Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2 (103) 2016
ISSN 0867–2245
SZTUKA WOJENNA
HOW TO WIN IN COMBAT – AN IDEAL MODEL
APPLIED IN A SCENARIO
LTC Lars HENÅKER
Finnish National Defence University, Helsinki
Swedish Defence University, Stockholm
Abstract
Are our tactics effective compared to our opponent or not? Since tactics are about how
to use time, units and resources in the best possible way to win or gain advantages
in battle, it becomes important to be able to evaluate and measure the outcome. The
purpose of this paper is to give an example of how a designed scenario in a specific
military tactical situation can work as a frame for an ideal model of win or lose in
combat. From the theories about how and why we are winning and losing in battles,
an ideal model of the most important criteria has been compiled. The ideal model is
not a “law” or the ultimate truth but more of an empirical path of knowledge and to
be used as a hypothesis. A specific military combat scenario is used in visualising
and to measure the quality of the tactician’s plan and action. The tactical scenario is
operationalised in the narrative based on conventional warfare in future high-intensity
and high-tech level conflicts. It is thus essential for the tactician to be proficient in
knowing his/her units, resources and capabilities, regarding how their mobility and
firepower can be optimised at different times and in different sequences. Tactical
criteria can be tested in various scenarios but need to be measured more thoroughly
by using wargames.
Keywords: tactics, victory in combat, scenario, wargame
Introduction
This article is about how to win in combat. War is a duel to compel the other side to
submit his/her will to fight (Clausewitz 1997). The article also focuses on military
tactics and applies an ideal model for winning in combat as derived from military
theories and developed in a previous article by Thunholm and Henåker (working
paper). A specific military combat scenario is used in visualising and to measure the
quality of the tactician’s plan and action. Military tactics are an art of understanding
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and effectively using time and military units through their ability to beneficially
deploy, combine weapons, maneuver and fight to achieve aims and objectives
(Thunholm & Henåker 2016). So, why should we try to find criteria to measure
tactical quality? Is it possible to approach this subject in a scientific way, and, if so,
to what extent? If tactical quality is possible to value, would it be possible to increase
both individuals and groups of tacticians’ skills in a controlled manner? Military
expertise (Creveld 1982) is inconceivable without victory. From the theories about
how and why we are winning and losing in battles, we now have an ideal model of
the most important criteria.
In the article by Thunholm and Henåker (working paper), How to Win in Combat
– An Ideal Model, they introduced an ideal model in which they identified and
explained seven steps of what it takes to win battles (see table 1). The model is based
on previous research on winning and losing in combat (e.g. Biddle 2004, Collins 2010,
Dixon 1976, Storr 2009, Leonhard 1994 etc.). The ideal model’s seven steps are:
(1) ability to deploy your own units and to be able to maneuver in depth and surprise
the opponent, (2) an aggressive reconnaissance but also preventing the opponent’s
reconnaissance from succeeding, (3) getting the opponent off balance with all
means of faster decision-loops and delivering effective, (4) fast and deep maneuvers
through surface gaps that reach into the depths of the opponent’s vulnerabilities,
(5) surprising by attacking the opponent’s back or his unprepared units, (6) exploiting
surprise to achieve shock and (7) ultimately striving to create an organizational
breakdown of the opponent. This ideal model draws on research aimed at exploring
phenomena related to military victories and losses and the following sections will
present the model. According to Biddle (2004, p. 35): “The key elements of modern-system offensive tactics are cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent
maneuver, suppression, and combined arms integration”. Collins (2010) emphasises
the importance of material resources, sometimes referred to as force ratios. In short,
victory tends to go to the side with more troops and more resources, through attrition
of the side with less material resources. If this is true, it is all about mathematics.
But Collins (2010) also points out the maneuver and counter-maneuver to have
a stronger causal path through organisational breakdown to achieve battle victory
and defeat. Although force ratios could also be measured with high quality, level
of experience or unique ability to achieve a successful breakthrough emphasises
that small units would be able to achieve victory over a numerically larger unit
in combat. If a commander is able to use his/her resources well and win battles,
e.g. by commanding a smaller number of units than the opponent, we can note the
importance of quality sometimes beating quantity (Creveld 1982).
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HOW TO WIN IN COMBAT – AN IDEAL MODEL APPLIED IN A SCENARIO
Ta b l e 1
The ideal model of winning battles, adopted from Thunholm and Henåker (working paper)
Seven steps to build an ideal model
The first step (Biddle 2004) is the ability to use the modern system deployment.
This means that your own units avoid enemy fire on purpose and slow down enemy
movement at the same time, conducting maneuvers in depth and surprising the
opponent. In his thesis, Biddle (2004) compares the effect through different variants
of tactics. He compares offensive tactics, defensive tactics, defensive operations
and offensive operations to find crucial differences. Biddle (2004) emphasises that
the key elements of offensive tactics are cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver, suppression and combined arms integration. Offensive
operations of today have two approaches. One is to gain and hold ground and the
second is the breakthrough and exploitation attempt (Biddle 2004). The breakthrough
attack and its exploitation often create a surprise.
Surprise arises, according to Leonhard (1994), when a unit in contact with the
opponent is not ready, which can be more difficult to perceive in a scenario than in
reality. A commander can always feel surprised, even if it is relatively unwarranted.
Surprise is an important property and should, in the dynamic decision-making, always
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be practiced or carried out to understand opportunities that occur with a high tempo
and surprise. Biddle (2004) points to the importance of how the force is employed in
the battlefield in order to both preserve its strength against attrition and in order to
concentrate force to accomplish (or resist) breakthrough (Biddle 2004).
The second step in the ideal model is aggressive reconnaissance and also
preventing the opponent’s reconnaissance from succeeding. Storr (2009) points out
that aggressive ground reconnaissance and air superiority are crucial for military
success. Lind (1985) emphasises the importance of finding and using surfaces and
gaps in the maneuver to avoid unnecessary losses and time consumption.
In the third step, Brehmer (2005) finds a key for explaining the mechanism whereby
some commanders are able to out-pace their opponent. Brehmer (2005) developed
his Dynamic OODA loop from within Boyd’s (1987) OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop) to serve as a source of hypotheses about winning and losing.
Here, it provides a much richer source of hypotheses than the original OODA loop,
which only seems to require faster and faster decisions in a world that seems far
too complex to allow even slow decisions. The Dynamic OODA loop (DOODA
loop) model explains what is necessary in order to out-pace the opponent and also to
implement action and obtain effect against the opponent, faster than the opponent is
able to react and implement action against one´s own force. The third step is to put
the opponent off balance with all means of faster decision loops (Brehmer 2005).
The DOODA loop is helpful in understanding different temporal aspects of combat
decision making. To measure a commander’s ability to solve complex situations
and obtain his/her end state, we should have a holistic approach and observe the
commander’s sensemaking and assess both the outcome of tactical effects and also
the perceived situation for each of the decision-makers.
Sensemaking is a form of understanding that involves knowing what to do
but not requiring a fully developed plan. The results of the planning process are,
nevertheless, likely to contribute to the sensemaking process, and, of course, vice
versa (Brehmer 2005). As a hypothesis of optimal tactical behaviour in battle, the
third measurable step occurs when the commanders understand their own and the
enemy systems’ capabilities, strengths and weaknesses in interaction and also have
the ability to implement action faster than the enemy. To choose the least expected
line of approach in the maneuver and exploit the line of least resistance to reach the
objects by following up with reserves helps achieve advantages in the fight (Liddell
Hart 1991). The opposite of this successful criterion is an obstinate persistence in
a given task despite strong contrary evidence (Dixon 1976).
In the fourth step, Collins (2010) emphasises maneuver as victory that comes
through fast and unexpected movement of one’s own forces that results in surprise
and sometimes shock and disorganised resistance from the opposing force. As
a hypothesis of optimal tactical behaviour in battle, the fourth measurable successful
criteria occur when the commanders find gaps and uses the opportunity to penetrate
in deep maneuver. Divided units should secure routes of approaches before deep
penetration maneuver starts and create appropriate conditions that will enable the
main thrust to succeed (Giáp 2013). Making full use of surprise, cover and tactical
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HOW TO WIN IN COMBAT – AN IDEAL MODEL APPLIED IN A SCENARIO
mobility infiltration units could saturate a small portion of the opponent with fire by
combined arms to create a dilemma for the defender (Dupuy 1984). The intent of
a maneuver is to generate confusion and disorder among the opponent’s units and his/
her decision making process (Lind 1985). Fundamental conservatism and clinging
to outworn tradition and an inability to profit from past experience is a negative
counter-weight to optimal tactical behaviour, according to Dixon (1976).
During the fifth step, the tactician must be able to identify the enemy’s weak
points and utilise surprise by attacking the opponent’s back or his unprepared units.
Lind (1985) underlines the importance of not repeating the same pattern of maneuvers
and action to avoid predictability. Fuller (1926) emphasises attacking weak points,
because at weak points favourable force-ratios can be created, even if you have
a smaller force in total. Attacking weak points will also offer the opportunity of an
early breakthrough and continuing to attack the weaker inner lines and rear parts of
the enemy’s force at a high tempo. A rapid breakthrough develops (Giáp 2013) new
situations in which the enemy threatens to collapse. Sometimes, it is necessary to
encircle, divide and decisively strike the enemy to obliterate his/her peripheral lines
and prevent them from regrouping (Giáp 2013).
Storr (2009) says that commanders should find ways to accomplish a breakthrough.
He highlights the importance of creating surprise and the way to do that is to maneuver
in a timely manner (often with high speed) and attack where the enemy is not prepared.
Surprise is effected by superior direction of force, determination of endurance and
mobility in offensive action, according to Fuller (1926). As a hypothesis of optimal
tactical behavior in battle, the fifth measurable successful step in the ideal model is
to achieve attacks on the opponent’s unprepared units preferably from unexpected
directions. Attacked units that have a lower alert or are not prepared or are without
the right combination of combined arms (C2, logistic etc.) would also be preferable.
According to Dixon (1976), the opposite of this swift cunning surprise attack would
be a predilection for frontal assault, often against the enemy’s strongest point.
In the sixth step, in the ideal model, the commanders must be able to create a surprise
and then exploit the surprise to achieve shock. Fuller (1926) describes the ultimate end
state of a successful surprise as reducing the enemy’s fighting spirit to just protect
himself in panic. Biddle (2004) emphasises the importance of preserving strength
against attrition in order to concentrate force to accomplish (or resist) breakthrough. The
commander must be able to identify the right moment, prepare and act when it occurs
to avoid the risk of attrition. This can be done primarily by knowing the conditions of
your enemy’s doctrine, organisation, modus operandi, morale and terrain very well
and the purpose is to find weaknesses in the opponent’s situation and be able to foresee
his/her next act. The effect (Storr 2009) of surprise attacks on the enemy’s flanks and
rear is considerable. Storr (2009) is very precise in figures of the effect that can occur
if a surprise is achieved. According to Storr (2009), an overall surprise has about a 75%
chance of succeeding and, if surprise is achieved, the probability of success is largely
independent of force ratio. If a surprise is not achieved, the probability of success is
highly dependent on force ratio. This indicates that if a surprise is not achieved, the
result of fighting is largely a matter of attrition (Storr 2009).
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The final step is ultimately striving to create a “systemic collapse” including the
command-and-control systems of the enemy to precipitate organisational breakdown.
An organisational breakdown (Collins 2010) is relative, as both sides are breaking
down to a certain degree.
According to Collins (2010), there is a stronger causal link from maneuver to
organisational breakdown than from firepower. This is mainly because maneuver, if
it is fast and/or concealed and based on accurate intelligence, can result in surprise
attacks from directions unexpected by the opponent and against rear areas with troops
not intended for direct battle (e.g. logistic and command and control units). Surprise
attacks can result in shock and disintegration and Collins concludes that it is often
after a force has been disintegrated that it suffers the greatest losses of materials and
soldiers (Collins 2010).
Storr (2009) considers surprise to be of huge importance besides applying
violence in a sudden concentrated manner. This leads to shock and the result can be
utilized and exploited (Storr 2009).
The ideal model as a hypothesis
After developing all steps that create the ideal model of how to win the battle described
earlier, they are now to be operationalised. This is done by testing all steps in the
scenario from a tactical perspective. The ideal model will be used as a hypothesis of
optimal tactical behaviour in battle. All steps are considered in the scenario with the
help of officers who have a background in army tactics and operational art of war.
The results should be able to answer whether all the steps provide the advantage
in battle that today’s theory and science states or not. The scenario as a narrative
offers problem-solving situations where the decision maker is forced to solve several
problems, not just a single problem. Sometimes, it is not enough to have only a few
training sessions to practice and train for dynamic decision-making during combat
exercises. In every situation, the commander must choose between the basic tactical
elements and carefully balance them well. To measure this, it is of great importance
to use the military combat scenario from double sides to its limit by using e.g.
wargames, micro-worlds, and discussions over maps or in a field exercise. Which
tactician has used the basic elements best can be understood after the scenario is
completed and also during the actual discussion, analysis and decision-making.
The risk of an excessive loss-making substantive outcome of a scenario is that
the side that has most units wins in attrition warfare. The steps in the ideal model
indicate otherwise. The system will collapse not only because of units taking losses,
but with fear, panic, exhaustion, hopelessness, low morale and poor cohesion etc. In
the scenario parameter, these properties arise when situations such as a breakthrough
and exploitation take place. Tactically skillful maneuvers enhanced by these as
multiples provide opportunities for a numerically smaller military unit to affect and
even defeat a numerically larger opponent.
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HOW TO WIN IN COMBAT – AN IDEAL MODEL APPLIED IN A SCENARIO
A tactical combat scenario
Having presented the ideal model, this section enhances all the steps contained in
the ideal model and puts them into a scenario. A scenario is a defined situation or
a starting point described for the commander and provides an ability to act within
a certain framework. The incident described in a scenario can be taken from reality,
e.g. military history battles, or be a fictional situation. A task or tasks are often given
and should be solved in the narrative of the scenario and under time pressure. Time is
of importance in a scenario, often to limit the expansion of the tactician’s possibilities.
In a scenario, the commanders usually have resources to use and must balance these
in an adequate manner. The approach is not known from the beginning nor is it given.
The commanders have to trust their own decisions and tackle the consequences.
Generally, scenarios are designed to generate situations that can be influenced by
tactical knowledge. In a scenario, a tactician will be tested against the identified
tactical success criteria in the ideal model. It is one thing to discuss the principles,
steps or criteria in general and how they contribute to victory in battle, but it may be
more productive to try to use these principles and criteria in certain scenarios and
examine if the application of these principles is actually correlated with winning or
losing criteria. The selected subjects in the scenario are commanders who resolve
tasks at battalion, battlegroup and brigade levels, when it is these commanders’
normal environment and area of professional realm of knowledge.
The following section outlines the scenario that is used in order to discuss and
apply tactical criteria that are assumed to be correlated with the ideal model in this
specific scenario. This tactical scenario may be used to evaluate the value of all
seven steps in the ideal model. This scenario originates from the military training
and education at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). It has been used more or
less during fifteen years of education as one of many scenarios. The content of the
scenario is inspired by the officer training programme to provide a range of different
combat situations. The complexity of the scenario is important to not exclude the
number of different solutions to the military problems that arise. The scenario offers
many different ways of choosing the line of least expectation (Liddell Hart 1991)
to accomplish a given task and achieve expected goals. Research and education
at SEDU focuses largely on the tactical level. This means that the scenarios are
adapted to a tactical level. The purpose of using the tactical level is to give officers
a good chance to use their own knowledge and skills in tactical situations. Sweden
has a relatively small defence force and depends on a very high level of well-trained
officers, soldiers and coherent units to defend its existence as a sovereign nation.
From this national perspective, Swedish units often fight in a numerically inferior
narrative against a powerful opponent.
The scenario should be seen from a generic minor defence force perspective
in a survive and win in battle situation. From this perspective, it is of existential
importance to know how to conduct maneuver warfare and inflict heavy losses on
the enemy side by achieving his/her organisational breakdown.
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Scenario build-up
The scenario materials consist of a written description of the overall realistic fictitious
situation in the eastern part of Sweden and an open conflict between two fictitious
opponents, Blueland and Redland. This occurs approximately on the morning of
October 16th at 0600 hours (the starting point of the scenario). In this scenario,
Redland is attacking with a conventional force. Redland has numerically superior
forces at a ratio of about 2-1 in terms of army brigades. Redland started its attack
on Blueland seven days earlier on October 9th using air force, cruise missiles and
sabotage directed towards the electrical supply of civilian and military command
and control functions and against Blueland’s air defence. On the morning of October
9th, the attack continued with airborne landing at strategic areas in order to seal off
important areas for the initial landing of follow-on forces by air, sea and land. One
day later, on the morning of October 10th, troops were landed in ports north and south
of Stockholm.
Figure 1. The situation in the scenario at the start and Redland’s possible routes of advance
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HOW TO WIN IN COMBAT – AN IDEAL MODEL APPLIED IN A SCENARIO
Redland forces have since then been engaged in fighting with Blueland forces
and, on the morning of October 15th, the situation is depicted in the map in figure 1.
Redland forces have been defeated south of Stockholm but they have established
a bridgehead on the coast north of Stockholm. A Redland marine infantry brigade
is defending the bridgehead and, so far, two mechanised brigades have been
successfully landed and deployed. There is also an attack helicopter company
based in the area. One of the brigades (143rd) is defending and the other one (57th)
is preparing to attack, probably in a western direction, and is estimated to be ready
to start an attack early on October 17th. The 2nd echelon is still waiting for transport
in harbours in Redland and the remaining part of the enemy army corps consists of
one to two armoured brigades and two mechanised brigades. On the Blueland side,
there is still a battle group in scattered defence against the landed enemy and the city
of Uppsala is defended. The defense is estimated to hold till October 16th but not
longer. Stockholm is defended by a smaller Blueland force. Redland airborne troops
landed in Köping and are engaged by a Blueland battalion. Two Blueland brigades
are advancing towards the bridgehead. The 2nd Mechanised brigade is arriving from
the west on October 15th –16th and the 3rd Mechanised brigade is arriving from the
north on October 16th –17th. Another mechanised brigade is estimated to arrive from
the south but not before October 19th – 20th.
Start situation in the scenario
The overall current situation (at the start of the scenario) is depicted in the map in
figure 1. Our focus is on the 1st Mechanised battalion on the Blueland side and on the
2nd Mechanised Battalion on the Redland side.
The 1st Mechanised battalion is a part of the Blueland 2nd Mechanised brigade. The
brigade consists of three mechanised battalions and one motorised battalion, one artillery
battalion, one engineer battalion, one logistics battalion, one reconnaissance company
and one air defence company. The brigade commander’s task is to prevent Redland units
from advancing over the Västerås – Fagersta – Avesta line (see blue shadow line in f
igure 1) before October 21st. The brigade should also be prepared to support the 3rd
Mechanised brigade with one mechanised battalion with 48 hours’ notice starting from
October 18th at the earliest and be prepared to attack in or north of Stockholm.
The Blueland brigade commander’s plan for the main task is to delay Redland
from advancing to the west along two main routes. On the southern route is the
1st Mechanised battalion and on the northern route is the 4th Motorised battalion. Those
two battalions are tasked to advance to the east and capture two key terrain areas
(Järlåsa and Örsundsbro, see figure 2) and prepare for a delaying operation towards
the west in order to create time for defensive preparations by the two remaining
battalions in the 2nd Mechanised brigade (see figure 2). On the southern route, the
2nd Mechanised battalion has been tasked to delay the enemy from advancing through
its area beginning October 17th at 1800 hours and for at least 48 hours.
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Figure 2. Set up situation on October 16th 0600 hours at the blue side when the scenario starts
When this scenario begins, it is the morning of October 16th. The 1st Mechanised
battalion is deployed according to the map in figure 4. It has received its orders from
the brigade and has developed a plan and is prepared to issue battalion operational
orders to start accomplishing its task:
1st Mechanised battalion
– Capture and defend the bridges in Örsundsbro with the purpose of creating
time for the 2nd Mechanised brigade’s preparations for a delaying operation towards
the west.
– Prepare the bridges in Örsundsbro for destruction.
– Be prepared to delay enemy advancement in own area of responsibility.
– Be prepared to be brigade reserve and initiate an attack 6 hours after brigade
orders have been issued.
Opposing the 1st Mechanised battalion is Redland’s 2nd Mechanised battalion
which is also tasked with capturing Örsundsbro and advancing west to break through
the line between Västerås and Fagersta, in order to create an advantageous position
for the next brigade to explore west. None of the sides know about the other side’s
plan and task. This is the starting point of our analysis of the seven steps in the
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HOW TO WIN IN COMBAT – AN IDEAL MODEL APPLIED IN A SCENARIO
ideal model to be operationalised in the tactical plan for the Blueland 1st Mechanised
battalion. There is, of course, a lot more information needed than this in order to
make a battalion battle plan, but this should be sufficient for our purposes in order
to apply and discuss some principles and derive the ideal model. When the scenario
starts, it is the morning of October 16th. Redland’s 2nd Mechanised battalion is
deployed according to the map in figure 3. It has received its orders from the brigade
and developed a plan and is prepared to issue battalion operational orders to start
accomplishing its task:
2nd Mechanised battalion
– Advance rapidly and secure the bridges in Örsundsbro with the purpose of
creating different routes of advance west.
– Destroy the enemy between Uppsala and Västerås with the purpose of creating
a breakthrough west for the brigade.
– Be prepared to delay enemy advancement in own area of responsibility.
Figure 3. Set up situation on October 16th at 0600 hours at the red side when the scenario starts
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Figure 4. Set up in detail of the situation on October 16th at 0600 hours at the blue side when the
scenario starts
Applying the ideal model’s steps in the scenario
So far, the previous discussion has been about the ideal model, the scenario, and the ideal
model as a hypothesis. The purpose of this paper is to show how the ideal model can and
should be expressed in a given scenario. There are more or less an open ended number of
opportunities for each commander to act within the scenario. So which act is superior to
other acts? If both sides conduct the same maneuver, who is winning then?
Step 1. To compare and validate Modern System deployment of the force and use
of the maneuver tactics in the scenario
The deployment of own troops as a starting point is fundamental when it comes to
gaining an advantage later on. A skillful deployment itself is a strategy (Jomini 1987),
reweaving each commander’s inner thoughts and knowledge of the core essences in
tactics. Commanders must choose an idea in advance of a sequence of performances
and hold on to that idea until it needs to be reviewed and adapted to new circumstances,
new decision points and eventually new tasks. If one or both commanders are able
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HOW TO WIN IN COMBAT – AN IDEAL MODEL APPLIED IN A SCENARIO
to reach into the opponent’s rear in a deep maneuver and achieve a surprise, it will
correlate to the ideal model and, as an expected result, eventually lead to organisational
breakdown on the other side. Biddle (2004) points to the importance of the force’s
employment in the battlefield in order to both preserve its strength against attrition and
concentrate force to accomplish (or resist) breakthrough. In the scenario, this would be
measureable as how the tacticians handle their resources and, as one negative outcome,
they risk losing their freedom of action and initiative. To correlate to optimal tactical
behaviour in battle, the first criteria would be measurable: how the force is deployed on
the battlefield influenced by knowledge of your enemy and having full confidence in
your own capabilities. Also, making the best use of their units and other means requires
knowledge of various systems and functions within the force. However (Dixon 1976),
a tendency to underestimate the enemy would be the opposite of optimal tactical
behaviour, according to Dixon.
At the beginning of the scenario, both sides lack intelligence and therefore
need to gain intelligence initially by a broad collection. During the morning of
16th October, each side initially needs to use a probe attack using e.g. UAV, request
for brigade level sources and reserves if a gap is found or as a counter measure.
Initially, tempo is of greatest importance for reaching the bridge area in Örsundsbro
(figures 3 and 4) and, when the area is secured, for exploiting and defending that area.
By defending the area, fixed positions can be used. Also, a more mobile and flexible
defence is preferred to preserve freedom of action to counter attack. If one side in
this situation is fixed in defensive positions without time spent in field preparation,
they could risk encirclement or find the opponent maneuvering deep in their rear
area. A battalion should initially use at least 2–3 of its companies in the probe attack
in order to find a route of advance into the opponent’s rear. The rest of the battalion
should be considered as reserves to use as a spearhead when opportunity occurs. In
contrast to the assumed successful method of the ideal model to achieve success in
battle, the player can be too careful in his/her advance towards the goals or ignore
the intelligence of the enemy maneuver.
Step 2. To compare and validate aggressive reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance in the scenario
This leads to the next step in the ideal model, aggressive ground reconnaissance
to find the opponent and eventually reveal his/her intent. By using aggressive
reconnaissance, either side tries to find gaps or weakly defended areas in order
to conduct maneuvers and reach deep into the enemy’s vulnerabilities, disrupt his
or her will to fight and interfere with the opponent’s decisions at a high tempo.
When the opponent is disrupted, mentally or physically, either commander starts
to out-pace the opponent and achieves the ability to implement action faster than
the opponent. It is risky to act on incomplete information and then wait and see
what will happen. Initially, both sides need more information about their opponent
and the terrain. Detailed questions must be answered quickly and with accuracy. To
find out where the enemy’s main body is, his direction or even his or her intent is
decisive information and should have an impact on the next move or act. This can be
visualised in the scenario by how early the commanders discover their opponent’s
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units and intentions and how they explore the intelligence and information to
influence the development of events. By using the scenario, individual commanders,
officers, groups of officers and staff elements could test implementing their plans.
During the implementation phase, incidents of situations for re-planning will occur
constantly. Situations like that usually occur automatically in a scenario. It is of
great importance that the scenario corresponds to the dynamic aspects of problem-solving and enables visualising frictions clearly. Both sides acting in a scenario must
act without knowing everything about the opponent and must continue aggressive
reconnaissance in order to build up a more solid intelligence picture of the situation.
The constant flow of feedback from new information as a result of acting gives new
input to each side to make new decisions and validates how well each commander
avoids being surprised by the enemy. Two to three companies from a battalion can be
used initially in an aggressive reconnaissance pull or push. As a hypothesis of optimal
tactical behaviour in battle, the second step in the ideal model would be measurable
by how successful each commander is in finding gaps for maneuvers and avoiding
a surprising enemy breakthrough and also blinding the enemy. The negative opposite
is a failure to make adequate reconnaissance and a failure to exploit a situation gained
and a tendency to “pull one’s punches” rather than conduct a massive and decisive
reconnaissance-push. Conducting an aggressive reconnaissance probe can turn into
a full engagement. Each player should have a clear intent of how intensive their
engagement should be or they risk losing tempo or taking losses. The opposite would
be (Dixon 1976) to reject or ignore new information and failure to make adequate
reconnaissance.
Step 3. To compare and validate how much the opponent is out-paced in the
scenario
In addition to an aggressive reconnaissance, it must be properly balanced with
reserves standing by to rapidly exploit the gaps and breakthroughs that are created
or spotted. In this way, a fast maneuver sent into the depths of enemy territory will
affect their behaviour negatively. A desired result of a maneuver in depth is that
the opponent’s decisions are too late and that prevents the opposing forces units
from regrouping in time to new places with the correctly balanced resources. When
one side is not prepared to fight in a new unexpected situation, then they would
be more or less surprised. As a result of being surprised, counter action is taken
too late and an out-pace situation occurs. If this moment is reached, the initiative
can be amplified by a breakthrough and exploitation phase. If any side does not
have time to make decisions and give orders to their units more skillfully than the
opponent, he or she will ultimately be left behind in decisions on tempo. In this
step, both sides’ understanding of the tactical decisions are measured. It means, for
example, how adept they are at understanding the enemy organisation, technology
and modus operandi but also full knowledge of their own capacities. If the battalion
is able to hold 2-3 companies in reserve during this step in the ideal model, then it
can be implemented. If the player is not able to avoid a frontal assault, especially on
the opponent’s strongest point, the risk of losing tempo or wastage of resources is
imminent.
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HOW TO WIN IN COMBAT – AN IDEAL MODEL APPLIED IN A SCENARIO
Step 4. To compare and validate how well deep and fast maneuver in the enemy
gaps is performed in the scenario
When exploitation occurs with follow-on forces, the breakthrough gap could be
widened and enemy forces risk being captured in encirclement. If the enemy is in
disorder, too late in taking up new fighting positions, is unable to conduct counter-attacks or pinned down lacking the ability to regain the initiative, then the unit
reaches a point of culmination that ultimately can lead to organisational breakdown.
This means that maneuver is critical because one side can fight from positions superior
to the other side and this could lead to surprise and to exploiting a breakthrough in
the situation. In order to measure if any side succeeds in finding superior fighting
positions and utilising them, these criteria must be visualised in the scenario. Both
sides need to seek fast and deep maneuvers through gaps that reach into the depths of
the opponent’s vulnerabilities. We need to measure in time how the acting sides in the
scenario are affected by the surprise from an unexpected maneuver. Does the effect
last or is it quickly transient? In a scenario discussion, the decision-making process
must be in real time and allow both sides to act in parallel. Now, here is one important
detail to take into consideration, commanders should not be tested as to how fast they
are able to move military units on a map or in a fictitious scenario, but how fast
they take decisions and act in a logical way. The side which manages to get into the
depths without lingering in too much friction and involuntary engagements creates
opportunities. These options of possibilities could be a selection of value targets, e.g.
soft targets, selection of favourable terrain, opportunities to disrupt the opponent’s
movement or to continue past the opponent’s positions. If the maneuver successfully
influences the opponent’s supply, combat support or the ability to coordinate his or
her unit’s needs to be protected or regrouped to new locations. When some or all
maneuver companies (rifle, mechanised or tank companies) in a battalion are able
to find and destroy soft targets to cripple the opposing sides’ abilities to fight and
maneuver, then that side should have an upper hand over its opponent correlated to
the ideal model. A failure would be not to explore a situation described above and
stall the maneuver. Also the capability to adjust the plan’s flexibility to maximise the
use of opportunity would be measured (Dixon 1976).
Step 5. To compare and validate how well a surprise attack is explored in the
scenario
Enemy units that are not prepared to fight but are attacked are considered to be
surprised. Key units like combat support, supply or command elements would be
referred to as soft targets, although organic vehicles are often lightly armoured. If the
ability to make use of indirect fire disappears, when e.g. a mortar unit is destroyed, the
defender makes it difficult to regain the initiative or to conduct further maneuvers. If
the ability to maneuver into new advantageous fighting positions disappears, the risk
increases for units taking unnecessary losses when exposed without support or being
encircled. A lack of combined arms hampers the ability to fight and units without support
risk a premature culmination. If one side manages to unravel a defending position and
push them on the retreat and pursue them, it can create a shock and paralysis of the
opponent’s will to fight. If one side is successful in maneuvering into the enemy rear
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LARS HENÅKER
area and finds unprepared units or soft targets to destroy, then a well surprised attack
has occurred. At this moment, when neither side is using this opportunity, the risk is
that the opponent’s side regains from the surprise and counter-attacks. This is a crucial
moment for both sides in avoiding defeat or gaining victory.
Step 6. To compare and validate the exploitation of a successful surprise attack
and create shock in the scenario
At least one maneuver company from the battalion should be able to exploit the
successful attack and use the breakthrough in a skillful way. Attacking new targets or
capturing key terrain and destroying escaping enemy units in order to maximise the
benefits from skillful maneuvers would be measures in line with the theory. A player
who is able to keep the momentum in decision-making and conduct accurate action
will avoid his/her own culmination but find new fighting positions, refill supplies and
combined arms in a skillful way. To measure this, we need to compare the plan and goals
with the actual outcome of completed action and its effects. Both Collins (2010) and
Leonhard (1994) highlight the importance of striving to achieve surprise and explore
the current situation. As a hypothesis of optimal tactical behaviour in battle, the sixth
measurable step from the ideal model is that commanders should avoid premature
culmination and continue fighting escaping enemy units as long as possible. The
opposite is a failure to make use of surprise or deception and starting to find scapegoats
for his/her military set-backs by not being able to maneuver into advantageous
combat positions (Dixon 1976). Even worse, if one side is not able to combine arms
correctly to accomplish new tasks and loses the ability to lead his/her battalion, defeat
is near. Leonhard (1994) highlights four different and important temporal aspects,
duration, frequency, sequence and opportunity. Leonhard (1994) defines the concept
of opportunity as a time-sensitive decision point. It applies to all command levels.
According to Leonhard (1994), and well in line with the theory of dynamic decisionmaking presented previously, combat by nature creates opportunities to act decisively.
The commander must identify every opportunity and consciously select which one
to explore and then commit fully to the situation until the opportunity has passed. To
validate this, it is of importance to identify all the opportunities and measure their
outcome in the scenario. Brehmer (1995, p. 114) points out that the decision maker
must develop a model to master the problems caused by the feedback delays of how
the system he/she is trying to influence. Brehmer and Thunholm (2011) also support
the idea of the ability to make timely decisions. The commanders (tacticians) must
know how to act in the current situation but must also keep a clear picture of what
he/she would like to achieve later on during the battle. To measure this, we need to see
how the commanders use reserves, reconnaissance, surface and gaps, combined arms,
engagement and disengagement in a proactive way.
Step 7. To compare and validate the enemy organisational breakdown in the
scenario
When a side has maneuvered into such advantageous positions that the opposing
side is not able to counter-attack or defend in an organised manner, then he/she
has lost the battle. In the scenario, one side should be able to maneuver at least
half of their own battalion in a controlled way and also be able to attack or defend
20
HOW TO WIN IN COMBAT – AN IDEAL MODEL APPLIED IN A SCENARIO
when necessary. The losing side is not able to conduct any organised fight. The side
whose units are scattered, oppressed, beaten and in shock have lost the battle. Collins
(2010) and Biddle (2004) emphasise superior elán (sometimes referred to as better
quality of troops in terms of morale, cohesion, fighting spirit, etc.). This is reflected
in how some units with better quality will be used and how a balanced combination
of different devices optimised from occasion during the wargame. Collins (2010)
concludes that it is often after a force has been disintegrated that it suffers the
greatest losses of materials and soldiers. To measure the degree of decomposition
and its effects in the scenario, effects can enhance the temporary elevated levels
of losses. As a hypothesis of optimal tactical behaviour in battle, the seventh and
last measurable step occurs when enemy units no longer counter-attack or defend
themselves in an organised way. This amplifies the failure due to the indecisiveness
and a tendency to abdicate from the role of decision-maker and no ability to act.
Conclusions: How to use the ideal model applied in a scenario
A number of tactical criteria or steps in the ideal model have now been utilised in
a realistic fictitious scenario. This enables us to use all the ideal model’s steps
in a wargame to verify if some or all of the steps are valid or not. The question arises:
how can we be so sure of these steps? Is it possible to actually evaluate some or all
steps? Through the study of historical battles, we can determine that certain criteria have
been successful. In order to verify the produced military historical criteria, we will also
make use of wargames to confirm or deny the validity of criteria. The ideal model is
not a “law” or the ultimate truth but more of an empirical path of knowledge. Tactical
criteria can be tested in various scenarios but need to be measured more thoroughly.
The tactical scenario is operationalised in the narrative based on conventional
warfare in future high-intensity and high-tech level conflicts. The geographic areas
are Northern and Western Europe. Furthermore, the scope of some of the scenarios
is that a major power is at war with a smaller nation. This article has not studied the
criteria of success except for conventional warfare. How is it possible to conduct
a breakthrough in “hybrid” warfare or in a low conflict with only insurgents? These
questions are not answered in this article, although the ideal model could of course
be tested in other types of conflict as well.
By using a scenario, officers can act against each other and be examined as to
how well the various success factors give divergent outcomes. The ideal tactician’s
ability to fully utilise all the success criteria at the same time may not exist in reality,
but still can be an optimal value to measure up in a scenario. All the ideal tactician’s
positive abilities to use success criteria are measured against how officers understand
and act in a scenario and what level of efficiency is achieved. It is important that the
scenario is conducted as a duel to create the conditions necessary for examining
the criteria. Mainly dynamic behaviour is pursued when tacticians are trying to
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LARS HENÅKER
outmaneuver each other and get in positions where the opponent both feels defeated
and has lost resources and has been denied reaching their goals.
The assessment of the officers’ tactical skills and knowledge during the
implementation of the scenario is conducted with an assessment of each participant
by the senior tactical experts and the result from e.g. wargames or field exercises.
Using the ideal model profile, we assess the officers’ skills in conducting and
accomplishing their tasks. From these assessments we can evaluate which of the
criteria were used more or less frequently and to what extent they were used and
when they led to achieving victory in the scenario. Eventually, the officers’ own
progression can be evaluated when tactical scenarios are conducted at different
times. Above all, the scenario provides us with two important things, the first is how
we can use and master all the steps in the ideal model, and the other is that we are
able to evaluate the development curve and its progression in our officers.
Future research path: Wargame method to evaluate scenario
The operationalisation is done by inserting criteria for success in combat into a wargame.
The wargame will create results and its outcome could be evaluated. This is one method
for using and considering the criteria but also for evaluating officers’ tactical ability at
a given time. With that comes knowledge and opportunity to have a focused approach
to improve future education. Even regulations and doctrines would be affected, since
they can be reviewed on the basis of the ideal model of successful tactical criteria.
Testing the ideal model will reveal if commanders that tend to win against their
opponent act according to the ideal model or not (or to what extent they follow
the model). In order to conduct such experiments, a wargame or a tactical battle
simulation are used to simulate all possible events in the scenario. The wargame
needs to be two-sided and played in real-time in order to mimic a realistic command
and control situation. The research effort will be to use our criteria to measure the
implementation or use of the model and improve training of officers in one of their
core competences, commanding battles.
The experiments are carried out mainly with the support of computer simulated
wargames but can also be carried out by using analog wargames. An important factor is
to be able to simulate and create the effect of human behaviour during combat. Effects
such as surprise and shock must be simulated in order to test some of the criteria.
Would it also be possible to implement more effective training for officers and
the training of military staffs and commanders of various units? If it is possible to
evaluate tactical quality of our officers, we would have the opportunity to choose the
most appropriate officers for their tactical skills and not because they are proficient in
other skills, such as administrative skills. Tactical skill is one of the core competencies
of an officer and a large part of his/her training focuses on developing and improving
this ability. Officers must constantly train and develop their core competencies to
maintain their skills in tactics and the operational art of war.
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HOW TO WIN IN COMBAT – AN IDEAL MODEL APPLIED IN A SCENARIO
This paper has focused on the designed scenario in a specific military tactical situation
and how it is possible to evaluate how well an ideal model of winning battles correlates
when commanders start to act. This needs to be developed further and tested. The test
of how valid this hypothesis about winning in combat is can be tried out in a wargame
environment. This article will not go deeper into the design of the wargame but it needs
to be explained thoroughly. Answers concerning how we will increase our opportunities
to achieve victory in battle would be one of the main questions in future research.
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