Central European University
Compulsory Consensus?
The Sources of Elite Political Culture and the
Consolidation of Central and East European Democracies
By Maximilian Spinner
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD
Central European University, Department of Political Science
Budapest, January 2007
Supervisor
András Bozóki (Central European University)
PhD Committee
Zsolt Enyedi (Central European University)
Sorina Soare (Université Libre de Bruxelles)
Jürg Steiner (University of North Carolina)
Summary:
The transitions of 1989/90 in Central and Eastern Europe led to the installation of democratic systems
with high numbers of veto players (i.e. democracies close to Arend Lijphart’s concept of consensus
democracy). The existing consensus democratic arrangements are the result of contingent dynamics
and the political vacuum following the break-down of communism, as well as the product of external
conditionalities, with particular regard to EU integration. However, when looking at contemporary
Central and East European politics it appears doubtful that a consensus-democratic institutional setup actually led to accommodative, consensus-oriented political elites boasting a “spirit of
accommodation” and showing commitment to consensus democracy. In short, political culture does
not seem to have adapted to the institutional context more than 15 years after the transition to
democracy and has yet to converge with more stable West European patterns. This leaves some to
wonder about the likelihood for the future persistence of these systems (i.e. the consolidation of
democracy in the region).
The apparent absence of an appropriate political culture stands against the classical
approach to political culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (to which Lijphart also subscribes)
which expects political culture, in the form of individual level attitudes, to adapt to institutions over
time. Internalization of the norms of the democratic system is seen as a requirement for consolidating
democracies by scholars in this tradition. I argue that commitment to an existing democracy does not
require political elites to be fully socialised into its underlying norms or to internalise them. However,
commitment does require the existence of a supportive habitus, such as a set of collective
representations of democracy which are explicitly upheld and commonly valued though not
necessarily internalized on the individual level. Unlike attitudes which are viewed to be based on
individual socio-economic background factors and post-recruitment socialisation, collective
representations are grounded in a collective memory developed during historical junctures.
In this dissertation I show that for the CEE democracies the critical juncture of the 1989/90
transition to democracy offered very different discursive resources to political elites to subsequently
commit to consensus democracy depending on the mode of transition. In the rather unstructured and
empty public realm of collapsed communism in 1989/90, formal democratic institutions and new ways
of interpreting politics had to be found simultaneously (some of which have persisted in public elite
discourse). Consequently, a multilateral, gradual, negotiated and legalistic transition with moderate
elite turnover offers rhetorical resources to justify consensus as a democratic practice. Political elites
were endowed with rhetorical resources to argue in terms of the common good, to support established
procedures and the existing institutional status quo. However, the absence of a shared judgement of
the past system and the persistence of competing historical “truths” undermines the development of
mutual respect between opposed political camps.
2
A unilateral transition (i.e. a more abrupt, imposed transition) marks a “new beginning” of
the polity in terms of its legitimacy and a high degree of elite turnover. It leaves a discursive legacy
favouring more competitive approaches to politics, argumentation in terms of particular interests, a
focus on outputs rather than procedures, and no explicit normative support for the existing
institutional status quo. However, its legacy of initially excluding the old power holders from
acquiring a stake in the new system generally undermines the development of a shared habitus
supporting a specific type of democracy among all elite members.
In order to test the hypotheses of my model of political culture Hungary and East Germany,
respectively, are almost ideal cases of multilateral and unilateral transition. At the same time, both
Hungary and Germany have a high number of veto players in their democratic system. Through
content analysis of parliamentary speeches, stable patterns of consensualist or majoritarian speech
are established for two electoral cycles. First, the lack of plausibility of the classical model focusing
on individual socio-economic background factors is illustrated and the patterns expected according to
the alternative model largely confirmed. Using in-depth interview data with around 60 MPs from the
two cases I then demonstrate how political elites across different backgrounds and party affiliations
are indeed connected by shared discourses. These discourses can then be used to delineate different
outlooks and future paths for democracy. Using East Germany as a case (with the inclusion of a
sample of West German MPs as a benchmark) also shows that cross-national differences in this
regard are not based on general “national political culture,” but on more recent experiences.
In all, transition legacies are shown to have strongly conditioned elite political culture. Yet
neither ideal type of democratic transition left a discursive legacy fully compatible with consensus
democracy. In a more tentative way, subsequent implications for the consolidation of democracy are
formulated. While political elites with a legacy of multilateral transition (as in Hungary or Poland)
are inclined to give support to the preservation of consensus-democratic arrangements, they will be
obstructed in its daily operation unless they manage to establish a commonly accepted legitimacy for
“the other” (rather than externalising opponents from the system). Political elites with the legacy of
unilateral transition such as in East Germany or the Czech Republic will be more likely to favour
institutional changes toward more competitive, majoritarian systems rather than preserving the
existing set-up. However, for changes to be achieved in a consensual, inclusive fashion they will have
to find ways of accommodating other initially marginalized players in the democratic game and help
them establish a stake in the system.
For the international dimension there can be conclusions drawn concerning EU
conditionalities for newly accessed or aspiring member states: just putting in place the “right
institutions” might not lead to the desired outcomes in a uniform way. Endogenous historical legacies
appear to influence the way political elites make sense out of exogenously introduced institutions.
Thus, a different understanding for the impact of ideational factors on the consolidation of democracy
is outlined and a new understanding of transition as a historical legacy in itself is advanced.
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation is the result of a long-cultivated interest in Central and East European history
and politics. My attraction to issues of post-communist societies has never been purely or
even predominantly academic. In fact, having grown up in East Berlin, I regard myself as
deeply socialized and shaped by the post-communist condition. I regard the fall of the Berlin
wall in 1989 as a crucial juncture that significantly shaped my outlook on the present, past and
future (in line with the main argument of this study). Travelling extensively in Eastern Europe
and Russia, working for 15 months for a Hungarian charity in 1998/99 and learning
Hungarian further entrenched my fascination with the region. Consequently, I acquired a
background in Russian and East Studies at the Osteuropainstitut of Berlin’s Freie Universität,
and the Centre for Russian and East European Studies in Birmingham. The subsequent return
to Budapest for undertaking a PhD at CEU was quite an obvious choice.
At this point, one will probably understand that my perspective on the topic covered is
surely not fully independent and unaffected by my pre-existing socialisation and experience
(and thus in line with Max Weber’s understanding of social science). In agreement with
Weber I do not regard this as a disadvantage. Verstehen wollen is a major drive for science.
For this undertaking I regard an inside perspective and a contextual small-N approach as the
best way to go (despite the suspicion it is sometimes met with by my colleagues). In fact, the
most exciting part of this PhD-dissertation was the chance to learn how politicians experience
the upheavals of post-communist politics from their subjective, or rather (I should say) intersubjective perspective. Twenty-seven Hungarian and twenty-eight East German MPs, who
generously shared their limited time and exciting insights with me, deserve my gratuity.
In terms of academic support first of all I express thanks to my supervisor, András
Bozóki, who strongly inspired the project and enabled me to successfully conclude it. Luckily
(for me) he returned to academia after having served as Hungarian Minister of Culture in
2005/6 and, ironically, turned temporarily from being my supervisor into a potential subject of
my research. (In the end, I did not include him into my sample.) Zsolt Enyedi was always
willing to provide detailed, insightful, and critical comments at crucial points of this project.
Grzegorz Ekiert was key in helping me lay the theoretical foundations of this project during
my stay at Harvard’s Department of Government. Jürg Steiner and Sorina Soare provided
further helpful advice as committee members for the conclusion of this project. Anna Seleny,
Nenad Dimitrijevic, Carol Harrington, Carsten Schneider, Umut Korkut, Emilia Palonen, and
Alan Renwick gave very useful criticism on earlier drafts. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, László
4
Bruszt, Yoshiko Herrera, Samuel Huntington, Claus Offe, Robert Putnam, Gábor Tóka,
Alexander Trechsel, Philippe Schmitter, and Daniel Ziblatt provided further comments on
single chapters or provided inspiration by sharing and discussing ideas with me. Also
important were the inputs and comments provided by fellow PhD students at doctoral
seminars at CEU, but also at Harvard and at the European University Institute in Florence
which helped to advance this project. CEU’s Political Science Department staff (Eva
Lafferthon, Kriszta Zsukotynszky and Robert Sata) deserve thanks for their untiring
administrative support.
Moreover, without the patient and persistent support of Dr. Daniel Jakócs in
improving my knowledge of Hungarian language my field research would have been
impossible. József Kiss, head of the Budapest-based Jelenkutató Alapítvány, generously
provided extensive biographical data about Hungarian MPs free of charge. Marietta Arki
aided in translating the question guidelines for the interviews. Krisztina Szabados, Henriett
Griecs, Gyöngyvér Szabó, Eszter Kollár, Leonard Gabriel Ciocan did very accurate and
timely transcriptions of the Hungarian interviews. Beth Onyenwoke proof-read the entire
dissertation and helped to cut short most of my long, German-style sentences. Funding by the
CEU for the larger part of this dissertation is gratefully acknowledged, as well as an ERPscholarship by the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes for my year at Harvard.
With hindsight, I have learned that concluding a PhD dissertation is not primarily
about solving relevant academic puzzles or about writing a reasonably insightful and
moderately interesting piece of independent research. Above all, it is about finishing it. For
this, one has to overcome all sorts of internal and external constraints. Next to one’s own
inadequacies, self-doubts or intellectual crises this also means enduring the vagaries of
academic policies, ignoring non-constructive criticism and dealing with sometimes slightly
capricious professors. However, this does not mean that writing a PhD is not rewarding.
While the larger academic community is probably not exactly waiting for this dissertation it
was nevertheless an exciting journey for me personally and intellectually. The fact that I kept
going on this journey I owe to the continuous encouragement, understanding and support of
my parents and Katrin. It is to them that I dedicate this dissertation (although they deserve
something better).
Berlin/Budapest, 10 January 2007
Maximilian Spinner
E-mail: [email protected]
5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 8
List of tables............................................................................................................................... 9
PREFACE ............................................................................................................................... 10
PART I: Introduction.............................................................................................................. 14
PART II: The Theory – Consensus, culture and consolidation ............................................ 20
Relocating Lijphart: Is there consensus democracy in Central and Eastern Europe?20
What is consensus democracy and how can we use this concept?................................... 20
Is there consensus democracy in Central and Eastern Europe? ....................................... 25
The “spirit of accommodation”: the ideational foundations of consensus democracy 32
Consensus democracy and its ideational sub-dimensions................................................ 32
Consensus democracy as deliberative democracy?.......................................................... 37
The classics of political culture: Almond & Verba and the operational code .............. 42
Socialization into democratic systems: attitudes on mass and elite levels....................... 42
Attitudes into behaviour: political culture and the consolidation of democracy.............. 50
Where the truth lies: the limitations of the classical model of political culture............... 54
The heretics of political culture: Discursive political culture and habitus ................... 56
Implicit and explicit cultural legacies .............................................................................. 56
Consolidating democracy: habitus as a shared understanding of legitimacy................... 65
The impact of historical junctures: modes of transition and discourses on democracy ... 71
Hypotheses derived from the alternative model of political culture ................................ 80
PART III: Testing the alternative model of political culture ................................................ 84
The cases.............................................................................................................................. 84
Hungary, East Germany and their transition legacies ...................................................... 84
Excursus: Why East Germany is not (such) a special case .............................................. 88
Consensus democracy in Hungary and Germany........................................................... 92
Commonalities ................................................................................................................. 92
Germany’s stable quasi-consociationalism ...................................................................... 93
Democratic Hungary: From extreme consensus towards majoritarian democracy?........ 96
The methodology .............................................................................................................. 101
Content analysis of parliamentary speeches................................................................... 101
The code book ................................................................................................................ 104
Measuring consensualism: Coding and counting........................................................... 110
Consensualism in parliamentary speeches – a content analysis .................................. 112
Patterns of consenualist and majoritarian statements..................................................... 112
The plausibility of the classical model of political culture ............................................ 113
The alternative model of political culture: shared discourses on democracy............. 120
The methodology: discourse analysis and “qualitative cluster analysis”....................... 120
Consensus and compromise: Panacea or expensive luxury? ........................................ 123
Professional politics: Common good vs. particular interests, procedures vs. outcomes 137
Keeping the institutional status quo? ............................................................................. 157
Enemy or legitimate opponent? Respect towards the “other”........................................ 167
PART IV: Conclusions and outlook: The future of consensus democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe...................................................................................................................... 182
6
Literature ............................................................................................................................... 198
Tables ..................................................................................................................................... 217
Annexes.................................................................................................................................. 239
7
List of abbreviations
CDU
Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CEE
Central and Eastern Europe
CoD
Consolidation of Democracy
DQI
Discourse Quality Index (as developed by Steiner et al., 2004)
EU
European Union
FDP
Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
Fidesz
Fiatal Demokrata Szövetsége (Young Democratic Union)
FPÖ
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
FRG
Federal Republic of Germany
GDR
German Democratic Republic
LDPD
Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Liberal Democratic Party of Germany)
MSZMP Magyar Szocialista Munkaspárt (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party)
MSZP
Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party)
MDF
Magyar Demokrata Forum (Hungarian Democratic Forum)
MP
Member of Parliament
OECD
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PDS
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism)
SED
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SPD
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SZDSZ
Szabad Demokrata Szövetsége (Free Democratic Union)
8
List of tables
Table 1
Characteristics of majoritarian and consensus models of democracy
p.20
Table 2
Two models of political culture
p.71
Table 3
Modes of transition
p.79
Table 4
Composition of MP samples for the 2002-2005 period
p.103
Table 5
Consensualism indicators’ correlation for two parliamentary cycles
p.113
Table 6
Consensualism indicators and geographical background
p.116
Table 7
Consensualism indicators and year of birth
p.116
Table 8
Consensualism indicators and affiliation with the former regime
p.117
Table 9
Consensualism indicators and incumbency
p.117
Table 10
Consensualism indicators and higher office
p.118
Table 11
Consensualism indicators and entry into parliament
p.118
Table 12
Consensualism indicators and type of mandate
p.118
Table 13
Consensualism indicators and ideology
p.119
9
PREFACE
1. The Argument
This study offers an explanation of why elite political culture in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) is not consensualist despite the largely consensus-democratic institutional set-up
established during democratic transition and the process of EU accession. In other words, it
tries to explain why political elites in the post-communist countries of this region do not fully
commit to consensus democracy. The key claim is that elite political culture has not adapted
to institutions more than fifteen years after the transition to democracy. The claim rests on an
empirical investigation and a theoretical argument: empirical observation shows that patterns
of consensualist and majoritarian positions assumed by political elites appear to be more
influenced by specific historical legacies such as the mode of transition rather than individual
socio-economic background or post-recruitment factors. As a consequence, there is a variety
of ways political elites in different countries make use of and interpret the institutions of
consensus democracy rather than a convergence (e.g. as expected by EU conditionalities for
accession). Thus, political leaders developed different kinds of commitments to the
democratic system strongly depending on transition legacies. The theoretical argument runs as
follows: specific discursive legacies of democratic transition (so far) have a stronger impact
upon shaping the outlook of political elites than their gradual socialization into the
institutional set-up of consensus democracy.
2. The Argument in context
The above-introduced argument is relevant in the context of the consolidation of democracy,
i.e. the persistence of younger democratic systems. While political culture has been neglected
and relegated to a secondary position behind formal institutions, it actually needs to be reconsidered as one of its key elements. This argument is based on the finding that introducing
certain kinds of institutional frameworks, namely a consensus-democratic set-up, neither led
to consensualist political elites nor to a similar degree of commitment by political elites to
these institutions. The findings stand against the wide-spread, flawed (and often hidden)
assumption among social scientists and practitioners that political culture would automatically
follow institutions over time. This assumption is reflected in the European Union’s accession
conditionalities, which focused predominantly on “getting the institutions right” without
regard for building what Arend Lijphart calls a “spirit of accommodation” in CEE domestic
politics. In fact, the latter is needed to effectively operate democratic systems characterized by
10
a high number of veto points and is apparently absent in many of the new democracies. In this
regard, I view institutions and institutional change as following both rationalist and
sociological dynamics. This means that, on one hand, actors aim at efficiently pursuing
certain pre-existing preferences in picking institutions and interacting through them
(following the “logic of consequentialism”) while, on the other hand, they also act according
to the “logic of appropriateness” (i.e. in their behaviour they adapt to collective norms of
“what is right”) which are embodied in these institutions.1
Therefore, this study advances an operationalization of an “appropriate” political
culture in consensus democracies, looks into the origins of political culture, and compares its
manifestation and some of its effects on the consolidation of democracy in two postcommunist societies. A consensualist political culture is shown to be grounded in five interrelated basic ideals: consensus as a valued practice, reference to the common good, support
for established procedures and the institutional status quo, as well as respect towards “the
other” ( i.e. the political opponent). These elements can be derived largely from the older
(now often disregarded) literature on political culture in the context of consensus democracy’s
main conceptual precursor—consociational democracy. However, differing from other
scholars in this tradition, I do not make a normative statement in favour of consensus
democracy or any other model. My goal is rather to examine and understand why different
elements of a consensual political culture are absent in CEE democracies and to discuss some
of the consequences.
While the classical model of political culture based on Almond and Verba’s seminal
work expects political culture (in the form of individually held attitudes) to adapt to
institutions over time (with socio-economic background factors mediating the speed of
adaptation), I advance a different concept. 2 My understanding of political culture is based on
explicit manifestations of collectively shared representations of democracy in the form of
public discourses and habitus, 3 rather than implicitly internalized and privately held
orientations on the individual level. As a consequence, political culture is not conceptualised
to directly impact upon behaviour of political elites (i.e. through a psychological impetus) as
in the classical model. It is rather understood to be mediating the way democracy and its
institutions are publicly interpreted by political elites. This way political culture also mediates
what kind of behaviour can be justified as acceptable. Explicit political culture therefore
J March, J Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, American Political
Science Review, Vol.78, No.3, Sept.1984, pp.734-749.
2
G Almond / S Verba, The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton UP,
1963.
3
P Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.
1
11
constrains the way political elites can make use of institutions and what kind of political
change can legitimately be argued for in the given context. This understanding of political
culture thus rests on a concept of “weak socialization” through which actors come to
explicitly accept the validity of certain norms or values on the collective level, but do not
necessarily internalise them individually (“strong socialization”). In this notion of political
culture values do not impact directly upon behaviour via deeply held attitudes on the
individual level. Rather, they constrain behaviour by forcing actors to justify themselves
along the lines of collectively upheld values. As a consequence, also an alternative
understanding for the role of political culture in the process of the consolidation of democracy
(CoD) is outlined. In my understanding of CoD political culture does not directly impact upon
behaviour but constrains and enables the justification of behaviour which deviates from the
status quo and thus also mediates the persistence of the democratic system.
The fundamental hypothesis concerning the origins of different explicit political
cultures is based on the deep impact historical junctures such as the 1989/90 transition had on
collective memories. Thus, depending on the genealogy of the democracy political elites have
at their hands, different rhetorical resources are used to justify fundamental positions within
the new polity. The constant reproduction of the most “successful” of these discourses
establishes a habitus in the sense of Bourdieu. This then serves to structure experiences even
beyond those personalities who were initially involved in crafting the new system. 4 As a
consequence, post-communist democracies seem to diverge in terms of elite commitment to
consensus democracy and not to converge to the rather stable West European patterns.
In order to demonstrate the utility of this understanding of political culture I will
investigate which properties of a consensualist elite political culture are present or absent in
Hungary and East Germany. Both Hungary and Germany are close to Lijphart’s ideal type of
consensus democracy, while Hungary and East Germany experienced just the opposite
transition dynamics in terms of speed, legal and historical continuity and elite turnover. At the
same time, West Germany can be used as a unique control case for the impact of “deep
national culture” as an alternative explanation. Therefore, these cases are the best possible
choice in order to test whether historical legacies prevail over institutions in shaping political
culture.
4
P Bourdieu, 1992.
12
3. Outline of the Dissertation
In the first section, the introduction presents the puzzle and relevance of the topic in the
context of theorizing the consolidation of democracy. Moreover, it introduces basic
definitions for key terms used in this study. In the second section I present and then discuss
Lijphart’s typology of consensus and majoritarian democracy before applying it to CEE.
Identifying the missing variable of political culture (which Lijphart calls the “spirit of
accommodation” in his earlier work) for explaining the stability and persistence of consensus
democracies, I go on to disaggregate consensual political culture into five ideational
components. In this context I also discuss another recent operationalization of the concept,
namely the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) by Steiner et al., in the tradition of deliberative
theory. 5 Then, I outline the existing literature on political culture and democratic elites in the
context of the civic culture paradigm by Almond and Verba, and its role in the consolidation
of democracy. 6 While discussing its methodological and epistemological limitations, I will
advance my own approach to political culture, and the consolidation of democracy.
The third section of the dissertation tests the patterns of elite statements expected by
both the classical and my own model of political culture. For this, I compiled an original set
of quantitative data derived through content analysis of parliamentary speeches by East
German and Hungarian MPs in terms of consensualist and majoritarian statements. Finding no
plausible relationships with social-economic background or post-recruitment factors, elite
discourses derived through in-depth interviews with twenty-seven Hungarian and twentyeight East German MPs are then investigated for collectively shared discourses along the lines
expected by my own hypotheses. Finally, the findings are discussed in the broader political
context of the two cases in order to illustrate their impact upon the consolidation of
democracy. The fourth section summarizes and concludes the dissertation, points out caveats
and gaps, outlines avenues for further research and discusses some implications for policy.
J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing
Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004.
6
G Almond & S Verba, 1963.
5
13
PART I: Introduction
Almost two decades after the end of communism democracy is safe and well-established in
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 7 Their integration into Euro-Atlantic
structures, as well as positive assessments by groups such as Freedom House, are indicators of
successful and lasting installation of democratic institutions. While it is no longer questioned
that the post-communist countries of the region are democratic in the minimalist, procedural
sense, academic attention has shifted to analysing various pathways of democratic
development in the region and the consolidation of democracy (CoD). CoD in the broadest
sense investigates the stability and survival of democratic regimes. 8 In opposition to
transitologist scholarship (which focuses on the regime question) students of CoD address the
question of what kind of democracy is actually developing in various countries. 9 Next to
institutional and behavioural factors cultural or attitudinal variables are increasingly
considered in this context. Elite commitment to the existing democratic system is seen as a
crucial component of CoD. 10
In spite of the increasing differentiation between CEE democracies one striking
commonality appears to be the fact that virtually all ended up having an institutional set-up
resembling more closely the type of consensus democracy as conceptualised by Arend
Lijphart. This type of democratic government, characterized by a high number of “veto
players” in decision-making, is found in a number of West European countries as opposed to
majoritarian forms predominantly found in the English-speaking world or South America. 11
West European democracies developed consensus democracy with a power-sharing
institutional set-up and utilized coalescent, co-operative elite strategies as an answer to the
7
Following a common definition the region of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe comprises Poland,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania.
8
G Munck, ‘The Regime Question – Theory Building in Democracy Studies’, World Politics, Vol.54, October
2001, p.130.
9
P Schmitter / N Guilhot, ‘From Transition to Consolidation: Extending the Concept of Democratization and the
Practice of Democracy’, in: M. Dobry (ed.), Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe: Lessons
for the Social Sciences, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000, p.132.
10
J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2000.
11
A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy –Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New
Haven: Yale UP, 1999; J Colomer, ‘Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.6,
No.2, 1995, pp. 74-85; H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems –
Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, pp. 345-346; A Roberts,
‘What Type of Democracy Is Emerging in Eastern Europe?’, paper presented at the American Political Science
Association annual meeting, September 2004.
14
threats of deep societal cleavages (e.g. religion, language, class). CEE countries ended up
with power-sharing institutions due to the contingent dynamics of the transition process,
though largely lacking the differentiated cleavage structures and not featuring particularly
consensus-oriented elite practices. Additionally, EU conditionalities for accession (e.g.
decentralisation and regionalization, minority representation, independent central banking
etc.) contributed to constrain institutional choices more towards a consensus-democratic setup.
Yet, in spite of the institutional set-up of consensus democracy (which regularly
requires a much higher degree of willingness for compromise, coalescence and co-operation
between different actors), elite political culture in the region very often appears anything but
consensual. In some countries such as Poland, Hungary or Slovakia political elites seem to be
more and more separated by unbridgeable cultural-ideological divides impacting day-to-day
politics. In many respects well-advanced post-communist societies, such as the Czech
Republic or the Eastern part of Germany, are experiencing the return and increased electoral
strength of unreformed post-communist parties. Often these parties appear in the form of
populist demagogues who are politically irresponsible and ostracised in the polity, thus
paralysing political processes. Having achieved EU accession some observers now even see
some of the new CEE member states, such as Poland or Slovakia, falling back in their
democratic standards (e.g. concerning minority rights). More generally, these findings shed
doubt on the expectation that institutional convergence with mainstream European institutions
would also lead to a convergence in terms of elite political culture in terms of commitment
and adaptation to the values of the new democratic system.
I follow Max Weber’s definition of political elites: they are people who live both for
and from politics. 12 This implies a more than temporary commitment to politics, as well a
certain degree of professionalization and routinization as opposed to amateur politicians or
short-term activists. Moreover, my definition of political elites is an explicitly positional one
which is the most common and reasonable approach for studying leaders in a democratic
setting (as opposed to reputation- or decision-based definitions which might be useful in less
formalized contexts). 13 Thus, I define political elites as the bearers of elected public offices on
the national level in legislative and executive positions. This definition thus reflects the
mainstream literature on elite sociology (e.g. Higley et al.’s definition of political elites) as
12
13
M Weber, Politik als Beruf, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 6th edition, 1977, p.9.
B Wasner, Eliten in Europa, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004, pp.119-125.
15
“persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to
affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially”. 14
In my research I will concentrate on members of parliament who, next to the
government, are the most important players in shaping the development of democracy and
offer a diverse pool of political views. According to mainstream democratic theory,
parliament is the key location for practising democracy by the representatives of the people.
Consequently, I will discuss popular support and commitment to democracy only in passing.
This certainly does not mean to relegate popular political culture to being of minor interest or
unimportant for the future of democracy. Nevertheless, a focus on political leaders appears
justified when it comes to the question of how to operate the central constitutional positions of
democracy. This is particularly true for the post-communist societies, which are still
characterised by weak popular political engagement and comparatively underdeveloped civil
societies. 15 There are both commonalities and differences between mass and elite political
culture. Therefore, my findings for politicians’ political culture certainly have to do with mass
political culture too, as democratic political elites at least partially have to resonate or be able
to relate to popular outlooks, norms or values. On the other hand, of course, we can expect
political leaders to be able to formulate much more elaborate and detailed opinions and
positions. Nevertheless, an application of my theoretical approach and methodology with
some modifications to the mass population is both possible and highly desirable.
This research project shall investigate how far political elites in the region have
actually developed a “spirit of accommodation” in line with the institutional set-up of
consensus democracy. 16 More generally, I will explain what kind of commitment to the
existing democracy can be found among the political leaders in these countries, discuss its
sources and, in a more tentative way, address some of its implications for the future of
democracy. In this regard I have to stress that I do not intend to make a normative argument in
favour of consensus democracy or any other subtype of democracy. My case studies will
show that adhering to the consensualist status quo may actually undermine the viability of
these new democracies. Thus, in opposition to other scholars of democratisation I do not
regard desirable the persistence of the initial constitutional arrangements in any case (which,
in CEE, are predominantly consensus-democratic). Rather I intend to point out some of the
J Higley / R Gunther (eds.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.8.
15
M Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, Cambridge UK: Cambridge UP, 2003.
16
A Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968.
14
16
factors that support or inhibit the working of consensus democracy and its potential
consequences for the further development of the polity.
In this regard, I view institutions and institutional changes as following both rationalist
and sociological dynamics. This means that actors aim at efficiently pursuing certain preexisting preferences in picking institutions and interacting through them (i.e. the “logic of
consequentialism”), and they also act according to the logic of “appropriateness” (i.e. in their
behaviour they adapt to collective norms of “what is right,” which are embodied in
institutions). 17 Politics is not just about making choices, though the primacy of outcomes has
been cultivated by mainstream political science for quite some time. This, however, diverted
attention from the equally important notion of politics as a process in which individuals
develop identities, establish communities and further the public good. Politics is also about
establishing meanings, reinforcing values, managing interpretations and creating visions. In
this regard also political institutions create an interpretative order which provides continuity
and within which political behaviour can be understood. 18
For the context of consensus democracy this means that institutional constraints, such
as a high number of veto players in the democratic game, forces actors to some extent to cooperate, exchange information, and seek commonly acceptable solutions for pursuing their
individual interests. On the other hand, institutional constraints in themselves are not
sufficient to consolidate consensus democracy. As Körösényi points out: a power-sharing
consensus-democratic set-up does not create consensus by itself, but makes it more difficult,
if not impossible, to govern in a majoritarian, confrontational style. 19 In fact, a consensusdemocratic set-up with a high number of veto players actually offers actors the resources for
both confrontational and co-operative strategies. 20
Put differently, if the survival of a consensus-democratic system is only dependent on
either continuously favourable output for all players or upon coercion, it is built upon shaky
ground indeed. This is especially the case if democratic consolidation is to go along with the
upheavals of economic reform or social change. Therefore, unlike other scholars, I do not
regard mere instrumental support for the democratic system as a sufficient indicator for
democratic consolidation. Instrumental support means that “actors follow the rules of the
J March, J Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, American Political
Science Review, Vol.78, No.3, Sept.1984, pp.734-749; J March, J Olsen, ‘The logic of appropriateness’, Centre
for European Studies at the University of Oslo, ARENA Working Papers 04/09, Oslo, 2004.
18
J March, J Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions – The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York: Free Press,
1989, pp.49-52.
19
A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, p.293.
20
T Börzel, ‘Demokratien im Wandel der Europäisierung’, in: J Katenhusen, W Lamping (eds.), Demokratien in
Europa – Der Einfluß der europäischen Integration auf Institutionen und neue Kulturen des demokratischen
Verfassungsstaates, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2003, p.191; similarly Steiner et al. 2004.
17
17
democratic game because they do not see a chance to, or advantage in, changing them”. 21 Yet
if actors are only to pursue predefined, egoistic interests, they might not regularly prefer cooperative strategies over confrontational ones in the context of a consensualist institutional
set-up (i.e. a democracy with many inbuilt veto-players). Therefore, next to mere instrumental
support for consensus democracy, we should also pay attention to the normative foundations
of consensus democratic institutions and their reflection in political culture. Consequently, the
persistence of consensus democracy becomes more likely if political elites not only regard
consensus democracy as serving their interests best but also come to embrace its underlying
norms and values.
In this dissertation I intend to complement the widely used classical approach to
political culture based in a socio-psychological understanding of individual value
internalization with a discursive approach based on collective socialization. I will show that
the latter approach, which relaxes some of the assumptions of the classical model, offers
better explanations for the origins of current elite political cultures in CEE. Consequently,
after establishing the extent to which CEE countries are endowed with a consensusdemocratic institutional set-up, I will offer two theoretical understandings and
operationalizations of political culture for investigating political elites’ commitment to
consensus democracy. One approach reflects the classical model of political culture
understood as individually internalised attitudes, the oher reflects an alternative understanding
of political culture based on collectively shared discourses. Both will then be tested
empirically using both quantitative and qualitative data for Hungary and East Germany and
the implications for the persistence of their democratic systems will be discussed. These two
cases are regarded as being among the most advanced in terms of democratic consolidation. 22
Hungary and East Germany, however, experienced opposite transition dynamics in terms of
speed, legal and historical continuity and elite turnover, and therefore serve as ideal cases to
test whether historical legacies prevail over institutions in shaping political culture. At the
same time, West Germany can be used as an ideal control case for the impact of “deep”
national political culture.
For this matter, I will make extensive use of original data, both quantitative and
qualitative: content analysis of parliamentary speeches from two parliamentary cycles by a
sample of Hungarian and German MPs as well as discourse analysis of in-depth interviews
C Schneider, Patterns of Consolidated Democracies. Europe and Latin America Compared, PhD dissertation,
European University Institute, Florence, 2004, pp.53-54.
22
J Higley, Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2000; U van Beek (ed.), Democracy under construction: Patterns from four continents, Barbara
Budrich Publishers: Bloomfield Hills & Opladen, 2005.
21
18
with these MPs are used to test the patterns hypothesized. The implications of the patterns
found are then discussed in the broader context by using existing findings on these cases and
on other CEE countries, as well as additional sources from domestic debates and post-1989
politics in both Hungary and Germany.
19
PART II: The Theory – Consensus, culture and consolidation
Relocating Lijphart: Is there consensus democracy in Central and Eastern Europe?
What is consensus democracy and how can we use this concept?
Almost two decades after the collapse of communism democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) can be regarded as safe and under no immediate threat. This fact, next to the
establishment of competitive market economies, the rule of law and the ability to take over
the obligations of the EU acquis communautaire, has been acknowledged by membership or
candidate status to the countries of the region by the European Union. At the same time,
similar to a general trend observed among West European countries, CEE democracies appear
to have developed many features of what Arend Lijphart calls “consensus democracy”. In the
following I will discuss the concept of consensus democracy on the basis of Lijphart’s model,
review its criticisms, and appraise the extent to which it can be applied to the cases of CEE.
In his widely-applied typology, Arend Lijphart differentiates between the ideal types
of consensus and majoritarian democracy measured by indicators in two separate
dimensions. 23 One dimension (party-executives dimension) concerns the dispersion of power
in the central government through party and electoral systems, government structure, and
relations between executive and legislative. The other concerns the diffusion of power to
different levels of government, or a unitary-federal dimension (e.g. through federalist and
decentralized government, bi-cameralism and strong judicial review of constitutional
issues). 24 Lijphart claims that the elements cluster independently in these two logically
coherent dimensions which are then used to construct a two-dimensional “conceptual map of
democracy”.
[table 1 about here]
Lijphart, with his concept of consensus democracy, tries to counter the notion of equating
democratic government with majority rule. While majoritarian government is concentrating
power in the hand of the majority, consensus government is government by “as many people
as possible” through mechanisms of dispersing and sharing power. Majoritarianism
The model was first outlined in A Lijphart, Democracies- Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus
Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984; and then further developed in
Lijphart 1999.
24
A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy –Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New
Haven: Yale UP, 1999, pp.2-4.
23
20
concentrates power in few institutions and individuals; consensus systems try to maximize the
number of people involved in decision-making and divide power over institutions. These
democracies tend to be more inclusive, emphasising bargaining and compromise. 25 At the
very extreme one could imagine consensus democracy leading to cartel politics in which
political competition is very limited, elections hardly matter for the configuration of
governments and only incremental political change takes place. On the other extreme,
distorted majoritarianism would be a “winner-takes-all” system, where every change of
government might mean a reversal of all earlier policies and allow the majority to govern in
an unconstrained, unchecked way until the next elections (described by O’Donnell as
delegative democracy). 26
In Patterns of Democracy Lijphart lays out the empirical reality of the described
contrasting models of democracy for thirty-six countries which, in most countries, are mixed
cases closer to the consensus than to the majoritarian ideal type. Moreover, he claims that
consensus systems are positively associated with policies of what he calls “kinder, gentler
democracy,” such as higher representation of women, more equality, political participation,
and social welfare. Therefore consensus democracy, according to the author, is also
normatively preferable to majoritarianism. 27
Lijphart’s model has become a widely applied approach in comparative politics but
also met a lot of criticism. His measurements and occasionally subjective weighting of the
individual indicators in the composed indicators have been criticised. 28 His typology cannot
easily accommodate and explain changes going on in some dimensions in certain countries. 29
Moreover, the independent clustering of his two dimensions does not hold outside his sample,
(e.g. for the post-communist democracies). They rather seem to be a statistical artifact of his
sample of consensus democracies which is heavily biased towards West European and OECD
countries. 30 The same is true for the superior policy outcomes of consensus democracies
25
A Roberts, 2004, p.3.
G O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No.5, 1994, pp.55-69.
27
A Lijphart, 1999, pp.275-300.
28
G Amyot, Review of Lijphart’s ‘Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
Twenty-One Countries’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.18, No.1, March 1985, pp.185-187; P
Policzer, Review of Arend Lijphart’s ‘Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in ThirtySix Countries’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.33, No.4, Dec.2000, pp.837-8; G Tsebelis, Veto
Players – How Political Institutions Work, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp.109-112; M Schmidt,
Demokratietheorien, Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 3rd ed., 2000, pp.346-355; M Flinders, ‘Majoritarian Democracy
in Britain: New Labour and the Constitution’, West European Politics, Vol. 28, No.1, January 2005, p.89.
29
A Körösényi, ‘Parlamentáris vagy elnöki kormányzás? Az Orbán-kormány összehasonlító perspektívából’,
Századvég, spring 2001, no. 20, pp. 3-38.
30
A Roberts, ‘What Type of Democracy Is Emerging in Eastern Europe?’, paper presented at the American
Political Science Association annual meeting, September 2004; J Fortin, ‘Patterns of Democracy?
26
21
which are co-founded by a high degree of development. 31 The relationship between policy
outcomes and consensus institutions is also only tested for in one dimension and not the entire
model.
Moreover, there are a number of definitional problems in clearly demarcating the
notion of consensus democracy and its indicators from the narrower and earlier developed
concept of power-sharing or consociational democracy32 (which Lijphart regards as the most
extreme case of consensus democracy). 33 Consociational democracy denotes power-sharing
democracy in segmentally divided plural societies. The concept was developed by Lijphart on
the basis of the democratic power-sharing model between political leaders of the polarized
Dutch society featuring grand coalition, proportional representation, minority veto and
segmental autonomy/federalism. 34 The concept included formal institutional arrangements
and more informal arrangements, elite strategies and political culture. 35
Consociationalist theory was meant to explain the puzzling stability of democratic
government in the Netherlands, and other deeply divided societies (e.g. Belgium, Switzerland,
Austria, or even South Africa and India). 36 One of the underlying assumptions in Patterns of
Democracy is the stability of consensus democracies which is no longer a dependent variable.
By way of including indicators for the superior quality of consensus democracy Lijphart is
justifying his normative preference of power-sharing arrangements also for more
homogeneous societies. This way, consensus democracy becomes Lijphart’s model of choice
and his advice to practitioners in all societies. 37
Thus the initially descriptive concept of consociational democracy, which was
inductively developed out of the Dutch example and later a few more cases, (which also lead
Counterevidence form Nineteen Post-Communist Countries’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Workshop in
Granada, Spain, April 2005. Fortin uses partly different indicators due to lack of appropriate data.
31
K Armingeon, ‘The effects of negotiation democracy: A comparative analysis’, European Journal of Political
Research, Vol.41, No.1, pp.81-105.
32
The two terms are synonymous (A Lijphart, ‘Definitions, Evidence and Policy – A Response to Matthijs
Bogaards’ critique’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.12, No.4, 2000, p.426).
33
K Armingeon, ‘The effects of negotiation democracy: A comparative analysis’, European Journal of Political
Research, Vol.41, No.1, p.86 (footnote 2), M Bogaards, ‘The uneasy relationship between empirical and
normative types in consociational theory’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.12, No.4, 2000, pp.395-423.
34
A Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation – Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2nd ed., 1975.
35
For a comprehensive overview of the history and genealogy of consociational theory, in particular concerning
the work of Lijphart, and criticism of consociatonalist theory see M van Schendelen, ‘The views of Arend
Lijphart and collected criticisms’, Acta Politica, Vol.19, No.1, 1984, pp.19-55, as well as the other collected
articles in this special issue.
36
J Steiner, Gewaltlose Politik und kulturelle Vielfalt. Hypothesen entwickelt am Beispiel der Schweiz, Bern:
Paul Haupt, 1970; J Obler / J Steiner / G Dierickx, Decision-Making in Smaller Democracies: The
Consociational “Burden“, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977; A Lijphart, ‘The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A
Consociational Interpretation’, American Political Science Review, Vol.90, No.2, June 1996, pp.258-268.
37
R Andeweg, ‘Lijphart versus Lijphart: The Cons of Consensus Democracy in Homogeneous Societies’, Acta
Politica, Vol.36, No.2, summer 2001, pp.117-128.
22
to changes in the concept) became increasingly prescriptive and normative. In his earliest
writings on consociational democracy in the Netherlands Lijphart still notes the diminished
democratic legitimacy of power-sharing elite arrangements securing stability, which leads to
de-politicization, apathy and stagnation. Also, he put particular emphasis on elite agency in
running consociational democracy through the cooperation of top leaders through partly secret
deals. 38 Consociationalism, by definition, still included informal, implicit or unwritten rules
next to formal institutional arrangements, some of which Lijphart criticised himself (e.g.
secrecy, de-politicization). 39 Over time, however, his scepticism for certain features of
consociationalism shifted to stressing its merits of securing democratic stability in plural
societies. 40 In the end, Lijphart associates the broader concept of consensus democracy with
better policies while the factor of democratic stability is no longer a dependent variable. 41
Consideration for cultural factors also impeded the increasingly fashionable large-N-studies,
and was subsequently dropped from the concept. By subsuming behavioural and cultural
factors into the formal institutional indicators Lijphart’s concepts have followed the trend
towards rational institutionalist thinking in the social sciences. This is unproblematic only for
the stable Western democracies which Lijphart picked for his sample.
Yet, for the cases of CEE, stability needs to be treated as a dependent variable rather
than a given. Thus, before wondering about possible favourable policy outcomes, we should
investigate whether the democratic arrangements of one kind or another are actually stable
and thus democracy consolidated (which shall be discussed further below). In this regard,
Fortin’s critical judgement of Lijphart, concerning the questionable relationship between
consensus democratic features and policy outcomes for the cases of post-communist
countries, appears rather premature (the majority of her sample includes data on a number of
countries—Bosnia, Armenia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia—which have been only
questionable democracies for most of the time span of her study). 42
A Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975, pp.103-138.
39
A Lijphart, 1975, pp.123-124.
40
R Andeweg, 2001, pp.117-128.
A theoretical explanation for the greater stability of consensualist settings is given by George Tsebelis who
shows that an increasing number of so-called veto players leads to more stable policy outcomes while a
decreasing number might lead to more instability (G Tsebelis, Veto Players – How Political Institutions Work,
Princeton University Press, 2002). However, as Tsebelis’ starting point is a rather simplistic rationalist setting in
which players have a priori fixed interests his model is hard to apply in real-world settings in which identities
obviously do have an impact on preferences which are constantly being shaped during interaction.
41
For a more detailed critique see Bogaards, 2000, and Lijphart’s reply (A Lijphart, ‘Definitions, Evidence and
Policy – A Response to Matthijs Bogaards’ critique’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.12, No.4, 2000,
pp.425-431).
42
J Fortin, ‘Patterns of Democracy? Counterevidence form Nineteen Post-Communist Countries’, paper
presented at the ECPR Joint Workshop in Granada, Spain, April 2005.
38
23
Consequently, Lijphart’s casual treatment of cultural factors in the working of
consociational/consensus democracy needs to be reconsidered. Simultaneously with his
gradual shift from description to prescription over time, Lijphart moves away from focusing
on political elites’ attitudes and behaviour to putting emphasis only on the formal-legal
features of the democratic system. 43 Thus, while successful consociational democracy still
required the leaders of the different subcultures to bridge deep cleavages in a “self-denying
fashion”, 44 the requirement for a cooperative and accommodative political culture curiously is
no longer part of the criteria of consensus democracy. Yet, similar to consociational
democracy, the consensus model entails multiple veto points which require inclusion,
negotiation and compromise between different groups. Thus it involves a “spirit of
accommodation” which is very different from the competitive political culture in majoritarian
democracies with their concentration of power. 45
Lijphart himself concedes that consociational democracy relies on informal practices
while consensus democracy focuses on formal-institutional devices, but he does not go on to
discuss how far formal institutions and informal behaviour actually coincide.46 In some of his
older publications on consociational democracy Lijphart demands that political elites should
be accommodative and co-operative. Moreover, they need to have the ability to accommodate
divergent interests and demands, transcend cleavages, and join common efforts with other
elites. They ought to be aware of the perils of political fragmentation and therefore have to be
committed to the maintenance of the system, the improvement of its cohesion and stability. 47
Later, while making clear that consensus democracy can only take root and thrive if
supported by a respective political culture, he no longer elaborates on its details. 48 Lijphart
argues that the first four indicators in the executive-party dimension are structurally linked
while the relationship with corporatism is established via political culture (i.e. the absence of
a “winner-takes-all-mentality”). 49 Claiming that a consensual political culture makes the
establishment of consensus democracy easier Lijphart also refers to “anecdotal evidence”
from Austria and Netherlands (where consensus democratic institutions led to the
J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing
Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, p.80.
44
A Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968, pp.103-138.
45
J Steiner et al., 2004, p.3.
46
A Lijphart, ‘Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes, and Consequences’, Journal of Theoretical
Politics, Vol., No.1, 1989, p.40.
47
A Lijphart, 1968, p. 8; A Lijphart, 1975, p.54.
48
A Lijphart, 1999, p.306.
49
A Lijphart, ‘Negotiation democracy versus consensus democracy: Parallel conclusions and recommendations’,
European Journal of Political Research, Vol.41, No.1, 2000, p.108.
43
24
development of a consensual political culture). 50 Hence the relationship between the
institutional arrangements of consensus democracy and a consensual political culture becomes
somewhat circular or tautological. 51 In fact, Lijphart’s “spirit of accommodation” has never
been measured in a systematic way until recently. 52
Early critics of Lijphart have questioned the impact of consociational arrangements on
elite political culture. For example, Hans Daalder viewed the Dutch model of power-sharing
as a result of historically accommodative and cooperative elite orientations in the Netherlands
over centuries, and not as its cause. This way he questions Lijphart’s claim of the “selfdenying hypothesis” of deeply divided elites co-operating with each other. 53 Similarly,
Bogaards does not see any sound empirical evidence for the transformative impact of
consensus democratic arrangements on political culture. 54
In sum, Lijphart’s basic differentiation between majoritarian and consensus democracy
is a useful typology which not only operationalizes two very different normative
understandings of democratic decision-making, but can also serves for comparing the
empirical reality of democracy on a global scale. Nevertheless, some qualifications are
needed. Firstly, the independent clustering of the two dimensions appears to be the result of
the initial case selection which has a rather limited scope in space and time. Therefore it
makes sense to use the concept of veto points or veto players rather than Lijphart’s two
dimensions to establish the extent of consensus-democratic institutions in a polity. Secondly,
the stability of neither consensus nor majoritarian democracy can be assumed a priori.
Thirdly, this is particularly the case since the existence or absence of a supportive political
culture is an empirical question and does not follow automatically from the institutional
features. Consequently, also an a priori normative preference for either type of democracy
appears unjustified. Given these premises, in the following I will discuss this concept with
regards to the new CEE democracies.
Is there consensus democracy in Central and Eastern Europe?
What then is the relevance of Lijphart’s concept of consensus democracy for the CEE
democracies? Interestingly, virtually all countries in the region ended up quite clearly on the
50
A Lijphart, 1999, p.307; A Lijphart, ‘Definitions, Evidence and Policy – A Response to Matthijs Bogaards’
critique’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.12, No.4, 2000, p.429.
51
M Bogaards, 2000, p.410.
52
J Steiner et al., 2004, p.12.
53
H Daalder, ‘The Consociational Democracy Theme’, World Politics, Vol.26, No.4, July 1974, pp. 611-612,
615-618.
54
M Bogaards, 2000, p.410.
25
consensus side of Lijphart’s typology of democracies. 55 Although the two independent
clusters of indicators are not present in the CEE cases mentioned above, most individual
indicators clearly score on the consensual side. There is a high effective number of parties, a
low share of time under minimal-winning-coalitions or single-party governments, short
cabinet durations, rather high degree of electoral proportionality, high thresholds for
constitutional amendments, strong judicial constitutional review, and rather independent
central banks in the CEE democracies. Interest group representation is, however, rather on the
majoritarian side. 56 Federalism and strong bicameralism are generally rare features in postcommunist Europe after the break-up of the (nominally) federal states of Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, resulting in comparatively small and more homogeneous
states. 57 Thus, at least for seven out of ten indicators, CEE countries are clearly on the
consensus side of Lijphart’s typology. However, the definition of consensus democracy in
CEE needs to be clarified: CEE countries have a consensus-democratic set-up in the sense of
having a generally high number of veto points in their democratic decision-making. In this
regard, they somewhat differ from Lijphart’s initial concept based on the Western sample in
which veto points also cluster in two mutually constituting clusters of veto points.
This general trend towards consensus democracy is usually explained with reference to
the dynamics of democratic transition. Consensus arrangements became an outcome almost
by default, and thus is a point of convergence among the different countries of the region.
Institutional designers deliberately chose to insert power-sharing elements instead of opting
for majoritarian solutions in response to a high degree of uncertainty and political volatility,
which soon became visible in the rapid proliferation of multiple parties and rather instable
party systems. Consensus institutions in the East were the outcome of short-term
contingencies as transition took place in an ‘underdetermined political situation.’ 58 In this
context institutions were hardly the outcomes of endogenous structural or cultural conditions,
but rather depended on contingent power constellations, individual agency, and exogenous
factors (e.g. West European models).
J Colomer, ‘Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.6, No.2, 1995, pp. 7485; Roberts, 2004.
56
A Roberts, ‘What Type of Democracy Is Emerging in Eastern Europe?’, paper presented at the American
Political Science Association annual meeting, September 2004.
57
Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently undergoing a revision of its federalist constitution. Similarly there appears to
be a tendency towards re-centralisation and de-federalisation in the Russian Federation under the Putin
presidency. Serbia-Montenegro as a federative state dissolved in 2005.
58
P Schmitter / N Guilhot, ‘From Transition to Consolidation: Extending the Concept of Democratization and
the Practice of Democracy’, in: M. Dobry (ed.), Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe:
Lessons for the Social Sciences, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000, p.134.
55
26
Majoritarian solutions were preferred only by post-communist parties when they were
clearly in a strong position assuming the popularity of their individual leaders. 59 Later these
arrangements were often reverted once the former opposition came to power. Consensus
solutions from the beginning were usually the result of a balance of power between the old
elite and the opposition during transition. Cases with the dominance of opposition groups in
the transition also mostly ended up with consensus set-ups as an insurance against a potential
return of communists into power or, in the case of East Germany, by institutional transfer of
the predominantly consensus-democratic West German system through re-unification (see
below for more details).
Also, the motivation to strengthen the rule of law supported the development of
consensus institutions as it led to rather rigid constitutions and a strong judicial review in
deliberate opposition to the communist dead-letter constitutions. Once installed, consensus
systems also have the tendency to reinforce themselves due to their inherent brakes on
constitutional change. 60 Finally (and quite importantly) , the process of Europeanization with
its focus on subsidiarity, minority representation, civil society involvement, regionalization,
decentralisation, and monetary stability constrained the choices of aspiring EU member states
in CEE and supported the development of more consensual institutions. In fact, EU
conditionalities for accession put a particular focus on “getting the institutions right”. The
existence of prescribed formal institutions is, of course, much easier to ascertain and to
monitor than their subsequent operation. Nevertheless, by this approach the EU seems to
follow Lijphart’s and others’ somewhat optimistic assumption that the existence of a specific
formal institutional set-up will transform political culture (as well as bureaucratic, business,
and legal cultures).
In terms of their institutional set-up along the lines of Lijphart’s ten indicators, most
countries of the region have not changed much for the last decade or so. While the first years
after transition saw a period of some adaptation of initial arrangements via constitutionmaking, consensualist arrangements in these countries are rather stable. This observation
mirrors Lijphart’s observation for his sample of (mostly Western) democracies which have
little changed in their consensualist or majoritarian outlook for a longer period.61 Do CEE
political elites therefore share a similar kind of commitment to consensus democracy as their
West European colleagues? As outlined above, we cannot assume this by merely pointing to
H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems – Competition,
Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p.32.
60
J Colomer, 1995; A Roberts, 2004.
61
A Lijphart, 1999, pp.253-257.
59
27
the institutional factors as Lijphart does. Also, empirically, the last one and a half decade of
post-communist politics which was rather confrontational, ideologized and volatile sheds
doubt on this claim. So, how far do CEE and more established consensus democracies differ?
In contrast to the post-communist cases, West European consensus democracy was
originally developed over time by risk-averse political leaders of rather homogeneous
ideologically opposed camps in order to bridge deep historical cleavages (religious, linguistic,
geographical, socio-economic) in society which threatened democratic stability in the course
of growing mass mobilisation and mass franchise. Consensus democracy in Western Europe
continues to work despite the attenuation of societal cleavages and the advance of new parties
and political movements. Paradoxically, rather than a return to more competition, there
appears to be a trend in West European politics to even more consensus and collaboration.
This might result in a new division in society; not between different sub-cultural segments,
but rather between the masses and the elites, leading to phenomena such as the cartel party
described by Katz and Mair. 62 For the last decade consensualist tendencies have been detected
even in the UK (Lijphart’s prime example for the majoritarian democracy). 63
Thus, Lijphart’s original model gets turned upside down: while according to powersharing theory there can be no stable democracy in plural societies with majoritarian
arrangements, consensualist set-ups now lead to some questionable distortions of democracy
in increasingly homogeneous societies. The ‘cartel of elites’ which kept society together is
obviously no longer required in order to secure the stability of democracy. Lijphart himself, in
his earliest studies, already predicted the negative side effects of power-sharing arrangements
such as de-politicization, political apathy and de-legitimation of established parties. 64
Consociational or consensus democracies in a way have become victims of their own
success. Bogaards observes a “degenerated consociationalism” in Italy where the polarisation
among the multiple small parties with their veto powers has become more dangerous to
political stability than societal segmentation (which, in fact, has clearly diminished over the
last decades). 65 Anton Pelinka argues that by closing the gaps between originally deeply
divided Austrian subcultures political elites destroyed their own power-base. As a
consequence, the FPÖ’s rise was much more the result of the declining elite “cartel” then the
62
R Katz / P Mair, ’Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy – The Emergence of the
Cartel Party’, Party Politics, Vol.1, No.1, pp.5-28; R Andeweg, ‘Consociational Democracy’, Annual Review of
Political Science, Vol.3, 2002, p.533.
63
M Flinders, ‘Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labour and the Constitution’, West European Politics,
Vol. 28, No.1, January 2005, pp.61-93.
64
R Andeweg, ‘Lijphart versus Lijphart: The Cons of Consensus Democracy in Homogeneous Societies’, Acta
Politica, Vol.36, No.2, summer 2001, pp.117-128.
65
M Bogaards, 2005.
28
cause of it. 66 The surge of right-wing extremists capitalising on discontent with established
elites is rising in other countries with a long consociationalist tradition, (such as Belgium and
the Netherlands) and is a symptom of dysfunctional consensualism. 67 In general, scholars
point to the problem of accountability of consensus governments and the lack of clear-cut
alternatives inside the system if voters want a change of government. 68 While Lijphart
emphasises the merits of consensus democracy for the reason of the presumed superior quality
of their policies, one might argue that political elites should rather make way for more
competitive politics in a number of established consensus democracies. So far, both the vested
interests of established parties and the built-in inhibitions of political change seem to prevent
moving away from traditional consensus democracy in Western Europe.
CEE countries in their constitutional features increasingly resemble West European
consensus democracies but lack the differentiated social landscape of Western European
societies in the mid-20th century. Save for re-emerging ethnic cleavages in some countries, the
post-communist social landscape is rather flat, unstructured, and de-mobilised. 69 Therefore,
there are no deep cleavages posing an immediate danger to democratic stability which would
require power-sharing approaches. Moreover, in the West European context, political leaders
and parties can organize political conflict and still represent more or less stable and
homogeneous groups of voters. This is less true for the much more volatile and socially
disconnected party systems in CEE. 70 Thus, CEE political elites have a rather different
starting point for consolidating consensus democracy, and less entrenched collective interests
in keeping the existing status quo.
One might wonder which factors might actually condition elites’ support for
consensus democracy if domestic pressure from below is absent. In terms of historical factors,
pre-transition legacies are rather mixed and ambiguous in terms of carrying consensual elite
political cultures in the region. Unlike the West European tradition, most CEE political elites
do not have a long experience of successful, consensual cooperation in democratic settings. 71
A Pelinka, ’Consociational Democracy in Austria: Political Change’, Acta Politica, Vol.37, No.1/2, 2002,
p.145-155.
67
M Bogaards, ‘The Consociational Analogy of the European Union – A Rejoinder to Crepaz with a Comment
on Kaiser’, European Union Politics, Vol.3, No.4, 2002, p.503; C Mouffe, On the political, London: Routledge,
2005, pp.64-72.
68
R Andeweg, ‘Lijphart versus Lijphart: The Cons of Consensus Democracy in Homogeneous Societies’, Acta
Politica, Vol.36, No.2, summer 2001, pp.120-122.
69
Zs Enyedi, ‘The role of agency in cleavage formation’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44, No.3,
2005, p.697.
70
I van Biezen, ‘On the theory and practice of party formation and adaptation in new democracies’, European
Journal of Political Research, Vol.44, 2005, pp.147-174; K Armingeon, ‘Forms of government in postcommunist countries’, paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Workshops, Granada, Spain, April 2005.
71
A Seleny, ‘Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies – Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and
Poland’, World Politics, Vol.51, July 1999, pp.481-519; H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka,
66
29
Rather than bridging internal divisions through domestic demands one could argue
that CEE elites, throughout the last century, were actually forced into mutual cooperation
through external pressures by neighbouring great powers. Thus, exogenous factors rather than
domestic developments enforced elite unity and covered deep divisions, if only temporarily
and under non-democratic circumstances. Collaboration with Nazi Germany, Sovietization
and later endeavours to appease Moscow against interfering with certain national variations of
socialism not only determined the outlook of the respective political elites but surely had a
lasting and formative impact on national collective memories until today.
The history of externally constrained or even imposed choices goes on with the
countries’ integration into the European Union or, more generally, CEE integration into
global capitalism and international competition for access to markets and investment. Lack of
adaptation to the European mainstream now threatens economic marginalization and replaces
the threat of aggression from hegemonic neighbours as in the past. Unlike other small,
capitalist economies such as the Netherlands or Denmark after the World War II, CEE
countries are facing a much more narrowly constrained choice of institutions and policies
which need to be employed in order to be accepted into the European or global capitalist
mainstream. At the same time, they have much less opportunity to contribute to determine
these policies on the supranational level.72 The so-called “Washington consensus” sets out
“universally accepted policy goals;” new market economies have to conform next to the
“Brussels consensus” (i.e. the acquis communautaire of the European Union) which covers
an ever expanding field of legislation focusing predominantly on formal and technical
details. 73 Both imply a set of institutions and policies which are deemed beyond partisan
dispute. According to Barcani and Di Quirico, democratization for the CEE countries
basically meant Europeanization (i.e. the institutional adaptation to EU standards). The levers
of conditionality have been powerful tools for shaping aspiring member states’ institutions. 74
In this regard EU accession “negotiations” were acutely asymmetrical, as it meant that “in all
areas of the acquis, the candidate countries must bring their institutions, management capacity
Post-Communist Party Systems – Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP,
1999.
72
S Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy – Building Accountable Government in Hungary and
Poland, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.37-54.
73
‘The stultifying Brussels consensus’, The Economist, 7 October 2006, p.50.
74
E Barcani, R Di Quirico, ‘Introduction’, in: R Di Quirico (ed.), Europeanization and Democratisation –
Institutional Adaptation, Conditionality and Democratisation in the EU’s Neighbour Countries, Florence:
European Press Academic Publishing, 2005, pp.11-24
30
and administrative and judicial systems up to EU standards, both at national and regional
level.” 75
This makes it even more difficult to establish how far institutional choices such as
consensus democracy might not just be another external model which is somewhat
ritualistically and opportunistically backed for lack of leeway. Geoffrey Pridham’s claim that
CEE political elites seemingly “hardly developed their own ideas about democratic
development” or “were too busy” for developing alternative concepts therefore has to be seen
in the light of the overriding priority of EU accession. 76 He concedes that EU accession
resulted in removing institutional uncertainty following transition, but did not necessarily lead
to a remaking of political culture or the dissemination and internalisation of the principles and
norms underlying the new institutions. 77 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon argue that there was an
underlying assumption that EU conditionalities would have a “normative power”; that actors
would be socialized into their underlying values, along with the power of hard economic
incentives and bureaucratic leverage. However, investigating regionalization policy the
authors show that the EU Commission was not so much concerned with the normative content
of “capacity-building,” but primarily with organizational and technical issues. Moreover, it
applied different approaches over time and with regard to different countries. The authors
conclude that actually little socialization of (sub-national) elites had taken place and that
Europeanization had much weaker effects than expected. They also find path dependent
factors in domestic political settings to be more important than external conditionalities. 78
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that most domestic and external observers generally
find little signs of accommodative and consensual patterns of elite behaviour in the region
reaching the standards of established Western consensus democracies. 79 Having successfully
concluded EU accession some external incentives for enforcing consensualism on a narrower
range of policies and institutions have diminished. At the same time EU directives are
increasingly seen as lacking democratic legitimacy or as being captured by interest groups
75
Website of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement, last login: 20 October
2006.
76
G Pridham, ‘EU Accession and Democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons from the
Enlargement of 2004’, in: R Di Quirico (ed.), Europeanization and Democratisation – Institutional Adaptation,
Conditionality and Democratisation in the EU’s Neighbour Countries, Florence: European Press Academic
Publishing, 2005, pp.67-68.
77
G Pridham, 2005, p.78.
78
J Hughes, G Sasse, C Gordon, Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and
Eastern Europe – The Myth of Conditionality, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
79
E.g. A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.292-5; R Tökés,
’Hungary: Elites and the Use and Abuse of Democratic Institutions’, in: J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after
State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000 for the case of Hungary.
31
from the old member states. 80 Indeed, the first post-accession years saw a surge in electoral
support for parties lacking commitment to both European integration and certain core values
of liberal, Western style democracy (as seen in Poland, Slovakia or Lithuania). This included
a startling revival of authoritarian, nationalistic, xenophobic, and illiberal ideas as well as a
questioning of certain constitutionally enshrined key elements of consensus democracy and
the EU acquis (such as minority representation in parliament).
Consequently, the application of Lijphart’s model, with a mere focus on institutions,
appears to have limited analytical value. While originally elite commitment to consensus
democracy was (implicitly) included in the concept, this can no longer be assumed to be the
case. This is particularly true for younger democracies where consensus solutions did not
grow out of a longer experience of elite accommodation and cooperation.
In conclusion, I have shown that CEE democracies strongly resemble Lijphart’s
consensus type of democracy, characterised by a higher number of veto points in democratic
decision-making (but not by two independently clustering dimensions thereof). Since the
genealogy of CEE consensus democratic institutions (the initial societal landscape, historical
experiences and external conditions differ quite significantly from their West European
counterparts) it is not self-evident that CEE political elites actually developed a similarly
consensual political culture (a “spirit of accommodation”; i.e. an ideational foundation of
consensus democracy). This leads to the central research question which shall be addressed:
What are the sources of commitment to consensus democracy by CEE political elites? More
tentatively, what might be the consequences of elite support or opposition to consensus
democracy for the stability and future development of the polity (i.e. for the consolidation of
democracy)?
The “spirit of accommodation”: the ideational foundations of consensus democracy
Consensus democracy and its ideational sub-dimensions
As discussed above, in order to investigate the current state and some future outlooks for
consensus democracy in CEE we need to go beyond institutional factors and look at ideational
factors supporting this type of democracy. Before going on to discuss different models of
political culture as approaches to operationalize commitment to consensus democracy, I will
briefly discuss the philosophical foundations of consensus democracy and try to disaggregate
the concept into sub-dimensions. This enables me to construct measurable and comparable
indicators for political culture. Next to Lijphart’s own references to the ideational foundations
80
S Rose-Ackerman, 2005, pp.49-51.
32
of consensus democracy in some of his older publications, I discuss the only existing
endeavour so far to operationalize the “spirit of accommodation” and explain why I chose a
somewhat different approach.
In his older studies Lijphart demands that elites should be accommodative and cooperative. Moreover, they need to have the ability to accommodate divergent interests and
demands, transcend cleavages, and join common efforts with other elites. They ought to be
aware of the perils of political fragmentation, and therefore have to be committed to the
maintenance of the system, the improvement of its cohesion and its stability. 81 These features
of elite political culture are clearly as relevant for consensus democracy in general as they are
for consociational democracy in particular. The existence of multiple veto-points presupposes
a spirit of accommodation on the level of political elites for its working, regardless of whether
a society is segmentally plural or not. From these short passages above one can already
derive some basic ideals underlying consensus democracy which will be further developed in
the following:
1. The centrality of consensus and compromise
Consensus institutions require elites to be able to work together and overcome differences.
Therefore compromise and consensus are to be valued as the key mechanisms for decisionmaking as opposed to divisive agitation, competition and imposed majority decisions. 82 From
a majoritarian position, consensus and compromise do not carry a value in themselves.
2. Politicians as proponents of the “common good”
In the introduction to his volume Patterns of Democracy Lijphart remarks that the widely
used Lincolnian definition of democracy as being “government by the people and for the
people” raises two fundamental questions: “who will do the governing and to whose interests
should the government be responsive to when the people are in disagreement and have
divergent preferences?” The two possible answers to this dilemma are: the majority, or as
many people as possible. 83 Thus, in fact, we could also formulate the two possible answers on
a philosophical level as either a more representation-oriented model of democracy, or a more
utilitarian one (Bentham: “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”). Thus, consensus
81
A Lijphart, 1968, p. 8; A Lijphart, 1975, p.54.
Compromise here denotes both a condition for consensus but also a preliminary stage of a consensus. The two
are often difficult to differentiate. On the most basic level consensus also implies a changes of preferences,
which however is hard to establish. (J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative
Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, p.91.)
83
A Lijphart, 1999, pp.1-2.
82
33
democracy requires not only an inclusive understanding in terms of participation, but also in
terms of its output.
Consequently, consensus democracy should focus on advancing the common good. It
should aim at solutions benefiting all, or at least not make decisions by putting someone at a
disadvantage for the benefit of another. For Lijphart and Crepaz this logic is embodied in the
concentration of partisan interests in corporatism as opposed to the more atomistic,
competitive and exclusive nature of interest group pluralism. 84 Similarly, it is reflected in
coalition governments, in which it is rarely possible to coherently realize individual party
programs. Rather, common denominators, if only minimal ones, have to be found between
two or more different parties. 85
In this regard, political elites in a representative democracy are therefore crucial in
defining the common good and bearing collective trusteeship for the “national interest”. This
stands in opposition to the less constrained competition of particular interests and their
representation in the polity in majoritarian democracy. Certainly, a totalitarian vision of the
common good (i.e. an essentializing claim of defining the only acceptable position) cannot be
considered democratic at all. Consensus democracy is therefore not about limiting pluralism,
but about reconciling differences and finding some common ground (as opposed to merely
letting the majority win). This means that particular interests should not be suppressed or
eliminated. However, arguments advancing particular interests should at least reflect a
concern for the common good and not be made in purely egoistic terms.
Nevertheless, there appears to be a certain affinity of strong consensus systems to
search for authoritative, ultimate solutions, and consequently a certain elitist notion of politics
as described by Dahrendorf. According to him, this notion of democracy is based on an
understanding of history as being driven by synthesis, not conflict. 86 Commonalities of
interest, the “common good” rather than particular interests in a society, drive consensual
politics. 87 Political decisions are redefined into technical questions which are to be decided by
independent “experts” – which Erwin Scheuch describes as the “cult of the expert” in West
84
A Lijphart / M Crepaz, ‘Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and
Empirical Linkages’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.21, No.2, April 1991, p.236.
85
K Grabow, ‘Zur Rolle der Eliten in der demokratischen Gesellschaft’, in: O Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther
(eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung,
2006, p.33.
86
R Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, New York: W.W. Norton, 1979, pp.132-140.
87
A similar differentiation (mandate and trusteeship relations between voter and MP) is made by Kitschelt et al.,
1999, pp.309-340. See also Putnam, 1973, p. 154. An alternative definition of the common good in line with the
Rawlsian difference principle is proposed by Steiner et al., 2004, p.21.
34
German politics. 88 This utilitarian ideal is thus connected with a rather elitist understanding of
politics: as politicians are assigned to define the common good they have to be aloof of
society and particularistic interests or conflicts. They have to apply a general perspective
rather than a narrow-minded view. Due to their prominent position in defining the common
good they are held up as role models, or even educators to the population.
3. The centrality of established procedures
Consensus democracy’s institutions are based on a highly balanced formula through which
different levels of government and various parties, groups or individuals are involved into the
political process. These processes are meant to ideally secure the equitable consideration of
all positions in order to establish the common ground between them, and to filter out selfserving or myopic demands. This often results in complex processes of decision-making
involving many veto-players, which frequently comes at the expense of concrete outcomes or
effectiveness. This, in turn, is often an advantage of majoritarian democracy. 89 Therefore, in
consensus democracies, political processes (particularly those which are meant to insure the
inclusion and participation of all relevant groups) carry a value in themselves.
4. Preserving the status quo
According to Lijphart the survival of consensus democracy depends on the commitment of the
political elites to it. 90 They must be convinced of the desirability of preserving the current
system. 91 As the consensus system aims at balancing the influence of all groups no one
should try to change major components of this arrangement and upset the balance. I argue that
this includes not only the (usually) constitutionally enshrined political institutions, but also
the major configuration of economic or redistributive systems (e.g. patronage for public
offices, educational system, social welfare provisions for particular groups etc.). This
“Proporzdemokratie” as described by Lehmbruch secures the socio-economic basis and a
balanced distribution of material benefits among all major groups in society 92 Thus,
consensus democracy works best when no-one questions the basic established balance
between various groups and the institutional status quo. Majoritarianism, in turn, does not aim
for the conservation of a particular political or socio-economic arrangement. In societies
E Scheuch quoted in U Hoffmann-Lange, ‘Elite Research in Germany’, International Review of Sociology,
Vol.11, No.2, 2001, p.212.
89
A Lijphart, 1999, pp.258-9.
90
A Lijphart, 1968, p. 8.; A Lijphart, 1975, p. 54.
91
A Lijphart 1975, pp.103-104.
92
G Lehmbruch, Porporzdemokraties: Politisches System und Politische Kultur in der Schweiz und Österreich,
Tübingen: Mohr, 1967.
88
35
which are not characterized by just two homogeneous groups but by a multitude of positions
on various issues, majority rule implies both temporariness and reversibility of decisions
made. Rather than stability it advances pragmatic change based on current problems and
constellations of actors, and gains its procedural legitimacy this way. 93
5. Respect towards “the other”
Lijphart would like to see political leaders in consensus democracy avoid the “perils of
fragmentation”. 94 Thus, rather than cultivating and stressing unbridgeable antagonisms
political elites from different camps should overcome them in order to be able to work
together in the same system. In the extreme case this can lead to what Dahrendorf described
as the “cartel of anxiety” in West Germany in the 1950s and 60s. There, members of the
political elite, regardless of their diverse backgrounds and ideologies, avoided conflicts
among each other for the sake of stability. 95 Therefore, consensus institutions should be
supported by mutual trust among political leaders of different groups which attenuate deep
cleavages between them, or what Robert Putnam would call “bridging social capital”. 96 A
basic precondition to establish trust is the mutual recognition of political leaders from
different camps as equally legitimate players in the democratic game. Consensual political
elites ideally accept the stake of each participant and develop common ground concerning
basic values and policies permitting some continuity even after government changes.
At the very basic level, mutual respect and acceptance as legitimate opponents is
surely part of any democratic system. Thus, in a consensus setting political leaders not only
have to accept each others part as a legitimate player, but also need to develop trust and
cooperative stances towards each other in order to work together. Political leaders in a
consensus democracy are supposed to aim at making positive use out of the commonalities
between parties rather than capitalising upon their differences. Majoritarianism in turn
depends on politicians making clear the competing programmatic alternatives for which they
stand and the discontinuities of policy after a changeover of government.
C Offe, ‘Politische Legitimation durch Mehrheitsentscheidung?’, in: B Guggenberger, C Offe (eds.), An den
Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984, pp.153-154, pp.164-169; C Gusy,
‘Das Mehrheitsprinzip im demokratischen Staat’, in: B Guggenberger, C Offe (eds.), An den Grenzen der
Mehrheitsdemokratie, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984, pp.70-79.
94
A Lijphart, 1968, p.8.; A Lijphart, 1975, p.54.
95
R Dahrendorf, 1979, pp.256-265.
96
R Putnam, Making Democracy Work – Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton UP, 1993; R Putnam,
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.
93
36
The above-outlined five dimensions appear to be strongly connected, if not mutually
reinforcing. For instance, it is hard to imagine political elites valuing compromise and
consensus without respecting the political opponent. Similarly, the preservation of the status
quo is hardly imaginable if political elites are more committed to obtain specific outcomes at
the expense of going through prescribed procedures. Consequently, consensus democracy,
lacking one or several of these ideational dimensions, seems rather strained or dysfunctional.
In the following an alternative way to conceptualise the ideational foundations of consensus
democracy and to operationalize them shall be discussed. Then turning to my own approach I
will develop hypotheses about the sources of consensualism, operationalize and test them
empirically.
Consensus democracy as deliberative democracy?
A recent prominent proposition for conceptualising Lijphart’s “spirit of accommodation” is
Steiner
et
al.’s
discourse
quality
index
(DQI). 97
Linking
the
literature
of
consociational/consensus democracy with deliberative theory the authors explore which
institutional conditions lead to a particularly high degree of deliberation, and whether this
matters for policy outcomes. This way they advance the first comprehensive approach to
empirically investigate the normative foundations of consensus democracy and examine
Lijphart’s “spirit of accommodation” in connection with Habermasian deliberative
democracy. 98
At the core of the deliberative model is the idea that all arguments in a political
discussion are respected with the best argument in terms of the common good prevailing. This
contrasts with strategic bargaining in which personal interests are being realised by
strategically acting participants. 99 Thus, there is a striking similarity of deliberative
democracy with the “spirit of accommodation” embodied in consensus democracy. The
foundations of ideal deliberative processes have been theorized extensively by political
philosophers (most notably Jürgen Habermas in his concept of ideal speech situations) 100 yet
the model has never been applied empirically. Steiner et al. advance the following dimensions
of deliberative politics constituting the DQI which resemble in many regards the abovedeveloped ones:
J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing
Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004.
98
J Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommuikatives Handeln, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983.
99
Steiner et al., 2004, p.4.
100
J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.
97
37
1) Participation by all citizens on an equal level and without constraints.
2) Truthfulness – all participants are open about their true preferences and do not try to
deceive or mislead others about their true intentions.
3) Logical justification of assertions and validity claims – i.e. participants present their
arguments in a logically coherent way so that other participants can understand them.
4) Arguments should be expressed in terms of the common good, i.e. consider the
well-being of others and the community at large.
5) Other participants, their demands, needs and arguments should be treated with
respect.
6) Participants should be willing to yield to the better argument which means that
preferences must not be fixed but be open to change. In this regard, also the difference
between deliberation and bargaining becomes evident: the latter does not include a
change of preferences.
These six dimensions are quantified by coding parliamentary debates. Trained assistants code
speech units according to a detailed code book containing scaled definitions for the individual
dimensions, determining the degree of justification offered by a speaker (possible codes:
none=0, inferior=1, qualified=2, or sophisticated justification=3). 101 The model is then
applied to parliamentary debates in specific institutional contexts. Steiner and his
collaborators find among others that a consensus democratic set-up and a higher number of
veto players, as well as debates in the second as opposed to first (or single) chambers of
parliament leads to a higher DQI,( i.e. higher discursive quality). 102 They also show that a
higher value of DQI is significantly associated with particular formal outcomes, namely
consensual (i.e. unanimous or nearly unanimous) decisions. However, they find but little
support for the hypothesized causal relationship between discursive quality and substantial
policy outcomes in terms of (weak) egalitarianism. 103
101
Steiner et al., 2004, pp.56-61.
Steiner et al., 2004, pp.99-137.
103
Steiner et al., 2004, pp.138-164.
102
38
Steiner et al.’s study is indeed an important and highly innovative contribution to the
study of different types of democracy which opens new, interesting avenues for comparative
research. In my research, however, I will abstain from applying their approach for theoretical,
epistemological and methodological reasons which I address in the following.
Quite a limitation of the DQI-approach is the component of “truthfulness” and the
impossible task of measuring it. Steiner et al. are well aware of the problem and leave out the
“truthfulness” variable from their study which however is crucial to Habermas’ discourse
ethics in deliberative democracy. 104 The authors propose some proxies such as the perception
of truthfulness by other participants, or approaches such as in-depth interviews for future
studies. 105 However, it is arguable whether it is possible to find out what participants in a
political debate “really mean”. It is, in fact, contestable if participants actually know this
themselves. Therefore, my approach conceptualises the “spirit of accommodation” without
the dimension of “truthfulness”, which in fact does not follow directly from Lijphart’s model
either. Further below, when discussing alternative approaches to political culture, I will also
argue in more detail why it appears preferable to neglect “truthfulness” in epistemological and
methodological terms. Also, the dimension of participation established by the authors has
only limited applicability for elite politics, and the authors use it only to record whether a
speaker is interrupted in his speech or not. Therefore, I do not regard this as a necessary
separate dimension and relegate interruptions to the “respect”-variable. 106
Moreover, my fourth component of consensus democracy, dubbed “Preserving the
status quo,” is not included in Steiner et al.’s model. In fact, it even contradicts a basic claim
of deliberative democracy. According to their model of consensus democracy in the
deliberative tradition every political outcome should be treated as provisional and fallible and
thus be revised as soon as new insights and rational arguments are accepted. In my opinion,
and in accord with Lijphart and other authors (see above), I claim that temporariness and
reversibility is in fact an inherent feature of democratic majoritarianism in which changing
configurations of parties govern and have their differing policies realised. A stable and
workable consensus democracy in turn depends on gradual, piecemeal changes only, and
prefers continuity to change for its survival. In this regard, I do not find it necessary that
politicians have to adjust their interests based on the logic of argumentation as demanded by
the deliberative model. 107
104
Steiner et al., 2004, pp.19-21.
Steiner et al., 2004, p.166.
106
My own code-book will be developed further below.
107
T Risse, ‘Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, Vol.54, No.1,
2000, pp.1-39.
105
39
Another methodological problem has to be raised concerning the coding approach of
Steiner et al. The authors develop a very detailed code book differentiating very fine degrees
of the individual variables (e.g. for the “level of justification”-variable mentioned above).
This indeed poses a high burden on the coder and his/her interpretative skills. The authors
report high degrees of inter-coder reliability among themselves after collectively developing
the code book, and after a certain time of practice and preparation. It will be much more
difficult though for other scholars to use the approach with similar results. 108 Students
assigned by the authors to code a parliamentary debate without further training therefore
achieved somewhat lesser degrees of inter-coder reliability. 109 Consequently, employing DQI
to large scale projects with various coders not involved in developing the model will be
difficult without diminishing the reliability of the fine-grained indicators. Moreover, in terms
of validity it is not obvious that the individual components of DQI are indeed scalable, or can
even be added up to composed indicators. 110 Therefore, in my own content analysis of
parliamentary speeches, I use a simpler and more easily replicated coding approach with
separate, dichotomous variables which I outline further below.
Finally, on a more basic level, I share some of the theoretical criticism brought
forward against the deliberative model of democracy. According to Chantal Mouffe and
others, consensus based on deliberative democracy is neither desirable nor possible. Mouffe
argues that politics is always a power game and should be acknowledged in this way. She is
against excluding “passions” (as opposed to reasoned arguments) from politics and claims
that there should be no privilege to a moral, allegedly impartial and fully rational point of
view. Mouffe quite correctly claims that every consensus leads to externalising certain other
points of view, designates them as illegitimate and thus creates a new boundary. Participants
who are relegated beyond the boundary are thus excluded from the democratic process and
denied the right to legitimately defend and pursue their demands and ideas. Sometimes this
exclusion might be just based on some participants’ lack of access to the process, or their
limited material resources and intellectual capacities to fulfil the demanding criteria for
reasoned, rationally argued discourse. Or their preferred way of expression (i.e. personal life
testimonies, but also arts, music, direct action, or even humour) do not meet the deliberative
standards and are thus defined as inferior to reasoned deliberation.
Externalisation of “the other” via an alleged consensus, according to Mouffe, might
therefore in fact endanger democracy by pushing marginalized groups into illegality. A lack
108
Steiner et al., 2004, pp.61-62.
Steiner et al., 2004, pp.71-73.
110
Steiner et al., 2004, p.60, p.108.
109
40
of legitimate opposition from within democracy will lead to opposition forming outside
democracy. The author argues that democratic politics should therefore not aim at eliminating
passions and antagonisms, but at mobilising them towards the promotion of democracy.
Democracy, in her opinion, requires at least two points of view: at least two legitimate
opponents who do not aim at reaching consensus but to compete with each other. 111 Beyond
Mouffe’s critiques there are several others which cannot be elaborated on in detail in this
place. To mention one example, another prominent critic of deliberative democracy shows
that deliberation might actually lead to further polarization than to consensus. 112
While I would not exclude the possibility that consensus on some basic issues can be
established without undermining democratic competition, representation and accountability, I
surely agree with some authors’ scepticism about promoting consensus or deliberative
democracy as superior to other, more competitive systems. Given this and the mentioned
epistemological and methodological issues for the deliberative model, I will align my own
approach more closely on Lijphart’s requirements for a democratic political culture in the
“spirit of accommodation” (according to the five dimensions which I developed in the
beginning).
In summation, in this chapter I have advanced a proposal to conceptualise the “spirit
of accommodation” which, in the previous chapter, was identified as a missing variable in
explaining the persistence of consensus democracy. The ideational foundations of consensus
democracy were analysed based on Lijphart’s own work and the first existing study in this
regard. Five sub-dimensions and their mutual constitution as ideational components of
consensus democracy were outlined and their advantages to an alternative model based on
deliberative theory delineated. In the next chapters I will discuss different theoretical
understandings of political culture (i.e. different hypotheses of how the ideational foundations
of consensus democracy can be appropriated by political elites, and how they might affect
their behaviour).
For more details of her criticism see C Mouffe, On the political, London: Routledge, 2005. One might argue
however, that also for agonistic, competitive politics a “meta-consensus” on basic rules of the democratic game
is required, which offers an opportunity to (partly) reconcile deliberative and agonistic democracy (J Dryzek, S
Niemeyer, ‚Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals’, American Journal of Political Science,
Vol.50, No.3, July 2006, pp.634-649).
112
For more details see Steiner et al., 2004, pp.32-42.
111
41
The classics of political culture: Almond & Verba and the operational code
Socialization into democratic systems: attitudes on mass and elite levels
The above-raised research question concerning the commitment to (consensus) democracy by
political elites is usually addressed with the theoretical framework of political culture. The
classical notion of political culture has been shaped by the seminal work of Almond and
Verba, as well as subsequent studies in their footsteps. 113 However, the prominence (and
predominance) of the classical model, its epistemology and methodology focusing on the
individual level and the process of value internalization, limits the explanatory power of
studies in its tradition. Therefore, I propose to complement the classical model with a
perspective on the group level to somewhat relax its rigid assumptions about value
internalization, and to shift our focus from implicit values to explicit discourses. Thus I do not
aim at disproving or fully dismissing the mainstream understanding of political culture, but
use a more flexible and differentiated perspective. This might enable us to better understand
the origins of elite commitment to democracy, and make inferences about the persistence and
future development of the democratic system (i.e. the consolidation of democracy). As I will
show with my case studies, a model of explicit political culture focusing on the group level
offers more plausible explanations for the origins of contemporary elite political culture in
CEE.
Consequently, at first I will outline the classical literature on political culture. After
discussing some of its shortcomings I present the alternative concept and explain how it might
complement and improve our understanding of political culture. On the basis of the classical
framework I will bring out the factors expected to impact upon elite commitment to
democracy in the sub-dimensions developed in the previous chapter. Then I contrast this with
hypotheses derived from my own approach.
The first studies of elite political culture were inductively developed psycho-analytical
explanations of individual leaders’ belief systems. They were focusing on pathological traits
in individual belief systems where conscious beliefs are viewed as rationalizations for
emotional compulsions following the Freudian psychoanalytical tradition. 114 From the 1960s
the focus shifted to more general social background factors and processes of socialization
following Almond and Verba and their concept of ‘civic culture’. Their research also departed
from the limited focus on individual members of the elite by the earlier studies and opened
G Almond & S Verba, The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton UP,
1963.
114
For an overview of these approaches see: R Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Eaglewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976, pp.73-80.
113
42
new avenues for large-scale social research via standardized mass surveys. Almond and
Verba’s approach is thus primarily focused on mass political culture, yet it also includes
references to elite political culture. Their basic hypotheses about early life socialization into a
civic political culture are as relevant for elites as they are for masses. Beyond that, there are
specific hypotheses relating to post-recruitment socialization of political elites along the lines
of the classical model by other authors which will be outlined further below.
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba conceptualise commitment to the democratic
system as political culture which is measured in the form of attitudes. According to them and
scholars in their tradition, political culture needs to be understood as the predominant beliefs,
attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system in a given
society and the role of the self in that system. 115 Their understanding of political culture still
is explicitly a psychological one as in earlier studies.116 Analytically, political culture research
following Almond and Verba differentiates between cognitive, affective and evaluative
attitudes which relate to four major objects: 1) toward the system as a whole, 2) toward ‘input
objects’ (i.e. the inflow of societal demands and their conversion into policies), 3) toward
‘output objects’ (i.e. the application or enforcement of policies), and 4) towards the self as a
political actor. 117 Based on different configurations of attitudes in these fields they derive
three major types of political culture on the mass level: parochial, subject and participant
cultures. 118
Almond and Verba hypothesize that particular kinds of political culture in the form of
certain combinations of attitudes fit particular systemic structures and that strong dissonances
between the two lead to inevitable strain and instability. 119 In reality the three ‘pure’ forms of
political culture therefore appear in “systemically mixed” forms with different subcultures
having different configurations of attitudes towards the system and different policy
orientations. 120 People develop positive, supportive evaluations towards their democratic
system predominantly through early life socialization, and later through participating in
existing democratic structures leading to the subsequent gradual internalization of democratic
values. These values in turn are seen to impact on behaviour inducing “civicness“. Thus, the
gradual socialization into the values of the democratic system is seen to also change
individuals’ preferences and interests leading to a “taken-for-grantedness” of the democratic
L Diamond, Developing Democracy – Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999, p. 163;
Almond & Verba, 1963, p.12.
116
G Almond & S Verba, 1963, p.13.
117
G Almond & S Verba, 1963, pp.13-15.
118
G Almond & S Verba, 1963, pp.16-18.
119
G Almond & S Verba, 1963, pp.21-22.
120
G Almond & S Verba, 1963, pp.23, 26-29.
115
43
set-up and the subsequent adoption of appropriate behaviour. Certain socio-economic
background factors such as high levels of education (which is most emphasised by Almond
and Verba) but also geographical origin, professional position or income, are claimed to lead
to higher awareness of political issues, civic competence, participation and democratic
allegiance. 121 Also, historical experiences play a great role in forming political cultures.122
Due to segmental differences in social background factors, different subcultures can develop
in society with different kinds of orientations towards the democratic system, its institutions
and roles.
According to this approach, stable political systems are characterized by a high degree
of congruence between the political culture and the political system and a balanced mix of
subject and participant attitudes. David Easton, who further developed some aspects of the
classical approach to political culture, differentiates between diffuse and specific support for a
regime. According to him diffuse support, based in a belief of legitimacy, is much more stable
and thus ensuring regime persistence than more volatile specific support (which is based on
positive evaluations of current regime performance and outputs). 123
In particular Britain and the USA are characterized by Almond and Verba, and
scholars in their tradition, as an allegiant participant political culture based on wide-spread
diffuse support and thus as stable democracies. This, of course, led to a lot of criticism against
the authors as being biased towards Western-style liberal democracy, and for employing a
teleological modernisation approach in which less democratic societies would soon follow the
British or American example. 124 Moreover, Almond and Verba are not completely explicit
about the causal arrow between democratic institutions and democratic political culture. Their
overall approach stands for an impact of institutions on political culture over time. However,
later on Almond also argues for a mutually supporting causality: democratic attitudes lead to
(more) democratic institutions, and experience with these institutions furthers the
development of civic attitudes. 125 Arend Lijphart subscribes to the classical concept of
political culture and his work reflects the same problem (i.e. the unclear causality between
consensualist political systems and consensual political culture as outlined above).
121
G Almond & S Verba, 1963, pp.315-336.
G Almond, ‘The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept’, in: G Almond / S Verba (eds.), The Civic
Culture Revisited, London: Sage, 1980, p.24.
123
D Easton, ‘A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.5,
No.4, 1975, pp.435-457.
124
G Almond / S Verba (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited, London: Sage, 1980; S Welch, The Concept of
Political Culture, London: Macmillan, 1993.
125
G Almond, ‘The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept’, in: G Almond / S Verba (eds.), The Civic
Culture Revisited, London: Sage, 1980, p.29.
122
44
With the advent of third wave democracies, especially the successful CEE democratic
transitions, the classical concept of political culture which had somewhat fallen into oblivion
made an astonishing comeback in political science. Public opinion surveys investigating mass
attitudes towards democracy and its alternatives have become a major tool in explaining and
predicting the course of democratic consolidation. 126
While Almond and Verba focus on mass political culture, they also make some
references to elite political culture. According to them, elite democratic political culture is
responsive and complementary to popular attitudes and moreover much more supportive of
democratic values. 127 In the footsteps of Almond and Verba, in line with studying mass
political culture, particular approaches were developed to study political elites. According to
Lucian Pye the study of elite political culture requires different methods of research than that
of mass political culture. While advanced techniques of public opinion research were essential
to the latter, the former requires more interpretative skills in investigating ideologies,
operational codes and the cognitive processes behind political behaviour. 128 According to
Pye, individuals get socialized into an elite political culture when they join the elite. A
national elite political culture shaping political ends and preferred means in turn is developed
through historical experiences and ideological outlooks. 129 The concept of an “operational
code” was first applied by Nathan Leites on the Soviet leadership in the early 1950s, in order
to develop a framework for explaining behaviour by certain patterns and categories of
cognition. 130 Thomas Anton employs the related concept of “roles” for the Swedish political
and administrative elites. 131 According to Gerd Meyer the “operating code” embodies the
dominant rules and norms in a society connecting formal institutions and informal behaviour
which is particularly relevant for the political elites. 132
In his comparative study of political elites in Britain and Italy Robert Putnam
compares two national elite political cultures. He differentiates three different categories of
D Pollack / J Jacobs / O Müller / G Pickel (eds.), Political Culture in post-communist Europe, Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2003; R Rose / W Mishler / C Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives – Understanding PostCommunist Societies, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.
127
G Almond / S Verba, The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton UP,
1963, pp.352-353.
128
L Pye / S Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton University Press, 1965, p.16.
129
L Pye, ‘Culture as Destiny’, in: D Pollack / J Jacobs / O Müller / G Pickel (eds.), Political Culture in postcommunist Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, p.8.
130
N Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951; A George, ‘The
“Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,“
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13 No. 2, 1969, pp. 190-222.
131
T Anton, Administered Politics – Elite Political Culture in Sweden, Boston: Nijhoff Publishing, 1980.
132
G Meyer, ‘Formal and Informal Politics: Questions, concepts and subjects’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal
Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine,
Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, pp.34-35.
126
45
politicians’ basic attitudes: political style, i.e. the way politicians approach political thinking
and policy analysis (‘How do they believe?’), cognitive predispositions i.e. basic
presumptions about the world, oneself and the relation to others (‘What do they believe?’),
and operative ideals, i.e. the norms and values that guide political action (‘What do they
believe in?’). As these three categories potentially relate to an infinite number of attitudes
Putnam restricts his analysis to a central issue in each of the three fields: concerning political
style he compares the extent to which politicians use ideological versus pragmatic approaches,
in terms of cognition he explores the view of politicians on the conflict-driven or harmonious
nature of society, and for the field of operative ideals, he investigates procedural preferences
of politicians. For this undertaking he uses aggregated data from open-ended interviews with
individual MPs which was coded according to pre-defined categories. 133 According to him,
the mentioned basic orientations inform but do not fully determine politicians’ approaches to
their tasks or even the very definition of these tasks. 134
The logic of political socialization would attribute a growing degree of commitment to
the democratic system by political elites in newly democratised countries (due to their close
involvement with the system over time and through practicing and internalising democracy)
and its underlying norms and values. Robert Rohrschneider, in his comparative study of
attitudes among MPs from East and West Berlin in the common Berlin city parliament after
1990, differentiates between those democratic values which can only be internalized via
institutional learning (i.e. democratic practice), and others which can be taken on
independently from the institutional context via value diffusion (e.g. through media
exposure). Thus, he finds support levels for basic liberal-democratic rights (e.g. free elections,
majority decision) among East Germans to be very similar to those of West Germans.
However, other “qualities of democratic citizenship”, as Rohrschneider calls them, such as
political tolerance, support for pluralist competition or individual entrepreneurship are less
frequently found among the East German population. They are more prevalent among West
German masses and elites, as well a East German elites who enjoy a longer and closer
institutional learning with the democratic set-up than the East German mass population.
Intervening variables, according to Rohrschneider, are basic ideological values in addition
with performance evaluations of the system, generation, and education. 135
R Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians – Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy’, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1973, pp.1-7.
134
Putnam, 1973, pp. 93, 127.
135
R Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy – Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford UP,
1999.
133
46
Unlike the mass population, political leaders, according to the classical model of
political culture, are claimed to hold more coherent beliefs which are more intensely held and
relatively stable as compared to those of the general population. 136 Thus, a known view on a
major issue of a politician will help to predict views on other topics. Therefore, according to
this approach, finding positive attitudes in the five above-mentioned ideational categories of
consensus democracy among a representative sample of political leaders in a society would
make us rather confident to find a political culture on the level of political elites which is
generally supportive of consensualist democracy. Adherence to certain ideologies, (i.e.
coherent belief systems) as institutionalised in parties are therefore seen as relatively good
predictors of individual attitudes. 137
Similar to Putnam or Rohrschneider we can thus develop ideal-typical attitudes which
we would expect to be present in a consensual political culture on the basis of the abovedeveloped ideational foundations of consensus democracy. Consequently, the classical model
of political culture expects political elites in consensus democratic settings to assimilate and
internalise values denoting a “spirit of accommodation” as following: 1) a positive orientation
to consensus, 2) a positive orientation to the common good (i.e. as being preferable to
particular interests), 3) support for established procedures, 4) support for preserving the
institutional status quo, and 5) respect for political opponents and their positions. A
majoritarian political culture would include the opposite attitudes: 1) a positive orientation
towards competition, 2) a positive orientation to particular interests (opposing the notion of a
common good), 3) a positive orientation towards specific outcomes (rather than procedures),
4) support for changes to the institutional status quo, 5) disregard for political opponents and
their positions. Over time, according to the classical model of political culture, we should find
political elites in consensus-democratic settings to assimilate to these values and to develop
corresponding attitudes.
Steiner et al. show how different institutional settings (next to issue characteristics)
influence the quality of political deliberation in different parliamentary settings using their
above-mentioned discourse quality index (DQI). 138 Unlike other approaches, however, the
authors do not take individual MPs or groups of them as their level of analysis, but their
debates. Thus, in a way, DQI denotes some kind of de-personalised political culture.
Nevertheless, Steiner et al. basically support both the view of a socialising function of values
embodied in democratic institutions in addition to a more rational choice-based perspective in
R Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976, p.116.
R Putnam, 1976, pp.88-89.
138
J Steiner et al., 2004, pp.98-137.
136
137
47
which institutions offer incentives to adopt to certain types of behaviour. 139 In this regard,
consensus democracy and the presence of multiple veto points should usually make MPs more
accommodating for two reasons: 1) because of its inbuilt incentives to share information and
to cooperate in order to come to decisions, and 2) also because of its underlying ideals of
communication, mutual respect etc. The opposite is true for majoritarian systems. Certainly,
the authors point out, there can be situations in which this difference does not hold (e.g.
during electoral campaigns in consensus systems). 140 Thus, both the rationalist “logic of
consequences” and the sociological “logic of appropriateness” are expected to play a role. The
DQI-approach also shows that there are quite some differences in the way different
components of consensualism (or deliberative quality for that matter) change in different
institutional settings, sometimes even in unexpected directions. 141 So, next to institutional
factors, what might be other sources for different degrees of commitment to consensus
democracy according to classical political culture models?
Similar to Almond and Verba, elite theorists such as Robert Putnam claim that the
biggest differences in political culture can be found cross-nationally, as political elites in one
country share many similar beliefs. 142 Steiner et al. admit that their study could not
incorporate the different cultural backgrounds and historical experiences in different nations
which might have an impact on deliberative quality but plan to do so in further studies and
focus group experiments. 143 Beyond national differences Putnam, again mirroring Almond
and Verba, focuses on individual socio-economic background factors as another major
explanatory variable. Thus, according to Putnam class position and educational background
impact upon politicians’ image of society as being more conflict-ridden or harmonious. This
“cognitive predisposition” in turn mediates the role-perception of politicians in the system,
their degree of hostility towards fellow politicians, and support for the existing democratic
set-up. 144 Following these cognitive predispositions he differentiates politicians’ selfperceptions as being either towards the role of a ‘tribune’ or ‘trustee’. The former is focused
towards defending the cause of one’s social group or class while the latter is more oriented to
national and general collective interests. 145 The mentioned ideal-typical roles are also
J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing
Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp.74-97.
140
J Steiner et al., 2004, pp.79-84.
141
J Steiner et al., 2004, pp.98-137.
142
R Putnam, 1973, pp.238-239; Putnam, 1976, p.99.
143
J Steiner et al., 2004, pp.135-136.
144
R Putnam, 1973, pp.93-136.
145
R Putnam, 1973, pp.123-125.
139
48
reflected in procedural preferences of problem-solving vs. bargaining. 146 Certainly, both
qualities are required from a politician in a modern plural and liberal democracy. However the
relative weight of either role is expected to vary in the different institutional settings
according to this approach. Moreover, lower class origins and/or lower educational
backgrounds are expected to lead to more conflict-oriented attitudes towards politics as such,
as well as towards fellow politicians, and towards a more particularistic position as opposed to
emphasis on the common good.
In his study on Italian and British MPs Putnam views these patterns to be
predominantly the result of socialization experiences prior to gaining political office, though
he does not find a significant relationship between time in office and conflict-orientation. 147
However, in a later publication the author supports the view that post-recruitment
socialization can take place which influences role conceptions and policy opinions. Its impact
on a moderation of beliefs is viewed to depend among others on the degree of
institutionalisation and the time spent in office. 148 Additionally, one might argue along this
line that the kind of electoral mandate might influence politicians’ role perceptions and
attitudes (e.g. making a directly elected MP more oriented towards her or his constituency and
its specific interests, whereas an MP elected on a list might be more oriented towards
generally national issues and the common good).
Furthermore, particular generational experiences are found to leave a lasting mark on
attitudes. Thus, for the case of Italy Putnam finds the generations socialized in the violent
upheavals of the Mussolini-era to be more conflict-oriented than younger cohorts who entered
adulthood in the democratic post-war period. 149 Following Mannheim, Putnam argues that
every national political elite can be divided into political generations who, due to their similar
and limited historical experience, have certain similar predispositions of thought and
action. 150 Also Rohrschneider finds generational differences in his sample. On this basis we
might hypothesize that politicians socialized in Western consensus democracy are more likely
to support it than those socialized in other systems. More generally for the mass level, Ronald
Inglehart’s studies show how formative historical experiences shape entire generations’
attitudes, values and ways of cognition. 151
146
R Putnam, 1973, pp.150-154.
R Putnam, 1973, pp.93-136.
148
R Putnam, 1976, pp.96-98.
149
R Putnam, 1973, pp.139-149.
150
K Mannheim, ’The Problem of Generations’, in: Mannheim – Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Paul
Kecskeméti, New York: Oxford UP, 1952, pp.276-322; Putnam, 1976, p.100.
151
R Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990.
147
49
In sum, the classical model of political culture regards actors’ commitment to
democracy hinges on the assumption of a strong socialization (i.e. the individual
internalization of the values embodied in the democratic system) over time. The pace of this
gradual internalization process is seen to depend on social background factors in general, and
for political elites additionally on individual post-recruitment factors. In the following I will
examine the way this understanding of political culture is used in conceptualising the
consolidation of democracy before turning to a modified understanding of political culture.
Attitudes into behaviour: political culture and the consolidation of democracy
Differently from the transition concept, the consolidation of democracy (CoD) is a rather
contested theoretical approach with various definitions. 152 Nevertheless, most scholars would
probably agree that CoD is not just a prolongation of transition - it involves different actors,
behaviours, processes, values and resources, and leads to a variety of democracies. 153 CoD
research also implies a move away from the short-term time horizon and focus on individual
rational agency as in the transition literature towards a long-term perspective, considering
both structural and cultural factors. Thus, unlike transition approaches whose mainstay were
individualistic, ahistorical rational choice approaches, CoD leaves some room for contextual,
historical and sociological explanations. However, its is impossible to establish a single
indicator for CoD as it involves multiple players, sites and processes which call for
disaggregating the concept. 154 In this regard, elite commitment to democracy is therefore just
one key indicator of CoD next to others which makes it hard to isolate from other factors.
In the most basic sense CoD is about securing the persistence of democratic
arrangements. The most minimalist definitions regard democracy as consolidated if one or
several free and fair elections have been held, and if power has (repeatedly) been transferred
peacefully between government and opposition.155 Two of the most prominent scholars on
CoD, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, differentiate between three dimensions: behavioural,
attitudinal and constitutional consolidation. Behavioural consolidation corresponds with the
A Schedler, ‘What is Democratic Consolidation?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1998, pp. 91-107, A
Schedler, ‘Measuring Democratic Consolidation’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 36,
No. 1, 2001, pp. 66-92.
153
P Schmitter, ‘Transitology: The Science or the Art of Democratization?’, in: J Tulchin (ed.), The
Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 12-17.
154
C Schneider / P Schmitter, ‘Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of
Democratization’, Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, December 2004, pp.67-68.
155
E.g. Huntington’s “two-turnover test”, i.e. the peaceful rendering of power of the first freely elected
government to the opposition in a subsequent election. S Huntington, The Third Wave – Democratization in the
late twentieth century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp.266-267. This test would have failed
obviously advanced democracies such as Japan or Italy still 40 years after the installation of their democratic
system.
152
50
mentioned minimalist “defensive” concept of consolidation (i.e. no significant group tries to
overthrow the democratic regime). Constitutional consolidation refers to the habituation of the
major political actors to the established rules with violations of these rules being costly and
ineffective. Attitudinal consolidation is obtained when even in the face of severe political and
economic crisis the overwhelming majority of the population believes that any further change
can only come from within the rules of the democratic game. 156
Similarly, Gunther et al. emphasise the need to have stable, routinized, legitimate and
institutionalized democratic behaviour to be able to talk about consolidated democracies.157
Carsten Schneider and Philippe Schmitter define CoD as processes that make mutual trust and
reassurance among relevant actors more likely. CoD institutionalizes certainty about
processes and uncertainty about outcomes with actors consenting to both. 158 Somewhat more
demanding, Elster, Offe and Preuss see democracy consolidated when the rules according to
which political and but also concerning distributional conflicts are carried out are no longer
object of conflict themselves. 159 Thus, support for the new regime and its rules of regulating
conflict and cooperation is viewed as a key factor in the process of CoD or, as Larry Diamond
puts it, democratic consolidation is about a shift in political culture. 160
For scholars in the tradition of the classical model this shift of political culture means
the development of supportive attitudes for the existing democracy. Larry Diamond argues
that there should be a broad normative and behavioural consensus on the constitutional system
regardless of its performance (i.e. a high degree of diffuse support). He argues (somewhat
arbitrarily) that if more than 70% of the mass public consistently believe that democracy is
preferable to any other form of government, and no more than 15 % actively prefer an
authoritarian government, democracy is consolidated. 161
Generally, these approaches hypothesize the development of a supportive political
culture with time passing under a stable democracy through the logic of individual
socialization and value internalization following Almond and Verba. Political elites (and
masses) would increasingly feature loyalty to the system and solidarity among each other
J Linz / A Stepan, ‘Toward Consolidated Democracies’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1996, pp. 1516. J Linz / A Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation : southern Europe, South America,
and post-communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996, p.6.
157
R Gunther, N Diamandouros, H Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in
Comparative Perspective, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p.7.
158
C Schneider / P Schmitter, ‘Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of
Democratization’, Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, December 2004, pp.61-62.
159
J Elster, C Offe, U Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies – Rebuilding the Ship at Sea,
Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.28.
160
L Diamond, 1999, p. 65.
161
L Diamond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999, p. 65-70.
156
51
overarching all societal cleavages, with elites leading the way. 162 Political elites in a
consensus-democratic institutional setting are then expected to develop the attitudes
favourable for consensus democracy as described above and behave appropriately (i.e. they
are expected to change some basic components of their self-understanding, their role in the
polity, their interests and political identities).
Thus, a direct causality between internalized political culture and behaviour basically
assumes that actors behave according to certain values and norms (the above mentioned
“operational code”) such as those embodied in consensus democracy, even if it is against their
self-interest as viewed from outside. According to this understanding of attitudinal CoD, the
more actors have accepted and internalized these values the less likely they will be to try to
act outside the rules of the system (or even overthrow it) as their self-understanding and their
perception of interests are increasingly in line with the norms of the existing system.
This claim is reflected to different degrees in the existing literature on elite political
culture: Putnam, following Dahl, views attitudes as strongly informing, but not fully
determining behaviour, which in turn impacts on the stability of regimes. 163 However, he does
not specify when and how political culture is actually a relevant independent variable. For the
Italian case (without making reference to the then non-existent concept of CoD) Putnam
shows how conflicting conceptions and understandings about democracy, within the elite and
in relation to the system, might have a destabilizing impact. There is a clash between widespread concepts of direct democracy and egalitarianism with more authoritarian ones among
different parts of the Italian political elites in the 1970s. However, none of these concepts fits
particularly well with the polyarchical democratic system in Italy. 164 Thus, the existence of
mutually exclusive attitudes about the “rules of the game,” or those in opposition to the
existing institutions, are potentially endangering democratic stability and can lead to what
Lijphart calls “centrifugal democracy”. Centrifugal democracy is characterized by a divided
political culture and non-coalescent, competitive behaviour.165
The precise mechanism between attitudes, behaviour and overall regime stability is
indeed hard to establish in this approach to political culture. Robert Rohrschneider criticises
that scholars investigating attitudes, both those from what he calls a more “culturalist” (i.e.
sociological) or a more “institutionalist” (i.e. rational choice) perspective, fail to elaborate on
162
G Almond and S Verba, 1963, pp.359-360; R Putnam, 1973, p.70.
R Putnam, 1973, p.7.
164
R Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians – Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy’, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 230-231.
165
A Lijphart, ‘Typologies of Democratic Systems’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.1, No.1, April 1968,
pp.3-44.
163
52
the mechanisms between attitudes and regime stability (with the majority basically just
postulating the need for congruence between political culture and institutions). 166
Andreas Schedler argues in favour of establishing a chain of causation between the
structural framework which impacts on attitudes of actors (and, in turn conditions a great
extent of their behaviour). This way, inferences about the stability of democracy and the
process of deepening it should be drawn. While behaviour ought to be a primary focus of
investigation, political culture in the form of attitudes and its consonance or dissonance with
behaviour and institutions can serve as an additional variable to explain democratic (in)stability according to the author. 167 In this regard, political elites matter most as compared to
an intermediate level of collective actors, and the popular level due to their close daily
involvement with the system. 168 Political elites which are consensually unified about the basic
rules of the game, either through a pact or gradual convergence over time, are seen as the
keystone of consolidated democracy. 169 According to Pigenko, Wise and Brown democracy is
consolidated if there is an elite consensus on the basic democratic institutions which in turn
have an independent socialising effect on MPs’ attitudes. 170
As mentioned, Almond and Verba themselves seem to assume that democratic
institutions and democratic orientations are correlated and mutually supporting, a claim which
is also advanced by Lijphart. 171 This way causality is assumed to go both ways: institutions
gradually influence attitudinal adjustment, but attitudes also gradually influence institutional
change. For the cases of new democracies, particularly the post-communist societies, this
claim appears problematic. Unlike the US, Britain or other established democracies (the cases
from which Almond and Verba derived their concept), CEE countries hardly have any
existing pluralist experiences prior to transition, nor could they develop democratic
institutions and accompanying values in a gradual fashion over decades or even centuries. As
outlined above, the institutional set-up in CEE is the result of contingent, partly exogenous
factors, and not grown out of long-term domestic developments.
In brief, scholars in the tradition of the classical model of political culture regard
attitudes favourable to the existing democratic system as a key factor in securing its
R Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy – Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford UP,
1999, pp.8-15.
167
A Schedler, ‘Measuring Democratic Consolidation’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.
36, No. 1, 2001, pp. 67-68.
168
L Diamond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999, p. 66.
169
J Higley / R Gunther (eds.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
170
V Pigenko, C Wise, T Brown, ‘Elite Attitudes and Democratic Stability: Analysing Legislators’ Attitudes
towards the Separation of Powers in Ukraine’, Europe-Asia Studies,Vol.54, No.1, 2002, pp.87-107.
171
A Lijphart, 1999, p.403.
166
53
persistence (i.e. its consolidation). In this understanding, political culture in the form of
attitudes is seen to have an immediate impact upon behaviour. Thus, according to this
approach, the more favourable attitudes we measure the better will be the prospects of
democratic stability and persistence. However, the model encounters problems in explaining
behaviour which is contradicting to pronounced attitudes. On these grounds, some scholars
dismiss political culture (which, however, they only approach in the classical, individual
attitude-based way) as irrelevant for CoD and argue for a focus on behaviour only. 172
In the following I will outline a criticism of the classical model of political culture and
the role of individually internalized attitudes in the process of CoD. I discuss why we need to
complement our understanding of political culture based on individually internalised attitudes
with a perspective on collectively shared, explicitly pronounced values. Moreover, I will
outline their role for CoD in my understanding. Further below, both approaches will be tested
empirically and compared in their explanatory strength in the CEE post-communist context.
Where the truth lies: the limitations of the classical model of political culture
Almond and Verba’s understanding of political culture as a psychological syndrome (i.e. as
being composed of values which are internalized through early life socialization and/or later
learning on the individual level) reaches back to Max Weber. Weber, in his famous
switchman metaphor, compared values to switchmen who determine the tracks on which
interest-driven locomotives (i.e. behaviour) move. 173 This understanding of political culture
encounters a number of conceptual problems. While it is assumed that political culture is
located in individually internalized values it is usually formulated on a systemic level, usually
through the aggregation of standardized survey questions. Therefore, the classical approach is
often (somewhat harshly) criticised for “psychological reductionism”. 174
While dismissing the classical approach as psychological reductionism might
overshoot the mark, the criticism certainly needs to be taken seriously. A concept of political
culture as a unified system cannot sufficiently account for variation or contradictory
orientations in individual value systems, even when allowing for the existence of segmental
sub-cultures. As Joseph Schull points out, even adherents of the same ideology might hold
C Schneider, Patterns of Consolidated Democracies. Europe and Latin America Compared, PhD dissertation,
European University Institute, Florence, 2004, p.53.
173
M Weber, The Sociology of Religion, 1922, p.280, quoted in: A Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and
Strategies’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, April 1986, p.274.
174
S Moscovici (ed. by G Duveen), Social Representations – Explorations in Social Psychology, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2000, p.4.
172
54
very different beliefs or interpretations of certain tenets of the ideology. 175 Thus, the
assumption that politicians hold coherent belief systems becomes doubtful.
Consequently, measuring attitudes as the basic unit of analysis for the classical
concept of political culture encounters problems of validity. This is because it hinges on the
assumption that respondents to survey or interview questions report (more or less) truthfully
their deeply held values and orientations. This problem is particularly evident with political
elites, who may conceal their individual opinion behind rhetoric while being skilful at finding
the right messages appealing to the public. Rather than expose their inner self, they know
what kind of beliefs they should advocate (what is appropriate, expected, or seen as politically
correct etc.) in a given context. One might even wonder how far politicians themselves
actually ‘know’ what they believe, or in the words of a fictitious, disaffected citizen:
“Politicians don’t have any convictions”. Therefore, while the statements of a politician (or
any other respondent) will have to do something with the meaning assigned to democracy in
the context of a given society, they do not necessarily reflect his/her deeply held values.
Most major studies on elite political culture (Pye, Leites, or Putnam) follow the
psychological approach; as does Gerard Alexander’s recent historical study on political
consolidation in Southern Europe. 176 He views democratic consolidation as being influenced
by right wing parties’ perceptions of left wing moderation. Testing the hypothesis on the
Spanish case Alexander takes politicians’ ex-post recollections about their perceptions and
claims about their perceived regime options in the past at face value, and on this basis makes
assumptions about internal processes. Similarly, Elena Levintova concludes the
internalization of certain democratic values among Russian and Polish political elites merely
from the expression of certain positions without a critical reflection on the validity of her
findings. 177
Putnam also points out that Italian MPs express great support in favour of
consensual politics but fail to implement them in practice. 178 Similarly, Rohrschneider’s
profound and intriguing analysis of value diffusion and institutional learning needs to rely on
the interviewees’ sincerity in reporting their attitudes (or in the researcher’s ability to
correctly infer them). Thus, for investigating the state of CoD in post-communist Europe
along the lines of the classical model of political culture, we are left to wonder: how we can
J Schull, ‘What is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soviet-Type Societies’, Political
Studies, Vol. 40, 1992, pp. 728-741.
176
G Alexander, The Sources of Democratic Consolidation, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.
177
E Levintova, ‘Revisiting Russian and Polish elite value orientations: Are the elites still committed to the
original goals of post-communist transitions?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, 2006, p.195;
178
R Putnam, 1973, p.153.
175
55
actually know that people’s support for (consensus) democracy has become truly “intrinsic
and unconditional”? 179
Almond and Verba discuss the problem of “truthfulness” only in passing. In a footnote
they allude to the possibility of political leaders paying only lip service to democratic values.
As a remedy they suggest another psychological mechanism – cognitive dissonance –
according to which repeated public declarations of certain positions create pressures for the
adaptation of private beliefs. 180 Also Putnam is aware of the “devil-quoting-the-scriptureproblem”. He discusses the arbitrary and instrumental way Italian MPs make use of term
“democracy”. 181 Similarly, O’Donnell marks the misfit between informal behaviour, habits
and institutions which leaves scholars of CoD puzzled. 182 As mentioned above, the unsolved
issue of “truthfulness” is also a shortcoming of Steiner et al.’s discourse quality index for
which it is not only epistemologically and methodologically relevant (e.g. as for standard
surveys), but in fact forms an independent part of the deliberation indicator. Some authors
such as Larry Diamond try to go around this problem by postulating high quantitative
thresholds of measured attitudinal support which they regard as sufficient indicator for CoD
(and which are often hardly met even by established Western democracies). 183
So, even if we were to find highly consensual (expressions of) attitudes in the abovedeveloped dimensions, what do they tell us about the likelihood of the persistence of
consensus democracy? If we were to find high degrees of (reported) “intrinsic” support to
consensus democracy, how do we deal with instances of behaviour obviously contradicting
these attitudes?
The heretics of political culture: Discursive political culture and habitus
Implicit and explicit cultural legacies
Obviously, the classical understanding of political culture is not sufficient to examine political
elites’ commitment to democracy as it encounters problems both in terms of validity and its
explanatory power concerning behaviour. Therefore, I will propose a different
conceptualization of political culture which includes non-individual, explicit sources of
democratic commitment. Moreover, I will show that commitment to the democratic system
does not necessarily require the full internalisation of the values of consensus democracy by
individuals. Rather, a kind of “weak socialization” (or habituation) to explicitly pronounced
179
L Diamond, 1999, pp.169-170.
G Almond & S Verba, 1963, p.353, footnote 16.
181
R Putnam, 1973, pp.232-236.
182
G O’Donnell, ‘Illusions about Consolidation’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No.2, 1996, pp.34-51.
183
L Diamond, 1999, p.68.
180
56
values can also influence the persistence and future development of democracy (i.e.
democratic consolidation). In this understanding, a “strong socialization” (i.e. the full
internalization of the values of consensus democracy leading to a change of identity and
interests, as in the classical model) is then only a rather extreme and rare case of elite
commitment to the democratic system. In terms of methodology, the extent of internalization
cannot be measured directly, but can only be inferred. Therefore, I will first outline the
alternative understanding of political culture. Then, I will discuss how it can complement the
shortcomings of the classical model. Finally, I will draw up an alternative understanding of
the role of political culture in the process of CoD.
The above-outlined socio-psychological notion of political culture stands in opposition
to approaches broadly found in the Durkheimian tradition. 184 These approaches have become
increasingly influential during the last two decades, particularly in the field of social
movement theory and in International Relations.185 These approaches locate (political) culture
not so much on the individual level, but rather view it as collectively shared representations
constituting social life. Thus, (political) culture reflects a group’s social and cultural context
and not so much their aggregated psychological traits. In his criticism of the classical
approach to political culture, Stephen Welch calls for a phenomenological turn in the tradition
of Cliffort Geertz’s “thick description” with an emphasis on exploring the process of
meaning-construction. 186
This way researchers need no longer to make strong assumptions about individuals’
“real”, (i.e. internalized) values or intentions and their reflection in surveys. Political culture is
investigated more on a discursive, inter-subjective level in the form of freely available texts of
all kinds. This kind of research is concerned with what Jan Kubik calls “explicit cultural
legacies” (as opposed to implicit legacies which might be unconscious or remain unstated). 187
Another scholar, David Laitin, conceptualises political culture not as “values to be upheld but
rather points of concern to be debated.“ 188 Consequently, (political) culture cannot be grasped
E Durkheim (translated W Halls), The Rules of Sociological Method, London: Macmillan, [1895] 1982; E
Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy, New York: Free Press, [1898] 1974.
185
E.g. A Morris / C McClurg- Mueller (eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven: Yale UP,
1992; H Johnston / B Klandermans (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1995; T Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics – Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow
1995 & 1999, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002.
186
S Welch, The Concept of Political Culture, London: Macmillan, 1993, pp.99-117, 162; C Geertz, The
Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 1973.
187
J Kubik,‘Cultural Legacies of State Socialism: History Making and Cultural-Political Entrepreneurship in
Postcommunist Poland and Russia’, in: G Ekiert /S Hanson, Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule, Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003, pp. 317-351.
188
D Laitin, ‘Political Culture and Political Preferences’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 2,
June 1988, p. 589.
184
57
at the individual level, but represents a shared property, a form of knowledge of a society or a
group within it. 189
This kind of political culture research focused more on its aggregated, explicit form is
concerned with “meaning”. Thus, political culture can be viewed as being more than the sum
of a group’s psychological dispositions. In fact, it exists autonomously from individuals in the
form of well-known symbols or discourses, such as collective representations. 190 Actors are
seen as being embedded in these constitutive settings reflecting the group’s shared history.
Collective representations entail discriminating experience (what is right and what is wrong),
and narratives of history “as it really was” in the form of dominant rhetorical frames. Thus,
they become some kind of epistemological device. 191 In the context of new democracies these
discourses are linguistic resources offering to actors ways to relate to the new system on the
basis of certain rhetorical frames, symbols or concepts. Groups of actors such as the political
elites of a country are discursively connected by specific conventions (e.g. a shared
vocabulary, figures of speech, standards of argument, criteria of coherence and verification, a
certain range of assumptions and problems, etc). 192
Not only political leaders approach reality rhetorically by making use of these
common discursive resources. 193 Yet, being the major actors in a country’s political
discourse, contrary to other types of elites (academics and artists, for instance), political elites
are constantly required to publicly justify their actions in order to gain the support of their
electorates and constituencies.194 Similar to a “tool-kit,” 195 actors apply particular discourses
in order to legitimise certain institutional designs or actions, or in order to exclude other
arguments from the “field of the imaginable”. They engage in “normative scheming,” as
189
A similar understanding of political culture termed “social representations” was developed by Pierre
Moscovici and further developed by Daniel Bar-Tal. (S Moscovici (ed. by G Duveen), Social Representations –
Explorations in Social Psychology, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000; D Bar-Tal, Shared Beliefs in a Society,
London: Sage, 2000). While Moscovici and Bar-Tal have moved away from the individualistic conceptions of
(political) culture, they still ground their concept in both psychological and sociological concepts.
Similarly, S Neckel, ‘Die ostdeutsche Doxa der Demokratie – eine lokale Fallstudie’, Kölner Zeitschrift für
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol.47, No.4, 1995, p.662.
190
L Dittmer, ‘Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis’, World Politics,
Vol.29, No.4, July 1977, pp.552-583.
191
C Cruz, ‘Identity and Persuasion – How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures’, World
Politics, Vol. 52, April 2000, pp. 275-312; T Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics – Identities and
Foreign Policies, Moscow 1995 & 1999, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002, pp.1-38.
192
J Schull, ‘What is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soviet-Type Societies’, Political
Studies, Vol. 40, 1992, p.731.
193
C Cruz, 2000, p.275.
194
M Marcussen, Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans Joachim Knopf and Klaus Roscher,
’Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation state identities’, Journal of European
Public Policy, Vol.6, No.4 (Special Issue), 1999, pp.614-633.
195
A Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, April 1986,
pp. 273-286.
58
Consuelo Cruz calls it. 196 Thus, they are not fully determined by fixed value orientations, but
do have a limited choice among a number of existing idioms. This concept of political culture
does not require people to put faith in certain values or ideologies, but to respect them through
their way of talking and behaving. 197
Respect for discursive conventions requires some kind of “weak socialization;” actors
must come to acknowledge certain statements or claims as true, but not necessarily alter their
individual ways of cognition and private normative appraisal of these values. As a result,
political culture is both constraining and enabling by informing or precluding certain kinds of
action through the availability of certain discourses, which are both descriptive and
prescriptive. 198 Therefore, in the given context of the discursive field, actors do make choices
and act ‘rationally’. Discourses define the boundaries of the possible; they contribute to shape
expectations and create incentives. 199 As a consequence, political elites have to submit to a
certain degree of consistency in applying these discourses when interacting among themselves
or when competing for voters’ support. 200
However, we cannot expect them to fully submit their behaviour to these expressed
values. The expectation of traditional approaches is that deeply internalised values should turn
into conforming behaviour. The focus on discourses rather than systems of beliefs relaxes the
assumption that values only influence action as long as they are internalized and sincerely
believed. Discourses shared in the social space have a power on their own to evoke
cooperation and conflict, or to give a certain meaning to particular situations or actions.201 For
example, actors can “rhetorically entrap” or “shame” other actors by publicly exposing
behaviour that contradicts the shared values of the community to which also the shamed actor
has publicly committed. This way, actors who publicly pledge to certain ideals are either
disciplined by other actors into conforming behaviour, or face possible electoral punishment
and/or marginalization within the elites for “breaking the rules”. For this to happen, neither
the shamer nor the shamed need to have individually accepted and internalised the validity of
the truth claims on which the shaming takes place. In fact, the shamer can use commonly
upheld values in an instrumental way to advance his own interests, while the shamed has left
C Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua – World Making in the
Tropics, New York: Cambridge UP, 2005, p.6.
197
J Schull, 1992, pp. 728-741.
198
C Cruz, 2000, p.278
199
C Cruz, 2000, p.279.
200
S Neckel, 1995, p.665; C Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua
– World Making in the Tropics, New York: Cambridge UP, 2005, p.29.
201
A Seleny, ‘The Foundations of Post-Socialist Legitimacy’, in: A Braun, Z Barany (eds.), Dilemmas of
Transition – The Hungarian Experience, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p.135.
196
59
the commonly declared values once they stood in the way of his egoistic interests. 202 Still,
these values constrain and indirectly regulate behaviour.
This differentiated view of political culture and different kinds of socialization has
been primarily developed by International Relations scholars, particularly in the field of
Europeanization studies, for offering nuanced explanations of how community values
sometimes override self-interested state behaviour. Jeffrey Checkel differentiates two types of
socialization: type I (“weak socialization”) denotes conscious “role-playing” or “mimicking”
of socially expected standards without their internalisation (i.e. some kind of public
habituation to declared norms). Actors with type-II-socialization (“strong socialization”) in
turn internalize the interests of the community. This “taken-for-grantedness” can either be
achieved via gradual socialization (e.g. of young actors without strong preset orientations) or
via reflective change along the lines of the Habermasian deliberative model in which actors
let themselves become convinced to change their positions according to the “logic of
arguing”. 203 Type-II-socialization thus reflects the assumptions of the classical model of
political culture and Steiner et al.’s (2004) model of deliberative quality.
Thus, we can conceptualize commitment to a set of certain values (e.g. those of
consensus democracy) as a continuum leading from mere rhetorical “lip-service” to deeply
internalized beliefs and a change in identity that incorporates these values. Depending on the
position on this continuum, behaviour is constrained to a lower or higher degree or, in the
unrealistic and extreme case of full internalisation, it is virtually fixed along the lines of these
values. “Weakly” socialised actors rhetorically uphold the values of the community which,
however, do not override or replace their egoistic material interests at all times. Moreover, as
mentioned, this approach does not exclude the possibility that actors use community values in
an instrumental way to pursue preferences in line with, but not necessarily inspired by, the
standard of legitimacy. 204 Thus, this concept of political culture subscribes to the logic of
appropriateness, but in a less rigid way by accepting that (weak) socialization into certain
values does not necessitate a change of interests. Subsequent internalisation of these values
through arguing, collective deliberation or individual reflection (or through psychological
mechanisms such as cognitive dissonance) is nevertheless possible. In epistemological and
methodological terms, however, strong socialization (with the full internalization of these
202
F Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of
the European Union, International Organization, Vol.55, No.1., winter 2001, pp.47-80.
203
J Checkel, ’International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework’, International
Organization, Vol.59, No.4, 2005, pp.801-826; T Risse, ‘Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World
Politics’, International Organization, Vol.54, No.1, 2000, pp.1-39.
204
F Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of
the European Union, International Organization, Vol.55, No.1., winter 2001, pp.62-77.
60
values) can only be inferred. Explicit rhetorical commitment is much easier operationalized as
we can investigate the extent to which a discourse is shared, but we cannot establish directly
as to how deeply it is anchored in individual mind-sets. This we can only infer by relating
pronounced values to real behaviour.
The two concepts of political culture often offer complementary explanations for the
development of political culture. For both strong and weak socialization, repetition is an
important mechanism. Repetition (e.g. reading a certain newspaper every day) can lead to
internalisation and acceptance of the underlying values pronounced in the articles, but it can
also serve to legitimise particular discourses by repeatedly restating certain “truths”.
Similarly, as for the classical understanding of political culture, socialization understood as
habituation is an important mechanism for transmitting discourses. Notions of explicit,
discursive political culture focus on linguistic and socio-economic aspects of the production
and reproduction of particular discourses rather than on psychological mechanisms. This way,
political culture is quite independent from individual protagonists.
So, how do collectively shared discourses develop in the first place, and how do they
change? In order to be widely adopted, a discourse must draw on empirical experience of a
given group. It must “make sense” or “ring true” (i.e. be based on the familiar). The same way
as attitude-base political culture is not just a psychological syndrome, discursive political
culture cannot be reduced to some kind of semiotic “superstructure” either. Thus, it cannot
just be ‘constructed’ ex nihilo, but rather it has to be rooted in historical experience as
reflected in collective memories. This limits the leeway for newly “invented traditions” or
“imagined communities” by political entrepreneurs. 205
Changing a dominant discourse is difficult and costly. This, however, does not exclude
the possibility of behaviour outside of the rhetorical boundaries of the permissible. Yet this
behaviour cannot be easily justified with the dominant discourse. It is viewed as being
illegitimate, or it undermines a dominant discourse and thus the power of its advocates.
Therefore, consistency of discourses is an important criterion for validation next to its
capability to draw on empirical evidence. Furthermore, the producers of “true discourses”
(such as intellectuals, and political entrepreneurs in particular) are also subject to the truth
C Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua – World Making in the
Tropics, New York: Cambridge UP, 2005, pp.29-32; E Hobsbawm / T Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, New
York: Cambridge UP, 1992; B Anderson, Imagined Communities – Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism, revised edition, London: Verso, 1991.
205
61
claims of these community values. They cannot escape the logic of their own discourses
without losing credibility and legitimacy within the polity. 206
The ‘life course’ of a discourse (i.e. its persistence and reproduction over time), is
often determined by exogenous factors: contingent circumstances, the social standing of its
protagonists, resonance with the public influence the reproduction, or replacement of a
collectively shared discourse. 207 Particularly “successful” discourses are discourses which
resonate well with the public and which are convincingly “confirmed” by empirical
experience, might very well outlive their original promoters, and be further reproduced by
future generations of politicians. Protagonists of a discourse might not even have experienced
the initial historical impetus for the emergence of a certain discourse, but are still able to
credibly reproduce it by referring to well known symbols and themes. This again stresses the
relevance of the national collective memory (i.e. the way history is publicly remembered and
the repertoire of discourses it offers to politicians). 208 An extreme example is the obvious
success of populist politicians in some post-communist countries in presenting their nations as
the eternal victims of greater powers. This is done by discursively relating current conflicts
(e.g. the question of Kosovo’s political status) to medieval history (e.g. the battle of Kosovo
Polje in 1389) in a way which obviously resonates convincingly with many voters (but not
necessarily with external observers). 209
Few scholars have attempted to apply the discursive understanding of political culture
to the context of newly democratised countries. John Dryzek and Leslie Holmes, in their
volume, lay out some kind of discursive maps that describe the attitudes of certain societies
(namely Central East and South Eastern European, post-Soviet and Chinese societies) towards
their systems. For this undertaking, they employ an innovative approach, namely Qmethodology. 210 Statements derived from focus groups discussing political issues in a given
country were ranked by respondents and the obtained results were analysed through cluster
G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, p.21.
207
S Roßteutscher, ‘Competing Narratives and the Social Construction of Reality – The GDR in Transition’,
German Politics, Vol.9, No.1, April 2000, p.63; Neckel, 1995, p.665.
208
“Most of the time when I remember it is others who spur me on, their memory comes to the aid of mine and
mine relies on theirs. […] There is no point in seeking where they [i.e. the memories, MS] are preserved in my
brain or in some nook of my mind to which I alone have access: for they are recalled to me externally, and the
groups of which I am part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them, upon condition, to be sure, that I
turn towards them and adopt, at least for the moment, their way of thinking. It is in this sense that there exists a
collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself
in these frameworks and participates in this memory that is capable of the act of recollection.” M Halbwachs (ed.
and transl. by L Coser), On Collective Memory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp.38-39.
209
Bar-Tal uses this example in a similar way to explain his (socio-psychological) model of societal beliefs (D
Bar-Tal, Shared Beliefs in a Society, London: Sage, 2000, pp.xiv-xv.)
210
J Dryzek / L Holmes, Post-Communist Democratisation: Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries,
Cambridge UP, 2002.
206
62
analysis. This way the authors derive a number of dominant political narratives for each
society. On their basis the authors put together nuanced pictures of very different postcommunist political cultures. Although they discuss the historical background of these
narratives they do not try to develop a theoretical explanation of how certain discourses are
related to specific institutions or common historical experiences across countries. Dryzek and
Holmes restrict themselves to description and interpretation and do not systematically
investigate the origins and effects of certain concepts of democracy. Moreover, they seem not
to be entirely clear of whether political culture is also based on internalized values, and in
how far it can be changed in a deliberate way (e.g. by political entrepreneurs).
Laura Edles’ study on elite discourses on democracy offers a detailed narrative
account of the cultural factors underlying the Spanish transition process, yet without
attempting broader generalization. 211 In the context of post-communism, but concerning the
economic transition, Yoshiko Herrera develops the concept of “imagined economies”. She
shows how different local understandings of the economy developed in different Russian
regions despite very similar economic conditions and institutions following perestroika. 212
A more elaborated and systematic theoretical understanding of (political) cultures’
dynamics (but without references to democratisation) is offered by Ann Swidler. According to
her concept new systems of meaning develop during unsettled times. Thus, historical
junctures and structural change requires people to reorganize their “cultural tool kit” in order
to develop new ways of relating to their environment. 213 Moscovici calls these events “points
of cleavage”. 214 According to Consuelo Cruz, who applies and partly modifies Swidler’s
approach, endogenous change of discursive frames becomes possible by way of constant
contestation (i.e. internal interpretive conflicts within one dominant frame) which then leads
to historical junctures. Consequently, this opens the discursive field for other frames to
compete with the dominant ones. 215 This contestation is mostly done by political
entrepreneurs (i.e. the political elite) while most of the time most people are passive “users”
of political culture. For political change to occur, political entrepreneurs must either advance
their competing political visions and agendas within a dominant rhetorical frame, or
alternatively “adjust reality” by changing the boundaries of the field of the permissible.
According to Cruz, this happens simultaneously with a reconfiguration of power relations.
L Edles, Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain – The transition to democracy after Franco, Cambridge UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
212
Y Herrera, Imagined Economies – The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005.
213
Swidler 278-279.
214
S Moscovici (ed. by G Duveen), Social Representations – Explorations in Social Psychology, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2000, p.8.
215
Cruz, 2000.
211
63
Political conflict and political change is thus a struggle over meaning. 216 This struggle,
according to Jan Kubik, also takes place by the deliberate, selective transmission of certain
historical discourses while suppressing others. 217 Again, a key role is played by political
elites. For the economic sphere, Herrera shows how the fluidity of political and economic
categories during perestroika opened the way to heterodox challenges to the orthodox
mainstream, Leninist discourse. New understandings of the economy, some of which local
elites used to make demands for more autonomy, replaced the previous categories. 218
On the basis of these approaches, I propose a conceptualization of discursive elite
political culture as the collectively shared representations of the political system by the
political elites of a given society, developed at critical junctures of their country’s history. 219
On the basis of the above-developed ideational foundations of consensus democracy derived
from Lijphart’s work, five (meta-)discourses representing rhetorical commitment to consensus
democracy can be established: 1) references to consensus as a central practice of democracy,
2) the invocation of the common good to justify arguments, 3) an emphasis on the inherent
value of rules and procedures, 4) the portrayal of the current system as the best possible, and
5) positive, respectful references to the political opponent. The counterparts of these metadiscourses in turn denote a more majoritarian political culture: 1) emphasis on the value of
competition rather than consensus, 2) reference to specific interests in justifying arguments, 3)
an emphasis on effectiveness and specific outcomes rather than procedures, 4) advancing
proposals for pragmatic changes without taboos on any political or socio-economic
arrangements, 5) negative, unrespectful references to the political opponent.
Thus, empirically, both classical and discursive political culture would observe the
same phenomena for a fully consensual political culture. However, classical political culture
would basically take repeated statements on the lines of these discourses as indicators for the
internalisation of the values they pronounce and expect them to impact upon behaviour.
Discursive political culture, in turn, makes no a priori assumptions about the extent of their
For the case of Spain see L Edles, Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain – The transition to democracy after
Franco, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
217
J Kubik, ‘Cultural Legacies of State Socialism: History Making and Cultural-Political Entrepreneurship in
Postcommunist Poland and Russia’, in: G Ekiert / S Hanson, Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 319.
218
Herrera, 2005.
219
There is good reason to believe that mass and elite political culture have both common and separate collective
representations. As my research for the above-mentioned reasons is only concerned with the relationship
between the democratic system and elite political culture I do not discuss the relationship between mass and elite
political cultures nor the impact of mass political culture on democratic stability. As pointed out above, this does
certainly not deny the relevance of popular political culture for democracy. However, incorporating it into this
research would be beyond the feasible scope of a project like mine. Nevertheless, the proposed model of political
culture can be applied to mass political culture in similar ways as shown by some recent promising studies in the
field such as Dryzek and Holmes’ (2003).
216
64
internalisation, and rather investigates in a second step their actual reflection in behaviour. As
outlined above, discursive political culture is based on non-individual sources. This stands in
opposition to the classical model, which is based on individual socio-economic or positional
background factors. As I will show below, the discursive model of political culture also seems
to offer causal explanations for the development of elite political culture in CEE which are
more plausible than the traditional ones.
In summation, for a better understanding of political elites’ commitment to the
existing democratic system, it makes sense to relax the rigid assumptions of individual value
internalisation of classical approaches to political culture. Values can have an indirect impact
upon behaviour when actors are only “weakly socialized” into them (i.e. when they explicitly
accept their validity). Apart from classical understandings of political culture, this perspective
requires a focus on the group level and its social and historical context rather than individual
actors and their socio-economic background or elite position. Furthermore, the outlined model
of discursive political culture offers different explanations about the origins of elite political
culture (which shall be elaborated for the cases of post-communist CEE and be tested
empirically further below). Before doing that, I will discuss the theoretical impact of this
extended perspective on political culture for investigating CoD.
Consolidating democracy: habitus as a shared understanding of legitimacy
The above-outlined concept of political culture based on explicit manifestations of certain
values suggests a different understanding of ideational factors in the process of CoD. When
investigating explicit political culture we do not know whether an individual has fully
internalised the values he/she is pronouncing. Therefore, we cannot predict whether he/she
will fully conform to these values in a specific situation. In my approach, the mechanism
linking elite commitment and democratic persistence is not to be found in individual
behaviour based on internalized values. It is rather situated in a shared habitus grounded in a
group’s collective memory, which allows political leaders of a country to develop “common
schemes of perception, conception and action which are the precondition of all
objectification”. 220 According to Pierre Bourdieu, a habitus enables actors to “partake of the
history objectified in institutions”; it “makes it possible [for them, MS] to inhabit institutions,
to appropriate them practically, and so to keep them in activity, continuously pulling them
from the state of dead letters, reviving the sense deposited in them, but at the same time
220
P Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, pp.53-54.
65
imposing the revisions and transformations that reactivation entails”. 221 Thus, the habitus is
embodied, incorporated history and enables institutions to attain their full realisation. In a
way, institutions and habitus are two ways of an objectification of the past. 222
A particular habitus is developed and shared by the inhabitants of the same lifeworld
with homologous practices such as the members of the political elite in a society. 223 The
habitus is developed from the collective memory; it ensures the active presence of past
experiences and represents a depository of rhetorical and behavioural resources. As an
analytical category habitus is an attempt to explain how a particular set of understandings can
take life on its own, such as that it serves to structure subsequent understandings of
experience. 224
In this regard, collectively shared, explicitly used concepts are much more important
than individual perception, cognition and internalisation. A habitus, in Bourdieu’s
understanding, is built on the “internalisation of externality” (i.e. on the explicit force of
shared conventions). 225 Only explicit values can be objectified. In a way, it is a process of
collective socialization, a process of collective habituation to particular values. It does not
exclude the possibility of individual internalisation of these values, but does not hinge on it
conceptually. Put differently, the concept of habitus can conceptually incorporate notions of
both weak and strong socialization. According to Gil Eyal, the concept of habitus actually
overcomes the polarity between internal and external principles of explanation. 226
Actors who adjust their social trajectory often do so in a collective and path-dependent
way. They can, for example, jointly reinterpret the roles they have to play and, in doing so,
draw on shared experiences, ways of knowing and common understandings. During historical
junctures, such as 1989, they realise that the habitus they carry is not appropriate to altered
circumstances, and look out for new models of behaviour and society. 227 Eyal, Szelényi and
221
P Bourdieu, 1992, pp.58-59.
P Bourdieu, 1992, pp.56-57.
223
P Bourdieu, 1992, pp.55-60.
Bourdieu and many of his students link the emergence of a specific habitus to class-related characteristics.
Following Bourdieu there has been a long debate about the class character of political elites. Here, I do not
intend to engage with this debate as it is not relevant for my undertaking. My definition of political elites is a
positional one as in all mainstream research on democratic leadership in which politicians do share similar lifeworlds but not necessarily class position. For a brief summary of the “new class”-debate, especially in the postcommunist context see G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of
Czechoslovakia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, pp.1-34.
224
Y Herrera, Imagined Economies – The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge University Press, 2005,
p.90.
225
Bourdieu, 1992, pp.55.
226
G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, p.137.
227
G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists – Class Formation and Elite
Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe, London: Verso, 1998, p.9.
222
66
Townsend show the ‘stickiness’ of habitus for elites, especially in small CEE societies where
there is only a limited pool of individuals with a similar backgrounds and collectively shared
life experiences, who can fill certain key positions. These personalities develop an interactive
relationship with institutions. Assuming a new position such as a parliamentary seat impacts
upon the habitus of individuals, but individuals also affect the way this institution is
operated. 228 This way, institutions and actors shape each other in variable ways, which stand
against the expectations of rational choice approaches (which would expect institutions to
mediate outcomes regularly in the same way). 229 This approach is compatible with
sociological and historical understandings of institutionalism in which “politics creates and
confirms interpretations of life.” Politics is also “a place for discovering, elaborating, and
expressing meanings, establishing shared (or opposing) conceptions of experience, values and
the nature of existence.” In this regard, the “processes of politics may be more central than
their outcomes” in which institutions are “signals and symbols of the appropriateness of
events” (i.e. their legitimacy). 230
Thus, a habitus created in a particular historical setting alongside certain institutions
preserves and constantly reproduces a limited repertoire of discourses and practices in relation
to this institution. The doxa imposed by the habitus limits the possibilities for imaginable and
justifiable change in settled times (while in unsettled times both habitus and institutions are
under threat). According to Bourdieu a habitus produces an infinite number of practices (i.e.
actions or manifestations of behaviour) that are relatively unpredictable (like the
corresponding situations) but which are limited in their diversity. 231
Consequently, the habitus developed during the political transition impacts upon the
actors’ commitment to the democratic system and their support for change and continuity.
The habitus is their grasp of the rules of the game. 232 However, subsequent behaviour and
actual changes of the political system cannot be solely explained by reference to the habitus.
The habitus only creates an explicit common understanding, a shared language and collective
conventions of how politics should (or should not) go along. Discourses (unlike individually
held attitudes) may well outlive their original protagonists by way of their constant
reproduction and transmission through other speakers (e.g. in the media), or in the words of
Bourdieu – a habitus constantly tries to recreate the conditions for its own survival.
228
G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, 1998, p.8.
G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, 1998, p.44.
230
J March, J Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, American Political
Science Review, Vol.78, No.3, Sept.1984, pp.741-742. (Brackets in original)
231
P Bourdieu, 1992, p.55.
232
G Eyal, I Szelényi and E Townsend, 1998, p.42.
229
67
The discursive approach to political culture and the concept of habitus have some
commonalities with approaches to frame analysis or schema theory. In these approaches,
frames are defined as “the ways actors conceive the world they are in and the choices they
face”, whereas schemas are defined as “processors, developed through experience, used by
individuals to understand information about the world”. 233 Scholars investigate frameworks of
understanding which are available in society for making sense out of events (i.e. they examine
the organization of experience). 234 Alan Renwick, who explores the course of transition in
Hungary and Poland using frame analysis, shows how the main opposition actors in the two
cases held very different conceptions of the situations facing them. Frames shape possible
responses to certain situations, which are reinforced through their “confirmation” by
experience. Thus, frames constrain the ways actors can think and act when no alternative
ways of viewing a particular situation are available, imposing a “cognitive lock”. Frames also
constitute opportunities (e.g. the perception of what kind of reform is acceptable) to the other
side, or to the population. Similar to a habitus, frames tend to outlast the forces that create
them. Also similar to a habitus (but different from classical concepts of political culture),
frames do not directly impact upon behaviour but offer opportunities and constraints, leaving
room for contingency and individual agency. 235 As Gil Eyal argues, we should understand
elite discourses not as “doctrine” (i.e. interpretations of prescribed policies and assess their
precise translation into action) but as a “technology” (i.e. a form of practical reason that is
relatively autonomous from both usage and abstraction, policy and theory in which struggles
over its interpretation are inescapable). 236
Therefore, for the sake of clarity, I prefer to apply the concepts of discursive political
culture and habitus for my study, as they are more explicit and tangible for the researcher,
whereas frames or schemata can also be understood as cognitive devices on the individual
level, which need to be inferred indirectly. This would require us to again to make
assumptions about individuals’ processes of internalisation. Frame analysis implies that actors
actually have taken on and accepted a certain conception of reality when employing a
particular frame. This way frame analysis might underestimate the ability of political
entrepreneurs to deliberately use (and possibly abuse) different concepts of reality for their
E Goffman, Frame Analysis – An Essay on the Organization of Experience, Boston: Northeastern UP, 1974,
p.8.; Y Herrera, Imagined Economies – The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005,
p.75.
234
E Goffman, 1974, pp.9-11.
235
Alan Renwick, ‘Why Hungary and Poland Differed in 1989: The Role of Medium-Term Frames in
Explaining the Outcomes of Democratic Transition’, Democratization, Feb. 2006a, Vol.13, No.1, pp. 36-57.
236
G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, pp.81-82.
233
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purposes. Using the discourse-focused approach, political elites are not necessarily required to
subscribe in private to their way of rhetorically relating to reality. Thus, a certain frame, a
certain conception of reality might actually also be used deliberatively by a politician to
impose it on others. Nonetheless, it does not exclude him/her from submitting him/herself to
the truth claims of this discourse. Frames can be both cognitive structures and rhetorical
devices. 237 In this dissertation, my use of the term “frame” is limited to the latter while I
abstain from theorising about cognition for the same epistemological and methodological
reasons raised for the issue of value internalisation.
Separating implicit normative support for a given system from explicit respect for
certain rules consequently leads to an ontologically different understanding of the
consolidation of democracy, too. Consolidated democracy is not a material thing “out there”;
it is not an object, but an inference, or even just an argument. 238 Andreas Schedler rightly
points out that the notion of democratic consolidation resembles the concept of legitimacy.
Legitimacy is not an objective feature of a system, but it is attributed to it by individuals on a
subjective basis: no regime is intrinsically legitimate but it is perceived or assigned to be so.
The same can be argued for democratic consolidation. As Max Weber spoke about belief in
legitimacy (Legitimitätsglaube) consolidation means a “belief in stability” or an “expectation
of persistence”. It is expressed by domestic actors, or by external observers such as students
of democratisation. 239 Linz and Stepan (i.e. two of the most prominent students of
democratisation) view (attitudinal) consolidation of democracy as being achieved “when,
even in the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the
people believe that any further change must emerge from within the parameters of the
democratic game.” 240 Instead, Schedler argues, the concept should rest on the claim that
actors in the democratic game believe that “further change will emerge from within the
parameters of the democratic game.” 241
For this, actors must share a similar understanding of the desirability of the existing
system, and the legitimate way to operate it, i.e. a similar kind of commitment. Therefore,
students of democracy in their judgement concerning democratic consolidation (i.e. their
expectations concerning the persistence of the existing system) should rely not so much on
237
Y Herrera, 2005, p.66.
A Schedler, ‘Measuring Democratic Consolidation’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.
36, No. 1, 2001, p.67.
239
A Schedler, ‘How Should We Study Democratic Consolidation’, Democratization, Vol.5, No.4, winter 1998,
p.11; M Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (Economy and Society, English translation by G Roth and C
Wittich, eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p.37.
240
J Linz / A Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, South America,
and post-communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996, p.6.
241
Schedler, 2001, p. 67.
238
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exogenously imposed measurements, but on the “indicators” and yardsticks used by the actors
themselves. Legitimacy, being a subjective attribution as mentioned above, is established “by
showing that the decisions accomplish appropriate objectives or intentions, or by showing that
they are made in appropriate ways”. 242 A habitus shared by the political elite of a polity
embodies this concept of appropriateness. Therefore, consensus democracy is consolidated if
actors treat it as legitimate based on similar collective representations (in turn, reflecting the
spirit of accommodation in their shared habitus). This verstehende perspective also avoids a
normative bias for or against particular democratic systems through exogenously assigned,
often arbitrary or highly demanding indicators of CoD.
Using the concept of habitus CoD then means that actors share similar conventions,
interpretations and justifications for the existing democratic system employing a limited set of
collective discourses. For the cases of consensus democratic settings this means that actors
share common discourses based on the above-mentioned, interlinked five ideational
dimensions of consensus democracy. In line with Bourdieu we could therefore define the
stability and persistence of the democratic set-up of CoD as a the creation of a common-sense,
self-evident “consensus on the meaning of the [democratic] practices […], the harmonization
of agents’ experiences and the constant reinforcement each of them receives from expression
[…] leading to durable dispositions to recognize and comply with the immanent demands”. 243
Already Gaetano Mosca, one of the earliest elite theorists in social science, emphasises the
need for a close correspondence between the political system and the so-called “political
formula” (i.e. the moral and legal principles which are used to justify any political regime). 244
Similarly, Vilfredo Pareto argues that similar values define the identity of any elite. 245 Even
Joseph Schumpeter (who is often credited with having defined a “minimalist” understanding
of democracy based on peaceful elite circulation via elections) laid down a number of key
preconditions for its proper functioning: a well-established political elite should be fit to
govern, hold a professional code of conduct and a common fund of views. Members of
parliament should exercise self-control and resist selfish temptations. 246
Unlike other notions of CoD, my approach applies a descriptive rather than a
prescriptive perspective. Thus, it does not imply a normative preference for the democratic
J March, J Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions – The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York: Free Press,
1989, p.49.
243
P Bourdieu, 1992, p.58.
244
G Mosca, The Ruling Class, (ed. and rev. A Livingston), New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 71, quoted in R
Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians – Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy’, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973, pp. 232-233.
245
V Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (transl. by C Brinkmann), Tübingen, 1955.
246
J Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1950, pp.290-295.
242
70
status quo put in place by transition, the persistence of a particular kind of democracy (e.g.
consensus democracy), or the stability of certain institutional arrangements as such. Rather, it
tries to situate political culture in the historical context. Moreover, it aims at outlining some of
the implications for the future of democracy based on the relationship between the
institutional setting and elite commitment embodied in the habitus (as the latter “tries to
create favourable conditions for its own survival”). 247 According to Leonardo Morlino,
political leaders, in the case of a mismatch between institutions and political culture, might
consequently either opt for strategies of (institutional) adaptation or (behavioural)
appropriateness. 248 Thus, explicit political culture is also offering a limited set of
interpretations and options for “reasonable” political change. In case of widely shared
discourses, it is more likely that endogenous political change will go along the lines
prescribed by political elites’ collective representations of democracy rather than in a different
way.
In sum, studying elite commitment to (consensus) democracy and its implications for
the persistence and future development of democracy requires us to leave the objectivist,
outsider perspective and assume a “verstehende” approach trying to grasp the local
knowledge and experience of the main actors. The following table puts together the basic
differences between the two alternative approaches to political culture and their implications
for the consolidation of democracy. In the following, I will discuss hypotheses when and how
political elites in the post-communist setting of CEE might have developed a shared
understandings of consensus democracy.
[table 2 about here]
The impact of historical junctures: modes of transition and discourses on democracy
Having outlined the theoretical premises of the alternative understanding to political culture
and its way to conceptualise the “spirit of accommodation,” I will continue by developing
hypotheses about the origins of discursive political cultures. My hypotheses are derived from
existing approaches in democratisation literature in general and democratic elite theory in
particular. As outlined above, political culture understood as collective representations or
discourses of the political system are reorganized and shaped at critical junctures in the
247
P Bourdieu, 1992, p.61.
L Morlino, Constitutional Design and Problems of Implementation in Southern and Eastern Europe, in: J
Zielonka (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe – Volume I: Institutional Engineering, New York:
Oxford UP, 2001, pp.48-108.
248
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history of a society. They rely on collective, rather than individual experiences of
socialization. The latest, deep historical juncture in CEE is clearly the period around the
democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As the communist leadership in most
CEE countries lost their hegemony over meaning, competing discourses entered the public
realm. 249 During these “unsettled times“, as Ann Swidler calls them, new systems of meaning
and organizing action were created. 250
This view also follows Jack Goldstone’s observation that the intensity of “cultural
creation” fluctuates over time. 251 According to him, new ideologies do not play a central role
in the breakdown of a regime, but occur afterwards since “cultural innovation is following
state breakdowns”. 252 Similarly, Yoshiko Herrera shows how the breakdown of orthodox
communist interpretations of the economy during perestroika in the Soviet Union weakened
the communist system and ultimately destroyed it as it opened the way for various competing
approaches. 253 Through the post-totalitarian or authoritarian legacy in the countries of CEE,
cultural innovation was rather strongly concentrated in the elitist interaction among and
between reform communists and dissident groups. 254 In their articles, András Bozóki and
Anna Seleny illustrate how opposition leaders contested and gradually changed the meaning
of certain key expressions of the old regime and thus came to define the new vocabulary of
reform (sometimes in collaboration with parts of the old regime). 255 Grzgorz Ekiert’s work
shows the long-term consequences of crises of communism in Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. Critical junctures such as those of 1956 or 1968 were thus more important
than formal characteristics of the political or economic systems of these countries in altering
the relationships between party, state and society. They modified practices of the regime,
249
J Kubik, ‘Does Culture Matter in Post-Communist Transformations? Bipolar Cultural Frames in Polish Post1989 Politics’, paper presented at the Ideas, Culture and Political Analysis Workshop, Princeton University,
1998, p.1.
250
A Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, April 1986,
pp. 273-286.
251
J Goldstone, ‘Ideology, cultural frameworks, and the process of revolution’, Theory and Society, Vol. 20,
1991, p.447.
252
J Goldstone, 1991, p.405.
253
Y Herrera, Imagined Economies – The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005.
254
This is the reason why I chose to focus on transition dynamics and not on historical legacies as such as other
approaches (e.g. Kitschelt et al.’s differentiation between different kinds of communist regimes, Kitschelt et al.,
1999, pp.19-42.). The previous regime type is certainly strongly impacting on transition dynamics, too.
However, the “meaning of democracy” could only crystallise and have an impact once democracy was actually
put in place. Moreover, a focus on transition dynamics leaves more room for contingent agency to shape political
culture rather than more rigid path dependencies.
255
A Bozóki, ’Rhetoric of Action: The Language of the Regime Change in Hungary’, in: A Bozóki (ed.),
Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.263-279; A Seleny, ‘The
Foundations of Post-Socialist Legitimacy’, in: A Braun, Z Barany (eds.), Dilemmas of Transition – The
Hungarian Experience, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, pp.131-154.
72
transformed cultural categories, produced new collective memories and path-dependent
patterns of mobilization. 256
For the protagonists of 1989 democratic transition meant “rebuilding the ship at sea”
(i.e. laying lasting foundations for a full-blown democracy without time for experimentation
or deliberation in an insulated environment). At the same time, the dilemma of simultaneity
required the impossible task of putting in place a working market economy, and in some cases
(such as the Baltic republics), state- and nation-building. 257 Transition was therefore indeed
an unprecedented and tremendously deep historical juncture throughout the region. 258 In a
way, democratic transition in CEE can be regarded as a historical threshold event with a
similarly lasting effect on (political) culture as other events like the reformation, industrial or
national revolutions. 259
While institutional outcomes of the transition do not vary strongly across countries
(and lead to a high number of veto points in all CEE countries as outlined above) transition
dynamics varied quite considerably between countries. From the perspective of
Europeanization literature, there is widespread agreement that the institutional build-up to
European standards of democracy and market economy was quite successful but performance
of these institutions varied considerably. Liborio Mattina explains this with the different
attitudes of political elites towards integration in EU aspirant countries due to their different
historical experiences of communism and regime change. 260 Hypothesizing the relevance of
the historical juncture of transition for the creation of durable discursive structures, we should
therefore expect a wider degree of variation in political cultures than in institutions.
Thus, according to the model just outlined, we can expect to find particular discursive
frames developed out of a reorganization of historical experiences during transition. These
frames will at least partly persist up to today in enabling or constraining certain forms of
behaviour. According to concepts of historical institutionalism, actors in new settings will
look out for interpretative rules, traditions, precedents and authoritative interpreters. 261
G Ekiert, The State Against Society – Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe, Princeton
UP, 1996.
257
J Elster / C Offe / U Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies – Rebuilding the Ship at Sea,
Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.19-21.
258
The simultaneous processes state- and nation-building and economic transition along with democratic
transition in the post-communist countries also mark a strong difference to earlier transitions in the South.
259
M Lipset, S Rokkan, ‘Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments – an introduction’, in: M
Lipset, S Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, New York: Free
Press, 1967, pp.1-64. Thanks to Jürg Steiner for pointing this out to me.
260
L Mattina, ‘Institutional Pressures and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe’, in: R Di Quirico
(ed.), Europeanisation and Democratisation – Institutional Adaptation, Conditionality and Democratisation in
the EU’s Neighbour Countries, Florence: European Press Academic Publishing, 2005, pp.25-36.
261
J March, J Olsen, ‘The logic of appropriateness’, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo,
ARENA Working Papers 04/09, Oslo, 2004, pp.7-9.
256
73
According to my approach, political elites in post-communist democracies will find at least
part of these in the legacy of democratic transition.
Laura Edles shows how Spanish elites, through their interaction during the Spanish
negotiated transition, came to redefine their interests and develop a common goal – the
peaceful introduction of democracy. 262 I argue that the kind of collectively “imagined”
democracy depends on the particular dynamics of the transition process, i.e. political elites
came to conceptualise democracy differently in different contexts of democratic transition.263
In other words, different modes of transition offered different kinds of discursive resources to
its protagonists to define the new polity and their own role within it. Therefore, in the next
step, we ask whether we can establish any systematic relationship between transition
dynamics and political culture starting from the existing literature on elite theory and political
change.
How do different historical junctures influence later democratic development and what
does the existing literature say in this regard? As uncertainty was still high in the first years
after transition most existing studies (usually dating back to the mid-1990s) investigating the
relationship between transition dynamics and democratic political elites focus on the
acceptance of democracy by all players in general and only differentiate the degree of
acceptance of democracy.
Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter argue that different modes of transition can be
associated with different types of democracy. They differentiate between four modes of
transition: pact (i.e. compromise and elite-driven), imposition (i.e. under force and elitedriven), reform (compromise and mass-driven) and revolution (force and mass-driven). Karl
and Schmitter claim that so far no mass-driven transition has lead to stable democracy.
Moreover, they resume that paradoxically the very modes of transition which enhance original
survivability (i.e. elite-driven) might impede change further down the road (e.g. economic
reform and redistribution). Still, according to them, pacted democracies boast more flexibility
for future policies than imposed ones. According to the authors, pacted democracies tend to
lead to corporatist or consociational limited democracies but, later on, there seems to be a
higher possibility of them to turn into pluralist democracies. 264 In their co-authored piece,
262
L Edles, 1998, pp.14-15.
The term „imagined democracies“ is derived by analogy from Yoshiko Herrera’s above-mentioned concept of
„imagined economies“ and Benedict Andersons “imagined communities” (Y Herrera, Imagined Economies –
The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005; B Anderson, Imagined Communities –
Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition, London: Verso, 1991).
264
T Karl, ’Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America’, Comparative Politics, Vol.23, No.1, Oct.1990,
pp.1.-21. T Karl / P Schmitter, ’Modes of transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe’,
International Social Science Journal, No.128, May 1991, pp.269-284.
263
74
Karl and Schmitter try to include the (then) new CEE cases into their matrix, but concede that
the complex interaction between mass mobilization and elite action makes clear positioning
difficult. The general importance of pacted transitions lies in its very procedure: negotiating
and bargaining over the future of the country rather than fighting each other enabled (or even
compelled) political leaders from both sides to think of each other as ‘adversaries’ rather than
‘enemies’ as in the past. 265 Along the same lines, Wojciech Sadurski remarks that
constitutional processes generally contribute to define roles in the new polity. 266
Gerardo Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff in turn present transitions with “reform
through rupture,” as in the Czechoslovak case, as more promising than revolutions from
above or negotiated transitions. This is because old elites no longer have a role in shaping the
new rules of the game. On the other hand, they concede that this might lead to an imposed
constitution without much debate and cooperation between different groups. 267
Elite theorists such as John Higley and his associates discuss in a number of
publications the connection between the democratic stability after regime changes, elite
circulation and so-called elite consensus. The authors show that a stable democracy requires
widely differentiated and consensually unified political elites. Differentiation is meant in
terms of social heterogeneity, organizational diversity and relative autonomy from each other
and the state. Elite unity, according to them, has an attitudinal and an interactive component.
The attitudinal dimension is defined in terms of shared beliefs and values, as well as more
specific norms about appropriate conduct. The interactive dimension concerns the extent of
channels and networks between different groups enabling access to key decision-making
centres. 268 The authors emphasize the need for a consensus on the “basic rules and codes of
political conduct and the worth of political institutions,” which includes all major groups of
diversified elites in the form of so-called elite pacts.269 The formulation hints that they view
this consensus as containing both internalized values and rhetorical support for them while not
specifically applying a certain model of political culture. Moreover, they do not define a
specific set of explicit values which need to be part of this consensus but are more concerned
with the process as such.
O Encarnación, ‘Do Political Pacts Freeze Democracy? Spanish and South American Lessons’, West
European Politics, Vol.28, No.1, January 2005, p.189.
266
W Sadurski, ‘Conclusions: On the Relevance of Institutions and the Centrality of Constitutions in the Postcommunist Transitions’, in: J Zielonka (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe – Volume I:
Institutional Engineering, New York: Oxford UP, 2001, pp.467-468.
267
G Munck / C Skalnik Leff, ‘Modes of Transition and Democratisation: South America and Eastern Europe in
Comparative Perspective’, in: L Anderson (ed.), Transitions to Democracy, New York: Columbia UP, 1999,
pp.193-216.
268
J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2000, p.2.
269
J Higley, R Gunther, 1992, p.4.
265
75
Higley et al. view so-called elite settlements in the form of pacts or more long-term
elite convergence as most promising in securing democratic stability. Concerning the postcommunist countries the path to elite settlements, via long-term convergence, has little
relevance (keeping in mind the absence of any organized and strong counter-elite under
communism with whom the power elite might have “converged” ideologically over the course
of decades). 270 Therefore, according to this theory, only elite pacts remain as a viable option
for securing democratic stability in the region. In a later volume on Eastern Europe Higley
and Lengyel present elite consensus as a desirable outcome still to be achieved in order to
have democracy consolidated. The authors regard Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic as
the most advanced countries in this respect. East Germany is claimed as already having
achieved this stage through German unification. 271 In their latest volume Higley and Burton
differentiate between the cases of Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (which basically upheld their
elite settlements throughout the upheavals of post-transition politics), and the Czech Republic
and Slovakia (where political elites only converged in the late 1990s). Countries such as
Romania, Bulgaria or Albania are characterized as still lacking a lasting elite pact or full posttransition elite convergence. 272
In another edited volume, Higley and Lengyel add a dynamic component of elite
change. Now the four kinds of elite configurations based on the two per two matrix of
strong/weak elite unity with wide/narrow elite diversity are associated with a different kind of
elite circulation each. Following from that, the most advanced countries in terms of their
progress towards democratic stability are those countries where elite circulation was wide and
deep in scope but also gradual and peaceful such as in the pacted transition countries. This
provided a way to exclude cases like Russia from the set of successful cases.273 Consequently,
according to Higley et al., a gradual, negotiated transition with a moderate elite turnover is
most conducive to achieve a viable political culture and stable democracy.
270
Poland and Hungary can be regarded as closest to this elite convergence due to a higher degree of plurality
allowed for in their communist parties and the existence of communication channels with the emerging
opposition.
271
J Higley, J Pakulski and W Wesolowski (eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe,
London: Macmillan, 1998, p.26.
For criticism of the model see V Gel’man, ’Russian elites in search of consensus: what kind of consensus?’, in:
A Steen / V Gel’man (eds.), Elites and Democratic Development in Russia, London: Routledge, 2003, pp.29-50;
and I Tarusina, ’Elite transformation and regime change – The case of Tomsk Oblast’, in: A Steen / V Gel’man
(eds.), Elites and Democratic Development in Russia, London: Routledge, 2003, p.170.
272
J Higley, M Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, pp.8489, 168-173.
273
J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2000, p.4-19.
76
A different elite-centred framework is proposed by Jacek Wasilewski. He does not
look for general properties of elite political culture (e.g. certain shared values) characterizing
a stable democracy, but rather defines the requirements on elites in terms of cultural resources
according to the tasks necessary to be performed during different stages of building
democracy. He differentiates between three kinds of elites during the stages of transition,
transformation and consolidation. 274 The first elite (elite of ‘mission and vision’) have to
bring down the old regime, enable the transfer of power and develop the basic outlines of the
new system. The second elite (‘engineers and technocrats’), during the stage of
transformation, have to fill the basic framework established during transition, put into action,
craft, adapt and run the new order. The third elite (‘moderators and integrators’) only make
smaller changes to the democratic system; they polish and refine it while habituating to it. 275
Wasilewski’s three elites not only have different tasks and objectives but also operate in very
different environments (in this path-dependent way, earlier developments impact on the later
stages). Therefore, according to this approach, we should not look for general properties of
political elites and elite political culture but rather define the requirements according to the
stage and the specific context of a country. 276
The author mentions that there seems to be little differences in sociological terms
between the elites of transformation and the elites of consolidation, whereas there are clearer
differences between them and the elite of transition. His explanation for this is that both the
stages of transition and transformation were not successfully completed and left unresolved
issues (e.g. for the Polish case the unresolved way of how to come to terms with the past).
Leftovers of the elite of transformation can be found in the areas of privatisation and overdue
reforms of social security. According to the author, these residues and unresolved issues then
‘contaminate’ the political process of the consolidation stage, prevent other issues from being
solved and become even more difficult to resolve over time. Consequently, elite members
sticking to and identifying with these issues often survive into the next stage and transfer
ideas and attitudes into the new environment. This often impedes the achievement of the
central objectives in the given stage and undermines democratic stability. 277
Overall, literature on democratisation and democratic elite theory seems to reflect two
competing claims about transition dynamics and the concurrent elite political cultures. While
274
This differentiation is slightly different from the usually applied two-step model of democratic transition and
consolidation.
275
J Wasilewski, ‘Three Elites of the Central East European Democratisation’, in: R Markowski and E WnukLipinski (eds.), Transformative Paths in Central and Eastern Europe, Warsaw: FES/ PAN-ISP, 2001, pp.133142.
276
J Wasilewski, 2001, p.135.
277
J Wasilewski, 2001, p.141.
77
Schmitter and Karl, as well as Higley et al., are more process-oriented and favour a gradual,
negotiated and consensual approach with a moderate degree of elite change, Munck / Leff and
Wasilewski are more outcome-oriented. They define the ‘ideal’ democratic elites according to
the tasks they have to perform successfully in a given environment, which implicitly includes
elite turnover in the process. While Higley et al. emphasize elite consensus on common
political codes, frames or discourses surrounding the rules of the democratic game,
Wasilewski is more oriented towards the collective realization of specific results, which then
define the outlook of political elites. There is obviously a trade-off between the two
approaches. Gradualism is not conducive to achieve quick and clear results in terms of policy
outcomes, while rapidly pushing through specific political strategies cannot be done in a very
consensual way. In fact, the two can be viewed as two opposite ideal types of transition.
The former ideal type, which I call multilateral transition, is characterized by an equal
distribution of contending factions in the transition process. Owing to this there is a stronger
need to accommodate and negotiate a compromise, and a higher degree in elite continuity
between old and new system. Transition is, therefore, more gradual, cautious and aiming for a
balance between different groups. There is more emphasis on a legalist approach and
“backward legitimacy” as Huntington calls it (i.e. changes are made through the established
procedures of the undemocratic regime). 278 Moreover, there is less emphasis on explicit
policy goals for which it is harder to find common ground. This makes the process rather
lengthy; in the beginning it is more vulnerable to reversion and less certain in terms of its
substantial objectives. Moreover, legal continuity appears to be a higher objective than
popular legitimacy (i.e. there is a less clear “new beginning”). Thus, competing claims of
historical legitimacy for the new democracy live on in the polity, and protagonists of the old
regime remaining in the new polity are vulnerable to questioning of their legitimacy. 279
The latter transition type, unilateral transition, is characterized by the domination of
the process by the opposition, who holds sway over politics for some time after the first free
S Huntington, The Third Wave – Democratization in the late twentieth century, Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991, p.141.
279
H Arendt, On Revolution, Hamondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973; János Kis on “radical reformism”, Jacek
Kuron on “self-limitation”, Adam Michnik on “new evolutionism” etc. (B Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence in
East-Central Europe, Budapest: CEU Press, 2003.); J Kis, ‘Between Reform and Revolution’, East European
Politics and Societies, Vol.12, No.2, s
Spring 1998, pp.300-383.
For a similar typology – differentiating three types of transition, i.e. transformation, replacement and
transplacement see Huntington, 1991, pp.124-174. Huntington puts more emphasis on the major players and
agents of change in the transition process, i.e. reformers and standpatters (WHAT’S A STANDPATTER?) in the
old regime, as well as moderates and radicals in the opposition whereas my typology is more concerned with the
overall dynamics of the process. In the end, his three types of transition (transformation, transplacement and
replacements) are quite close to mine with an added intermediate type.
278
78
elections. There is less need and pressure to negotiate with the post-communists, who are
weakened and/or soon marginalized. This constellation allows more leeway to the opposition
to push through substantial policies, implementing far-reaching political and socio-economic
changes (thus being closer to the tabula rasa approach). Transition is therefore rapid, has a set
goal and appears rather irreversible from an early point in time. It also involves a higher
degree of elite turnover. This way, the break with the past regime becomes more visible as the
new regime seeks to build itself on a new legitimacy, not legal continuity. Thus, the winning
former regime opposition also imposes a historical closure and a condemnation of the old
regime. The new legitimacy might be based on an elaborated blueprint of policies whose
implementation is the openly pursued aim (while procedural issues have only secondary
importance).
[table 3 about here]
Among the CEE countries, East Germany and Czechoslovakia / the Czech Republic fall most
clearly into the category of unilateral transition, while Hungary (and with some qualifications
also Poland and Bulgaria) fall into the category of multilateral transition. 280 Concerning the
“new” nation states, the classification requires a closer look, but similar patterns can be found.
Slovenia seems to be more on the multilateral side as the gradual democratisation process was
initiated by the Communist party quite some time before free elections. Slovenia insisted on
“legally” leaving the Yugoslav Federation on the basis of the Yugoslav constitution, assuring
legal and historical continuity of its polity. In opposition to that, the Baltic states did not
experience domestic democratisation before the very late 1980s. Unlike Slovenia, the Baltic
republics, under the leadership of strong opposition movements, declared their status as
Soviet Republics as null and void, seeking a renewed popular legitimacy by returning to the
pre-Soviet constitutions of the 1930s (and partly even by redefining the demos). Thus, they
can be regarded as being closer to the unilateral type of transition.
280
Poland’s pacted transition owes strongly to the fact that it was the first country in the region to start
democratic transition. Through the particularly high uncertainty (e.g. about a potential Soviet intervention) the
otherwise most powerful opposition movement in the region came to accept far-reaching compromises in favour
of the post-communists. As Alan Renwick writes, the Soviets were still invisibly present at the Polish roundtable in 1989. (A Renwick, ‘Why Hungary and Poland Differed in 1989: The Role of Medium-Term Frames in
Explaining the Outcomes of Democratic Transition’, Democratization, Feb. 2006a, Vol.13, No.1, p.40). Only
when the post-communists lack of popular support became obvious in the first semi-free election Solidarity
changed to a more confrontational stance and came to dominate the process. In Bulgaria in turn, the opposition
was clearly weaker than the post-communists who for some time came to dominate the process despite extensive
negotiations between the two sides.
79
In the case of Slovakia, there was a higher degree of gradualism in terms of elite
turnover, breaking with the past and general reform policies than in the Czech lands. While
the new political elites in Prague pushed for rapid democratisation and de-communization, old
and new Slovak leaders urged a more cautious and gradual course. Based on their different
life experiences since 1968, Czech and Slovak political elites formed two very distinct
discursive communities. This fact, according to Eyal, prepared the field for the latter break-up
of Czechoslovakia. 281 Romania, however, might not be easily categorized as a case of either
unilateral or multilateral transition due to its uniquely violent revolution in 1989 and the
initial lack of any relevant “new elite”. 282
Thus, the typologies of multilateral and unilateral transition refer to a limited set of
cases with certain properties that usually go together. The construction of this typology, and
the two polar ideal types, facilitate the understanding of historical dynamics in transition and,
consequently, some of the discursive sources for the development of democratic elite political
cultures in the region.
Hypotheses derived from the alternative model of political culture
According to the outlined model, which views critical junctures such as the transition period
as being crucial for offering political elites collective representations of democracy, we should
expect to find some systematic differences through the impact of these basic differences in the
transition process. Moreover, if these collective representations are durable and relevant we
should expect to find at least parts of them in this noticeable constellation up to today.
Therefore, the basic approaches to political change and the dominant ways of interaction in
the two ideal types of transition are expected to have left their mark on collective
representations of the new democracy. At least partly, they are expected to be reproduced
until today. Following from that we can formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Political elites’ collective representations in countries with the experience of
unilateral transition promote a more competitive understanding of democratic practice than
countries with a multilateral transition, where we expect to find a more consensus-oriented
G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.
282
The use of violence during transition by one or both sides or by an external actor might also leave a lasting
mark on collective memories and thus shape political culture e.g. in cases such as Ex-Yugoslavia, Moldova,
Georgia, or Tajikistan. This aspect cannot be considered in detail in this context. For some interesting insights in
this regard concerning popular discourses on democracy see J Dryzek / L Holmes, Post-Communist
Democratisation: Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries, Cambridge UP, 2002, p.131-169. Also Linz
and Stepan characterize Romania as a special case due to its legacy of “Sultanism” with personalized power, the
complete absence of any opposition, leading to a violent overthrow of the ruler without further elite turnover and
a nationalist backlash (J Linz / A Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe,
South America, and post-communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996, pp.345-364).
281
80
outlook in elite discourses on democracy in which compromise and consensus are presented
as a value in itself.
This hypothesis rests on the premise that, during transition, political elites came to
develop a kind of collective identity by reconfiguring their way of interaction according to the
above-developed model of political culture. In the rather unstructured and empty public realm
of collapsed communism new ways of organizing politics had to be found. Due to the
described very different constellations between opposition and post-communists in the two
ideal types of transition, very different practices and forms of interaction were newly
developed (or were revived from earlier periods). In multi-lateral transitions, both opposition
groups and former communists are more likely to have developed a common notion of
responsibility for the new system. This required them to temporarily leave aside deep
differences of opinion and to develop an inclusive, coalescent approach (if only until a basic
agreement about the terms of regime change was found and the first free elections held). At
later points the legacy of peaceful and co-operative political change would be revived in order
to achieve further decisive reform steps (e.g. constitutional reform, economic adjustment etc.)
even if only rhetorically, or ultimately unsuccessfully in terms of substantive results. In
unilateral transitions we would expect this common identification with the system and
consensual decisionmaking to be less strong (at least with those players who were
marginalized from the process) and therefore to find less emphasis on consensus-seeking
positions. Instead, differences between government and opposition were fully played out, and
concluded with the opposition winning their way when establishing the new system.
Hypothesis 2: Formal and predictable procedures should have a much stronger weight in the
elite political culture of countries with a multilateral transition. Politicians in countries with a
more unilateral legacy of transition would rather emphasise the achievement of concrete
policy results rather than valuing procedures for their own sake.
Through the experience of transition as a highly formalized and legalistic approach,
politicians in countries of multilateral transition have at their hand discourses presenting
democracy as embodied in predictable, formal procedures and balanced participation of all
groups. New mechanisms of negotiation, accommodation, and inclusive decision-making had
to be developed before substantive reforms were started. In countries with unilateral
transition, regime change and later reforms had to be pushed through by some (opposition)
groups against the uncompromising communists and without an inclusive negotiating process.
The quick and irreversible achievement of precise goals stood in the foreground. These
substantive goals (i.e. creating a liberal democracy and a market economy), which were
81
mostly supported by a majority of the (mobilized) people, can be presented by them as being
more important than particular procedures to reach these goals.
In unilateral transitions, while acting as a unified group in overcoming communist rule
and preparing free elections, very soon competition started between increasingly
differentiated parties which developed out of the former opposition while the (unreformed)
post-communists would remain ostracised. In multilateral transitions, the post-communists
remained strong political players and (after a few years) became a serious contender for
power. 283 Thus, we might add Hypothesis 3: In societies with the legacy of unilateral
transition, collective representations of democracy contrast quite strongly between the postcommunists on the one side and parties developed out of former opposition groups on the
other side. In this regard, they differ from the cases of multilateral transitions, where both
sides have a common stake and share rather similar rhetorical frames concerning the
system).
Countries with a legacy of unilateral transition should therefore feature a more
competitive, outcome-oriented approach to politics which is presented as the ideal in elite
discursive frames (at least from the side of the former opposition), as opposed to the
consensual and more procedure-oriented approach of multilateral transitions. Collective
representations of democracy might therefore also feature a very different role model for
politicians.
Hypothesis 4: In countries of multilateral transition, political elites share a collective
representation of politicians as playing the central role in the democratic process in being
rather aloof of particularistic interests and collectively finding the best solution for the
country, the “common good” (i.e. closer to the utilitarian model of democracy). Political
elites in countries with unilateral transitions should present their own role as being
representative of competing interests in the first place.
Political elites (with the legacy of multilateral transition) should thus find their
collective representations of democracy embodied best in the consensus institutional set-up,
whereas political elites from unilateral backgrounds might present the requirements of
consensus institutions as being in the way of decisive, efficient and outcome-oriented politics.
Hypothesis 5: Political elites in societies with a unilateral transition background advocate
283
Kitschelt et al. point out that in democracies following “national-accommodative” communism the regime
cleavage is less pronounced than in democracies after “bureaucratic authoritarianism”. Assuming a strong
connection between previous regime types and transition dynamics my hypotheses to some extent mirror
Kitschelt’s. However, my focus is slightly different as I am not concerned with comparing party systems but
political culture and the way political elites relate to the democratic system (H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R
Markovski/ G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems – Competition, Representation and Inter-Party
Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p.306).
82
changes to the political system more strongly/extensively than political elites from
multilateral transitions.
Political elites from countries with multilateral transitions do not share a societal
consensus on how to evaluate the past as opposed to those from countries with the legacy of a
unilateral transition. The latter involved not only a “new beginning” in terms of political
legitimacy, but also the (at least temporal) expulsion of the protagonists of the old regime, and
generally a more forceful (sometimes imposed) “coming to terms with the past” resulting in a
predominant condemnation and public de-legitimation of the old regime. Mutlilateral
transitions allowed for the persistence of competing concepts of legitimacy of the new polity,
or at least did not require actors to fully dissociate themselves from the communist (or any
other previous) regime(s). Therefore, the absence of an (imposed) condemnation of the old
regime(s) may lead to clashing definitions of legitimate leadership in countries with the
legacy of multilateral transition, and consequently result in a lack of mutual acceptance and
respect as legitimate players in the democratic system.
Hypothesis 6: Political elites in democracies developed out of multilateral transition will be
found to be more explicitly aiming at demarcating themselves culturally and ideologically
from political opponents than in unilateral transitions.
83
PART III: Testing the alternative model of political culture
The cases
Hungary, East Germany and their transition legacies
In order investigate the sources of elite commitment to consensus democracy and the
consequences for the future of democracy I introduced the traditional approach to political
culture, its role in the consolidation of democracy and an alternative approach. Both shall now
be tested empirically. The classical model of political culture in the tradition of Almond and
Verba claims that consensualist institutions over time lead to a consensualist political elites
via individual value internalization. Hence, we should be able to find similarities or even
convergence in this regard between countries with similar degrees of consensus-democratic
institutions. Differences on the way to a consensual elite political culture should be
recognizable on the individual level depending on social background and post-recruitment
factors as shown by Putnam and others. The alternative model in turn makes us expect clear
national differences regardless of institutional similarities, and less relevance of individual
variables. The impact of historical ruptures should leave a mark on collective elite political
cultures.
In order to assess the explanatory value of both models we need to compare political
elites’ commitment to consensus democracy between societies with a very different history of
transition dynamics, but similar in institutional structures. According to the classical model of
political culture, differences in attitudes between the two cases should then be based in socioeconomic differences between the subjects studied and, possibly, specific national traditions
or subcultures. According to my alternative proposition, the above-mentioned factors are less
tangible in their impact on elite political culture than historical junctures, in particular
differences in transition dynamics for the CEE democracies.
Hungary and East Germany are ideal cases for testing empirically the two approaches
to political culture. They resemble most closely the ideal types of multilateral and unilateral
transition, respectively, while sharing a similar extent of consensus democracy in terms of
their institutional arrangements. At the same time, West Germany can be drawn in as a control
case for an alternative explanation based on national cultural legacies. Focusing on more
recent data rather than on data from shortly after the transition enables us to trace the
hypothesized persistence of elite political culture conditioned by the transition juncture even
after more than a decade. This would be surely a much more powerful finding than just
finding a transition-related political culture shortly after transition.
84
Hungary resembles most closely the ideal-typical multilateral mode of transition. With
a legacy of reforms dating back till the 1960s, a strong reform-oriented faction in the
communist party and a variety of differentiated opposition groups and proto-parties (often
with personal links to reformers in the administration), the country set on a gradual,
negotiated transition process in which the foundations for the new democracy were laid
during round-table talks in summer 1989. Probably neither power-holders nor opposition were
expecting these talks to culminate in a full-blown liberal multi-party democracy just a few
months later. In fact, the Hungarian transition can be regarded more as a “failed reform”
rather than a revolution. 284 Indicative of this is the lack of a common term in Hungarian
public discourse denoting the 1989/90 events. Three terms can be heard most frequently:
rendszerváltás, rendszerváltozás, or rendszervaloztatás, meaning, respectively, exchange of
system, change of system, or changing of system. All three have differentiated undertones
concerning the extent and agency of change, which are hard to translate precisely into
English. 285
Instead of a “new beginning” through constitution-making by a democratically elected
assembly, the path of legal continuity was chosen (i.e. constitutional amendments through the
old, illegitimate parliament). There was no large-scale purge or systematic prosecution of
those aligned with the old regime, and only a moderate elite turnover. The files of the former
secret service remained mostly closed to the public, and no generally accepted approach of
how to judge the old regime was debated. 286
In several waves Hungary’s reform communists had first replaced the older generation
of leaders around the veteran leader János Kádár before younger hardliners, such as János
Berecz or Károly Grosz, were replaced by more reform-oriented protagonists. During the
mid- and late 1980s, very active opposition groups had developed which cultivated different
degrees of engagement with the regime. Parties have a large amount of variation, ranging
from the conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (which featured prominent writers and
historians in their ranks) to the revived Independent Smallholders Party and Christian
Democratic Party on the right; the liberal Free Democrats (composed of various dissident
circles) and the radical liberal Young Democrats (an independent student and youth group).
There was already a high degree of plurality in Hungary prior to transition, if only among a
J Batt, ‘The End of Communist Rule in East Central Europe’, Government and Opposition, Vol.23, No.6,
1991.
285
A Arato, Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp.93-94. Also in
my interviews with Hungarian MPs all three terms were used. The first one appears to be the most popular one,
although more right-wing MPs frequently also use the latter two.
286
For a detailed study of Hungary’s transition and its antecedents see R Tökés, Hungary’s negotiated revolution
– Economic reform, social change and political succession, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
284
85
limited group of elites and aspiring elites. 287 The negotiated outcome of the transition assured
the peaceful and constitutional change to a fully democratic system. Some components of the
agreement (i.e. most prominently the way of electing the first president), however, were
changed in a referendum in favour of the proposal of the two liberal opposition parties (who
had abstained from signing the agreement but not impeded its implementation). 288 Economic
transition in Hungary also took a rather gradual path profiting from its lead position in the
region (e.g. in terms of openness and private sector share in the economy when communism
collapsed).
East Germany experienced the most dramatic and rapid transition from the collapse of
hard-line post-totalitarian rule in autumn 1989: mass demonstrations and a mass exodus to
West Germany via Hungary, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November, a short-lived East
German democracy with free elections in March 1990, and culminating in reunification with
West Germany in October 1990. East Germany was among the latest CEE regimes to start
transition, but among the earliest ones to have concluded it with holding fully free elections in
March 1990. There, the transition process, unanimously called die Wende (“the turn” or “the
turning point”) in German, was dominated from the beginning by the opposition, in particular
by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU, an erstwhile puppet party and ally of the ruling
communists in the GDR). In alliance with some civic activists the newly founded East
German Social Democrats (SPD) and, with backing from the West German Kohl government,
the East German CDU soon promoted the unification and the full implementation of the West
German political and market economy model. At the same time, the former communists and
the more left-leaning civic activists were marginalized. They argued for the elaboration of an
independent East German model of democracy which had little popular support. Rapid
activism dominated by the opposition, and later the first freely elected East German
government resulted in fast, far-reaching changes and strong discontinuities in terms of
institutions, policies and personnel in order to start an irreversible integration process with
West Germany.
Popular legitimacy, not legal continuity, was the guiding principle of the new East
German government which, backed by a strong mandate for pro-unification parties, strove to
implement the West German political and market model in order to prepare for unification as
quickly as possible. 289 The first major step in this regard was the economic, monetary and
A Arato, Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp.52-63.
For a comprehensive perspective on the Hungarian round-table talks see A Bozóki (ed.), The Roundtable
Talks of 1989 – The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy, Budapest: Central European UP, 2002.
289
E.g. Already prior to unification decentralisation and federalisation was implemented in the GDR; the social
security system was rebuilt according to the Western model.
287
288
86
social union between the GDR and the FRG set up on 1 July 1990. Economic transition had
many traits of a rapid, decisive “shock therapy”. However, unlike other post-communist
societies, East Germany’s population was protected against the social fall-out through
generous transfers from the West and the immediate full implementation of the West German
social welfare state. 290
Complete discontinuity with the communist GDR was marked by the German
reunification on 3 October 1990, through which the West German Basic Law and the entire
legal body (save for a few temporary exceptions) was extended to East Germany. In legal
terms, unification took place via Article 23 of the West German Grundgesetz (Basic Law)
which allows other German Länder to join the federation. Thus, West Germany was basically
“enlarged” by five new Länder. 291 Claus Offe reminds that unification was actually a
unilateral decision of the first democratic East German government (with support and
approval of the Western side, of course) in which the West German population was not asked
for their assent. 292 Endeavours for a newly elaborated constitution (for either an independent
East Germany or the newly unified Germany) did not materialize: there was little popular
support for a separate East German state, as the only historical legitimacy for its existence
was based in a now discredited socio-economic model of Marxism. 293 Instead, the old West
German political and socio-economic model was virtually rebuilt 1:1 in the East.294
In fact, there was an easily available different option to achieve national unity in a
constitutional way by establishing what Claus Offe calls a new and binding “post-totalitarian
political consensus”. The adoption of a new all-German constitution by an all-German
referendum was a provision actually foreseen for the case of German unification in the
Grundgesetz article 146. 295 This way, the fathers of the West German Basic Law had actually
laid down the provisional nature of the West German constitution. Still, the Grundgesetz was
given a permanent status by majority decision of the two German parliaments in 1990.
290
H Wiesenthal, ’German Unification and ’Model Germany’: An Adventure in Institutional Conservatism’,
West European Politics, Vol.26, No.4, Oct.2003, pp.37-58.
291
D Conradt, The German Polity, 5th ed., New York: Longman, 1993, pp.207-208.
292
C Offe, Varieties of Transition – The East European and East German Experience, Cambridge: Polity Press,
1996, p.14.
293
A working group of the (compared to other CEE countries politically rather irrelevant) round-table talks
prepared new draft constitution for East Germany, which was also seen as a possible new all-German
constitution. In the course of preparing for German unification along the lines of the Grundgesetz however it was
equally disregarded by the last East German government and the Kohl government in Bonn.
294
Attempts for a major overhaul of the Grundgesetz or even the drawing up of a completely new constitution to
be adopted by a popular referendum as supported by the then oppositional SPD were blocked by the Kohl
government. A constitutional committee based on MPs from both chambers of parliament only agreed on minor
changes, leaving out most demands by former East German activists such as more elements of direct democracy
and a more substantive definition of democracy in terms of social equality (D Conradt, 1993, pp.208-210).
295
C Offe, 1996, pp.26-27.
87
Elite turnover in East Germany was the most far-reaching in the region. Applicants for
a large number of public positions have to undergo screening for links to the former secret
service. Virtually all former high-ranking officials lost their office. Economic, judicial,
academic and military elite positions were quickly occupied by West Germans, while political
positions went predominantly to political newcomers from the newly founded or revived
parties. 296 A larger number of both high-ranking officials (e.g. former members of the
Politburo), but also some lower ranking officials (e.g. border guards who had killed people
trying to escape to West Germany), were put on trial though few served sentences. The files
of the former secret service, which had been saved from destruction by civic activists during
the last weeks of the old regime, were made available to the public. 297
According to Edinger, there were several phases of elite change in East Germany since
the beginning of transition in autumn 1989, which started with elite turnover within the old
regime by replacing Erich Honecker with the younger Egon Krenz. Since late 1989, the
process was already characterized by the complete inability of the ruling elites to shape
democratic transition leading to an “imposed revolution” and German unity. 298 Overall, the
East German case of democratisation is very close to the ideal type of unilateral transition
and, therefore, represents the best choice for a case of unilateral transition.
Excursus: Why East Germany is not (such) a special case
Most comparative case studies in the context of democratic transition and consolidation have
designated East Germany a case on its own, reducing its analytical use to inner-German
comparisons only. 299 Usually, three major arguments are advanced as a justification. Firstly,
it is argued that, through unification, East Germany ceased to exist as a state on its own. It is
not a “country” and therefore could not be compared to other (“real”) countries. Secondly,
the East German transition process is often presented as being completely dominated, if not
pre- or over determined, by the unification issue and almost entirely driven and controlled by
296
West Germans became to occupy a few of the most prominent positions in the Länder, e.g. Prime Minister
posts, and those positions which required western legal and economic expertise, (e.g. Land ministers for finance
or justice) for which there were few qualified Eastern candidates.
297
For a comprehensive description of the East German democratic transition and subsequent unification with
West Germany in English see G Glaessner, The Unification Process in Germany – from dictatorship to
democracy, London: Pinter Publishers, 1992.
298
M Edinger, ’Alte Eliten in einer jungen Demokratie? Elitenzirkulation und Elitenreproduktion unter
ostdeutschen Parlamentariern’, in: H Veen (ed.), Alte Eliten in jungen Demokratien? Wechsel, Wandel und
Kontinuität in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2004, pp.69-70.
299
For two intra-German comparative studies on political elites in English see: R Rohrschneider, Learning
Democracy – Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford UP, 1999; J Yoder, From East
Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP, 1999. Both follow the more
traditional approach to political culture.
88
West Germany. 300 Thirdly, in the context of comparative elite studies, East Germany is often
portrayed as not having its own political elite, both due to the absence of a national
government since late 1990 and the takeover of virtually all key positions by West Germans.
All three claims can be challenged. Moreover, the very nature of the East German case offers
new opportunities for comparative studies (which other CEE cases do not offer, as I will
discuss in the following).
Firstly, on the surface, East Germany is certainly special because of the unique event
of national unification in the post-communist realm, due to a part of it being located in the
West. Yet, in the broader CEE context, the discontinuity of states and the coincidence of
national reformulation with democratisation are rather frequent and certainly complicate
comparisons. Nevertheless, the reverse of unification (i.e. the split-up of countries) has not
caused us to exclude cases such as Slovenia, the Czech Republic, or Lithuania from
comparative studies on democratic development. The absence of a post-communist state
surely does not imply the absence of a post-communist society, or the absence of a postcommunist elite (see further below). One does not have to go as far as some authors who
claim a kind of distinct national identity of East Germans 301 to see that the Eastern part of the
unified Germany in many regards (e.g. social structures, voting behaviour, value systems etc.)
is rather more “post-communist” than “West German”. 302
Secondly, East Germany’s transition (i.e. the collapse of communism and the
installation of a freely elected government) was based on a domestic transition process whose
agenda was dominated by issues such as human rights, democracy, rule of law, and
environmental protection. Increasing opposition to the old regime as elsewhere in the region,
not the drive to unification, brought down communism and installed democracy in the GDR.
Massive demonstrations in Leipzig and other cities in autumn 1989 were triggered by an
accumulation of domestic events: obvious electoral fraud in the last local elections,
increasing economic and ecological decay. Parallel developments that occurred within the
Soviet bloc (Gorbachev, Solidarnosc, Hungary opening the iron curtain etc.) which also
caught West Germany completely unprepared. The Leipzig demonstrators in late 1989 fought
for a political liberties and democracy. Not Helmut Kohl, but civic activists, church leaders
and ordinary people in the streets brought democracy to East Germany. German unification
only became a real option after communism had been defeated and East Germany had
300
H Kitschelt et al., 1999, p.389.
M Howard, ‘An East German Ethnicity? Understanding the New Division of Unified Germany’, German
Politics and Society, Vol.13/37, 1995, pp.49-70; J Yoder, ‘West-East Integration: Lessons from East Germany’s
Accelerated Transition’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.14, No.1, pp.114-138.
302
J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP, 1999, p.118.
301
89
become democratic. The democratisation process in East Germany, which resembled other
CEE countries, (e.g. Czechoslovakia) predated and enabled unification, and thus left its own
legacies.
Moreover, it can be also argued that, similar to the East German case, none of the
other CEE transitions was free of western influences. George Soros, Radio Free Europe, and
an increasing inflow of western money (both in the form of credits for the bankrupt regimes
and tacit aid to the opposition), or liberalized travel regimes 303 did have a significant impact
on the course of transition. The above-mentioned factors enabled the diffusion of liberal
democratic values or materially supported the opposition in all CEE countries (arguably in
some countries much more and much earlier than in East Germany). 304 Shortly after
transition, the ultimate goal of EU membership then imposed very strict conditionalities (if
not a predetermination) on CEE countries’ democratic consolidation, and strongly limited the
leeway for domestic politics as outlined above.
Thirdly, while there is no longer a national East German government there surely is a
distinct East German political elite, which can be found both at the national and at the Land
level. As mentioned above, unlike in other areas, elite turnover in politics did not result in a
West German dominance of East Germany’s political elites. Exceptions for some key
administrative positions prove the rule. 305 Moreover, East German political elites can still be
clearly distinguished from West German ones in sociological terms and, in many respects,
resemble more some of the other CEE countries. 306 Furthermore, the existence of an
intermediate level of Land politics offers a distinct breeding-ground for the reproduction of
East German politicians. 307 Finally, the “import” of some political leaders is, in fact, not a
special East German phenomenon. Current presidents of all the three Baltic states or the
former Bulgarian Prime Minister (until 1946 known as the Tsar) are just the most prominent
examples of (self-styled) politicians who returned to their native country only after decades of
303
Since the late 1970s it had become easier for a Pole or a Hungarian to visit West-Berlin than for an East
Berliner.
304
M Spinner, The ‘National Interest’ and the Transformation of Hungarian Foreign Politics in the 1980s’, MA
thesis, University of Birmingham, 2002.
305
H Derlien, ’Elitenzirkulation und Institutionenvertrauen’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, No.4, 1997,
pp.539-556. In fact, most of the West German politicians assuming office in East German Länder or running in
East German constituencies do have roots in the region and are just “returning”.
306
C Welzel, ‘Rekrutierung und Sozialisation der ostdeutschen Eliten. Aufstieg einer demokratischen
Gegenelite?, in: W Bürklin, H Rebensdorf (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Rekrutierung und Integration,
Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997, pp.201-237. See also the discussion of socio-economic background factors
further below with more references.
307
J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP, 1999.
Also on the national level there are a number of separate East German institutions, such as so-called
Landesgruppen within the factions of the parliament, or cross-factional East German working groups in the
Bundestag.
90
exile during which they were politically socialised and often even naturalised as citizens of
Western democracies.
Thus, in the light of the above-mentioned facts, East Germany appears more as an (not
so) extreme case of CEE democratic transition rather than a special case “off the map”. 308
History only offers a handful of cases for comparative investigation. To the dismay of some
scholars history cannot be replicated in the laboratories, nor surrounding factors held
constant while some variables are being manipulated. However, when looking at the impact
of political culture East Germany offers quite unique chances for comparative case studies
due to the (almost) “laboratory-like” conditions of the divided German nation (which allows
to hold constant the tricky variable of deep “national” culture). 309 Researchers excluding the
case from cross-country comparisons, due to the mentioned (often superficially argued)
reasons, therefore forego some great opportunities. A number of scholars in fact have
discovered the great prospects East Germany offers for comparative studies in the postcommunist realm, with West Germany as a control case. 310 In my study I will pay special
attention to the peculiarities of the East German case (but equally so to peculiar features of
other CEE cases) and in particular illustrate the existence of a distinctly different East
German political culture on the elite level by including a sample of West German MPs for
comparison (see below). Thus, it can be explored in how far East German political culture is
actually overshadowed by West German influences, and/or both East and West German
political culture based in a common, deeply rooted “national” political culture reaching back
into long-term historical experiences.
With West German politicians as a “yardstick” we can determine the “natural” level of
consensual political culture to which East Germans should have adapted according to the
civic culture paradigm. This shall be measured (in an imperfect way) by establishing the
number of consensus-oriented and majoritarian statements in a given period of time in
speeches delivered in the same institution, i.e. the Bundestag (see below). At the same time,
we can control for the impact of deep national cultural legacies, the “longue durée.” As both
East German and West German MPs, who are now working in the same polity, are supposed
to be endowed with the same long-lasting German cultural legacies any differences between
308
For a more extensive debate on whether or not the East German case is unique in the CEE context see: A
Pickel / H Wiesenthal, The Great Experiment, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1997.
309
R Rohrschneider, 1999.
310
M Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, Cambridge UK: Cambridge UP, 2003.
Also Pollack et al. include East Germany in comparative studies on CEE political culture (D Pollack / J Jacobs /
O Müller / G Pickel (eds.), Political Culture in post-communist Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). One of the
latest volumes in comparative democratisation with a global also includes East Germany (U van Beek (ed.),
Democracy under construction: Patterns from four continents, Barbara Budrich Publishers: Bloomfield Hills &
Opladen, 2005).
91
them in terms of political culture have to be based in lasting legacies of the communist period
and the transition to democracy. The bigger these differences, the less support an explanation
based on “deep national culture” would find.
Consensus democracy in Hungary and Germany
Commonalities
East Germany and Hungary experienced very different transition dynamics, and are close to
the above-outlined ideal types of unilateral and multilateral transition respectively. At the
same time, Hungary and Germany share rather similar, namely consensus (rather than
majoritarian) institutional set-ups on the national level following the model of Lijphart. When
amending the Hungarian constitution in 1989, Hungary in fact adopted a number of
provisions on the basis of the German model.
Both countries have moderate multi-party (rather than two-party) systems and have
been governed by coalition governments rather than one-party governments. Hungary,
between 1990 and 2002, was even governed by oversized coalitions only. Both countries have
legislatives which, as “working parliaments” with a strong committee system, represent a
counterbalance against the government (as opposed to cabinet-dominated systems). Their
mixed electoral systems assure a higher degree of proportional representation than pure firstpast-the-post systems. 311
Moreover, both countries have a written constitution with rather rigid requirements for
constitutional amendment and strong judicial review. The German constitutional court’s
rulings are seen as usually seeking a middle ground, reconciling opposed positions and thus
being an important contribution to Germany’s Verhandlungsdemokratie. 312 The Hungarian
constitutional court is even regarded as one of the most powerful and activist ones in the
world, due to its far-reaching judicial competences. This makes it a potentially very powerful
veto player. 313 Finally, central banks are independent from the government and, particularly
in the Hungarian case, have repeatedly asserted themselves as independent players next to or
311
Lijphart deems Hungary’s electoral system as “moderately majoritarian” (A Lijphart, ‘Democratisation and
Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 1989-1991’, in: Gy Szoboszlai (ed.), Flying
Blind: Emerging Democracy in East Central Europe, Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association, 1992,
p.102).
312
Rudzio, 2006, p.293.
313
Zs Enyedi, ‘The Survival of the Fittest: Party System Concentration in Hungary’, in: S Jungerstam-Mulders
(ed.), Post-Communist EU Member States – Parties and Party Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, p.188.
92
even against the government. 314 These are clear indicators for consensus democracies
according to Lijphart. 315
Some constitutional elements in both countries, such as the 5%-hurdle, certainly have
a rather majoritarian character though, as well as the traditionally strong fusion between
executive and legislative offices. Both party systems are quite competitive and concentrate
around two large parties respectively. Nevertheless, in Lijphart’s model Germany is still well
on the consensualist side in the executives-party dimension covering executive power
concentration, executive-legislative relationships, party systems, electoral systems and interest
group representation. 316 Given the far-reaching resemblance between the two countries in
these dimensions the same can be argued for the Hungarian case. 317 The constructive vote of
no-confidence, which is in place in both constitutions, can be regarded as a neutral device
between consensus and majoritarian democracy as it contributes to government stability
regardless of whether a government is based on a parliamentary majority or not. 318 Beyond
these commonalities, I will now discuss in more detail the differences between the two cases.
Germany’s stable quasi-consociationalism
(West) Germany is one of the most prominent federal democracies. In Lijphart’s study
Germany even scores the highest value among the thirty-six countries in the federal-unitary
dimension covering de-centralisation/federalisation, bi-cameralism, judicial rigidity, judicial
review of constitutional change and central bank independence. 319 Concerning the executiveparties dimension, Germany occupies a moderately consensualist position for Lijphart’s
second time period (starting from the 1970s) as opposed to a more consensualist position
before. 320 Nevertheless, there is no doubt in Germany’s classification as a consensus
democracy. 321 The introduction of a high number of veto points and the strengthening of
regional powers was in fact a deliberate measure by the Western Allied Powers after World
314
Zs Enyedi / G Tóka, ‘The Only Game in Town: Party Politics in Hungary’, in: S White, D Stansfield, P Webb
(eds.), Political Parties in Transitional Democracies, Oxford UP, 2006 (forthcoming), p.22.
315
For more details on Hungary A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999,
pp.285-298; for Germany: T Rudzio, Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden: VS
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 7th edition, 2006.
316
A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy –Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New
Haven: Yale UP, 1999, p.312.
317
A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.292-293.
318
A Lijphart, 1999, p.101; differently Zs Enyedi / G Tóka, ‘The Only Game in Town: Party Politics in
Hungary’, in: S White, D Stansfield, P Webb (eds.), Political Parties in Transitional Democracies, Oxford UP,
2006 (forthcoming), p.15.
319
A Lijphart, 1999, p.312.
320
A Lijphart, 1999, p.255.
321
K Grabow, ‘Zur Rolle der Eliten in der demokratischen Gesellschaft’, in: O Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther
(eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung,
2006, p.33.
93
War II to prevent Germany from regaining a strong nationalist identity (and from re-emerging
as a powerful state in Europe). In fact, the Länder, some of which were newly created or
rearranged by the Western allies, were the nucleus of West German democracy in the late
1940s. Their elected representatives were charged with drawing up the Basic Law of 1949,
which was then ratified by the Länder parliaments.
The German Länder participate in most federal legislation through the second
chamber of parliament (Bundesrat). Their administrative structures implement most of the
federal legislation and therefore constantly negotiate the details of policy with the federal
government. Moreover, there is a large amount of cooperation among the Länder, or between
the Länder and the federal level, in areas where the Länder have all legislative powers (e.g.
education, culture). In these areas Länder executives, rather than federal ministers, represent
Germany on the European level. Thus, there are many inter-organisational linkages, and a
large amount of joint decision-making. This is particularly visible in fiscal federalism – the
Länder hold a veto right on regulating all major taxes due to a division of revenues between
centre and Länder. 322 Since the 1960s, the share of legislation which the Bundesrat can veto is
higher than 50%. 323
A key institution of German consensus democracy is the mediation committee
(Vermittlungsausschuß) consisting of members of Bundesrat and Bundestag, which draws up
compromises on legislation contested between the two chambers of parliament. Steiner et al.’s
impressive case study illustrates the high degree of deliberation, which is their measure for the
“spirit of accommodation”, in this particular setting. 324 Fritz Scharpf, in contrast, does not
consider Germany a consensus democracy in terms of political culture as, in his opinion,
partisan conflict on the national level overshadows accommodation on other levels. 325 In fact,
there is a lot of crossing back and forth of politicians between Länder and federal offices
making a clear separation between the two levels difficult.
The federalist tradition in Germany can actually be dated much further back than to
the post-war period. Already, the Holy Roman Empire, which consisted of multiple
independent territories and a rather weak centre, was held together by consociationalist
arrangements. Gerhard Lehmbruch also characterizes contemporary Germany as “quasiconsociationalist”. According to him, the idea of parity and negotiated politics leads back
322
W Rudzio, 2006.
W Ismayr, Der Deutsche Bundestag im Politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Ein
Studienbuch, Opladen, 2000, p.289.
324
J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing
Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp.140-142.
325
F Scharpf, ‘No exit from the joint-decision trap? Can German federalists reform themselves?’, European
University Institute Working Paper, No.24 / 2005, pp.3-4.
323
94
until the Westphalian peace of 1648, which put an end to the thirty-year war enshrining the
equal sovereignty of all territories regardless of size, religion and constitution. Since then, the
idea of a need for parity between centre (Reich) and periphery (individual states), between
Protestants and Catholics, and later between different social groups has been foundational to
German politics. Competing, hierarchical understandings of conflict management (be it
Prussian militarism or Fascism) have been discredited in a lasting way, while competitive
democracy came to play a role rather late. According to Lehmbruch, the Weimar Republic
was a ‘social compact’, a failed attempt to actually put in place a working consociational
democracy reconciling competitive democracy with pluralism and parity. Certain institutional
legacies, however, survived or were revived in 1949 along with a competitive party system
arranged around the two large parties. 326 Also, the corporatist interest group policies
(especially collectivised wage bargaining of peak associations), parity and co-determination
(Mitbestimmung) in large enterprises’ boards, and corporatist institutions governing social
security and public health care system became a key feature of German democracy. 327
Beyond this, Germany is well known for its tradition of proportional distribution of posts for
constitutional and other high courts, high administrative positions, the secret service etc.
328
This Proporzsystem is also a frequent feature of consociationalist democracies such as Austria
or Belgium, which Lijphart regards as extreme cases of consensualist democracy (see above).
Appointments, according to the rules of Proporz, can be interpreted as inserting veto players
inside institutions.
Over the last decades (basically since the origins of the West German state in 1949),
the German consensualist set-up has changed very little. In fact, certain consensualist
properties, especially concerning the powers of the second chamber (Bundesrat) have been
further extended by increasing the scope of laws which require approval by the Bundesrat in
the 1970s and 80s. Only a recent reform initiative adopted in spring 2006 aims at reducing the
number
of
federal
laws
requiring
both
Bundestag
and
Bundesrat
approval
(Zustimmungsgesetze). At the same time, powers of the Länder increase in other areas of
legislation where they obtain exclusive legislative powers, thus reducing the extent of the
German Verhandlungsdemokratie (negotiation democracy; i.e. the need for a close
cooperation between the two chambers in legislation). 329 In the framework of Lijphart these
326
G Lehmbruch, ‘Quasi-Consociationalism in German Politics: Negotiated Democracy and the Legacy of the
Westphalian Peace’, Acta Politica, Vol.37, No.1/2, spring/summer 2002, pp.175-194.
327
G Lehmbruch, 2002, pp.175-194; K Grabow, 2006, p.34.
328
W Rudzio, 2006, p.448.
329
W Rudzio, 2006, p.282. See also: ‘Förderalismusreform: Der Kampf um Kompetenzen, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 150, 1.Juli 2006, pp.6-7. On earlier reform attempts see F Scharpf, ‘No exit from the
95
changes overall actually mean no change, as Germany becomes slightly less consensualist
concerning the bicameralist indicator (as the powers of the second chamber get diminished)
but slightly more consensualist concerning the federalist indicator (as powers are transferred
from the central government to the regions).
At this moment it is still too early to say how further envisaged reforms such as a
different system of fiscal federalism might change the balance of power. Overall, regardless
of its rather competitive party system and quite strong executive, Germany is and remains
clearly on the consensualist side of Lijphart’s typology, and is likely to do so for the near
future. The high number of veto players in German democracy therefore presupposes a spirit
of accommodation among its political elites.
Democratic Hungary: From extreme consensus towards majoritarian democracy?
Being rather small and homogenous, Hungary is a unitary state. Still it has quite a high degree
of administrative decentralization with some powers for local authorities. 330 However, there is
no second chamber of parliament. 331 In other indicators (e.g. constitutional rigidity,
constitutional review, and arguably also central bank independence since the 2002 Euro
adoption in Germany) Hungary has a higher degree of consensus institutions than Germany.
Hungary’s constitutional court has been described as one of the most powerful and activist in
the world, often making “political” decisions and enjoying a high reputation. 332 Next to
constitutional changes, a larger number of important laws also require a two-thirds majority in
parliament for revision.
Hungarian presidents since 1990 appear to have built up some counterweight to the
government by using their right to make parliament reconsider legislation, by making public
statements in which they have sometimes explicitly criticised the government, by implicitly
siding with opposition positions, or by regularly inviting the leaders of all parties in
parliament for consultations. 333 All of this has been less frequent in the case of Germany.334
joint-decision trap? Can German federalists reform themselves?’, European University Institute Working Paper,
No.24 / 2005.
330
A Bozóki, E Simon, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Hungary’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal
Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine,
Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, pp.159-160.
331
The introduction of a second chamber of parliament to represent civil society associations, churches, trade
unions, employers’ organisations etc. has however been a recurring proposal (A Arato, Civil Society,
Constitution and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p.77).
332
K Scheppele, ‘Constitutional Negotiations – Political Contexts of Judicial Activism in Post-Soviet Europe’,
International Sociology, Vol.18, No.1, March 2003, pp.219-238; A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.161-163.
333
A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.156-158.
334
Since 1949 there have been only seven occasions when German Presidents sent legislation back to parliament
for reconsideration (Die ZEIT, 26 October 2006). The current President Horst Köhler however appears
somewhat more proactive than his predecessors and has repeatedy sent back legislation in 2006.
96
Moreover, Hungary has four independent ombudsmen, two of whom have a constitutionally
enshrined status. They address people’s complaints about violations of their rights (e.g. civil
rights, ethnic minorities’ rights, data protection) by the administration. They have repeatedly
used their authority to confront government decisions and advanced their own proposals for
changes to legislation or policy in their reports to parliament. 335 Therefore, they can also serve
as a (moderate) counterbalance against the dominance of majority rule and executive power,
if only from a reactive position.
A number of authors, therefore, view Hungary’s democratic set-up well on the
consensus side of Lijphart’s framework. At the same time, this finding is contrasted with the
strongly adversarial political culture (which will in fact be addressed further below). 336
Beyond that, there has been some debate in Hungarian social sciences about Hungary being a
consensus democracy, mostly due to a number of changes since the democratic transition in
1990. An extreme type of consensus democracy (or what Àgh calls half-made or fragmented
democracy) with an overdriven separation of powers was put in place by the Hungarian
negotiated transition in 1990. 337 Its most extreme features, such as the large number of laws
requiring a 2/3 majority, were diminished already starting in 1990. In that year another “pact”
between the two largest parties, the newly governing conservative MDF and the liberal
SZDSZ via constitutional amendments strongly reduced the number of laws requiring a
supermajority in order to assure the governability of the country. Yet, at the same time, some
new consensualist elements were introduced as a concession to the opposition (e.g. the
election of their presidential candidate and agreements on the even distribution of committee
chairs in parliament). The latter remained a practice until 1998.
The 1994-1998 oversized coalition by MSZP and SZDSZ, in spite of its supermajority,
failed to make far-reaching unilateral decisions (safe for the so-called Bokros package, which
I will discuss below) against the other parties and constitutional bodies and aimed at
accommodating them. The 1998-2002 conservative government, lead by Fidesz, however
undermined some elements of consensus democracy (e.g. by reducing the revenue basis of
local governments). 338 The Orbán administration also abolished self-governing pension and
health insurance funds, replacing them with agencies controlled by ministry of finance and
S Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy – Building Accountable Government in Hungary and
Poland, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.74-83; A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.163-164.
336
A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999; Zs Enyedi, ‘The Survival of
the Fittest: Party System Concentration in Hungary’, in: S Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post-Communist EU
Member States – Parties and Party Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, p.188.
337
A Ágh, ‘Early Consolidation and Performance Crisis: The Majoritarian-Consensus Democracy Debate in
Hungary’, West European Politics, Vol.24, No.3, July 2001, p.94.
338
A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, p.160.
335
97
thus deprived trade unions and social sector interest organizations of institutional bargaining
positions in the budgetary process. 339 Shifting from a weekly to a three-weekly parliamentary
session timetable and from a yearly to a two-yearly budget also diminished the parliament’s
role. 340 The powers of the executive were strengthened by so-called “frame” laws
(kerettörvények) empowering the government at the expense of the legislature. Finally, power
became increasingly centralised in a strong prime minister’s office, a feature that was kept
also in the subsequent socialist administrations. 341
Some scholars see Hungary’s political landscape shifting towards a bipolar (if not twoparty) system with the smaller parties disappearing, closely aligning or even merging with the
two large ones. This would create a party system similar to the German one, which was quite
competitive from the beginning and favouring party concentration. Moreover, the rules for
party finances effectively contribute to prevent the entry of smaller new parties. 342
Nevertheless, some of the phenomena connected with party concentration in Hungary seem to
mirror, to some extent, other post-transition countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia or
Poland. 343 During the first parliamentary cycle the threshold for entering parliament was
raised from four to five percent (as is the case in Germany), which was predominantly
motivated by the desire of the centrist parties to keep out of parliament right-wing extremist
and
revived communist parties. Observers also point out that the last elections were
predominantly personalised and focused on the two opposite camps and their respective
leaders: Orbán and Gyurcsány, reminding of American or British examples. 344
Some authors, such as András Körösényi, therefore argue that over time Hungary has
actually developed towards a quasi-presidential system in which the prime minister takes on a
similarly strong role as the American president or the British premier concentrating executive
power in his hands. Although Körösényi prefers to use the presidential vs. cabinet typology
over Lijphart’s consensualism/majoritarianism model, his argument basically mirrors the
claim that Hungary is continuously developing towards a more majoritarian system and is
339
Zs Enyedi / G Tóka, ‘The Only Game in Town: Party Politics in Hungary’, in: S White, D Stansfield, P Webb
(eds.), Political Parties in Transitional Democracies, Oxford UP, 2006 (forthcoming), p.25; M Brusis, V
Dimitrov, ‘Executive configuration and fiscal performance in post-communist central and eastern Europe’,
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.8, No.6, p.900.
340
At the same time however, four new standing committees in parliament were created, arguably as additional
control mechanisms of the parliament (G Illonszki, ‘Parliament and Government in Hungary: a changing
relationship’, Central European Political Science Review, Vol.2, No.3, summer 2001, p.80)
341
Zs Enyedi / G Tóka, 2006, pp.32-33; A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.154-156.
342
Zs Enyedi, 2006, pp.187-188.
343
A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.149-151.
344
A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.170-176. For the 2006 elections Fidesz presented a candidate for the
(constitutionally not prescribed) office of vice-prime minister in analogy to the American presidential elections.
Also the establishment of “shadow cabinets” by the opposition has been introduced.
98
reducing veto points in the system. Zsolt Enyedi argues that the adversarial political culture
made Hungarian political elites try to bring institutions closer to their political culture as they
frustrated victorious majorities rather than fostering mutual understanding. 345 In his 1999
publication, Körösényi regards the confrontational political culture in Hungary as based in the
need for political parties to first establish and demarcate their electorates rather than to
reconcile subcultures by accommodative strategies. 346
Other authors however argue that attempts to centralize and decentralize power
actually came in waves. 347 Attila Ágh sees as a basic pattern that conservative governments
(1990-1994, and after 1998) aimed at diminishing consensualism while the social-liberal
government (1994-1998) tried to “complete consensualism” but failed in this undertaking. 348
Similarly, Gabriella Illonszki sees the 1994-1998 parliament as the one boasting the highest
degree of inter-party cooperation and interaction, while the previous and the following
parliaments were characterized by bi-polarity and conflict. She observes that, while in the first
parliament (1990-1994) individual MPs were dominating the scene, power shifted to
committees in the second parliament (1994-1998) and to factions in the third one (19982002). 349 Furthermore, oversized coalition governments remained the form of government
until 2002. 350
Similarly, regional decentralisation came in several waves with some reversals. While
there was more decentralisation under the 1994-1998 social-liberal coalition, there was a
reduction of powers for local self-administration under the following conservative
government. According to Brigid Fowler decentralisation is, in fact, a valence issue in
Hungary; there have been just very different arguments over the means and ways. Political
elites present the relationship between central government and sub-state units as inherently
conflict-ridden rather than neutral among Hungarian political elites. Hungarian parties have
been attacking each other for allegedly “centralising” when in power and made negative
references to the communist legacy of centralism when doing so. 351 The introduction of
directly elected mayors in large cities from 1994 somewhat strengthened the standing of sub345
Zs Enyedi, 2006, p.188.
A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.294-295.
347
See debate in Századvég, spring 2001, No.20, and autumn 2001, No.22, especially A Körösényi,
‘Parlamentáris vagy elnöki kormányzás? Az Orbán-kormány összehasonlító perspektívából’, Századvég, spring
2001, No. 20, pp. 3-38.
348
A Ágh, ‘Early Consolidation and Performance Crisis: The Majoritarian-Consensus Democracy Debate in
Hungary’, West European Politics, Vol.24, No.3, July 2001, pp.89-112.
349
G Illonszki, ‘Parliament and Government in Hungary: a changing relationship’, Central European Political
Science Review, Vol.2, No.3, summer 2001, p.85.
350
Zs Enyedi, 2006, p.186.
351
B Fowler, ’Hungary: Patterns of Political Conflict over Territorial-Administrative Reform’, in: J Batt, K
Wolczuk (eds.), Region, State and Identity in Central Eastern Europe, London: Frank Cass, 2002, pp.16-35.
346
99
national players, but decreasing fiscal autonomy of local administration since 1998 worked in
to the opposite direction. 352
After the 2002 elections a number of more consensualist elements were re-established
(e.g. the weekly parliamentary session and the yearly budget). Furthermore, smaller parties
which have been pronounced dead keep surviving and managed to enter both the 2002 and
2006 parliaments, and observers go on waiting for the two-party system to materialize. In a
similar way, observers claim the return of a more accommodative position of the prime
minister towards parliament. Starting from the first freely elected prime minister Antal and his
successors (Boross, Horn, Orbán and Medgyessy) there was a gradual decrease in the prime
minister’s presence in parliament. Ferenc Gyurcsány, the first prime minister without a seat in
parliament (prior to the 2006 elections), seemed to emphasise his commitment to parliament
by spending much more time in the plenary and making his most important policy
announcements in parliament (breaking with the practice of his predecessors). 353
This again contrasts with plans of the re-elected Gyurcsány government in summer
2006 which includes, among others: a restriction of MPs’ immunity in cases of ordinary
criminal offences, scaling down of parliament and local administration, the abolition of the
intermediate megye system of territorial administration, a streamlining of the cabinet, a
reduction of the number of ministers and state secretaries, and the centralisation of more
powers in the prime minister’s office. The latter has been partly realized, e.g. with regards to
the administration of EU funds. 354
In sum, while an ultimate judgement might still be premature, there appears to be
enough evidence to still regard Hungary as consensus democratic on most of Lijphart’s
indicators (as done by Körösényi in 1999) despite some changes. 355 While the 1990
constitutional changes basically abolished excessive and unworkable consensualist
arrangements, some later developments did indeed add certain majoritarian elements. Some of
them were undone again later though. Nevertheless, similar to Germany, Hungary remains a
consensus democracy due to its large number of veto players. Like in the German case, a high
amount of the “spirit of accommodation” is required in the cooperation between the various
institutions.
As outlined for CEE in general, and in the Hungarian case in particular, it makes more
sense to refer to the individual properties of consensus democracy in terms of veto points than
352
Zs Enyedi / G Tóka, 2006, p.25.
’Házi kassza’, HVG, 28 January 2006, pp.8-12.
354
’Pläne der Reformer’, Pester Lloyd, 31 May 2006, p.1-2.
355
A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.292-293.
353
100
to conceptualise two independently clustering dimensions as Lijphart does. This prevents us
from assuming some kind of unified system of consensus democracy in which all dimensions
are indiscriminately consensus-democratic, excluding the possibility of individual
majoritarian elements (e.g. the party system), and ongoing change in both directions.
The methodology
Content analysis of parliamentary speeches
In the previous chapter, Hungary and East Germany were established as two cases with very
different experiences of democratic transition but similar degrees of consensus democracy
through their high number of veto players in democratic decision-making. In the following, I
go on to discuss the approach used in order to test the two models of political culture. In a
first step, I analyse elite statements quantitatively in terms of the ratio between positive and
negative statements in the five ideational dimensions of consensus democracy established
above. This way, standardized indicators are derived which can be used in order to confirm or
disconfirm the pattern expected in both the traditional approach to political culture and in my
own hypotheses.
Taking these indicators as either expressions of an implicit or explicit political culture,
I test for the patterns expected in the hypotheses of the two models. In this quantitative
investigation, I will first apply the individualist approach of the classical model and take elite
statements as the expression of individually internalized beliefs. I will then measure the extent
to which they are consensualist or majoritarian. Discussing the limited plausibility of this
model, in the second step the indicators will be taken as proxies for discourses and my
alternative hypotheses will be tested. For this purpose, the extent to which discourses are
shared across party lines and socio-economic backgrounds will be explored by drawing in
qualitative data from semi-structured interviews. An in-depth analysis, focused on the five
ideational dimensions of consensus democracy, then puts the discourses into the context of
the existing democratic systems in the two cases. Finally, I discuss their potential to
contribute to the consolidation of consensus democracy.
In my case studies, I concentrate on members of parliament in the Hungarian
parliament (Országgyűlés) and members of the German parliament (Bundestag) from East
German constituencies. MPs are, next to high-ranking members of the executive, the most
visible, powerful and influential members of the political elite and therefore justify this
positional approach (which is also the most common in existing empirical research on
101
political elites in democratic societies). 356 Due to the generally public character of
parliamentary sessions, MPs provide extensive, rich, and systematic material which can be
used for analysis. According to democratic theory, parliaments are the key setting for
deliberation of the representatives of the people. Moreover, parliaments include a broader
political spectrum in terms of membership than any other high-ranking positional elite (e.g.
the government). As the parliament is one of the key arenas of consensus democracy, I chose
this strongly institutionalised context for my comparative case study in order to hold constant
potential influences of this setting. Further research needs to determine in how far other
settings might have an impact on consensualism. 357
In this dissertation, I focus on a limited number of MPs in a limited period, namely the
last two parliamentary cycles. This has to do both with reasons of feasibility, data availability
and theoretical considerations. At the time of writing, there were no electronically available
transcripts of parliamentary speeches for the first two electoral cycles in Hungary. As for the
German case, they do exist, but cannot be searched electronically for individual MP’s
contributions. At the same time, finding patterns expected in my hypotheses in parliamentary
speeches during the most recent years strengthens my argument. Nevertheless, for future
research, it might be an interesting task to trace these patterns also for speeches still closer to
transition, and, in the future, for speeches still further away from it.
For both Hungary and East Germany, I picked twenty-seven Hungarian and twentyeight East German MPs, covering all parties represented in parliament roughly in relation to
the size of the share of votes in the 2002 general elections in both Hungary and Germany. 358
The sample assures a balanced mix of age, gender, professional background, regional origin
(urban, rural, capital), time in parliament, and lists the single-member district MPs (national
and regional) which also roughly reflects the distribution of these factors among all MPs. 359
356
E.g. R Putnam, 1973; V Kaina, M Sauer, ’Ostdeutsche Eliten und gesamtdeutsche Führungsschicht im
gesellschaftlichen Integrationsprozeß. Ergebnisse der „Potsdamer Elitestudie 1995“’, in: P Hübner (ed.), Eliten
im Sozialismus – Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR, Köln: Böhlau, 1999, p.91. Differently Kitschelt et al.
1999, p.144, who interview both high-ranking and middle-ranking politicians. Non-democratic societies with
their usually lesser degree of stable institutions might require other kinds of approaches, e.g. reputational or
decision-based approaches (B Wasner, Eliten in Europa, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004,
pp.119-125).
357
Variation in contexts has some influence on the quality of deliberation in Steiner et al.’s DQI. (J Steiner / A
Bächtiger / M Spörndli / M Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse,
Cambridge University Press, 2004.)
358
Both Hungary and Germany had almost synchronous electoral cycles since 1990 until the 2005 early German
elections with general elections in 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002. In the electoral cycle starting from 2002 the two
countries were governed by a centre-left coalition government. These similarities are another asset allowing me
to control for potential short-term distortions (e.g. campaigning) and the impact of incumbency.
359
Due to their minor relevance no independent MPs were included.
102
For the East German case I focused exclusively on MPs from the East German
constituencies. 360
[table 4 about here]
I decided to focus on East German members of the Bundestag rather than members of the East
German regional Länder parliaments or local politicians. The latter two can be more
conveniently identified and separated from the all-German national context but they were
already the subject of a number of studies, next to the members of the first (and last) freely
elected GDR parliament in 1990. 361 As I am not interested in regional discourses but national
ones (and given the higher positional location of MPs), my choice for the so-far underexplored East German MPs was clear. Moreover, finding a distinct East German political
culture, even among politicians interacting in a common institutional setting (the Bundestag)
with West German politicians, would even further strengthen the thrust of my arguments.
This includes the East German Länder and the formerly Eastern part of Berlin. Two constituencies in Berlin
which comprise both sections of the former East and West of the city were not included. There are a handful of
MPs in East German constituencies who either moved to West Germany before 1989 and returned later or who
are “Western imports”. In the field of politics elite transfer from the West is rather rare as mentioned (against
the wide-spread assumption), nevertheless it is reflected also in my sample with one MP who only moved to an
East German constituency in the early 1990s. The other East German MPs in the sample (as around 90% of their
colleagues from East German constituencies) grew up and lived in East Germany before 1990.
361
For regional political elites see W Patzelt, ‘Ostdeutsche Parlamentarier in ihrer ersten Wahlperiode: Wandel
und Angleichung’, Historical Social Research, Vol.22, No.3/4, 1997, pp.160-180; H Derlien, S Lock, ’Eine neue
politische Elite? Rekrutierung und Karrieren der Abgeordneten in den fünf neuen Landtagen’, Zeitschrift für
Parlamentsfragen, No.1, 1994, pp.61-94; S Lock, Ostdeutsche Landtagsabgeordnete 1990-1994: vom
personellen Neubeginn zur politischen Professionalisierung?, Berlin: VWF Verlag für Wissenschaft und
Forschung, 1998; R Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy – Democratic and Economic Values in Unified
Germany, Oxford UP, 1999; and J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites,
Durham: Duke UP, 1999; S Schüttemeyer, M Lübke, ‘Der Brandenburgische Landtag nach zehn Jahren – ein
Parlament wie jedes andere?’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, pp.585-598; L
Davidson-Schmich, Becoming Party Politicians – Eastern German State Legislators in the Decade following
Democratization, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006; J Plöhn, ‘Ostdeutsche Profile in in der
Politik – Vom Aufbruch zur Gesamtdeutschen Normalität’, in: O Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther (eds.), Eliten in
Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006, pp.135152.
For local political elites see: C Perron, ‘Eastern German and Czech Democratization from the Perspective of
Local Politics’, in: L McFalls / L Probst (eds.), After the GDR – New Perspectives on the Old GDR and the
Young Länder, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001, pp.221-245; and S Neckel, ‘Die ostdeutsche Doxa der Demokratie –
eine lokale Fallstudie’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol.47, No.4, 1995, pp.658-680.
For the 1990 GDR-parliament (Volkskammer) see H Müller-Enbergs, ‘Zwischen Bewahrung und
Modernisierung. Politische Einstellungen in der letzten Volkskammer der DDR’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss
(eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und
den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.248-271; B Scholz, ’Bundestag und
Volkskammer. Meinungsprofile von Abgeordneten im Vergleich’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien
und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen
Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.272-299; C Hausmann, ‘Die 10. Volkskammer der
DDR 1990: Elitenpool der ersten Stunde’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000,
pp.527-541.
360
103
Beyond that, I will make extensive references to the existing (mostly German) literature on
East German regional elites and discuss their findings in the light of my results.
My initial sample of MPs was based on the then current parliaments in 2004/05 in
Hungary and Germany. I first coded all statements in parliament of the MPs in my sample
between the elections of 2002 (April 2002 in Hungary, September 2002 in Germany) and late
September 2005 (when the last Bundestag session before early elections took place). For the
preceding period (1998-2002), I coded the entire parliamentary cycle for both parliaments for
those MPs who were already in parliament. Moreover, due to the PDS’s failure to jump the
nationwide-5% hurdle, there were only two PDS-MPs in the 2002 German Bundestag (both of
whom had won individual constituencies in East Berlin). Eight more PDS-MPs were included
into the East German sample for the 1998-2002 cycle. This way, a larger sample of statements
from this party could be considered (for more details, see annex 1). This is justified because in
East Germany, the PDS is the third largest party, regularly scoring around 15-25%. Moreover,
an additional sample containing twenty-six West German MPs serves as a control case (see
below). They are equally taken from the 2002-2005 Bundestag, with a balanced mix of
background factors and roughly in line with their parties’ vote shares in West Germany.
The code book
Content analysis of speeches and/or public documents written by political elites is a wellestablished method applied in the field. 362 Using the official parliamentary records for both
cases for the periods 1998-2002 and 2002-2005, I coded all instances of positive or negative
statements by every MP in the sample according to a codebook developed on the basis the
above-developed ideational foundations of consensus democracy. 363 In the following, I will
outline the codebook and give examples for typical statements in the respective dimensions,
which are mostly taken from parliamentary records.
1. The centrality of consensus and compromise
A positive statement in this dimension counts:
•
presenting consensus as an ideal to be achieved in general, as being crucial for the
working of the democratic system, or as being part of an ideal political culture
J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing
Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004; E Levintova, ‘Revisiting Russian and Polish elite value
orientations: Are the elites still committed to the original goals of post-communist transitions?’, Communist and
Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, 2006, p.179.
363
All parliamentary records for the mentioned period are available online at www.parlament.hu and
www.bundestag.de in Hungarian and German respectively (last login: 20 October 2006).
362
104
•
presenting cooperation and compromise between opposition and governmental parties
as something necessary, useful or desirable in general, or for solving a particular
problem
•
presenting an issue as requiring a consensual decision beyond the parties in
government
•
formally
asking
one
or
several
non-allied
parties
to
join
into
consultations/negotiations/collective deliberations (beyond the normal debate in
parliament or its committees) in order to find a commonly agreed solution to an issue
•
rhetorically diminishing the difference between government and opposition (e.g. by
demanding
a
“responsible
opposition”
regardless
of
actual
constitutional
requirements e.g. for decisions by two-thirds’ majorities)
A negative statement in this dimension counts:
•
presenting consensus as something not generally necessary or useful, or as not
carrying a value in itself for the working of the democratic system
•
expressing opposition to a proposed consensus solution on a particular issue, or praise
for the achievements of certain results explicitly against the opposition of another
party
•
demarcating the difference between government and opposition e.g. by refusing to
take over joint responsibility for a certain decision, or declining an invitation to join
negotiations for a consensus solution
examples for consensus statements
examples for majoritarian statements
"Political culture is the culture of cooperation "Not
every
compromise
is
a
good
and compromise. This is lacking in our compromise"
democracy."
"I prefer clear majority votes over fishy deals
“We prefer to have this law adopted by a with the opposition."
consensus of all parties in parliament.”
“This issue is of such an importance that it “We do not mind pulling through this law
must be decided together by government and without the approval of party XY.”
opposition.”
“In spite of our 72% majority we never
decided anything against the traditions of this
parliament.”
105
“A serious/mature opposition would take “This government has its own way to do
over its part of responsibility for this crucial things; we do not need your advice.”
decision.”
“This is an area of legislation where it is
improper for the opposition to seek conflict
with the government.”
2. Politicians as proponents of the “common good”
As a positive statement in this dimension counts:
•
reference to “the national interest”, “our shared values” or similar denominators of
common ground among all or most of the political parties
•
criticism of special or particular interests which stand against the national interest / the
common good or similar
•
declaring an issue as not being suitable for political arguments, party politics or
ideological debates
•
declaring an issue as being a scientific/technical question for whose resolution there is
only one “true” answer
As a negative statement in this dimension counts:
•
reference to a socio-economic group (e.g. workers, farmers, business) in defining
one’s position on an issue, or declaring to represent a particular socio-economic group
without reference to superior categories representing the common good
examples for consensus statements
examples for majoritarian statements
“This law serves our national interest.”
“Our party rejects this law as it is contrary to
the needs of smallholding farmers”
“Don’t abuse this sensitive issue for political “The policies of your party make small
arguments.”
income earners worse off.”
“Party politics has nothing to do in the field of “The government neglects workers’ interests
education.”
in their policies.”
“There is not a leftist or rightist approach to
the problem of XY, but only a national one / a
correct one.”
106
“We are proposing the solution of this “Parties can only carry partial opinions, they
problem on the basis of scientific expertise.”
are not the general department of truth”
“As politicians we have to tell the people “Coming from this region myself I know what
where the truth lies with these problems.”
it means to become an unemployed miner and
therefore I cannot support this.”
“I hope the minister regards himself as “My party and I stand for the interests of the
serving the entire nation.”
disadvantaged rural population”
3. The centrality of established procedures
As a positive statement in this dimension counts:
•
praising / defending / arguing in favour of another constitutional body’s involvement
in a particular decision (e.g. president, second chamber of parliament, constitutional
court, central bank, ombudsman etc.)
•
demanding / arguing in favour of the strengthening of or defending co-decision or
controlling rights for the parliament or other constitutional bodies in front of the
executive
•
calling in the constitution in order to justify / defend one’s position or criticising an
opponent by calling his/her proposals as not being constitutional
•
stressing the importance of certain formal procedures as a value in itself, even if at the
cost of not coming to a final decision
As a negative statement in this dimension counts:
•
opposing / criticising / arguing against the participation of other constitutional bodies
in a particular decision, or presenting them as superfluous / useless etc. in general
•
arguing against the increase of co-decision or controlling rights for the parliament or
other constitutional bodies in front of the executive
•
denouncing certain formal procedures as impeding effective decisions, emphasising
the value of effective decisions, or denying an inherent value to prescribed procedures
examples for consensus statements
examples for majoritarian statements
“I am grateful for the valuable advice given to “This incomprehensible decision by the
us by the President in his latest speech.”
constitutional court will unfortunately prevent
us from overhauling the pension system.”
107
“Only
in
banana-growing
countries
the “If we were to grant the same amount of
government can overturn a decision of the speaking time to all MPs this parliament
parliament.”
would be unable to work.”
“It’s good to consult with the Länder “Your party constantly abuses its majority in
governments on this issue.”
the Bundesrat [=second chamber] to obstruct
our policies.”
4. Preserving the status quo
As a positive statement in this dimension counts:
•
declaring the current constitutional system as ideal / the best possible / without
alternative or similar
•
objecting to / denying the need for proposed changes to the constitution, or major
reconfigurations of key political institutions 364 (e.g. party law), or basic redistributive
systems/socio-economic arrangements (basic social welfare systems, corporatist wage
negotiations etc.)
As a negative statement in this dimension counts:
•
presenting the current constitutional system or certain parts of it as being outdated / no
longer suitable / in need for change or similar
•
proposing / advocating / expressing support for changes to the constitution or major
reconfigurations of key political institutions, or basic redistributive systems / socioeconomic arrangements
examples for consensus statements
examples for majoritarian statements
“We should not tinker with our well-balanced “This constitution was meant to be only
institutions and this way upset our well- temporary. As it has become dysfunctional it
working democracy.”
needs to be replaced.”
“What you call far-reaching reforms is in “We are having a social system which reflects
reality undermining the social peace of this the situation of 30 years ago, which is no
country.”
longer sustainable and which is therefore in
need for a paradigmatic/structural change.”
364
This excludes demands for changes towards more consensus institutions (see 3.).
108
5. Respect towards the other side
As a positive statement in this dimension counts:
•
expressing support for / praising / mentioning favourably (the proposals of) another
non-allied party or one of its members
•
expressing criticism for own party’s position
•
emphasising a continuity of policies after a change of government between different
parties in power
•
asking for apology for one’s inappropriate remarks/behaviour towards the other side
As a negative statement in this dimension counts:
•
declaring another party or an individual politician from a different party as
incompetent, irresponsible, or illegitimate to govern / to be in parliament
•
accusing other parties or individuals of having broken promises, or referring to
him/her with derogatory characterizations
•
hold responsible a present or past government lead by another party for a certain
problem
•
compare another party’s / coalition’s performance in government unfavourably to
one’s own party’s/ coalition’s performance
examples for consensus statements
examples for majoritarian statements
“I can only agree with what Mr/Mrs XY from “Party XY has proved its incompetence in
[non-allied] party Z proposed.”
solving the issue of unemployment when they
“I thank all parties in the committee for their could not come up with a solution over the
valuable contributions to our work.”
last …. years.”
“I have to say that I’m sorry for my “You were lying when you claimed that….”
unfriendly heckling when you just spoke.”
“You deceived your voters when you adopted
this law.”
“I see your old communist / undemocratic
way of thinking is there again.”
“Our economy is performing well and this is “The ongoing problems in the economy were
our common success.”
left to us by your party’s government.”
“Both the coalition lead by party X and our
coalition committed mistakes in the field of
health reform.”
109
“Our government will continue the process of “Under my party’s government we reduced
successfully reducing public debts started by public debts while you started to squander
our predecessors in office.”
again.”
Measuring consensualism: Coding and counting
Statements are only counted towards the consensus/majoritarian indicator in this content
analysis when they clearly matched one of the coding criteria. 365 Ideally, the coding of the
material should be undertaken by external, specially trained assistants and not by the
author. 366 Yet, in this case, this option was not feasible due to the financial constraints of the
project. Nevertheless, in order to check the reliability, more than 50% of the material was
coded for a second time after several weeks had elapsed and compared to the original results.
This way the degree of coding concurrence between the two instances could be assessed and,
in fact, proved to be quite high. Moreover, the analysis was done by alternating between the
German and the Hungarian material, and between MPs from different parties in order to
ensure a high degree of consistency and reliability across the entire sample. 367 Surely, even
with the most unambiguous codebook and the best coding specialists, this methodology will
not completely close any room for interpretation to the coder. Despite these imperfections, my
results appear quite clear and robust in terms of the overall patterns as will be shown below.
Moreover, as mentioned above, my coding approach is more clear-cut and
straightforward allowing for an easier application to other studies and testing by other
scholars than Steiner et al.’s very sophisticated, highly differentiated approach. Surely, in both
Steiner et al.’s and my study, contextual knowledge of current politics in the countries is
needed in order to interpret MPs’ contributions. Nevertheless, while my coding instructions
focus mostly on the form of arguing and look for the presence of certain key words, Steiner et
al. are concerned with both form and content of the debates studied (e.g. coding the degree of
justification, or changes of position). This is surely a more demanding task for the coder and
leaves more room for interpretation (and possibly error). 368
All instances of positive or negative statements in the five ideational dimensions of
consensus democracy (identified according to the code book) were recorded, the balance
365
As the author speaks German as his mother tongue and is proficient in Hungarian he is in the position to work
with the original material in both languages without intermediate translation.
366
Larger projects coding MPs speeches or interviews such as Putnam (1973) or Steiner et al. (2004) employed a
number of specially trained assistants, but coding by the author is not unsual either (e.g. E Levintova, ‘Revisiting
Russian and Polish elite value orientations: Are the elites still committed to the original goals of post-communist
transitions?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, 2006, pp.175-199).
367
This approach is recommended among others by R Putnam, 1973.
368
J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing
Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp.60-67.
110
calculated in each dimension and then overall per MP, party and country. Moreover, the
“intensity” (i.e. the ratio of the statements’ balance per “speech unit”) was calculated. One
speech unit includes all recorded verbal contributions of an MP to a single item on the
parliamentary agenda on one day of session, regardless of length and frequency of the
contribution(s). 369 Thus, for example, a speech and a number of short interventions on the
same item on the agenda on one day by an MP count as one unit. Two interventions on two
different topics on one day, or two interventions on the topic but on different days, count as
two units. In cases when only a heckling interruption (i.e. a loud remark during another MP’s
speech) was recorded, this was not counted as a separate speech unit (although it was equally
submitted to content analysis and counted towards the amount of negative or positive
statements in a certain category, if applicable). This way, it was assured that speech units are
comparable in average length between the two cases and differences in standing orders of the
two parliaments accounted for. 370 The balance of positive and negative statements per speech
unit is thus a quantitative measure for the “intensity” and the “direction” (i.e. more consensual
or more majoritarian) of MPs’ contributions in parliament in a specific ideational
dimension. 371
A Hungarian MP in the sample on average accumulated forty-nine speech units per
parliamentary cycle, an East German MP thirty-seven speech units (see annex 4 table 1). The
difference is mainly based on the fact that the Hungarian material covers a slightly longer
period 372 , and the smaller size of the Hungarian parliament (thus allowing for more
interventions in average for a single MP in the course of one parliamentary cycle). 373 In
general, members of smaller factions in average accumulated a larger number of speech units
than members of the biggest factions, which is due to the non-proportional (i.e. consensualist)
distribution of speaking time in the two parliaments. 374 Also, those MPs who spoke much in
1998-2002 also continued to do so in the next parliamentary cycle, while those who were
369
For a similar coding (though independently developed approach) see J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli,
Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004,
pp.55-56. The authors unit of analysis are debates, not individual MPs.
370
E.g. the Hungarian parliament’s standing order allows for more individual interventions which however are
shorter in average length than in the German case.
371
For a similar coding scheme using dichotomous variables in coding texts see E Levintova, ‘Revisiting
Russian and Polish elite value orientations: Are the elites still committed to the original goals of post-communist
transitions?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, 2006, pp.179-182.
372
While the cut-off point for both cases are the early German elections in 2005, Hungary’s parliamentary cycle
in 2002 started a few months ahead of the German one.
373
The Hungarian parliament has 386 MPs, the German parliament of 2002-2005 had 603 MPs.
374
As the most extreme case the two PDS-MPs in the 2002-2005 Bundestag exhausted their statuary rights to
deliver a short speech on virtually every single item on the parliamentary agenda and thus gathered more than
200 speech units each. Also, as the smallest faction in the 1998-2002 Bundestag PDS-MPs featured a high
frequency of oral contributions, similarly members of SZDSZ and MDF in the Hungarian case.
111
rather reticent kept quiet later on as well. 375 The use of a cumulated measure over a four-year
period ensures the levelling out of possible temporary fluctuations which might distort a onetime measure (e.g. mid-term electoral campaigns or reactions to singular events). Therefore,
my cumulative indicator gives a more reliable measure than a one-time measure such as a
standardised questionnaire.
Consensualism in parliamentary speeches – a content analysis
Patterns of consenualist and majoritarian statements
From the quantitative results of the content analysis of the two parliamentary records there
emerges quite a clear pattern: while the large majority of the Hungarian MPs in both electoral
cycles have positive ratings in the first four ideational categories of consensus democracy,
East German MPs (with the notable exception of PDS members) are rated negatively in all
five dimensions. For PDS members the image is more mixed, but with quite a tendency
towards more positive values (see annex 2).
Thus, Hungarian MPs share an expressed preference for consensus as a practice
(annex 2, table 1b). They present democratic politics predominantly as an undertaking which
should aim at finding the common good rather than considering particular interests and view
politicians as playing a crucial role in this regard (table 2b) They emphasise the value of
formalised democratic procedures and the interplay between constitutional bodies (3b). They
basically present the current political and socio-economic system as the best possible solution
denying the need for far-reaching changes (4b) (this, however, in a less uniform way as
indicated by the values in the first three dimensions). Finally, Hungarian MPs are not
respectful towards each other, according to the last indicator (5b).
In turn East German MPs (with the notable exception of the PDS) seem not to be
designating a particular value to consensus solutions in politics (annex 2, table 1a). They
present democratic politics as being about the competition of different interests with
politicians representing them (table 2a). They do not assign any particular value to formalized
procedures (3a), or the existing institutional status quo (4a). Similar to Hungarian MPs, they
are also not very respectful towards each other (5a). Only the PDS promotes a partially
consensual outlook on democracy by emphasising procedures over outcomes (3a) and,
interestingly, by arguing for the perseverance of the status quo of the existing (West German)
system (4a).
375
The correlation between an individual MP’s number of speech units in the two cycles is 0,78 (excluding
PDS). For a comparative perspective on individual MPs contributions in parliament see ‘Buzgó Rétorok és néma
leventék, HVG, 28 January 2006, p.10.
112
These patterns basically stay the same for the two electoral cycles investigated and can
confidently be taken as relatively stable and independent from contextual changes (such as the
changeover of government in the Hungarian case in 2002). 376 Drawing a scatter diagram in
which each MP’s consensualism indicator in the first four categories marks a position on the
x-axis for the 1998-2002 cycle (and the same indicator for the 2002-2005 period), we find a
symmetrical pattern on the y-axis with points clustering close to the 45-degree line. This
indicates identical positions for both x and y. 377 Thus, we can be confident to be investigating
phenomena which are not just temporary as they seem to persist beyond a four-year
parliamentary cycle. Moreover, the clear separation between East German and Hungarian
MPs becomes visible in terms of the individual indicators. During both parliamentary cycles,
East German MPs predominantly figure negative values whereas Hungarians feature positive
values in the first four indicators. Within the East German sample PDS-MPs feature a
different configuration of these indicators, another indication of the explanatory power of my
alternative model (see hypothesis 3).
[table 5 about here]
Thus, we find some preliminary support for the patterns expected in the hypotheses of the
alternative model. Yet, before testing the discursive model of political culture in more detail
(and investigating its relevance for CoD), the classical model of political culture will be tested
for its plausibility This means taking the results from the content analysis as reflecting
attitudes and investigating their association with individual background factors.
The plausibility of the classical model of political culture
Testing the power of the explanatory variables for political culture along the lines of the
classical approach entails the assumption that MPs’ statements reflect their attitudes. 378 All
MPs are under the same institutional constraints of the parliamentary setting in consensus
democracy. Therefore, according to this model, differences in the respective consensualism
indicators between MPs must be based in individual-level differences such as party affiliation,
376
The chance that the pattern found is just due to chance (null-hypothesis) is less than 5% for East Germany in
all dimensions across the two cycles and in Hungary for all but the fourth dimension (z-tests on national level for
both cycles, for East Germany calculated without PDS-MPs). The impact of incumbency will be tested
separately further below.
377
The correlation coefficient of the consensualism indicator in the two cycles across all dimensions for the
respective MPs is 0.71.
378
Scholars in this tradition would still make some additional assumptions about the impact of contextual
factors such as incumbency, ongoing electoral campaigns or issue dimensions. My research design therefore
refrains from taking a one-point measure and uses an averaged indicator for the entire electoral cycle.
113
time in office, age, etc. The impact of incumbency as a changing context and “deep” national
cultural legacies will also be tested as other possible explanatory factors.
In terms of quantitative results, the last dimension concerning inter-party conflict
(annex 2, tables 5a/b) shows a similarity between all Hungarian and German MPs and does
not allow for sophisticated differentiations and comparisons at this stage. In terms of
quantitative measures, it does not follow my hypothesis. For this reason the following
quantitative comparison focuses on the other four dimensions which do show clear
differences between the two cases calling for explanation. Only at a later stage can a more
qualitative approach investigate if the two cases really are as similar in this fifth dimension as
they seem.
Due to the limited amount of data it will not be possible to employ sophisticated
statistical methods such as multivariate regressions. Pooling Hungarian and East German MPs
allows for at least some basic comparisons and juxtapositions on the basis of a few
background factors. 379 Thus, the aim of this undertaking is not to fully disprove the classical
model, but rather to demonstrate the explanatory strength of an alternative approach based on
the notion of collective rather than individual socialization of political elites.
At first we might wonder how far differences are based in deep cultural differences
between Germany and Hungary (i.e. long-lasting historical differences between national
political cultures). For this matter West Germany is an ideal control case as it shares the same
“deep cultural” legacies as East Germany. In his famous work, Ralf Dahrendorf describes
German politicians as being traditionally consensus-oriented, arguing in terms of the common
good, looking for an ultimate synthesis to solve all problems, and being afraid of conflict and
competition. 380 Yet, according to my data, this long-lasting orientation does not seem to have
re-emerged in the East German case, but does seem to have some validity for West German
politicians. In all but the last dimension West German MPs show clearly positive indicators in
four out of five subdimensions of a consensualist political culture (see annex 2, tables 1-5). In
this regard, strangely enough, they seem more similar to the Hungarian than to the East
German pattern. Therefore, it is hard to presuppose a strong impact of “deep national”
political culture in this context (as we would expect this to lead to more of a convergence
379
For average measures across different groups every individual MP was given the same weight. This reflects
the assumptions of the individualist, attitude-based model of Almond and Verba. An alternative approach using
weighted measures depending on MP’s number of speech units did not change decisively the overall patterns
reported in this place.
380
R Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, New York: W.W. Norton, 1979.
114
between East and West Germany). 381 In how far these quantitative similarities in terms of
consensualist statements really indicate a convergence between, say, Hungarian and West
German (or more broadly West European) political culture will be discussed further below.
For this, we will need to look also at qualitative aspects (i.e. the content of these statements).
Variables concerning early life socialization do not play a very prominent role in most
studies on elite political culture. Usually, socialization in office is viewed as having a stronger
impact on politicians’ attitudes than socio-economic background. 382 However, in most
contemporary democracies it is not very convincing to expect these factors to (still) carry an
equally strong explanatory value as in Putnam’s samples from the late 1960s and early 1970s.
His representative samples combined Italian MPs with a background of socialization in a
communist or fascist subculture, or British Eton- and Oxbridge-educated aristocrats together
with trade union leaders from a working class background. By now, there is much less
variation in these variables in contemporary Western democracies. Thus there is little value in
testing, for instance, the impact of education on contemporary elite political culture as there
are now very few MPs without a higher education in most European democracies. This lack
of variation is, in fact, even more visible among politicians who grew up in rather egalitarian
communist societies with relatively little social differentiation in terms of class, or income (as
reflected in my Hungarian and East German samples). 383 The same goes for factors such as
education or gender, due to a comparatively modern and open educational system, as well as
quite progressive policies concerning gender equality in the Soviet bloc. Therefore, it is also
not surprising to find no clear differences based on geographical background for “attitudes”
based on the mentioned indicators measuring the ideational components of consensus
democracy across time. For the West German control sample of MPs with rural and urban
backgrounds (in the tested 2002-2005 period) there are almost identical consensualism
indictors in the first four dimensions. This supports the position that socio-economic
381
Interestingly the only West German born MP (representing an East German constituency) in my sample (SPD
#2) is well in the average for all indicators among his East German colleagues rather than showing a pattern
close to West German MPs (as one might expect). This finding further supports the notion that individual
socialization through individual socio-economic background factors matters much less than collective
socialization and the reproduction of context-dependent discourses in the specific context.
382
R Putnam 1976.
383
Few Hungarian MPs report significant amounts of additional income next to their parliamentary pay. Official
declarations of MPs’ income are available at www.parlament.hu (last log-in 20 October 2006). German MPs are
(so far) not required to publish additional income in numbers. However, the obligatory publication of sideline
jobs indicates no potential sources of large-scale additional income for most East German MPs, either. If East
German MPs do hold positions next to their parliamentary seat they are either moderately paid party positions
and/or voluntary engagements in civil society organisations. This stands in contrast to a large number of West
German MPs who often maintain part-time jobs such as in law firms and/or multiple well-paid positions in
supervisory boards of corporate firms. (See websites of individual MPs at www.bundestag.de, last log-in 20
October 2006).
115
background factors seem to have generally lost strong explanatory power in explaining
political culture.
[table 6 about here]
The small number of female MPs in the sample (due to their small share in both parliaments)
prevents the testing of the impact of gender. Concerning religion, only East German MPs
publish their religion if they are member of one of the officially recognized churches
(Catholic or Lutheran) and thus do not allow for comprehensive comparisons. 384 Again, these
issues already demonstrate the limited value of the traditional explanations of socialization
into different value systems based on socio-economic differences. This is especially true in
the post-communist context, where political elites are rather undifferentiated due to the legacy
of 40 years of levelled out social diversity.
When testing the relationship between age and the indicators for consensualist
statements we find little indication for the mechanism suggested by the classical model.
Scatter-diagrams marking the MPs’ year of birth and the four mentioned indicators show a
random pattern for both electoral cycles. They give no indication of a relationship between
specific consensus-related attitudes and age. Also, there seem to be no visible generational
patterns (as represented by a rather random distribution of data points in an even cloud). MPs
that spent more of their life time under communism do not appear to hold attitudes
particularly positive or negative in terms of a consensus-democratic political culture for any
of the five indicators. Again, only the differences between Hungarian and East German MPs
(with the exception of the PDS) become visible. Only West German MPs who were analysed
for the 2002-2005 period score clearly on the positive side, differing from their East German
colleagues.
[table 7 about here]
Beyond individual socio-economic variables there is one background factor, in the context of
political socialization prior to obtaining public office, that might appear relevant indeed in the
See almanac of the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag, Kürschner’s Volkshandbuch Deutscher Bundestag,
2003).
Neubert argues that a ‘protestant political culture’ surviving in East Germany throughout communism supported
specific advantageous aspects of a democratic, post-communist East German political culture. It allowed for a
focus on interpersonal communication, pragmatic, rational and ethical behaviour, as well as an emphasis on
human rights (E Neubert, ’The Political Culture of Protestantism in the GDR’, in: D Berg-Schlosser, R
Rytlewski (eds.), Political Culture in Germany, London: Macmillan, 1993, pp.153-169).
384
116
context of post-communist societies—individual membership in either the communist party or
an opposition group prior to the beginning of democratic transition in summer/autumn 1989.
This might lead to very different ways of socialization towards approaches of conflict and
consensus. Yet there seems to be no stable pattern in this regard; for the 1998-2002
parliamentary cycle, opposition members show higher than average values for the consensusrelated indicators (understood here as attitudes), while for the 2002-2005 cycle this is the case
for former communists.
[table 8 about here]
Concerning political socialization in public office the classical approach supposes a gradual
value internalisation through individual socialization into the political system (depending on
time and position occupied). Yet, fifteen years after transition, East Germany’s political elites
do not feature as consensualist a political culture as we would expect from their exposure to
the system. Also, no visible change towards stronger consensualism can be observed between
the two averaged periods spanning seven years for either the East German or the Hungarian
case. In fact, due to the demonstrated viability of the well-working West German model and
its immediate full implementation in East Germany in 1990, East German politicians should
have adapted their political culture even more obviously and rapidly to consensus-based
outlooks than their Hungarian colleagues (who did not have this experience, according to the
model of individual socialization). Thus, we do not really find much support for a socialising
impact of consensus-democratic institutions on individual MPs for the two parliamentary
cycles covered.
According to the data considering the contextual factor of incumbency in office, it is
found not to have a great impact. 385 Only in the third dimension (concerning the preference of
procedures over outcomes) in both parliamentary periods opposition are MPs rated much
higher than government-affiliated MPs. This is not really surprising since opposition MPs
depend much more on their guaranteed procedural rights for having a say in national politics
than government MPs. West German MPs, with the exception of the mentioned third
dimension, show very similar distribution of consensualism values across opposition and
incumbents.
[table 9 about here]
385
1998-2002 saw a Fidesz-led government in which MDF was a junior coalition partner and an MSZP-SZDSZ
opposition, while an MSZP-SZDSZ government has been in power since 2002 facing a Fidesz-MDF-opposition.
117
MPs who occupied (or are currently occupying) a higher office in the executive or legislature
(“frontbenchers”), and are thus to be expected to have a closer involvement and socialization
into consensus democracy, do actually have higher consensualist indicators than average MPs
(annex 8). Yet the differences are not huge. 386 In the third dimension (concerning the
preference for procedures over outcomes) for the 1998-2002 period, frontbenchers are much
less consensualist than backbenchers. In the West German case MPs with experience in
higher office and those without it score very similar values.
[table 10 about here]
There also appears to be no relationship between consensualism indicators and the time
parliament was entered. The amount of time spent as an MP does not appear to influence
consensualism either for the two post-communist samples or for the West German sample.
[table 11 about here]
Consensualism indicators do not seem to be associated with the type of parliamentary
mandates of individual MPs (i.e. directly elected or list mandates). Classical approaches to
political culture might make us expect to find differences here concerning dimensions two and
three (e.g. with directly represented MPs more strongly representing particular constituent
interests and interested in gaining particular outcomes for their voters). For West Germany,
again, the very even distribution between the two is striking. This seems to be another
indicator for the lack of relevance of these kinds of background factors in established
democracies.
[table 12 about here]
Next to the factors of time and elite position ideology is also classified as a background factor
which impacts attitudes in the classical model of political culture. Coding for different kinds
of (partly overlapping) party-families (conservative, social democratic, leftist, post-
386
Coded as “higher office” were all MPs who occupied one of the following offices at any point between the
first free elections in 1990 and summer 2005: government minister or state-secretary (the Hungarian
“Àllamtitkár” or the German “Staatssekretär” – also on the Bundesland level), speaker or deputy speaker of
parliament.
118
communist, liberal) does not bring out clear differentiations either. Interestingly, only postcommunism seems to be associated with somewhat higher than average levels of
consensualism indicators in the four dimensions during both parliamentary cycles. However,
this is mostly due to the impact of the PDS (see above).
[table 13 about here]
In sum, the basic quantitative analysis did not establish much support for the classical model
of political culture based on individual socialization. Key variables did not relate to
individuals’ socio-economic background (such as age or geographical origin), nor did later
socialization prior to or in public office (due to affiliation with the former regime, ideology,
time in office, type of mandate or “front-bencher” status) show a visible and lasting impact on
consensus-related attitudes. Some of these missing relationships can be attributed to the
specific post-communist context with its lack of variation in individual socio-economic
backgrounds. This is mainly due to the communist approach to modernization which levelled
out socio-economic differences. Factors of post-recruitment socialization in general also
appear to have little explanatory value.
However, as mentioned above, this study cannot test for the possibility of a more
sophisticated interaction between several of these variables due to the small number of cases
and limited time frame. Again, my study does not aim at fully disproving the relevance of an
attitude-based model of political culture. More sophisticated statistical analysis and a number
of additional simplifying assumptions would improve the explanatory value of the classical
model in this context. Nevertheless, already on this very basic descriptive level it is obvious
that country (with East Germany counting separately from West Germany) is the most
decisive variable in explaining variation in the indicators. Therefore, cross-national
differences deserve special attention and specific, medium-term historical factors on the
aggregate (rather than the individual) level appear to be a more promising source of
explanation.
The differences between Hungary and East Germany on the aggregate level cannot be
explained, however, as being merely based in national historical legacies (since East and West
Germany are shown to differ quite strongly). Consequently, a medium-term legacy-based
explanation on the aggregate level as proposed in the discursive model of political culture
appears reasonable, and shall be explored in the following. In short, explicit, rhetorical
commitment of political elites to consensus democracy (without knowing whether it is
119
individually internalised) in the two cases appears to follow more the logic of collective rather
than individual socialization.
The alternative model of political culture: shared discourses on democracy
The methodology: discourse analysis and “qualitative cluster analysis”
In order to give full support to the discourse-based model of political culture it now needs to
be established how MPs justify their expressed consensus or majoritarian stances, and if they
are indeed connected by shared discourses on democracy. It was shown above that an
explanation of current CEE elite political culture (based in experiences of collective
socialization) is more plausible than an explanation along the lines of the classical model with
individual socialization. In order to establish how far political elites with a common
experience of transition are indeed connected by shared collective representations of
democracy, elite discourses shall be investigated for their inter-subjectivity (i.e. their
properties which are shared across a group of people). Are there distinct figures of speech,
ways of arguing, narrative conventions, or explanations in this regard which are shared by
MPs across party lines, and different socio-economic backgrounds in the two cases? Do MPs
in the two post-communist societies relate to distinct “toolboxes” of discursive conventions
when talking about democracy? Do they share certain discursive representations of
democracy, as opposed to various “model types” of politicians, with different rhetorical
repertoires depending on their socialization within the polity (as described by Kéri)? 387 How
far do these collective representations go back into history and what kind of empirical
references are made to support arguments? Do they refer to (or even idealize) certain elements
of the collective memory in a logical and coherent way? In a second step, the discourses will
then be discussed in the context of the existing democracies and the implications for CoD
outlined. For this, discourses will be related to current CEE politics and ongoing political
debates in the two countries. Additional material will also be drawn in from the media, as well
as academic studies from international, Hungarian and German authors. In how far did elite
discourses enable or constrain behaviour as “appropriate”?
For this investigation structured interviews were conducted with the Hungarian and
East German MPs in the sample and then subjected to discourse analysis. Questions in the
interviews focused on the five above-developed dimensions of consensus/majoritarian
democracy (see annex 3). MPs’ answers are analysed by applying a “qualitative cluster
387
L Kéri, ‘The Socialization Process for Hungary’s New Political Elites’, in: F Farnen, H Dehler, R
Meyenberg-Gerau (eds.), Democracy, Socialization and Conflicting Loyalties in East and West, London:
Macmaillan, 1996, pp.292-303.
120
analysis” 388 . This means to establish those discourses which were widely used and shared
across each sample, and the major counter-themes to these discourses. In the analysis I try to
stick as closely as possible with the verbatim material when arranging and summarizing the
findings. I try to be sensitive to fine distinctions and, whenever appropriate, use direct quotes
to illustrate the different nuances of a particular discourse.389 Unlike previous quantitative
analysis I will refrain from immediate categorisation of my material. Instead, I choose to work
in a more inductive fashion, letting the material speak for itself without categorisation (which
inevitably removes meaning from its context). 390
The central themes and frames found will be substantiated by footnotes identifying the
MPs subscribing to them in order to demonstrate, in particular across party lines, the extent to
which a certain discourse is shared. Moreover, I also take note if in a certain domain there are
no clearly recognizable common discourses, unexpected themes and frames, or antihegemonic discourses. References to findings of other studies which substantiate or question
my findings will be made. Discourses will also be located within their political context (e.g.
current or historical events, or important domestic debates to which they make references).
For further examples secondary material from the media will be used. Thus, the grounding of
elite discourses in empirical reality (a major indicator for the validation of discursive political
culture) will be explored, too. Finally, the findings are compared across my two cases by the
juxtaposition of the summarized major discourses in each section. In addition, I will pay
particular attention to those MPs who had particularly high values in certain dimensions in the
previous content analysis and who thus represent either extreme cases within the expected
pattern, or extreme outliers. Their in-depth answers to the interview questions (and possibly a
look at their individual background) can help to understand the extent of a certain discourse,
its variations and limits.
In short, by a close comparison between the two cases differences in the way
preferences for consensus or majoritarian democracy are being justified (and the sources of
these discourses) shall be established. The lack of some clearly distinguishable major
discourses which are shared across party lines (but not across countries) and/or which cannot
be grounded in transition dynamics would refute the hypotheses of my discourse-based model
of political culture. At the same time, the basic, rather stable patterns found in the previous
T Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics – Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1995 &
1999, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002, pp.23-33; L Edles, 1998, pp.22-25; J Dryzek / L Holmes, 2002, p…
389
Also, all interviews were conducted and analysed by the author. In case of a few uncertainties concerning the
translation of particular statements in the Hungarian texts, several native speakers of very different age, gender
and social backgrounds were asked for advice in order to ensure the highest possible reliability.
390
T Hopf, 2002, p.25.
388
121
quantitative analysis need to be reflected in the interview data in order to be able to conceive
of a relevant habitus. Thus, results confirmed via triangulation of these two very different
methods can be regarded as rather robust.
Unlike positivist scholars I do not uphold the claim of being able to rise to a
completely objective point of view. Instead I apply a verstehende perspective in investigating
how political elites make use of certain discourses. An approach which involves the
investigation of spoken or written language as its main empirical source cannot be completely
objectivist, as language is (at least partly) subjective. 391 Consequently, a more interpretive,
constructivist methodology like this discourse analysis should not be seen as competing with
mainstream positivist scholarship. Rather, it should be viewed as compensating the latter’s
most obvious limitations, such as the danger of rationalist or psychological reductionism (but
also not being free of shortcomings either). While the previous quantitative approach was
useful in establishing basic patterns of consensual and majoritarian speech, this qualitative
investigation aims at establishing more subtle relationships. In this regard I intend to follow
some promising recent studies in the field which do indeed break up the existing orthodoxies
and make use of both positivist and more interpretative approaches in one and the same
study. 392 Therefore, it is best to try to be conscious, self-critical and sincere about
shortcomings in every approach. By starting of from a quantitatively established pattern and
by being as explicit as possible about my framework, method of analysis, and sources (which
are freely available and/or reproducible) I allow for the replication and possible refutation or
correction of my results.
In this context, critics might claim that MPs possibly justify their stance on consensus
or majoritarian democracy in a different way when interviewed by a (foreign) student of
political science than when talking in other contexts. Although this is rather unlikely, 393 it
391
According to Ludwig Wittgenstein language is inextricably connected with understandings of life. Removing
language from this proper context (e.g. for scientific analysis) therefore creates philosophical problems. A
common understanding of language would in fact require a common understanding of life (L Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, (trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe), New York: Macmillan, 1953).
392
Marc Howard (2003) in his study on civil society in CEE first uses existing survey data to establish major
quantitative differences in civil society participation between Post-Communist and other democratic societies
while semi-structured interviews are used to establish the reasons why people do not join civil society
organisations.
393
All interviewees were asked for permission to tape, reproduce and publish the interviews. Thus, their
statements are in fact no longer restricted to remain in the private realm (i.e. differing from the context of an
informal conversation among two people). This way the statements gain public quality, if only in the limited
realm of academia where they might be made available and attributable. Moreover, most interviewees made
explicit that they will not debate any personal points of view nor reveal any information which was not already
publicly available. In fact, most MPs seemed to approach the interviews as they would approach an official,
publishable interview with an unknown journalist. They often also explicitly pointed towards existing sources
such as their websites for further elaboration on particular issues and therefore clearly situating the interview in a
public discursive field. Finally, also the fact that the interviews reflect very well the patterns of statements found
122
would not necessarily undermine the testing of my hypotheses. In other words, if many MPs
“lied” to me in the same fashion, by using the same discursive frames and figures, this would
already tell something about the legitimatising strength and political relevance of these
discourses (e.g. in front of Western audiences). Thus, unlike other interview data in other elite
studies, 394 I do not need to take the honesty of my interviewees for granted. Consistency and
credibility (i.e. in applying the right vocabulary and relating to existing rhetorical frames and
empirical reality in order to “ring true”) rather than sincerity matters in promoting a certain
objective.
I will now turn to the analysis of the material which is again approached according to
the above-developed dimensions of consensus/majoritarian democracy. I will proceed as
follows: for all five dimensions of consensualism I will present both Hungarian and East
German MPs’ answers to the respective questions in sticking very closely with the verbatim
material and making numerous references. I focus in particular on those discursive elements
which are particularly prominent, but also show unexpected or counter-hegemonic themes. In
a third part the major discourses in each dimension for the two cases are contrasted with each
other, and a thick interpretation based on the different historical dynamics of the transition
process is developed and evaluated in the light of the above formulated hypotheses.
Alternative explanations from the existing literature are considered and discussed as well.
Furthermore, findings for other countries of the region are being explored in order to consider
the scope conditions of the hypotheses. Finally, in a more speculative way, discourses in the
different dimensions are being evaluated for their potential as forming a habitus supporting
the consolidation of consensus democracy.
In the following four sections I will thus lay out the discourses of political elites in
Hungary and East Germany on consensus democracy, discuss their form, content and extent,
contrast them with each other, and, more tentatively, discuss their implications for the future
of democracy in the context of the existing institutional set-up.
Consensus and compromise: Panacea or expensive luxury?
First, I investigate the way MPs relate to consensus as a democratic practice: how do MPs
explain and justify an expressed support for more consensus-oriented or more competitive
practices in the democratic system as established in the quantitative analysis? In how far are
in the quantitative analysis (see below) gives us little reason to assume that MPs spoke and argued quite
differently on the issues covered in the interview setting. The (qualitative) discourse analysis thus also serves to
confirm the results of the (quantitative) content analysis through triangulation.
394
E.g. R Putnam, 1973; R Rohrschneider, 1999.
123
the same justifications advanced across party lines in Hungary and East Germany
respectively? What other explanations exist in the literature to explain these stances and what
evidence can be found to support or question my own approach? Finally, what kind of
practical constraints does a consensualist or majoritarian habitus in this regard pose to
consolidating consensus democracy (i.e. how does it mediate the way political elites use and
further develop the democratic system)?
According to my hypotheses and suggested by the aforementioned quantitative data,
we expect discourses supportive of consensus politics for Hungarian MPs and the opposite for
East German ones which is also confirmed by the analysis:
a) In Hungary the term “consensus” is overwhelmingly framed in very positive terms.
Hungarian MPs across party lines present consensus as something inherently valuable and in
many areas as indeed necessary or even indispensable. There is a striking similarity across all
parties in stressing the need to address some fundamental issues such as social and economic
reforms or the demographic decline in a consensual way between the (two big or all four)
parties. At the same time the constant lack of consensus in Hungarian politics is deplored and
blamed on a deficient political culture.395 Certain problems are presented as being too
important or too severe to be left to a majority decision by the parties in government.
Moreover, there is suspicion that a simple majority decision in parliament would not lead to a
balanced and just outcome. It is lamented by many that through the changeover of
government every four years the previous government’s major policies would be undone and
reversed. 396 One MP mentions the difficulty in making weighted decisions, as there is
“always someone hurt”. 397
Thus it seems that, according to this widely shared discourse, only co-operation and
consensus would allow for continuous progress in crucial fields. As one MP put it, rather than
creating artificial divisions and problems the parties should “get together in order to solve the
real problems”. 398 The assumed existence of “two Hungaries” (as called by a number of
MSZP-MPs) or generally the existence of “two camps” in the political landscape is presented
as a major impediment to Hungarian politics and blamed for the lack of positive reputation for
the political elites. 399
395
SZDSZ #1, 3, 4, 5, 6, Fidesz #3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 MSZP #1, 5, 6, 8, 9, MDF #1, 3.
Fidesz #5, SZDSZ #3.
397
Fidesz #2.
398
Fidesz #7.
399
MSZP #5, 6, 8, MDF #1, Fidesz #3, 5, 6.
396
124
Members of the coalition parties assure their willingness to cooperate with the
opposition on major issues while at the same time criticising them for not being constructive
enough, for conducting smear campaigns or spoiling the atmosphere. Opposition MPs equally
accuse the parties in government of doing the same. 400 Moreover, members of the opposition
deplore the lack of cooperative gestures from the government and accuse them of being
populist and interested in short-term gains only. 401 Interestingly, self-criticism or criticism for
one’s own party appears rather marginal among all Hungarian MPs. 402
Only one MP associates the term “consensus” negatively by making references to the
Kádárist “National People’s Front” which was meant to embody the unity of all major interest
groups and organisations in a socialist society (the so-called “transmission belts”). This MP
did not see the urge for the creation of what he calls “National Fronts” or grand coalitions, as
Hungary was not in danger of making this necessary. Rather than aiming for compromises
“parties should try to win elections”. 403 This exceptional anti-consensus view is contrasted by
another MP who even included consensus in his definition of democracy. 404 Another MP
remarked that he was well aware that a multi-party system goes hand in hand with disputes
and battles of words, but “one shouldn’t view this as the essence of politics.” 405 Moreover,
some of his colleagues made positive references to countries succeeding in the creation of a
national consensus, mentioning in particular the Spanish Moncloa Pacts where the major
political parties decided about post-Franco Spain’s political and economic development by
consensus. 406 One MP even calls for the inclusion of other societal participants beyond the
political parties (i.e. civil society, unions, the media, etc.) into an overall consensus or
corporatist approach to politics. 407
In sum, consensus and accommodation is presented as an ideal worth pursuing and
something which still needs to be achieved in Hungary. In a way, consensus appears to be
presented as panacea to overcome all serious problems the country faces. A deficient political
culture rather than a lack of willingness is blamed for the failure of consensus politics in
Hungary. The roots for this deficient political culture and the lack of consensus are widely
seen in post-transition politics, where both camps see their respective time in government as a
400
MSZP #1, 6, 9, Fidesz #2, 3, 4, 5, SZDSZ #1, 4, MDF #3.
Fidesz #2, 3, 4, 8.
402
SZDSZ #3, Fidesz #6.
403
MDF #2.
404
Fidesz #6.
405
MSZP #5.
406
SZDSZ #3, MSZP #8.
407
Fidesz #6.
401
125
period during which there were attempts made to include the other parties but cooperation
became impossible and decisions were undone when the “other side” came into power. 408
b) In great contrast to Hungarian MPs, East German MPs clearly do not present consensus as
a value in itself. Instead, facing reality and implementing clear solutions and successful
reforms is presented as being more important than the achievement of compromise. 409 Both
government and opposition MPs mostly characterize consensus and compromise as useful and
good if achieved, but often infeasible and usually being rather an impediment to decisive
reforms. In fact, many stress the need of the respective government to carry responsibility for
its policies on its own. It should not look for someone to take over a part of the job. 410
Many MPs make clear that they generally preferred consensus 411 but that “Germany
can no longer afford consensus”, 412 that too much time was lost in finding it 413 or that there
should not be “consensus at any price”. 414 Working together would not necessarily mean the
need to find compromises in the end. 415 One MP argues that Germany has too many
compromises which cannot be put into action. Therefore, instead of two dysfunctional
compromises he would prefer two clear decisions, even if he could realize his ideas only in
one of them and would the other see being made by a political opponent. 416 Another one even
talks in a disparaging way about his strong dislike for “consensus pulp” (“Konsenssoße”). 417
Thus, consensus is not seen negatively, though its achievement is not presented as a goal in
itself.
The consensus-oriented institutional structure of the German political system, in
particular the second chamber of parliament representing the interests of the Länder
(Bundesrat), is blamed for the failure to achieve far-reaching changes. 418 Hence competition
for the best ideas should prevail rather than compromises. 419 This majoritarian outlook is also
part of the underlying notion of democracy advanced by some MPs: non-voters are presented
408
Fidesz #5, SZDSZ #3.
CDU#1, 2, 3, SPD#7, PDS#6, 8.
410
SPD#1, CDU#4, 5.
411
CDU#2, 3, Green#1, SPD#4, 5, 10, PDS#6, 8.
412
Green#1.
413
SPD#10.
414
CDU#2.
415
PDS#6.
416
CDU#5.
417
CDU #2.
418
SPD#1.
419
CDU#2, 5, SPD #8.
409
126
as the greatest danger to democracy “because they let a minority decide”,420 as consensus is
precisely about the minority’s veto to decisions by the majority.
This rather sceptical stance towards consensus politics is also reflected in some PDS
MPs’ remarks. 421 Yet, among PDS MPs, we also find some very supportive statements of
consensualist politics which cannot be found within other parties. Thus, a PDS MP declared
the Scandinavian Konkordanzdemokratie as her preferred model of politics 422 while others
demand more consultation with societal organisation such as unions and churches, or a crossparty consensus to fight extremism. 423 Another MP stated great disappointed with West
German democracy as there is too little consensus, too many decisions over people’s heads
and too much party power. For her, democracy means “protecting minorities”. 424 This stands
against most other East German MPs who advance a definition of democracy as primarily
being built on the majority principle: democracy is where the majority decides, be it with a
one vote margin. 425
In sum, East German MPs present themselves as less supportive of consensus
approaches to political decision-making. While not opposing the idea of co-operation and
consensus, there is much stronger agreement and emphasis on the need for political
competition and the fight for better arguments. Compromise is often presented as being both
costly and retarding real decisions. The picture is less clear with regards to PDS MPs, who
seem to be divided on the issue if not pro-consensus.
This preference for a competitive democratic system is already reflected in a survey of
MPs in the first (and last) freely elected parliament of the GDR in spring 1990. When asked
about their preferred model of parliament 50% of MPs support the option of a “dual model”
(i.e. a parliament which is clearly divided along the lines of government and opposition with
the latter presenting itself as a critical counter-balance and government in waiting). Among
West German MPs in 1990 a relative majority of 39% favoured a “separation of powers”model in which parliament as a whole serves as a counterbalance or veto player to the
government (the “dual model” was supported by only 34%). 426 The 1990 GDR-parliament is
widely seen as the breeding ground for the first post-unification East German political elites
with as much as 30% of MPs from the 1990 Volkskammer still active in regional, federal or
420
SPD#1, 2, 9.
PDS#6, 8.
422
PDS#7.
423
PDS#2, 5.
424
PDS #3.
425
CDU #2, SPD #4.
426
B Scholz, ’Bundestag und Volkskammer. Meinungsprofile von Abgeordneten im Vergleich’, in: O
Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der
ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.281-283.
421
127
European politics in 1999. 427 This obviously contributed to the promotion of different
understanding of parliamentarian democracy as compared to West German MPs.
In her study, Jennifer Yoder found East German members of regional (i.e. Länder)
parliaments to be actually more consensus-oriented than their West German colleagues. 428 As
national MPs’ criticism for consensus democracy is strongly focused on the powers of the
Länder-chamber in parliament (Bundesrat) there might be a latent conflict between East
German MPs on the national and regional level. The Bundesrat is the major forum for
representing regional interests on the national level, and few regional MPs will seriously
argue against this institution. This should caution us against generalising too far from our
findings beyond the national level of politics. Also, as outlined above, East German MPs are
not against consensus per se. Rather, they make their preference for it conditional upon other
factors (resources, time, and results). This is also reflected in the 2003/2004 telephone survey
conducted by Best et al. in which around 95% of East German and around 85% of West
German MPs respond positively to the question of “whether one should seek consensus even
if one is right in a political conflict”. 429 My interview data does not contradict but relativises
this finding, thus exposing the limitations of using fixed survey questions as opposed to semistructured, open-ended-question interviews. The following table juxtaposes some typical
statements for the two cases showing their contrasting positions on the ideal of consensus in
democratic politics.
Hungary
East Germany
Consensus on major issues is crucial to avoid Consensus is sometimes useful but mostly
setbacks.
unrealistic or not feasible.
Consensus as an ideal still to be achieved in Competition and clear decisions are better
Hungary
than compromise at any price which might
The Spanish Moncloa Pact is a positive impede progress.
example of a national consensus.
Bundesrat as a negative example for political
delay through consensus mechanisms.
C Hausmann, ‘Die 10. Volkskammer der DDR 1990: Elitenpool der ersten Stunde’, Zeitschrift für
Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, p.540; H Schöne, ’Vereinheitlichung und Diversität:
Elitenintegration im Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September
2000, p.575.
428
J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP, 1999,
pp.129-131.
429
H Best / M Edinger / K Schmitt / S Jahr, ’Zwischenauswertung der Deutschen Abgeordnetenbefragung
2003/04 – Gesamtergebnis’, Sonderforschungsbereich 580, Friedrich-Schiller Universität Jena, online
http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/typo3/a3.0.html, last accessed 20 October 2006.
427
128
c) Having outlined and contrasted the findings from the discourse analysis of in-depth
interviews and further secondary sources, I will now go own to explore the sources of these
collective representations of consensus democracy and discuss their impact on CoD.
Hungarian MPs and East German MPs draw on two very distinct rhetorical images of
their polity. Hungarian MPs are united in portraying compromise and consensus as part of
their normative constitution (i.e. their self-defining convictions and norms) which are
presented as natural and which have to be respected. 430 At the same time, another rhetorical
frame designates Hungarian political elites as usually incompetent in achieving this ideal.
Different political parties and camps claim superiority in interpreting and achieving this ideal,
while their political opponents are claimed to still be further away from it. This finding
prompts us to restate the conceptual interconnectedness of all five ideational components to
be relevant for the working of consensus democracy: undermining the legitimacy of the
potential partner in consensus politics will inhibit rather than foster the finding of consensual
solutions, even when all sides assure their support for this approach. As I will show below, the
lack of respect towards “the other” is a major obstacle in Hungarian consensus democracy
which undermines the otherwise favourable discursive foundations for consensus democracy
in the other dimensions.
East German MPs (with the partial exception of PDS members), in stark contrast to
Hungarian MPs, promote a competitive image of politics as an ideal which is contrasted with
the time- and resource-consuming processes of finding compromises in reality. What are the
sources of these diverging collective representations in the two very similar political systems?
According to some authors Hungary’s political landscape is traditionally characterized by a
strong inclination to consensus-oriented decision-making. Some relate this trait back to the
post-1956 situation with Hungary’s milder version of communism under János Kádár. After
the failed revolution, Kadar, allowed Hungary a somewhat greater degree of pluralism (as
well as economic and social deviationism) than other communist countries. This required a
more sensitive, less imposing political style which is claimed to live on in the new polity. 431
Others trace this approach even further back in time by pointing towards the 1867 Ausgleich
with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the legalistic traditions developed in this
context. 432
430
I borrow the expression from C Cruz, 2000, p.310.
R Tökés, Hungary’s negotiated revolution – Economic reform, social change and political succession,
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
432
A Bozóki, E Simon, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Hungary’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal
Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine,
Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, p.145; A Seleny, ‘The Foundations of Post-Socialist Legitimacy’,
431
129
In a different study, Anna Seleny argues for a traditional persistence of consensus
practices in Hungary which she uses as a main factor in explaining the Hungarian
“compromise-corporatist” model of democratic consolidation. Seleny points out that many
practices of post-communist politics can be traced back to pre-transition cultural legacies of
political interaction and dominant frames of conflict. In the content analysis of parliamentary
speeches outlined above, three Socialist MPs (MSZP#3, MSZP#4, and MSZP#9, see annex 2,
table 1b) show the highest value for this dimension. This underpins the view that support for
consensus politics might already have been developed prior to transition, as all three
mentioned MPs were already communist party members and active in professional politics at
different levels during the old regime.
My argument is in line with Seleny’s findings, as it does not claim that all dimensions
of elite political culture developed or were “invented” only during transition. In fact,
multilateral transitions by definition contain a higher degree of discursive continuity from the
old regime as the system came not to be de-legitimised as strongly as in unilateral cases.
Nevertheless, in my model cultural legacies from the old regime need to go through the
“filter” of transition as a discursive mechanism (e.g. by active transmission, re-articulation
and re-legitimisation of certain discourses and practises by political elites).
That is why Seleny’s approach cannot quite explain why Hungarian political elites
tend to stick to this ideal regardless of very confrontational politics. She observes this as being
particularly so since the 1998 elections and the advent of the centre-right Orbán government,
and the rise of the extreme-right MIÉP. How should the ideal live on if it is no longer
practised?
My approach focuses more on consensus as a rhetorical ideal, as an argument or a
symbol rather than a “habit”. This way notions of compromise and consensus are points of
reference to a romanticised past, to instances of national convergence and consensus such as
1867, the “Kádár consensus” in the 1960s and 70s, or the 1989 round-table talks (with the
Spanish Moncloa talks as a role model) when both government and opposition followed selflimiting, gradualist and accommodative approaches (“radical reformism” etc.).433
While the ideal of consensus democracy as in 1989 can rarely be sustained in practice
in the upheavals of post-transition politics, it obviously is still a powerful symbol. The
rhetorical value of it can bolster one’s own credibility or, alternately, shame a political
in: A Braun, Z Barany (eds.), Dilemmas of Transition – The Hungarian Experience, Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1999, pp.131-154; A Seleny, ‘Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies – Compromise and
Confrontation in Hungary and Poland’, World Politics, Vol.51, July 1999, pp.481-519.
433
J Kis, ‘Between Reform and Revolution’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.12, No.2, spring 1998,
pp.300-383.
130
opponent. It does not have to be internalized and constantly practised, however. Thus,
independently from people’s private attitudes and actual behaviour in the short run, nonconsensual practices are to be condemned or deplored, and one’s own willingness to
compromise constantly needs to be underlined in this context.
One of the latest prominent examples for this was Prime Minister Medgyessy’s (rather
unrealistic) proposal in 2004 to have all Hungarian parliamentary parties agree on a common
list for the first elections to the European Parliament after joining the EU. In this way, the
common commitment of all major parties to the European project would be demonstrated
symbolically and divisions on this crucial issue be avoided. 434 The mere fact that such a
proposal had the chance to be advanced officially by the Prime Minister (regardless of its
minuscule chances for success) demonstrates the high political significance and value which
is assigned to consensualist practices if only as a means to promote one’s own legitimacy.
Different camps or parties simultaneously ask for consensual practices while
attempting to monopolize the definition of who is better to achieve this ideal. Only at some
points is the ideal of a national consensus (the mentioned “Golden Age”) revived. Such
occasions may occur when negotiations among the four major political parties are initiated
(usually in order to find compromises on key legislation). This is often, but not always,
required due to a high number of key legislative items requiring two thirds majorities
according to the Hungarian constitution. These meetings mostly have rather mixed results. At
the same time this rhetorical frame or point of reference makes it hard for politicians arguing
in favour of more competitive politics to justify their position, as they are proposing
something far away from the “field of the imaginable”. 435 According to Kim Scheppele this
consensus-seeking, negotiated approach has also characterised the relationship between the
parliament and another veto player in Hungarian democracy – the constitutional court.
Through repeated rounds of law-making and subsequent rulings on the constitutionality of
legislation, parliament and the powerful court tried (and often managed) to reconcile
sometimes diametrically opposed positions. 436
This discourse on the need to unite behind some kind of national consensus, and the
task of political elites to create the foundations for this consensus, is in fact also a wide-spread
topic in Hungarian academia, media and even literature. National consensus is presented as
something which gave Hungary strength against external threats while the lack thereof is
See various articles in Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Nemzet, Népszabadság and Népszava in March 2004.
Cruz, 2000.
436
K Scheppele, ‘Constitutional Negotiations – Political Contexts of Judicial Activism in Post-Soviet Europe’,
International Sociology, Vol.18, No.1, March 2003, pp.222-227.
434
435
131
often seen as the reason for failure and disaster (such as the Turkish occupation in the 16th
century) or the loss of two thirds of territory after World War I (the so-called “trauma of
Trianon”). New (perceived) threats through EU accession and globalisation have reinforced
this collective representation. This way, the discourse on consensus is even further legitimised
and popularised. Journalists, intellectuals or other prominent personalities repeatedly call on
their political leaders to put together a consensus on all kinds of issues deemed to be decisive,
be it EU accession, economic reform, social policy or others.437 Even well-known Hungarian
social scientists join the choir calling for a new “elite pact”. This includes demands for pacts
to stabilise fiscal policy, social welfare reform 438 , or even (somewhat bizarre) calls for a new
elite consensus in order to solve “the “quantitative and qualitative decline of the population,
the crisis of morals, [… and to secure the] safeguarding and strengthening of our culture,
especially the preservation of our identity within the European Union” by some Hungarian
scholars. 439 There appears to be some kind of desperate desire to agree on something,
contrasting the rather inimical relations and lack of mutual respect between the major political
parties and camps which will be discussed further below.
Thus, it was shown that explicit support for consensus appears to be an almost
inadmissible part of Hungarian politicians’ habitus. Moreover, it was discussed in how far the
experience of historical junctures (such as the negotiated transition of 1989) served to (re-)
legitimise this approach, and in how far this explanation differs from more general
explanations based in “national culture”. Beyond that, I will also outline in a more tentative
way how this observation can help to understand specific problems in the consolidation of
Hungarian democracy.
The continuous reference paid to consensual politics raises high expectations towards
political elites, as mere majority decisions on particularly sensitive topics are then thought of
as being inferior in terms of their legitimacy. This in turn creates pressures for government
majorities to abstain from passing particularly controversial or extensive decisions without a
super-majority, even if they are not required to seek them in constitutional terms. Thus, farreaching policy changes are then much harder to achieve regardless of existing institutional
constraints in terms of veto players. A prominent example in this regard is the debate about
the so-called Bokros-package of 1995. Named after the then Socialist Minister of Finance this
437
E.g. ‘Összehangolt cselekvés – Gondolatok egy középtávu társadalmi-gazdaságpolitikai megállapodásról’,
Népszabadság, 27 September 2003; ‘A jobboldal visszaigazolást vár’, Népszabadság, 23 December 2003;
‘Bokros csomag: iskola- és kórházbezárás, minimálbér-eltörlés…’, Magyar Nemzet, 28 August 2006.
438
D Gyôrffy, 2006, pp.252-254.
439
K Kulcsár, ‘The new political system and the Hungarian reality’, Central European Political Science Review,
Vol.6, No.19, spring 2005, p.36.
132
austerity package adopted on the verge of economic crisis included a sharp devaluation of the
Hungarian Forint, the introduction of a crawling peg, a surcharge for imports, far-reaching
wage and social welfare cuts, a strong reduction in public investments and public
employment, as well as the introduction of study fees. It also started to transform the pension
system into a partly capital-funded system and paved the way for far-reaching cash-generating
privatisations of state-owned enterprises to foreign investors. 440
This measure stood in stark contrast to Hungary’s very gradualist and accommodative
approach to economic transition and social welfare reform. It could be argued that only the
Bokros package concluded the Hungarian economic transition. In fact, the Bokros package
was the only real “majoritarian” measure in Hungarian politics. This far-reaching policy was
implemented without consultation between the major parties and constitutional bodies and in
the context of otherwise very moderate, gradualist and accommodative policies. Having built
their overwhelming electoral victory in 1994 on the promise for negotiations towards a farreaching social-economic pact, the social-liberal Horn government endeavoured to negotiate
an agreement with the Interest Reconciliation Council (i.e. the major tripartite corporatist
forum) on a transformation strategy for the next three years. Thus, despite its supermajority in
parliament, the Horn government employed very accommodative approaches to decisionmaking. 441 Attila Ágh claims that Prime Minister Horn basically wanted to follow the Spanish
Moncloa Pact, which has served as a powerful example and success story in Hungarian
politics (which is also reflected in my interviews). 442 According to David Stark and László
Bruszt, the Horn government initially wanted to use negotiations and collective deliberation
with the corporatist interest groups over the social pact to educate the public over the
hardships yet to come. Then major actors, such as Finance Minister Bokros, decided that there
is not such a thing as “deliberation in an emergency room” (i.e. the government went on to
impose its measures after the failure of the negotiations and being faced with a looming major
financial crisis). 443 Prime Minister Horn gave a free hand to a few trusted top policy makers
around Bokros who, in a coup-like fashion, announced the package surprising both politicians
and the public. While this kind of secretive, top-down imposed “shock therapy” was not
previously unseen in other countries of the region (or other countries undergoing economic
B Greskovits, ‘Consolidating Economic Reforms: the Hungarian Experience with Lessons for Poland, CASECEU Working Papers Series, No.31, Warsaw, 1999; D Gyôrffy, ‘Governance in a Low-Trust Environment: The
Difficulties of Fiscal Adjustment in Hungary’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.58, No.2, March 2006, pp.239-259.
441
B Greskovits, 1999, p.17.
442
A Ágh, ‘Early Consolidation and Performance Crisis: The Majoritarian-Consensus Democracy Debate in
Hungary’, West European Politics, Vol.24, No.3, July 2001, p.99.
443
D Stark / L Bruszt , Post-Socialist Pathways – Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe,
Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.172-175.
440
133
transition) it came particularly unexpected in the Hungarian context due to the extreme
consensualist discourse into which it burst like a bomb.
The Bokros package was exceptional in so far as, for the first time, large parts of mass
society were antagonized and disadvantaged in favour of a small entrepreneurial class whose
strengthening was a major goal of the package. Moreover, it challenged the existing socioeconomic status quo, in particular the role of the state in the economy and the extensive
“premature welfare state,” 444 and was strongly outcome-oriented. In this regard, it also
differed from previous crises such as the so-called “taxi blockade” in October 1990. Thus,
employing the above-mentioned dimensions of consensus democracy, it was the precise
opposite of consensus. While according to most experts the Bokros package was successful in
stabilising the Hungarian economy and the state budget, 445 domestically it came to be seen as
a political failure. This view also reflected the constitutional court’s ruling which declared
void parts of the package due to its violation of certain procedures. Finance Minister Bokros
consequently resigned from his post. At that time the constitutional court enjoyed popularity
ratings of 90% as opposed to plummeting support for the government. 446
Thus, while the economic consequences of the Bokros package have, with hindsight,
proved overwhelmingly beneficial for Hungary, it continues to be presented as a negative
political legacy in the light of the consensus-favouring discourses. Since its implementation
the package has been constantly condemned by the great majority of politicians even from
within the then social-liberal coalition for the way it was imposed on society. The term
“Bokros package” or “XY package” (with XY standing for the contemporary prime minister
or minister of finances) was soon turned into a populist slogan used to mobilize resistance
against any kind of (fiscal) reform policies. The term Bokros-package has become a negative
denominator for any kind of austerity measure proposed or implemented. In my interview
sample, a younger Fidesz-MP refers to his forming experience as a student by the Bokrospackage; he cites the imposition of study fees as the reason for having entered professional
politics. 447 A younger MSZP-MP restates the general criticism of the way it was imposed on
society, although it achieved the desired outcomes. 448 Thus, every new government has to
convincingly assure society that it does not plan a new “Bokros”-package in order not to lose
popularity (e.g. the re-elected Gyurcsány government in 2006 which is widely viewed to be
J Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton University Press, 1992.
M Brusis, V Dimitrov, ‘Executive configuration and fiscal performance in post-communist central and
eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.8, No.6, pp.899-900.
446
K Scheppele, ‘Constitutional Negotiations – Political Contexts of Judicial Activism in Post-Soviet Europe’,
International Sociology, Vol.18, No.1, March 2003, p.233.
447
Fidesz #1.
448
MSZP #1.
444
445
134
under pressure to implement far-reaching austerity measures for preparing the accession to the
EURO). Thus the Hungarian consensualist discourse constrains the options for political
change, even though there are successful cases of majoritarian policies to refer to. This way
the consensualist habitus embodied by Hungarian political leaders is constantly being
reproduced and “re-confirmed” by the “reality” it creates. In spite of desirable outcomes
methods that are recognised as inappropriate are therefore opposed. 449 In brief, deliberate
reform has to be defined in value-rational terms, that is, in terms of their appropriateness and
not solely in efficiency-terms. Change is usually only possible in entrenched interpretative
traditions and according to the authoritative interpreters of different types of rules, thus it is
proceeding relatively slowly. 450
Similar to the Hungarian case, according to a number of prominent scholars, German
politics is historically compromise-oriented and aiming for balanced, equitable decisions. 451
For some strange reason, however, support for this approach did not resurface in postcommunist East Germany even after the West German consensus democracy had been
installed 1:1 (as shown above). Unlike elsewhere in the region no institutional experiments
were undertaken. The assumption that culture would follow institutions proved wrong, too, as
the diverging results for the content analysis between East and West Germany demonstrated.
Rather, a very different, more majoritarian outlook on politics was developed as
shown both quantitatively and qualitatively. As Jennifer Yoder correctly observes, the process
of integrating into a new system is not just about values, but also about identities. 452 What
kind of rhetorical resources, what kind of collective representations and common identities
can East German political elites thus use to justify their “non-conformist” stance towards
established West German institutions such as the Bundesrat? Unlike in the Hungarian case,
there is little value and legitimacy in the widely discredited past of Nazi, Weimar or Imperial
Germany. Unlike the case of Kádár’s Hungary, the communist GDR is not only viewed as an
illegitimate regime but also for providing recipes for confrontational, imposing politics.453
East German political elites do not have the collective memory of consensual solutions at
historical turning-points which could serve as a strong unifying symbol (therefore lacking the
rhetorical resources to justify consensus politics). Basically, any collective memory of a
449
J March, J Olsen, ‘The logic of appropriateness’, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo,
ARENA Working Papers 04/09, Oslo, 2004, pp.17-18.
450
J March, J Olsen, 2004, p.14.
451
R Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, New York: W.W. Norton, 1979.
452
J Yoder, ‘West-East Integration: Lessons from East Germany’s Accelerated Transition’, East European
Politics and Societies, Vol.14, No.1, p.118.
453
The ability of the old regime to quickly push through its economic policies without the need for extensive
consultations with societal groups (as opposed to today’s measures) is in fact favourably mentioned by one
otherwise staunchly anti-communist MP (CDU#7).
135
“better” past would have to go back to the time before 1933 at least, and with few
personalities alive who could help re-establishing this link. 454
In fact, the experience of a confrontational but successful transition (i.e. a revolution in
which co-operation with the petrified old regime would have been fatal and compromise
impossible) rather support this notion. Although there were some elements of compromise
and accommodation (e.g. round table talks) real changes occurred through decisive (but
peaceful) actions from some of the groups and parties. Examples include the occupation of the
Stasi-headquarters in order to prevent the destruction of secret police files, large
demonstrations demanding (the speeding up of) reforms, and later reunification in which
hundreds of thousands of people took part on a regular basis. In the light of this discourse the
West German consensus-corporatist model is identified as an impediment to political
progress, it is approached rather pragmatically and critically as creating too much delay and
high costs. East German politicians are rarely found to publicly advocate consensus-solutions
to current issues, whereas it is not uncommon to West German ones (e.g. as shown by a recent
public appeal of leading environmental politicians from CDU, SPD, FDP and Greens for a
“new consensus on environmental policy”). 455
The findings for Hungary and East Germany, as ideal types for either multilateral or
unilateral transition respectively, are also reflected in other CEE countries. Alan Renwick in
his study shows how discursive legacies of different dissident movements in CEE collide or
harmonize with certain aspects of democratic political society and thus contribute or impede
CoD. The author counters the claim of Linz and Stepan, that dissident discursive legacies
about an alternative political society in general might impede the consolidation of democracy,
and employs a more differentiated perspective. Renwick shows that Vaclav Havel’s concept
of anti-politics, which was a guiding principle in the unilateral Czechoslovak transition, has
certain anti-consensual traits due to its strong claim for an uncompromising, straightforwardly
sincere (but non-essentializing) grounding of politics (although Havel, as a President, stood in
for accommodation and consensus). 456 The approach of the Solidarity trade union during the
Polish (multilateral) transition was, in turn, much more inclined to endorse compromise
(which came to be viewed positively by the main opposition protagonists). 457
C Offe, Varieties of Transition – The East European and East German Experience, Cambridge: Polity Press,
1996, p.13.
455
’Neue Stärke oder Niedergang’, Die Zeit, 14 September 2006, pp.36-37.
456
A Renwick, ‘Anti-Political or Just Anti-Communist? Varieties of Dissidence in East-Central Europe and
Their Implications for the Development of Political Society’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.20,
No.2, 2006b, pp.305-306
457
A Renwick, 2006b, pp.309-313.
454
136
Thus, transitions in CEE indeed left a legacy on the way political elites in different
countries embrace or reject consensus and compromise. Transition contributed to create a
discursive legacy, a habitus, by legitimising particular practices. Political elites are
constrained in the way they can convincingly conceive of their actions and gather support for
different approaches for political change.
In this regard, one alternative explanation deserves some further dwelling: the factor
of uncertainty. One might suggest that East German MPs do not advocate consensus politics
because they did not face such a high degree of political and economic uncertainty in the posttransition years, as they were safely being taken care of by the West German “Big Brother,”
and thus can afford to put on a competitive stance. To put it in Hirschmann’s words: “the light
at the end of the tunnel” was closer in the East German case than in the other CEE cases. This
objection has some plausibility and I do not claim to be able to fully disprove it with this
study. However, I will try to put things into perspective. First of all, multilateral transitions by
definition indeed do have a higher degree of political and economic uncertainty attached to
their first years of operation due to the balance between old and new forces. In unilateral
transitions the liberal, pro-market opposition strikes decisively against the old regime. In
terms of external uncertainty, I endeavour to argue that East Germany was not in a much
better position than the other CEE countries keeping in mind that the last Russian troops left
Germany only in 1994. Now, whether political elites from other CEE countries with a more
unilateral transition (e.g. the Czech Republic) are really as outspoken in supporting consensus
politics as the Hungarians, I doubt. This, of course, I have to leave for further empirical
research to prove. Finally, the factor “uncertainty” should no longer be a relevant factor once
CEE democracies have joined the European Union and thus have “locked in” their integration
into Western markets and the liberal democratic mainstream. From my data, no difference is
noticeable in terms of consensusalist discourses prior to and after accession. Again, further
research on discourses in the first post-transition years (i.e. under a higher degree of
uncertainty) and in the future should look into this.
Professional politics: Common good vs. particular interests, procedures vs. outcomes
The second ideational dimension of consensus democracy concerns the way demands and
arguments are being advanced. Consensus democracy was shown to be based in an
understanding of politics favouring the “common-good”. The third ideational dimension
concerns the value of formalised, routinized procedures to assure the working of consensus
democracy as opposed to a mere focus on achieving particular outputs. Therefore, in order to
137
elucidate MPs justification towards common-good or interest-based politics as well as inputor output-focused argumentation, MPs were asked to elaborate on how an “ideal MP” should
look like, what they like and dislike about their job, and how the new generation of politicians
should differ from current leaders.
First, this shall enable us to establish possible discursive patterns in the two cases;
giving support for a more common-good-focused model of political culture in the Hungarian
case and a more interest-centred one for East Germany (as suggested by the quantitative
analysis). While the former is being based on a focus establishing the “common good” the
latter is more inclined to argue for the free competition of various particular interests. From
these opposite ideals very different role models for politicians can be derived. One based on
political elites as the “vanguard” of national unity (as impartial experts or intellectuals who
are aloof of any particularistic groups, and who guide and/or educate the people). The other is
based on the ideal of politicians as being the representatives from the middle of society who
compete for the support of the voters. Both positions, of course, are to be found to different
degrees in both consensus and majoritarian democracy. An extreme understanding of the
common good or “national interest” (which denies the legitimacy of particular interests)
equals the totalitarian vision of a homogenous or synchronized society, whereas unrestrained
particularism equally destroys the foundations of liberty and equality.
Secondly, these questions enable us to inquire into the ultimate purpose of being a
politician; into the meaning of politics. Do MPs portray politics rather as a purpose in itself,
as being about procedures and political input which is key for consensualist politics, or do
they refer to politics as a means to an end with emphasis on ultimate outcomes as found to be
relevant for majoritarian politics? The quantitative data, as well as my hypotheses, suggest the
more input-based model for the Hungarian case and the output-based for the East German
one. In the following I will outline my findings and also discuss some of the implications for
the consolidation of democracy. As the two dimensions are strongly interlinked in terms of
the way they were discuss in the interviews, I will discuss them together here.
a) All Hungarian MPs in the interviews portray the ideal politician first and foremost as a
highly educated, knowledgeable and skilful person. There is a strong, dominating discourse
which explicitly demands that MPs should have a higher education, 458 or that this would be
useful in any case 459 (one MP even demands “at least two university degrees”). 460 Law,
458
MSZP#1, 2, 3, 5, MDF#1, Fidesz #5, 8, SZDSZ #4, 5.
SZDSZ #1, 6, Fidesz #3, 4, 6, MDF#2, MSZP#9.
460
Fidesz#1.
459
138
political and social sciences, history and economics, as well as specialist degrees (e.g.
agriculture) are presented as being the most useful educational background and preparation of
analytical skills for a good politician. At the same time, knowledge of (several) foreign
languages is repeatedly mentioned as a crucial skill.461 Politics is portrayed by some not so
much as a vocation, but rather as a chosen profession like many others. 462 As one MP put it:
“politics can be learned.” 463 Thus, to be admitted into the rather elitist circle of politicians in
Hungary, one needs to acquire cultural capital in the form of a higher education and other
skills. This elitist requirement was even turned into manpower policy in 1998. The then newly
elected conservative Prime Minister Orbán announced that there should be no minister
without a university degree in his government. 464 Subsequently, this excluded a major
ministerial aspirant from his own party’s leading circle to assume ministerial office until he
had finished his degree in 1999.
In addition to knowledge and education, communicative and rhetorical skills – both in
interacting with fellow politicians and the public—are widely mentioned as an unomitable
skill. One MP refers to “theatrical” or exhibitionist orientations as being useful for this job; 465
others refer to charisma, a convincing personality, leadership or “selling qualities”. 466 Also
mentioned are sensitivity and the ability to connect to people and understand their needs and
feelings. 467 But one MP makes priorities clear by saying that “professionalism is needed, not
just empathy and love for people”. 468 Furthermore, truthfulness, 469 as well as patience or
endurance, 470 flexibility, 471 and courage to stand for one’s opinion, 472 as well as ambition or
“love for power” 473 are presented as crucial traits of an ideal politician. Politics is thus a way
for realizing oneself. 474 Consequently, for Hungarian MPs, politics is about a small elitist
group of specialists organising the polity in the best possible way. Rather than embeddedness
in particular social groups, Hungarian politicians cultivate the image of the disconnected
intellectual or expert taking care of the common good in an impartial way. Hungarian MPs
461
MSZP#2, 3, 5, Fidesz #1, 8, MDF#1.
Fidesz#5.
463
SZDSZ#4.
464
Quoted in B Lomax, ‘The 1998 Elections in Hungary: Third Time Lucky for the Young Democrats’, Journal
of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.15, No.2, June 1999, p.124.
465
MSZP #1, SZDSZ #4, MDF#1.
466
MSZP#2, 5, 7, 9, Fidesz#2, 3.
467
MSZP#1, 7, Fidesz#3.
468
Fidesz#7.
469
MSZP#5, SZDSZ#5.
470
Fidesz#1, 2, SZDSZ#3.
471
MDF#2, Fidesz#6.
472
Fidesz#6, 7.
473
MSZP#4, 10.
474
MDF#2, Fidesz#6.
462
139
portray their work as part of a “harmonizing and guiding process,” 475 the “realization of a
higher goal,” 476 or generally “shaping the fate of the country” 477 (i.e. they present their work
in the light of the common good).
Some MPs deplore that they do not fulfil the mentioned high expectations for a
professional politician and were not well enough prepared since they rather unexpectedly got
involved with politics in the late 1980s. 478 However, these high standards need to be met by a
new generation of professional politicians 479 who should be more rational and professional,
not only in terms of knowledge and expertise but also in the relationship to other parties and
politicians. More openness, a “normal relationship between the parties”, and “less ideological
struggles” are deemed desirable. 480 Yet, in a rather counter-hegemonic discourse, one MP
warns that professional politicians who depend on their mandates for their living also
endanger the multicoloured landscape of politics. As a consequence there might remain as
little difference between the parties as “between Pepsi and Coke”. 481
Others state doubt about whether a new generation can really make things better than
the current one. They express apprehension that a new generation will create even more
scandals, will be more ideological, more superficial, more polarised than the current one.482
Therefore, strong calls are being made for the need of a different political culture: there
should be more consensus, and less ideological confrontation. 483 As the “socialization was
bad in this generation”, and since “everybody hurt each other already” only a new generation
can make a new start. 484 A new generation should ask about the past, but from distance and
through an objective approach to history. They should rise beyond the personal experiences
that so strongly impacted the first generation of post-communist politicians. 485 Some would
like to see the “communist heritage be frayed out completely” by the younger generation.
Communism should not be allowed to reappear as good idea. 486 One apparently marginal
discourse in opposition to the stronger elitist one argues that the new generation of politicians
475
MSZP#4.
MDF#2.
477
SZDSZ#5.
478
MDF#1, SZDSZ#4.
479
Fidesz#4.
480
MSZP#1, 3, 8, Fidesz#1, 4, MDF#1, 3, SZDSZ#4.
481
Fidesz #4.
482
MSZP#2, SZDSZ#1, 3, MDF#1.
483
MSZP#2, 5, 7, 9, 10, Fidesz#1, 6, MDF#1, 2, SZDSZ#3, 6.
484
MSZP#6, Fidesz#3.
485
MSZP#3, 4, Fidesz#6.
486
Fidesz#5, 7, SZDSZ#5.
476
140
should be closer to the people (e.g. through participation in local politics); they should “be
normal people” an not a “closed circle”. 487
Thus, there are high demands again. This time moral requirements and personal
integrity are advanced to aspiring new politicians. Ideal politicians are portrayed as rather
extraordinary personalities who can rise above the conflicts of past and present. There is also
the ideal of synthesis and consensus that seems to resonate in these statements, too. Politicians
are not portrayed as representatives of societal groups or constituencies, but rather as the
custodians of national unity and harmony.
When asked about what they like and dislike about politics, Hungarian MPs put quite
some emphasis on politics as a public process and their enjoyment of being part of it. They
say that they love to “be involved in great things”, “be in the centre of interest”, or to “get
close,” 488 to “enjoy the twirl and to be inside” 489 or even to “live out one’s exhibitionism.” 490
Hungarian politicians report feeling a sense of deep gratification by experiencing power and
success, (e.g. by winning elections). 491 MPs claim to appreciate the great personal experience
through the opportunity to work on interesting and manifold topics 492 and the chance to learn
many new things. 493 One MP complains that by all decisions there is “always someone
hurt”, 494 which in a way is a reversed utilitarian argument used to justify non-decisions.
Rather than aiming for concrete goals Hungarian MPs report enjoying being representatives
of the people in general. 495 Role and identity are more important than action. Rather than
realising their voters’ demands they stress the chance to create/find/tell the truth (to them) 496
and to enjoy people’s trust. 497 One even reports his great pleasure in realising “that people
want to listen [to me].” 498
Hungarian MPs thus assign a central role to themselves in the working of democracy.
They are less concerned with what is the output of their work, but rather with “putting on a
good show”. For them, doing politics is already a purpose in itself which is serving a higher
goal. MPs seem to gain their raison d’ètre not through their mandate as elected
representatives, but through their role in running the democratic institutions. Investigating the
487
MSZP#3, 6, 10.
MSZP#1, 2, 3, Fidesz #1, 5, SZDSZ#1, 3, 5.
489
Fidesz#1.
490
MSZP#2.
491
Fidesz#1, 7, SZDSZ #6.
492
MSZP#3, 4, 5, 7, Fidesz#4, SZDSZ#3, 4.
493
MSZP#3, 4, SZDSZ#5.
494
Fidesz #2.
495
Fidesz#2, 6, 7, SZDSZ#6.
496
MDF#1, SZDSZ#4, Fidesz#6.
497
Fidesz#7.
498
MSZP#1.
488
141
concept of representation among Hungarian politicians, Gabriella Ilonszki finds MPs putting
most emphasis on the representation of the “national interest” before one’s constituency and
party. Moreover, she finds very little explicit links of MPs to interest organisations. 499
b) In contrast, East German MPs, when describing their ideal politician, clearly negate the
notion of a specially trained professional and an elitist understanding of politics. Rather they
quite unanimously would like to see politicians come from the middle of society, who bring
sufficient experience from “real life” which is more important than specialist knowledge and
expertise. Politicians should reflect the plurality of the population’s lives and experiences 500
and act out of a sense of responsibility for society rather than self-realisation. 501 This
understanding explicitly excludes the idea of politics as a professional career choice, and also
quite strongly limits the opportunities for young aspiring politicians lacking practical
experience “in the real world”. The straight way into politics is actually portrayed rather
negatively, even by a 29-year-old MP who presents his lack of experience in a normal
profession as disadvantageous and generally rather undesirable. 502 Thus, experience in a
job 503 and/or local politics, 504 a stable character (in German: “gefestigte Persönlichkeit”
which implies both maturity and a certain age) 505 and other personal qualities such as
endurance, 506 flexibility, 507 and cooperativeness 508 (rather than a university degree or
language certificates) should be the entry qualifications to politics. In complete opposition to
the dominant Hungarian discourse, an East German MP argues that “how to become a
politician cannot be studied at university.” 509 Politics is in fact rather “training on the job” 510
requiring constant further learning. 511 In general, many East German MPs would like to see a
larger variety in professional backgrounds in parliament underlining the importance of having
499
G Ilonszki, ’Representation deficit in a new democracy: Theoretical considerations and the Hungarian case’,
in Gy Lengyel, Zs Rostoványi (eds.), The Small Transformation: Society, Economy and Politics in Hungary and
the New European Architecture, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2001, p.483-500.
500
CDU#1.
501
SPD#1, 4, CDU#1, 2, 3, PDS#10.
502
SPD#1, 8, CDU#4, 5, PDS#4.
503
PDS#2, 3, CDU#2, 4, SPD#2, 9, FDP#1.
504
PDS#2, 3, 5,
505
SPD#1, 4, Green#1.
506
Green#1, SPD#7, 8, 10.
507
Green#1, CDU#3, SPD#7, 8.
508
Green#1, CDU#3, SPD#9.
509
Green#1.
510
PDS#6.
511
SPD#2, CDU#3.
142
more workers, natural scientists, engineers or even pensioners, and not just lawyers and social
scientists who only have a certain kind of perspective. 512
Only PDS MPs make a stronger statement in favour of having politicians with a
special training, strong scientific background or particular expert knowledge. 513 PDS MPs
claim that their Marxist education in the GDR was very useful for their current role, as it
prepared them for understanding the reality of capitalist democracies. They “knew how things
were going to turn out” 514 and therefore decided to use their insights and expertise to better
the lot of the people affected. However, among the PDS there are calls for a limitation of the
time in office, thus making politics a temporary vocation for otherwise socially integrated
personalities. 515
Thus, East German MPs describe the ideal MP as being as “ordinary” as possible and
closely involved with the daily life of its constituency or voters. Rather than floating above
societal groups, their conflicts and their interests politicians should come from their midst.
This definition, of course, is rather contrary to the understanding of expert politicians seeking
the “common good”.
While also stressing communicative skills East Germans seem to refer more strongly
to interpersonal rather than theatrical or rhetorical capabilities in this regard. Unlike their
Hungarian colleagues they mention these skills more in the context of empathy, openness and
sensitivity with regard to people’s needs,516 “Menschenkenntnis” (i.e. the ability to understand
and deal with people), 517 perceptive capabilities, 518 or even “humbleness” and an “ability to
take criticism”. 519 Rhetorical skills are not prominently discussed. 520 Rather than convincing
or educating the people politicians should listen and win the voters’ confidence. 521
In stark opposition to the dominant Hungarian discourse, good politicians, according
to this East German discourse, should be good listeners rather than good speakers. This
includes also the demand of not “losing contact with the ground”, 522 staying an ordinary
human 523 and remaining truthful. 524 Politicians are thus portrayed as not having any kind of
512
CDU#1, 2, PDS#8.
PDS#1, 2, 6, 7, 8.
514
PDS#1, 4, 5.
515
PDS#1, 2, 5, 10.
516
SPD#1, 5, 8, PDS#1, 3, CDU#3, 5, FDP#1.
517
SPD#4.
518
PDS#7.
519
Green#1, SPD#8.
520
PDS#6, 7, CDU#5.
521
FDP#1.
522
PDS#3, SPD#4.
523
PDS#10.
524
SPD#1, PDS#9,
513
143
superior knowledge or being able to teach the populace. 525 Instead, they should be aware of
their role as decision-makers. Rather than leaving decisions to so-called experts MPs should
assert the primacy of politics. 526
This rather anti-elitist, down-to-earth conception of politics is also reflected in East
German statements regarding the question of how a new generation of politicians should look
like. They would like to see less “career politicians” 527 or mere “managers”. 528 Ideal
politicians in the future should stay “close to people” or “close to their roots”. 529 They should
be more genuine, sincere, or honest with their voters. 530 Also, they should be able to better
adapt to changes, employ new ways of thinking, and demonstrate farsightedness. 531 One MP
states that no change was needed. 532 In line with their earlier mentioned discourse PDS MPs
would like to see less party influence, 533 and have more expert knowledge among
politicians. 534 Another PDS MP suggests that not all MPs are actually representing legitimate
interests. 535
When asked about what aspects of being a politician they like or dislike, in contrast to
Hungarians, East German MPs present the agency-component of politics as the most exciting
and important aspect of their work. Nearly everyone expresses great satisfaction to be able to
decide important societal questions as an MP or at least to have an influence on many issues.
In general, MPs refer to the great opportunities to influence, to shape or to create some
tangible political results. 536 They seem to emphasise the “political” of being a politician (i.e.
the need to make decisions for or against something). Slow and protracted decisions or fishy
compromises are presented as a real problem and strongly disliked. 537 Unlike in the
Hungarian case the expressed gratification with one’s profession is not so much connected
with self-realization, but rather with “being able to do something for the people”. 538 This
rather pragmatic, result-oriented stance is underpinned by a dislike for too much ideological
and party dominance in politics. 539
525
CDU#3.
PDS#6, CDU#5.
527
SPD#2, 8, PDS#4, 5.
528
PDS#2.
529
Green#1, CDU#3, PDS#5, 10, SPD#7, FDP#1.
530
CDU#2, PDS#4, 9, Green#1, SPD#5, FDP#1.
531
CDU#1, 3, 4, SPD# 9, 10.
532
SPD#1.
533
PDS#1, 3, 4, 10.
534
PDS#3.
535
PDS#6.
536
SPD#1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, PDS#2, 3, 8, Green#1, CDU#1, 3, 5, FDP#1.
537
PDS#3, SPD#2, CDU# 2, 3, FDP#1.
538
SPD#1, 10, CDU#1, 5, PDS#3.
539
CDU#1, 4, PDS#6, 7, 8, SPD#6, 9, 10.
526
144
The de-emphasis on personal self-fulfilment in favour of devotion to delivering to the
voter is also clear when considering the strong criticism advanced against superficiality,
empty talking, rituals, ignorance, know-it-all attitudes or showmanship in politics. 540
Hypocrisy and vanity are equally despised. 541 In strong contrast to her “exhibitionist”
Hungarian colleagues, one East German MP expresses that she just “does not want to be
worshipped.” 542 Politicians should rather make sure “not to get too far away from real life.” 543
Also in the German media East German MPs are often portrayed, if not idealised this
way, usually in contrast to their more prominent West German colleagues. East German MPs
are presented as appreciating quiet work behind the scenes; they seem not to care for the
headlines and not to aim for media attention but for “results”. Unfortunately, so this discourse
claims, this way they rarely get elected into senior positions since (even with 15 years of
parliamentary experience) they fail to make good use of public relations. 544 East German MPs
frankly admit that they are autodidacts, who are “learning by doing”. They present themselves
as less ideological and more pragmatic, and more sincere than the West German “showmen”. 545
The lack of privacy and becoming a “public person” is also strongly disliked by East
German politicians. 546 Rather than trying to embody a VIP, or even to educate the people,
East German MPs take their profession as a constant learning experience where they enjoy
meeting and interacting with (many different) people, 547 acquire knowledge about a great
variety of issues all the time, 548 or travelling extensively through the country. 549 In fact, a
number of East German MPs made very clear that they do not like the term “political elites”
when the author introduced his research interest to them. Only among PDS MPs some
importance seems to be attached to the opportunity to argue and debate frequently in public,
or to be able to transmit one’s “truth”. 550
Unlike the Hungarians, where politics is portrayed as a harmonizing, synthesising
activity for finding some kind of rational, de-politicised, passionless Habermasian consensus,
East German MPs are emphasising the “political” in politics are more in the line of Chantal
540
SPD#1, 5, 7, PDS#2, 3, 7, 8, 10, CDU#4, 5.
CDU#1, PDS#3, 10, SPD#4, 8.
542
SPD#4.
543
PDS#1, SPD#4.
544
Interview with SPD #9 and report about other East German MPs in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 March 2005.
545
W Patzelt, ’“Seiteneinsteiger, Neulinge, Ossis…“: Die Integration ostdeutscher Abgeordneter in
‚gesamtdeutsche’ Parlamente’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, pp.545/8.
546
PDS#1, Green#1, SPD#4.
547
PDS#3, 5, 6, 7, CDU#2, SPD#4.
548
PDS#3, 7, CDU#2, 4, 5, SPD#8.
549
PDS#1, 5, CDU#2, SPD#8.
550
PDS#7, 9.
541
145
Mouffe, or even Karl Schmitt. 551 East German MPs do not advance anything coming close to
define the “common good” or “national interest” etc. Instead they make clear references to the
needs of individuals or groups in society. In the end, East German MPs present themselves as
caring about what politics does for the people. Outputs are also much more important than
procedures. This Jacksonian, even slightly populist stance assigns legitimacy to politicians not
through their separation from and superiority to the people but, quite the contrary, on being
authentic representatives and executants of voters’ interests. Politicians are not there to find
some ultimate common good but to directly address the needs of the diverse layers in society.
Politics is not something which should be left to free-floating “experts;” it is about making
decisions for different groups of people with different interests. There should be no illusion:
“politicians are always lobbyists”. 552
This specific East German emphasis on interest representation as opposed to notions
of the common good, as well as the declared preference for outcomes as opposed to
procedures, is already well reflected in the earliest surveys of East German parliamentarians
in the 1990 parliament. To be unaffiliated with the former regime is seen by the new MPs as
their most important quality. Thus, they have to be from the middle of society, from sub-elite
positions or completely non-politicised backgrounds. They do not need to be well known or to
have any political experience. PDS-MPs, already in 1990, emphasised most prominently the
need for expertise and parliamentary experience.553
In a comparison with contemporary West German parliamentarians East German MPs
in the 1990 freely elected East German parliament (Volkskammer) in a survey mention the
representation of voters as their most important task( as opposed to their Western colleagues
who emphasise their personal interest in influencing decisions). East German MPs state much
stronger dissatisfaction with their opportunities to help their voters and to take care of their
problems. Also, in reality, they are also much more frequently in the constituency than their
West German colleagues, who are more concerned with gathering information and interacting
with other members of the political elite during their working hours. 554
For the case of regional (Länder) MPs Werner Patzelt finds East Germans as putting
much more emphasis on responsiveness to voters and special interests (as opposed to
C Mouffe, On the political, London: Routledge, 2005.
PDS #1.
553
H Müller-Enbergs, ‘Zwischen Bewahrung und Modernisierung. Politische Einstellungen in der letzten
Volkskammer der DDR’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem
und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,
1994, pp.252-253.
554
B Scholz, ’Bundestag und Volkskammer. Meinungsprofile von Abgeordneten im Vergleich’, in: O
Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der
ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.274-279.
551
552
146
overriding national interests) than West Germans. Both in theory and in practice, Patzelt finds
East German regional MPs stressing less the exercise of “leadership”. They spent more time
in their constituencies than their West German colleagues, but are still less satisfied with the
number of contacts to the population. 555 They put much more emphasis on pragmatic
problem-solving than on the debate of basic questions. They do not care as much about their
PR, in particular their relationship with the media as West Germans. Instead they are more
open to interest groups. Some of these patterns, however, are found to be gradually adjusting
to West German patterns. 556 For Patzelt the strong emphasis on responsiveness to the voters is
based in the experience of the completely unresponsive (and politically irrelevant) GDR
parliament under the old regime. 557 Also, Davidson-Schmich in her study finds East German
members of regional parliaments to be more outcome-oriented than their West German
colleagues, similar to Machatzke in an earlier survey from 1995. 558 The discursive pattern
found in my interviews are quite well reflected in various empirical studies throughout the last
15 years on East German parliamentarians. This also demonstrates that my findings seem to
refer to rather persistent cultural differences between East and West Germany, as compared to
post-communist countries with different historical experiences such as Hungary. Edinger and
Vogel find East German MPs putting stronger emphasis on representing their constituency (as
opposed to the country as a whole) than their West German colleagues. They argue that this
might be based in their perception to represent a special East German interest. 559 Still, as I
will discuss below, it would be too easy to relegate this East German discourse to merely
being a reaction to West German domination in political and economic terms. Below, there is
again a brief summary of the major discursive differences in the two dimensions between the
two cases is compiled.
555
Similarly PDS #1. The opposite position (i.e. a strong dislike for constituency work) is expressed by Fidesz
#4.
556
W Patzelt, ‘Ostdeutsche Parlamentarier in ihrer ersten Wahlperiode: Wandel und Angleichung’, Historical
Social Research, Vol.22, No.3/4, 1997, pp.164-169.
557
W Patzelt, ’“Seiteneinsteiger, Neulinge, Ossis…“: Die Integration ostdeutscher Abgeordneter in
‚gesamtdeutsche’ Parlamente’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, p.566.
558
L Davidson-Schmich, Becoming Party Politicians – Eastern German State Legislators in the Decade
following Democratization, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, p.58; J Machatzke,
’Einstellungen zum Umfang staatlicher Verantwortung – Zum Staatsverständnis der Eliten im vereinten
Deutschland’, in: W Bürklin, H Rebensdorf (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Rekrutierung und Integration,
Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997, pp.340-350.
559
M Edinger, L Vogel, ’Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion and Political Attitudes of East and West German
Parliamentarians – Findings from the Jena Parliamentary Survey (2003-4)’, Czech Sociological Review, Vol.41,
No.3, 2005, p.378.
147
Hungary
East Germany
The ideal MP is an omniscient, multilingual The ideal MP has experienced real life and a
orator who enters politics after finishing a real job before entering politics. He/she acts
graduate degree in Oxford with merit. He/she out of a sense of responsibility, not selfis a real professional and realises her-/himself realisation. Politics is not a profession, it’s a
in interacting with voters and fellow MPs.
calling. Not talking but listening to the people
My generation did not have the chance to is most important.
develop all these skills, besides our political PDS: A Marxist education and specialised
culture is rotten.
training in the GDR helped me to understand
how a capitalist system works.
------------------------------------------------------
It’s great to convince people or fellow It’s great to learn what the people have to tell
politicians about your ideas. It’s bad that and be able to make a difference for them. It’s
politics has such a poor reputation in our bad that it takes so much time and energy to
country.
achieve something.
c) Having contrasted the findings for the two cases regarding the second and third ideational
dimensions of consensus democracy (i.e. references to the common good, and the superiority
of procedures over outcomes) I will now discuss possible sources for these differences.
Again, two very distinct major discourses shared across party lines can be observed in
the two cases, this time concerning the more philosophical question of how an ideal politician
should look like. Hungarian MPs portray the ideal politician as being part of some kind of
elitist circle of highly educated professionals. Qualification for office is based on knowledge
and expertise. Thus, whether one can become a politician depends on who he/she is. East
German MPs in turn qualify good politicians by whom they represent and what they do.
Hungarian MPs portray politics as ideally run by an elitist circle of experts who, through their
leadership qualities, can well communicate their activities to the people. Communication
rather takes place top-down or within the elite. East German MPs view the ideal politician as
being as close as possible to ordinary life with his/her ears and eyes close to the people.560
Their ideal politician represents a certain segment of society from which he/she receives the
input to his/her work. Thus, implicitly for Hungarian MPs, political elites are meant to define
the ultimate goals, the common good, which are then communicated to the people. East
See also J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP,
1999, pp.127-128, for very similar findings on the self-image of members of regional parliaments in East
Germany in the mid-1990s.
560
148
German MPs portray politicians more as agents of different interests in society who have to
make political decisions. Only PDS members feature more elitist discourses, stressing the
importance of specialist knowledge of politicians.
Concerning the dimension about procedures vs. outcomes Hungarian MPs express a
strong emphasis on politics as a process of interaction within the political elite – they stress
their enjoyment of interacting, arguing, debating, communicating etc. According to this
discourse politicians play a role; they need to engage in finding the truth and communicate it
to the population. Their public image as a political class matters strongly to them and they
express concern about general politicisation. East German MPs present themselves as being
focused towards achieving concrete results for the people. They do not feature a particularly
elitist esprit de corps. They portray themselves as being free of elitist presumption or
aspirations as popular enlighteners or educators but rather stress the value of “local
knowledge” for their work. They express concern about cumbersome processes which are
often in the way of concrete achievements. They express opposition to de-politicisation and
the predominance in politics of experts trained in particular subjects.
If we take these discourses as rhetorical devices employed by politicians to
communicate and legitimate their role in politics, rather than attitudes, we find the mentioned
discourses strongly reflecting the setting of the transition to democracy. In the East German
case civic activists gained legitimacy by being completely unaffiliated with the old elites, by
being untainted with any ideology, coming from occupations far away from politics, coming
from the middle of the ordinary mass population (“Wir sind das Volk!”), and this way
challenging and exposing the regime which claimed to represent the people. Through this
authentic, non-elite status they gained “moral capital” as outlined by Lenka Siroky for the
Czech case. 561 The PDS, in turn, is trying to “revalue” their cultural capital from the old
system (i.e. their good education in both specialised fields and Marxist ideology) for coping
with the new system. An alternative explanation which relates this understanding of direct
representation back to the practice of communist parliaments, where all major societal groups
(e.g. peasants, workers, writers, artists, scientists, women, youth etc.) were symbolically
represented appears rather implausible due to the complete de-legitimation of the old regime.
To some extent this somewhat populist self-idealisation or self-belittlement could be
characterised as a reaction to West German political culture (which obviously values selfpromotion, professionalism, specialist expertise and elitist self-consciousness more strongly).
However, as shown above, the emphasis of being an ‘ordinary’ citizen as opposed to being
L Siroky, Dissidents and Engineers – The Rise and Fall of Moral Capital, MA-thesis, Harvard University,
2004.
561
149
affiliated with the old regime was already the major asset of self-characterisation for the new
East German political elites in the 1990 GDR parliament (Volkskammer) when unification
was hardly on the agenda yet, and interaction with West German politicians rather sparse.
Thus, confrontation with “the other”, the experience of a different political culture in the
united Germany, might have very well reinforced this theme which originated in the
revolutionary transition of East Germany. Thus, the habitus of the “plebeian underdog” tries
to create the conditions for its own reproduction and survival by offering plausible
interpretations and concurrent strategies for changed circumstances. Instead of emphasising
the fact of being unaffiliated with the old regime, East German MPs now emphasise in how
far they are different from the established West German elites (who traditionally feature a
strong overrepresentation of males, civil servants, professional party officials, lawyers and
self-employed professionals). 562
In the mid-1990s East German MPs were, on average, significantly younger than
Westerners (47 vs. 54 years), had a higher share of women in their ranks (30% vs. 10%) and
still a notable dominance of natural sciences and technical backgrounds as opposed to the
prominent representation of legal and social sciences, and public administration among West
German MPs. 563 These differences have diminished but are still noticeable in the new
millennium. 564 Since recruitment for elite positions of East German politicians now has to go
through the filter of Western criteria (e.g. long-standing party involvement, experience in the
public sector, legal expertise etc.) certain East German experiences and perspectives become
increasingly marginalized. 565 Still, East German MPs seem to be trying to act according to
this plebeian ideal, even though it might mean to be disadvantaged in terms of posts and
media coverage (see above). Obviously, playing the “outsider”-theme appears more
promising and convincing in defining one’s role than joining the mainstream in a context
which is seen as de-valuing the biographies of East Germans and raising West German (or
EU-)”experts” to being the ideal.
T Rudzio, Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften, 7th edition, 2006, pp.407-426.
563
V Kaina, M Sauer, ’Ostdeutsche Eliten und gesamtdeutsche Führungsschicht im gesellschaftlichen
Integrationsprozeß. Ergebnisse der „Potsdamer Elitestudie 1995“’, in: P Hübner (ed.), Eliten im Sozialismus –
Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR, Köln: Böhlau, 1999, pp.87-105; B Scholz, ’Bundestag und
Volkskammer. Meinungsprofile von Abgeordneten im Vergleich’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien
und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen
Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.284-286.
564
J Plöhn, ‘Ostdeutsche Profile in in der Politik – Vom Aufbruch zur Gesamtdeutschen Normalität’, in: O
Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn:
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006, pp.138-141.
565
A Segert, ‘Allokationsprozesse deutscher Eliten – Diskussion der Kolonialisierungsthese’, in: L McFalls / L
Probst (eds.), After the GDR – New Perspectives on the Old GDR and the Young Länder, Amsterdam: Rodopi,
2001, pp.287-307.
562
150
In this regard, certain socio-economic background factors which are supposed to
influence political culture (in the form of attitudes in the classical model) do indeed matter,
but in a different and more straight-forwards way. The new freely elected East German MPs
on average were younger, more female, more religious and had a stronger educational
background in natural sciences (rather than politicised subjects such as law or economics)
than the late communist leadership. 566 This may also (in some way or another) have imbued
them with different values and orientations due to different individual social backgrounds.
More importantly, it endowed them with cultural capital and rhetorical resources to distance
themselves from the personalities representing the past: old, ungodly, ideologically blinded,
self-righteous and obstinate men.
Few East Germans had openly protested or rebelled against the regime since those
who did often paid the price by losing their freedom, health and/or their home. Under these
circumstances no alternative elite could develop, but an alternative understanding of politics
without elites. According to Jürgen Plöhn today no political class exists in East Germany as
typical East German politicians only share the way they adapted to the former regime but
otherwise have very different individual profiles and experiences. 567 These “un-affiliated”
people avoided the need to make ideological commitments during the old regime by using the
marginal opportunities of academic self-realisation in the natural sciences. Sometimes they
joined a “bloc” party, such as the nominally Christian democrat or Liberal parties, as a
“compromise” when they were pressured into joining the communist party. 568 They practiced
free speech only in the protected sphere of church activities and rarely openly challenged the
regime until shortly before its breakdown. Several MPs in the interviews stressed that they
were “no heroes”, “no freedom fighters” and “no martyrs”. 569 Christian Welzel differentiates
four types of political affiliation in the GDR: communist party members, bloc party members,
opposition activists and the non-affiliated. In absolute terms the formerly non-affiliated now
represent the largest share of the new East German elites. 570
566
C Welzel, ‘Rekrutierung und Sozialisation der ostdeutschen Eliten. Aufstieg einer demokratischen
Gegenelite?, in: W Bürklin, H Rebensdorf (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Rekrutierung und Integration,
Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997, pp.208-209.
567
J Plöhn, ‘Ostdeutsche Profile in in der Politik – Vom Aufbruch zur Gesamtdeutschen Normalität’, in: O
Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn:
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006, p.150.
568
L Davidson-Schmich, Becoming Party Politicians – Eastern German State Legislators in the Decade
following Democratization, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, p.23.
In my sample, CDU #1 mentions work place pressure to join the SED as the reason for his decision to join the
CDU. This meant commitment to a socialist GDR under the leadership of the SED, but less of an ideological
commitment to communism as such.
569
SPD #1, 4, 6, PDS #1, 4.
570
Welzel, 1997, pp.218-222.
151
In 1989/90, after 40 years of communist indoctrination from the cradle to the grave, a
biography of non-affiliation was already statement enough to be a legitimate new face in
politics in a society still full of former petty apparatchiks and Stasi informers. Having
withstood communist indoctrination, if only in a self-created niche, helped these people to be
regarded the most authentic personalities for a new beginning in the Arendtian sense. Soon,
both the old leaders and the most radical civic activist were marginalized. 571 In truth, we do
not need the detour of value internalisation of the classical model to explain the pre-eminent
traits of this new political culture, of the habitus brought about by the new political elites. Pretransition biographies were devalued or revalued by going through the filter of transition and
thus became a resource or a liability for different kinds of individuals.
Interestingly, and in line with my argument, references to particular interests and their
representation (rather than an elite-defined common good) are most frequent in the content
analysis of parliamentary speeches among those East German MPs who immediately started
their political career in 1989/90 on the national or regional level (e.g. CDU #2, CDU #5, CDU
#6, SPD #1, see annex 2, table 2a). The pronounced differences in this regard between East
and West Germany on the one hand, and certain similarities between West Germany and
Hungary on the other, also speak against an alternative explanation which would point
towards the higher degree of social differentiation and modernization in Germany as a whole
(as opposed to Hungary) which might have lead to these different understandings of political
representation.
This non-elitist stance of East German MPs also goes some way in explaining why,
according to the content analysis, they assume an output- rather than input-oriented approach
to democracy (i.e. valuing political outcomes rather than procedures for themselves). Unlike
Hungarian MPs East German parliamentarians define themselves through their pragmatism in
closely representing their voters’ needs and demands. Interestingly, this position is assumed
by all but two MPs who have a background in regional politics before entering the parliament
(CDU #1 und CDU #6). Save for PDS-MPs, they are the only East German parliamentarians
featuring predominantly positive statements towards the established procedures of consensus
democracy, making mostly positive references to the inclusion of the Länder. This might
actually indicate a possible socialization impact of regional politics as already mentioned
above (in line with the classical model of political culture).
In contrast to East Germans, aspiring democratic politicians in Hungary (during the
period of transition) had to distinguish themselves by their expertise, charisma or moral
571
H Arendt, On Revolution, Hamondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973.
152
authority, be it as an urban intellectual with abstract ideals about the future democracy, a
populist writer defining the essence of the nation, or as a post-communist reformer finding the
right balance between market and state. Rather than challenging the old elite by being as far
and as different as possible from the leaders of the old regime, the Hungarian opposition
sought to reach an equal footing with them through their cultural capital as distinguished
scientists, philosophers, writers, legal or economic experts (as Hungarian Kádárist
communism was not fully de-legitimised in the eyes of the Hungarian population). Gradual
co-optation of non-party experts into the administration had increased the value of cultural
capital since the 1970s while the 1989 transition involved only moderate elite turnover among
the former communists. 572 Rather than representing a constituency the opposition sought
legitimacy through gaining elite status. To the Hungarian elites of 1989 the birth of
democracy at the round table talks was based on collective deliberation, as opposed to the
Aufbruch (=awakening, departure) by the East Germans which made the established order
break down through action.
Some East German MPs make explicit references to their experience of the
significance of real political agency during transition (i.e. the power of political decisions to
intentionally change the course of history). They refer to this memory in order to reject the
“de-politicisation of politics”, to counter calls for expert governments, or to argue against
claims that politicians are powerless in the context of globalisation.573 Hungarian MPs in turn
constantly make references to the orderly, expert-led transition and the first freely elected
parliament full of little “philosopher (sociologist, historian, poet…) kings” serving the
common good which, in the light of contemporary quarrels and problems, appears like a
Golden Age (though it was not seen as such during that time). Even if Hungarian MPs do not
(any longer) come close to the ideal, they very much present the omniscient, polyglot, freefloating academic as their ideal politician and value the elaborated procedures of democratic
decision-making. Unlike East German MPs, who focus on representing different interests in
society, Hungarian MPs put strong emphasis on being representatives of the common good
(or the national interest). However, it often seems that every party or camp claims for itself to
define or represent the common good and to exclude the other side from it. Hence, MPs from
left and right accuse each other of representing only their own party’s interest, or a small
minority of the rich, rather than helping the poor or furthering the entire nation. 574 Thus, while
G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists – Class Formation and Elite
Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe, London: Verso, 1998.
573
CDU#5, PDS#6.
574
Fidesz #1, 2, 3, MSZP #3, SZDSZ #3.
572
153
the discourse of common-good orientation is strongly pronounced, it is partly usurped in order
to delegitimize political opponents. In line with the model of political culture outlined above,
I would argue that the common-good discourse has become part of the collective, explicit
political culture of Hungarian MPs. However, it did not lead to a full adaptation of behaviour
away from self-interested positions towards collective norms, which we would expect if full
internalisation had occurred on the individual level. An attempt to explain why this did not
happen is advanced further below when discussing the dimension of “respect towards the
other”.
Thus, both Hungarian and East German MPs use their own biography as a resource of
legitimacy and keep emphasising these old ideals, although patterns of elite recruitment and
interaction have changed since then. In contrast to their pronounced ideal of the socially
embedded MP, only 8% of East German MPs work in a “normal” profession next to their
mandate, as opposed to 28% of West Germans. 575 Few poets and historians have remained in
Hungarian politics, 576 and natural scientists or protestant theologians become less prominent
among East German MPs. However, authenticity as being as “ordinary” and as close to the
people as possible in the East German case, and being as “educated” as possible in the
Hungarian case is still demanded in order to enter politics. Some statements are, in fact,
clearly defensive to ongoing changes and try to “raise the bar” for future politicians (e.g. “at
least two university degrees, at least two foreign languages” vs. “be more mature and have
experienced real life”) or deplore the deviations from the transition ideal (“we did not have
the chance to be better prepared for politics” vs. “we need less career politicians”). Both
Hungarian and East German political elites define themselves and the ideal which needs to be
aspired in front of the collective memory, in front of the ideal of democratic transition.
Also, in other post-communist countries we can find analogous discursive cultures
with regards to defining the conflicts between common good vs. particular interests, and
procedures vs. outcomes in democratic politics. A survey conducted among Polish MPs in the
mid-1990s finds discourses around the common good as the most dominant definition for the
essence of politics. Moreover, Polish MPs also advance very elitist understandings of
politicians lamenting a lack of experts. They voice little appreciation for particularistic or
575
H Best, M Edinger, Manuscript for presentation „Politik als Beruf und Berufung“ in the German Bundestag ,
15th December 2004, Sonderforschungsbereich 580, Friedrich-Schiller Universität Jena, online
http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/typo3/a3.0.html, last accessed 20 October 2006.
576
G Illonszki, ‘Parliament and Government in Hungary: a changing relationship’, Central European Political
Science Review, Vol.2, No.3, summer 2001, pp.72-103; ‘Öregedett a parlament, bár száznál több as új
képviselô’, Népszabadság, 16 May 2006.
154
conflict-oriented definitions of democracy. However, similar to their Hungarian counterparts,
they claim their colleagues follow egoistic or particularistic motives. 577
Alan Renwick, in his study on the legacies of dissident discourses, points out Vaclav
Havel’s explicit rejection of routinized institutions and his emphasis on “people-centred”
politics. 578 Havel’s famous greengrocer described in The Power of the Powerless starts
“living within the truth” just by no longer putting up signs with empty communist propaganda
slogans. There is indeed nothing heroic, elitist or extraordinary about this exemplary
greengrocer – he just starts being an authentic person again with his position in society. 579
The “truth” in this regard is not defined in an essentialist fashion, but just as the expression of
an authentic daily life. These bottom-up concepts of the democratic polity stood in contrast to
the dominant discourses among Hungarian dissidents who were explicitly arguing in favour of
routinized democratic institutions with prominent protagonists such as János Kis warning
against “anti-politics”. Very similar positions could be found among leading members of the
Polish opposition. 580
Also Gil Eyal, writing on the Czech and Slovak cases, contrasts the differing ideals
and meta-discourses of dissidents and later political elites in Prague and Bratislava. He
contrasts the essentializing discourses among the Slovak political elites with the dominant
Czech position which rejected the idea of guiding society by superior teleological knowledge.
Thus, while the Slovak political elites aimed at preserving and protecting their claim to
teleological knowledge (“prognosticators”), and presented themselves as bearers of the
national interest or the common good, the former Czech dissidents focused on establishing
conditions in which life could be authentic again (i.e. “living without the lie”). They limited
their role to being “pastors” rather than educators. Eyal finds the sources of these different
responses to the 1989 break-down of communism as based in homologous life experiences of
Czech dissidents and monetarist economists on the one side, and Slovak managers,
economists and nationalist historians on the other side to the historical juncture of 1968.581
Eyal demonstrates very convincingly the impact of historical watersheds on discursive
cultures. Different life experiences of Czech and Slovak intellectuals after the failed 1968
577
B Mach, W Wesolowski, ‘Politiker in Zeiten der Transformation: „Transformational correctness” oder
divergierende Wahrnehmungen?’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, No.3, 1999, pp.382-388.
578
A Renwick, ‘Anti-Political or Just Anti-Communist? Varieties of Dissidence in East-Central Europe and
Their Implications for the Development of Political Society’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.20,
No.2, 2006a, pp.306-315.
579
V Havel et al. (ed. by J Keane), The Power of the Powerless – Citizens against the State in Central Eastern
Europe, London: Hutchinson, 1985, pp.31-44.
580
A Renwick, 2006a, pp.306-315.
581
G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, pp.59-134.
155
reform experiments and the different conclusions drawn from it by the two groups lead to the
demarcation of these very different discursive communities. For the Hungarian case some
commonalities can be found between the Slovak discourse of rational, “prognostic” guidance
of society as described by Eyal with the Hungarian Socialists’ discourse on “enlightened
modernisation”. The latter defined a new role for the former technocrats as experts for
economic development and social planning from above, as described by Bozóki. 582 Similarly,
as in the Slovak case, Hungary’s transition was initially dominated by a coalition of
communist soft liners, reform economists, nationalist historians and writers who were trying
to marginalize more radical dissidents and student activists.
In this regard, it is also clear why in the East German case most PDS MPs do not share
the mainstream East German political culture. Being part of the formerly regime-affiliated and
privileged strata or professions their life-worlds were very different from those of the
“apolitical” or “unaffiliated” during the old regime. We do not know whether PDS members
who, in their majority, were also members of the communist party until 1989 really
assimilated communist convictions during that time, or whether they were just opportunistic
fellow travellers who were advancing their career chances. However, it is clear that their
biography offers very different explicit aspects for justifying and legitimising professional and
life choices. As the old party membership is at least partly being replaced now by younger
people without political involvement in the old regime (such as PDS MP #17 in the sample)
this demarcation becomes less marked, or even contested inside the party.
Concerning the consolidation of consensus democracy the relevance of the aboveoutlined discourses might be less discernible than in the previous section concerning the issue
of consensus as a democratic practice. On the most basic level, it is clear that East German
and Hungarian politicians raise very different expectations towards the political system. East
Germans focus on political outputs might clash with the limited ability of consensusdemocratic systems to deliver rapid decisions. I would not go as far as denoting their
predominant output-orientation as a sign of an inferior “subject” political culture, as in
Almond and Verba’s typology (i.e. a political culture focused on government as delivering
specific benefits but being unconcerned with input processes and participation). 583 In fact,
East German MPs have been shown in several studies to be much more in favour of
582
Eyal, 2003, p.110; A Bozóki, ‘The Ideology of Modernization and the Policy of Materialism: The Day after
the Socialists’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.13, No.1, 1997, pp.56-102.
583
G Almond / S Verba, The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton UP,
1963, pp.16-18.
156
participatory direct democratic elements than their West German colleagues.
584
This
interesting difference, which some authors also relate to the legacy of transition, will not be
further investigated in this context. 585 Nevertheless, the gap between rhetorical demands on
the system and real outputs (e.g. concerning the convergences with West German living
standards or the struggle against unemployment in East Germany) surely leads to support
arguments expressing alienation from the established procedures, or even an outright rejection
of the democratic system. In fact, several surveys have confirmed that, among the general
East German population, support for the democratic system is made conditional upon socioeconomic performance. 586
In the Hungarian case hostility towards the system might easier grow out of the
obvious gap between Hungarian MPs constantly self-proclaimed high moral and professional
standards and their poor performance in this regard or, put differently, their weak individual
internalisation of the values of consensus democracy. As Hungary’s Prime Minister
Gyurcsány remarked in an interview, Hungarian political parties “have not yet accepted that
also the other parties stand in for the common good”. Yet, he rather self-righteously excluded
his own party from this accusation in line with the dominant discourse described here. 587
Keeping the institutional status quo?
According to the above-outlined quantitative analysis of MPs’ statements Hungarian MPs
(across party lines) feature expressed support for the current institutional set-up of the
political and major redistributing systems. East German MPs (with the exception of PDS
members) are overall expressing more support for changes to the status quo. In the following I
intend to explore as to whether these differences in the fourth ideational dimension of
consensus democracy are based in discursive foundations which are shared across party lines
and based in historical references. For this matter I asked MPs in the interviews about the
584
V Kaina, ’Zwischen den Welten: Die Funktionsbewertung des politischen Systems in Führungsschicht und
Bevölkerung’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, No.1, 2000, pp.131-155; B Scholz, ’Bundestag und
Volkskammer. Meinungsprofile von Abgeordneten im Vergleich’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien
und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen
Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.292-293.
585
The content analysis of speech unit also incidences of positive and negative mentioning of direct democratic
elements were recorded. For East Germany the ratio of positive minus negative statements overall was 1 per 18
speech units (with particularly strong contributions from PDS members), for West Germany 1 per 50 speech
units, while for Hungary negative statements against direct democracy even weighted slightly stronger than
positive ones (-1 per 250 speech units).
586
C Zelle, ‘Socialist Heritage or Current Unemployment: Why Do the Evaluations of Democracy and Socialism
Differ Between East and West Germans?’, German Politics, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1999, pp. 1-20; J Grix, ‘East German
Political Attitudes. Socialist Legacies vs. Situational Factors – A False Antithesis’, German Politics, Vol.9,
No.2, August 2000, pp.109-124; H Meulemann, ’15 Jahre und kein bisschen gleicher? – Unterschiedliche Werte
in West- und Ostdeutschland’, Neue Gesellschaft – Frankfurter Hefte, Vol. 50, No. 9, 2004, pp.26-29.
587
Interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, Der Tagesspiegel, 21 October 2006.
157
present, past and future: what was good about the old system? Should it have been kept or
could it potentially be reintroduced? What mistakes have been committed during transition,
and what needs to be changed? Moreover, the context of the discourses established will be
explored and possible implications for CoD will be discussed.
a) Hungarian MPs are presenting themselves as quite happy that the old regime is gone for
good. Yet, they decline to engage in a debate about the possible merits of the past system. As
“the system was not working,” it is an “illusion” that anything should have been kept or can
be revived again. 588 Since the old regime broke down completely, there was nothing worth to
be kept. 589 In fact, some argue, rather too much stayed (i.e. the system is “not yet rooted out
well enough”, as the opposition was too undetermined in the beginning). 590
Debating the shortcomings of the current status quo, however, appears as approaching
a taboo, especially when comparing it to the past. Only when pressed, some MPs admit that
some issues (e.g. with regards to health care, family support, integration of gypsies or social
mobility through education, and the situation of agriculture) were indeed better in the past. 591
However, rather than arguing for a selective re-incorporation of certain elements of the past
system, they dismiss the old system in toto and would not even like to engage in a discussion
of what could be learned from the past.
When asked about the current political and socio-economic system and proposals for
potential changes, virtually all Hungarian MPs are arguing there was no real need for changes
since everything was working well or at least better than in the past. Any “messing” with the
system in turn might upset the “sharply balanced” arrangement “which is dancing on a razor
blade”. 592 Only when really pushed, Hungarian MPs elaborate some ideas for possible
changes to the political system. Some proposals which were frequently debated in the
Hungarian political scene (such as a smaller parliament, 593 a directly elected president 594 or a
second chamber 595 ) find some support but are equally met with opposition. 596 In particular,
the issue of the presidential election is controversial. While it is argued that a directly elected
president with little political powers can be a vital component of democracy, as shown by the
588
MSZP#1, 2, 7, 10, Fidesz#1, 2, 4.
SZDSZ#1, 3, 4, 5, Fidesz#5.
590
MDF#1, 2, 3, SZDSZ#6.
591
MSZP#2, 4, 9, 10, Fidesz#1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7.
592
MSZP#2, 4, 7, 8, Fidesz#1, 2, 5, 6, 7, SZDSZ#1, 3, 4, MDF#1, 2, 3.
593
MSZP#1, SZDSZ#1, 6, Fidesz#5.
594
MSZP#1, 3, 4, 8, 10, MDF#1, 3.
595
MSZP#4, 8.
596
Against smaller parliament: Fidesz#2, MSZP#4; against directly elected president MSZP#2, Fidesz#2, 3, 4,
SZDSZ#3, 4, 5, 6.
589
158
Austrian, Polish or Slovak examples, 597 Slovakia is also raised as a negative example where a
popular vote would have almost brought the demagogue Meciar back into office. 598 Some
argue for a stronger president, 599 while others are undecided about the role of the president. 600
In general, arguments against any reconfiguration of the political system rest on the claim that
the institutional configuration is perfect and sharply balanced; any changes would upset this
balance, and possibly lead to unexpected upheavals. 601 In fact, many arguments go in the
direction of strengthening or extending consensual institutions. Rather than electing the
president by popular vote, parliament should make sure to elect the president with a 2/3
majority vote in any case or even by a high degree of consensus. 602
MPs demand an ombudsman for future generations (which would add another veto
player, who is able to limit the possibility for far-reaching decisions with a future impact e.g.
on natural resources or debt levels), 603 more regional powers and a reform of local
administration. 604 One MP argues that a new constitution would be useful, but that this was
not a real option at the moment. 605 Some MPs from the two big parties state support for a
majoritarian electoral system, and more directly elected MPs, 606 while MPs from the two
smaller parties argue against a two-party system, and demand a 3%-hurdle. 607 Other issues
mentioned concern civil service reforms, 608 minority issues 609 and the fight against
corruption. 610 Again, a change of political culture and mentality is demanded, as people are
“too ignorant or too politicised.” 611
Overall, Hungarian MPs seem to be united in a conservative discourse stressing the
benefits of the current system. Debate about potential changes is being rejected as dangerous
or useless, especially concerning a reconsideration of merits of the past system, or the
proposals voiced cancel out each other rather than pointing towards some common issues and
goals. Most proposals seem to aim towards strengthening the consenualist character of the
Hungarian democracy by introducing or reinforcing the powers of certain veto players.
597
MSZP#8.
SZDSZ#3.
599
MSZP#8, 10.
600
Fidesz#6.
601
MDF#2.
602
MDF #1, MSZP #5, Fidesz #2.
603
Fidesz#6.
604
MSZP#1, 3, 4, Fidesz#1, 5, MDF#2.
605
MDF#1.
606
MSZP#3, Fidesz#4.
607
SZDSZ#1, 6, MDF#1.
608
Fidesz#1, MSZP#3, 9.
609
MSZP#8.
610
SZDSZ#5, Fidesz#6, 7.
611
Fidesz #3, MSZP#8.
598
159
Hungarian political elites in their expressed desire to work together consensually (see above)
actually only agree on the status quo put in place by transition as their common denominator.
Debates about the learning from the past are being edged out as either dangerous or useless.
b) Similar to Hungarian MPs, most East German parliamentarians (except for PDS-members)
would say that “I’m not really sorry that not too much stayed of the old system”. 612 Yet this
does not prevent them from arguing for selective reconsideration of the past system’s merits,
especially in the area of social welfare and education. In particular, the East German
educational system is presented as being superior to the West German one (which was
introduced after unification) 613 including kindergartens, 614 higher education, 615 professional
training, 616 and sports. 617 Additionally, the general configuration of social services, in
particular the health care sector, 618 as well as support for families or socially disadvantaged in
the GDR is presented as a success story which should have been kept after unification. 619
Furthermore, the potential of East German science and core industries 620 as well as
emancipative women’s policies are raised. 621 In all these areas, according to East German
MPs, one should reconsider an overhaul of the current system and a potential reintroduction
of the past GDR arrangements.
Concerning the institutional status quo East German MPs seem to widely agree that, if
not a new constitution, then at least a far-reaching overhaul of the constitution was needed.622
Interestingly, in particular a number of established (West) German elements of consensus
democracy are approached in a highly critical way. Firstly, the existing federalist system is
deemed ripe for a far-reaching reform. East German MPs demand a clearer separation of
powers between the federal government and the Länder administration, and less power for the
Bundesrat (second chamber of the parliament comprised by representatives of the Länder
governments) as it is viewed to be blocking many necessary reforms. 623 Instead of too much
time-consuming and costly co-decision between Länder and the central government, there
should be more leeway for separate legislation of both Länder and centre without the need to
612
SPD#1, CDU#1, 6.
PDS#1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, SPD#1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, CDU#4, 6, FDP#1.
614
PDS#3, SPD#6, 7, 8, 10, CDU#6.
615
PDS#6.
616
CDU#4, PDS#5, FDP#1.
617
PDS#1, 9.
618
PDS#2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, Green#1, SPD#4, 5, 7, 9, CDU#3, 4.
619
PDS#5, 8, 10, SPD#5, 8.
620
PDS#1, CDU#3.
621
SPD#1.
622
SPD#1, 5, 6, CDU#3, PDS#2, 5, 9.
623
In fact some of these reforms have been initiated since conducting the interviews (see above).
613
160
consult in the Bundesrat. 624 Also, elections on the federal level and in the Länder should be
synchronised in order to avoid constant electoral campaigns (giving national weight to
regional elections and resulting in changes of majority in the Bundestag). 625 Thus, while East
German MPs seem to be critical of the current federal set-up they are not against federalism
as such, but rather would like to see it disentangled and reconfigured towards more
competition between the different entities.
In addition, some MPs again make clear their preference for a stronger majoritarian
system which they would also like to see realized (e.g. by an increase of single-mandate
districts) 626 which would also help to weaken the power of parties. 627 In line with statements
described above East German MPs demand “more real majority decisions, and less
compromises”. 628 One MP argues for a longer term of office for parliaments and simultaneous
elections in all Länder (which would avoid having constant campaign time). 629 Some MPs
claim that constitutional issues are not of concern, but rather a change of mentality is most
needed. 630
Only among PDS members do we find more conservative discourses arguing for a
strengthening of the existing consensus set-up as already discovered in the quantitative
analysis. A third chamber of parliament with “societal interest” representation consisting
mostly of experts nominated by various groups should have a veto against elected
politicians. 631 Civil society should be more strongly involved. 632 In fact, PDS MPs argue that
the original vision of the (West German) constitution still needs to be realized in terms of
securing basic rights and popular participation in democracy. 633 Therefore, certain recent
changes in the constitution (e.g. concerning the Asylum law or the privatisation of public
utilities) are strongly criticised for undermining the spirit of the Grundgesetz. 634 Parliament as
a whole and individual MPs should not voluntarily give up powers to parties or to the
executive, but rather should aim to strengthen their rights. 635 Thus, PDS MPs do not only put
emphasis on defending those consensualist features of the system which secure its position as
624
SPD#1, 2, 8, 9, 10, CDU#2, 4, FDP#1.
SPD#10.
626
SPD#6.
627
PDS #7.
628
SPD#8, 9.
629
SPD#10.
630
CDU#5, 6, SPD#7.
631
PDS#3, 4.
632
PDS#10.
633
PDS#2, 5, 8, 9.
634
PDS#2.
635
PDS #8, 10.
625
161
a small party, but more broadly defend the existing system based on the West German model
which therefore cannot be explained from a position of mere self-interest.
East German MPs expressed willingness to undertake major reforms both in the
political system and other major fields such as social welfare, education, and employment. A
1995 survey shows East German elites 636 as less satisfied with the functioning of the
democratic system and more in favour of reform than their West German counterparts. At that
point, however, elite members affiliated with the PDS and the Greens saw the greatest need
for changes. 637 In the early 1990s, shortly after unification, PDS’s criticism was still
characterised by a basically sceptical stance towards (West German) capitalism and
democracy, similar to those members of the East German Greens who originated in those
dissident groups which argued for a renewed democratic socialist East Germany. Since the
initiation of certain far-reaching reforms of the German social market economy (mostly in
consensus among the major parties, including the Greens, and some constitutional changes
concerning issues such as immigration, internal security, and recently issues of power
distribution between the federal centre and the Länder etc.) the PDS is now increasingly
presenting itself as the most conservative party in this regard, as shown both by my
quantitative and qualitative analysis. Again, the PDS argues from an ostracised, outsider
position for the conservation of specific arrangements in the Grundgesetz, which the other
parties see as no longer tenable. Thus, while political contexts and contents have changed, the
PDS remains (or is kept) outside of the consensus of the established parties. This consensus
used to be in favour of continuity with the West German model until about the mid-1990s and
is now (moderately) in favour of modernising and reforming the system.
Already most of the 1990 Volkskammer MPs emphasised specific good sides of the
old regime and wanted to see health care, child care and educational systems kept after
unification. 638 Demands for the reintroduction or preservation of certain elements of the East
German socio-economic arrangements are not just a reaction by East German politicians to
the economic decline in the mid-1990s, or a “little brother”-syndrome developed against
patronizing West German political elite. Therefore, an alternative explanation based on these
mechanisms cannot fully explain the development of these positions as they were already
present before unification and the experience of the West German system.
636
The survey covered also economic and civil society elites.
V Kaina, ’Zwischen den Welten: Die Funktionsbewertung des politischen Systems in Führungsschicht und
Bevölkerung’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, No.1, 2000, pp.131-155.
638
H Müller-Enbergs, ‘Zwischen Bewahrung und Modernisierung. Politische Einstellungen in der letzten
Volkskammer der DDR’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem
und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,
1994, pp.259-261
637
162
East German politicians’ critical position towards the federal set-up of the polity are
also reflected in Best et al. survey data from 2003/4, in which a mainstay of exclusive Länder
legislative and administrative authority is questioned: 74% of East German regional MPs (as
opposed to 44% of Westerners) supported the view that high school curricula and exams
should be standardized and centralised rather than remain an exclusive responsibility of the
Länder. Thus, East German regional MPs in this survey actually support a downgrading of
their own role in this regard. Among members of the Bundestag even 90% of East German
MPs favour a centralisation of administrating secondary education (as opposed to 48% of
West German ones). 639 Other studies confirm East German politicians’ much more critical
position towards certain veto players in German consensus democracy, in particular towards
the involvement of Länder administrations, when compared to their West German colleagues.
Investigating the long-term impact of participation in opposition activities in 1989 on
later political participation, Karl-Dieter Opp argues that satisfaction with the working of the
existing democracy is higher with those people who were more involved in the protest
activities in 1989 than with passive bystanders. Moreover, those who were involved in 1989
see themselves as more competent and capable to achieve political changes today. His
explanatory mechanism is based on socio-psychological explanations: the internalisation of
protest norms, the “effort justification hypothesis”, and socialization into particular groups
and networks. However, his results support my findings and point to the decisive impact of
transition on shaping positions towards political change and continuity.640 Therefore it is not
surprising that in the previous content analysis of parliamentary speeches the highest values
for arguments in favour of changing the current status quo were measured with MPs who
were initially rooted in the GDR dissident movement (e.g. CDU #5, Green #1, see annex 2,
table 4a).
Hungary
East Germany
In 1989 we achieved the best possible Our current system is good, yet with hindsight
outcome under the given circumstances.
we should have kept certain achievements of
As the old system broke down there is the GDR – we should also consider their
nothing we should consider to reintroduce, selective reintroduction.
639
H Best / M Edinger / K Schmitt / S Jahr,’ Zwischenauswertung der Deutschen Abgeordnetenbefragung
2003/04 – Gesamtergebnis’, Sonderforschungsbereich 580, Friedrich-Schiller Universität Jena, online paper,
2004, online http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/typo3/a3.0.html, last accessed 20 October 2006.
640
K Opp, Die enttäuschten Revolutionäre – Politisches Engagement vor und nach der Wende, Opladen: Leske
& Budrich, 1997, p.227.
163
rather too much still stayed.
Lets not temper with the result of the round- The Basic Law requires a major overhaul to
table talks, it would endanger the well- reflect today’s realities.
balanced stability of our democracy.
There are some minor things which could be There is no value in keeping institutions
possibly improved but it would not be worth which have become dysfunctional.
upsetting the status quo / it is not possible to
change because of our political culture.
Rather than changing our institutions we German federalism in its current form is too
should change the way we interact among the cumbersome and costly. We need to have
political elite and teach the people to clearer demarcations between central and
appreciate our democracy.
Land governments and competition among
the Länder.
-----------------------------------------------------PDS: We should realise the original vision of
the constitution and defend it rather than
change it.
c) Again we can recognise a basic difference in the way the democratic system is rhetorically
approached in the two cases. Hungarian MPs present the current set-up of the democratic
system as the best possible solution. The question of possible changes or alternatives is put
under taboo, or at least presented as a futile undertaking and only reluctantly discussed with
mutually contradictory demands, even within one party. East German MPs, while not
questioning the foundations of the democratic system and clearly preferring it to the past,
present themselves as much more open to debate both the adaptation of the current system and
the reconsideration of positive achievements of the old regime (mostly in the area of social
policy and education). Also, concerning proposals for reform, there is a strong emphasis on
reducing consensus arrangements in the federal system and diminishing the powers of the
second chamber. Interestingly, as already found in the content analysis, PDS MPs are the
most outspoken defenders of the (West) German constitution.
Why do East German MPs feature a much more critical position towards the
institutional set-up in place than Hungarians given the fact that a well-working (and widely
appreciated) constitution just fell into the laps of the former while the latter had to go through
a long and uncertain process of rewriting their constitution? Why should the hardly reformed
164
post-communist PDS have adapted best to the new system? This puzzling outcome certainly
contradicts strongly the assumptions of an attitude-based understanding of political culture
with individual socialization and value internalisation as a mechanism. If, however, we regard
the transition process as a defining moment not only for the institutional basis of the new
democracy but also for a new collective identity of the new political elite, we might offer a
different explanation: Hungarian political leaders are connected by the common achievement
of the 1989 round-table talks which resulted in the establishment of the new order via
constitutional amendments. Their legitimacy thus originates in this achievement. Since this
defining moment there have been few common achievements or goals shared between the
major parties.
Moreover, due to the gradualist and accommodative mode of transition there has been
no comprehensive approach to deal with or come to terms with the past. Thus, there is no way
in which all major parties could approach the past and draw lessons from it in a uniform way.
Due to the accommodative, non-confrontational and inclusive nature of the Hungarian
transition the short period in 1989/90 remains a “golden era” (between a much contested past
and a contested present and future) in the collective rhetorical repertoire of Hungarian
politicians. Concerning changes (or even potential alternatives) to the existing system
different parties would draw on very different historical precedents or concepts of legitimacy
which were not destroyed by an imposed transition (as in unilateral transitions such as the
East German one). Therefore, Hungarian MPs stick to the status quo rather than potentially
opening a Pandora’s Box which could potentially lead to the clash of very different historical
concepts of democracy, modernity or nationhood. These latent concepts of historical
legitimacy of the Hungarian polity span from a renewed version of Kádár’s happy goulash
socialism on the left to nostalgic Horthyite dreams of corporatist or clerical authoritarianism
on the right (including the revival of a Greater Hungary, undoing the “trauma of Trianon”, i.e.
the loss of territory and Hungarian population following World War I.).
In East Germany there have been extensive efforts to “come to terms with the past”
with much less controversy concerning the judgement of the old system. It was completely
pulled down by the democratisation of the GDR, and there is little nostalgia left for any other
previous regime among mainstream politicians. Unification, however, was less defining for a
collective identity, least so for the PDS. East German politicians did not hold a stake in the
creation of the current system: West German democracy and social market economy was
presented to East Germans as the best possible system and little debate devoted to
alternatives. Unification basically meant the effective enactment of the West German legal
165
system in East Germany as of 3rd October 1990. The drawing up of a new German
constitution was obstructed by the Kohl administration, and debates in the constitutional
committee of the Bundestag only resulted in minor changes to the Grundgesetz (see above).
Consequently, as East German MPs do not hold an active stake in the current system, they can
surely argue in a much more pragmatic way for change and do not have to put up taboos as
the Hungarians. After a clear break with the old system, and the generally shared
condemnation of its most negative traits, it is also possible now to selectively reconsider some
of its more favourable elements are when judged against obvious shortcomings of the current
system.
Hungarian MPs, in turn, disagree on almost everything, save the success of the 1989
transformation and its institutional legacy. Unlike the East German opposition Hungarian
dissidents in 1989 lacked mass support and thus (pre-)democratic legitimacy. Behaving as if
they were already in a democratic Rechtsstaat during the round-table talks by sticking to the
letter of the existing constitution, they peacefully negotiated and achieved an institutional
consensus endowed them with some kind of Ersatz legitimacy. 641 Thus, references to the
1990 round-table talks and their outcomes carry a strongly positive meaning denoting not only
the birth of Hungarian democracy, but also the knighting of its new political leaders.
Criticising, questioning or even changing the outcome of the round-table talks from the
beginning thus has always aroused suspicion and fierce protest (since the original institutional
status quo is discursively linked with the legitimacy of the major Hungarian parties and their
protagonists). Interestingly, when asked about personalities who are most significant for
Hungarian democracy virtually all MPs in the interviews name the first democratically elected
Prime Minister József Antall. He seems to be the only commonly embraced figure-head of
Hungarian democracy beyond party lines. Next to him, MPs predominantly mention only
personalities from pre-democratic times such as the hero of the 1948 revolution Lajos
Kossuth, or even King Stephen the Great from the 11th century, or depending on their party
affiliation, one of the post-1990 prime ministers. Thus, next to the current democratic system
as “the best possible”, any alternatives have an un-democratic or pre-democratic overtone and
draw on very different lines of history and historical legitimacy.
Nevertheless, this consensus on the institutional status and its historical legitimacy
does not prevent politicians from (ab-)using this discourse in attempting to discredit and delegitimise political opponents. Thus, calling someone a traitor of the 1990 agreement, or
demands for a new “national round-table” in order to undo the governments’ mistakes are
J Kis, ‘Between Reform and Revolution’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.12, No.2, spring 1998,
pp.300-383.
641
166
rhetorical endeavours to redefine and lay exclusive claims to the legacy of 1990. 642 They are
surely not based in a fully consensualist political culture since the crucial dimension of
respect towards the other (see below) is missing. Using the above sketched-out differentiation
between weakly and strongly socialized actors, we might hypothesize that Hungarian political
elites are only weakly socialized since they accept the validity of this discourse but did not
fully adapt their individual behaviour to it.
Concerning the consolidation of democracy, the absence of an explicit normative elite
consensus on the existing set-up could be seen as a lack of democratic credentials. 643 This,
however, appears to be grounded in a conservative understanding of democratic consolidation
favouring the status quo put in place by transition. In fact, a consensus on reconsidering
certain arrangements, which appears to be the case among East German elites (without the
PDS) is surely a sign of more democratic maturity than an institutional consensus due to a
lack of ability to agree on anything else (as in the Hungarian case). In the East German case,
of course, adapting the institutional status quo in order to better reflect East German political
culture will hardly be possible against the resistance of established West German elites and,
paradoxically, the PDS.
Enemy or legitimate opponent? Respect towards the “other”
Finally, concerning the last dimension of elite commitment to consensus democracy I intend
to investigate how political elites in the two cases justify the predominance of negative,
confrontational or even derogative statements about other parties which were found in the
quantitative analysis. Also, I will try to explore in how far Hungarian and East (and West)
German MPs are similarly constituted as implied by the results of the quantitative analysis.
Therefore, interviewees were asked about what or who is to be blamed for the currently most
urgent problems (which were defined by the interviewee in the preceding question).
Moreover, I asked which individuals or parties had changed most strongly since transition and
why these changes took place. Thus, I will outline and compare discourses describing MPs
respect to wards the political “other”.
a) Hungarian MPs are quick to call in the mistakes of previous governments and other parties
in this regard. While some, mostly rightist MPs put all blame on the current leftist government
E.g. ‘Radikalisabb Fideszt akarnak a jobboldali értelmiségiek’, Magyar Nemzet, 12 September 2006.
J Higley / R Gunther (eds.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; J Higley, J Pakulski and W Wesolowski (eds.), Postcommunist
Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1998; J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after
State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.
642
643
167
(under then Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy), in particular for cuts in housing and family
support, and the inept preparation for EU accession, 644 another MP blames the “economic
lobby who stands behind the current government”. 645 Yet another MP blames the first
democratically elected (conservative) Antall government for being too little concerned with
the economy. Also the Horn government is presented as having made grave mistakes 646 and
being too unconcerned with society. 647 Finally, the Orbán government is accused by leftist
MPs for “populist, superficial solutions”.648 Leftist governments in turn are indicted for
lacking political visions for the country. 649 While criticizing mostly the other side for
mistakes of the past, there are a few MPs who argue that everyone in the political elite and all
previous governments were engaged in populism, trying to please their voters with “electoral
presents” and were too cowardly to commit to needed far-reaching reforms. 650 Moreover, a
number of useful policies were often cancelled or reversed after one electoral cycle with the
return of the opposition into government. 651 Members from both left and right parties concede
that they were not brave enough when in power and did not have real long-term visions. 652
Again a deficient political culture is blamed for these shortcomings. This leads to parties
which are too preoccupied with themselves rather than real problems 653 , and an irresponsible
media 654 with no short-term solution to this problem. 655
Concerning the change of persons and parties since transition some Hungarian MPs
admit that everybody changes/ed, 656 and (although there was no longer a communistanticommunist antagonism) 657 each party accuses one or all of the others of having betrayed
the ideals of transition or as having never really been a democratic party. Whereas the postcommunist MSZP is accused of either still being the same and/or having turned into the worst
capitalists, Fidesz is characterized as a party which changes its colours every few years. The
liberal SZDSZ is being portrayed as a party which betrayed the ideals of the former
644
Fidesz#2, 7, SZDSZ#3.
Fidesz#1.
646
Fidesz#7.
647
MSZP#1.
648
MSZP#1, 5, 10, SZDSZ#2, 3, 4.
649
MDF#2.
650
SZDSZ#3, 4, 6, MSZP#8, 10, MDF#2, 3.
651
Since the first free election in 1990 (with the coming to power of the conservative Antall government)
Hungary experienced two returns of the post-communists: in 1994 and 2002. They, in turn, were interrupted by
the conservative Orbán-government who came to power in 1998. In 2006, for the first time in modern Hungarian
democracy, a government was re-elected (namely the socialist-liberal coalition of Prime Minister Gyurcsány).
652
Fidesz#2, 3, MSZP#4, SZDSZ#1, 6.
653
MSZP#4.
654
SZDSZ#3.
655
MDF#1, SZDSZ#5.
656
MSZP#3, 5, 7, Fidesz#3, 5, 6, 7, SZDSZ#3.
657
SZDSZ#5, Fidesz#7, MSZP#7.
645
168
opposition and opportunistically allied with the post-communists. According to some MPs
from the other parties, MSZP basically stayed what it was, it only “refined its cadre
techniques,” or “got democratic legitimacy” through the new system. But in reality
“democracy is a straightjacket for them.” 658 Only on the surface they changed from
communists into democrats. 659 According to an alternative theme, MSZP changed the most:
“from communists and informers into capitalists,” “from [being obedient to] Moscow to
[being obedient to] Brussels,” as “they never stood with the people” and always have several
faces. 660
According to MSZP-members themselves (and some of their liberal coalition partners)
the MSZP made the largest changes before 1989 and, since then, is a reliable democratic
party. 661 MSZP and their liberal allies from the SZDSZ in turn view the conservative Fidesz
as the most unreliable and ever-changing party which turned from a dynamic youth party into
a “Forza-Italia-like populist party.” Fidesz succeeded in “forgetting their [liberal] roots,” and
moving to “extreme right” via “salami tactics;” their leader, Viktor Orbán, turned “from an
aggressive democrat into an aggressive power-seeker”. 662 Orbán was a danger to democracy,
an “immoral, cynical pretender” and a “professional liar”. 663 Fidesz accusations against
MSZP are presented as being hypocritical since “they had more communists in their
government than MSZP does have now”. 664 Fidesz-MPs present their own party as the one
that stayed (or went back to be) true opposition. 665 Fidesz is portrayed as having had to
change some of their ideological tenets, as it had to “collect and gather the right,” and at the
same time experienced a natural generational change and thus became more conservative.666
SZDSZ is denounced by rightist parties as having changed strongly from the “harshest
opposition to joining the communists in 1994,” in “giving up ideals for power,” 667 or “turning
ultra-liberal” 668 or be again radical. 669 SZDSZ-members themselves admit to having changed,
to have had to learn their lesson, and that there exists “some schizophrenia in the party,” as
“anti-communism is no longer relevant.” 670 The small MDF, sometimes denounced as
658
Fidesz#2, 6, SZDSZ#3, MDF#2.
Fidesz#7.
660
Fidesz#1, 4, MDF#3.
661
MSZP#1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, SZDSZ#5.
662
MSZP#1, 2, 3, 5, 10, SZDSZ#1, 2, 3, 5, 6, MDF#1.
663
SZDSZ#2.
664
MSZP#8.
665
Fidesz#1.
666
Fidesz#2, 3, 4, 5, 7, MDF#2, 3.
667
Fidesz#1, 2, 3, 5, MDF#3.
668
MDF#2.
669
MSZP#1, 10.
670
SZDSZ#1, 2, 5.
659
169
moving left, 671 views itself as the only stable and unchanged party which stands for “200
years of continuity” and the Lakiteleki ideals (where one of the constituting meetings of the
Hungarian opposition took place). 672
Inter-party relations on the discursive level in Hungary can be characterized as
anything but consensualist. Countless amounts of press articles, speeches and public
statements by members from all parties, but more prominently from right wing politicians,
could further illustrate a discourse meant to exclude and de-legitimise “the other side” from
the polity. While politicians from the MSZP and their liberal coalition partners are being
attacked for MSZP’s roots in the old regime and accused of trying to re-establish political,
economic and cultural hegemony in Hungary, Fidesz and their right-wing allies are being
accused of building a “shadow-state”. 673 Hungarian MPs appear to largely lack basic respect
towards the political opponent and deny protagonists from other parties to be a legitimate
player in the democratic game.
b) In the East German case MPs are quite reluctant to put blame on a particular party or
government for the current problems. In fact, insincerity and lack of action by every
government so far is quite prominently mentioned, in particular the failure to reform the social
security system, and for the accumulation of debts out of fear to take unpopular decisions. 674
Also, the drive to consensus is raised as a cause for inaction and uncourageous decisions. 675
Some MPs make clear that its “everybody’s mistakes – don’t blame always the others”. 676
There is some mentioning of western takeover as causing the major problems 677 and the
dominance of western lobbies and interests which lead to the East “falling of the rim”. 678
Moreover, one must not forget that the economic structure of the old system was not viable 679
and that Germany is exposed to the problems connected with globalisation and international
security. 680 But it is also claimed that people are too pessimistic and that the situation is much
better than often presented. 681
Concerning change and continuity among the political parties in East Germany, the
PDS still remains somewhat controversial as it directly connects to the old communist SED.
671
Fidesz#1.
MDF#1, 2, 3.
673
‘A jobboldal visszaigazolást vár’, Népszabadság, 23 December 2003.
674
SPD#2, 5, 8, 9, 10, CDU#4, PDS#6.
675
Green#1.
676
PDS#3, SPD#2, Green#1.
677
SPD#1.
678
CDU#3.
679
SPD#2, CDU#4.
680
PDS#3, SPD#2, 5, 10, CDU#3.
681
SPD#1.
672
170
Its membership is to large extent holdovers from the GDR. Nevertheless, the reservations
towards the post-communist PDS appear rather mild if seen in the light of the mutual
resentments between Hungarian parties. Some East German MPs argue that the PDS has
changed since the old times. 682 They agree that the PDS accepts democracy, and has taken on
a new role. 683 However, some MPs claim that the PDS in fact did not change at all since the
end of the old regime. 684 According to its own members, the PDS has nothing in common
with the SED 685 and stayed truest to the ideals of an East German democracy of 1989/90 686
(while the Social Democrats would not deserve their name). 687 Surprisingly critical views are
presented on former East German civic activists who can be found in almost all parties now.
They are being criticised for abandoning their idealistic stance and an East German identity in
exchange for power, office and recognition in the West. 688
Finally, members of the former “bloc parties” who were integrated into their West
German sister parties meet criticism for opportunism, 689 in particular by members of the
(newly founded under transition) SPD and Green party, who in turn are claimed to have
stayed truest to their old ideals. 690 Some claim that the former bloc party members are even
now still close to the post-communist PDS in terms of their mindset. 691 In the end, there
seems to be some agreement that one should focus on individuals’ development rather than on
parties or groups since “everybody changed”692 , and “only apolitical people stay the same”. 693
Also, there is a noted absence of derogatory, personally offensive statements towards other
MPs as frequently recorded in the Hungarian case, both in the speech material used for
content analysis and during the interviews. Thus, East German elite political culture is indeed
competitive and majoritarian as the number of confrontational statements is higher than the
number of accommodative ones. Nevertheless, beyond this quantitative finding, East German
MPs seem to accept each other as equally legitimate political opponents, unlike their
Hungarian colleagues.
East German MPs’ pragmatism in dealing with political opponents has also been
confirmed by other studies. According to Werner Patzelt, East German MPs claim not to mind
682
SPD#1, 4, CDU#5.
CDU#1, SPD#2, 7, 8, PDS#7, 8.
684
CDU#3, SPD#6, 10.
685
PDS#3, 6.
686
PDS#2, 4.
687
PDS#2, 3.
688
CDU#1, 2, 3, PDS#2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, SPD#2, 6, 10, FDP#1.
689
CDU#1, SPD#2, 4, 7, 8, 10, PDS#2, 6.
690
SPD#1, 7, Green#1.
691
SPD#1, 8.
692
CDU#1, 2, 4, 5, PDS#5, SPD#5.
693
CDU#5.
683
171
voting for the proposals of other parties if they find them convincing (which they have done,
especially in the first post-transition years). This, of course, has been a particular nuisance for
their West German colleagues, who are used to more political demarcation and party
discipline. 694
Hungary
East Germany
The government of party X [from the other False promises by politicians and exaggerated
camp] is mostly to blame for the biggest expectations created by all parties are to
problem our country is facing.
blame for the current problems.
My party stayed truest to the democratic X, Y and Z [all different parties] managed
ideals of 1989.
most quickly to become like “Westerners”.
The party/parties X (and Y) of the other camp
betrayed and abandoned these ideals for the
sake of power.
c) In sum, while East German MPs present themselves as rather unwilling to designate guilt
and shame on each other while admitting some kind of collective responsibility, Hungarian
MPs trade mutual accusations for political failure in the past. East German parties seem to
mutually accept each other as equal parties, only with some reservations remaining towards
the post-communist PDS. Accusations of opportunism are brought forward against former
civic activists who are now a small minority found among all parties, and members of former
“bloc parties” (but not against entire parties or political camps, as in the Hungarian case).
Thus, in a way, political constellations from the transition period are partly still reproduced in
which PDS and some of the civic activists stand against the other parties. While being critical
and outspoken about one’s opponents past there appears to be little attempts to rhetorically
de-legitimise certain parties or political positions as such. Instead, shame is put on
individuals. Thus, the East German discourse rather lacks the destructive friend-foe-logic
which characterizes the Hungarian one. Despite a conflict-oriented stance towards other
parties (as found in the quantitative analysis) there appears to be some common ground
concerning the image of the past and its use in present discourses among East German
694
W Patzelt, ’“Seiteneinsteiger, Neulinge, Ossis…“: Die Integration ostdeutscher Abgeordneter in
‚gesamtdeutsche’ Parlamente’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, p.560.
172
politicians regardless of party affiliation and other background factors. This view is
underpinned also by Eckhart Jesse in his study on former GDR dissidents. 695
The Hungarian political elite is strongly divided by party lines in mutually accusing
each other of betrayal, opportunism or questioning one’s democratic credentials and thus
trying to deny them an equal standing in the polity. 696 In front of increasingly confrontational
politics Gabriella Illonszki speaks about the dissolution of the elite agreement of 1989 in
Hungary. 697 Anna Seleny reports similar developments. 698
Thus, in spite of similar negative ratings in the quantitative indicator for
consensualism (in the above-outlined content analysis from parliamentary speeches), there
seem to be some significant qualitative differences between the two cases. While East
German MPs present a collegiate but competitive understanding of democratic politics with
everyone accepted as an equal player, Hungarian MPs are trying to de-legitimise political
opponents by rhetorically excluding them from the common polity. The former appears to be
an indicator for a “normal” competitive political culture, while the latter appears rather
problematic and out of place for both consensus and majoritarian democracy. Therefore, the
finding of similar quantitative results from the fifth dimension should not automatically lead
us to draw similar conclusions for the two cases. As shown in the quantitative analysis, even
among consensus-oriented politicians (such as the West German ones) we overall find more
negative than positive remarks towards the political opponent. In fact, expecting more praise
than criticism for the political opponent (which would lead to a positive score in this
dimension) might be too unrealistic even for strong consensus systems. In the light of the
qualitative results it might actually make sense to reformulate the fifth indicator and its coding
instructions in order to be able to better grasp the differences between the two cases by better
specifying the notion of “respect towards the other”.
Some authors blame an “ancient cultural divide” for the current polarization in
Hungary. 699 This “deep culture”- explanation, as mentioned above, usually fails to account for
the mechanism which made this divide come to life again and become a powerful marker in
E Jesse, ’Einleitung’, in: E Jesse (ed.), Eine Revolution und ihre Folgen – 14 Bürgerrechtler ziehen Bilanz,
Berlin: Ch.Links, 2000, p.19.
696
A Bozóki, E Simon, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Hungary’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal
Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine,
Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, pp.166-167.
697
G Illonszki, ‘Ist die Kontinuität der Elite von Bedeutung?’, in: H Veen (ed.), Alte Eliten in jungen
Demokratien? Wechsel, Wandel und Kontinuität in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2004, pp.233242.
698
A Seleny, ‘Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies – Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary
and Poland’, World Politics, Vol.51, July 1999, pp.481-519.
699
D Gyôrffy, ‘Governance in a Low-Trust Environment: The Difficulties of Fiscal Adjustment in Hungary’,
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.58, No.2, March 2006, p.252.
695
173
some contexts and not in others. Another explanation is advanced by János Kis, one of the
most prominent participants during the 1989 round-table talks and established political
philosopher. According to Kis, the “unwritten rules” of Hungarian democracy did not
consolidate as opposed to the mere constitutional rules. He deplores Hungarian politicians’
lack of moral standards and the absence of other qualities such as self-restraint, moderation,
and mutual trust, which very much in line with my definitions, are prerequisites for a
workable consensus democracy. Kis sees the origins of this problem already in the transition
context. Secret talks between the then major opposition party, the conservative MDF and the
ruling MSZMP (in which, among others, the direct election of the president was agreed),
undermined the legitimacy of the democratisation process and the official round-table talks.
That is why, according to Kis, two other opposition parties, namely Fidesz and SZDSZ (the
party he co-founded and led at that time), could not sign the final agreement of the roundtable talks. 700 In a rather rare event in the Hungarian transition they mobilized the people and
managed to initiate and win a referendum on the contested issues. According to Kis the
absence of the mentioned unwritten rules lead to a deep polarisation between left and right. In
this climate losers of the elections always had to fear they would lose everything, not just
power and office. This understanding of politics as a zero-sum game, according to Kis, leads
to an opportunist and populist short-sighted competition in which ever more untenable
promises are being made and necessary long-term sacrifices cynically postponed. 701
Other scholars blame the reformed post-communists and the failure to implement farreaching elite turnover for the ongoing elite divisions and lack of common ground. Arguing
from a more rightist position Tamás Fricz talks about a return (or even a “roll-back”) of the
old post-communist elites, who either managed to keep their jobs in the administration, came
back after the 1994 landslide electoral victory of MSZP, or hibernated in managerial positions
in newly privatised enterprises. According to Fricz, for post-communist leaders it was easy to
switch their loyalties from Moscow to Brussels or Washington rather than to represent the
“real interests of people”. 702 While the latter claim seems more like a personal opinion rather
than a scientifically founded finding, the sociological argument about the moderate elite
turnover (and its impact upon the way claims to democratic legitimacy are established) is
surely valid. In fact, every change of government has been used by the newly elected
Interview with János Kis with Index.hu online magazine, 14 July 2004, (online www.index.hu, accessed 14
July 2004).
701
J Kis, A politika mint erkölcsi probléma, Budapest: Èlet és Irodalom, 2004, pp.300-302.
702
T Fricz, ‘Die alte Elite im neuen demokratischen Ungarn”, in: H Veen (ed.), Alte Eliten in jungen
Demokratien? Wechsel, Wandel und Kontinuität in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2004, pp.285307.
700
174
government to make a declaratory break with the previous government, such as the 1998
programme of the newly elected Orbán government solemnly announced: “less than a regime
change but more than a change of government” (“rendszerváltásnál kevesebbet de
kormányváltásnál többet”), 703 or as promised by the oppositional Fidesz’ prior to the 2006
elections: “new economy, new state, new politics”. 704
The initial defection from the ideal of consensually negotiated change, the original sin
of “betraying” the transition consensus and subsequent attempts to rhetorically exclude other
players from the democratic game, is thus a prominent and re-current theme among the
political elites. It is used both as an excuse for one’s own indecent behaviour and as a moral
cudgel against one’s opponents. Furthermore, as Kis’ writings illustrate, it has also become a
prominent explanation in Hungarian political science for the deep political polarization. While
I agree with Kis on the key importance of the round-table talks in this regard, I would not like
to imply an inevitable automatism between the mentioned historical events (i.e. the specific
dynamics of negotiated revolution, and contemporary political culture). There is surely an
element of agency which requires someone to make active and deliberate use of the discursive
resources provided by history in a certain way. In this regard, prominent personalities of
Hungarian politics such as Viktor Orbán, István Csurka or József Torgyán cultivated and
popularised a divisive discourse in which battles of the past (“communists vs. opposition”),
and recent past (“communist turncoats and their allies vs. true democrats during the roundtable talks”) are rhetorically extrapolated into the present. Discourses about the need for
consensus politics are used in order to legitimate the opposite: confrontational, exclusive
approaches in which the “common good” is defined according to narrow party interests and in
which consensus denotes the exclusion of the political opponent who becomes an enemy. 705
Contingent events, such as the situation after the round-table talks discussed by Kis,
but also other crises (e.g. the so-called “Taxi-blockade”) after an increase in petrol prices, the
mentioned Bokros-package in the 1990s, or the recent political crisis following a leaked tape
with Prime Minister Gyurcsány admitting to have lied to the voters, give an opportunity to
opposition parties to shame the respective government for having left the path of consensus,
common good and preservation of the status quo. In the light of these commonly upheld
values fallible politicians (who no longer stand for “the truth”), and far-reaching changes to
the existing socio-economic arrangements appear particularly outrageous (or can be presented
’Konszenzus vagy pillérdemokrácia?’, interview with Ervin Csizmadia, Népszabadság, 7 October 2002.
’Gyurcsány változást, Orbán új rendszerváltást ígér’, Magyar Hírlap, 16 October 2005.
705
A Bozóki, E Simon, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Hungary’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal
Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine,
Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, p.169.
703
704
175
as such). Therefore, in the long term, further external crises (as Bourdieu calls them) might
undermine and possibly replace the existing habitus by exposing its arbitrary nature and
dissociation from reality. 706
Paradoxically, the historical ideal of consensus as provided by the round-table talks in
its discursive distortion lends itself particularly well to the construction of an externalised
“other”. As Chantal Mouffe remarks, every consensus in a democracy in fact marks a new
boundary which, by definition, excludes certain ideas or people from the polity. Defining the
consensus thus means externalising rather than including the political opponent. Claiming to
be the (only) “true” heir of the democratic consensus established in 1989 externalises other
participants from the polity and denies them an equal democratic legitimacy. The other side’s
disagreement on the “true” interpretation of certain events, institutions or policies is then
easily presented as “proof” of their illegitimate position and their positioning against “the
people”, “the nation” or other denominators of the common good. The accusation of being
outside of the 1989 consensus, to be outside Hungarian democracy, is probably the most
severe claim which can be made against a democratically elected MP. As discussed in the
previous sections this far-reaching absence of mutual respect is also overshadowing the other
dimensions of a consensual political culture and therefore makes it hard to denote Hungarian
elite political culture as “consensual” without further qualifications.
Emilia Palonen investigates this logic of the discursive construction of “the other” in
Hungary in detail. According to her the major Hungarian parties create and constantly
recreate a “bipolar hegemony” which serves as an interpreting device for all issues. There is a
“totalising system” of demarcation and “political fixedness of identity” which forces ordinary
citizens into taking sides involuntarily by occupying symbols and discourses of daily life.
National symbols, memorials, national holidays, or even so far empty signifiers such as
“polgári” (which can be translated as both “civic” and “bourgeois”) are being assigned with
new meanings in order to impose totalising divisions on society. This “structure of political
articulation and identification” is maintained through constant re-articulation. According to
Palonen both left and right parties use this destructive discourse in order to maintain their
position in the political system due to lack of other markers in the post-communist context,
and at the same time in order to safeguard against the emergence of potential alternatives.
This way, a negative “consensus” in the Mouffian sense is being constructed (which defines
democracy as “politics without the other”). Polarization, Palonen observes, is in many regards
706
P Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.
176
similar to the politics of consensus, as it is in fact “two consensuses divided by a frontier”. 707
This is particularly problematic when these protagonists of consensus politics implicitly or
explicitly claim moral superiority of their approach to political competition by equal
contenders, as morality does not allow for compromise.
Körösényi argues that the confrontational political culture will persist for sometime in
spite of largely consensus-democratic institutions as parties need to create stable camps of
supporters. 708 Similar developments are now being reported by observers for the Polish right
wing parties. 709 There, also soon after transition, a confrontational style developed and MPs
expressed derogative positions on other parties in order to de-legitimate them in a survey
conducted. 710
A multilateral transition leaves a discursive legacy making the polity open to attack
by competing claims of historical legitimacy, and makes some of its major protagonists
potentially vulnerable to accusations concerning their role in the past. It also requires skilful
political entrepreneurship to turn these “resources” into political capital. As it seems, political
elites have not always been successful in this regard. In the early 1990s the parties of the
centre-right Antall-government failed to establish a nationalist, Christian-conservative
“Hungarian” version of modernization and demonize socialist or liberal positions. Christian
democracy did not manage to build up again a stable subculture. 711 Polarizing positions and
radical fringe discourses on both left and right lost out at elections.
Yet, later on, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz was much more successful at establishing a steep
cultural-political cleavage between left and right. Zsolt Enyedi shows how the originally leftlibertarian party managed to reinvent itself on the right, burning all bridges behind itself and
at the same time shape voters’ attitudes and their identification with new cleavages. Thus
Fidesz, to a certain extent, managed to turn political into primary divisions. 712 According to
some authors the Hungarian right is currently building up its own societal pillar with its own
civil society, media, educational institutions, historical and social-scientific institutes etc. This
way, an alternative understanding of modernity and modernisation, with a focus on national
identity, religion, and localism (“family”, “community”, “Hungarian soil”, “middle class”)
shall be socially embedded in society in declared opposition to the market-friendly,
E Palonen, Political Polarization in Contemporary Hungary, unpublished manuscript, Budapest, 2006.
A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, p.
709
Die Welt, 27 September 2006.
710
B Mach, W Wesolowski, ‘Politiker in Zeiten der Transformation: „Transformational correctness” oder
divergierende Wahrnehmungen?’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, No.3, 1999, pp.393-395.
711
Zs Enyedi, ‘Organizing a Subcultural Political Party – The Case of the Hungarian Christian Democrats’,
Party Politics, Vol.2, No.3, 1996, pp.377-396.
712
Zs Enyedi, ‘The role of agency in cleavage formation’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44,
No.3, 2005, pp.697-720.
707
708
177
cosmopolitan, and anti-clerical positions of the left camp (which is claimed to have reoccupied the key positions and definitional hegemony in all reins of life). Few areas have
been left out of this build-up of essentializing antagonisms, most prominently Euro-Atlantic
integration. 713
Nevertheless, political elites in Hungary appear to have been only partially successful
in superimposing their polarization on society, and in a number of instances have probably
gone too far in articulating divisions. This is supported by indicators such as the ongoing
survival of the long pronounced-dead smaller parties and two successive electoral failures for
Fidesz’ particularly confrontational style. Some more recent attempts to personalize historical
guilt and expose senior politicians of both left and right for their (or their family members’)
involvement with crimes committed in the 1956 revolution, or collaboration with the
communist secret service, frequently backfired (in some cases even increased the popularity
of the shamed person). 714 Obviously, in theses instances, political leaders failed to change the
boundaries of the “field of the permissible” as they used discourses which did not resonate
well with the larger public.
Similarly in the Polish case, cultural-ideological polarization has worked less well in
the early and mid-1990s than later on. Some explanations in the literature see the origins of
contemporary polarization already in pre-transition legacies. Anna Seleny finds the “us vs.
them”-logic to persist in the Polish case since the rise of Solidarity in the 1980s, but this does
not suffice in explaining the ups and downs of polarizing politics over time. 715 Finally, yet
another explanation is thinkable: frustration with unworkable consensus institutions might
have led some actors to seek a remedy by imposing a new, polarized logic of politics, even if
it meant going beyond the boundaries of democratic competition.716
Therefore, further research is needed in order to better establish the systematic and the
more contingent factors impacting upon the timing and impact of cleavage formation by
political entrepreneurs using the discursive legacies of transition. 717 In fact, one might expect
another wave of exclusivist ideological demarcation from both left and right in countries like
Hungary, Poland or Slovakia after years of externally imposed conformity in the run up to EU
’Konszenzus vagy pillérdemokrácia?’, interview with Ervin Csizmadia, Népszabadság, 7 October 2002.
A Bozóki, E Simon, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Hungary’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal
Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine,
Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, p.167.
715
A Seleny, The Political Economy of State-Society Relations in Hungary and Poland, New York: Cambridge
UP, 2006.
716
This explanation seems to be suggested by Zsolt Enyedi, ‘The Survival of the Fittest: Party System
Concentration in Hungary’, in: S Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post-Communist EU Member States – Parties and
Party Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp.177-201.
717
In this regard, external sources such as the influence of foreign models on major protagonists (e.g. Fidesz’
preference for a clearly demarcated ‘British’ two-party system) might play a role (Seleny, 2006, p.253).
713
714
178
accession now followed by some disappointment of EU membership (e.g. with the new
conservative Polish President promising a “moral revolution”). 718 Up to 2004, one might
argue, an externally imposed consensus on EU integration had prevented cultural-ideological
divisions from gaining too much ground among CEE political elites.
The deception experienced by many Hungarians following a leaked tape with the
admission of Prime Minister Gyurcsány to have lied to voters “day and night” might further
fuel disrespect, polarization and unwillingness to coalesce between the camps and have a
similar impact as the deception described by Kis following the round-table talks. 719 Political
entrepreneurs on the right take Gyurcsány’s admission as “proof” of a crypto-communist
conspiracy in which Hungary is going to be turned into a Russian colony again. 720
Demagogues on the left use the violent protests against the Gyurcsány government (in the
weeks following the crisis) as an attestation of the right’s irresponsibility and undemocratic
character. 721 Beyond that, it is also possible that, in the future, the 2006 events in Hungary
will be regarded as a new historical juncture which led to the discharge of some of the abovedescribed discourses focusing around consensus and co-operation (as they were so severely
undermined by elites’ behaviour). 722 At the time of writing it is far too early to pass a
judgement on the long-term effects of these events.
In sum, while I would not claim that this kind of destructive, confrontational logic
follows automatically from pacted, multilateral transition, it is, however, one of the possible
uses of this legacy by political entrepreneurs. This approach is much less conceivable in
countries with the legacy of a unilateral transition. In these cases there can hardly be credible
competing claims to authorship of the new democratic system. The issue of what Huntington
calls the “torturer problem” is largely solved by judicial or administrative means in cases of
unilateral transitions (i.e. former protagonists of the old regime are inhibited from taking on
higher positions in the new polity through lustration or even criminal prosecution).
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 September 2006.
Thanks to Anna Seleny for pointing me to this parallel.
720
Opposition leader Viktor Orbán in an interview warned that under the current social-liberal government
Hungary was in danger to become “Gazprom’s happiest barrack” in an allusion of Hungary’s former selflabeling as the “happiest barrack in the Soviet bloc” (‘Robbanásveszélyes Orbán-szavak’, Népszabadság, 5
January 2007).
721
In fact, the Hungarian MSZP in 1989/90 made a much more radical break with the past than its Polish
counterpart, both in terms of party organization and rhetorical distancing from the past. At the same time the
persistence of a small holdover communist party in Hungary makes it easier for the MSZP to disassociate itself
from its past and claim a modern, social-democratic image. (A Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist
Past – The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe, Cambridge UP, 2002, pp.105-114).
722
There were, however, signs that neither the social-liberal government nor the conservative coalition were
willing to engage in an all-out confrontation. In this regard, especially the moral authority of the President as a
symbol of national consensus and impartiality was respected by both sides (e.g. when he indirectly called upon
the prime minister to have a vote of confidence in parliament and urged the opposition to moderate their public
mobilisation strategy) (Népszabadság, Magyar Nemzet, Magyar Hírlap September/October 2006).
718
719
179
Multilateral transitions in turn face the dilemma of implementing historical justice while
keeping up the rule of law. 723
Thus, potentially competing claims of superior democratic legitimacy of one actor
over another are hardly persuasive in countries of unilateral transition, or can only be
advanced as long as the post-communists entirely reject the new democratic system.
Therefore, among German political elites the PDS, which initially came to be seen as the
unholy relicts of an illegitimate regime, has meanwhile been accepted into the democratic
mainstream. It has even become a valuable coalition partner in several East German Länder
governments. This political reality is even accepted by most CDU-MPs. The PDS is no longer
being rhetorically or in any way credibly de-legitimised as a return of the red menace (as done
in the mid-1990s). 724
Therefore, East German political culture in this regard seems to well reflect the logic
of a competitive, majoritarian democracy. Given the fact that in terms of its party and
electoral systems Germany is indeed rather majoritarian than consensus, and this is good
news. 725 East German MPs seem to express the logic of agonist but not inimical political
competition; they do not strive to establish agreement by necessity but they do express respect
for the political opponent as a legitimate competitor for power. In this regard they appear to
be in the company of stable Western democracies with competitive party systems. In this
dimension they also match the West German political culture. Thus, while the quantitative
analysis of parliamentary speeches showed a similar degree of non-consensualist statements
for all three samples, there is a qualitative difference between Hungary on the one hand and
the two German samples on the other: Hungarian MPs largely use derogatory or (negatively)
moralising statements for characterizing their political opponents as shown in the interviews.
German MPs in parliamentary speeches and in the interviews also criticise their opponents
and try to positively contrast themselves from other parties. However, they do this without
denying the other’s democratic legitimacy. In fact, in parliamentary speeches (next to
criticism of political opponents) there are very often conciliatory statements thanking each
other for the good discussions in committee sessions. Appreciation for the useful contribution
of the other side is pronounced, something which is rarely heard in the Hungarian parliament.
S Huntington, The Third Wave – Democratization in the late twentieth century, Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp.214-231. Also Jon Elster discusses the limited possibilities for historical justice in
cases of pacted transitions (J Elster, Closing the Books – Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective,
Cambridge UP, 2004).
724
’Kein Eros, kein Logos’, Die ZEIT, 14 September 2006, p.8; ’Rot-Rot, na und?’, Die ZEIT, 5 October 2006.
725
Lijphart, 1999, pp.143-170.
723
180
Hungarian MPs offer rather negative accounts about their political opponents while at
the same time explicitly hold up the ideal of consensus and accommodation. This way again
the existing institutional framework might be overtaxed with the expectations raised. If
political consensus and consensual relations between different political parties is declared as
the standard to be met, conflicts and disagreements appear even more unacceptable or even
illegitimate. Furthermore, if these ideals are used to advance one’s own position and to
discursively externalise political opponent from the polity the stability of the democratic
system is indeed under threat. At the moment, Hungarian elites defend non-consensualist
behaviour by referring to established symbols of consensus, national unity and the common
good in exclusivist terms. Demands for a “second transition” or the “conclusion of transition”
aiming at the purge of old elites, retroactive justice and reprivatization advanced by rightwing politicians are surely undermining the stability of the democratic system. 726
Thus, in Hungary political conflicts are not yet immune from being carried over into
higher-order conflicts over legitimacy and abstract rule-making and thus not meeting Elster,
Offe and Preuss’ definition of democratic consolidation. 727 As long as Hungary’s political
elites continue to frame democratic politics as a zero-sum game democracy is in trouble, and a
workable consensus democracy is ever further away.
A Arato, Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp.106-121.
J Elster / C Offe / U Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies – Rebuilding the Ship at Sea,
Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.28.
726
727
181
PART IV: Conclusions and outlook: The future of consensus democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe
This dissertation ventured to address the question in how far a consensus democratic
institutional set-up led to a consensualist elite political culture in the new democracies of
CEE. Political elites in the region do not seem to be strongly committed to consensus
democracy. Therefore, the wide-spread expectation that political culture would adapt to
institutions over time appears flawed. Consequently, this dissertation advanced an alternative
explanation for the sources of elite political culture. Rather than individual socialization based
on the internalization of norms such as those embodied in consensus institutions, I found
collective socialization through historical junctures and their reproduction in collective
memories leaving a greater mark on elite political culture. Thus, elite political culture in the
region is still to a great extent conditioned by historical legacies rather than contemporary
institutions.
This dissertation started from the observation of the apparent mismatch between
institutions and political culture in the region. A critical review of Arend Lijphart’s concepts
of consensus and majoritarian democracy reveals the hidden assumption of an elite political
culture featuring a “spirit of accommodation” going along with stable consensus-democratic
arrangements. Unlike the developed Western democracies in Lijphart’s sample, consensus
democratic institutions in CEE were created in a largely exogenous manner. They were the
result of contingent uncertainties in the post-communist context and external influences from
the EU rather than the result of long-term experimentation and domestic adaptation.
So what makes a consensual political culture, as opposed to a majoritarian one? While
the structural-institutional features of consensus democracy can be easily quantified and
compared using Lijphart’s indicators and the related concept of veto players, the “spirit of
accommodation” has remained without a systematic operationalization for a long time.
Steiner et al.’s Discourse Quality Index (DQI) is the first promising attempt in this regard.
However, the introduction of deliberative theory into the concept encounters a number of
theoretical and methodological problems, most notably the impossible task of establishing
actors’ “truthfulness” as one of their criteria for a consensual political culture.
Therefore, I advance a different conceptualisation of a consensual political culture
derived from Lijphart’s earlier writings based on five dimensions: 1) support for consensus
and compromise as central elements of policy-making, 2) reference to the common good, 3)
support for established procedures, 4) support for the preservation of the existing institutional
182
status quo, and 5) respect towards political opponents. Thus, this study asked in how far these
properties are present in current CEE elite political cultures, and endeavoured to establish
some of the sources for cross-national differences. More tentatively, some implications for the
consolidation of consensus democracy were outlined, too.
In my concept of political culture politicians’ rhetorical repertoire (but not necessarily
their internalized values) is influenced by the availability of rhetorical resources to justify and
legitimise behaviour. These rhetorical resources are in particular conditioned by historical
junctures such as the democratic transitions of 1989/90. These junctures not only established
new democratic institutions but also the vocabulary for politicians to refer to the political
system, their own role and that of their opponents. Coding East German and Hungarian
deputies’ speeches in parliament for the five dimensions of consensus democracy the greatest
differences were found cross-nationally. Moreover, I show that the patterns found are rather
stable over time. By drawing in West Germany as a benchmark I give evidence that the
differences between Hungary and East Germany cannot just be reduced to long-term, deep
national political culture. Similarly, individual background variables such as age, time in
office or political affiliation do not appear to be strongly associated with consensualism.
Therefore, an explanation based on the classical understanding of political culture grounded in
the individual socialization and internalisation of (consensualist) values lacks plausibility in
this setting. One reason for this might be the increasing homogeneity of political elites in
modern democracies, and in particular the levelling out of socio-economic differences in
former communist regimes of CEE.
Consequently, I turn to explanations based on collective socialization experiences
through historical junctures and the collective memory thereof. Discussing the legacies of
multilateral and unilateral transition in the region, I show that neither offers a discursive
repertoire fully supportive of consensus democracy. By way of a meticulous discourse
analysis of data generated through in-depth interviews with nearly sixty MPs I show the
extent to which Hungarian and East German are connected by shared discourses across party
lines and other background variables.
Hungary is a case close to the ideal type of multilateral transition (i.e. transition with a
gradual, negotiated, accommodative, legalistic approach without an explicit break with the
past). It was found to feature political elites with shared collective representations
emphasising the value of consensual decision-making, reference to the common good, the
centrality of established procedures and the institutional status quo. However, due to the
persistence of competing notions of historical legitimacy, political entrepreneurs are able to
183
establish sharp cultural-ideological divisions and deprive each other of recognition as equal
participants in the democratic game. East Germany, as a case closer to the ideal type of
unilateral transition, experienced an abrupt, imposed regime change with the exclusion of the
protagonists of the old regime. This marked a “new beginning” with little legal or historical
continuity. As a consequence, East Germany was found to lack a common elite discourse with
regards to the democratic system connecting the other parties with the post-communist PDS,
as well as connecting East and West German MPs (even within the same parties). Thus,
differently from both West German and PDS-MPs, non-PDS East German MPs argue in
favour of competition rather than consensus, they invoke particular interests rather than the
common good, underline the importance of outcomes rather than procedures, and argue in
favour of far-reaching changes to the institutional status quo. In quantitative terms similar to
their Hungarian colleagues, East Germans (as well as West German) MPs voice more
negative than positive statements with regard to political opponents. However, the qualitative
analysis shows that, unlike in the Hungarian case, MPs basically accept each other as equally
legitimate players in the democratic game.
Using Bourdieu’s concept of habitus I then illustrate how these shared discourses
might constrain or enable political behaviour by demarcating legitimate avenues for change
and persistence and thus impact upon the persistence of the democratic system, i.e. the
consolidation of democracy. Thus, for the Hungarian case I discuss how the expressed
preference for consensualist decision-making delegitimizes and impedes fully legal
majoritarian decisions, while on the other hand the lack of respect for “the other” undermines
co-operation by rhetorically externalising political opponents from the system.
For the East German case, the rather anti-consensualist discourses of non-PDS MPs
clash with the established traditions of West German “quasi-consociationalism”. This way,
East German MPs fail to develop a commonly shared supportive habitus for the existing
system, with PDS MPs (in line with West German MPs) mostly supporting conservation or
furthering of the consensualist system, and the other East German MPs arguing for change.
Following from this differentiated perspective, the conclusions about CoD must also
be differentiated between the CEE countries. In countries with the legacy of a multilateral
transition the absence of a comprehensive debate about the past makes the new polity
vulnerable to potential usurpation by both left and right with mutually exclusive
understandings of historical legitimacy. Unlike in unilateral transitions, there was no “new
beginning” in the Arendtian sense (i.e. the building of the new polity on a clear break with the
old regime). Thus the old regime, or any previous regimes prior to communism, are not
184
univocally delegitimized and can be taken up again by political entrepreneurs to promote
alternative visions of modernization and democracy (e.g. corporatist-clerical and ethnocentric
authoritarianism or some kind of reform socialism) in order to deny equal legitimacy to
political opponents as demonstrated in the Hungarian case. Next to a higher degree of
personal continuity in politics there are, in these countries, a higher number of members of the
old regime’s political elites that have benefited from “spontaneous” or insider privatisation
and moved from political into economic leadership positions. 728 This fact offers another target
for attacks from the right against post-communist parties accusing the latter as illegitimately
still profiting from their former position, or even as conspiring against the new system.
Thus, while promoting an otherwise consensus-oriented political culture and
commitment to the institutional status quo, the lack of mutual respect and acceptance as equal
players in the democratic game can severely undermine the daily working and the credibility
of consensus democracy. The consolidation of democracy in the case of multilateral
transitions therefore depends on the ability of political elites to mutually accept each other and
engage in a constructive dialogue over the past.
In the Hungarian case, if the confrontational style between the different parties
continues, it will further undermine the working and the popular acceptance of the democratic
system, in particular given the high expectations raised by political elites themselves. If
democratic politics is presented as being based in defining the common good, in avoiding
disagreement or conflict, and in assuming a morally superior, truthful position it becomes
vulnerable to be overtaxed by disappointed expectations. This might be particularly the case if
consensus democracy is associated with elitist, non-transparent and sometimes antiparticipatory discourses and practises. A lack of pragmatism by political elites and a depoliticization of the masses are blamed for the failure of consensus or consociational
democracy in the past (e.g. in the case of France). 729
As Manfred Schmidt notes, consociationalism presupposes the existence of
autonomous segments in society while consensualism furthers their development. 730 In this
regard, the consolidation of consensus democracy in CEE appears problematic due to the
conspicuous absence of well-defined and rather stable social groups. Therefore, political
parties might engage in “cultural engineering” from above and try to achieve social
embeddedness. As mentioned above, in the Hungarian case this is one of the strategies
G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists – Class Formation and Elite
Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe, London: Verso, 1998; D Stark / L Bruszt , Post-Socialist
Pathways – Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
729
A Lijphart, ‘Consociational democracy’, World Politics, Vol.21, No.2, 1969, pp.222-224.
730
M Schmidt, Demokratietheorien, Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 3rd ed., 2000, p.340.
728
185
pursued by the right who lack organisational embeddedness more than the post-communist
left. The left can still rely on relatively extensive local party organisations. Moreover,
managers affiliated with the old regime enjoyed a head-start in the privatisation process, as
well as a continuous presence in other organizations (media, trade unions etc.). Historically,
the establishment of clear ideological boundaries has often increased political stability.
Perhaps we are already observing new cleavages in the making as some authors argue that
parties in countries such as Hungary and Poland attempt to turn political differences into
primary ones. 731 This could result in two (or more) relatively stable camps which have their
own definitions of basic values, modern society and the common good and in which voters
only elect their camp’s leaders (but also where consensus is required for the highest national
offices and policies). As one MP put it: “Hungarian politicians are unable to compromise
because they do not know their positions. When you do not have a position, a standpoint or a
goal you are unable to compromise.” 732 Therefore, consensus democracy might work better
once political parties have developed clear-cut, stable socio-cultural profiles and at the same
time have established the boundaries of acceptable discourse.
Cases with the legacy of unilateral transition are, in turn, are less vulnerable to
competing concepts of democracy and modernization since the previous regime(s) alongside
with its claim to historical legitimacy was fully discarded during the revolutionary transition
to democracy. Also, a higher extent of Vergangenheitsbewältigung was imposed upon society
e.g. through far-reaching and systematic lustration campaigns, the opening of secret service
and state archives, public commemorations, teaching at schools etc. 733 However, the initial
exclusion of protagonists of the former regime and the imposition of the new system by the
former opposition furthers a rather majoritarian democratic discourse, prevents all players
from developing of a common stake in the system resulting in a lack of understanding for the
worth of consensus-democratic arrangements.
In countries with the legacy of unilateral transition, political elites might therefore
come to find their understanding of democracy to be better served by more competitive,
majoritarian institutions. Thus, institutional adaptation towards diminishing the number of
Zs Enyedi, ‘The role of agency in cleavage formation’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44,
No.3, 2005, pp.697-720.
732
MDF #2.
733
Vergangenheitsbewältigung has surely also taken place in countries such as Hungary and Poland yet with
largely competing interpretations of the past and without a serious dialogue between the opposing camps. In
Hungary different symbols have been used and even major national holidays are celebrated separately by left and
right parties. Different versions of history have been promoted by various governments and were subsequently
institutionalised through competing museums, memorials or historical institutes. Lustration and transparency
about the old regime’s archives has been initiated in a more selective and opportunistic fashion (e.g. the
campaign by the Oleksy government in Poland in the early 1990s).
731
186
veto players might be a possibility to increase the acceptance of the system (e.g. as attempted
by the two major Czech parties in the 1998 “opposition agreement”). 734 This might increase
their effectiveness and output-orientation, which is a major pillar of their political leaders’
yardsticks for democratic legitimacy. At the same time destructive polarization (as in the
cases of multilateral transitions) appears less likely. Therefore, there is also little reason to
fear from more competition. In these polities, danger looms rather from the fringes of the
political spectrum if consensus politics remains unchanged.
In countries with multilateral legacies, major changes to the transitional status quo are
also pursued sometimes opportunistically by individual actors and parties (as described above
for Hungary). However, a large-scale departure from the status quo put in place by transition
will probably meet stronger resistance as it threatens the legitimacy of major parties which are
connected to the 1989 democratic beginning, threatening further polarization.
Beyond that, the “special case” of East Germany deserves further dwelling. My
conclusions for the consolidation of democracy in East Germany are different from most of
the existing literature. There, East German political elites are often viewed as being among
the most advanced in terms of a democratic political culture because of the rapid adoption of
the well-functioning West German democratic institutions and their convergence to the West
German political culture. 735 However, the story looks more complicated. In fact, convergence
concerning the consensus-conflict dimension between East and West has not been achieved as
yet. East German MPs (without the PDS) are quite united in arguing for some far-reaching
changes towards diminishing consensualism and advance very similar justifications for their
stance. This in turn might put pressure on the established West German elites and lead to
conflict inside the German polity, especially within the large parties SPD and CDU which are
strong in both East and West Germany. Conflicting East-West positions about the future of
German democracy within the major parties emerged not only recently (e.g. in the context of
reforming Germany’s federalism, or the corporatist health care system). 736 Especially for East
A Roberts, ‘Demythologising the Czech Opposition Agreement’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.55, No.8,
December 2003, pp.1273-1303; M Novák, ‘The Relevance of Small Parties – From a “General Framework” to
the Czech Opposition Agreement’, Czech Sociological Review, 2000, Vol.36, No.1, pp.27-47; S Saxonberg, ‘A
New Phase in Czech Politics’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.10, No.1, 1999, pp.96-111; J Higley, M Burton, Elite
Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, pp.168-170.
735
M Edinger, L Vogel, ’Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion and Political Attitudes of East and West German
Parliamentarians – Findings from the Jena Parliamentary Survey (2003-4)’, Czech Sociological Review, Vol.41,
No.3, 2005, pp.375-399.
736
E.g. Die Welt, 27.11.2006, DER SPIEGEL 29.11.2006.
734
187
German MPs the Grand coalition established in 2005 is probably a rather unpopular
experience in consensus democracy as it is associated with deadlock and ineffectiveness. 737
Ideally, one could imagine East German politicians as the “vanguard” of institutional
reform in the united Germany against the opposition of established West German politicians
and the PDS. 738 Perhaps a better inclusion of East German demands in current reform
endeavours might help to also establish a genuine legitimacy of the constitutional set-up
among the East German population, a sense of ownership in line with the Habermasian
Verfassungspatriotismus. 739
Paradoxically, the post-communist PDS presents itself as the most conservative force
in terms of their attachment to the West German democratic system, defends its consensualist
foundations and established corporatist welfare policies. Thus, in a way, the role of the PDS
as an unreformed post-communist party needs to be reconsidered. While the PDS does not
share the East German meta-discourse it is no longer questioning the democratic united
Germany in its current constitutional set-up. Thus, unlike other scholars who argue that the
PDS is a unique East German phenomenon which explains the differences between East and
West German political elites in terms of political culture, 740 I showed that the PDS is in fact in
some regards more similar to West German MPs’ positions than to the other East German
MPs. An explanation based on individual socialization and value internalisation would be
rather misleading in this regard. In fact, an attitude-based explanation of PDS-MPs positions
would probably come to the paradoxical finding that they internalised best the values of West
German democratic institutions, as they voice the strongest support for a conservation of the
status quo. Differently from that, an explanation based on the different experience of life
worlds and historical junctures can indicate why PDS MPs in many regards are closer to the
West German habitus of professional politicians and do not share the discursive world of the
East German political late beginners from the other parties.
In terms of the consolidation of democracy the PDS might therefore not so much be a
danger to the status quo but instead be an obstacle to further change. As the PDS is currently
reshaping its profile as a party defending West German consensus democracy and its classical
737
When asked during the interviews about the desirability of a Grand coalition to solve the country’s major
problems most MPs responded very negatively in 2004/5.
738
This idea became particularly evident when for a short time in 2005/6 both CDU and SPD were chaired by
East Germans.
739
J Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1990, pp.147-176.
740
M Edinger, L Vogel, ’Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion and Political Attitudes of East and West German
Parliamentarians – Findings from the Jena Parliamentary Survey (2003-4)’, Czech Sociological Review, Vol.41,
No.3, 2005, p. 395; D Segert, ’The PDS – Regional Party or a Second Social-Democratic Party in Germany?’,
in: A Bozóki, J Ishiyama (eds.), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe, Armonk:
M.E. Sharpe, 2002, p.166-187.
188
achievements (e.g. corporatism) it might shed its negative stigma of a formerly communist
party and become an attractive option for West Germans as well. PDS’ recent opening to
disaffected former Social Democrats, trade unionists or Greens and its planned re-christening
as an all-German “Leftist Party” points into this direction. In the wake of Germany’s largescale overhaul of the established welfare system the chance opened up for the postcommunists to establish themselves as a powerful veto-player and keeper of the status quo.
Also in other CEE societies post-communist parties might well assume the role of a
conservative force claiming to guard societies against too much political and socio-economic
change (e.g. as demanded by Brussels or international investors). For convincingly assuming
this role, post-communist parties are in a much better position in countries with a unilateral
transition where they can easily distance themselves from the political “mainstream” and thus
the consensus on EU membership. In countries with a multilateral transition in turn, postcommunist parties are major protagonists of the European consensus and cannot easily
distance themselves from it. There, a danger arises rather from the populist right which can
blame problems associated with EU membership on post-communist “opportunists” and
“traitors to the nation.” Finally, I have to restate that East Germany can indeed increase the
universe of cases among the post-communist democracies and, together with the control case
of West Germany, be used for comparative studies in a fruitful way. 741
Following from my study, we need to reconsider our traditional understanding of
political culture which usually relies on differentiation in socio-economic background factors
of politicians and long-term processes of gradual, individual socialization into existing
democracies. Neither condition really holds in a convincing way for the young and socially
flattened post-communist democracies. Thus, the “collective memory” is added as another
dependent variable in explaining political cultures in general, and Lijphart’s “spirit of
accommodation” in particular. For the global application of Lijphart’s model political culture
should be reconsidered and form part of his typology of consensus and majoritarian
democracy (as in his original concept of consociational democracy). In sum, the key finding
of this thesis is that political elites’ commitment to their democratic system is mediated to
quite some extent by the legacies of democratic transition.
A reorientation of political culture research towards mechanisms of collective rather
than individual socialization (and thus a stronger emphasis on explicitly shared discourses
rather than implicitly held attitudes) also helps to overcome some of the epistemological and
methodological problems connected with the classical socio-psychological approaches.
741
M Spinner, ‘Working at Democracy’, European Political Science, Vol.5, No.4, December 2006, pp.417-422.
189
Focusing on explicitly expressed and reproduced discourses rather than implicitly internalised
attitudes enables us to explore political culture, its sources and impact without having to make
assumptions about individuals’ internal processes and their honesty in expression. As
illustrated, even without supposing individual internalisation, collectively shared values can
shape behaviour by delineating appropriate, socially acceptable action. In fact, relaxing the
requirement of a “strong socialization” with individual value adaptation to a weaker notion of
collective socialization (with an explicit acceptance of group norms) appears also more
realistic for conceptualising elite political culture. Including the possibility of a “weak
socialization” into our concept of political culture allows us to explore the sometimes cynical
or opportunistic use of normative discourses. For example, commonly held values can be used
in order to shame others into conforming behaviour and/or to give credit to one’s own (often
purely self-interested) positions. This way, discourses are part of behaviour and not separate
from it. 742
In this regard, my study is only a first exploratory undertaking. Mainstream political
science has by and large stuck around the civic culture paradigm since the mid-1960s. While
developing more powerful statistical tools, basic assumptions barely changed. More
sophisticated and differentiated concepts of socialization, value diffusion and political culture
which have been developed in other fields of social sciences (such as in International
Relations) were hardly embraced. However, while the classical approach in its dependence on
value internalisation might be too rigid, many constructivist approaches might be too
inconclusive in their results. Therefore, I tried to make use of some of the insights from other
bodies of literature and combine them with established approaches from elite sociology,
democratic theory, transititology and consolidology, consociationalism, and comparative
history in an interdisciplinary fashion. I apply both quantitative and qualitative approaches in
exploring a large set of original data, draw on a large number of existing studies about the two
cases throughout the last two decades, and discuss several alternative explanations.
Therefore, the scope of the study is rather limited in space and time. Further research
is required to test the hypotheses for other CEE cases (e.g. the Czech Republic as another case
of unilateral transition, and Poland as a case of multilateral transition). Some findings from
the existing literature are at least pointing towards similar patterns as in my approach, as
mentioned above. Surely, some caveats regarding the uniqueness of the East German
transition remain: East German MPs as part of a larger polity in which they have to adapt to
P Donati, ‘Die Rahmenanalyse politischer Diskurse’, in: F Keller et al. (eds.), Handbuch
sozialwissenschaftlicher Diskursanalyse, Band 1: Theorien und Methoden, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2001,
p.169.
742
190
pre-existing, well-working institutions might make different use of discursive legacies than
MPs in other CEE democracies (which are at the same time engaged in state- and nationbuilding and the development of new party systems). A close inspection of the Czech case,
which is the most similar in terms of its transition dynamics to East Germany, might be useful
in this regard. Given the findings from the existing literature I am still confident that it will
indeed show largely similar patterns.
As the classical model, my approach to political culture is not free of conceptual
shortcomings either. It appears better at explaining persistence rather than change. Therefore,
it seems most promising to use both the classical and the discursive approach to political
culture in a complementary way. Over time individual socialization, generational turnover to
politicians without active experiences of the pre-1989 period and the fading out of collective
memories about transition might very well play an ever growing role in determining the
outlook of political elites. Also, the discursive power of increasingly far-away historical
junctures will decrease. For younger generations, different experiences and discourses will
increasingly influence political behaviour, or new interpretations of past points of common
reference may arise. Moreover, it is possible that other crucial post-transition events left their
mark on elite discourses. In this regard, East Germany is quite an extreme case, not for the
fact of German unification but for the experience of two historical junctures of unilateral
political change (democratisation in 1989/90 and unification in late 1990) in a very short time
period. Nevertheless, Polish students of democratisation have alerted me to the fact that Polish
transition also experienced several crucial historical junctures: the foundation of the Solidarity
movement, the imposition of martial law, round-table talks and the first semi-free elections to
fully free elections, a provisional constitution in 1992 and a “complete” constitution in 1997.
In this regard, further studies will be highly important, especially in the East German
case which experienced a large-scale discharge of former East German dissidents from the
Bundestag with the 2005 elections. 743 Will their leaving the political stage also weaken the
specific East German non-conformist discourses in the polity and speed up the convergence
between East and West German political culture? Also, further major and minor historical
junctures (such as the 2006 riots in Hungary following the Prime Minister’s admission to have
lied to the public for years) will probably impact the way democracy is being interpreted and
approached in the future.
‚Dem Bundestag gehen die DDR-Bürgerrechtler aus’, DER SPIEGEL, 20 June 2005; ’Der Herbst der
Wildblumen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, No.28, 17 July 2005, p.8; J Plöhn, ‘Ostdeutsche Profile
in in der Politik – Vom Aufbruch zur Gesamtdeutschen Normalität’, in: O Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther (eds.),
Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006,
pp.138-141.
743
191
So what are other general implications from this for the fate of democracy in CEE?
Elite political culture and politicians’ patterns of talking as “verbal behaviour” 744 is surely a
relevant and important subject for research already in its own right. 745 Beyond that, elite
political culture has a role to play in the future development of young democracies. As
remarked by Dryzek and Holmes, without a supportive discourse acceptance for the existing
democratic system can only rest on habituation, pragmatic compliance (based on
performance), or coercion. 746 As my research showed, habituation appears at least partly
doubtful; pragmatic, temporary compliance and outright coercion remain rather questionable
or normatively unacceptable mechanisms for the consolidation of democracy. As mentioned
earlier, consensus-democratic institutions offer both resources for accommodative and
conflict-oriented strategies and do not automatically lead to an “appropriate” consensualist
political culture. 747 Thus, democratic political elites advancing consensus and accommodation
as a yardstick for their own legitimacy will also be measured in this regard. Political elites
who set themselves up as authentic plebeian contestants have to live up to this ideal, even
when institutional or external constraints strongly limit the range of action. Leaders advancing
demands for far-reaching and extensive new policy outputs not only raise high expectations
but also frustrate them by getting bogged down in the consensus-focused decision making
processes. This can be used as a powerful argument against consensus democracy, or even
democracy in general. If consensus democracy is not explicitly valued on normative grounds
(e.g. for including minorities and assuring equitable participation), but rather presented as
being in the way of necessary decisions its future becomes conditional upon its own in-built
institutional mechanism to prevent change (while at the same time possibly increasing
frustration and alienation).
For investigating the future of consensus democracy I showed that it makes sense to
disaggregate the concept and not to lump together different dimensions of consensualism. As
illustrated for the Hungarian case, political elites might not be consensualist in all five
dimensions but in fact develop partly contradicting positions between the different dimensions
(i.e. by calling for consensus politics and at the same time not expressing respect for political
opponents). Therefore, it is oversimplifying the affair to call Hungarian (or other) political
R Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians – Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy’, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1973, p.xi.
745
G Pomper, Passions and Interests – Political Party Concepts of American Democracy, Lawrence: University
of Kansas Press, 1992, p.2.
746
J Dryzek / L Holmes, Post-Communist Democratisation: Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries,
Cambridge UP, 2002, p.9.
747
T Börzel, ‘Demokratien im Wandel der Europäisierung’, in: J Katenhusen, W Lamping (eds.), Demokratien
in Europa – Der Einfluß der europäischen Integration auf Institutionen und neue Kulturen des demokratischen
Verfassungsstaates, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2003, p.189.
744
192
elites in CEE merely “consensual” if they show some traits of consensualist political culture
but miss others.
Following from that, the concept of democratic consolidation has to be rethought, too.
Rather than employing an a priori prescriptive-normative position in favour of the existing
status quo and/or consensus democratic institutions we should apply a more descriptiveanalytical verstehende position from the perspective of major protagonists. An ahistorical,
purely rationalist and positivist approach might miss some key sources for explaining
democratic persistence and change. Thus, a mixture of positivist and constructivist approaches
with quantitative measures to establish patterns and qualitative methods to explain them might
be a fruitful way in this regard.
Moreover, I endeavoured to free the typology of consensus and majoritarian
democracy from its frequent normative undertone. Having a consensus democratic set-up in a
homogenous society is not good (or bad) per se. In the context of approaches investigating the
consolidation of democracy we should therefore more critically scrutinize in how far the
freezing of the institutional arrangements put in place by transition is desirable, and whether
these arrangements actually enjoy stable and sustainable commitment of both political elites
and masses.
In my study, I concentrated on the structural legacies of transition in the form of
discursive resources. Surely, the articulation and the use of these resources also depend on
political entrepreneurship as other studies have shown. 748 Therefore, there will hardly be
exactly the same patterns of consensual political culture in two countries. As important as
elite political entrepreneurship in this regard is popular resonance.
In this dissertation I focused only on the “supply side” of discourses and did not look
at the “consumers” (i.e. the mass population). 749 Elite discourses must definitely be anchored
in the empirical realities of the respective society; they need to “ring true”, be attractive and
appealing to voters or otherwise soon fall into oblivion. 750 Thus, the resonance of elite
political culture in the general population is indeed an important aspect which deserves further
research. In this regard, this study might be just the first step for a more extended project.
Nevertheless, for the key importance of political elites in the establishment of CEE
Zs Enyedi, ‘The role of agency in cleavage formation’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44,
No.3, 2005, pp.697-720.
749
For an attitude-based model of democratic supply and demand between elites and mass population see: R
Rose / W Mishler / C Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives – Understanding Post-Communist Societies,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, pp.3-24; pp. 201-227.
750
S Roßteutscher, ‘Competing Narratives and the Social Construction of Reality – The GDR in Transition’,
German Politics, Vol.9, No.1, April 2000, p.61.
748
193
democracies, and given their ongoing dominance due to the rather weak civil societies, my
focus appears well-justified. 751
In this study I focused predominantly on developing a different understanding of
political culture and aimed at establishing some of its antecedents and sources. Further studies
have to elaborate more systematically the role of political culture also as an independent
variable for which I only offer some illustrations and more tentative conclusions. Also, the
precise mechanisms mediating the relationship between political culture and behaviour need
to be elaborated in more detail. This can be done using Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as I
propose, or other suitable concepts. For this undertaking, again, it seems advisable to employ
approaches already used successfully in other subfields of social sciences (e.g. in the
International Relations and Europeanization literatures). 752 Additionally, Steiner et al.’s
approach which looks into some of the consequences of the “spirit of accommodation” in line
with deliberative theory is a further possible avenue to follow in this regard. 753
Concerning my own focus on the sources of contemporary elite political culture, it will
also be necessary to further differentiate transition types beyond the simple dichotomy of
unilateral versus multilateral transition. For example, a third ideal type of transition is well
imaginable in which elites of the old regime start a pre-emptive democratisation process in
order to prevent a regime overthrow by the opposition, or in order to evade the need to engage
in negotiations with them. 754 This type might fit better cases such as Romania or Bulgaria,
and possibly also cases from CIS countries, or even countries outside the post-communist
realm. This way, scope conditions of the approach can be extended and a much larger
universe of cases be covered. More generally, my approach to investigate the origins of elite
political culture can surely be employed to other contexts and specific hypotheses can be
formulated about the impact of other historical junctures.
My approach also contributes to the growing “legacy”-literature which takes serious
initial conditions for the long-term path-dependent development of democracy. Next to the
well-discussed legacies of state and society under the old regime I historicize transition and
show that in fact it became a legacy in itself through the collective memory. Thus, in the long
term, the old wisdom that “institutions matter” is complemented by the insight that history
matters, too. In this context, the utility of historical and sociological institutionalist
M Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, Cambridge UK: Cambridge UP, 2003.
E.g. the special volume of International Organization devoted to “Institutions and Socialization in Europe”
(International Organization, Vol.59, No.4, 2005).
753
J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing
Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, ‘Chapter 5: Discourse and its consequences’, pp.138-164.
754
Thanks to László Bruszt for alerting me to this point and discussing some of its implications with me.
751
752
194
approaches next to rationalist institutionalist perspectives needs to be restated. With hindsight,
and separate from the claim of rational-choice transitologist scholarship, it therefore did make
a difference whether democratic transition was unilaterally imposed or multilaterally
negotiated. Democratic transition was more than an underdetermined political situation as it
already carried in itself parts of the genetic (i.e. discursive) material for the future
development of the democratic system put in place. While different modes led to establish
similar types of democratic institutions, they offered rather different meanings for operating
and making sense out of them.
Also, a long-established causality (i.e. the relationship of political culture on the mode
of transition) was enriched by a new perspective in which transition dynamics also condition
political culture. As a consequence, we cannot just extrapolate pre-transition political culture
into the new system and basically assume continuity. I surely accept the well-justified
position that pre-transition legacies influenced the way transition took place and continue to
have an impact also in the new polity. A recent publication by Anna Seleny very well works
out how the differences in state-society relations, with different ways of framing and
approaching conflicts and conflict resolution during the old regime, contributes to current
political cultures. 755 Also, for the East German case, the persistence of some longer cultural
traditions is possible (e.g. the Prussian tradition of a strong, centralized state as opposed to the
consociational traditions in the rest of the German Empire). However, it is not by necessity (as
I have shown), that deep historical legacies translate into a contemporary political culture. In
this regard, transition was shown to be a crucial historical juncture which works like a filter
for existing practices and memories, and as an incubator for new ones.
Thus, I also contribute to the growing body of literature concerned with the history of
ideas of the 1989 transitions in CEE. National and regional legacies do remain important. The
“long shadow” of history in the form of transition legacies is still notable in elite political
cultures in new democracies almost two decades after transition and should therefore not be
neglected. In sum, discursive legacies of the democratic transitions of 1989 as shown in my
research (but also other crucial historical junctures) can create certain path dependencies
which enable or constrain political leaders to engage in political change beyond the
opportunities and constraints exercised by institutional structures. This approach might
therefore improve our ability to investigate success and failure of political change in these
countries. Future research along the lines of my approach can further lay out the variety in
democratic pathways of CEE democracies and establish commonalities and differences
A Seleny, The Political Economy of State-Society Relations in Hungary and Poland, New York: Cambridge
UP, 2006.
755
195
between countries in a more systematic way. In this regard, not only more cases should be
looked at but also longer time frames be covered. For the case of Hungary data availability in
terms of electronically accessible parliamentary records limited my study to two
parliamentary cycles. A focus on earlier elite discourses which were still closer to the
transition and contrasting them to contemporary discourse might further reveal change and
continuity in terms of collective representations.
In general, political culture might take new avenues after the 2004 EU accession of the
CEE countries. Removing the external constraint to consensualist politics in the form of
accession conditionalities we might now see a further increasing variety of political culture
off the European consensualist mainstream. Therefore, I would also like to draw some
tentative and preliminary conclusions for the international context. External actors such as the
EU might need to employ a more differentiated approach to these countries. As shown,
similar institutions as prescribed by EU directives were used and interpreted in quite different
ways. Therefore, the European Union’s focus merely on formal institutions might not
automatically lead to the desired results (e.g. in terms of decentralisation, monetary policy
etc.) if political cultures do not fully reflect the “spirit of accommodation”. Consequently, a
more differentiated perspective and a better understanding of domestic constellations and
“home-grown” understandings of democracy might be useful.
CEE countries externally enforced compliance with prescribed recipes in the run-up to
the 2004 EU accession should not make us expect instant consolidation of these institutions,
even in countries usually deemed as more advanced in terms of liberal democracy. Post-2004
elections in Poland or Slovakia brought to power governments exhibiting less univocal
commitment to pluralist democracy, minority representation or a non-politicised public
administration and judiciary. Similar developments are feared for Bulgaria and Romania after
their recent accession to the EU in January 2007. This has led some scholars to refer to this
process as “constrained” consolidation, or even an “unfinished” democratisation. 756
Therefore, a closer comparison of post-transition and post-accession discourses might be
useful in establishing patterns of change and continuity of political cultures. In the long run, it
will be interesting to compare in how far a strong, externally conditioned process of
institution-building (in the cases of CEE) leads to success stories similar to the cases of West
Germany or Japan (which developed well-adapted political cultures). Also in post-WWII
Western Europe, consensus democracy took a long time to consolidate. Therefore, even two
756
András Bozóki, Zsolt Enyedi and László Bruszt, discussion at EUDO-seminar, European University Institute
Florence, 12 October 2006.
196
decades after transition it might be premature to make an ultimate judgement about the
consolidation of the CEE democracies.
197
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Tables
Table 1
Two dimensions and ten characteristics of majoritarian and consensus models of democracy
(and their indicators) according to Lijphart (1999):
Executive-Parties Dimension
1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets vs. executive
power-sharing in broad multi-party coalitions (percentage of time under minimal
winning coalition or one-party cabinets)
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant vs. executivelegislative balance of power (average time of cabinet duration)
3. Two-party vs. multi-party system (effective number of parliamentary parties)
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral system vs. proportional representation
(index of electoral disproportionality)
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups vs.
coordinated and corporatist interest group systems aimed at compromise and
concertation (index of interest group pluralism)
Federal-Unitary Dimension
1. Unitary and centralized government vs. federal and decentralised government (index
of federalism)
2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislative vs. division of
legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses (index
of bicameralism)
3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities vs. rigid constitutions
that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities (index of constitutional rigidity)
4. Systems in which legislatives have the final word on the constitutionality of their own
legislation vs. systems in which laws are subjects to judicial review of their
constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts (index of judicial review)
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive vs. independent central banks (index
of central bank independence)
(Source: Lijphart 1999)
217
Table 2
Implicit political culture
Explicit political culture
(“operational code”)
(”collective representations of
democracy”)
Units of analysis
Attitudes
Discourses
Level of analysis
Individual
Group
Extent of socialization
Strong (i.e. internalisation),
Weak (i.e. explicit acceptance of
“taken-for-grantedness”
values)
Ways of appropriation
Social learning, individual
Practice, discursive reproduction
of culture
reflection, collective
deliberation, “logic of arguing”
Change
Gradual
1.) Gradual (adoption of new
practices)
2.) Sudden (breakdown of doxa
due to external crisis –
historical juncture)
Relationship with
Impacts directly upon behaviour
behaviour
Mutual constitution – legitimises
behaviour, enables and constraints it
Conditions for
Positive attitudes towards
Embeddedness of institutions in
persistence of
system, congruence between
habitus (shared interpretation and
democracy
attitudes, behaviour and
legitimation for practices)
institutions
Concept of CoD
Prescriptive
Descriptive
Normative
Analytical
Static (preservation of status
Dynamic (allowing for change)
quo)
Epistemological
Objective; expert knowledge
perspective
Predominant
Intersubjective; “verstehende”,
participant knowledge
Survey research
Discourse analysis
methodology
218
Table 3:
Mode of transition
Unilateral
Multilateral
Elite actors
opposition dominating
Balance between power-holders
and opposition
Approach to Change
Swiftness, decisiveness, ‘shock Gradualism,
balance,
therapy’
accommodation
Major objective of actors
New legitimacy
Legality
Conception of history
New beginning, clear break Continuity, past regime(s) not
with the past
fully de-legitimized
Focus on
Outcomes
Procedures
Uncertainty
Lower
Higher
Irreversibility
Higher
Lower
Way of implementation
Apply/impose well-tried
Negotiate
‘blueprints’
ideas
Lower
Higher
Popular participation (in the Higher
Lower
Elite continuity
among
competing
beginning)
219
Table 4
Composition of MP samples for 2002-2005 period
Hungarian MPs
Hungarian sample
East
German East
German
MPs
sample*
Average age in 2004
46,63 years
48,00 years
49,79 years
49,25 years
Gender m/f
90,9% / 9,1%
89,9% / 11,1%
63,8% / 36,2 %
80% / 20%
96,3% / 3,7% / 0%
82,5% / 11,3% / 90% / 5% / 5%
Education higher/ secondary/primary 94,5% / ? / ?
6,2 %
First elected
1990/ 1994 / 1998 / 15,8%/19,8%/
37,0%/25,9%/
34,7%/7,4%/
35%/10%/25%/30%
30,3%/34,3%
22,2%/14,8%
31,6%/26,3%
(1990**: 15 %)
2002
(1990**15,8%)
Mandate direct/list
45,6%/
40,7%/
(r=regional, n=national)
36,3%(r), 18,1%(n)
29,6% (r), 29,6 (n)
Origin rural/urban/capital
?
14,8%/37%/48,1%
59,8% / 40,2%
65%/35%
42,4% / 51,1%/ 30%/50%/20%
6,5%
* does not include complementary PDS MPs from 1998-2002 Bundestag
1990** first freely elected East German parliament March-October 1990
220
Table 5:
Correlation between consensualism indicators for two
parliamentary cycles
2
1,5
1
0,5
2002-2005
-1,00
-0,50
0
0,00
-0,5
0,50
1,00
-1
-1,5
-2
1998-2002
Legend: blue squares :East German MPs; yellow squares :Hungarian MPs
This table depicts the scores for the content analysis of parliamentary speeches of East
German and Hungarian MPs in the first four dimensions. The scores for the first
parliamentary cycle (1998-2002) and the second parliamentary cycle (2002-2005)
demonstrate a clustering of Hungarian MPs’ indicators above zero and the East German MPs’
indicators below zero in these dimensions.
221
Table 6:
a) Sample 1998-2002: overall average: N=45 (22 East Germany/ 23 Hungary), urban
background: N=33 (12/21), capital city background: N=15 (5/10), rural background: N=10
(6/4)
Consensualism and geographical background (1998-2002)
0,2
0,15
consensualism value
0,1
0,05
0
-0,05
-0,1
-0,15
rural background
capital city background
urban background
-0,2
-0,25
1
2
overall average
3
4
consensualism dimension
This table depicts the scores of the first four dimensions of consensualism, i.e. the “spirit of
accommodation” for the pooled Hungarian-East German data according to the geographical
background of MPs. The data was derived from content analysis of individual MPs’ speech
contributions in the two parliaments for the given period according to the above-outlined
codebook.
A systematic relationship between geographical origin and consensualism indicators is
not noticeable. Moreover, there is no stable pattern if this table is compared to the next
parliamentary cycle (see below). The following tables follow the same logic (i.e. East German
and Hungarian data are pooled and the relationship to other individual-level factors is
depicted across the two parliamentary cycles for the first four dimensions of the “spirit of
accommodation”).
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
222
b) Sample 2002-2005: overall average: N=47 (20/27), urban background: N=34 (11/23),
capital city background: N=17 (4/13), rural background: N=13 (10/3)
Consensualism indicators and geographical background (20022005)
0,2
0,15
consensualism value
0,1
0,05
0
-0,05
-0,1
rural background
-0,15
capital city background
-0,2
urban background
-0,25
1
2
overall average
3
4
consensualism dimension
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
223
c) Sample for West Germany (2002-2005):
rural background: N=12, urban background: N=13, capital city background: N=1 (not
depicted)
Consensualism indicators and geographical background (West
German MPs, 2002-2005)
0,55
0,45
consensualism value
0,35
0,25
0,15
0,05
-0,05
-0,15
rural background
urban background
-0,25
1
overall average
2
3
4
consensualism dimension
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
224
Table 7:
Consensualism indicators and year of birth (1998-2002)
2,00
1,50
consensualism value
1,00
0,50
0,00
1925
-0,50
1935
1945
1955
1965
1975
-1,00
-1,50
-2,00
year of birth
Consensualism indicators and year of birth (2002-2005)
2,00
1,50
consensualism
1,00
0,50
0,00
1925
-0,50
1935
1945
1955
1965
1975
-1,00
-1,50
-2,00
year of birth
Legend: blue squares: East German MPs (CDU, SPD, Greens and FDP); brown triangles:
East German MPs (PDS); yellow circles: Hungarian MPs, red circles: West German MPs
This table pools all scores for consensualism dimensions 1- 4.
225
Table 8:
a) Sample for 1998-2002: overall average: N=44 (21 East Germany / 23 Hungary) 757 ,
communist party: N=16 (8//8), opposition group: N=17 (6/11)
Consensualism indicators and affiliation with the former regime
(1998-2002)
0,5
consensualism value
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
-0,1
opposition group
communist party
overall average
-0,2
1
2
3
4
consensualism dimensions
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
757
One East German MP who lived in West Germany until 1990 was excluded from the average.
226
b) Sample for 2002-2005: overall average: N=46 (19 East Germany / 27 Hungary) 758 ,
communist party: N=11 (3/8), opposition group: N=17 (6/11)
Consensualism indicators and affiliation with the former regime
(2002-2005)
0,5
consensualism value
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
-0,1
opposition group
communist party
overall average
-0,2
1
2
3
4
consensualism dimensions
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
758
One East German MP who lived in West Germany until 1990 was excluded from the average.
227
Table 9:
Incumbents 1998-2002: N=18 (9 East Germany / 9 Hungary), opposition 1998-2002: N=27
(13/14), incumbents 2002-2005: N=27 (11/16), opposition 2002-2005: N=20 (9/11)
Consensualism indicators and incumbency
0,5
consensualism value
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
-0,1
-0,2
opposition 2002-2005
incumbents 2002-2005
opposition 1998-2002
incumbents 1998-2002
-0,3
1
2
3
4
consensualism dimension
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
228
c) Sample for West Germany 2002-2005: Incumbents: N=13, Opposition: N=13
Consensualism indicators and incumbency (West German MPs
2002-2005)
0,5
0,4
consensualism value
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
-0,1
-0,2
-0,3
opposition
1
2
consensualism indicators
incumbents
3
4
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
229
Table 10:
a) Sample for 1998-2002: higher office: N=14 (5/9), no higher office: N=31 (17/14)
Sample for 2002-2005: higher office: N=19 (6/13); no higher office: N=28 (14/14)
Consensualism indicators and higher office
0,60
0,50
consensualism value
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
higher office 2002-2005
no higher office 2002-2005
-0,10
-0,20
higher office 1998-2002
1
2
no higher office 1998-2002
3
4
consensualism dimension
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
230
b) Sample for West Germany 2002-2005: higher office: N=5, no higher office: N=21
Consensualism indicators and higher office (West German MPs
2002-2005)
0,6
consensualism value
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
-0,1
higher office
-0,2
1
2
no higher office
3
4
consensualism dimension
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
231
Table 11:
a) Sample for 1998-2002: 1990-94: N=18 (8 East Germany / 10 Hungary); 1994-98: N=12
(5/7); 1998-2002: N=15 (9/6)
Consensualism indicators and entry into parliament (1998-2002)
0,70
0,60
consensualism value
0,50
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
-0,10
-0,20
1990
-0,30
1994
1
2
1998
3
consensualism dimension
4
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
232
b) Sample for 2002-2005:
1990-94: N=17 (7/10 ), 1994-98: N=9 (2/7), 1998-2002: N=11 (5/6), 2002-: N=10 (6/4)
Consensualism indicators and entry into parliament (2002-2005)
0,70
0,60
consensualism value
0,50
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
-0,10
1990
1994
1998
2002
-0,20
-0,30
1
2
3
4
consensualism dimension
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
233
c) West German sample: prior to 1990: N=3, 1990-1994: N=3, 1994-1998: N=4, 1998-2002:
N=6, 2002-2005: N=10
Consensualism indicators and entry into parliament (West German
MPs 2002-2005)
0,7
0,6
consensualism value
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
-0,1
before 1990
1990
1994
1998
2002
-0,2
-0,3
1
2
consensualism dimension
3
4
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
234
Table 12:
a) Sample for 1998-2002: direct mandate: N=20 (11 East Germany / 9 Hungary), list
mandate: N=25 (11/14)
Sample for 2002-2005: direct mandate: N=24 (13/11), list mandate: N=23 (7/16)
Consensualism indicators and type of mandate
0,50
consensualism values
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
list 1998-2002
-0,10
direct 1998-2002
list 2002-2005
-0,20
1
2
direct 2002-2005
3
4
consensualism dimension
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
235
c) Sample for West Germany (2002-2005): direct mandate: N=13, list mandate: N=13
Consensualism indicators and type of mandate (West German
MPs 2002-2005)
0,45
consensualism value
0,35
0,25
0,15
0,05
-0,05
list
-0,15
1
2
direct
3
4
consensualism dimension
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
236
Table 13:
a) Sample for 1998-2002: overall average: N=45 (22 East Germany/ 23 Hungary),
conservative: N=12 (3/9), social democratic: N=16 (8/8), liberal: N=7 (1/6), leftist: N=25
(18/7), post-communist: N=17 (9/8)
Consensualism indicators and ideology (1998-2002)
0,4
consensualism value
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
-0,1
post-communist
leftist
liberal
social democratic
conservative
overall average
-0,2
-0,3
1
2
3
4
consensualism dimension
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
237
b) Sample for 2002-2005: overall average: N=47 (20/27), conservative: N=17 (6/11), social
democratic: N=19 (10/9), liberal: N=7 (1/6), leftist: N=23 (13/10), post-communist: N=13 (2/11)
Consensualism indicators and ideology (2002-2005)
0,4
consensualism value
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
-0,1
post-communist
leftist
liberal
social democratic
conservative
overall average
-0,2
-0,3
1
2
3
4
consensualism dimension
consensualism dimensions denote:
1 general support for consensus and compromise
2 reference to the common good
3 support for established procedures
4 support for the status quo
5 respect towards “the other”
238
Annexes
Annex 1: The samples
a) Sample of MPs for Hungary
MP
s
Year
Entered
Education
Origin Mandate
Other office
speech
Political
e
of
parliament
1998-2002/
units 1998- affiliatio
x
birth
first in
2002-2006
2002
/ n in June
2002-2005
1989
Fidesz #1
m
1975
2002
higher
rural
-/list
-/8
---
Fidesz #2
m
1970
1998
higher
urban
list/list
42/52
---
Fidesz #3
m
1962
1998
higher
rural
list/direct
35/40
---
Fidesz #4
m
1963
1998
higher
urban
direct/direct
28/9
---
Fidesz #5
m
1966
1990
higher
capital direct/list
37/25
Fidesz
10/9
---
57/147
Fidesz
62/18
Fidesz
minister (1999-2002),
vice-president of
parliament (2002-05),
Fidesz #6
m
1961
1998
higher
urban
direct/list
Fidesz #7
m
1968
1993
higher
urban
direct/list
vice-president of
parliament (2002-04)
Fidesz #8
m
1961
1990
higher
urban
direct/direct
MSZP #1
m
1968
2002
higher
capital -/list
state secretary (2002-06) -/121
---
MSZP #2
m
1953
1994
higher
capital direct/direct
state secretary (1996-98) 41/55
MSZMP
MSZP #3
m
1958
1994
higher
capital list/list
MSZP #4
m
1942
1994
higher
capital list/direct
MSZP #5
m
1936
1994
higher
urban
MSZP #6
f
1953
2002
higher
capital -/direct
minister (2002-05)
MSZP #7
m
1952
1998
higher
rural
state secretary (2002-06) 3/5
MSZMP
MSZP #8
m
1946
1994
higher
capital list/direct
state secretary (1994-98, 47/10
MSZMP
23/9
state secretary (2002-06) 31/46
MSZMP
53/48
MSZMP
-/0
---
list/list
list/list
MSZMP
2002-06)
MSZP #9
m
1946
1990
higher
rural
list/direct
minister (1994-98)
MSZP#10 f
1951
1998
higher
urban
direct/direct
state secretary (2003-06) 103/125
SZDSZ #1 f
1949
1990
higher
capital list/list
162/149
SZDSZ
SZDSZ #2 m
1952
1990
higher
capital list/list
3/1
SZDSZ
SZDSZ #3 m
1954
1990
higher
capital list/list
state secretary (1997-98) 41/80
SZDSZ
SZDSZ #4 m
1955
1994
higher
urban
state secretary (2002-06) 40/4
---
SZDSZ #5 m
1946
1990
higher
capital list/direct
state secretary (1994-97) 47/50
SZDSZ
SZDSZ #6 m
1958
1990
higher
urban
list/list
63/29
SZDSZ
MDF #1
m
1955
1990
higher
urban
direct/list
69/95
MDF
MDF #2
m
1942
1990
higher
capital direct/direct
43/26
MDF
MDF #3
m
1967
2002
secondary
capital -/list
-/234
MDF
list/list
minister (1990-1993)
38/32
MSZMP = Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (communist party until 1989); state secretary= államtitkár
239
MSZMP
MSZMP
b) Sample of MPs for East Germany 2002-2005
MP
s
Year Entered
e
of
x
birth first in
Education
Origin Mandate
parliament
Other office
speech Political
1998-2002/
units
affiliation in
2002-2005
1998-
Sept. 1989
2002 /
20022005
CDU #1
m
1948 2002
higher
urban
-/list
Land
prime -/70
CDU***
minister(1993-94)
CDU #2
m
1957 1990
primary
rural
direct/direct
34/27
---
CDU #3
m
1954 2002
higher
urban
-/list
-/6
SED
CDU #4
m
1975 2002
higher
urban
-/direct
-/88
---
CDU #5
m
1959 1990*,1998
higher
capital list/list
40/37
church
opposition
group
CDU #6
m
1955 1998
higher
urban
direct/direct
Land
minister 14/40
Neues Forum
(1990-1998)
SPD #1
m
1945 1994
higher
rural
direct/direct
6/11
---
SPD
m
1940 1998
higher
rural
direct/direct
20/13
SPD
#2****
SPD #3
(W.Germany)
m
1956 1990*,1990
higher
rural
direct/direct
State secretary
35/15
(2000-2002)
church
opposition
group
SPD #4
f
1959 2002
secondary
urban
-/direct
-/8
---
SPD #5
f
1952 1998
higher
rural
direct/direct
12/1
---
SPD #6
m
1944 1990
higher
capital direct/direct
24/10
---
(1998- 36/28
---
secretary 49/50
---
State secretary
(1998-2000)
SPD #7
m
1959 1990*,1990
higher
urban
direct/list
Minister
2005)
SPD #8
m
1950 1990
higher
urban
direct/list
State
(1998-2005)
SPD #9
m
1949 1990
higher
urban
direct/direct
19/14
---
SPD#10
f
1958 2002
higher
urban
-/direct
-/12
---
PDS #1
m
1958 1998
higher
urban
list/-
8/-
SED
PDS #2
m
1952 1994
higher
rural
list/-
8/-
SED
PDS #3
f
1954 1994
higher
urban
list/-
59/-
SED
PDS #4
m
1940 1998
higher
rural
list/-
85/-
SED
PDS #5
m
1947 1994
higher
rural
list/-
80/
SED
PDS #6
f
1961 2002
higher
capital -/direct
-/267
SED
240
PDS #7
f
1971 1998
secondary
urban
list/-
PDS #8
f
1963 1998
higher
capital direct/direct
60/281 SED
PDS #9
m
1931 1958**, 1998 higher
rural
14/-
SED
PDS#10
m
1951 1990*,1990
higher
capital list/-
123/-
SED
Green#1
f
1964 1994
higher
urban
list/list
35/23
Neues Forum
FDP #1
m
1947 1990
higher
rural
list/list
33/8
LDPD***
list/-
35/-
---
SED = Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, East German communist party
Neues Forum = biggest civic opposition group in GDR 1989/90
1990* = member of the first freely elected GDR-Parliament (March-October 1990)
1958**= member of the communist GDR parliament
*** = members of “bloc parties” in the GDR (Liberal Democratic Party, LDPD; and Christian Democratic Union
of East Germany, CDU)
**** = MP lived in West Germany until 1990
State secretary= Staatssekretär
241
c) Sample of MPs for West Germany (2002-2005)
MP
sex
Year Entered
of
Education
Origin Mandate Other office
parliament
speech units
2002-2005
birth first in
CDU #1W
m
1952 1998
higher
rural
direct
22
CDU #2W
m
1954 2002
higher
rural
list
18
CDU #3W
m
1967 1998
higher
urban
list
17
CDU #4W
m
1943 1972
secondary
rural
direct
CDU #5W
m
1959 2002
secondary
urban
direct
CDU #6W
m
1941 1983
higher
urban
list
CDU #7W
m
1956 1991
higher
urban
list
17
CDU #8W
m
1951 2002
higher
rural
direct
14
CDU #9W
m
1958 2002
higher
rural
direct
18
1955 2002
higher
capital list
CDU #10W f
State secretary (1989-1998)
6
6
State secretary (1994-1998)
20
Land state secretary (1996- 16
1999)
CDU #11W f
1966 1998
higher
urban
direct
33
SPD #1W
m
1945 1996
primary
rural
direct
7
SPD #2W
f
1953 2002
higher
urban
direct
32
SPD #3W
m
1954 1998
higher
urban
direct
24
SPD #4W
f
1952 1994
higher
rural
direct
SPD #5W
m
1959 2002
higher
urban
direct
5
SPD #6W
m
1954 2002
higher
rural
direct
16
SPD #7W
m
1943 2002
primary
urban
list
SPD #8W
m
1962 1998
higher
rural
list
3
SPD #9W
m
1940 1990
secondary
urban
list
20
SPD #10W
f
1945 1980
higher
urban
list
28
SPD #11W
f
1950 1990
higher
urban
direct
15
Green #1W
m
1946 1994
higher
rural
list
52
Green #2W
f
1983 2002
secondary
rural
list
24
FDP #1W
f
1950 1998
higher
rural
list
70
FDP #2W
m
1942 1994
higher
urban
list
39
State secretary (2000-2005)
Minister (1998-2002)
51
1
State secretary= Staatssekretär
(sources: Országos Választási Iroda, Országgyülési Képviselök, Budapest, 2002, Jelenkutató Alapitvány
Budapest 2004; Deutscher Bundestag, Kürschner’s Volkshandbuch Deutscher Bundestag, 2003 and 2006.)
242
Annex 2: Quantitative results of the content analysis of parliamentary speeches
This and the following tables give the full data on the content analysis of parliamentary
speeches for individual MPs across the two cases and two parliamentary cycles in the
mentioned five dimensions plus a West German control sample for the second cycle. Denoted
are the numbers of positive or negative statements in the respective dimension for all oral
contributions of each MP during the respective parliamentary cycle as coded according to the
code book, the overall balance and ratio per speech unit which is the ultimate score for
individual MPs in the respective dimension for the respective cycle.
Table 1: Statements about the value of consensus
9
1
1
5
1
4
1
6
10
0
balance/ speech unit
2
1
speech units
CDU # 1
CDU # 2
CDU # 3
CDU # 4
CDU # 5
CDU # 6
SPD # 1
SPD # 2
SPD # 3
SPD # 4
SPD # 5
SPD # 6
SPD # 7
SPD # 8
SPD # 9
SPD # 10
PDS # 1
PDS # 2
PDS # 3
PDS # 4
PDS # 5
PDS # 6
PDS # 7
PDS # 8
PDS # 9
PDS # 10
Green # 1
FDP # 1
4 -2
5 -4
3 -3
6 -6
16 -7
11 -10
5 -5
4 -3
4
1
1
0
8 -8
0
3 -3
11 -7
2 -2
29 -28
25 -19
14 -4
0
0
70
27
6
88
37
40
11
13
15
8
1
10
28
50
14
12
267
-0,03
-0,15
-0,5
-0,07
-0,19
-0,25
-0,45
-0,23
0,067
0,125
0
-0,8
0
-0,06
-0,5
-0,17
-0,1
-0,07
-0,17
0
consensus -
-0,03
-0,43
-0,14
0
0
-0,06
0,08
-0,04
-0,03
-0,02
-0,16
-0,25
0,13
0,02
0,08
0,04
-0,03
0,08
0,14
0,07
-0,23
-0,06
consensus +
34
40
14
6
20
35
12
24
36
49
19
8
8
59
85
80
35
60
14
123
35
33
East Germany
2002-05
consensus -
3
-1
21 -17
2
-2
0
3
0
6
-2
1
2
-1
7
-1
1
-1
4
-3
2
1
2
1
2
7
2
3
4
-1
2
5
0
2
3
8
12
-8
4
-2
balance
1
2
1
3
9
5
3
7
2
11
4
2
balance/ speech unit
3
4
1
1
6
speech units
2
4
balance
CDU # 1
CDU # 2
CDU # 3
CDU # 4
CDU # 5
CDU # 6
SPD # 1
SPD # 2
SPD # 3
SPD # 4
SPD # 5
SPD # 6
SPD # 7
SPD # 8
SPD # 9
SPD # 10
PDS # 1
PDS # 2
PDS # 3
PDS # 4
PDS # 5
PDS # 6
PDS # 7
PDS # 8
PDS # 9
PDS # 10
Green # 1
FDP # 1
consensus +
East Germany
1998-2002
a)
281
23
8
243
West Germany
2002-05
consensus +
consensus -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
CDU # 1W
CDU # 2W
CDU # 3W
CDU # 4W
CDU # 5W
CDU # 6W
CDU # 7W
CDU # 8W
CDU # 9W
CDU # 10W
CDU # 11W
SPD # 1W
SPD # 2W
SPD # 3W
SPD # 4W
SPD # 5W
SPD #6W
SPD #7W
SPD #8W
SPD #9W
SPD #10W
SPD #11W
Green #1W
Green #2W
FDP #1W
FDP #2W
6
6
6
2
1
6
10
2
2
3
9
8
9
7
18
1
14
0
1
2
6
5
17
4
7
7
0
1
2
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
1
1
0
1
3
2
0
4
0
0
1
6
5
4
2
1
5
10
2
1
3
7
8
8
6
16
0
13
0
0
-1
4
5
13
4
7
6
22
18
17
6
6
20
17
14
18
16
33
7
32
24
51
5
16
1
3
20
28
15
52
24
70
39
0,27
0,28
0,24
0,33
0,17
0,25
0,59
0,14
0,06
0,19
0,21
1,14
0,25
0,25
0,31
0,00
0,81
0,00
0,00
-0,05
0,14
0,33
0,25
0,17
0,10
0,15
244
1
1
3
1
1
1
2
1
-
balance/ speech unit
1
3
2
-
speech units
-
balance
4
Fidesz # 1
Fidesz # 2
Fidesz # 3
Fidesz # 4
Fidesz # 5
Fidesz # 6
Fidesz # 7
Fidesz # 8
MSZP # 1
MSZP # 2
MSZP # 3
MSZP # 4
MSZP # 5
MSZP # 6
MSZP # 7
MSZP # 8
MSZP # 9
MSZP # 10
SZDSZ # 1
SZDSZ # 2
SZDSZ # 3
SZDSZ # 4
SZDSZ # 5
SZDSZ # 6
MDF # 1
MDF # 2
MDF # 3
consensus -
1
4
12
2
4
11
14
15
23
18
1
12
18
30
25
1
2
3
18
9
7
3
-
42 0,24
35 -0,03
28 0,14
37 0,32
10 0,20
57
0
62 0,18
41 0,34
23 0,61
31 0,65
53 0,30
3 0,33
47 0,23
38 0,47
103 0,28
162 0,14
3
0
41 0,02
40 0,05
47 0,34
63 0,13
69 0,10
43 0,07
-
consensus +
10
-1
-4
12
2
0
11
14
14
20
16
1
11
18
29
22
0
1
2
16
8
7
3
-
Hungary 2002-2005
-
balance/ speech unit
balance
10
speech units
consensus -
Fidesz # 1
Fidesz # 2
Fidesz # 3
Fidesz # 4
Fidesz # 5
Fidesz # 6
Fidesz # 7
Fidesz # 8
MSZP # 1
MSZP # 2
MSZP # 3
MSZP # 4
MSZP # 5
MSZP # 6
MSZP # 7
MSZP # 8
MSZP # 9
MSZP # 10
SZDSZ # 1
SZDSZ # 2
SZDSZ # 3
SZDSZ # 4
SZDSZ # 5
SZDSZ # 6
MDF # 1
MDF # 2
MDF # 3
consensus +
Hungary 1998-2002
Table 1b)
0
11
4
5
3
0
9
21
44
26
4
24
5
0
6
2
21
23
26
0
32
12
15
19
26
6
40
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
0
0
4
0
4
3
1
0
4
0
11
4
5
3
-2
8
21
42
26
4
24
5
0
6
2
19
20
26
0
28
12
11
16
25
6
36
8
52
40
9
25
9
147
18
121
55
9
46
48
0
5
10
32
125
149
1
80
4
50
29
95
26
234
0
0,21
0,1
0,56
0,12
-0,22
0,05
1,17
0,35
0,47
0,44
0,52
0,1
0
1,2
0,2
0,59
0,16
0,17
0
0,35
3
0,22
0,55
0,26
0,23
0,15
245
Table 2: Statements referring the Common good
common good +
common good -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
29 -28
19 -17
1
0
3
-2
8
-8
7
-2
5
-5
2
-2
7
-7
11 -10
7
-1
1
3
5
20 13
28
9
9
7
2 19
12
8
1
6
25 36
11
-7
17 -17
34
40
14
6
20
35
12
24
36
49
19
8
8
59
85
80
35
60
14
123
35
33
-0,83
-0,43
0
-0,33
-0,40
-0,06
-0,42
-0,08
-0,19
-0,20
-0,05
-0,38
0,63
0,22
0,11
0,09
0,54
0,13
0,43
0,29
-0,20
-0,52
CDU # 1
CDU # 2
CDU # 3
CDU # 4
CDU # 5
CDU # 6
SPD # 1
SPD # 2
SPD # 3
SPD # 4
SPD # 5
SPD # 6
SPD # 7
SPD # 8
SPD # 9
SPD # 10
PDS # 1
PDS # 2
PDS # 3
PDS # 4
PDS # 5
PDS # 6
PDS # 7
PDS # 8
PDS # 9
PDS # 10
Green # 1
FDP # 1
7
4
1
4
5
7
2
2
4
2
18
21
3
26
16
35
11
5
8
4
-11
-17
-2
-22
-11
-28
-9
-3
-4
-2
0
-3
0
-12
3
-3
-100
-89
14
-1
70
27
6
88
37
40
11
13
15
8
1
10
28
50
14
12
267
-0,16
-0,63
-0,33
-0,25
-0,30
-0,70
-0,82
-0,23
-0,27
-0,25
0
-0,30
0
-0,24
0,21
-0,25
-0,37
-0,32
0,61
-0,13
common good -
East Germany
2002-05
1
6
4
5
33
37
16
21
20
7
61
4
balance/ speech unit
5
0
0
speech units
1
2
1
1
balance
CDU # 1
CDU # 2
CDU # 3
CDU # 4
CDU # 5
CDU # 6
SPD # 1
SPD # 2
SPD # 3
SPD # 4
SPD # 5
SPD # 6
SPD # 7
SPD # 8
SPD # 9
SPD # 10
PDS # 1
PDS # 2
PDS # 3
PDS # 4
PDS # 5
PDS # 6
PDS # 7
PDS # 8
PDS # 9
PDS # 10
Green # 1
FDP # 1
common good +
East Germany
1998-2002
a)
3
6
1
7
5
11
14
21
13
4
8
111
103
7
1
281
23
8
246
West Germany
2002-05
Common good +
Common good -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
CDU # 1W
CDU # 2W
CDU # 3W
CDU # 4W
CDU # 5W
CDU # 6W
CDU # 7W
CDU # 8W
CDU # 9W
CDU # 10W
CDU # 11W
SPD # 1W
SPD # 2W
SPD # 3W
SPD # 4W
SPD # 5W
SPD #6W
SPD #7W
SPD #8W
SPD #9W
SPD #10W
SPD #11W
Green #1W
Green #2W
FDP #1W
FDP #2W
13
25
11
4
6
10
12
7
6
5
25
1
28
16
17
1
11
0
4
19
19
8
11
18
42
16
2
8
2
0
0
0
2
10
3
1
10
1
7
9
4
0
0
0
0
2
11
1
1
4
20
7
11
17
9
4
6
10
10
-3
3
4
14
0
21
7
13
1
11
0
4
17
8
7
10
14
22
9
22
18
17
6
6
20
17
14
18
16
33
7
32
24
51
5
16
1
3
20
28
15
52
24
70
39
0,50
0,94
0,53
0,67
1,00
0,50
0,59
-0,21
0,17
0,25
0,42
0,00
0,66
0,29
0,25
0,20
0,69
0,00
1,33
0,85
0,29
0,47
0,19
0,58
0,31
0,23
247
2
1
1
-
1
2
-
1
5
1
4
1
3
-
Fidesz # 1
Fidesz # 2
Fidesz # 3
Fidesz # 4
Fidesz # 5
Fidesz # 6
Fidesz # 7
Fidesz # 8
MSZP # 1
MSZP # 2
MSZP # 3
MSZP # 4
MSZP # 5
MSZP # 6
MSZP # 7
MSZP # 8
MSZP # 9
MSZP # 10
SZDSZ # 1
SZDSZ # 2
SZDSZ # 3
SZDSZ # 4
SZDSZ # 5
SZDSZ # 6
MDF # 1
MDF # 2
MDF # 3
3
2
1
7
5
31
13
11
1
2
4
3
6
9
5
1
2
1
6
10
10
24
16
1
21
1
17
15
17
9
26
2
3
5
6
1
13
1
6
5
1
1
10
balance/ speech unit
0,19
0,40
0,21
0,38
0,56
0,12
0,39
0,05
0,30
0,26
0,06
0,33
0,04
0,42
0,15
0,29
0,33
0,12
0,13
0,15
0,19
0,26
0,05
-
speech units
42
35
28
37
10
57
62
41
23
31
53
3
47
38
103
162
3
41
40
47
63
69
43
-
balance
balance/ speech unit
8
7
6
14
5
7
24
2
7
8
3
1
2
16
15
47
1
5
5
7
12
18
2
-
common good -
speech units
7
2
3
common good +
balance
15
9
9
14
7
8
25
2
7
9
5
1
2
17
15
52
1
6
9
8
12
21
2
-
Hungary 2002-2005
common good -
Fidesz # 1
Fidesz # 2
Fidesz # 3
Fidesz # 4
Fidesz # 5
Fidesz # 6
Fidesz # 7
Fidesz # 8
MSZP # 1
MSZP # 2
MSZP # 3
MSZP # 4
MSZP # 5
MSZP # 6
MSZP # 7
MSZP # 8
MSZP # 9
MSZP # 10
SZDSZ # 1
SZDSZ # 2
SZDSZ # 3
SZDSZ # 4
SZDSZ # 5
SZDSZ # 6
MDF # 1
MDF # 2
MDF # 3
common good +
Hungary 1998-2002
Table 2b)
0
1
0
1
5
5
27
10
5
1
-1
7
4
0
6
8
7
19
10
0
8
0
11
10
16
8
16
8
52
40
9
25
9
147
18
121
55
9
46
48
0
5
10
32
125
149
1
80
4
50
29
95
26
234
0
0,02
0
0,11
0,20
0,50
0,18
0,56
0,04
0,02
-0,11
0,15
0,08
0
1,20
0,80
0,22
0,15
0,07
0
0,10
0
0,22
0,34
0,17
0,31
0,07
248
Table 3: Statements about preferences for established procedures
procedures +
procedures -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
5
0
17
-8
2
-1
1
-1
3
-1
15 -10
3
15 -12
15
-8
15
-6
6
-2
7
0
4
7
19
4 22
-
34
40
14
6
20
35
12
24
36
49
19
8
8
59
85
80
35
60
14
123
35
33
0
-0,20
-0,07
-0,17
-0,05
-0,29
0,25
-0,50
-0,22
-0,12
-0,11
-0,88
0
0,12
0,22
0,28
0,37
0,83
0,21
0,28
-0,11
-0,03
CDU # 1
CDU # 2
CDU # 3
CDU # 4
CDU # 5
CDU # 6
SPD # 1
SPD # 2
SPD # 3
SPD # 4
SPD # 5
SPD # 6
SPD # 7
SPD # 8
SPD # 9
SPD # 10
PDS # 1
PDS # 2
PDS # 3
PDS # 4
PDS # 5
PDS # 6
PDS # 7
PDS # 8
PDS # 9
PDS # 10
Green # 1
FDP # 1
29
6
1
10
13
13
1
1
2
1
6
2
1
10
22
9
9
9
5
4
23
-4
0
0
-9
4
-8
-8
-3
-3
0
-16
-41
-32
-20
-12
80
113
-34
-1
70
27
6
88
37
40
11
13
15
8
1
10
28
50
14
12
267
0,33
-0,22
procedures -
East Germany
2002-05
11
19
26
13
53
5
36
9
4
balance/ speech unit
2
5
3
3
7
9
4
7
speech units
5
9
1
balance
CDU # 1
CDU # 2
CDU # 3
CDU # 4
CDU # 5
CDU # 6
SPD # 1
SPD # 2
SPD # 3
SPD # 4
SPD # 5
SPD # 6
SPD # 7
SPD # 8
SPD # 9
SPD # 10
PDS # 1
PDS # 2
PDS # 3
PDS # 4
PDS # 5
PDS # 6
PDS # 7
PDS # 8
PDS # 9
PDS # 10
Green # 1
FDP # 1
procedures +
East Germany
1998-2002
a)
3
2
1
13
5
50
3
35
-4
-1
1
4
4
4
17
45
36
24
12
8
4
37
3
88
117
3
2
281
23
8
-0,24
0,10
-0,73
-0,62
-0,20
-0,38
0
-1,60
-1,46
-0,64
-1,43
-1,00
0,30
0,40
-1,48
-0,13
249
West Germany
2002-05
procedures +
procedures -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
CDU # 1W
CDU # 2W
CDU # 3W
CDU # 4W
CDU # 5W
CDU # 6W
CDU # 7W
CDU # 8W
CDU # 9W
CDU # 10W
CDU # 11W
SPD # 1W
SPD # 2W
SPD # 3W
SPD # 4W
SPD # 5W
SPD #6W
SPD #7W
SPD #8W
SPD #9W
SPD #10W
SPD #11W
Green #1W
Green #2W
FDP #1W
FDP #2W
5
5
3
9
2
2
4
1
11
15
5
1
2
6
16
3
9
0
1
4
16
1
26
5
10
8
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
6
1
6
0
5
0
1
2
0
1
6
5
2
0
5
4
3
9
2
2
4
1
11
15
5
0
-4
5
10
3
4
0
0
2
16
0
20
0
8
8
22
18
17
6
6
20
17
14
18
16
33
7
32
24
51
5
16
1
3
20
28
15
52
24
70
39
0,23
0,22
0,18
1,50
0,33
0,10
0,24
0,07
0,61
0,94
0,15
0,00
-0,13
0,21
0,20
0,60
0,25
0,00
0,00
0,10
0,57
0,00
0,38
0,00
0,11
0,21
250
49
7
17
27
12
12
34
15
15
16
-
3
7
-
1
7
17
27
0
10
1
-
12
24
15
14
16
-
Fidesz # 1
Fidesz # 2
Fidesz # 3
Fidesz # 4
Fidesz # 5
Fidesz # 6
Fidesz # 7
Fidesz # 8
MSZP # 1
MSZP # 2
MSZP # 3
MSZP # 4
MSZP # 5
MSZP # 6
MSZP # 7
MSZP # 8
MSZP # 9
MSZP # 10
SZDSZ # 1
SZDSZ # 2
SZDSZ # 3
SZDSZ # 4
SZDSZ # 5
SZDSZ # 6
MDF # 1
MDF # 2
MDF # 3
5
9
4
1
11
6
115
14
18
10
1
14
2
1
3
8
1
2
1
1
8
10
8
20
1
1
1
2
3
25
12
10
8
6
8
26
1
1
13
balance/ speech unit
0,05
0
0,14
0,05
0,10
0,74
0
0,68
0,57
0,77
0,55
0
1,02
0,18
0,17
0,17
0
0,29
0,30
0,70
0,24
0,20
0,37
-
speech units
1
42
35
28
37
10
57
62
41
23
31
53
3
47
38
103
162
3
41
40
47
63
69
43
-
balance
balance/ speech unit
5
2
1
45
7
28
13
24
29
-
2
0
4
2
1
42
0
28
13
24
29
0
48
procedures -
speech units
4
procedures +
balance
6
Hungary 2002-2005
procedures -
Fidesz # 1
Fidesz # 2
Fidesz # 3
Fidesz # 4
Fidesz # 5
Fidesz # 6
Fidesz # 7
Fidesz # 8
MSZP # 1
MSZP # 2
MSZP # 3
MSZP # 4
MSZP # 5
MSZP # 6
MSZP # 7
MSZP # 8
MSZP # 9
MSZP # 10
SZDSZ # 1
SZDSZ # 2
SZDSZ # 3
SZDSZ # 4
SZDSZ # 5
SZDSZ # 6
MDF # 1
MDF # 2
MDF # 3
procedures +
Hungary 1998-2002
Table 3b)
5
9
4
0
8
6
107
14
17
8
1
14
1
8
52
40
9
25
9
147
18
121
55
9
46
48
0
5
10
32
125
149
1
80
4
50
29
95
26
234
0,63
0,17
0,10
0
0,32
0,67
0,73
0,78
0,14
0,15
0,11
0,30
0,23
0
0
0,70
0,28
0,05
0,11
0
0,19
0
0,18
0,24
0,06
0,31
0,06
0
7
9
6
17
0
15
9
7
6
8
13
251
Table 4: Statements about support for the institutional status quo
status quo -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
East Germany
2002-05
status quo +
status quo -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
CDU # 1
CDU # 2
CDU # 3
CDU # 4
CDU # 5
CDU # 6
SPD # 1
SPD # 2
SPD # 3
SPD # 4
SPD # 5
SPD # 6
SPD # 7
SPD # 8
SPD # 9
SPD # 10
PDS # 1
PDS # 2
PDS # 3
PDS # 4
PDS # 5
PDS # 6
PDS # 7
PDS # 8
PDS # 9
PDS # 10
Green # 1
FDP # 1
status quo +
East Germany
1998-2002
a)
3
1
1
14
32
1
2
4
12
2
3
13
12
12
3
2
21
13
12
5
10
2
15
28
13
-11
-31
0
-2
-3
-8
-2
-3
-8
-8
-12
-3
0
3
22
6
12
10
-1
13
-26
-11
34
40
14
6
20
35
12
24
36
49
19
8
8
59
85
80
35
60
14
123
35
33
-0,32
-0,78
0
-0,33
-0,15
-0,23
-0,17
-0,13
-0,22
-0,16
-0,63
--0,38
0
0,05
0,26
0,10
0,34
0,17
-0,07
0,11
-0,74
-0,33
CDU # 1
CDU # 2
CDU # 3
CDU # 4
CDU # 5
CDU # 6
SPD # 1
SPD # 2
SPD # 3
SPD # 4
SPD # 5
SPD # 6
SPD # 7
SPD # 8
SPD # 9
SPD # 10
PDS # 1
PDS # 2
PDS # 3
PDS # 4
PDS # 5
PDS # 6
PDS # 7
PDS # 8
PDS # 9
PDS # 10
Green # 1
FDP # 1
2
5
4
-3
-4
0
-17
-1
-6
-14
-4
-5
0
0
-1
-1
-5
-4
70
27
6
88
37
40
11
13
15
8
1
10
28
50
14
12
267
-0,04
-0,15
0
-0,19
-0,03
-0,15
-1,27
-0,31
-0,33
0
0
-0,10
-0,04
-0,10
-0,14
-0,33
0,15
0,14
-1,87
-0,13
1
4
-
5
4
2
24
35
18
17
20
1
28
2
2
3
1
17
2
7
14
4
5
2
3
1
5
4
52
68
1
13
29
44
1
39
39
-43
-1
281
23
8
252
West Germany
2002-05
Status quo +
Status quo -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
CDU # 1W
CDU # 2W
CDU # 3W
CDU # 4W
CDU # 5W
CDU # 6W
CDU # 7W
CDU # 8W
CDU # 9W
CDU # 10W
CDU # 11W
SPD # 1W
SPD # 2W
SPD # 3W
SPD # 4W
SPD # 5W
SPD #6W
SPD #7W
SPD #8W
SPD #9W
SPD #10W
SPD #11W
Green #1W
Green #2W
FDP #1W
FDP #2W
6
1
2
0
1
0
1
2
1
0
2
0
1
6
3
0
0
0
2
0
11
0
7
1
0
5
2
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
1
5
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
6
1
7
4
4
-2
2
0
1
0
1
2
1
0
-2
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
-1
10
-1
1
0
-7
1
22
18
17
6
6
20
17
14
18
16
33
7
32
24
51
5
16
1
3
20
28
15
52
24
70
39
0,18
-0,11
0,12
0,00
0,17
0,00
0,06
0,14
0,06
0,00
-0,06
0,00
0,00
0,04
0,04
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,33
-0,05
0,36
-0,07
0,02
0,00
-0,10
0,03
253
4
8
2
6
12
9
4
3
4
1
6
11
2
3
-
1
16
4
3
1
4
2
2
4
2
1
3
1
-
Fidesz # 1
Fidesz # 2
Fidesz # 3
Fidesz # 4
Fidesz # 5
Fidesz # 6
Fidesz # 7
Fidesz # 8
MSZP # 1
MSZP # 2
MSZP # 3
MSZP # 4
MSZP # 5
MSZP # 6
MSZP # 7
MSZP # 8
MSZP # 9
MSZP # 10
SZDSZ # 1
SZDSZ # 2
SZDSZ # 3
SZDSZ # 4
SZDSZ # 5
SZDSZ # 6
MDF # 1
MDF # 2
MDF # 3
1
1
1
6
3
2
5
4
2
1
5
2
1
2
3
2
9
9
2
8
2
1
2
1
5
9
5
balance/ speech unit
0,02
-0,06
-0,04
0
-0,10
-0,21
-0,06
0,12
0,04
0,06
0,19
0
0,15
0,11
-0,03
0
0
-0,02
0,13
0,17
0,03
0,04
-0,02
-
speech units
42
35
28
37
10
57
62
41
23
31
53
3
47
38
103
162
3
41
40
47
63
69
43
-
balance
balance/ speech unit
1
-2
-1
0
-1
-12
-4
5
1
2
10
0
7
4
3
0
0
-1
5
8
2
3
-1
-
status quo -
speech units
4
2
1
status quo +
balance
5
Hungary 2002-2005
status quo -
Fidesz # 1
Fidesz # 2
Fidesz # 3
Fidesz # 4
Fidesz # 5
Fidesz # 6
Fidesz # 7
Fidesz # 8
MSZP # 1
MSZP # 2
MSZP # 3
MSZP # 4
MSZP # 5
MSZP # 6
MSZP # 7
MSZP # 8
MSZP # 9
MSZP # 10
SZDSZ # 1
SZDSZ # 2
SZDSZ # 3
SZDSZ # 4
SZDSZ # 5
SZDSZ # 6
MDF # 1
MDF # 2
MDF # 3
status quo +
Hungary 1998-2002
Table 4b)
0
0
0
0
1
0
3
-2
0
1
0
2
-1
0
0
5
-1
-1
-7
0
7
0
6
-1
-1
5
4
8
52
40
9
25
9
147
18
121
55
9
46
48
0
5
10
32
125
149
1
80
4
50
29
95
26
234
0
0
0
0
0,04
0
0,02
-0,11
0
0,02
0
0,04
-0,02
0
0
0,50
-0,03
-0,01
-0,05
0
0,09
0
0,12
-0,03
-0,01
0,19
0,02
254
Table 5: Statements denoting respect for political opponents
respect -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
East Germany
2002-05
respect +
respect -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
CDU # 1
CDU # 2
CDU # 3
CDU # 4
CDU # 5
CDU # 6
SPD # 1
SPD # 2
SPD # 3
SPD # 4
SPD # 5
SPD # 6
SPD # 7
SPD # 8
SPD # 9
SPD # 10
PDS # 1
PDS # 2
PDS # 3
PDS # 4
PDS # 5
PDS # 6
PDS # 7
PDS # 8
PDS # 9
PDS # 10
Green # 1
FDP # 1
respect +
East Germany
1998-2002
a)
2
3
95
108
24
2
53
61
8
34
48
36
56
9
3
53
55
68
39
46
8
63
75
27
-93
-105
-24
-2
-52
-60
-5
-33
-42
-33
-54
-8
-2
-39
-40
-56
-33
-37
-7
-56
-73
-21
34
40
14
6
20
35
12
24
36
49
19
8
8
59
85
80
35
60
14
123
35
33
-2,74
-2,63
-1,71
-0,33
-2,60
-1,71
-0,42
-1,38
-1,17
-0,67
-2,84
-1,0
-0,25
-0,66
-0,47
-0,70
-0,94
-0,62
-0,50
-0,46
-2,09
-0,64
CDU # 1
CDU # 2
CDU # 3
CDU # 4
CDU # 5
CDU # 6
SPD # 1
SPD # 2
SPD # 3
SPD # 4
SPD # 5
SPD # 6
SPD # 7
SPD # 8
SPD # 9
SPD # 10
PDS # 1
PDS # 2
PDS # 3
PDS # 4
PDS # 5
PDS # 6
PDS # 7
PDS # 8
PDS # 9
PDS # 10
Green # 1
FDP # 1
3
2
71
52
4
132
89
121
22
43
19
6
1
75
13
24
69
8
245
261
100
16
-68
-50
-4
-129
-81
-104
-21
-37
-14
-6
-1
-69
-13
-21
-61
-6
-211
-225
-82
-15
70
27
6
88
37
40
11
13
15
8
1
10
28
50
14
12
267
-0,97
-1,85
-0,67
-1,47
-2,19
-2,60
-1,91
-2,85
-0,93
-0,75
-1,00
-6,90
-0,46
-0,42
-4,36
-0,5
-0,79
-0,80
-3,57
-1,88
1
1
3
1
6
3
2
1
1
14
15
12
6
9
1
7
2
6
3
8
17
1
6
5
6
3
8
2
34
36
18
1
281
23
8
255
West Germany
2002-05
respect +
respect -
balance
speech units
balance/ speech unit
CDU # 1W
CDU # 2W
CDU # 3W
CDU # 4W
CDU # 5W
CDU # 6W
CDU # 7W
CDU # 8W
CDU # 9W
CDU # 10W
CDU # 11W
SPD # 1W
SPD # 2W
SPD # 3W
SPD # 4W
SPD # 5W
SPD #6W
SPD #7W
SPD #8W
SPD #9W
SPD #10W
SPD #11W
Green #1W
Green #2W
FDP #1W
FDP #2W
15
4
7
7
2
8
5
0
3
1
1
4
2
8
16
2
3
0
0
0
2
2
8
1
9
6
30
34
27
4
9
14
7
15
9
25
71
4
22
30
36
1
13
1
5
20
18
10
47
25
45
36
-15
-30
-20
3
-7
-6
-2
-15
-6
-24
-70
0
-20
-22
-20
1
-10
-1
-5
-20
-16
-8
-39
-24
-36
-30
22
18
17
6
6
20
17
14
18
16
33
7
32
24
51
5
16
1
3
20
28
15
52
24
70
39
-0,68
-1,67
-1,18
0,50
-1,17
-0,30
-0,12
-1,07
-0,33
-1,50
-2,12
0,00
-0,63
-0,92
-0,39
0,20
-0,63
-1,00
-1,67
-1,00
-0,57
-0,53
-0,75
-1,00
-0,51
-0,77
256
respect +
respect -
Hungary 2002-2005
Fidesz # 1
Fidesz # 2
Fidesz # 3
Fidesz # 4
Fidesz # 5
Fidesz # 6
Fidesz # 7
Fidesz # 8
MSZP # 1
MSZP # 2
MSZP # 3
MSZP # 4
MSZP # 5
MSZP # 6
MSZP # 7
MSZP # 8
MSZP # 9
MSZP # 10
SZDSZ # 1
SZDSZ # 2
SZDSZ # 3
SZDSZ # 4
SZDSZ # 5
SZDSZ # 6
MDF # 1
MDF # 2
MDF # 3
4
4
2
3
3
11
7
63
13
2
9
5
balance/ speech unit
5
1
3
3
2
1
2
3
-
-0,55
-0,57
-0,32
-0,38
-0,90
-1,16
-0,56
-0,35
-0,30
-1,03
-0,15
-1,33
-0,51
-0,47
-0,65
-0,64
-1,00
-1,68
-0,95
-1,15
-0,59
-0,14
-0,21
-
speech units
1
42
35
28
37
10
57
62
41
23
31
53
3
47
38
103
162
3
41
40
47
63
69
43
-
balance
4
3
3
1
-
26
-23
20
-20
10
-9
17
-14
9
-9
69
-66
35
-35
18
-14
10
-7
35
-32
9
-8
4
-4
24
-24
19 -18
67
-67
109
-104
4
-3
72
-69
41
-38
56
-54
38
-37
12
-10
12
-9
-
respect -
3
balance/ speech unit
1
3
speech units
3
balance
Fidesz # 1
Fidesz # 2
Fidesz # 3
Fidesz # 4
Fidesz # 5
Fidesz # 6
Fidesz # 7
Fidesz # 8
MSZP # 1
MSZP # 2
MSZP # 3
MSZP # 4
MSZP # 5
MSZP # 6
MSZP # 7
MSZP # 8
MSZP # 9
MSZP # 10
SZDSZ # 1
SZDSZ # 2
SZDSZ # 3
SZDSZ # 4
SZDSZ # 5
SZDSZ # 6
MDF # 1
MDF # 2
MDF # 3
respect +
Hungary 1998-2002
Table 5b)
24
53
46
12
42
9
256
31
131
32
-24
-49
-42
-10
-39
-6
-245
-24
-68
-19
2
-11
-11
0
-1
-24
-9
-73
-54
0
-69
-8
-49
-12
-4
-8
-104
8
52
40
9
25
9
147
18
121
55
9
46
48
0
5
10
32
125
149
1
80
4
50
29
95
26
234
-3,00
-0,94
-1,05
-1,11
-1,56
-0,67
-1,64
-1,33
-0,56
-0,34
0,22
-0,24
-0,23
0
-0,20
-2,40
-0,28
-0,58
-0,36
0
-0,86
-2,00
-0,98
-0,41
-0,04
-0,31
-0,44
20
16
4
2
3
12
35
5
26
12
85
89
22
4
5
7
12
7
17
91
12
54
19
16
15
121
257
Annex 3: The Interviews
a) Approach
The interviews were conducted by the author from late March till early July 2004 in Hungary,
and mid-July till mid-September 2004 in Germany (i.e. in the middle of both parliaments’
four-year electoral cycle) during which both countries were governed by a middle-left
coalition government. 759 MPs were initially contacted by e-mail. The e-mail introduced the
author as a German PhD-student in Political Science with an interest in current
Hungarian/East German politics and asked for a one-hour interview about the MP’s political
career and his/her views on a number of political issues.
From the 386 Hungarian MPs around 200 randomly selected ones were approached by
e-mail. Only the first two or three interviewees were deliberately selected and approached
through personal contacts in order to enable a “smooth start” of the project due to the initial
belief that a foreign researcher might have a hard time gaining access to (and obtain the
confidence of) a sufficiently large and diverse number of Hungarian MPs. This proved to be
rather unjustified, as twenty-seven interviews were conducted and many more MPs expressed
their willingness to take part (around 40%). A completely random selection process was, as in
most other respectable elite studies, infeasible. 760 Having interviewed several representatives
from all parties (MSZP, Fidesz, SZDSZ and MDF) in parliament from different generations,
gender, 761 a large variety of professional and geographical backgrounds, list and directly
elected MPs (including a number of MPs holding additional offices in local/regional politics),
the executive, parliament or their party, backbenchers and frontbenchers etc., a high degree of
qualitative saturation was achieved and therefore many more MPs who had signalled
willingness to participate were not asked for an appointment in the end.
As for the smaller number of potential interviewees all 97 East German MPs were
approached by e-mail. The response rate was much higher than in the Hungarian case (around
759
Originally, it had been expected that both parliaments would serve their entire electoral cycle (as usual)
allowing the author to ultimately cover almost identical periods in the quantitative analysis of statements in
parliaments. The interviews, however had already been conducted in the (anticipated) middle of the electoral
cycle in order to avoid potential short-term influences or after-effects of electoral campaigns. The rather
unexpected dissolution of the Bundestag and calling of early elections somewhat shortened the overall time
frame covered for the East German case.
760
H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems – Competition,
Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p.146; R Rohrschneider, Learning
Democracy – Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford UP, 1999, p.
761
Women are strongly underrepresented in the Hungarian parliament (see table), particularly in the two
conservative opposition parties from which none of the few female MPs was available for an interview.
258
90%). 762 In their replies all but four MPs expressed their willingness to be interviewed. This
is a remarkably high number if compared to other studies using interviews with national or
regional MPs. Again, a suitable number of MPs based on a large distribution of background
criteria was finally picked and interviewed. In general, the response rate in Hungary was
higher among MPs from the governing parties (MSZP and SZDSZ). In the East German case
response rates were highest among SPD and PDS members. Therefore, one might speculate
whether leftist parties have a higher inclination to participate in these kinds of interviews or
whether it has to do with incumbency. 763 However, there appeared to be no systematic
differences in terms of cooperativeness which was the case for the great majority of the
interviewees.
The interviews were conducted by the author in the form of pre-structured open-ended
questions in which MPs were asked about their own background and self-image, the reasons
for their political engagement, their “version” of the transition process, evaluation of the
current system and proposals for change. The author intervened only to clarify, or to probe
obviously illogical statements, or in case of excessive departure from the topic. Otherwise the
MPs were given the (obviously very much appreciated and rather rare) opportunity to develop
extensive statements on the questions asked in a relaxed atmosphere.
Due to the above-mentioned under-representation of the PDS in the 2002 Bundestag
based on the national 5%-hurdle it was decided to include some additional former PDS-MPs
into the sample. Only one of the additional eight PDS interviewees is no longer active in
“high” politics. The others hold Länder and/or local council mandates and/or high party
functions and/or had (unsuccessfully) run for the European Parliament meanwhile and/or were
planning to run for the next Bundestag and/or Länder parliaments. 764 Therefore, they can be
regarded as being part of the top East German political elite and the best possible choice to
represent the PDS in the sample. Thus the East German sample overall consists of 29
interviews from the mentioned three large parties in a balanced distribution of age, gender and
other background factors, and also included one Green and one FDP MP. The latter parties,
762
Best et al. report a response rate of 59-89% for telephone interviews conducted with German regional MPs in
2003/4, national MPs between 18-31% depending on the party. The highest rates were among East German
members of regional parliaments. (H Best / M Edinger / K Schmitt / S Jahr, ’ Zwischenauswertung der
Deutschen Abgeordnetenbefragung 2003/04 – Gesamtergebnis’, Sonderforschungsbereich 580, FriedrichSchiller Universität Jena, online paper, 2004, online http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/typo3/a3.0.html, last
accessed 20 October 2006, pp.5-6).
763
Similar observations by R Putnam, 1973, and R Rohrschneider, 1999.
764
Four of these former MPs ran again in 2005 and two of them regained their mandates in the Bundestag.
259
however, hardly play a role in East German politics and owed their representation in the
Bundestag to the parties’ performance in the West. 765
For the interviews a pre-structured, pre-tested questionnaire in Hungarian and German
(on the basis of an English original) was used. To ensure semantic correspondence the
Hungarian questionnaire was translated and re-translated into English with the help of
experienced native speakers with a background in social sciences. All interviews were taped
and transcribed except for two instances of technical malfunction. Extensive back-up notes
taken during the talks were used to reconstruct missing or incomprehensible parts of the tape
records. One East German MP chose to answer to the questionnaire in writing due to temporal
absence from Germany. Otherwise, the interviews lasted between 40 and 120 minutes, on
average around 60 minutes. Most of them were conducted in the MPs’ offices in Berlin or
Budapest. One Hungarian and three German MPs were interviewed in their local constituency
offices. Three Hungarian MPs were interviewed in the context of an informal press meeting
which the author was allowed to join. The additional former PDS MPs were interviewed in
their current places of work (2) in Berlin and Magdeburg, the PDS party headquarters in
Berlin (2), cafés in Berlin (2), the author’s home in Berlin (1), and the former MP’s home in
Berlin (1). Except for three interviews which were conducted in the context of the press
meeting, all other interviews were not attended by any other person. There seems to be no
indication whatsoever that the setting (if only for the degree of background noise) had any
remarkable impact on the course and content of the interviews. The German interview tapes
were transcribed by the author, the Hungarian ones by hired native, experienced assistants.
The entire transcribed material amounts to around 800 pages (1,5 spaced, 12-point) and can
be made available for scientific purposes upon request.
765
In regional elections in East Germany both FDP and Greens regularly fail to pass the 5%-hurdle.
260
b) Guideline for questions
•
Why did you become a politician? Was there a particular event or a particular personal
experience as a major reason?
•
Which ability, experience, or training do you regard as important for being a good
politician?
•
Social-economic status (as far as not available from other sources), i.e. age, education,
rural/urban background, profession, parents / family background
•
Other individual information (as far as not available from other sources or discussed
above) e.g. party member since when, party membership under old regime,
participation in former anti-communist opposition / round-table talks etc.
•
Where would you place your party on the same scale?
•
What do you find most appealing about politics? What do you dislike most about it?
•
In what way should the new generation of politicians differ from the current one?
•
How much of a politician’s past should be known to his/her voters?
•
Is there a moment when one needs to draw a ‘thick line’ in dealing with the past?
•
How well do you think society has dealt with its recent past?
•
What event and which personality do you regard as the most important for your
country’s democracy and in general since 1989? Why?
•
With the wisdom of hindsight – is there anything of the old system which would have
been worth keeping and why?
•
If you look back to 1989 – what were your aspirations, hopes, ideas of how democracy
should look like? How much of it has been realized?
•
When you look back at the changes of 1989/1990 with the wisdom of hindsight, what
were the mistakes committed then, what could have been done better?
•
Should the democratic system be maintained as it stands now? What needs to be
changed and why?
•
How would you define democracy?
•
Do you think that it would be a good idea to have the President directly elected by the
people? Why?
•
Who of the main actors of 1989/90 have changed the most? In what way did they
change?
•
What are three gravest problems the country is facing currently?
261
•
Who or what is to blame for these problems? The current system, the old system, a
certain party or government, certain indiviudals or policies, international factors or
else?
•
How do the conflicts of interest involved in connection with (the most important
problem mentioned) impact on the governability of the country?
•
What are the major advantages and disadvantages following from the establishment of
a free market economy in this country?
•
Do you think there is a lack of democracy in some areas of life, e.g. in the working
place?
• Which group is the greatest danger for democracy in this country at the moment?
262