Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies
7:1 (2010), 32-48
Politics on the Peninsula: Democratic Consolidation
and the Political Party System in South Korea
Daniel BAILEY
Northeastern Illinois University
[email protected]
Abstract
Determining the extent of the consolidation of South Korea’s democratic system is a
challenging task. The post-transition presidential elections seem to indicate there exist a fully
democratic, constitutional system in place on the Korean peninsula. The volatile political
party system, in contrast, suggests the opposite is true. Therefore, by utilizing a procedural
definition of democratic consolidation, in which political structures play an important role,
the article attempts to explain this apparent instability in the political party system by
highlighting the following four variables: the importance of political personalities/individuals,
the presence of political regionalism, plurality electoral systems, and the strong political
influence of the United States. Based on this analysis, the article concludes that South Korea
is missing a key component – a stable party system – in its overall political structure, and
that party system stability must be made a priority before full democratic consolidation can
occur.
SOUTH KOREAN democracy is a relatively young phenomenon, only formally
established with the adoption of the Constitution of the Sixth Republic and
subsequent 1987 presidential election, in which Roh Tae-Woo became the first
directly elected South Korean president to take power in 26 years. Successive
presidential elections in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 resulted in the election of four
different presidents: Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, Roh Moo-Hyun and Lee
Myung-Bak, respectively. By all accounts, these five presidential elections were
administered freely and fairly (Mah, 2002; Rose & Shin, 2001; Lee, 2002). Taken at
face value, however, they present a distorted view of the state of South Korean
democratic development and consolidation. More telling is the number of major
liberal and conservative political parties that existed during the same time period,
1987 through 2008. No less than nine liberal and seven conservative parties have
been established and disestablished, either through mergers with other parties or
splits within parties (see Table 1 on the following page). This fact can be interpreted
to indicate the existence in South Korea of an immature, fractious and
underdeveloped democratic system. More directly, it suggests that the South Korean
political party system is somewhat destabilized. Much of the literature explains this
instability by pointing to South Korean politics’ personalistic and regionalist
32
www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/gjaps
characteristics, or the affect of South Korea’s various electoral systems (Croissant,
2002; Mah, 2002; Horiuchi & Lee, 2007; Reilly, 2007; Im, 2004; Shin, 2002). However,
most surprisingly little is said concerning the destabilizing affect of the continued,
overwhelming presence of the United States on South Korea’s party system. Because
of these two conflicting indicators of the state of democratic consolidation in South
Korea – the successful, democratic presidential elections on the one hand and the
high level of political party turnover on the other – it is imperative that a deeper and
more complete analysis of the current political situation in South Korea be carried
out. More specifically, this article will attempt to answer the research question: what
accounts for the instability of the South Korean political party system?
Table 1: Conservative and Liberal Political Parties by Presidential Election Cycle
Year
1987
1992
1997
2002
2007
Conservative
-Democratic Justice Party
-New Democratic Republican
Party
-Democratic Liberal Party
-Grand National Party
-New People Party
-Grand National Party
-Grand National Party
-Independent/Liberty
Forward Party
Liberal
-Reunification
Democratic
Party
-Peace and Democracy Party
-Democratic Party
-Unified People’s Party
-National Congress for New
Politics
-Millennium
Democratic
Party
-United New Democratic
Party
Understanding the extent of the consolidation of the South Korean democratic
system is important, not simply for academic reasons, but also for its realpolitik
implications. Academically speaking, a thorough and dynamic study analyzing the
nature of South Korea’s political party system will contribute substantially to the
scholarly literature. By isolating the relevant variables that explain its instability and
demonstrating their role in shaping the current party system in South Korea, this
article will allow for future research to build upon its findings. Specifically,
identifying the causes of instability in the South Korean party system may potentially
lead to the understanding of similarly destabilized party systems. In terms of its
realpolitik importance, this article may allow policy makers to apply a portion of its
findings in order to further the democratic consolidation of the South Korean state.
Given the truculent and tenuous nature of politics on the divided Korean peninsula,
a stable and democratic South Korea is in the interest of all parties worldwide. For if
South Korea were allowed to suffer a return to authoritarianism, the disastrous and
potentially violent geopolitical situation on the peninsula would leave no state
untouched.
In addition, a part of the significance of this survey lies in its providing, albeit
indirectly, a cursory glance into the nation’s political culture. Each of the variables
discussed below will help develop a more complete picture of the values, processes,
institutions and personalities that define the political culture of South Korea. This
knowledge will enable scholars of multiple academic disciplines to accurately
Bailey/Politics on the Peninsula
33
evaluate both the state of its democratic consolidation, as well as the influence of
local custom on the imported elements of liberal democratic governance.
In developing a response to the above question, the article will first review and
examine the established theoretical explanations for South Korea’s party system
instability, highlighting a potential explanatory factor not found in the literature.
Following this, the contested concept of democratic consolidation will be considered,
leading to the identification and definition of the relevant variables affecting South
Korea’s party system. Finally, the validity of these explanatory variables will be
tested through a case study of South Korea’s party system development from 1987 to
the present, allowing for some general conclusions to be drawn regarding the
instability of the party system in South Korea and its relation to democratic
consolidation.
Theoretical Explanations for South Korea’s Party System Instability
Much of the academic literature on the South Korean political party system
highlights its three major characteristics: the importance of political
personalities/individuals, regionalism, and variable electoral systems. These three
features, individually and collectively, contribute to the instability of the South
Korean party system.
First, in South Korean politics, political leadership matters – or rather,
individuals matter. More specifically, in the era of the ‘three Kims’ – Kim YoungSam, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil – political parties were created, dissolved and
recreated to suit the needs of the individual political aspirant: ‘they reigned over
their respective parties as imperial party presidents who claimed unique control over
the nomination of candidates, the appointment of party secretaries and officials, and
the chairmanship of National Assembly committees,’ (Im, 2004, p. 189). Naturally,
this impeded the establishment of an ideologically coherent and stable political party
system. Second, for the South Korean electorate, regional identity matters. The
regionalization of South Korean politics became prominent in 1963 with the
presidential candidacy of Park Chung-Hee; ‘in that year, Yongnam, Park's native
region, voted heavily for him along with the adjacent rural areas of Honam, while
provinces around Seoul voted for Yun, the major opposition candidate’ (Kim & Koh,
1972, p. 846). This pattern has continued to plague the development of the South
Korean party system, even after the democratization of 1987. Third, South Korea’s
electoral system matters. The process by which the South Korean President is elected
has taken various forms since the founding of the First Republic in 1948. It has
evolved from an indirect system (with intermittent direct elections), through which
the president was elected either by the National Assembly, a joint session of a
bicameral legislature, or an electoral college, to a post-1987 direct, popular election
system (Croissant, 2002). Similarly, the election system for the National Assembly
has also varied greatly, alternating between single-member districts, proportional
representation, presidential appointment and a mixture of some of the above
(Croissant, 2002). Most importantly, however, is the effect this unstable electoral
system has on the political party system in South Korea:
The current electoral system hampers the development of stable party
organizations. Instead it supports tendencies toward a short-lived, volatile
34
www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/gjaps
party system, characterized by frequent party splits, mergers and refoundings of party organizations, continuous re-labelling of parties and a
lack of party institutionalization. (Croissant, 2002, p. 262)
While all three of these characteristics, political personalities/individuals,
regionalism, and variable electoral systems, are helpful in explaining the nature of
the South Korean party system, the lack of any thorough consideration of
international forces directly influencing the party system exposes a weakness in the
literature. No domestic political system operates in a vacuum, especially in South
Korea, where the United States has and remains a political force. The simple
presence of 28,000 US military personnel stationed on the peninsula affirms the fact
that US national interests play and have played an extremely important role in South
Korean electoral politics (Ahn, 2003). Therefore, the following analysis will attempt
to remedy this absence in the literature, by drawing on international relations
research of US-South Korean relations (J.J. Suh, 2004; Izumikawa, 2004).
Based on the above, the hypothesis regarding the state of the South Korean
party system, which shall be tested below, can be stated as follows:
H1: The current political party system of South Korea can be characterized as one that is
destabilized, based on the fact that the importance of political personalities/individuals, the
presence of political regionalism, plurality electoral systems, and the strong political influence
of the United States has not subsided.
Definitions and Variables
Democratic Consolidation
In order to initiate such an analysis, it is necessary to define what exactly
democratic consolidation entails – or rather, what processes or elements must be
present in order for it to be said that a state has consolidated its democratic system?
The literature examining this process, democratization, is highly diverse in its
assumptions and conclusions concerning the nature of democracy and democratic
systems. The literature can be, in general, divided between scholars who emphasize
procedural definitions of democracy (e.g., O’Donnell, 1973; Dahl, 1989; Stepan &
Skach, 1993; Bernhard, 2001; Pevehouse, 2002) and those that emphasize substantive
definitions of democracy (e.g., Gould, 1988; Chang, 2007; Dryzek, 1996; Kowert &
Legro, 1996). Scholars of the former coterie focus on the structural elements of
democratic regimes that consider a regime democratic when it is the, ‘only game in
town’ (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 15). In other words, a democratic regime is considered
to be fully consolidated when, ‘all politically significant groups regard its key
political institutions as the only legitimate framework for political contestation, and
adhere to democratic rules of the game’ (Gunther, 1995, p. 7). More specifically, it
has been shown that political parties and party systems play an important role in the
transitions to and consolidations of democratic systems (Lai, 2005; Mainwaring,
1995). Under these democratic processes, political parties provide both the only
legitimate outlet for expressing political grievances and mechanism for political
change.
Conversely, substantivist scholars of democratic consolidation argue that the
above definitions of what constitutes a democracy are limited to liberal democratic
Bailey/Politics on the Peninsula
35
notions of democracy as a regime, not as a participatory or deliberative model (Kim,
2006; Dryzek, 2005). Instead, they argue, democracy should be conceptualized as an
ongoing, dynamic process: ‘democracy can move forward or backward, but it cannot
stand still’ (Dryzek, 1996, p. 5). It is from this participatory democracy perspective
that Sungmoon Kim (2006) analyzes the state of South Korean democracy,
emphasizing the role of civil society and citizenship in the dynamic process of
democratic consolidation. While these studies are helpful in that they provide an
alternative conception of the democratic consolidation process, they tend to
underestimate the importance of electoral and regime structures and processes to the
functioning of any democratic system, be it liberal or participatory in nature.
Concrete, established structures (i.e. political parties) allow for the efficient
translation of ideational values into political instruments. Moreover, because no
participatory or ‘deeper’ democracy yet exists in South Korea, democratic
consolidation theory must be based upon empirical observations of the operations of
liberal democratic systems.
The working definition of democratic consolidation that this study will employ
is the one developed by John Peeler (2004) in his study of democracy in Latin
America. He argues that along with an active civil society and stable governing
institutions, the institutionalization of a stable political party system is one of the
critical elements of democratic consolidation. The presence of both a large and
vigorous civil society (Shin, 2003; Kim, 1997; Kim, 2006) and stable governing
institutions in South Korea, as indicated by the perpetuation of the Presidency and
the National Assembly since their initial establishment in the 1948 Constitution of the
First Republic, leaves only the explanation of the instability of the South Korean
political party system to be determined.
Party System Stability and Party System Instability
It is also necessary to define a number of concepts crucial to the analysis of
South Korea’s party system, the dependent variable. Two important concepts are
party system stability and party system instability. In relation to South Korea’s political
party system, party system stability will be defined as occurring when both the
conservative and liberal elements of the South Korean political spectrum form
ideologically coherent, structured and long-lasting (i.e. more than two presidential or
parliamentary election cycles) political parties, that are not subject to destructive
leadership quarrels and regional biases. Similarly and purposefully opposed, party
system instability will be defined as occurring when both the conservative and liberal
elements of the South Korean political spectrum suffer from ideologically incoherent,
unstructured and short-lived (i.e. less than two presidential or parliamentary election
cycles) political parties, that are subject to destructive leadership quarrels and
regional biases.
Independent Variables
The other four concepts related to South Korea’s party system that need to be
defined are political personalities/individuals, regionalism, electoral system and the strong
political influence of the United States. First, political personalities/individuals refers to
those individual actors in South Korean electoral politics who possess sufficient
political influence to lead, establish/disestablish, and otherwise form parties along
36
www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/gjaps
personalistic and sometimes clientelistic lines. This definition should not be
construed as one that is inherently negative. Furthermore, such individuals must not
necessarily be corrupt or financially motivated political actors, as is certainly the case
with Kim Dae-Jung, who by all accounts is a very influential political
personality/individual in South Korean politics. Second, the concept of regionalism in
South Korean politics refers to the political identification or preference of the voting
population being highly correlated with locality. This brief description of the
concept will be further elaborated upon in the case study section of this article.
Third, an electoral system is the process by which the representatives in the South
Korean National Assembly (legislative) and the president of South Korea (executive)
are chosen. Legislative elections can be classified as either winner-take-all/singlemember-district, proportional representation, or some type of mixed-member
system. Presidential elections in South Korea can be classified as indirect (i.e.
through an electoral college) or direct (i.e. popular vote). Similarly to regionalism, the
electoral system concept will be more fully explained in the case study sections below.
Fourth, the strong political influence of the United States is defined as the
disproportionate influence of US national interest on domestic South Korean
electoral politics. The special US – ROK relationship that was established in the postWorld War II/Cold War world by the 1953 mutual defense treaty continues to define
the available spectrum of South Korean public policy options. Moreover, when
compared with the apparent willingness of some South Korean political actors (i.e.
Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun) to attempt reconciliation with North Korea, it is
easy to envision the potential tensions generated by US national interests’ influence
in domestic Korean relations.
Therefore, based on the above literature review, its insights and its failings,
the following four explanatory variables have been identified as being essential when
answering the question regarding the instability of South Korea’s political party
system (i.e., the dependent variable): 1) the importance of political
personalities/individuals, 2) the presence of political regionalism, 3) plurality
electoral systems, and 4) the strong political influence of the United States.
Instability of the South Korean Party System
The organization of the following case study of South Korea’s party system will
reflect the structural logic of the above hypothesis: the importance of political
personalities/individuals will be discussed first, followed by the presence of political
regionalism, a plurality electoral systems, and lastly, the strong political influence of
the United States.
Political Personalities/Individuals
The political transition to democracy that occurred in South Korea in 1987 did not
remedy the problems plaguing the political party system held over from earlier
regimes. Since the mid-twentieth century, two men had competed against each other
for leadership of the pro-democracy opposition in South Korea, Kim Young-Sam and
Kim Dae-Jung. Both men were important, vocal figures in the anti-military
government opposition, which resulted in their arrest and imprisonment on multiple
occasions. During the 1987 presidential election campaign, however, the fissure
between these two personalities came to a head:
Bailey/Politics on the Peninsula
37
[…] no sooner did power seem to be within reach when trouble started in the
marriage of convenience between the two Kims. Each Kim saw himself as the
hero of South Korea's political drama, and each plainly thought the other was
behaving unreasonably in not agreeing to pull out of the race for the
presidency. (Han, 1988, p. 55)
As a result of this disagreement, Kim Dae-Jung broke with his party, the
Reunification Democratic Party and its leader Kim Young-Sam, forming his own
party, the Peace and Democracy Party in October of 1987. This effectively split the
political opposition. In addition to the now three-way race for the presidency (Roh
Tae-Woo of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung),
came Kim Jong-Pil and his New Democratic Republican Party, which emerged as an
alternative voice in the authoritarian ruling circle (Im, 2004; Han, 1988). These four
parties served merely as vehicles for their respective candidates, as did all
subsequent political parties.
The experience of the 1987 presidential election in South Korea, as well as the
political party system it helped more deeply institutionalize, continued to influence
subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections. The 1992 presidential and
parliamentary elections were again plagued by strong, competing political
individuals. Although President Roh Tae-Woo and Kim Young-Sam had merged
their two parties in 1990 to form the Democratic Liberal Party, infighting kept the
party from consolidating its power in the National Assembly (Lee, 1993). This led to
a change in the National Assembly’s party balance and set up a three-way race in the
1992 presidential election, with Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Chung Ju-Yung
as the candidates representing the three parties in parliament (Lee, 1993). These
parties again were merely vehicles of their respective candidates’ presidential
ambitions, especially that of former Hyundai chairman Chung Ju-Yung (Lee, 1993).
Political personality clashes continued to play an important role in the
instability of the party system during the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections. The
liberal wing of the party system was able to unite itself for the 1997 presidential
election, merging Kim Dae-Jung’s National Congress for New Politics with Kim
Jong-Pil’s United Liberal Democrats.
The Grand National Party or GNP
(conservative), however, suffered from a clash of political personalities/ambitions –
Rhee In-Je split with Lee Hoi-Chang formed the New People Party, while Lee HoiChang became the GNP’s candidate for both the 1997 and 2002 elections.
Interestingly, during the interim period between the two elections, Rhee In-Je had
joined Kim Dae-Jung’s Millennium Democratic Party, giving up his presidential
ambitions allowing Roh Moo-Hyun to become the ruling party’s (MDP) candidate in
the 2002 presidential election by winning the nomination primary.
Similar political personality disputes continued to play a major role in shaping
the party system for the 2007 election. The Grand National Party nomination, which
was decided by a popular primary vote, was contested by Park Geun-Hye (daughter
of former President Park Chung-Hee) and Lee Myung-Bak, the eventual winner of
both the primary and general election (Ziemek, 2007). Lee Hoi-Chang had
previously decided to run as an independent candidate and quit the GNP, thus
splitting, though not effectively, the conservative vote in South Korea. On the liberal
38
www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/gjaps
wing of the political party system, following the dismantling of the Uri Party of
President Roh Moo-Hyun (originally a splinter group of the Millennium Democratic
Party), the United New Democratic Party nomination was contested in a party
primary by Son Hak-Gyu, Lee Hae-Chan, and Chung Dong-Young, who eventually
captured the nomination (Kim, 2007).
Lastly, the role of the political personality was also evident in the 2008 National
Assembly elections, especially among the various conservative factions in the South
Korean party system. The GNP was again split into two factions – the Pro-Park
Alliance controlled by Park Geun-Hye supporters (i.e. Seo Cheong-Won) and the
main splinter group led by Kang Jae-Seop. The conservative wing was further
divided by the candidacy of Lee Hoi-Chang and other members of his Liberty
Forward Party (LFP). Interestingly, for this round of elections, the liberal wing of the
party system seemed to be spared similar divisive personality clashes, uniting
around the United Democratic Party’s (UDP) candidates led by Son Hak-Gyu.
However, it remains to be seen how long this uniting spirit will last.
Political Regionalism
In addition to the ever-present disruptive influence of strong political
personalities/individuals, the party system in South Korea has also suffered from a
contentious regionalism as well. In the 1987 presidential election, Kim Jong-Pil and
his party received much of their support in his native Chungcheong province, while
Roh Tae-Woo was supported mainly in the southeastern provinces (Han, 1988).
More important, however, was the extensive and longstanding southwesternsoutheastern provincial divide. This divide was cultivated in the Park Chung-Hee
dictatorship, which begun the political tradition of rewarding supporters with
government spending on local development projects (Kim & Koh, 1972). Because of
this influence South Korean presidents have on distributive policies, the citizens in
the southwestern Cholla provinces felt discriminated against by regimes whose
leaders originated in the southeastern Kyongsang provinces (Horiuchi & Lee, 2007;
Han, 1988).
As a result, these citizens residing in the Cholla provinces
overwhelmingly supported the opposition parties in the 1987 presidential election,
primarily Kim Dae-Jung’s Peace and Democracy Party.
The effect of regionalism was also acutely felt in the 1992 parliamentary
elections, in which the Democratic Liberal Party lost its majority – Kim Dae-Jung’s
Democratic Party was again strongly supported in the southwestern provinces, while
the Democratic Liberal Party was less than strongly supported in many of the
southeastern provinces (Lee, 1993).
Regionalism again ‘was still the most critical divide in politics’ (Park, 1998, p. 6)
during the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections (Lee, 2003). The electoral divide
between the southeast (conservative) and the southwest (liberal) continued to exist
and greatly contributed to the arbitrary nature of political party formation in South
Korea. In the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae-Jung, the National Congress for
New Politics’ (liberal party) candidate, received the vast majority of his electoral
support from the two Cholla provinces, including his native South Cholla province.
Because of the presence of two conservative candidates, Lee Hoi-Chang of the GNP
and Rhee In-Je, the voters residing in provinces in the southeast (the traditional
regional stronghold of the conservatives) split, especially in North Gyeongsang, thus
Bailey/Politics on the Peninsula
39
allowing Kim Dae-Jung to win the general election (Park, 1998). The 2002
presidential election proved no different in terms of the affect of regionalism on the
electoral outcomes, with Roh Moo-Hyun (liberal) winning in the southwest and Lee
Hoi-Chang (conservative) winning in the southeast (Lee, 2003).
Finally, regionalism in South Korea continued to help determine the party
system structure for both the 2007 presidential election and the 2008 National
Assembly elections. As was the case in all previous presidential elections, the eastwest divide was present in the 2007 election, but to a somewhat lesser degree
(National Election Commission). The 2008 National Assembly elections also
displayed the traditional regional-based results – the conservative GNP was able to
maintain its base in the southeastern provinces and in Seoul, the liberal UDP was
heavily supported in the southwestern provinces, and Lee Hoi-Chang’s conservative
LFP further entrenched its electoral base in Chungcheong, specifically Hongseong
County.
Plurality Electoral System
In conjunction with the presence of strong political personalities and divisive
regionalism, the presidential election process in South Korea contributed
significantly to the weak and unstable party system that existed during the 1987
election. As stated above, the 1987 presidential election was the first in 26 years to be
decided by direct, popular vote. Specifically, the president of South Korea is elected
through a first-past-the-post system (Croissant, 2002). While this type of electoral
process plays a sufficiently stabilizing role in other states that utilize it (e.g., the
United States), in South Korea it is much more problematic, especially when
combined with the other issues plaguing its party system. Because a first-past-thepost system only requires a plurality to win an election, it is not conducive to catchall, large party formation as is the case in majoritarian electoral systems (e.g., France).
Therefore, when coupled with the other three variables, strong political
personalities/individuals, divisive regionalism and the strong political influence of
the United States, the first-past-the-post system only further encourages and induces
the fragmentation of the political party system. As a result of this electoral system, in
the 1987 presidential election Roh Tae-Woo was able to win with only 36.6% of the
popular vote (National Election Commission).
In addition to the presidential election process, the electoral system through
which members of the National Assembly are elected also inhibits the creation of a
stable party system in South Korea. In the 299-seat unicameral parliament, ‘243
[seats] are elected from single-member constituencies by a plurality formula, whereas
the remaining 56 [seats] are chosen from a national constituency by PR [proportional
representation]’ (Reilly, 2007, p. 1356). As Maurice Duverger famously argued,
proportional representation is conducive to a multiparty democracy, a majority vote
on one ballot is conducive to a two-party democracy, and a majority vote on two
ballots is conducive to a multiparty democracy (1972). Therefore, the utilization in
South Korea of a mixture of proportional representation, single-member-plurality
constituencies, and two separate ballots (Reilly, 2007) only serves to augment the
importance of strong political personalities and regionalism, resulting in an unstable
party system.
40
www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/gjaps
The results of the 1992 election, in which Kim Young-Sam received 42%, Kim
Dae-Jung received 33.8% and Chung Ju-Yung received 16.3%, revealed the continued
importance of the electoral system in South Korea – the simple plurality requirement
for winning the election resulted in a fractious and numerous political party system
(Lee, 1993). While the result was the election of the first non-ruling party candidate,
the fact that a majority was not needed to win the South Korean Presidency enabled
the rift between Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung to continue. Additionally, the
simple plurality requirement feature of the South Korean electoral system
encouraged the third party participation of Rhee In-Je in the 1997 election, along with
Kim Dae Jung and Lee Hoi Chang (Park, 1998), and allowed Roh Moo-Hyun to win
the 2002 presidential election with less than 50% of the popular vote (National
Election Commission).
Lastly, the plurality electoral system in South Korea continued to help
determine the party system’s formation during the 2007 presidential election cycle.
The requirement of only obtaining a plurality of the popular vote, again allowed
conservative Lee Myung-Bak to claim victory with only 48.7% of the vote, with the
liberal Chung Dong-Young receiving 26.1% and perennial candidate Lee Hoi-Chang
receiving 15.1% (National Election Commission). In other words, the electoral
system discouraged the formation of large, diverse parties and encouraged the
fractious, personality-driven politics to dominate.
Political Influence of the United States
While all three of the above variables, strong political personalities, divisive
regionalism and variable electoral systems, are essential in explaining the South
Korean party system during the 1987 presidential election, the presence and
influence of the United States cannot be underestimated. The Cold War was still the
dominant feature of the international system, and the conceptual threat from North
Korea remained an important influence. More importantly, however, was the
presence of what J.J. Suh calls the alliance constituency and its ability to control the
dominant political discourse (Suh, 2004). This alliance constituency, which consisted
of an international coalition of military officers, political officials and merchants that
existed and grew based on the US – South Korean alliance, was able to construct a
political ‘reality,’ where a continuing alliance with the US was seen as natural (Suh,
2004). This ‘reality’ limited the political options open to the electorate by inducing
them to vote for Roh Tae-Woo and the conservatives, who were much more
consistently supportive of the United States than the liberals/centrists, such as Kim
Dae-Jung (Chae and Kim, 2008; Eberstadt, 2002).
The influence of the US on the party system in the 1992 election, however, is
less than clear. But given the fact that US – North Korean relations continued to be
tense and the alliance constituency was beginning to further entrench its interests and
influence by reducing its public visibility, it can be said that the conservative
candidate, Kim Young-Sam, did not suffer a disadvantage with his move to the right
of the political spectrum (Suh, 2004).
However, unlike the 1987 and 1992 elections, the 1997 and 2002 presidential
elections in South Korea seemed to indicate that the United States was losing its
influence on party system stability. In 1997 Kim Dae-Jung was finally elected to the
Presidency of South Korea after four earlier attempts. His election as the first nonBailey/Politics on the Peninsula
41
ruling party (non-conservative) candidate to be elected president was a major
turning point in South Korea’s democratization. More importantly, however, was
his pursuit of the so called ‘Sunshine Policy’ towards North Korea, which was
continued by his successor, Roh Moo-Hyun. But this thawing of relations between
North and South Korea was not indicative of a less influential United States, because
it also reflected the United States’ policy toward North Korea during the Clinton
Administration (i.e. 1994 Agreed Framework) and during the initial phases of the
Bush Administration (Izumikawa, 2004). North Korea’s withdrawal from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 altered the United States’ position and
therefore, due to the US – South Korean alliance constituency’s control of the political
discourse, framed the following 2007 presidential election differently than the
previous two (Lee, 2003).
The 2007 election of Lee Myung-Bak to the Presidency of South Korea returned
the conservative wing of the party system (i.e. the Grand National Party) to the Blue
House after 10 years in opposition. Moreover, like the previous four presidential
elections, the party system in this election was not immune from the influence of the
United States, political personality clashes, divisive regionalism and the electoral
system. As mentioned above, the change in relations between the United States,
North Korea and South Korea occurred because the US – South Korean alliance
constituency reasserted its influence on South Korean political discourse; this was
based primarily on the Bush Administration’s ‘renaming’ of the North Korean state,
not on a change in its material capabilities: ‘it was a change in the actors’ [North
Korea and the United States] social understanding that broke the virtuous cycle
[Sunshine Policy],’ (Suh, 2004, p. 158). Therefore, this change benefited the
conservative Grand National Party’s candidate, Lee Myung-Bak, who was more
supportive of the continuation of the US – South Korean alliance (Lee, 2008). The
same can be said of the 2008 National Assembly elections, in which the conservative
GNP was able to maintain its majority, even with Lee Hoi-Chang’s LFP splitting the
conservative vote. More directly, these elections proceeded under similar conditions
as the 2007 presidential elections – the Bush administration’s adversarial and
aggressive stance toward North Korea.
In addition, the case of Chung Dong-Young’s relationship with his former
political party, the Democratic Party, is especially illustrative of the disruptive nature
of the US – South Korean alliance on party system stability. During the 2007
presidential campaign, the positions Chung Dong-Young held on some important
policy areas relevant to the US – South Korea alliance created divisions among the
leadership of the Democratic Party, then known as the United New Democratic
Party. This is especially true of then President Roh’s (a member of the United New
Democratic Party) material support of the Bush administration’s Iraq War: ‘Chung
reiterated his objection to the government's plan to extend the deployment of South
Korean troops in Iraq. “Roh should keep his promise to withdraw the troops by the
end of this year,” he said’ (Jung & Kim, 2007). As mentioned above, because of the
renewed influence of the US – South Korean alliance constituency under the Bush
administration this policy position was not one to be tolerated, and among other
reasons, led to Chung Dong-Young’s eventual expulsion from the Democratic Party.
Additionally, in late 2006 during the beginning of the 2007 presidential campaign,
former Prime Minister and member of the Democratic Party, Goh Kun, left the party
42
www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/gjaps
over what he perceived to be poor policy decisions made by President Roh’s
administration: ‘the current government has worsened the economic environment by
favored appointments and creating division, wallowing in self-righteousness and
incompetence, changing relations with the U.S. for the worse and resulting in political
dissention and conflicting ideologies [emphasis added]’ (“Ex-PM Criticizes Politics
of Division,” 2006). What these two examples seem to indicate is the continued
importance of the US – South Korea alliance in interparty dialogue and its
destabilizing affect on potential party longevity.
Findings and Conclusion
Based on the above case study and its explication of the character of South
Korea’s party system, I suggest that the current political party system of South Korea
is destabilized based on the fact that the importance of political
personalities/individuals, the presence of political regionalism, plurality electoral
systems, and the political influence of the United States has not subsided. Neither
the conservative nor the liberal/centrist wing of the party system in South Korea has
consolidated its ideological coherence or party structure for more than two
presidential or parliamentary election cycles. These findings confirm the hypothesis
proposed earlier in this study. Although this case study may be considered limited in
the scope of its analysis, as well as the rigid formation of its hypothesis and
theoretical explanation, for the limited space available it provided an informed and
well-reasoned account for South Korea’s destabilized party system.
While some scholars see continued destabilization of party systems and
partisan identification as an opening for party reform and further democratic
consolidation in general (Vidal, 2010), and in South Korea specifically (Im, 2004), this
has not been the case.
Roh Moo-Hyun’s administration, in which the
aforementioned scholars had put their faith, did not deliver the desired party reform,
and was kept politically impotent by corruption charges and Millennium Democratic
Party/Uri Party/United New Democratic Party infighting (Lee, 2004). Moreover,
measured against the standard of John Peeler’s (2004) conception of democratic
consolidation, which includes party system stabilization as a necessary element, it
can be said that South Korea is missing a critical element in its overall political
system. Therefore, political party system stability must be made a priority before full
democratic consolidation can take place in South Korea.
Beyond this specific South Korean instance, it could be the case that similar
variables currently affect the stability of party systems in other parts of the world. In
the future, because of both the palpable influence of the United States and the
existence of strong political personalities, it could be useful to investigate whether in
any of the Latin American states, regionalism or plurality electoral systems affect the
stability of their political party systems.
Now with regards to South Korea, in the future, should either ideological wing
of the party system begin to stabilize its structure and establish ideological coherence
that is independent of, or at least lessens the salience of regionalism, individual
manipulation and US – South Korean alliance constituency influence, then it will be
necessary to continue this analysis. Future scholars will need to question its
underlying assumptions and attempt to better comprehend the emerging South
Korean political party system, respecting and more completely understanding the
Bailey/Politics on the Peninsula
43
influence of the unique political culture existing in South Korea’s democratic system
of
governance.
44
www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/gjaps
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank Dr. Sangmin Bae of Northeastern Illinois University for
the encouragement she gave me in researching and preparing this article for
publishing.
Bailey/Politics on the Peninsula
45
References
Ahn, B. M. (2003). Elites and Political Power in South Korea. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar Publishing.
Bernhard, M., Nordstrom, T. & Reenock, C. (2001). Economic Performance,
Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic Survival. The Journal of Politics,
63(3), 775-803.
Chae, H. & Kim, S. (2008). Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea. The
Washington Quarterly, 31(4), 77-95.
Chang, Y.T., Chu, Y. H. & Park, C. M. (2007). Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia.
Journal of Democracy, 18(3), 66-80.
Croissant, A. (2002). Electoral Politics in South Korea. In A. Croissant,
G. Bruns and M. John (Eds.), Electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia (pp. 233276). Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Dahl, R. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dryzek, J. S. (1996). Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideals, Limits, and Struggles. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Dryzek, J.S. (2005). Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to
Agonism and Analgesia. Political Theory, 33(2), 218-242.
Duverger, M. (1972). Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System. In M.
Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups (pp. 23-32). New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell.
Eberstadt, N. (2002). Our Other Korea Problem. The National Interest, 69, 110-118.
Ex-PM Criticizes Politics of Division (2006, December 21). The Dong-A Ilbo, accessed
August
10,
2009. http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=050000&biid=20061221
62118
Gould, C. C. (1988). Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in
Politics, Economy, and Society. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gunther, R., Diamandourous, P. N., & Puhle, H. J. (Eds.), (1995). The Politics of
Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Han, S. J. (1988). South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization. Asian Survey,
28(1), 52-61.
Horiuchi, Y. & Lee, S. (2007). The Presidency, Regionalism, and Distributive Politics
in South Korea. Comparative Political Studies, 41(6), 861-882.
Im, H. B. (2004). Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at
the End of the ‘Three Kims’ Era. Democratization, 11(5), 179-198.
Izumikawa, Y. (2004). Alliance Security Dilemma and Domestic Politics: Explaining
US -ROK-DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World. Prepared for the annual
meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 17-20,
2004, 1-30.
Jung, S. K. & Kim, S. Y. (2007, October 29). Chung Dong-young Vows to Become
Leader of Unity.
The Korea Times,
accessed August 10, 2009.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/04/113_12726.html.
Kim, H. M. (1997). Rational Choice Theory and Third World Politics: The 1990 Party
Merger in Korea. Comparative Politics, 30(1), 83-100.
46
www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/gjaps
Kim, J. O. & Koh, B.C. (1972). Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South
Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections. The Journal of
Politics, 34(3), 825-859.
Kim, S. Y. (2007, September 16). Chung Dong-young Leads 3-Way Nomination Race.
The
Korea
Times,
accessed
November
18,
2008. http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2007/09/116_10250.html.
Kim, S. M. (2006). Civil Society and Political Action in Democratized Korea:
Revamping Democratic Consolidation from a Participatory Perspective. New
Political Science, 28(4), 527-546.
Kim, S. H. (1997). State and Civil Society in South Korea's Democratic Consolidation:
Is the Battle Really over? Asian Survey, 37(12), 1135-1144.
Kowert, P. & Legro, J. (1996). Norms, Identity, and their Limits: A Theoretical
Reprise. In P. J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security (pp. 451-497).
New York: Columbia University Press.
Lai, B. & Melkonian-Hoover, R. (2005). Democratic Progress and Regress: The Effect
of Parties on the Transitions of States to and Away from Democracy. Political
Research Quarterly, 58(4), 551-564.
Lee, H. Y. (1993). South Korea in 1992: A Turning Point in Democratization. Asian
Survey, 33(1), 32-42.
Lee, H. Y. (2003). South Korea in 2002: Multiple Political Dramas. Asian Survey,
43(1), 64-77.
Lee, H. Y. (2004). South Korea in 2003: A Question of Leadership? Asian Survey,
44(1), 130-138.
Lee, J. (2002). Primary Causes of Asian Democratization: Dispelling Conventional
Myths. Asian Survey, 42(6), 821-837.
Lee, M. B. (2008). TogetherWe Shall Open A Road to Advancement. Inaugural
Address.
Linz, J. & Stepan, A. (1996). Toward Consolidated Democracies. Journal of Democracy,
7(2), 14-33.
Mah, I. S. (2002). Social Cleavage Structure and Democracy in South Korea. Prepared
for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Boston, USA, August 29-September 1, 2002, 1-24.
Mainwaring, S. & Scully, T. (Eds.), (1995). Building Democratic Institutions: Party
Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
National Election Commission of South Korea (2007, December 19). Turnout of
Presidential
Election,
accessed
November
18,
2008. http://www.nec.go.kr/english/overview/offices_turnout01.html#e.
O’Donnell, G. (1973). Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South
American Politics. Berkley: University of California Press.
Park, B. G. (2005). The Territorial Politics of Regulation under State Capitalism:
Regional Parties and the Politics of Local Economic Development in South
Korea. Space and Polity, 9(3), 237–259.
Park, C. W. (2007). Effects of Social and Ideological Cleavages on Vote Choice in the
Korean Presidential Election of December 19, 2007. Prepared for presentation at
the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Diego, USA,
March 22, 2008, 1-27.
Bailey/Politics on the Peninsula
47
Park, T. W. (1998). South Korea in 1997: Clearing the Last Hurdle to PoliticalEconomic Maturation. Asian Survey, 38(1), 1-10.
Peeler, J. (2004). Building Democracy in Latin America, 2nd Ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc.
Pevehouse, J. C. (2002). With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations
and the Consolidation of Democracy. American Journal of Political Science, 46(3),
611-626.
Reilly, B. (2007). Democratization and Electoral Reform in the Asia-Pacific Region: Is
There an ‘Asian Model’ of Democracy? Comparative Political Studies, 40(11),
1350-1371.
Rose, R. & Shin, D. C. (2001). Democratization Backwards: The Problem of ThirdWave Democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 31(2), 331-354.
Shin, E. H. (2002). Correlates of the 2002 Presidential Election in South Korea:
Regionalism, the Generation Gap, Anti-Americanism, and the North Korea
Factor. University of South Carolina, 1-14.
Shin, E. H. (2003). The Role of NGOs in Political Elections in South Korea: The Case
of the Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Election. Asian Survey, 43(4), 697715.
Stepan, A. & Skach, C. (1993). Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic
Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism. World Politics, 46(1),
1-22.
Suh, J. J. (2004). The US- Korea Alliance and Analytical Eclecticism. In J.J. Suh, P. J.
Katzenstein & A. Carlson (Eds.), Rethinking Security in East Asia: Indentity, Power
and Efficiency (pp. 131-171). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Vidal, D .X. M., Ugues, A., Bowler, S. & Hiskey, J. (2010). Partisan Attachment and
Democracy in Mexico: Some Cautionary Observations. Latin American Politics &
Society, 52(1), 63-87.
Ziemek,
M.
(2007).
Südkoreas
Konservative
wählen
ihren
Präsidentschaftskandidaten –Vorentscheidung für Korea? – South Korea’s
Conservatives choose their Candidate for the Presidency – Preliminary Decision
for Korea?. KAS Auslandsinformationen, 9/07, 24-36.
48
www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/gjaps