The Power-Sharing Enigma in South Sudan: Governance and Policy Advice to President Salva
Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar
Francis Onditi PhD
Department of International Relations
United States International University-Africa
[email protected]
Abstract
This paper utilizes the power-sharing model as espoused by Caroline Hartzell and Matthew
Hoddie to advance the debate on how intricate conflict in South Sudan could be resolved.
Although each of the four dimensions of the power-sharing model1 have been embedded within
the various peace agreements in the country, including the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and the IGAD-led August 2015 Compromise Agreement, the results have been much
less promising than the proponents of this model would suggest. This article reveal that the four
dimensions of power-sharing, as applied within successive peace agreements in South Sudan,
have served the belligerent and predatory motives of the main signatories. Rather than being
defined by democratic values and a sense of cooperation, these agreements have served to further
entrench a perverse system of military patronage. The implication is that contrary to Hartzell and
Hoddie’s model, the answer is not always to rely on power-sharing. Instead, the article suggests
that cultivating a culture of political discourse and dialogue will eventually culminate into a
political architecture in the country, anchored on democratic principles.
Keywords: South Sudan, power-sharing, political architecture, SPLM/IO, IGAD
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In my career as a policy researcher and advisor on civil-military relations, I have had the
privilege of not only training senior military officials drawn from the Sudanese Peoples
Liberation Movement (SPLM), but I have also spent a significant amount of time mentoring the
officers and soldiers to embody the value for their independence and defend it throughout their
lives. In one of the induction trainings at the Nairobi-based International Peace Support Training
Centre (IPSTC), where I was a researcher and a Directing Staff (DS) member, one of the SPLM
senior military officials commented, “We South Sudanese fought for a long time against the
Arab north, and now we are all brothers of the same mother and no need to fight again.” In this
example and on many other occasions, the SPLM military officials manifested a genuine passion
for total liberation (intellectual and material) and the desire to be recognized as a nation of
people bound by common African values, culture, philosophy, and color. This embodiment of
emancipation enriched my teaching notes and perspectives in some of my graduate courses in
International Relations (Critical Issues in Africa, Public Policy Analysis and Conflict and War
Studies). In preparation for writing this article, I contemplated Johan Galtung’s2 dispassionate
inflection that one of the most difficult conflicts to erase in the human race is one that is valuedriven (Galtung, 1972). And so, when tension between ‘brothers’ ensues, fighting does not
normally resolve the conflict; instead, resolving the underlying issues is worth contemplation.
Barely five months after Dr. Riek Machar was reinstated as the First Vice President3 of
the autonomous South Sudan following political rearrangement on April 29, 2016, the country
slipped back into ethno-political tension. The active conflict drastically escalated the already
worsening humanitarian situation, leading to the internal displacement of several communities;
refugees into the neighboring Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya; and more than 300 people killed, in
what analysts have described as ethnic cleansing (Daily Nation, 2016). In what seems to be a
confirmation of the dire situation in the country, one of the most respected South Sudanese
religious clergy, Bishop Santo Laku Pio of the Catholic Archdiocese of Juba, opined that “it was
better to be dead than live in South Sudan” (Sudan Tribune, 2016). The situation has put the
government of President Salva Kiir in a governance dilemma. On one hand, the conflict reflects
a government of incapable of providing leadership, and on the other, peace enforcement would
lead to wiping out the opposition soldiers, who pay allegiance to Machar.
The signing of peace agreement for South Sudan on August 17, 2015 was viewed as a
pathway to resolving the politically-instigated conflict that began in December of 2013. The
crisis emerged following a disagreement between President Salva Kiir-led faction Sudan
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the SPLA-in Opposition (SPLM-IO), led by Machar.
Although the mediation processes led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) had begun in earnest, clouds of uncertainty have prevailed in the country for a long time.
In fact, the chairperson of the IGAD-led mediation, Seyoum Mesfin, asserted that three
outstanding issues require redress in the country: (1) security arrangement; (2) power sharing;
and (3) improvement of the federal system. In addition to these fundamental issues, there are
other governance problems that compromise prospects for sustainable peace and stability in
South Sudan. One of the least debated issues—yet the one with possibly the greatest potential for
creating stability in the country—is a that of the country’s functional ‘political architecture.’ The
lack of an appropriate political architecture in South Sudan has been attributed to a deep-rooted
culture of insurgency, leading to intractable political violence, ethnic tensions, ethno-centric
clandestine networks, and agitation for self-rule (Spears & Wight, 2015; Robertshaw, 1987). The
snarled narrative of power-sharing has been particularly caustic to the peacemaking processes.
The Power-Sharing Enigma in South Sudan
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Hitherto, the complication that comes with a power-sharing model of conflict resolution
can rarely be addressed by merely distributing wealth or “dishing out” political positions to
members of warring groups. The success of power-sharing arrangements depends on the
capacities and interests of armed groups involved in or excluded from an agreement (Spear,
1999). Inclusive settlements seek to integrate a broad section of national elites into the ruling
coalition, while exclusive bargains involve a much narrower set of elites (Sisk, 1996).
International state-builders have seemingly accepted that there is a need to include “unsavory”
actors at the negotiating table. In South Sudan, the August 2015 power sharing deal was
dominated by top politicians and military elites who negotiated, signed, and benefited from an
agreement. In this way, the policies of inclusion offer political payoffs for insurgent violence,
thereby turning the rebel path into an appealing option in the pursuit of otherwise blocked
aspirations (Sukanya, 2013).
In South Sudan, mechanisms for managing the conflict and bringing about durable peace
remain weak (Beza, 2015). The proposed boundaries review process aimed at creating twenty
eight states seems to have awoken ethnic consciousness, with bordering communities such as
Bare and Mundare in Central Equatoria fighting over boundaries. These factors have been
fueling conflict among the Sudanese people as early as 1950s and through 1970s (Rolandsen,
2011; Sambanis, 2004; Sharkey, 2007). It may sound pessimistic, but the political arrangement
undertaken on April 29, 2016 (commonly known as ‘Good Friday’), spearheaded by President
Kiir and Vice President Machar, was simply a follow up to the August 2015 peace agreement
that did not last. Lessons from the history of this country show that a series of conflicts, wars,
and the various attempts at conflict resolution have been derailed by political machinations, the
‘big man’ syndrome, territorial maneuvers, and the militarization of institutions (Kon, 2015).
Lack of an effective political architecture is sustained by absence of a culture of political
discourse as a means of achieving consensus in addressing political violence (Straus, 2012).
Some scholars argue that the secession of southern Sudan in 2011 was merely an extension of the
previously northern-conceived kleptocracy—a militarized, corrupt neo-patrimonial system of
governance (Radon & Logan, 2014).
As a result of this style of conflict resolution, the formal institutions of power-sharing in
South Sudan have been incapable of overcoming the belligerent and self-interested motives of
the leading political elites (Seymour, 2014). Rather than promoting democratic values, like other
previous agreements, the August 2015 peace deal represented little more than an elite
understanding of how networks of patronages would be shared. Indeed, the signing peace pacts
by warring groups does not necessarily lead to sustainable peace or an authentically democratic
political architecture; instead there must be a political will to achieve these things. Indeed,
previous attempts to nurture sustainable peace in South Sudan have been thwarted by similar
forces. With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005,
many South Sudanese thought the absence of war would automatically bring about sustainable
peace and freedom, and lead the country away from the servitude previously experienced under
the Arab domination in Khartoum.
Despite an enduring series of peace negotiations spanning from the 2005 CPA to the
IGAD-led 2015 Compromise Agreement, sustainable peace has yet to be realized in South Sudan
(Sabala, 2011). To the contrary, the country continues to experience both humanitarian
catastrophes and development degeneration. The 2016 Fragile States Index placed South Sudan
at the top of its list of high risk countries, with issues such as Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons (IDP), group grievances, fictionalized elites, human rights, and legitimacy of the state
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counting significantly. In total, South Sudan (113.8) ranks slightly behind Somalia (114.0),
making it among the most fragile states in the world (Fund for Peace, 2016). The country is
anchored on weak institutions, and, therefore, repeated attempts to reach a negotiated peace
settlement following the resumption of conflict from mid-December 2013 have been futile. The
IGAD-facilitated deal suffered several accusations of bias against the Machar-led faction. Also,
IGAD experienced fatigue resulting from having to deal with an ever-changing multitude of
demands from Juba and regional political leaders. Scholars and policy analysts alike have
observed that the failure to secure sustainable peace in the country points to the deep-rooted
ethnocentric, power-sharing culture (Pinfari, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2015) and that
efforts by IGAD and other international actors remain too bureaucratic to dis-intricate the
country from this conflict ‘slavery.’
In order to understand the intricate conflict and the complexity of conflict resolution
processes in South Sudan, this article employs Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie’s (2003)
model of power sharing (political, territorial, military, and economic). Applying the model to the
South Sudan situation facilitated analysis of both facilitative and limiting forces that have
influenced the possibilities of a sustainable peace in the country. In order to draw lessons for the
political leadership of the country, the article deciphers what it means to create a conducive
environment for sustainable peace. As such, we explore viability for a political architecture as a
juxtaposition to conflict resolution mechanisms.
Conceptualizing Power-Sharing Framework
Power-sharing, as a model of resolving conflicts in deeply divided societies, first came
into light following the seminal work of Arend Lijphart on consociationalism (Lijphart, 1975). In
studies that drew cases from western experiences—including the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
Northern Ireland—Arend Lijphart, advances the argument that bringing peace in historically
divided societies requires the formation of political entities that reflect the cultural, religious,
ideological, and territorial diversities of the region (Nordlinger, 1972). For their part, Caroline
Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie view power-sharing as only one part of the institutional evolution
process, conceiving the model as consisting of “rules that allocate decision-making rights,
including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power” (Hartzell &
Hoddie, 2003, p. 319). In this regard, power-sharing as an institution is embedded within the
territorial, military, or economic facets of the society. In theory, power-sharing institutions are
believed to promote moderate and cooperative behavior among warring factions by guaranteeing
each group a share of state power and other strategic resources such as oil, ports, seas, and
political capitals.
In political power-sharing, provisions for central or political power-sharing in peace
settlements promise to distribute political power in the core governing institutions of the state
among groups in the divided society (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). Arend Lijphart’s work on
consociationalism has been influential in providing principles for resolving ethnic conflicts in
countries such as the Netherlands. He contends that managing ethnic tensions in a democratic
system is made possible by making ethnicity the central building block of politics. In order to
conform to Lijphart’s definition, a country’s constitution must establish four key features: a
grand coalition, proportional representation, mutual veto power, and segmental autonomy
(Lijphart, 1977). Consociational democracy rests on the importance of cooperation between elite
representatives of the country’s most prominent ethnic groups. The logic behind power-sharing
The Power-Sharing Enigma in South Sudan
5
draws on the belief that when all warring parties are incorporated into the political system, they
are more likely to develop vested interests in the stability and proper functioning of the state
(Lekha & Zahar, 2009).
The territorial dimension of power-sharing refers to policies aimed at placing institutional
limitations on unbridled central authority. Territorial power-sharing arrangements call for the
devolution of powers from the central government to regionally concentrated groups, using some
form of constitutionally entrenched regional autonomy. Federalism, the most commonly used
approach, describes a system in which power is shared between multiple levels of government as
a means of combating ethnic or regional divisions. This system of multi-tiered government, or
partitioned decision-making, includes a constitutionally entrenched division of powers between
the central government and federal sub-units (Pospiezzna & Schneider, 2013).
Emancipation for federalism has a long history in South Sudan and is rooted in the fear
that a political and ethnicized entity will come to dominate. From 1956-2005, successive civil
wars were fought over issues related to the centralization of power and resources by a minority
of northern mixed-Arab tribes. During the rather short-lived time of peace under the Addis
Ababa Agreement from 1972-1983, the government in Khartoum provided a certain degree of
regional autonomy for the south. President Jafaar al-Nimeiri used this agreement to take
advantage of divisions in the south, periodically reshuffling the power structure and dissolving
regional governments (De Waal, 2014; Kebbede, 1997). These moves eventually led to a
resumption of conflict in 1983. When the CPA was signed in 2005, the SPLM was granted
almost complete autonomy within a Sudanese federation, an arrangement the population
ultimately rejected when they voted for independence in 2011 (Johnson, 2014).
Military power-sharing agreements typically seek to integrate the former antagonists’
troops into a unified national army. This new army may include an equal number of forces from
each group or establish a formula that reflects their relative size at the end of the civil war. This
will often include mandated appointments of members from within subordinate groups to key
leadership positions in the security sector. Military power-sharing, as such, seeks to specify the
details around the staffing, control, and make-up of the state’s coercive agencies. This is
designed to reassure groups that have experienced violence or repression at the hands of the state
and its agents and encourage them to lay down their arms. Civil war situations are often
characterized by a fragmented ‘market’ of violence in which the state must compete with
multiple non-state armed groups to secure a monopoly of violence and establish itself as the
premier security agency within its territory (MacGinty, 2010).
Military power-sharing agreements seek to combat two underlying mechanisms that work
against the successful integration or dissolution of warring factions in the aftermath of civil war.
First, the logic of the ‘security dilemma’ holds that each side will resist integration and
demilitarization out of fear that the other side will use the opportunity to exclude all others from
power (Walter, 1997). The second identifies the role of ‘spoilers’ as one of the main threats to
successfully implementing a peace agreement. These are parties that believe a peace agreement
threatens their interests and, in response, use violence to undermine the process (Stedman, 1997).
Finally, economic power-sharing is defined as the “distribution among groups of
economic resources controlled or mandated by the state.” Economic power-sharing is used in
cases in which discrimination has resulted in differential distribution of state resources and
economic development among certain groups or regions within a country. Concerns regarding
access to economic resources and the identity of those controlling the levers of economic power
are acute in contexts in which particular groups have historically been marginalized. Settlement
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architects seek to construct policies for the distribution of state resources that achieve a stable
balance among competing groups, or at least prevent any single group from monopolizing
economic resources.
There are generally two forms of economic power-sharing: wealth redistribution among
specified communities and resource power allocation, that is, giving rebel groups resource
control in the government (Binningsbo & Rustad, 2012). Wealth-sharing is, therefore, the sum of
a negotiated agreement that determines the distribution of income derived from natural resources
and other state revenue streams. When civil wars are motivated by grievances related to unfair
distribution of economic revenues or resource wealth, the objective of rebel groups is to gain
control over certain resource-rich areas. Wealth-sharing arrangements seek to manage access to
revenue sources and to increase the opportunity costs of renewed conflict. A second post-conflict
wealth-sharing strategy is to allocate decision-making power over natural resources and state
finances to representatives of rebel groups. This ‘power allocation’ gives control over resources
to certain groups at an elite level in government (Wennemann, 2012).
State-building and conflict management literature allude to the fact that there are “limits
[to] institutional engineering alone” in achieving sustainable peace (Wolff, 2011). As stipulated
in the peace accord, institutional arrangements that promote consociational governance have
importance in promoting inclusive governance in divided societies. With the on-going
humanitarian catastrophes, coupled with the weakening SPLM-IO due to absence of its leader,
Machar since taking off to self-excile from late 2016, as well as the failure of the August 2015
peace deal seems to have been a reiteration of the past. The country underwent a period of
emancipation during the 1960s, demanding equitable access to political power, social provision,
and cultural recognition (Mac Ginty, 1997).
Why did the August 2015 Deal collapse?
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 between the National
Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in
Juba included all four aspects of power-sharing: (1) Political, in the formation of the Transitional
Government of National Unity (TGoNU) and the autonomous Government of South Sudan
(GoSS); (2) Territorial, in the form of a north-south boundary and referendum on secession; (3)
Military, in the creation of Joint Integrated Units (JIU) between the Sudanese Armed Forces
(SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and the integration of all opposition
forces into either army and the redeployment of both forces to their respective sides of the northsouth border; and (4) Economic, in the form of a 50/50 division of oil revenues and a two percent
share going to oil producing states (Brosche, 2009).
After conflict broke out once again in 2013 following the defection of Riek Machar’s
SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) forces, the coalition of international mediators has, in
many ways, reproduced the CPA model. This was demonstrated by the content of the August
2015 Compromise Agreement (CA): (1) A major sticking point in the discussions has been over
the make-up of the executive branch within the TGoNU and the power-sharing ratios allocated
throughout the state’s political organs. (2) The SPLM-IO has made calls for federalism one of its
key policy demands. (3) The agreement calls for the creation of joint police forces, the
integration of the SPLA-IO into the SPLA and the (partial) demilitarization of Juba. (4) The
rebels secured a great deal of control within the two oil producing states and a stake in
The Power-Sharing Enigma in South Sudan
7
government in the three states of Greater Upper Nile, while calling for an increase in revenues
being shared with the communities in these states.
These successive multifaceted power-sharing arrangements have thus far proven
incapable of producing a lasting peace in South Sudan. A fundamental problem has been that
rather than promoting democratic values, these agreements represent little more than an elite
understanding of how the spoils of patronage will be dispersed. Formal power-sharing
institutions are generally developed based on an externally driven ‘democratic reconstruction’
model (Ottaway, 2003). At the same time, these arrangements are at the mercy of the selfinterested and belligerent motives of the agreement’s signatories. The intersection of these forces
produces a ‘hybrid peace’ that reflects internal resistance to the implementation of this foreign
peace- and state-building model (MacGinty, 2010). In an effort to arrive at a settlement, no
matter how flawed, international mediators have promoted negotiation processes and agreements
that are fundamentally lacking in the democratic values they ostensibly promote.
The Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), after the August 2015 peace
deal in South Sudan, was designed to administer the country for the next two and a half years, in
preparation for elections that were initially scheduled for 2018. The peace agreement was
established on the understanding that boundary review would be commissioned immediately to
create the twenty-eight states that would ensure that at least six issues are addressed. The main
mechanism for delivering the agreement and monitoring the power sharing deal was installed:
the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS). The rival parties
agreed to form a unity government and implement reforms in the country. Each faction
nominated officials who were appointed to ministerial positions based on the number of
ministerial portfolios allocated in the power sharing deal in the new 30-member cabinet, within
which the government or SPLM-IG has 16 national ministers, SPLM-IO, 10 national ministers,
former detainees (FDs), two, and other political partices (OPPs), two. This is in addition to a
number of deputy ministers.
Although President Salva Kiir’s faction continued to dominate the cabinet, Machar would
have had not only the majority of the opposition members in the cabinet but also the majority of
opposition membership in the national parliament. However, analysts have faulted the deal as a
mere socio-political reengineering of institutions—as opposed to a means of forming a
sustainable political architecture that would (1) stand test of disunity in the SPLM, (2) respond
to power-sharing squabbles, and (3) address the question of militarization and skewed decision
making processes. Earlier on, in his reservation against the IGAD-led Peace Agreement signed in
Addis Ababa August 17, 2015, President Salva Kiir, pronounced his discontent with the
Agreement, saying:
It must be stated clearly that the reality of political differences within the SPLM which
has been cemented in the Peace Agreement, and accepted cheerfully by our colleagues in
the opposition; requires us all to reorganize ourselves on a new basis. This simply means,
the SPLM will never be one again as long as we follow the implementation. (The East
Africa, 2016)
Indeed, the issues raised by President Salva Kiir in reference to the 2015 Peace Agreement are
not necessarily different from complaints over the April 2016 political rearrangement that
brought Machar on board shortly before the fall out. The sticky issue remains a paucity of
political leadership. It is a common phenomenon not to have solid leadership in fragile states;
however, the paradox is that even as people in such countries suffer lack of effective
management of national resources, policy makers will continue to share and divide power among
Journal of International and Global Studies Volume 8, Number 2
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rivals along political, territorial, military, or economic dimensions (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003).
This theoretical orientation jives well with conceptualization of this article, namely that the
problems of South Sudan—particularly in regard to prospects of attaining durable peace and
sustainable political architecture—boils down to a missing link between the governing
institutions (top leadership) and the inability of those in power to meet the basic material needs
of their population.
As a result of this failure of political institutions to create functional relationships
between the rulers and those ruled, skewed decision-making with respect to the granting of rights
seems inevitable, with those with access to public resources and opportunities excluding the rest
of the population from access to the same resources. It is for this reason that institutional
theoreticians hypothesize that the multiple dimensions (political, economic, military, territorial,
etc.) of power-sharing in a peace agreement will have a cumulative effect on the actors’ sense of
security, with the different forms of power-sharing becoming mutually reinforcing (Hartzell &
Hoddie, 2003; DiMaggio, 1991). (In South Sudan, for example, former combatants may require
assurances that no single group will be able to use the power of the state to secure what they
failed to win on the battlefield. Nevertheless, if governing institutions are well articulated, they
could, to a large extent, possibly promote moderate and cooperative behavior among contending
groups by guaranteeing each group a share of state power.) However, these sequential
multifaceted power-sharing deals have thus far proven incapable of producing not only a lasting
peace but also a sustainable political architecture through which citizens and leaders can
exercise their democratic rights in South Sudan.
In the succession of unsuccessful peace deals, a fundamental problem has been that the
political elites have failed to appreciate the fact that governing institutions are most likely to
suffocate if not anchored on democratic principles (Ottaway, 2003). Like many other peace deals
signed in this country, the August 2015 peace agreement and the subsequent political
rearrangement constituted in April 2016 seem to have been destined to collapse. The intersection
of the forces between SPLA and SPLA-IO produces a ‘negative peace’ that reflects nothing less
than fear and internal resistance to the implementation of a genuine peace agreement (Mac
Ginty, 2010). In an effort to arrive at a settlement, amid pressures from both internal and
international sources, the IGAD-plus mediators have unfortunately promoted negotiation
processes and arrangements that are fundamentally lacking in the democratic values they
allegedly promote.
This selective power sharing approach presents several complications in its
implementation. First, there is a potential for the government to impede implementation or for
the rebels, along with groups excluded from the process, to end up as spoilers. Secondly, the
incapability of a party to enforce an agreement within its own ranks can lead to a resumption in
fighting by splintering factions that reject the contents of a power-sharing agreement. Third,
signatories are often duplicitous and use an agreement for tactical reasons to achieve their
military objectives. Furthermore, the parties to the power-sharing agreements often do not
encompass all actors with a capacity to prolong the conflict. The assumption is that meeting the
economic demands of some rebel groups will dis-incentivize further rebellion. At the same time,
giving potential spoilers access to state resources bolsters their power bases and can increase the
rationale for using violence as a bargaining tactic (Le Billon, 2009).
There are also ethical concerns with the use of power-sharing agreements given that those
who negotiate them—and thus benefit most—have occupied positions of power by force or
sword rather than consent. Wealth-sharing, by design, institutionalizes access to state resources
The Power-Sharing Enigma in South Sudan
9
by the government and rebels. However, some scholars have cautioned that this politically driven
distribution of state assets and positions is accompanied by a tacit agreement on corruption that
is informally embedded into any peace accord (Ottmann, 2015). By essentially “buying off”
armed opponents, wealth-sharing brings rebel groups into existing systems of patronage designed
to divert state income to finance personal support networks or for self-enrichment. In South
Sudan, the ‘big man’ syndrome seems to perpetuate the already disfranchised economy and now,
ethnic undertones are rapidly tearing apart the social fabric of the South Sudanese people. The
trade-off is that while power-sharing agreements generally ignore past abuses and struggle for
self-governance, they seek to curb further suffering if the conflict persists. Also, neglecting the
economic agendas of spoilers, power-sharing arrangements risk sustaining the already intractable
cycles of conflicts and wars (Nitzschke & Studdard, 2005). As such, then, what governance
policy options do the two leaders (President Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar) have?
Lessons for President Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar
South Sudan has a history of relapsing into conflict and wars. Indeed, in light of the
August 2015 peace deal, the envisaged transition government collapsed no sooner than it took
off. Meanwhile, the former president of Nigeria, Olesegun Obasanjo-led investigation, African
Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS) has accused both sides of committing
a litany of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In particular, this report detailed a massacre
of ethnic Nuer in the first days of the conflict carried out primarily by privately funded militias
assembled by and loyal to Salva Kiir.
Perhaps more important than a decision on how power should be divided between the
parties included in the negotiations is the question of who should be able to sit at the table. While
it is often argued that the inclusion of non-military actors is a pre-condition for a durable peace, a
solution without the men holding the guns means no peace will prevail at all. Throughout the
mediation process that led to the August peace deal, the SPLM-Juba and SPLM-IO sought to
keep the process exclusively between the two warring parties at the expense of other rebel
groups. This is already problematic. Even in countries such as Northern Ireland, where the
conflict was mainly ideological, the ‘Good Friday Belfast’ treaty of 1998 was ratified by a
majority of people on both sides of the north-south border (Rankin, 2008; Shirlow & Tonge,
2008). Engaging ordinary citizens at all levels of negotiation has the ‘power’ to avert tensions,
particularly in ethnically polarized situations.
Analyses in this article have revealed that the government of Salva Kiir has reluctantly
accepted the SPLM-IO’s demands of federalism but has since worked to undermine and control
this proposal. Since signing the peace agreement, the government has made moves to adopt a
federal system unilaterally and based on its own terms. After having rejected the SPLM-IO’s
proposal to create 21 states at the negotiating table, in October 2015, President Kiir issued a
unilateral decree to impose his own design of 28 states (Adeba, 2015). This move was a clear
abrogation of the 2015 peace agreement, which was based on the current ten state system and
called for further negotiations regarding the final make-up of any federal structure. In addressing
this stalemate, the two leaders may wish to reconsider devolution in its totality, bi-partnership,
and consent principles that usually transform a country into ‘real’ democracy (Edwards, 2008).
For example, in anticipation of constitutional crisis, after the Belfast Agreement 1998, Blair
initiated constitutional and territorial adjustment, which saw an effective return to devolved
government in the three peripheral regions of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (O’Leary,
Journal of International and Global Studies Volume 8, Number 2
10
2004). In New Labour discourse, this decentralization of governance sprang from both a deepseated belief in empowering ordinary people and in a firm commitment to achieving a peaceful
settlement to this most enduring of conflicts. A commitment to reconfiguring the constitutional
landscape of the UK was the key point of differentiation between New Labour’s policy towards
Northern Ireland and that of its political counterparts or predecessors.
There is some merit to the SPLM-Juba’s argument that South Sudan cannot survive as a
unified nation with two separate armies. Nonetheless, the security arrangement that haphazardly
combined the two forces without even a minimal grace period is likely to represent a return to
the status quo ante that risks unraveling once again. The SPLM-IO sees this as a thinly veiled
attempt by the government to marginalize its command structure. At the same time, the SPLMIO has failed to properly address the modalities of how it would be possible to reintegrate its
forces in the near future, or what to do about the White Army militias.4 Lack of real political
power held by local politicians, together with a lack of representation of various factions in the
parliament, embedded inequality at the macro-level for the country, and especially with absence
of Machar, the Nuer and other “small” ethnic groups that seek refugee in SPLA-IO have been
edged to marginalization. The absence of a forum via in which political discourses can be
directly effectual has been the cause of the absence of sustainable political architecture in the
Republic of South Sudan.
A culture of political discourse is central to the process of change and, importantly, to the
impression of stability through its role in bringing together concepts, interaction, and context. In
Northern Ireland, for example, the 1998 and 2006 Agreements have been carefully presented so
as not to imply radical change to the ideologies and goals of the parties concerned (Hayward,
2008). The key to the success of these agreements has been the ability to place all moves made
as either tactical or as pragmatic, i.e., in line with the interests of one’s own group. This has been
achieved in no small part through organized political discourses.
The breakdown of the South Sudanese army, mainly along ethnic lines, during the
political rearrangement in April 2016 suggests that the presidential pardons from the past failed
to appropriately integrate South Sudan’s militias into a single entity. At the outset of the conflict,
somewhere between 60 to 70 percent of SPLA soldiers defected, the majority of defectors being
former militia fighters that had been “integrated” in the post-CPA period.5 That the underlying
issues that caused the breakdown of the CPA’s security arrangement have not been resolved and
that the two parties appear equally uninterested in truly integrating suggests a cycle that is likely
to repeat itself.
Former prisoners have also been involved in creating alternative community narratives
that link them into a post-ceasefire process (Shirlow & Tonge. 2008). This has also involved
challenging the mythic appeal of violence and diverting youth attention away from paramilitaries
and sectarian violence. From this perspective, former SPLA prisoners’ involvement in
community work and restorative justice initiatives may reduce tensions and/or promote
reconciliation among the various groups and society at large. In essence, constructive ideological
mobilization needs to be prioritized ahead of the next general elections planned for 2018. This
could be achieved through various approaches, including the use of commemoration, identity
(the fact that all south Sudanese trace same genealogy), socialization, and the goal of South
Sudan unity; and the demands for equality of recognition and anti-discrimination legislation.
Lack of such measures will continue to breed hatred and distrust among leaders and set
conditions for dissent against the regime.
The Power-Sharing Enigma in South Sudan
11
The CPA was negotiated exclusively between the SPLM and the NCP, a decision that
contributed to the problematic integration of SSDF forces into the SPLA. The ideological
differences between the SPLM and SPLM-IO are thriving in a political environment that lacks
democratic values and in which exclusion provides the impetus for marginalized groups to rise
up in arms. Although South Sudan is relatively young nation compared to Northern Ireland, with
a different cultural orientation, the case of Northern Ireland presents a study in the possibility for
more lasting peace for South Sudan. A central factor contributing to the success of the most
recent peace process experience in Northern Ireland has been the development of a cross-party
political and ideological consensus on long term and short-term policies and goals for Northern
Ireland. This new emphasis on political consensus played a key role in maintaining the peace
process and in implementing the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ (O’Donnell, 2008). The language of
the peace process, as espoused by the main parties in the Republic, has been framed within terms
of reconciliation and a peaceful settlement. There has also emerged a common understanding
between Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil (and Sinn Féin) on the meaning of republicanism as both
democratic and pluralist and as accepting of the principle of consent. For South Sudan,
harmonization of ideological orientations between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar is critical in
fostering peace and stability.
When Salva Kiir assumed office in 2005, he made a decision to use the country’s oil
wealth to fund a vast patronage network with the intension of absorbing other armed groups
rather than fighting them. The 2016 Juba peace deal was the largest in a series of deals designed
to integrate rebel groups into the SPLA and their commanders into the movement’s political
wing, the SPLM. Though this process of internal buyoffs may have been necessary to avert
further conflict, it may simply have served to further entrench South Sudan’s system of military
patronage. The current violence is the most recent manifestation of a cycle of ‘rent-seeking
rebellions’ followed by ‘belligerent buyouts,’ which are typical of this distinct system in South
Sudan. In what International Relations (IR) scholars refer to as a “marketplace” (Cornelissen et
al. 2012; Morgenthau, 1994), politicians in South Sudan strive to access sizeable budgets to
secure the loyalty of subordinates and to compete with rivals. This economic system is both
kleptocratic and militarized. Progressive and inclusive political institutions in South Sudan have
to be nurtured in order to create equity and ownership of development by all ethnic groups.
Solutions to the South Sudan conflict are therefore multifaceted and require “framing,”
“facilitation,” and “forging common ground” among all parties and communities.
Framing negotiation is critical to the process of developing a political discourse culture.
Political discourse can affect the construction of a (conceptual) framework within which
negotiations can take place. The political discourse on power can be used to justify a new course
of action by the party concerned that is considered necessary preparation for the negotiations to
follow. In this sense, justification by political actors for the use of the power and responsibility
that their supporters have given them is tested frequently and over a long period of time to
ascertain the trustworthiness of the leaders at the negotiating table. For similar reasons, when
political actors step into the realm of preparing for negotiations with the “other,” discourses of
principle are needed to reassure their supporters of their integrity. This integrity would require
both President Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar to uphold the principles founded in the CPA and
other subsequent peace agreements and to anchor such a trust on shared ideology.
Facilitating agreement proceeds framing. Once the groundwork for negotiations has been
laid, political discourse can play a vital role in enabling agreement to be reached between
moderate parties, between moderates and hardliners, or between extreme ideological positions.
Journal of International and Global Studies Volume 8, Number 2
12
Political discourse on power at such a time is of particular interest because real power is at stake
according to the discursive line followed by participants in the negotiations. The priority of
political actors as negotiators is to balance the requirements of power with the possibility of
holding it. Discourses of principle are also under particular pressure when it comes to facilitating
agreement; “agreement” by definition means agreed terms, but does it also mean agreed
meanings? Certainly, the room that is necessary for bargaining in order for those “at the table” to
make progress must be enabled by the discourses they espouse.
The final step is to forge common ground. The stability of any common ground revealed
through a peace agreement may be determined to a large degree by the discourses of those
sharing power. The very fact that new actors are holding power has huge significance. If political
discourse has “consequence,” is a co-operative or a competitive discourse more likely? Aside
from the particularities of the context, the nature of political discourse chosen by parties at this
stage depends in part on their assessment of whether progress towards their goals is best
achieved through co-operation or competition with one’s political opponents. The construction of
some shared political space as a result of an agreement can mean that political competition is
more direct, and, according to the particular terms of the political agreement, this competition
could either be directed most severely at opponents within each community or at those
representing the “other” community.
Conclusion: Policy Options
In spite of the merits, the model of power-sharing is not necessarily “one size fits all.”
This is partly because the current style of ethno-centric governance in South Sudan that was built
on ethnic politics, dominations, and representation based on tribal alliances and ‘big man’
syndrome continues to drag the country into an endless cycle of violence. This form of
governance system might continue indefinitely and not foster the process of nation-building or
precipitate peaceful co-existence, nor install a functional political architecture. As such, the
following conclusions should be put into consideration in search of sustainable peace, not only in
South Sudan but also in other situations with similar contextual alignments.
First, the August 2015 Peace Agreement in South Sudan seems to have merely reaffirmed
the same politics of patronages and the ‘big man’ governmental structure that resulted in a
climate in which the abrogation of civil and human rights flourished: Instead of giving the people
of South Sudan full legislative autonomy or voice, county governments still have only a limited
scope of legislative authority. This flaw thereby withholds from the people of South Sudan a
comprehensive guarantee of a protective and democratic voice in their domestic politics.
Secondly, the August 2015 Peace Agreement, while itself a product of both regional and
international influence, neither entirely recognizes nor maintains the vital role that international
and legal experts play in pursuing ongoing peace and respect for civil and human rights.
International experts and academics provide essential objectivity and seasoned viewpoints to a
still antagonistic political situation. As part of their initiative to rebuild South Sudan into a postconflict and human rights-oriented society, the Joint Monitoring Committee, together with
IGAD’s oversight, could greatly benefit from the creation of a formal Bill of Rights reflecting
the highest international standards of human rights protections. The contribution of international
non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs) with expertise in
rebuilding post-conflict societies is essential to ensure both the success of a new society and
ensuring that such societies incorporate the highest regard for civil liberties and human rights.
The Power-Sharing Enigma in South Sudan
13
Third, for the elites within both warring parties, the preferred model of economic powersharing is one that maximizes their access to power and wealth. Through the IGAD-led
negotiations, Dr. Riek Machar was reinstated as the First Vice President on the assumption that
he legitimately represented the Nuer, who form more than 15% of the total population, and, by
extension, the assumption that he would represent other ethnic groups who felt left out by Kiir’s
government. Thus, the August 2015 peace deal is nothing more than a reiteration of the country’s
previous political arrangement. In addition to perfecting conditions for intractable conflict, the
2015 peace deal simply (re)distributed power among these elites. As such, wealth-sharing
represents not only a formal dispersal of South Sudan government resources but also an informal
bargain that allows for individual accumulation. At this time, President Salva Kiir has gained the
courage to run the government without Dr. Riek Machar. The celebrations should, however, be
restrained. Even though Salva Kiir has been endorsed by both internal and international actors,
restraint is required not just in memory of the victims of the ongoing civil war and not just
because we know some will try to take advantage of the weakening 2015 Agreement through
further political patronages. Restraint is required because there are obvious stress points in the
new political architecture.
Fourth, the militarization of South Sudan has been and currently remains a central issue
to maintaining peace and amicable relations between divided populations. The military regime
that set the stage for numerous violations of human rights and the subjugation of a minority
population ought to be replaced by a professional army that affords civil control to even greater
powers than under the current arrangement. The August 2015 peace agreement, while aspiring to
the normalization of security arrangements, predicated changes in security operations on
“healing and reconciliation.” This implies that its need for provisions regarding the deployment
of tools of state-building (other than the military) is profound in South Sudan.
Finally, the August 2015 Peace Agreement makes no direct mention of protections for
marginalized populations such as children and women against excessive force, as recognized
under international law. The harried and perilous practices of armed forces in South Sudan, every
time there are signs of dissent, continue not only to violate the rights of women but also to blight
the gains made by women in the country towards achieving gender balance in all sectors of the
economy, and therefore, the current situation in South Sudan gives rise to the need for formal
protections. Because the hazards faced by women remain very real in the country, as evidenced
by the rise in gender-based violence (GBV) since the resumption of civil war in 2013, the August
2015 peace Agreement should have made explicit reference to the moral and legal commitments
made by the transition government with respect to the protection of children and women.
Notes
In these article, we advance Arend Lijphart’s argument that pluralistic societies that made use of power-sharing
rules and practices would be able to exercise power consensually. Building on this understanding, we interrogate
application of the power sharing dimensions (political, economic, territorial, and military) to evaluate possibilities or
impossibilties of sustainable peace in South Sudan.
2
Johan Galtung is often considered the father of peace and conflict studies.
3
Machar had originally served as the vice president of South Sudan under President Salva Kiir from the country’s
2011 independence until his 2013 dismissal by Kiir, himself the leader of The Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA). In April 2016, Machar was appointed First Vice President of the country but soon thereafter became the
leader of a rebel faction opposing President Kiir, The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLMIO).
1
Journal of International and Global Studies Volume 8, Number 2
14
4
It is a youth-based outfit among the Nuer ethnic group traced to a number of structural and historical factors,
among them the August 1991 split of the SPLA and cattle ownership as well as the proliferation of small arms and
light weapons (SALWs). Like other non-state armed groups in South Sudan, the White Army’s primary purpose is
to protect the community against external threats and to defend property and livestock. Groups performing this role
are very common among pastoralist communities in the country. For example, among the Dinka, this first-line
defence formation is called Gulweng. Among the Otuho of Eastern Equatoria State, this youth defence entity is
called the Monyimiji.
5
The GoSS decided to embark on a strategy of absorbing the various militias that had once been aligned with
Khartoum against the SPLA. The return of troops loyal to Riek Machar and Lam Akol, who had split with the
SPLM/A in 1991, was followed by the landmark Juba Declaration of 2006, which sought to incorporate the South
Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) under the command of Paulino Matiep. This strategy encouraged a dynamic of
recurring belligerence, under which there were multiple processes of incorporation with little effective integration
and social cohesion. Instead, these agreements served to consolidate and further entrench Southern Sudan’s system
of military patronage.
The Power-Sharing Enigma in South Sudan
15
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