group, now referred to as al-Qaeda in Iraq (henceforth AQI), began fighting the USled Iraqi insurgency and aimed to draw the U.S. military into a Sunni-Shiite civil war by targeting
Shiites (AQI itself was Sunni). 14 This sectarianism, invoked in response to the US invasion, laid
the groundwork for the current operational framework for the Islamic State.
AQI Bleedout and the Islamic State
The year 2006 saw organizational leadership changes as well as an accompanying
paradigm shift from the al-Qaeda philosophy of global terrorist networking to a more Iraq-centered
approach, encompassing several other Iraqi revisionist groups. This division from al-Qaeda was
reflected by a name change to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI had set its sights on Syria’s most
radical rebel group and former offshoot of AQI, Jabhat al-Nusra (or the al-Nusra Front). By April
2013, ISI annexed JN, effectively becoming the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 15 When
ISIS took control of a swath of territory in Northern Iraq in June 2014, the group was once again
11
Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. 2014. “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: Background.” The Council on
Foreign Relations.
12
Country Reports on Terrorism: Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 2006. US Department of State, Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
13
Whitaker, Brian. October 12, 2005. “Revealed: Al-Qaeda Plan to Seize Control of Iraq.” The Guardian: World
News.
14
Laub 2014
15
Gulmohamad, Zana Khasraw. 2014. “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Levant) ISIS.”
University of Sheffield; Global Security Studies, Spring 2014, Volume 5, Issue 2. p. 1-2.
5
rebranded as the Islamic State (IS), representative of the group’s expanding aspirations of control
outside of just Iraq and Syria.
Research Question
For this paper, I will attempt to address why individuals are motivated to leave their
countries and join foreign insurgencies by analyzing several variables based off of the reported
number of foreign fighters from two groups: foreign AQI fighters in 2007 and foreign IS fighters
in 2014.
While these two conflicts represent an evolution in the phenomenon of foreign fighters, the
conflicts themselves are different and therefore these fighter numbers should be seen as snapshots
of the phenomenon at two different times. In other words, the 2014 data should not be read simply
as a continuation of the 2007 data. I chose these two conflicts for several reasons: availability of
information, geographic location, and time frame. These two conflicts offer as reliable of
information as is available for this phenomenon, and they both took place in the same general
geographic location. They are also interesting to look at due to the fact that the Iraqi case of 2007
was before the Arab Spring, while the case in Iraq and Syria in 2014 was after. This offers an
opportunity to investigate the extent of the influence of regime type across the data.
6
Foreign Fighters in the Iraqi Insurgency Circa 2007
During the Iraq War (2003-2011), the al-Qaeda led anti-coalition insurgency drew a
multitude of fighters from countries around the world, as mentioned above. On September 11,
2007, al-Qaeda records 16 were seized by coalition forces in the town of Sinjar, Iraq detailing the
movements of 595 foreign fighters entering Iraq as of August 2007. 17 These records were compiled
by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point as part of an effort to make the
Department of Defense’s database detailing the inner workings of al-Qaeda (the Harmony
Database) available for the academic community. 18 This data is not the definitive number of
foreign fighters in Iraq at the time, as our knowledge of fighters is limited by the records kept by
al-Qaeda and their affiliates. 19 However, these documents are the best and most complete source
of data that we currently have regarding the number of fighters that were in Iraq during this time.20
Their findings are represented below:
Records were compiled on the letterheads of 3 different incarnations of al-Qaeda operating in Iraq: al-Qaeda in
Iraq, the Mujahideen Shura council, and the Islamic State of Iraq.
17
Princeton, Sinjar, 13
18
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. The Harmony Program. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/programsresources/harmony-program
19
Bergen, Peter, et al. 2008. “Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: Al-Qaeda’s Road in and out of Iraq.”
Combating Terrorism at West Point: The Harmony Project. Princeton. P32-33
20
It is also the most widely cited, with scholars using this data in journals like The Colombia Human Rights Law
Review, The New England Law Review, The Times Higher Education, and more. A LexisNexis search of “The Sinjar
Records” garnered 166 hits for newspapers as well.
16
7
Table 1: CTC Harmony Project: Foreign Fighters in Iraq, 2007
Country
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Population
26.3
35.1
1
74.2
71.8
5.7
2.6
4.1
5.8
30.7
2.6
163.9
1.2
Saudi Arabia
25.9
10.2
69.5
Tunisia
Turkey
United
Emirates
Yemen
Arab
5.8
21.2
Number of
Foreign
Fighters
Not Reported
41
Not Reported
4
Not Reported
11
1
1
112
36
1
Not Reported
Not Reported
Foreign
Fighters per
Capita*
N/A
1.17
N/A
0.05
N/A
1.93
0.38
0.24
19.31
1.17
0.38
N/A
N/A
237
9.15
33
6
3.24
0.09
Not Reported
N/A
44
2.08
Source: CTC Harmony Project
*Denotes per capita per million
For an example of an average record, see Appendix A on page 55.
The above table represents 527 of the 595 foreign fighters reported by al-Qaeda documents.
The 68 fighters that went unaccounted for may have originated at least in part from the countries
listed as “Not Reported.” The lack of concrete reports from these countries is most likely due to
Sinjar’s location in Northwestern Iraq, not terribly far from the Syrian border. While most fighters
came across the Syrian border due to ease of access and lax border control, fighters from the
countries listed as “Not Reported” are all located east of Iraq, thus suggesting that they may have
not entered through Syria and thus their records did not make it to Sinjar. This may add a bias into
8
my subsequent findings. However, if you look at the 2014 data on page 11, these 6 countries did
not contribute a great number of foreign fighters per capita per million in that conflict, so it is very
possible that their contribution in 2007 would have been small as well.
Graph 1: Number of Foreign Fighters in Iraq, 2007
Foreign Fighters 2007
250
200
150
100
Foreign Fighters 2007
0
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
Turkey
United Arab…
Yemen
50
Graph 2: Foreign Fighters per Capita per Million in Iraq, 2007
Foreign Fighters per Capita* 2007
25
20
15
10
Foreign Fighters per Capita
2007
0
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
Turkey
United Arab…
Yemen
5
*Denotes per capita per million
9
Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq Circa 2014
Currently, no official documents like the Sinjar Records have been collected or released in
relation to the foreign fighters in the Islamic State. What we rely on instead are educated guesses
and aggregates of accounts from social media, community knowledge, law enforcement
investigations, and official statements from foreign ministries.21 Often, hard numbers only occur
when a fighter has died and either the member’s family is notified by an official from the Islamic
State, or their death notification is published on one of the insurgency social media pages. 22 We
can also use official government reports, but even those are problematic. In the Middle East
especially, there can be a level of institutionalized secrecy in the governments of certain countries
that hinders accurate reporting, stifles on independent reporting, or a simple lack of resources to
compile frequent and accurate numbers. In some cases, the question of citizenship is problematic
as foreign fighter figures often refer to a person’s country of residence, not necessarily citizenship.
These numbers also do not account for the fighters who left for Syria or Iraq under the guise of
humanitarian aid workers. 23
I will be citing numbers from the The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization
and Political Violence (ICSR) Report, titled “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds
20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980.” This group is a London-based think tank
whose mission is to “educate the public and help policymakers and practitioners find more
intelligent solutions in dealing with radicalization and political violence.” 24 They also partner with
King’s College London, the University of Pennsylvania, Georgetown University and other
21
Berrett, Richard. 2014. “Foreign Fighters in Syria.” The Soufan Group. June. p11
Ibid, p12
23
Zelin, Aaron Y., Rena and Sami David Fellow, et al. 2013. “ICSR Insight: Up to 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria;
steep rise among Western Europeans.” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political
Violence. King’s College, London. Dec. 17, 2013.
24
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, About US. Web.
22
10
institutions, as well as having an affiliation with the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi and
the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies. 25 They have been studying the phenomenon of foreign
fighters joining the ranks of the Islamic State since 2012 and remain the leading source of fighter
data for major news outlets, analyzing thousands of openly sourced documentation regarding the
movement of foreign fighters into Syria, as well as media reports, official government estimates,
and statements made by Syrian jihadi groups. 26
Their results suggest that, as of the end of 2014, 20,730 foreign fighters have flocked to
Syria and Iraq from around the world. While media reports have focused on Western fighters,
ISCR found that only about 4000 fighters originated from the West, while over 11,000 fighters
have originated from the MENA region, as represented in the table below. For a more extensive
review of ICSR’s collection methodology, see Appendix B on page 56.
Table 2: Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq by Country, 2014
Country
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
Population
Number of Foreign Fighters
Foreign Fighters per Capita*
30.6
39.2
1.3
82.1
77.4
6.5
3.4
4.5
6.2
33
3.6
182.1
2.2
50
200
12
360
3
1500
70
900
600
1500
1
500
15
2500
3000
600
15
110
1.63
5.1
9.23
4.38
0.04
230.77
20.59
200
96.77
45.45
0.28
2.75
6.82
28.8
10.9
74.9
9.3
24.4
Source: ICSR as of January 27, 2014, *Denotes per capita per million
25
26
ibid
ibid
86.81
275.23
8.01
1.16
4.51
11
Graph 3: Number of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria, 2014
Foreign Fighters 2014
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
Foreign Fighters 2014
0
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
Turkey
United Arab…
Yemen
500
Graph 4: Foreign Fighters per Capita per Million in Iraq and Syria, 2014
Foreign Fighters per Capita* 2014
300
250
200
150
100
Foreign Fighters per Capita
2014
0
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
Turkey
United Arab…
Yemen
50
*Denotes per capita per million
12
Comparing the two sources of data
Scholars that study the phenomenon of foreign fighters note that it is virtually impossible
to find out the exact number of foreign fighters that participated in a conflict. 27 However, there are
three ways to get as close as possible to the actual number of foreign fighters in a conflict. The
first method is to compile the number of those who return to their home countries, but that is
problematic because it only includes those who return and get caught. The second method is to use
field reports or records of the number, but this requires that an organization keep detailed records
and due to logistics, those records are generally area-specific. 28 The Sinjar Records were compiled
in such a way. The academic community is fortunate that they exist, as the recovery of this kind
of record keeping is extremely rare. However, this method of reporting fighters is problematic
when you directly compare it to the last method, which is using an aggregate of these methods,
plus openly derived sources as mentioned above.
While comparing these two data sources (Sinjar and the ISCR report) is not perfect, I
believe that these two sources are the best representation of foreign fighter levels available today.
Both data sets represent samples of foreign fighters into Islamic extremist organizations from a
similar geographic area, which offer the only known itemization of foreign fighters by country that
exists today. They are the most complete, most vetted, and most widely-cited compilations of
foreign fighter country of origin available, with the most transparent methodology. That being
said, one significant question that should be raised is whether these two sources are comparable
enough to warrant analyzing them both at the same time.
See: Hegghammer, Thomas. 2013. “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’
Choice Between Domestic and Foreign Fighting.” American Political Science Review. Vol. 107, No. 1. February. p.3
28
Ibid, p.3-4
27
13
In order to address this concern and to see if I felt comfortable proceeding with an analysis,
I did a Q-Q plot, which sought to compare the distributions of the two data sets against each other,
with the numbers of foreign fighters adjusted per capita per million. I also transformed my
dependent variable by taking the log of the number of foreign fighters per capita per million in
order to normalize the distribution of the data to compensate for a small sample size with a lot of
small numbers. For an extended justification of taking the log of the dependent variable, see
Appendices C and D on pages 57-58. The Q-Q plots for 2007 and 2014 can be found below:
Figure 1: Normal Q-Q Plot of Foreign Fighters per Capita per Million (log), 2007
14
Figure 2: Normal Q-Q Plot of Foreign Fighters per Capita per Million (log), 2014
As demonstrated by the similar shape of the Q-Q plots above, the distribution of the data
is similar between both the case of al-Qaeda in 2007 and the Islamic State in 2014. Therefore,
while any conclusions drawn from combining these two data sets should not be read as definitive
(due, in large to the fact that the sample size for 2014 is much greater than 2007), it is not
statistically unreasonable to do so.
A Note on MENA Foreign Fighters
The next part of this paper will be devoted to answering what motivates these individuals
to leave their homes and take up arms in a foreign conflict. In the MENA region, part of this
15
motivation lies in an ideological framework that cannot be reduced down into independent
variables and quantitatively analyzed. There are aspects of Islam that these fighters often reach to
in order to justify their involvement. One of these aspects is the duty to complete jihad. Jihad has
gotten a bad reputation, but in essence, it simply means “struggle,” and usually refers to the inner
journey one takes in order to be a good Muslim. The only violent manifestation of jihad is military
jihad, which is used in a traditional sense to defend greater Islam. 29 Foreign fighters who invoke
jihad often do so as a misguided attempt to justify their involvement in a conflict. However, the
desire to protect Islam when an individual perceives it to be under attack from various entities
remains a strong motivation to enlist in foreign movements, by many personal anecdotes. 30
This logic extends to and effectively becomes inseparable from sectarian identities as well,
which are arguably more salient to modern MENA fighters than Islam in general. In the case of
the Sunni-run AQI in 2007, the Sinjar Report tells us that the fighters were almost exclusively
Sunni, 31 and a look at Table 2 above shows that Iran (with a population that is 90-95% Shia32)
contributed negligible fighters to Sunni Islamic State. The idea of sectarianism as a motivator for
involvement is compelling across cases.
Ideology aside, there are earthly motivators for the individuals who chose to be foreign
fighters. These motivators are measurable and analyzable, and I have included 6 possible
motivators in this paper, which follow.
29
Kabbani, Shaykh Muhammad Hisam and Shaykh Seraj Hendricks. 2014. Jihad: A Misunderstood Concept from
Islam - What Jihad is, and is not.” The Islamic Supreme Council of America. April 2.
30
Sullivan, Kevin. 2014. “Tunisia, after igniting Arab Spring, sends the most fighters to Islamic State in Syria.”
The Washington Post. October 28., Farivar, Masood. 2014. “The Foreign Fighters and Me.” The New York Times.
April 1.
31
Bergen 2008, p.35
32
Pew Research Center. 2008. “Mapping the Global Muslim Population.” Pew Research: Religion and Public Life.
October 7.
16
II: Independent Variables
The independent variables in this paper will be framed by two levels of analysis: one at the
state level (independent variable 1), which seeks to examine the phenomenon of foreign fighters
from a top-down, political-centric manner, and the other level of analysis (comprised of
independent variables 2-6) which will examine the individual level.
Independent Variable 1: Level of Democratization
The Historical Promotion of Democracy
The first variable I will address is the level of democratization amongst the 18 countries in
my data set. However, before I analyze this, it is important to note why this variable is so
significant, especially since the MENA region has been on the receiving end of many
democratization efforts, both homegrown and foreign imposed.
It is intuitive to think that democracies foster peace, security, and general welfare. In fact,
this idea was key in the foreign policy of the Bush Administration as well as one of the driving
forces behind the 2003 invasion of Iraq. At the time, it was said that democracy would promote
American security by spreading its values, thus making democracy in the Middle East synonymous
with US security. 33
This idea was rooted in the The Democratic Peace Theory, or Mutual Democratic Pacifism
as it is sometimes called, which states that democracies do not fight each other out of mutual
respect for their like-minded ideology. This theory became popular amongst many US policy
makers and advisors when discussing the Middle East. John Kerry made mention of the need for
democracy in the Middle East as a way to foster peace during his run for the presidency in 2004,
33
Gause, Gregory III. 2005. “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs. September/ October. p62
17
and New York Times columnist Thomas Freidman became the mouthpiece for this line of thinking
to a receptive public. 34
Martin Indyk, a key advisor on the Middle East in the Clinton Administration, advocated
for democratization in the region when advising on the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. 35 It was
thought that if there was an increase in the number of Arab democracies, they would be more likely
to cooperate with Israel (and the US) in reaching peace, due to a newfound mutual appreciation
for the key tenets of democracy. This connection between democracy and peace in the Middle East
was so widely accepted, American policy makers seemed to view democracy not only as a
mitigator of regional conflict, but as a panacea for the whole region.
Many equated an increase in regional democratization not only to increasing stability by
fostering intra-regime cooperation, but to decreasing instances of terrorism as well. Former
executive director of Freedom House, Jennifer L. Windsor said, “promoting democratization in
the closed societies of the Middle East can provide a set of values and ideas that offer a powerful
alternative to the kind of extremism that today has found expression in terrorist activity.” 36 In a
speech in 2005, Bush further explained this point by saying, “When a dictatorship controls the
political life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop, and dissident is driven
underground and towards the extreme,” 37 thus increasing participation in terrorist activities.
This is a very attractive connection to make. If democratic nations become more
cooperative when interacting with other democratic nations, then it doesn’t take much to come to
the conclusion that democratic countries would produce fewer terrorists that would then attack
34
Ibid, p64-65
Ibid, p64
36
Windsor, Jennifer L. 2003. “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism.” The Washington Quarterly.
Vol. 26, No. 3. p43
37
Ibid, p64
35
18
other democratic countries (one of the key concerns of the Bush Administration after 9/11).
However, the assumption that is made in this line of thinking is that the actions of regimes can be
extrapolated to include the actions of individuals living within that regime.
Democratization as a Motivator for Terrorism
Increases in terrorism may be more linked to responses of individuals who are not having
their needs met than responses to governmental structure. Nowhere is this more apparent than in
transitioning regimes. A study done by Eubank and Weinberg suggests that democratizing
countries experience more terrorist attacks than established democracies. 38 Therefore, the driving
force may lie in the process of democratization, or the incomplete transition of a regime on its way
to democracy, rather than an inherent shortcoming in democracy itself.
Mansfield and Snyder argue that democratizing nations see more terrorist attacks because
of an “incomplete transition” from an autocratic to democratic regime structure, thus they lack
developed institutions that provide state and human security. 39 In other words, fully developed
democratic institutions offer ways to address the grievances of the people, as well as offering some
sort of social benefits or safety nets, public works, etc. In a transitioning regime, these institutions
are either nonexistent, or are in their infancy and are not effective yet. This can cause a population
to be frustrated that their needs are not being met or they are not being protected.
Institutions in established democracies also serve to manage the power struggle between
the old elites and a new populous that now have a voice and thus are a prerequisite for mass
38
Eubank, William Lee and Leonard Weinberg. 1994.” Ðoes Democracy Encourage Terrorism?” Terrorism and
Political Violence. Vol. 6, Issue 4. p417-435
39
Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 2005. “Electing to Fight: Why Emerging
Democracies Go to War.” Cambridge: MIT Press.
19
political participation. 40 Lacking these avenues, people may be frustrated that they cannot fully
realize their goal of participating politically in a meaningful way. This is echoed by Miriam Elman,
who said, “without the rule of law (or in this case specifically, without the order that institutions
establish), mass electoral participation and party competition typically lead to violence.” 41
Mansfield and Snyder also assert that these unstable regimes are most volatile a few years after
they begin their transition. This timeline syncs up well with what we saw and continue to see from
the countries that participated in the Arab Spring.
James Piazza outlined this phenomenon in his 2007 study regarding state failure as a
motivator for the increased success of terrorist networks. Using 19 Middle Eastern countries from
1972-2003, he found that “the more politically liberal Middle Eastern states- measured both in
terms of democratic processes and in terms of civil liberties protections—are actually more prone
to terrorist activity than are Middle Eastern dictatorships.” 42 This, he argued, is largely due to the
inability of these states to “respond to fundamental challenges to political stability posed by
internal political strife, ethnic conflict or the phenomenon of ‘stateless areas,’ geographic or
political spaces within states that eschew central government authority, are significantly more
likely to host or sustain attacks from terrorist groups.” 43 This lack of coping mechanisms to
navigate political instability can cause the general population to become disillusioned with their
governmental system in what is termed as psychological frustration-aggression. 44 This frustration
can cause individuals to become activated as terrorists in an attempt to revise their perceived
wrongdoings of their regime and can be compounded by the inefficiencies of fledgling regimes.
40
ibid
Elman. Miriam. 2012. “The Arab Spring and the Future of Democracy in the Middle East: Rethinking Middle
Eastern Studies.” Palestine-Israel Journal. 18.1. p 101
42
Piazza, James A. 2007. “Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion, State Failure, and Terrorism in 19 Middle
Eastern Countries.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 30. P 521
43
Ibid
44
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. “Why Men Rebel.” Paradigm Publishers, 2010.
41
20
Motivations of Foreign Fighters as an Analogue to Terrorism
Most literature is centered around the causes of terrorism. It is not my intention to lump
terrorists and foreign fighters together, as they are often different entities. That being said, in this
case, it is possible that the same forces that have been argued to increase terrorist activities may
also increase numbers of foreign fighters. Clifford Geertz said that the idealization of religion is
often a coping mechanism to deal with the perceived failure of traditional structures. When an
individual accepts this idealization, in conjunction with frustration-aggression directed at their
government, it follows that they would seek out ways to correct the perceived wrongdoings by
invoking their religion as justification. In the case of religiously-justified terrorism, this correction
usually comes in the form of violent actions against the government or its representations.
The phenomenon of foreign fighters may be an extension of this logic, adjusting for
moments of opportunity. If an individual is disenchanted with their government, they may be
prompted to not attack domestically, but instead join a foreign insurgency if an ideologized war is
raging elsewhere.
In the case of Islamic terrorism, the notion of transnational action is justified by the idea of
the Ummah, or the greater community of Muslims. This idea of an entity that is greater than an
individual’s country may facilitate the movement of fighters beyond their own borders in order to
protect the Ummah from whatever the perceived transgression may be (an invading force,
unIslamic laws, etc). The saliency of defending the Ummah has allowed many individuals who
may have already been prone to radicalization to seek opportunities beyond the borders of their
own countries, into the far reaches of the Ummah.
21
Therefore, because the phenomenon of foreign fighters may be caused by the same forces
that cause terrorism in general, but adjusted for conflict location, I argue that it is possible to use
a similar rubric when talking about democratization and terrorism and democratization and foreign
fighters. In this section, I will examine if democratization increases the number of foreign fighters
produced by certain countries.
Data and Methodology
In order to compare regime types, I chose to use Freedom House’s ranking system of global
political rights and civil liberties. 45 This report, entitled Freedom in the World, has been a yearly
publication since 1973, having been cited by a multitude of scholars, 46 think tanks, 47 and news
outlets 48. Freedom House ranks each country on two variables: political rights and civil liberties,
using a questionnaire. 49 These variables each receive a ranking from 1-7 (1 being most free and 7
being least free). The values of these variables are then averaged, resulting in the “Freedom
Rating.” For a full breakdown of Freedom House’s methodology, see Appendix E on page 59.
This rating is often used as a representation of the level of democratization in the world. I have
compiled these ratings from the reports representative of the calendar years of 2007 and 2014, 50
along with the number of foreign fighters per capita per million from those years. The change in
Freedom Rating is also shown, in order to give a sense of the change in ranking from 2007 to 2014.
45
Freedom House. “About Us.” Web.
For previous usage, see: Treisman, Daniel. 2009. “Twenty Years of Political Transition.” University of California,
Los Angeles., Alvaro Franco et al., “Effect of Democracy on Health: Ecological Study.” British Medical Journal 329
(2004)., as well as many other citations from the Cato Journal, the World Bank Economic Review, the Journal of
Democracy, and Foreign Affairs
47
See: Pyror, Frederic L. 2007. “Are Muslim Countries Less Democratic?” The Middle East Quarterly. Vol. 14, No.
4. Fall. Pp 53-58.
48
A LexisNexis search garnered 791 hits for Freedom House used in newspaper articles
49
The questionnaire can be found at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology
50
Due to Freedom House’s publication cycle, the rankings for 2007 are found in their 2008 report, and the rankings
for 2014 are found in their 2015 report.
46
22
Table 3: Level of Democratization vs. Percentage of Total Reported Foreign Fighters
Country
Change in
Foreign Fighters
Foreign Fighters Freedom
Freedom
Freedom
per Capita* 2007
per Capita* 2014 Rating 2007 Rating 2014 Rating*
Afghanistan
N/A
1.63
5
6
+1
Algeria
1.17
5.1
5.5
5.5
No Change
Bahrain
N/A
9.23
5
6.5
+1.5
Egypt
0.05
4.38
5.5
5.5
No Change
Iran
N/A
0.04
6
6
No Change
Jordan
1.93
230.77
4.5
5.5
+1
Kuwait
0.38
20.59
4
5
+1
Lebanon
0.24
200
4.5
4.5
No Change
Libya
19.31
96.77
7
6.5
-0.5
Morocco
1.17
45.45
4.5
4.5
No Change
Oman
0.38
0.28
5.5
5.5
No Change
Pakistan
N/A
2.75
5.5
4.5
-1
Qatar
N/A
6.82
5.5
5.5
No Change
Saudi Arabia
9.15
86.81
6.5
7
+0.5
Tunisia
3.24
275.23
5.5
2
-3.5
Turkey
0.09
8.01
3
3.5
+0.5
United
Arab
N/A
Emirates
1.16
5.5
6
+0.5
Yemen
4.51
5
6
+1
2.08
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World
*Denotes per capita per million
*Remember, Freedom House’s Freedom scale is set up in a way that increases in the scale
(numbers approaching 7) represent less freedom. Therefore, an increase in the Change in Freedom
category in the table above should be interpreted as countries incurring less freedom.
23
Independent Variable 2: Internet Access
The Growing Importance of Social Media
In the past, terrorist organizations have relied on in-person recruitment strategies.
However, this method may be increasingly replaced by online methods of radicalization and
recruitment. Marc Sageman noted that the same sources of support and validation that used to be
found exclusively in person can now be found online, leading him to refer to the Internet as the
“invisible hand” that guides transnational terrorist organizations. 51
In the pre-Internet era, terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda (AQ) had to rely on the
mainstream media to get their message out to the public in order to attract people to join their
movement. That dynamic worked to a point up until about 2006, when the communications
platform began to shift. Al-Jazeera, concerned that it was beginning to look like the propaganda
wing of al-Qaeda, began to lessen its coverage of AQ’s media releases. 52 Simultaneously, as more
and more people began to get access to the Internet, jihadis and aspiring extremists began to talk
amongst themselves on chat rooms. Their message, often incorporated seamlessly into discussions
of religious doctrine, began to garner the attention of other users. 53
Al-Qaeda leadership saw this trend and recognized it as the future means of communication
for a global jihad. Osama bin-Laden wrote of online media platforms, “It is obvious that the media
war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90 percent of the
total preparation for the battles,” and AQ’s current leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has said that the
“media battle” is a “race for the hearts and minds of our Ummah.” 54
51
Sageman, Marc. 2008. The Next Generation of Terror. Foreign Policy. March/April.
Klausen, Jytte. 2015. “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, No 38, pg 1-22.
53
ibid
54
Ibid, p3
52
24
However, these chat rooms circa 2006 were closed to the public and vertically-integrated,
meaning that conversations were managed in a top-down hierarchical style. This combination of
structure and the fact that individuals had to be independently motivated to seek out and contact
AQ members to gain access to the chat rooms, meant that AQ was only able to reach a limited
audience. This, coupled with the fact that these “secret” chat rooms were subject to infiltration by
anti-AQ entities, meant that the full potential of the Internet was not fully realized. 55
This may be why, when demographic records were released regarding foreign fighters in
Iraq in 2007, only 3.9% of fighters reported that they were recruited on the Internet. 56 This, coupled
with the fact that Internet penetration in MENA before 2007 was relatively small, may help to
explain why foreign fighters instead reported personal networks as the source of their recruitment.
This trend was catalyzed in 2011 during the Arab Spring, when jihadis took note of the
success protesters had by utilizing social media platforms. These platforms are horizontally
integrated, meaning that they are decentralized forums where anyone can access, post, share, and
comment on whatever they come across. Therefore, due to the sheer volume of users, redundancy
of posts, user anonymity, and widespread access to information, social media has revolutionized
how terrorist organizations disseminate their message. 57 No longer do they have to wait for a third
party like a media outlet to agree to run their press releases- they now have a world of total access
and instant gratification at their fingertips.
Therefore, considering the impact that social media has on the spread of propaganda and
recruitment, it is possible that there is a correlation between a country’s Internet penetration and
its levels of foreign fighters.
55
Ibid, p.4
Bergen 2008, p.45
57
Klausen 2015, p.5
56
25
Data and Methodology
To test this, I have compiled statistics on Internet Availability in the region from 2007 and
2014. For the purposes of this paper, Internet availability is measured by the number of people
with access of the worldwide network, measured per every 100 citizens. 58 The number of foreign
fighters per capita per million is also given, in order to measure the extent to which Internet
availability in a particular nation corresponds to the number of people (per capita per million)
fighting in the two measured conflicts. The rate of increase is also shown, in order to give an
overview of the trend of internet penetration and growth in the region.
Table 4: Internet Availability vs. Percentage of Total Reported Foreign Fighters
Foreign
Fighters per
Foreign
Capita* Fighters per
Country
2007 Capita* 2014
Internet Users
per 100 People 2007
Internet
Users per 100
People 2014
Rate
of Increase
(%)
Afghanistan
N/A
1.63
1.9
5.9
210.5
Algeria
1.17
5.1
9.5
16.5
71.4
Bahrain
N/A
9.23
32.9
90
173.6
Egypt
0.05
4.38
16
49.6
210
Iran
N/A
0.04
9.5
31.4
230.5
Jordan
1.93
230.77
20
44.2
121
Kuwait
0.38
20.59
34.8
75.5
117
Lebanon
0.24
200
18.7
70.5
277
Libya
19.31
96.77
4.7
16.5
251.1
Morocco
1.17
45.45
21.5
56
160.5
Oman
0.38
0.28
16.7
66.5
298.2
Pakistan
N/A
2.75
6.8
10.9
60.3
Qatar
N/A
6.82
37
85.3
130.5
The World Bank Group. 2015. “The World DataBank: World Development Indicators: Internet Users (Per 100
People).”
58
26
Saudi Arabia
9.15
86.81
30
60.5
101.7
Tunisia
3.24
275.23
17.1
43.8
156.1
Turkey
0.09
8.01
28.6
46.3
61.9
United Arab
Emirates
N/A
1.16
61
88
44.3
Yemen
2.08
4.51
5
20
300
Source: World Bank Data Archives
*Denotes per capita per million
Independent Variable 3: Urbanization
Urbanization as a Facilitator to Recruitment Coordination
Even with the advent of the Internet, personal networks are incredibly important in jihadi
recruitment. Marc Sageman, wrote that meeting groups of likeminded prospective jihadis can act
as an “echo chamber,” reinforcing perceived injustices and intensifying feelings of justification
towards radical action. 59 This may be compounded by the fact that there is a big trust factor in
actively becoming a foreign fighter. People may be more likely to follow through with their travel
plans if they are familiar with a person whom they can trust and have become familiar with in
person, rather than an anonymous user online.
This suggests that the phenomenon of foreign fighters may be better explained by
urbanization rather than Internet availability. It would follow that an increase in urbanization
would increase the likelihood of a prospective fighter and a recruiter coming into contact with one
another, which would facilitate the process of radicalization by allowing for more in-person
meetings. This theory is worth examining in the Middle East, considering that the region is
becoming rapidly urbanized, with the rate of urbanization second only to Latin America. 60
59
60
Sageman 2008, p.2
Kharoufi, Mostafa. 2003. “Urbanization and Urban Research in the Arab World.” UNESCO: MOST.
27
The demographic portion of the Sinjar Records seems to support this idea. Even in 2007,
when Internet links to terrorist activity were well known, only 3.9% of records stated that
individuals were introduced to their travel coordinator via the Internet, while the rest of them were
introduced via some form of personal contact (through a religious cohort, mosque, relative,
neighbor, etc.). 61 This suggests that personal networks were more important than virtual ones- a
phenomenon that may still hold true even with the increase in Internet penetration. Thus, I will
take a look to see if urbanization increases the level of foreign fighters.
Data and Methodology:
To test this, I have compiled statistics on urbanization in the greater MENA region from
2007 and 2014. For this paper, urbanization refers to the number of people living in urban areas,
as defined by the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects as a city having a population of
300,000 or greater. The number of foreign fighters per capita per million is also given, in order to
measure the extent to which the level of urbanization in a particular nation from 2007 and 2014
corresponds to the number of people (per capita per million) fighting in the two measured conflicts.
The percent increase in the level of urbanization is also shown, in order to give a sense of the
growth of urban population per country.
61
Bergen 2008, p.45
28
Table 5: Urbanization vs. Percentage of Total Reported Foreign Fighters
Country
Foreign
Foreign
Fighters
per Fighters
per Urban Population Urban Population
Capita* 2007 Capita* 2014 (% of total, 2007) (% of total, 2014) % Increase
Afghanistan
N/A
1.63
24
26
2
Algeria
1.17
5.1
65
70
5
Bahrain
N/A
9.23
88
89
1
Egypt
0.05
4.38
43
43
No Change
Iran
N/A
0.04
69
72
3
Jordan
1.93
230.77
82
83
1
Kuwait
0.38
20.59
98
98
No Change
Lebanon
0.24
200
87
88
1
Libya
19.31
96.77
77
78
1
Morocco
1.17
45.45
56
59
3
Oman
0.38
0.28
74
77
3
Pakistan
N/A
2.75
35
38
3
Qatar
N/A
6.82
98
99
1
Saudi Arabia
9.15
86.81
81
83
2
Tunisia
3.24
275.23
65
66
1
Turkey
0.09
8.01
69
72
3
United Arab
N/A
Emirates
1.16
83
85
2
Yemen
4.51
30
33
3
2.08
Source: The World Bank Data Archives, Urbanization, UN World Urbanization Prospects
*Denotes per capita per million
Independent Variables 4 and 5: Secondary and Tertiary Education
Education and Foreign Fighters
It is known that the majority of foreign fighters are composed of young people. As reported
in the Sinjar Records, the average foreign fighters were students in secondary or post-secondary
29
schools, ages 24-25. 62 In fact, when asked about their occupation, 42.6% of fighters said they were
students, making that subsection the largest plurality by far. 63
Therefore, it is possible that students are likely to join these kinds of foreign insurgencies.
The basis for this idea lies in several assumptions. Firstly, this demographic is generally searching
for an identity and a community to include them. This desire for a place to belong may make them
easily susceptible to radical indoctrination and the promise of inclusivity. Secondly, younger
students may have not yet started a family. With fewer obligations, they have less of an incentive
not to act upon their radicalization and join a foreign movement. Thirdly, their level of education
may give them a sense of employment entitlement which, if not fulfilled upon graduation, may
foster a deep sense of disappointment and disillusionment. Their youth may also afford them a
certain wherewithal not found in their older counterparts, to leave their country and embark upon
an often glamorized adventure.
The traits mentioned above are a hallmark of youth in general, not just students. However,
being in a secondary or university school setting may expose them to more extremist ideas, or
position them for further letdowns, than they would have experienced elsewhere. This, combined
with the majority of fighters reported in the Sinjar Records being students suggests that the possible
exposure students are getting to radical ideology may prompt them to join jihadist organizations.
Based off of this, it is reasonable to expect to see a positive correlation between the number of
foreign fighters and a country’s level of both secondary and tertiary education.
62
63
Bergen 2008, p.42
Ibid, p.44
30
Data and Methods
In the case of these variables, I thought it would be important to distinguish between
secondary and tertiary education due to the fact that the motivations that drive an individual’s
enrollment in secondary school versus tertiary school are different, and those differences may
impact the data. By defining these variables separately, it may also allow show if there is an
opportune time in a person’s educational timeline at which they are more likely to become
activated as a foreign fighter.
Variable 4: Secondary Education
Secondary education refers to the official educational programs that complete the
provision for basic education according to the UN, providing more specialized instruction. I have
compiled data for this variable using a report from UNESCO’s Institute for Statistics which
collected data worldwide. This data represents the percentage of enrolled students in a country’s
secondary schools, based off of the total number of those eligible for such a program. 64 The
number of foreign fighters per capita per million is also given, in order to measure the extent to
which the level of secondary education in a particular nation from 2007 and 2014 corresponds to
the number of people (per capita per million) fighting in the two measured conflicts. The percent
increase of secondary school enrollment is also given, as a measure of the difference from 2007 to
2014.
64
The World Bank Group. 2015. “The World DataBank: World Development Indicators: Education, School
Enrollment, Secondary (% Gross).”
31
Table 6: Secondary School Enrollment vs. Percentage of Total Reported Foreign Fighters
Country
Foreign
Foreign
Fighters
per Fighters
per Secondary School Secondary School %
Capita* 2007 Capita* 2014 Enrollment 2007 Enrollment 2014 Increase
Afghanistan
N/A
1.63
29
54
+25
Algeria
1.17
5.1
69
98
+29
Bahrain
N/A
9.23
92
96
+4
Egypt
0.05
4.38
74
86
+12
Iran
N/A
0.04
78
86
+8
Jordan
1.93
230.77
93
88
-5
20.59
100
100
No
Change
0.38
Kuwait
Lebanon
0.24
200
76
74
-2
Libya
19.31
96.77
No Data
No Data
No Data
Morocco
1.17
45.45
55
69
+14
Oman
0.38
0.28
87
94
+7
Pakistan
N/A
2.75
33
37
+4
Qatar
N/A
6.82
91
100
+9
Saudi Arabia
9.15
86.81
93
100
+7
Tunisia
3.24
275.23
90
91
+1
Turkey
0.09
8.01
90
89
-1
United Arab
N/A
Emirates
1.16
No Data
No Data
No
Data
Yemen
4.51
43
47
+4
2.08
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics
*Denotes per capita per million
Variable 5: Tertiary Education
Tertiary Education refers to the level of schooling that may or may not lead to an
“advanced research qualification” and “normally requires, as a minimum condition of admission,
the successful completion of education at the secondary level.” UNESCO has also compiled data
32
for tertiary education using the same parameters as secondary education, mentioned above. 65 The
number of foreign fighters per capita per million is also given, in order to measure the extent to
which the level of tertiary education in a particular nation from 2007 and 2014 corresponds to the
number of people (per capita per million) fighting in the two measured conflicts. The percent
increase in tertiary school enrollment is also given in order to give a measurement of the change
in enrollment from 2007 to 2014.
Table 7: Tertiary School Enrollment vs. Percentage of Total Reported Foreign Fighters
Country
Foreign
Foreign
Fighters per
Fighters per
Capita* 2007 Capita* 2014
Tertiary School
Enrollment (%
Gross), 2007
Tertiary School
Enrollment (%
Gross), 2014
% Increase
Afghanistan
N/A
1.63
1
4
+3
Algeria
1.17
5.1
22
31
+9
Bahrain
N/A
9.23
22
33
+11
Egypt
0.05
4.38
32
30
-2
Iran
N/A
0.04
30
55
+25
Jordan
1.93
230.77
41
47
+6
Kuwait
0.38
20.59
No Data
No Data
No Data
Lebanon
0.24
200
47
46
-1
Libya
19.31
96.77
No Data
No Data
No Data
Morocco
1.17
45.45
12
16
+4
Oman
0.38
0.28
21
28
+7
Pakistan
N/A
2.75
5
10
+5
Qatar
N/A
6.82
13
12
-1
Saudi Arabia
9.15
86.81
30
51
+21
Tunisia
3.24
275.23
31
35
+4
Turkey
0.09
8.01
38
69
+31
UAE
N/A
1.16
No Data
No Data
No Data
Yemen
2.08
4.51
11
10
-1
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, *Denotes per capita per million
65
The World Bank Group. 2015. “The World DataBank: World Development Indicators: Education, School
Enrollment, Tertiary (% Gross).”
33
Independent Variable 6: Youth Unemployment
Youth Unemployment in the MENA Region
John Hayward wrote that “unemployment is the cause of social unrest and alienation,”
continuing to explain that employed people have a stake in the structure and order of society and
do not tolerate radicalism. 66 If this is the case, unemployment may be an important factor when
considering foreign fighters, especially when you look at MENA’s unemployment rates, and even
more so when you look at specifically youth unemployment.
Generally, the rate of unemployment is four times higher for young people compared to
the rest of the age demographics. This is especially significant considering that the MENA region
has the highest regional rates of unemployment in the world. 67 This lack of employment
opportunity has contributed greatly to a survey that reported 70% of youth wanted to leave the
region. 68
Levels of unemployment like those in MENA cause a host of problems, one of which being
the idea that bored and restless youth will find trouble if they have nothing else to do. This lack of
direction may cause a great deal of frustration. Lacking legitimate opportunities, certain young
people may seek stimulation or purpose elsewhere, thus becoming more susceptible to
radicalization.
This problem may hit especially hard in the MENA region due to the increase in higher
education, especially as I outlined with Variable 6. This increase in college graduates, coupled
with a dismal job market, has been observed in the past to increase radicalization. In his 1978
66
Hayward, John. 2015. “Unemployment and Cultural Weakness Cause Radicalism, Not Poverty.” Breitbart. 16
January.
67
Ellen Knickmeyer. 2011. “The Arab World’s Youth Army,” Foreign Policy, 27 January. p.170
68
Gavriel Queenann. 2011. “Report: 70% of Arab Youth Want to Leave Region,” Arutz Sheva, 16 November.
34
study, Charles Derber concluded that a feeling of “employment entitlement” among unemployed
college graduates prompted them to adopt radical ideas in response to their situation. 69 This
phenomenon may also be expressed in levels of foreign fighters.
Data and Methodology
Here, youth unemployment refers to the portion of the total youth labor force, defined as
between the ages of 15-24, who were without work but were available and seeking employment at
the time. Ideally, I would include numbers for unemployed college graduates, but those numbers
do not exist from reputable sources. The number of foreign fighters per capita per million is also
given, in order to measure the extent to which the rate of unemployment in a particular nation from
2007 and 2014 corresponds to the number of people (per capita per million) fighting in the two
measured conflicts. The change in the rate of employment is also given, in order to measure the
differences in the years 2007 and 2014.
Table 8: Total Youth Unemployment and Foreign Fighters
69
Country
Foreign
Foreign
Fighters per Fighters per Youth
Capita*
Capita*
Unemployment
2007
2014
2007
Youth
Unemployment
2014
%
Change
Afghanistan
N/A
1.63
19.7
17.5
-2.2
Algeria
1.17
5.1
27.5
24
-3.5
Bahrain
N/A
9.23
26.7
27.9
1.2
Egypt
0.05
4.38
26.1
38.9
12.8
Iran
N/A
0.04
22
29.7
7.7
Derber, Charles. 1978. “Unemployment and the Entitled Worker: Job Entitlement and Radical Political Attitudes
among the Youthful Unemployed.” Social Problems. Vol. 26, No. 1. p.26-37.
35
Jordan
1.93
230.77
29.4
33.7
4.3
Kuwait
0.38
20.59
9.1
19.6
10.5
Lebanon
0.24
200
22.8
20.6
-2.2
Libya
19.31
96.77
44.3
51.2
6.9
Morocco
1.17
45.45
17.2
18.5
1.3
Oman
0.38
0.28
21.8
20.5
-1.3
Pakistan
N/A
2.75
7.6
8.5
0.9
Qatar
N/A
6.82
1.8
1.5
-0.3
Saudi Arabia 9.15
86.81
30.2
28.7
-1.5
Tunisia
3.24
275.23
27.8
31.2
3.4
Turkey
0.09
8.01
19.3
20.4
1.1
United Arab
N/A
Emirates
1.16
8.4
9.9
1.5
Yemen
4.51
25.9
29.8
3.9
2.08
Source: International Labour Organization Key Indicators of the Labor Market Database
*Denotes per capita per million
III: Analysis and Discussion
The following tables were compiled using OLS linear regression models, using IBM’s
SPSS. For my comprehensive data sheet, see Appendix F on page 62.
Independent Variable 1: Democratization
Table 9: 2007 Freedom Coefficient: OLS Regression Predicting FF Contribution (log)a
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
-5.599
2.009
freedom
1.090
.387
Model
1
a.
Dependent Variable: logffcap
.665
t
Sig.
-2.787
.019
2.814
.018
36
Table 10: 2014 Freedom Coefficient: OLS Regression Predicting FF Contribution (log)a
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
228.952
91.176
freedom2014
-32.859
16.882
Model
t
Sig.
2.511
0.023
-1.946
0.069
1
a.
-0.438
Dependent Variable: logffcap2014
As shown in Table 9, B is a positive value (1.090), while in Table 10, B is negative
(-
32.859). Correct interpretation of this result is a bit counterintuitive due to the manner in which
the data was compiled, so some explanation is required. Remember, the Freedom House scores
that constituted the numbers for this variable, ranked countries on a scale from 1-7, with 1 being
most free (most democratic) and 7 being least free (least democratic). This means that a decrease
in freedom score actually correlates to more freedom (more democracy) in a country.
Thus, the positive correlation that is found in the 2007 data means that an increase in the
freedom score (approaching a number 7) corresponds to greater numbers of foreign fighters. In
other words, the data suggests that the less democratic a country was in 2007, the greater the
number of foreign fighters were. This finding is reversed in the 2014 data. Because B is negative
in Table 10, this suggests that as foreign fighters increase, the freedom ranking decreases. Put
differently, higher levels of freedom correspond to higher levels of foreign fighters.
Looking at the tables with this framing in mind, it appears that every unit increase in the
freedom ranking corresponds with an increase of 1.090 on the logged foreign fighter per capita per
million scale for 2007, and a decrease of 32.859 on the logged foreign fighter per capita per million
scale in 2014. This means that a greater number of Foreign Fighters came from less democratic
37
nations in 2007, while in 2014, a greater number of these fighters came from more democratic
nations.
Graphic representation of these regressions can be found below. Due to the nature of
logarithmic transformations, the x axis shows negative numbers. Points on the scatterplots that
have these negative numbers are representative of the countries which have a foreign fighter per
capita per million value of less than 1.
Graph 5: 2007 Freedom Coefficient Predicting Foreign Fighter Contribution
More Democratic
Less Democratic
As Graph 5 shows, as the freedom rating increases, or countries become less democratic,
there is an increase in the logged foreign fighter per capita per million scale. This correlation of
less freedom and more fighters is switched in the graph below.
38
Graph 6: 2014 Freedom Coefficient Predicting Foreign Fighter Contribution
More Democratic
Less Democratic
As Graph 6 illustrates, as countries become less democratic, their foreign fighter
contribution actually decreases. Now, there is a discrepancy between Table 10’s B value of
-
32.859, which is effectively the slope of the linear equation of the model if plotted, and the slope
of Graph 6 above. This is due to the fact that the line of fit’s R^2 value is only 0.062, meaning that
the fit is much weaker than in Graph 5, where the B coefficient for 2007 and the slope is the same.
Therefore, instead of interpreting the 2014 results as every unit increase in freedom corresponds
to a decrease of 32.859 on the logged foreign fighter per capita per million scale, Graph 6 suggests
that another compelling argument may be made that every unit increase in freedom corresponds
to a decrease of 0.22 on the logged foreign fighter per capita per million scale for 2014.
39
This difference is most likely due to somewhat of an outlier effect coming from the lowest
two points, as can be seen in the graph above. These two points have the power to pull the B value
down- an effect that is compensated for in the line of fit in Graph 6. However, due to the very
small sample size of my data, these low points are still valuable to the overall analysis, and since
they are not extreme outliers by any means, I feel that it is more compelling to reference the
coefficient table’s reading of the B value.
Independent Variables 2-5
The variables Internet, Urbanization, Secondary Education, and Tertiary Education were
not of statistical significance in either year 2007 or 2014, with regard to univariate regressions.
Independent Variable 6: Youth Unemployment
Table 11: 2007 Youth Unemployment Coefficient: OLS Regression Predicting FF Contribution (log)
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
-3.429
1.336
Youthunemploy
.134
.051
Model
1
.643
t
Sig.
-2.567
.028
2.652
.024
40
Graph 7: 2007 Youth Unemployment Coefficient Predicting Foreign Fighter
Contribution
Youth Unemployment was the only variable that came back as statistically
significant in a univariate regression. As you can see in Table 11 and subsequent Graph 7,
every percent increase in youth unemployment corresponds to an increase in the logged
foreign fighter per capita per million scale of 0.134.
While Table 11 and Graph 7 above suggest that the youth unemployment rates in 2007 may
have had an effect on the number of foreign fighters contributed to al-Qaeda’s operations in Iraq,
the 2014 data falls short of statistical significance in my tests. Therefore, the only significant
variables that came out of univariate regressions are freedom for years 2007 and 2014 and youth
unemployment for year 2007. All others were not significant enough to draw conclusions from
41
univariate analysis alone. To investigate further, I ran a series of bivariate and multivariate
regressions to explore possible relationships between the variables, and to see whether or not the
variables mentioned above are significant when run in regression tests with multiple variables.
Bivariate and Multivariate Regressions
Table 12: Bivariate and Multivariate Nested Coefficient Table, 2007 and 2014
Variable
Freedom
Youth
Unemployment
B Values
4.527,
-38.421**
0.379*,
3.335**
1.112**,
-33.031*
Excluded
Excluded Excluded
0.551***, 0.391*,
2.854
2.145
Excluded
0.616***,
6.259
.005,
0.345**,
Internet
Excluded .144
Excluded Excluded -1.097
Excluded 0.081,
0.043,
Urbanization
Excluded
1.053
Excluded 5.196
Secondary
Excluded
-0.074,
Education
Excluded
Excluded Excluded -3.126
Tertiary
Excluded
-0.042,
-0.131*,
Education
Excluded
Excluded 1.117
-0.791
The B values for 2007 are reported on top while 2014 is reported on bottom.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
0.438,
-47.808**
0.546*,
8.376**
0.342**,
-1.253
0.037,
6.290**
-0.076,
-3.134
-0.108,
-2.411
The above table is representative of only the cases in which at least one B value is
significant for either year, for any variable. In other words, each column represents a bivariate or
multivariate regression where there is at least one significant B value. Therefore, the table is
representative of 6 bivariate or multivariate regressions, as represented by the 6 columns. As a
reminder of this when reading the table, the variables that were not included in a column’s
regression test are marked as “Excluded.” Many variables were not significant (for example,
secondary education was never significant). However, some conclusions can be drawn.
42
The two independent variables that were significant in the univariate regressions remained
the most robust in the other regressions. Youth Unemployment generally had a significant impact
across the board in 2007, but it did not always hold its significance for 2014. Freedom, on the other
hand, was significant more frequently in 2014 than in 2007. Youth Unemployment, in the last
multivariate regression column, was the most robust coefficient behind Freedom.
The second to last column shows an analysis of the individual-level variables run in a
multivariate regression. As you can see, without the Freedom variable, no other variable for 2014
was significant. When read in conjunction with the last column, which shows the results for the
multivariate regression including all variables, Freedom was significant in 2014 but not 2007. This
suggests that Freedom was a more important factor in determining foreign fighter contribution in
2014 than in 2007. This is supported by Table 10 in the univariate analysis of the Freedom variable,
as the B value exerted a stronger predicting effect of the level of foreign fighters in 2014 than in
2007.
Internet and urbanization also had an interesting dichotomy based on year. In 2007, Internet
availability was positively correlated with foreign fighter contribution and urbanization was not,
while in 2014, the Internet was not statistically significant and urbanization was.
IV: Conclusions
Foreign Fighters: an Unintended Consequence of the Arab Spring
As shown in the analysis for 2007, the case was that more democracy was correlated with
less foreign fighters. In 2014, more democracy was associated with more foreign fighters.
Therefore, how do you reconcile these opposing findings from data sets that have demonstrated to
be comparable? The answer may lie in examining the most important sociopolitical upheaval that
43
took place between these two years, and may have had the power to cause this paradigm shift in
the phenomenon of foreign fighters: the Arab Spring.
The Arab Spring began in Tunisia in 2010 with the self-immolation of a street vendor,
driven to despair from the institutional injustices he faced. This act catalyzed a chain reaction that
swept through the MENA region (not just exclusively the Arab states), but nowhere were the
protests more successful at affecting substantial regime change than in the country in which they
began. This change is reflected in Tunisia’s Freedom House freedom ranking, which recorded the
country at 5.5 in 2007 (placing it firmly in the Not Free category), but upgrading it to a 2.0 in
2014. 70 This is the most dramatic regime change caused by the Arab Spring, by far. Interestingly,
as of spring 2015, the country also contributes the highest numbers of foreign fighters.
The fact that Tunisia’s political freedom increased drastically while they simultaneously
contributed an estimated 3000 foreign fighters into the ranks of the Islamic State makes for an
interesting scenario- one that my findings suggest likely played out across the region (albeit to
varying degrees).
Instability as a Cause of Foreign Fighters
At its advent, the Arab Spring was heralded as a new promise for peace in the Middle East,
forged by the proliferation of democratic ideals. However, recent history has shown that to not be
the case. Instead of peace and prosperity, the hallmark of this movement has been unstable regimes,
power vacuums, and an increase in terrorist mobilization. It is likely that this political instability,
not necessarily democratization itself, explains my results regarding foreign fighter contribution.
70
Freedom House. 2015. Freedom in the World: Tunisia. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/2015/tunisia
44
Tunisia was strictly secular before the revolution, with harshly enforced bans on public
displays of religion. This was common in the MENA region, with many autocrats viewing
religious extremism as a security threat. 71 However, the elected government after the Tunisian
revolution took the form of a moderate Islamist government, which promoted religious expression.
Some have suggested that it was this switch that allowed religious extremists who, no longer jailed
for their views, were able to gain a foothold in Tunisian society and disseminate their ideology. 72
This is a compelling explanation for the finding, and it can be extended to the region as a
whole when you look at the regimes that came out of the Arab Spring. The outcomes of the Arab
Spring may be distilled into 4 categories: either autocracies shifted into entirely new regimes (like
Tunisia and Egypt), autocratic regimes remained autocratic but enacted reforms (like Morocco,
Jordan, Oman, and Algeria), entire countries were thrown into chaos (Libya, Syria, and Yemen),
or not much of substance happened expect for regime-squashed protests (like the Gulf States and
the non-Arab states included in this analysis).
There is a commonality in all of these experiences of the Arab Spring, and that is the fact
that they all posed a serious disruption to the established political system in a way that allowed
radical fundamentalists an opportunity to establish themselves within society and disseminate their
views in a way that had been previously held in check by a more functioning government. It’s not
as if the governments that came out of the Arab Spring were purposely more friendly to extremists,
but by introducing more religion in government, or relaxing heavy-handed policies of quashing all
forms of religious expression as a threat to regime stability, extremists were able to spread their
71
72
Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. 2015. “Bashar al-Assad.” Georgetown University.
Sullivan, Kevin. 2014. “Tunisia, after igniting Arab Spring, sends the most fighters to Islamic State in Syria.” The
Washington Post. October 28.
45
message in a way that was not previously possible. These new avenues for extremists at the regime
level may have allowed this boom in foreign fighters.
Internet and Urbanization: A Counterintuitive Trend
My data suggests that in 2007, the Internet may have played a role in the number of foreign
fighters going into Iraq. However, in 2014, the same correlation was not found to be significant.
Instead, urbanization and foreign fighters were positively correlated. This finding suggests that the
in-person contacts that are facilitated by living in a larger population center may be more important
in the actual recruitment of foreign fighters via the Internet. Upon first glance, this finding is
counterintuitive, considering the increasing importance and use of technology and the Internet in
the region. However, there may be a very simple reason as to why this trend emerged from my
data: trust.
While social media and chatrooms revolutionized the way terrorist organizations operated,
it also changed counterterrorism strategies. There are now analysts working around the clock for
the purpose of monitoring online communication, and this threat of infiltration by law enforcement
entities may be enough of a deterrent so that the actual recruitment part of becoming a foreign
fighter is handled in person. This may help account for the difference in results between 2007 and
2014. As more terrorist activity was moved online, so too did the attention of counterterrorism
officials shift to online forums. This increase in monitoring was not a secret, so recruiters may
have shifted their focus away from doing their main recruitment online to in person.
Another explanation may lie in the differences in internet propaganda and recruitment as a
whole from al-Qaeda in 2007 and the Islamic State in 2014, specifically in regard to the use of
social media. The differences in online mediums utilized by the two groups are beyond the scope
46
of this paper, as I just tested for the broad trend of internet penetration. For future research, I
suggest using variables that take into account the role of social media across these organizations.
There have been several articles written on the matter using terrorism as the dependent variable,
but I suggest testing this idea with special attention paid to foreign fighters.
This finding does not discount the importance of the Internet in its role in disseminating
propaganda and radicalizing certain segments of the population. For this reason, it is hard to argue
against the impact of the Internet in propagating extremism (specifically with regard to terrorism)
or contributing to the cause of activating foreign fighters. I do not seek to argue that the Internet
does not matter in these cases. Rather, I argue that in the case of foreign fighters, the Internet is
utilized differently than if the subject of analysis is just acts of terrorism, broadly defined.
As I have mentioned before in this paper, it is not my intention to lump foreign fighters in
with terrorists on the individual level, as individual cases are too varied and the classification of
terrorist too broad. However, most literature regarding Internet useage and extremism has centered
around terrorism, and especially domestic acts of terrorism. I have argued that certain traits are
shared by terrorist syndicates and foreign fighter coordinators on an organizational level, and one
of these similarities is their use of the Internet to spread their message (the Islamic State has an
entire media branch dedicated to this). That being said, I argue that there is one main difference
between domestic terrorism and the phenomenon of foreign fighters that may discount some of the
effect of the Internet, in that the barrier to entry is higher for foreign fighters than for individuals
who attack domestically.
Take, for example, a bomber who attacks a market in their own country. The person in
question may be exposed on the Internet to extremist ideas, becomes in contact with the person or
group who posted said ideas, and becomes a suicide bomber who carries out their mission locally.
47
In contrast, a different person who wishes to become a foreign fighter may very well have seen the
same material online that inspired them to act upon their urge to fight in a foreign conflict.
However, instead of making the commitment to carry out an attack domestically, they have to
coordinate with a person or group trustworthy enough to send them on an international mission, to
a country with which they are most likely unfamiliar, to a foreign militant group consisting of
people they have never encountered before.
Therefore, I propose that the experience of being activated as a domestic attacker is
different enough from the experience of being activated as a foreign fighter in that the same logic
that applies to Internet usage and terrorism does not necessarily apply to the phenomenon of
foreign fighters. This caveat may make a large portion of the literature surrounding the Internet
and extremism less relevant for the study of foreign fighters. However, due to the limitations of
my data, further research is needed to draw stronger conclusions. An analytical and anecdotal
comparison of the motivations and methods of domestic terrorists and the motivations and methods
of foreign fighters would make for compelling future research.
The Saliency of Youth Unemployment
One of my most robust findings, which held significant in almost every data test I ran, is
youth unemployment. As I cited on page 32, 70% of young people reported in one survey that they
wanted to leave the region. This desire to leave may be brought on by the fact that MENA’s
unemployment rates are incredibly high. This dissatisfaction with the dismal job market, coupled
with the desire to leave may have implications for levels of foreign fighters when you consider
that disillusioned and restless youth make the perfect targets for recruiters.
48
Youth Unemployment was statistically significant in more cases than any other variable,
and it was the second most robust variable in terms of effect on foreign fighter contribution, behind
Freedom. This suggests that, while regime structure is important when considering this
phenomenon, it is not the whole story. Rather, it may be more indicative of a sort of hierarchy of
needs. Generally, people are conditioned to take care of their basic needs before considering
anything else, and the means by which people attain these necessities is usually via employment.
Therefore, someone who is unemployed would likely be more focused on and dissatisfied by their
own unemployment rather than worried about the direction their country is taking politically.
While a citizen who is hurting on an individual level due to unemployment may use that
dissatisfaction as a basis for political dissent or a motivation for political participation, the root
cause of whatever action they take is still driven by their original grievance: unemployment.
Recruiters see this dissatisfaction and are ready to exploit it. While they target people with
grievances in general, they are often most successful at radicalizing those who are simultaneously
on the fringes of society- those who feel marginalized in some capacity. Well-employed
individuals with established lives fall into this category markedly less than those without a job,
and especially less than young people without a job.
Implications
While individual motivations are most definitely a salient factor in this phenomenon, the
importance of the effect from the state level cannot be overlooked. There is a way to reconcile the
individual level of analysis with the state level in a way that ends up encompassing both of them.
The things that occur at the state level have a trickle-down effect on almost every aspect of society.
State institutions and their policies have the power to affect parts of all of the independent variables
49
examined in this paper, whether it’s promoting Internet access, urban development initiatives and
incentives, education programs and institutions, employment opportunities or unemployment
benefits.
In this way, government oversight and social safety nets, or the lack of these programs in
instable countries, have the power to influence behavior on the individual level. This relationship
of state institutions to foreign fighters may come in a less-than-direct way, but discounting the
effect of a regime in this phenomenon is to discount the influence of the regime entirely. Attention
should also be paid to the mechanism by which recruitment occurs. While this paper does not
attempt to suggest that Internet recruitment is not an issue, it is possible that in-person contacts are
more valuable to potential fighters, especially considering the nature, logistics, and trust required
of those seeking to fight in a foreign country. Changes in Internet technology and social networking
norms, having occurred rapidly in the past several years, have surely contributed to foreign fighter
recruitment as well. Future research in this field should be directed at the ways in which the next
generation of social media and communication technology will affect the number, type, and impact
of future foreign fighters.
This paper attempted to unpack part of the complicated and evolving phenomenon that is
the motivation of foreign fighters. This phenomenon is likely driven by a complex interplay of
individual and state culpability, with personal grievances compounded by some level of systematic
failures in the regime, and with an individual’s subsequent fighter activation facilitated by those
same failures. Furthermore, I conclude that there needs to be detailed study of the recruitment
mechanisms of fighter coordinators in order to see the ways in which this phenomenon is evolving,
as the general consensus of the Internet being the most important factor in this new wave of fighters
is likely not the whole story.
50
Additionally, the findings from this paper challenge how many individuals and policy
makers view the nature of unrest in the MENA region. Conflict here is almost thought of as a
given, and following a determined behavior. This thought continues to the point that any changes
in the underlying causes for the unrest can go overlooked- overshadowed by the broader pattern
of violence.
This logic does not take in to account the fact that unrest and extremism are reactionary in
nature, thus they are subject to change just like every other reactionary phenomena. Therefore,
policy makers should be careful not to assume that extremism and unrest in the region is constant
and follow the same trends across conflicts, because changes in the sociopolitical system of the
region have the power to affect the behavior of combatants. Context is key, and in order to analyze
unrest in the MENA region, you have to look at causes and reactions from multiple levels of
analysis. By doing this, we can come closer to understanding the nuances of instability in the
MENA region.
51
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55
APPENDICES
Appendix A
Example of average al-Qaeda record collected by coalition forces in Sinjar, Iraq in 2007.
Source: Bergen, Peter, et al. 2008. “Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: Al-Qaeda’s Road
in and out of Iraq.” Combating Terrorism at West Point: The Harmony Project.
Princeton.
56
Appendix B
Sources and limitations of the data from ICSR.
Source: Neumann, Peter R. 2015. “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000;
Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s.” The International Centre for the Study of
Radicalization and Political Violence.
Sources and Limitations
The aim of this Insight is to gauge the overall extent and evolution of the phenomenon, detect
trends and draw basic comparisons. We are under no illusion that the underlying data is incomplete
and – in many cases – ambiguous. Given the nature of the subject, no estimate of foreign fighter
flows will ever be exact.
Our dataset contains approximately 1,500 open source items which have been collected since
November 2011. They include: media reports about foreign fighters in English, Arabic and several
other languages (and from both sides of the conflict); government estimates; and statements about
foreign fighters by jihadist groups, typically published in online extremist forums and on social
media.
57
Appendix C
Justification of logged dependent variable.
Unlogged distribution graph, foreign fighters per capita per million, 2007
Unlogged distribution graph, foreign fighters per capita per million, 2014
58
Appendix D
Logged distribution graph, log of foreign fighters per capita per million, 2007
Logged distribution graph, log of foreign fighters per capita per million, 2014
59
Appendix E
Freedom House methodology, Freedom in the World index
Source: Freedom House. 2015. “Methodology.” Interactive Map of Freedom. In conjunction
with Forum One Communications.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings – A country or territory is assigned two ratings (7
to 1)—one for political rights and one for civil liberties—based on its total scores for the political
rights and civil liberties questions. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the greatest
degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom, corresponds to a specific range of total
scores (see tables 1 and 2).
Free, Partly Free, Not Free Status – The average of a country’s or territory’s political rights and
civil liberties ratings is called the Freedom Rating, and it is this figure that determines the status
of Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0) (see table 3).
RATINGS AND STATUS CHARACTERISTICS
POLITICAL RIGHTS
1 – Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of political rights, including free
and fair elections. Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are competitive, the
opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power, and the interests of minority groups are
well represented in politics and government.
2 – Countries and territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker political rights than those with
a rating of 1 because of such factors as political corruption, limits on the functioning of political
parties and opposition groups, and foreign or military influence on politics.
3, 4, 5 – Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 either moderately protect almost all
political rights or strongly protect some political rights while neglecting others. The same factors
that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in those
with a rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to a greater extent at each successive rating.
6 – Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted political rights. They are ruled
by one-party or military dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. They may allow a few
political rights, such as some representation or autonomy for minority groups, and a few are
traditional monarchies that tolerate political discussion and accept public petitions.
7 – Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no political rights because of severe
government oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war. They may also lack an
authoritative and functioning central government and suffer from extreme violence or rule by
regional warlords.
60
CIVIL LIBERTIES
1 – Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, including
freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They have an established
and generally fair legal system that ensures the rule of law (including an independent judiciary),
allow free economic activity, and tend to strive for equality of opportunity for everyone, including
women and minority groups.
2 – Countries and territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker civil liberties than those with
a rating of 1 because of such factors as limits on media independence, restrictions on trade union
activities, and discrimination against minority groups and women.
3, 4, 5 – Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 either moderately protect almost all
civil liberties or strongly protect some civil liberties while neglecting others. The same factors that
undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken civil liberties in those with a
rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to a greater extent at each successive rating.
6 – Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted civil liberties. They strongly
limit the rights of expression and association and frequently hold political prisoners. They may
allow a few civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted
private business activity, and some open and free private discussion.
7 – Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no civil liberties. They allow virtually
no freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of detainees and prisoners, and
often control or dominate most economic activity.
The gap between a country’s or territory’s political rights and civil liberties ratings is rarely more
than two points. Politically oppressive states typically do not allow a well-developed civil society,
for example, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain political freedoms in the absence of
civil liberties like press freedom and the rule of law.
Because the designations of Free, Partly Free, and Not Free each cover a broad third of the
available scores, countries or territories within any one category, especially those at either end of
the range, can have quite different human rights situations. For example, those at the lowest end
of the Free category (2 in political rights and 3 in civil liberties, or 3 in political rights and 2 in
civil liberties) differ from those at the upper end of the Free group (1 for both political rights and
civil liberties). Also, a designation of Free does not mean that a country or territory enjoys perfect
freedom or lacks serious problems, only that it enjoys comparatively more freedom than those
rated Partly Free or Not Free (and some others rated Free).
61
Political Rights (PR)
Total Scores
PR Rating
36–40
1
30–35
2
24–29
3
18–23
4
12–17
5
6–11
6
0–5*
7
Civil Liberties (CL)
Total Scores
PR Rating
53–60
1
44–52
2
35–43
3
26–34
4
17–25
5
8–16
6
0–7
7
Combined Average of the PR and CL Ratings (Freedom Rating)
Freedom Status
1.0 to 2.5
Free
3.0 to 5.0
Partly Free
5.5 to 7.0
Not Free
62
Appendix F
Comprehensive data set for regression analysis
Country
pop
ff
ff
cap
Afghanistan
26.3
0
0
Algeria
35.1
41
1.17
Bahrain
1
0
0
Egypt
74.2
4
0.05
Iran
71.8
0
0
Jordan
5.7
11
1.93
Kuwait
2.6
1
Lebanon
4.1
Libya
log
ffcap
ffadj
freedom
internet
urban
secondary
tertiary
Youth
unemploy
year
0
5
1.9
24
29
1
19.7
2007
7.78
5.5
9.5
65
69
22
27.5
2007
0
5
32.9
88
92
22
26.7
2007
0.76
5.5
16
43
74
32
26.1
2007
0
6
9.5
69
78
30
22
2007
0.658
2.08
4.5
20
82
93
41
29.4
2007
0.38
-0.968
0.19
4
34.8
98
100
9.1
2007
1
0.24
-1.427
0.19
4.5
18.7
87
76
22.8
2007
5.8
112
19.31
2.961
21.25
7
4.7
77
44.3
2007
Morocco
30.7
36
1.17
0.157
6.83
4.5
21.5
56
55
12
17.2
2007
Oman
2.6
1
0.38
-0.968
0.19
5.5
16.7
74
87
21
21.8
2007
Pakistan
163.9
0
0
0
5.5
6.8
35
33
5
7.6
2007
Qatar
1.2
0
0
0
5.5
37
98
91
13
1.8
2007
Saudi Arabia
25.9
237
9.15
2.214
44.97
6.5
30
81
93
30
30.2
2007
Tunisia
10.2
33
3.24
1.176
6.26
5.5
17.1
65
90
31
27.8
2007
Turkey
69.5
6
0.09
-2.408
1.14
3
28.6
69
90
38
19.3
2007
UAE
5.8
0
0
0
5.5
61
83
8.4
2007
Yemen
21.2
44
2.08
0.732
8.35
5
5
30
43
11
25.9
2007
Afghanistan
30.6
50
1.63
0.489
0.42
6
5.9
26
54
4
17.5
2014
Algeria
39.2
200
5.1
1.629
1.68
5.5
16.5
70
98
31
24
2014
Bahrain
1.3
12
9.23
2.222
0.1
6.5
90
89
96
33
27.9
2014
Egypt
82.1
360
4.38
1.477
3.02
5.5
49.6
43
86
30
38.9
2014
Iran
77.4
3
0.04
-3.219
0.03
5.5
31.4
72
86
55
29.7
2014
Jordan
6.5
1500
230.77
5.441
12.57
5.5
44.2
83
88
47
33.7
2014
Kuwait
3.4
70
20.59
3.025
0.59
5
75.5
98
100
19.6
2014
Lebanon
4.5
900
200
5.298
0.08
4.5
70.5
88
74
20.6
2014
Libya
6.2
600
96.77
4.572
5.03
6.5
16.5
78
51.2
2014
Morocco
33
1500
45.45
3.817
12.57
4.5
56
59
69
16
18.5
2014
Oman
3.6
1
0.28
-1.273
0.01
5.5
66.5
77
94
28
20.5
2014
Pakistan
182.1
500
2.75
1.012
4.19
4.5
10.9
38
37
10
8.5
2014
Qatar
2.2
15
6.82
1.920
0.13
5.5
85.3
99
100
12
1.5
2014
Saudi Arabia
28.8
2500
86.81
4.464
20.95
7
60.5
83
100
51
28.7
2014
Tunisia
10.9
3000
275.23
5.618
25.13
2
43.8
66
91
35
31.2
2014
Turkey
74.9
600
8.01
2.081
5.03
3.5
46.3
72
89
69
20.4
2014
0.157
1
47
46
63
UAE
9.3
15
1.16
0.148
0.13
6
88
85
Yemen
24.4
110
4.51
1.506
0.92
6
20
33
47
10
9.9
2014
29.8
2014