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STANLEY, James Grosvenor, 1937UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY VIS-A-VIS
WESTERN EUROPE DURING THE JOHNSON
ADMINISTRATION; A CHANGE IN PRIORITIES?
The American University, Ph.D., 1976
Political Science, international law
and relations
Xerox University Microfilms,
Ann Arbor, Michigan 4810e
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
VIS-A-VIS WESTERN EUROPE DURING THE JOHNSON
ADMINISTRATION*
A CHANGE IN PRIORITIES ?
by
James G. Stanley
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
International Studies
Signatures of
Chairmani
lean of/the/Sfchool
Date
1976
The American University
Washington, D.G. 20016
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
s :i% \
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This writer wishes to express appreciation to those who have
been most constructive, helpful and supportive in their advice
throughout the duration of this enterprise.
First, I wish to
express gratitude to Dr. Marian Irish for serving as the Chair­
person of the dissertation committee until her retirement in
May 1974, In her quiet manner she gave both encouragement and
instruction.
I wish also to express appreciation to Dr, Abdul A,
Said, who willingly assumed the Chairmanship of the committee, and
for his continued support and confidence in a fledgling graduate
student of years past.
To Dr. William Cromwell this writer wishes
to express grateful appreciation for being most helpful in giving
guidance and direction in the preparation of this paper.
This
writer is also indebted to Dr. Theodore Couloumbis who, while
involved in a very busy schedule, consented to fill the vacancy on
the committee caused by the retirement of Dr. Irish.
But most of all I am deeply grateful to my wife Carol
and to
David and Linda for their patience and understanding while "Dad"
was completing his journey and they were missing their vacations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION...................................... 1
II.
UNITED STATES CONCERN IN WESTERN EUROPE:
19^5-1963. 8
A, Western Europe— Central to United States
Foreign Policy, , ,
........................ 8
B, Perceived Vital Interests of the United
States in Western Europe
1, The Truman Administration............... 23
2, The Eisenhower Years.
...........
75
3, The Kennedy Interlude.............. . , ll6
Conclusion, , , , , , , ,
III,
...........
l6l
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE JOHNSONIAN ERA:
1963— 1968: ANALYTIC APPROACH................... I66
A, Internal and Special Interests
Economic Interests, , ,
United States Force Levels in Europe,
B, International and Foreign Policy Factors,
, 174
,, , 206
, , 232
NATO Policy and Charles DeGaulle...........234
United States, Détente andEîurope...........272
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. , .
,, , 295
Vietnam:
,. , 325
IV, CONCLUSION:
Crisis of Commitment (?), ,
A "NEGLECTED" EUROPE (?)............. 357
V. BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................... 358
LIST OF CHARTS
PAGE
Total Statements by President Lyndon B. Johnson
on Foreign Policy, I963-I969. . . . . .
.........
. .
34?
by President Johnson, 1963-19&9, . . . . . . . . . . . .
349
"Major Statements" on foreign policy issues
"Brief Statements" on foreign policy issues by
President Johnson, I963-I969.
.........
350
Presidential Press Conferences and Interviews,
1963-1969......................................... 352
I,
IMTRCffiUCTIOf
Did the United States, during the Johnson Administration
(1963-1969), change the basic commitment of a European-oriented
foreign policy?
That is, did the United States— because of its
prolonged and complicated involvement in Vietnam, and because of
the resulting domestic distress at home— so shift the priorities
of her foreign policy that the Interests of Western Europe were
neglected?
To state It another way, could America's European
allies reasonably complain (notwithstanding repeated assurances
from the Johnson Administration) that NATO had lost its priority
in the formulation of American foreign policy?
As part of a statement made In Brussels on 13 November I968
Representative Paul Findley (R-Illlnois) stated that during the
Johnson Administration the NATO Alliance had "fallen on days of
neglect," ^
He continued by pledging that the President-elect,
Richard M. Nixon, would once again give priority to Western Europe.
2
Also, Stanley Hoffmann in Gulliver's Troubles
argued that the
United States had neglected Europe and that a new approach was
necessary to Insure the continued cooperation between the Western
European states and the United States.
Similar arguments can be
found elsewhere In the literature during the period of the Johnson
^New York Times. November 14, I968.
2
Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of
American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., I96SJ,
'
Administration,
3
The basic assumption underlying the above positions suggests
that during the middle and late 1960's the United States pursued
other interests at the expense of its European obligations and
relationships.
It is the object of this dissertation to clarify
and examine United States' interests in Western Europe, weighing
them against other American internal and foreign policy concerns.
Only then can it be determined whether the European loss of
priority is apparent or real.
The initial question to be asked is»
important to the United States?
why is Western Europe
Are the policies which are directed
toward Western Europe central to United States foreign policy?
It is necessary first to consider how the pre-Johnson adminis­
trations approached Western Europe:
the decisions they emphasized.
the objectives they sought and
It is thus the purpose of the first
part of this work to review the historical relationship with Europe
of each of the three administrations which preceded the Johnson
Administration:
The Truman Administration (1947-1953), the Eisen­
hower Administration (1953-1961), and the Kennedy Administration
(1961-1963) in order to extablish the firm commitment of American
foreign policy to strengthen America’s relationship with Europe.
Such a review provides a basic background against which an
analysis of the Johnson Administration can be made more adequatelly.
3
See, for example, Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., Last Chance in
Europe (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, I967).
If this dissertation is to find whether, in fact, there existed
a neglect of Europe, a reordering or a redirection of priorities,
then a few of the primary elements, both domestic and foreign,
that affect America's role in international politics must be deter­
mined and analyzed.
Domestic issues— like the special interests of particular
groups within a nation— the business community, for example— may
also affect the direction of international politics.
A second
domestic influence of the 1960's, one that increasingly claimed
the attention of the makers of foreign policy, was the internal
debate over maintaining the American force levels in Europe as an
outgrowth of the continued debate over the costs of Vietnam.
It
is important to understand the development of each of these domestic
concerns during the Johnson and pre-Johnson Administrations if we
are to understand the Johnson Administration's conduct of foreign
affairs.
Non-domestic concerns even more obviously and directly affected
America's role in international politics»
the vital issue of Amer­
ican relations with NATO and with President Charles De Gaulle; the
American desire for detente; the question relating to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (which raised further questions as to the
basic compatibility of American policies with those of the nations
of Western Europe); and the impact of the United States' involvement
in Vietnam upon Ekiropean policy.
America's response to these policy
issues and problems within the Atlantic structure must be analyzed
to see if they reflect a neglect of American-European relationships.
In this dissertation, conclusions concerning President Johnson's
European policies will be drawn from an analysis of these domestic
and foreign influences on those policies.
Inevitably, a number of
related questions will claim attention in the course of this study:
Was there a lessening European confidence in United States leader­
ship?
What were the implications of Johnson's policies?
Finally,
was it possible— or desirable— for President Nixon, during the
first year of his administration, to effect a realignment of atti­
tudes and policies?
A note of caution and clarification must be made.
The issue
of "neglect" (or the loss of policy emphasis) has been treated in
this dissertation in terms of the macro-level as is indicated by the
statements of President Lyndon B. Johnson and other officials of his
administration, the lack of visits to Europe, the concern over the
Vietnam conflict, detente, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as
well as other domestic and foreign issues.
However, if this research *
was more behaviorally and comparatively oriented some of the following
types of analysis covering the period from 1945— 19&3 would have been
incorporated:
comparing statistics of United States trade and invest­
ments (as a slmre of the total) with Europe demonstrating their in­
creasing or decreasing levels ; comparing visits by top administration
officials to Europe (as a percentage of the total visits); comparing
United States troop levels both in Europe and in other parts of the
world ; and, comparing the share of statements and press conference
responses of previous American leacDers which were devoted to European
issues ; and other related issues.
Further, it must be noted that
"neglect" of the United States toward Europe is, in part, a function
of the European response to the American presence which has changed
as Europe became more politically stable, economically viable and
as it progressed toward greater integration.
Such a study as described above has value for a number of rea­
sons.
This study provides an opportunity to survey and analyze
United States-Western European foreign relations during the years
of the Johnson Administration within a limited focus of that rela­
tionship.
Secondly, this study provides the means by which to examine
foreign policy in terms of the demands placed upon it by domestic
experiences and pressures, an important ingredient in American society
of the 1960's.
Such a study.also opens for analysis the credibility
and desirability of such concepts as "massive retaliation," "detente,"
and "atlantic partnership." Along with promoting a greater under­
standing of the relationships which have existed between the United
States and Europe, this study has produced for the author— a history
and social studies teacher— a very useful and more general result:
a sharpened perception of political reality.
The research for this study has been long
ficult.
Working witha recent time period has
attendant to writing "instant history."
and, at times, dif­
created problems
First, working with the
Johnsonian period has created difficulty obtaining information in
more sensitive areas of United States foreign policy.
To illustrate,
papers and documents housed in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Texas
were not available, though permission to use them was sought.
A second problem involved the location of American public opinion
attitudes regarding American policies vis-a-vis Western Europe during
the period covered by this study, I963-I969, Numerous sources were
evaluated including the U.S.I.A., the Library of Congress, the Harris
Poll, the Gallup Poll, the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the
Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Inc., as well as other sources
without finding any material which would bear substantively upon the
dissertation.
Thirdly, living in Canton, Ohio,
has imposed limitations upon the
quality and availability of library resources.
However, the Malone
College Library, the Canton City Library and the Mount Union College.
Library have been freely and liberally used.
An abundance of import­
ant resource material was obtained from the Department of State, from
information services of various European embassies, from Congressional
committee hearings, reports, documents, and statements, and from
numberous memoirs, first-hand records, and other writings of adminis­
trations and administrative actions since 1945.
A final problem in the development of this dissertation must be
identified.
I am now convinced that the titile chosen for the disser­
tation involved too broad a topic for a dissertation and any of the
separate chapters would have served as a more responsible
research
topic by providing a greater opportunity for in-depth research.
The original proposal for this dissertation provided for aji
extensive discussion of a number of topics.
to be all inclusive.
But there was no attempt
To topics chosen were those which the writer
wished to explore in the pursuit of his inquiry— "NATO," "detente,"
"The Non-proliferation Treaty," and the impact of American involve-
ment in Vietnam— rather than all possible topics concerning relattions
between the United States and Europe,
It was believed, in making
the original proposal, that the topics indicated would be more than
sufficient to resolve reasonably the question raised as the focal
point of this study and to permit the arrival at reasonable conclu­
sions.
Such topics as economic issues were generally avoided because
of the writer's unfamiliarity with the complexities of international
economics.
As a result the emphasis is placed upon the political
aspects of the topics discussed.
Also, time limitations and availability of material created
a
bias toward the use of printed materials attainable in the United
States.
Information concerning European attitudes on specific issues
during the Johnson Administration was virtually impossible to find;
the writer was forced to rely on such publications as the German Press
Review, the British Weeklies, and the Bulletin— all publications from
the information offices of the embassies of the Federal Republic of
Germany and of Great Britain.
This writer is aware, however, that to
rely too heavily upon these sources as a firm basis of German or
British opinion is a risky business at best.
The choice of approach to such a sizable topicwas more simply
determined.
The traditional approach chosen was one primarily of
personal style, a style which permitted the writer
to progress one
step at a time, more in keeping with the time available for working
on this particularly study.
A consideration of all significant
aspects of United States-European relations was, of course, an
impossibility.
It should be noted, however, that this problem has
been a constant and strong source of frustration.
II. UNITED STATES CONCERN IN WESTERN EUROPE: 1945-1963
A, Western EuropeCentral to United States Foreign Policy
At the outset, It Is Important to raise three fundamental
questions:
Was a reordering of priorities In United States foreign
policy under the Nixon Administration necessary?
Did the United
States downgrade Its commitments and relations with Western Europe
during the Johnson Administration?
If the latter Is so, was this
a result of Its pressing commitment In Southeast Asia?
Before these questions can be answered, a prior question must
be considered, namely:
national Interests?
has Europe remained central to United States'
To answer this a discussion of three factors
In the United States-European relationship Is In order as they
relate to the period ending In 1963.
The first factor Is the trad­
itional reasons for close association with Europe, and It Is the
purpose of this chapter to discuss such Items as the cultural and
historical association between America and Europe; secondly, the
nature of the economic commitment; thirdly, Europe's geographical
position vls-à-vls the Soviet Union and the United States; and
lastly, the political basis of United States foreign policies.
Including the resistance to Communist aggression and the support
of European unity.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has been con­
fronted with pressures which have placed strain on the Republic
both at home and abroad.
Central to this tension has been the con­
frontation with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations over
conflicting interests stretching around the world.
This "cold war"
conflict has, in turn, necessitated new forms of power configurations
traditionally unacceptable to the United States.
The new bl-polar power alignment required new analyses of
values, objectives, and capabilities.
Further, the emphasis in
the location and in the intensity of the Cold War confrontation has
shifted from time to time; yet, for the United States the underlying
premise has remained constant: that irrespective of the major forces
or conditions at work around the world, Europe— especially Western
Europe— has remained the area of most critical foreign policy con­
cern for the United States, and Europe's security Its most vital
foreign Interest,
It Is reasonable to conclude that World Wars I and II demon­
strate a direct relation between the security of the United States
and the security of Western Europe, and that the nations on both
sides of the Atlantic are bound together by a natural community of
Interests,
In support of this position, former Secretary of State
George C. Marshall, speaking In 1951 before a Congressional com­
mittee concerned with assigning American combat forces to Europe,
observed
. . . the action of the Senate In 1949 when
Itvoted 82
to 13 In favor of theNorth Atlantic Treaty, and then 55 to
24 In favor of the mllltary-ald program was, I took It to be,
a confirmation of theview that the Independence of the North
Atlantic community of nations was of vital Importance not
only to the further development of free and democratic govern­
ments but also to the security of this country. . . . 1
U.S., Congress, Statement by George C. Marshall, "Assignment
of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty In the European Area."
Hearings, 82nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1951), PP, 38-42.
10
Since 1964 the view has been expressed that the United States
has lost Its primary concern for Western Europe and In Its place
has substituted the necessity of halting Communist aggression In
2
Southeast Asia.
High administrative officials supporting United
States Involvement In Vietnam elevated It to the level of ideologi­
cal conflict and Invoked national honor In seeking an "honorable
peace,"
Apprehension In Europe raised the Issue of potential
American over-commltment to an area of the world with question­
able strategic value while at the same time giving second place
to those matters which concerned the relationships between
Europeans and the United States.
These as well as other factors forced the United States during
the mld-1960's to re-examine Its European policy In order to meet
and consider some Issues confronting the Atlantic Community,
These
Issues Included monetary stability, the role of NATO In the 19?0's,
the balance of payments, Great Britain and the European Economic
Community, and the continuing problem of nuclear sharing.
In effect.
It was Important that a reordering of policy priorities take place
so as to reaffirm America's Involvement In the cultural, economic,
and political stability of Western Europe as the primary strategic
element of United States foreign policy,
A discussion of America's role In each of these three spheres—
Western European cultural stability, economic stability, and polit­
ical stability— will assist In presenting a more complete explan-
2
Two outstanding presentations of this view include: Charles
0. Lerche, Jr., Last Chance In Europe (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1967) and Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles (New York: McGrawHill Book Co., 1968).
11
at ion of the vital importance Western Europe has played in United
States foreign policy from 19^5 until I963. It is the first of
these to which we now turn.
The Historical Context
America's historical debt to Europe for its
traditions and
cultural contributions to American life is unquestioned.
It has
ranged over all areas of our cultural life— from political philos­
ophies, inventions, religious traditions, language, and national
holidays to the types of focds we enjoy.
The American, however, is the productof not one ethnic
tradition, but many, since 30 million Europeans from all parts of
that continent came to America between 1820 and 1920,
Since 1920,
particularly between the two world wars and immediately following
World War II, many more came seeking the challenge of a new life
and new opportunities.
It was appreciation of these facts that President Johnson
reminded his audience on 7 October I9661
., .Most of our fathers came ftom Europe— East or West,
North or South, They settled in London, Kentucky ; Paris,
Idaho; and Rome, New York, Chicago, with Warsaw, is one of
the great Polish cities of the world. And New York is the
second capital of half the nations of Europe....Americans and
all Europeems share a ccnnectlon which transcends political
differences. We are a single civlllzatlcn; we share a
commcn destiny; our future is a common challenge, 3
3
^Speech by President Lyndon B, Johnson to the National Con­
ference of Editorial Writers, New York City, October 7, 1966; Pres­
ident Johnson, "Making Europe Wholes An Unfinished Task," Department
of State Bulletin. October 24, I966, pp. 622-625,
12
President Johnson thus reaffirmed the view that the United States
has been a haven and a home for millions of people from all parts
of the world.
In addition to ethnic ties, the history of Europe has been a
very strong Influence upon the economic and political life of the
United States,
During the l?th and a major part of the 18th
centuries, the North American communities served as little more
than appendages of the major conflicting nations of Europei France,
England and Spain,
Through the early part of the 19th century, the
United States was able to avoid an implicating role in European
affairs.
This attempt to avoid European Involvements can be related
to two basic sources.
First was the pragmatic admonition in Presi­
dent George Washington's farewell address warning against becoming
Involved in the political and military difficulties ever present
in Europe,
Secondly, a large number of European immigrants during
the 18th and 19th centuries wished very much to reject Europe and
European systems; many immigrants came to America, primarily be­
cause the new world represented a break with the past and a hope
for the future.
Throughout the 19th century "xenophobia" was the result of
an exaggerated sense of American nationalism which overlooked
Improved relationships with Great Britain and other forms of diplo­
matic and commercial cooperation between the United States and the
nations of Europe,
Not until General Pershing and the American
Expeditionary Force arrived in wartc m Europe during World War I
was it publicly accepted that the United States was willing to
Intervene in European affairs.
13
During the 1930's a strong threat of totalitarianism in Europe
intensified two contradictory desires in American consciousness:
to remain out of any wax and to assist the democracies in Europe
to maintain their freedom and stability.
first, to be the answer.
Neutrality appeared, at
However, as conditions in Europe worsened.
President Roosevelt became convinced that a vigorous defense program
would not be sufficient — American security depended upon the
successful resistance of England, Prance and the Soviet Union to
German aggression.
President Roosevelt marked a decisive turn in
his policy when he called "a delusion" the idea that the United
States could exist as a lone island of "peace" in a world composed
of brute force.
Further, he pledged the United States to defend
American security by giving all-out aid to England and France, ^
Roosevelt's policy toward Russia, also, was pragmatic.
He
believed that Woodrow Wilson had failed disastrously during and
after World War I by taking a far too rigid and moralistic position
toward the Bolsheviks,
President Roosevelt was unwilling to repeat
this error, and he attempted to achieve a flexible and conciliatory
policy which would enable the two states to achieve viable, friendly
relationships.
His failure to achieve this goal set the stage for
the Cold War confrontation which placed Europe in the forefront of
United States priorities, ^
^Robert Divine, Roosevelt and World War II (Baltimore:
Hopkins Press, 1969)1 P. 31.
^Ibid.. p, 73.
Johns
14
There does exist a second consideration to the question of
Western Europe's importance to the United States,
While the
historical, ethnic, and cultural associations are important
inputs into this issue, they must give way to more important
pragmatic considerations.
Among these considerations are geogra­
phic factors and American financial interests in Europe,
The Geographical and Economic Context
The contributions of Europe as à geographic region and a
source of vast wealth have required the increased commitment 'of
the United States,
Being a world power requires action on a wide
range of issues and places, and the geographical position of
friendly states through 19&3 was a major concern of the United
States.
As a major section of the industrialized northern hemi­
sphere, Europe played a vital role in American considerations,
Europe is a continent with vast natural resources.
Since
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the peoples of Europe
have developed both their natural resources and their skilled, well?
educated workers to the point that these nations together now com­
prise an economic power center which is second only to that found
in North America,
Thus, the industrial development based upon
natural conditions has made Europe a strong stimulus to Americans
seeking new profits and markets.
Since 1945 this economic growth has resulted from a number
of factors: abundance of natural resources, a strong labor market,
advancing technology, advanced transportation and communication
-
., y
-
...
-
..........
15
systems, ready consumer markets, a strong Industrial base, a
flourishing world trade and vital American economic assistance.
Further, because of these conditions and the establishment of the
European Economic Community the nations of Western Europe became
a region of singular investment and sales opportunities for Amer­
ican commercial and business interests.
One measure of this factor is the growth in the value of United
States exports shipped to Europe during these years of 1945 through
1963. From 1947 until I96O the value of these exports remained
rather steady (only exceeding 6 billions of dollars in 195& and
1957) until i960 when the total value of exports to all European
nations increased to 7,405.6 millions of dollars, ^ Then by 1963
the total reached 8,737.7 millions of dollars,
A second criterion
which can help to explain the economic significance of Europe is
the value placed upon imports from the various European nations.
While in 1947 only 816,9 millions of dollars were imported from
Europe into the United States, by I963 that total had increased
to 4,810,7 millions, a figure which represents both slow but steady
growth in the European economic capacity to produce goods for export.
Further, the nations of Europe which represented the most steady
growth in their exports to the United States were West Germany
and Great Britain, exporting 212,3 millions and 485.3 millions
respectively in I952 but increasing that to I, 003,1 and 1 , 079,3
millions respectively in I963. ^
business Statistics. Department of Commerce, 1973, pp. 109
and 110.
^Ibid., pp. 114-115.
16
But the growth of American economic interest should not be so
narrowly defined,
A third and most significant indication of Amer­
ican economic interest in Europe can be shown by the extent to which
private international investment also expanded during this period,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
(in billions of dollars)
1930
8,00
1950
1955
i960
1963
11,79
19.40
32.78
40,69
Clearly the economic gains from trade and new business opportunities
impressed themselves upon American businessmen.
Of the 40,69 billions
of dollars in direct investment abroad in I963, approximately 30J6
g
went to Europe,
Also, between the years of 1958 and I967 American
corporations invested 10 billion dollars in Europe, more than one
third of their total investment abroad; and during the same decade
6,000 new businesses were started overseas by Americans, one-half
of which were in Europe,
Much of the rapid increase of economic involvement in Europe
after 1956 was in large measure due to a series of causes.
First,
by 1956 most Western European economies, having benefited earlier
from the Marshall Plan, had gained strength and relative stability,
A second fkctor was the establishment of the European Economic
Community, which opened new opportunities for American investments
and businessmen.
Finally, negotiations over tariff barriers cul-
g
Leo Model "The Politics of Private Foreign Investment"
Foreign Affairs. Vol. 45, No, 4 (July, I967), pp, 639-651,
17
ininating in the United States in the Trade Expansion Act of I962
provided a real stimulus for continued economic cooperation.
Also the impact of European regional organizations upon the
United States proved to be significant.
The United States actively
supported and encouraged the Western European states in their
attempts to join together to achieve mutual economic advantages
and growth.
This support was premised upon close geographical
proximity, common economic needs and the requirements of the Gold
War for rapid economic reconstruction, and stability.
This support
made possible the creation of regional economic organizations of
thirteen of the Western European states* the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the Buropeem Free Trade Area (EFTA), ^
The
nations involved have been able to achieve great economic advantages
enabling them to far outdistance the Eastern European counterpart,
Comecon, as well as providing the United States with opportunities
for economic investments and trade.
The lessening of Gold War tensions has permitted the seeking
of improved trade relations with the Eastern European nations, thus
increasing the hope and desire for not only improved conditiôns for
detente but at some distant time a non-divided Europe,
In the
development of a stable and economically prosperous Western Europe,
the United States played a major role; from the first United States
commitment under the Marshall Plan in 1947, the United States has
g
The founding members of the European Economic Community
included: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, The members of the European Free
Trade Association included: the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal,
18
encouraged regional organization and cooperation.
By I963 the
nations of Western Europe had become the single largest trading
bloc in the world.
On occasion this condition has proved frustrating
and disconcerting to United States policy makers; yet the nations
of Western Europe have remained, for the most part, faithful allies
in times of crisis and competitively cooperative in pursuing mutual
economic goals.
Economically, the point is quite clear:
the nations of Western
Europe and those that make up the Atlantic Community (which includes
Canada) by I963 had received the single, most significant share
of American business investments, of defense expenditures abroad,
and of the import-export trade.
Thus, until I963, Western Europe
continued to be, for the United States, one of the most significant
geographical, economic, and political areas of the world.
The Political Context
Political policies from 194-5 until 1963 remained relatively
constant in substance, with variations only in emphasis.
Also,
they appear to have been rather thematic in their recurrence.
were three major policies.
There
The first was a recognition of the
pragmatic international facts, namely, the need to halt Communist
extension and to deter its potential outbreak in Western Europe,
Secondly, the United States consistently pursued a policy of recon­
struction of individual nations in Western Europe but in a way that
would encourage rebuilding within a framework of regional cooperation.
Finally, United States foreign policy was based on a recognition
19
of the power realities of a bi-polar world in which the United
States was seeking arms limitations with the Soviet Union.
The
test ban agreement of 1963, the non-proliferation agreement and
a limited agreement on offensive weapons in the continuing SALT
talks
in a later period illustrate the continued pursuit of
detente.
During 1946 and 194? American concerns in Europe became in­
creasingly clear:
Europe, having been ravaged by the war, was in
a condition of imminent collapse; Communist parties in both France
and Italy prior to 194? achieved political successes growing from
their resistance roles against the Nazi occupations of World War
II; and the Soviet Army was in occupation of Central Europe,
Quick,
decisive action was believed necessary to prevent Communist expan­
sion through military actions or internal takeover and to promote
political and economic stability.
United States foreign policy thus became based upon a number
of presuppositions.
The United States formulated the position
that if the states of Western Europe were to play their proper role
in the world, the Europeans must bring together their strengths;
and in doing so, they must secure Britain as an integral part,
A
second presupposition enlarged the field of cooperative adventures ;
for it suggested that the security of both the United States and
of Europe depended upon maintaining close associations across the
Atlantic,
It could not be in the interest of either to threaten
the arrangements which gave security to free Europe,
^^Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,
20
The United States embarked also on a policy which placed re­
sponsibility on both Western Europe and the United States to assist
in constructing an international system from which aggressive uses
of force would be removed or at least severely limited.
In so doing
the United States attempted not only to unify Europe and strengthen
NATO’s defensive system but also to make overtures to improve EastWest relations.
In pursuing these objectives the United States wished for
Western Europe to fill the American need for "company" in the world.
What the United States needed was neither "yes-men" nor "straightmen" but responsible partners and critics able to see the world as
a whole and not from a narrow parochial view— able, that is, to
give not only advice and assistance, but also reproof and restraint,
Each of these interests has been of vital concern to United States
policy makers.
However, problems have always existed and new ones
are sure to develop between the United States and the European
allies; some degree of uneasiness will always be inevitable.
The United States was deeply involved with Western Europe
during the period of 19^5-1963.
There was involvement with the
nations of Europe through such formal organizations as NATO, OECD,
GATT, and many others of different and more specialized concerns.
Further, there was involvement in the Atlantic Community because
Francis M, Bator, "The Politics of Alliancei The United
States and Western Europe," in Kermit Gordon, ed,, Agenda for the
Nation, (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc,, 1968)7 p, 338,
21
the European peoples were our customers, suppliers, and competitors
in trade and technology ; and these European nations were partners
in deterring the Soviet Union from potential expansionism,
American policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany was a
further illustration of this condition.
United States policy
throughout the 1943-1963 period sought not only the unity of Europe
but also, at least rhetorically, the reunification of the German
state.
Further, this policy, reaffirmed by numerous crises (includ­
ing the most significant in I96I), supported the integrity and
security of West Berlin,
This was done to the point that American
prestige and national security was identified with the security
of West Berlin, a dramatic representation of American commitment
to the free nations of Western Europe,
Has Western Europe been vital to the United States?
At this
point in the analysis the response must be that it has been.
The
cultural, ethnic, and historical traditions have brought the United
States and the Europeans much closer together through their mutual
concerns and interests.
The considerations of economics, geography,
and politics have forced the United States to give strong emphasis
to its policies vis-a-vis Western Europe,
Although the concerns
of American foreign policy have been, since World War II those of
a wcnrld power, the main concern has been with the European con­
tinent,
It is there, if any place, where America must assert the
primacy of United States foreign policy.
The question, however, has been raised as to whether the United
States during the Johnson Administration did not, in fact, lose its
22
primary concern for Europe and place it elsewhere.
Before this
question can be dealt with in detail it is necessary to evaluate
and attempt to determine the perspective of each of the three pre­
ceding administrations I Truman's, Eisenhower's, and Kennedy's,
How did they view Europe?
Did these three administrations consider
Western Europe of initial value?
What were the policy priorities
which emerged from each administration as they related to Ehirope?
Perhaps, through the evaluation of these administrations, clues
can be found which will clarify the issue which has been raised.
B. Perceived Vital Interests
of the United States in Western Europe
1, The Truman Administration :
The Truman Doctrine
Following World War II Americans were slow to reëvaluate their
foreign policies in light of changing conditions in the international
system.
World-wide hostilities had caused the extensive commitment
of men and material to all comers of the world; but, with the
surrender of both Germany and Japan, the people of the United States
found themselves interested in resuming life which had been inter­
rupted by the war.
Not until the announcement of the Truman Doctrine
on 12 March 194? were the American people alerted to the responsi­
bilities of being a world power, won by virtue of being one of two
major powers to emerge from the conflict more powerful than when
they entered.
The change in the attitude of many Americans was
slow and grudging.
There appear to be a number of possible explanations for this
situation.
World War II had been waged, at least in the minds of
many, with the fervent hope of calling a halt to power politics
and restoring peaceful relations once again among nations,
A second
fkctor resulted from the strong association of the American people
with its wartime ally— the Soviet Union,
Re-education of the
American people to the changed conditions of international con­
frontation proved difficult but not impossible, as the eventual
acceptance of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan and the formula-
24
tlon of NATO clearly demonstrate.
American society had been disrupted by the complete mobiliza­
tion effort of the war, and there existed a desire to concern itself
once again with domestic needs,
A part of this feeling was expressed
in the public demand for the speedy demobilization of the military
forces within only a fey months of the close of war.
Finally, Con­
gress, in tune with their withdrawal oriented constituencies,
reduced the military budget hastily from $41 billion to $31.5
billion in 194?. ^
Combined with this strong movement towards withdrawal ftom
world affairs was the relative obliviousness of the American people
to the plight of the peoples of Europe,
of economic and political collapse.
Europe was on the verge
With virtually no economic
productiveness, the peoples of Europe had to purchase most of
their necessities from the United States, thereby creating yet a
further problem— a sizable "dollar gap,"
The threat created by the
potential collapse of Western Europe posed a fundamental question
for the American government : are Europe’s stability and security
vital to American security?
One commentator recognized the impli­
cations of Europe's weakness as this condition increasingly became
known during January and February of 194? i
Last week it was suddenly brought home to us that we are
now in the front line,,,.The crisis in Britain and France
pointed up a truth the United States knows but shrinks from
facing. They are primarily economic crises, signs of the
difficulty of treating post-war breakdown by democratic means.
^John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since WW II (New York:
Frederick A, Praeger, 1971), p. 32,
25
They reveal how battered and shaken are the old stronghdMs.,
of democracy in Europe, and how few these stronghold are.
Most of all they throw the ball to us, giving notice that if
freedom as we understand it is to survive, it's up to the
United States to save it,
Germany was divided and broken.
was in very bad condition,
strengthen itself.
The Netherlands, its empire gone,
Belgium was weak, not knowing how to
But, of greatest importance, Great Britain was
in desperate condition and no longer able to hold back threats to
Western civilization from around the world.
Only the United States
was in a position to halt these threats to Western Europe, and, as
seen by many, the threats to Western civilization and its conceptions of liberty and democracy.
3
Relations with the Soviet Union after the German surrender
had become increasingly difficult.
This was particularly true in
occupied Germany where the three Western powers, the French, the
British and the Americans, had experienced increasing Soviet intran­
sigence in the fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement regarding Ger­
many's reconstruction and redevelopment.
The nature of this rela­
tionship was to cause a réévaluation of United States policies,
not only toward the Soviet Union and the Soviet-occupied nations
of Eastern Europe but toward the nations of Western Europe as well.
The nature of the problems as they faced President Truman and
his advisors in February and March of 1947 were great in scope and
significance.
What were the priorities of the Truman Administration
^New York Times. February 17» 1947, p. 17.
& e w York Times, March 2, 1947, p. 4,
26
in its policies toward Western Europe?
What were the responses of
this administration and, more importantly, why did they respond in
this manner?
Were their responses consistent with keeping Europe
in the forefront of United States foreign policy priorities?
When World War II came to the end, proponents of two divergent
views of world order began to emerge and clamor for support among
the policy makers in the United States and in Europe,
The first
were considered "universalists," for it was their view that all
states shared common interests in the affairs of the world and that
peace and order could and would be guaranteed by international
cooperation through the developing embryo of collective security,
the United Nations,
The second position argued that international
order should be maintained by the creation of "spheres of influence,"
According to this view, each of the super powers would be assured
of recognized predominance in an area of vital interests.
This
system was to be regulated by a resurrection of the system of
L
"balance-of-power,"
From the end of the war and until the early
spring of 194?, the United States continued to operate on the
premise that the allied cooperation which had been so successful
in bringing the war to its conclusion would continue in the rebuild­
ing of world peace,
Stalin* for his part, sought the implementation of a system
dominated by a "spheres of influence" concept.
For Russia, his
primary concern was the protection of its frontiers and specifically
4
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr,, "Origins of the Cold War," Foreign
Affairs,. 46 (October, 196?)» 26,
27
its western borders,
Stalin's interests lay not in world coopera­
tion nor in world conquest but in Russian security— basically an
expression of a defensive policy,
Roosevelt, projecting the
"universalist" view, found that immediate military objectives and
their implications, while important, were less important than the
construction and development of the United Nations and the promo­
tion of his concepts of post-war Allied cooperation,
Roosevelt
refused to recognize significant value in the conceptualization
of the "sphere of influence," which he considered to contain the
beginnings which could well lead to a third world war.
Further,
an acceptance of the "sphere of influence" solution would signal
the betrayal of principles for which the war was being fought : the
Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and the development of the
United Nations,
Moscow, in reaction to the positions taken by Roosevelt and
the United States, perceived that American emphasis on self-deter­
mination in Eastern Europe constituted a systematic and deliberate
pressure on Russia's western frontiers.
Thus, there developed a
pattern of action and often mis-perceived reaction on the peurt of
both powers,
Arthur Schlesinger suggests that at this point the
"cold war was a product not of a decision but of a dilemma.
Each
side felt compelled to adopt policies which the other could not but
regard as a threat to the principles of peace," ^ Thus, there was
created an escalation of mutual mistrust.
The developments which were the substance of this "mutual dis-
^Ibid,, p, 45,
28
trust" through the 1945 to 194? period became the major elements
which led to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and, later,
the Marshall Plan,
The imposition of Soviet control on Eastern
Europe and the efforts of the Soviet Union to break through into
the Middle East led directly to the Truman Doctrine,
The helpless­
ness of Western Europe, its impending economic, political and social
collapse with its consequences for United States security, together
with the problem of a divided Germany, brought about the ideas
which matured in the Marshall Plan,
The emergence of these policies in reaction to the perceived
threats proved to be an exciting process.
Secretary of State James
Byrnes, for example, proclaimed the policy of "firmness and patience"
with the Soviet Union in order to show concern and at the same time
not to be rushed into unwise policy decisions.
There was also the
need to assist Great Britain immediately upon the conclusion of
the war.
This was manifest by the negotiation of a loan for
$3.75 billion at the end of 1945 and its approval in 1946, ^
Although the providing of foreign assistance had been planned
for in the transition
from a wartime economy to one geared for
peace, it had been improvised on a bilateral basis.
Thus, measures
were directed to particular issues and to emergency situations.
It is important to note that they were not inspired by a basic
conversion of foreign policy nor by a basic change in the attitudes
of public opinion towards the world.
^Ernst H, van Der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Part­
nership (New York; Elsevier Publishing Company, 1966%, p, 20,
29
However, a more firm line was developing with respect to
specific issues concerning the Soviets,
The assumption was that
if the United States took a tougher bargaining position, the Soviets
would see the pointlessness of obduracy and agree to fair compromise
solutions.
In short, "firmness would make the Russians reasonable."
The strongest advocate of measured firmness and patience was
George E, Kennan, Head of the Policy Planning Staff at the Depart­
ment of State,
In writing his famous "Mr, X" article, Kennan was
able to focus attention on restricting Soviet aggression through a
g
"long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment,."
He
envisaged containment as the test of American democracy, with its
very survival at stake,
Kennan made it clear that the United States
could not expect to achieve political intimacy with the Soviet Union
in the foreseeable future.
He argued that the United States must
continue to expect that Soviet policies would demonstrate no love
of peace or stability and
ent,
have no
happy coexistence of the two
real faith inachieving
aperman­
ideological worlds.
Containment, or what United States policy must be, in Kennan's
words was
", , , a question of degree to which the United States
can create among the peoples of the world generally the impres­
sion of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping
successfully with the problems of its internal life and with
the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual
vitality, capable of holding its own among the major ideological
^Spanier, 0£, cit,, p, 34,
g
George Kennan, "The Sources
Sourc
of Soviet Conduct," ("Mr, X")
Foreign Affairs. Vol. 25 (July, 194?), pp, 566-582,
30
currents of the time,
9
Kennan believed that the United States had the capability of placing
great strains upon Soviet policy in order to force the Kremlin to
a greater degree of moderation and caution than it had exhibited
in the preceding years.
To use this capability would, in his
judgment, be the most advantageous policy the administration could
pursue with respect to the growing disenchantment with the Soviet
Union,
It was into this atmosphere of debate that two notes regarding
Greece and Turkey were transmitted to the United States by the British
Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel.
The Ambassador informed Dean Acheson,
the Under Secretary of State, that Britain could no longer be the
reservoir of financial and military support for Turkey and Greece,
Such support would require expenses of about $250 million in 194?
and the British simply could not bear that expense.
In the view
of Secretary of State Marshall, this was equivalent to British
abdication from the Middle East with obvious implications as to the
consequences.
10
The political scene into which this international bombshell
fell was not prepared for the requirements of the time,
A Republi­
can Congress which tended toward economic conservatism and a Demo­
cratic President who tended toward political liberalism were now
^Ibid.
10
Walter Millis, ed,, The Forrestal Diaries (New York; The
Viking Press, 1951), P. 245,
31
faced with new responsibilities in international affairs,
After President Truman had been able to determine what aspects
of assistance to Greece and Turkey would require legislation, he
arranged for Congressional leaders to meet at the White House to
hear the administration's proposals,
American interests in Greece,
the legislators were told by George Marshall, "were by no means
restricted to humanitarian or friendly impulses,"
Senator Arthur
Vandenberg (R-Miohigan) recounts Marshall's explanation";
If Greece dissolved into full-scale civil war, it was
altogether possible that it would fall to Soviet control,
Turkey, then, would be surrounded; Soviet domination might
thus extend over the entire Middle East to India; the effect
upon Hungary, Austria, Italy, and France could not be over­
estimated, It was not alarmist for Marshall to warn that
the United States was faced with the first crisis of a series
which might extend Soviet domination to Europe, the Middle
East, and Asia,
Marshall argued that the situation in Turkey was different.
There the Soviets were confronting the Turks with a war of nerves
calculated to loosen their hold upon the Dardanelles,
It was his
position and that of the military establishment that an independent
11
It was fortunate that there existed such a harmonious rela­
tionship between the President, Secretary of State Gem^e Marshall and
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Other significant members of
the cabinet during this period included Secretary of Defense James
Forrestal. Secretary of Commerce Averrill Harriman, and Under Secre­
tary of State for Economic Affairs, William L, Clayton, In the
Congress the most significant figure was Senator Arthur H, Vandenberg,
at this time Chairman of the Senate Committee on "Foreign Relations,
who proved invaluable with his support for the administration's
assistance program for Greece and Turkey,
12
Arthur H, Vandenberg, Jr,, ed,, The Private Papers of Senator
Vandenberg (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p, 338.
32
Turkey was essential to the security of the eastern Mediterranean
and the Middle East,
Neither the President nor Marshall could give the legislators
assurances that American assistance would save the situation, but
Marshall was sure that it could not be saved without American
assistance.
He stated;
or losing by default,"
"The choice is between acting with energy
With this view the President concurred
and at the same time won support from Senator Vandenberg,
14
11
^
By
winning Vandenberg's support the Democratic Administration had re­
moved one of its major apprehensions in getting its program approved
by a Republican Congress,
An important criticism of the proposed program for Greece and
Turkey was that the United States was failing to utilize the organ­
ization through which many thought it logically should go— the
United Nations,
Senator Vandenberg, expressing his views regarding
the utility of the United Nations in this situation, asserted that
", , , The Greek appeal is primarily for economic aid; and
of course the United Nations is not created or equipped to deal
in economic aid, , , , Furthezmore, the United Nations is not
yet equipped with the military reserve contemplated by its
Charter because Soviet Russia has stubbornly refbsed £ “in U,N,
Committee^/ to sanction the agreements which are to be sub­
mitted to the member nations in respect to military reserves,
I should be delighted to have U.N. approval of anythihg that
may be done to save Greece; but I am frank to say that I
think Greece could collapse fifty times before the United
Nations itself could ever hope to handle a situation of this
^^Harry S, Truman, Years of Trial and Hope. 1946-1953 (New
York; Doubleday & Company, Inc,, 1956), Vol, II, p, 103.
^\andenberg, 0£, cit,. p, 339.
33
nature. It Is not supposed to handle such situations. But
if there is any way to tie it in collaterally, I shall be
very glad to see this done, 15
Beyond the problem of by-passing the United Nations, the Chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee saw the need to assist Greece
for a more critical reason.
He believed Greece must be helped or
she would sink permanently into the Communist order.
occurred, Turkey would inevitably follow,
If this
Vandenberg is expressing
here an early edition of the "domino theory," for he considered that
a chain reaction might sweep from the Dardanelles to the China Sea,
After lengthy discussions within the administration,
Presi­
dent Truman, on the evening of 12 March 194?, delivered his speech
to Congress,
The key sentence of this speech which was to become
the basis for the "Truman Doctrine" stated;
I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures, ^7
In his memoirs, Truman stated that in his preparations for the
speech, he originally said; "I believe that it should be the policy
of the United States , , , ,"
He took his pencil and crossed out
"should" and wrote in "must,"
In other places he did the same
thing,
Truman stated;
I wanted no hedging in this speech.
This was America's
^^Ibid,. p, 340,
16
These discussions are most ably presented by Joseph M, Jones,
in The Fifteen Weete, (February 21-June 5» 194?)i(New York; The
Viking Press, 1955).
17
'Truman, 0£, cit,, p, 105,
34
answer to the surge of expansionism of Communist tyranny,
It had to be clear and free of hesitation or double talk.
This declaration of the "Truman Doctrine" became the turning
point in American foreign policy which now took the position that
wherever aggression threatened the peace and the security of the
world, the United States was to be involved.
This policy was not
meant to be a panacea nor a plan to achieve peace.
There was no
promise of its success, only the benefit of calculated risk.
Further, the Truman Doctrine was projected as a means of strength­
ening the United Nations by supporting its objectives in respect
to the immediate necessities, until the time when the United Nations
could assume this burden.
One problem with the analysis of events in the relations between
states is that of the interpretation of Effects," There did exist
a perceived threat, one which seemed real enough.
The Administration
firmly believed that inaction would produce grave results;
It be­
lieved that inaction would result in a collapse of Europe's flank
in the Eastern Mediterranean and the establishment of Communist
dominance in the Middle East and a potential i^ovlet breakthrough
into South Asia and into North Africa,
The psychological impact
upon Europe of such a victory by Soviet Russia would be disastrous
for the West,
Europe already found itself demoralized by the diffi­
culties of the postwar period and the resultant loss of world power
and prestige.
^®Ibid,
Such movement by the Soviets would be a final blow
35
for Europe,
19
What was at stake in Greece was America's survival
and reestablishment as a counterweight to a European balance of power,
The immediate consequences of the Truman Doctrine were serious.
First, this statement of policy undermined the Foreign Ministers
Conference in Moscow on March 10,
20
The American position was one
which could be interpreted as being opposed to any change around
the world that would give advantage to the Soviet Union,
Subsequently,
the Moscow Conference was a flop and the Truman Doctrine closed off
constructive conventional diplomacy with the Soviet Union for years,
A further consequence was that it revealed America's willingness
to abandon the United Nations as a serious forum for the resolution
of international conflict because the issue involved major policy
changes within the United States which could not be subjected to
review or approval by the United Nations,
The United States was very
much interested in extending its influence beyond Europe, and the
^^Spanier, o£, cit,. pp, 33-42,
20
This fourth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers,
held in Moscow in March 194? was a direct confrontation of the policy
of the main powers with regard to the future of Germany,
The Russian price for German unification was a strong central
government, and $10 billion of Reparation payments from the current
German industrial production. In pressing the issue of a strong
central government it was clear that the Soviet Union aimed at domin­
ation of that government. Further, they wanted to profit not only
from the productive capacity of the Soviet zone, but also from the
three other zones, turning Germany into an area on which huge amounts
of assistance would be poured from the West, This desire on the
part of the Soviets was totally unacceptable to the West and led
to the failure of the conference.
36
importance of controlling oil and raw materials in the Middle East
was certainly not lost upon either the Democratic administration
or the Republican Congress.
21
As early as 18 April 194?i the assistance for Greece and Turkey
was seen as a forerunner of many other and very much larger economic
political actions in other parts of the world.
Secretary Forrestal
had argued that there would be a series of economic disasters in
Europe which could produce repercussions here.
He further predicted
that the British loan would be near the exhaustion point by the
end of 1948, that French hard money needs would be deficient by one
billion dollars, that Italy would need half a billion dollars and,
in addition, great demands would continue to be put upon the United
States by China, Japan, and Germany,
22
Even as the United States undertook to bolster the economy of
Greece, the overriding task that seemed to confront American policy
in Europe was to provide an incentive for the Europeans to look at
the situation in the broadest possible terms rather than in narrowly
nationalistic, or even partisan, focus.
Indeed, by the time this
problem came to beset the United States in Greece, General George
Marshall had already made his famous Harvard speech, out of which
grew the plan bearing his name.
America, through the Truman Doctrine and the program to assist
Greece and Turkey, had committed herself to meet each threat as it
21
Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power (New
York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp, 343-345.
Z^Millis, 0£, cit,, p. 263
37
arose by such action as might be appropriate to the particular
time, place, and conditions, as well as making a significant change
in policies which were geared toward protecting and enhancing
United States economic interests abroad.
The Marshall Plan
By the early spring of 1947, the Gold War conflict with the
Soviet Union was proving a potential danger.
The problems of Greece
and Turkey were not isolated but were symptomatic of all of Europe's
problems,
Europe appeared on the verge of economic, social and
political collapse.
So serious was the situation in France, that
the State Department sent John Foster Dulles on a secret mission
to Pairis to assess the danger of a Communist attempt to seize power
or the possibility of an outbreak of civil war between the leftists
and the followers of General Charles De^laulle, who at that time
was making a bid for political power.
Communist pressure in France,
as well as in Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Finland, was increasing,
Britain's supply of dollars, essential to industrial recovery, was
at the vanishing point.
Freak weather of alternate drought and
storm paralyzed European agriculture and mining.
Hunger, unemploy­
ment, economic stagnation, and resultant despair— all the inputs
of political unrest— tormented Europe,
The impending collapse of Europe raised a fundamental question
in the minds of policy makers in the United States:
just how vital
to the security of the United States is the stability of Europe?
38
Four considerations reflect the American response to this question
in 1947, First, American independence and security required that
the United States establish and maintain a balance-of-power in the
interior of Europe.
Next, Western Europe controlled the sea gate­
ways considered vital to American security interests— the Skagerrak,
the English Channel, and the Straits of Gibraltar,
The third con­
sideration was one which recognized that Western Europe possessed
the greatest aggregation of skilled workers outside of the United
States, and to see this resource dissipated by chaos would endanger
United States goals aimed at the revival of economic influence and
stability, not only in Europe but in the world.
Finally, the
countries of Western Europe exercised control over many strategic
raw materials which were considered essential to the military and
industrial capability of the United States,
23
To react effectively to these considerations in terms of
American security needs. United States policy makers needed a
strong and healthy Europe,
An economic or political collapse of
Western Europe would destroy any possibility for a political settle­
ment between East and West and would only enhance the potential
danger of the U.S.S.R.
The Council of Foreign Ministers of the "Big Four" met in
Moscow during the month of March 1947.
24
As a result of this
23
^Spanier, o£, cit,, pp, 48-50,
24
The "Big Four" included the governments of the Soviet Union,
France,■Great Britain, and the United States,
39
meeting, the United States concluded that the U.S.S.R, would agree
to a settlement concerning Germany only if it had a near certainty
of being able to dominate the political development of Germany.
Secretary of State Marshall became convinced (especially after a
private conference with Stalin) that the Russians favored a delay
in a German settlement.
25
Why was it that the Soviet Union had not considered it advan­
tageous to come to any agreement with the United States over Ger­
many?
Three explanations are plausible:
first, the belief that
the United States would soon suffer an economic crisis that would
reduce American interests and influence in European and world
affairs; secondly, the view that the United States would be unable
to handle alone the economic deterioration in Western Europe and
thus would soon play into the hands of the '^ommunist elements in
the various countries; or finally, that President Truman's address
on Greece and Turkey which took a strong ideological stand aigainst
Communism left little ground for constructive compromise.
Whatever the real reason for the Soviet lack of cooperation.
Secretary Marshall on 28 April 194? returned from Moscow disturbed
greatly by the realization of the seriousness and urgency of the
crises in Western Europe, where something approaching total econ­
omic disintegration seemed to be imminent.
Any solution for the
ills of Europe, which included the cooperation and collaboration
^^Van Der Beugel, 0£, cit,. p, 35.
40
with Russia, was considered unrealistic.
26
On returning from Europe Secretary Marshall discussed this
problem with George F, Kennan, the head of the Policy Planning Staff,
and after much consideration, reported that the United States did
not see Communist activities as the root of the actual difficulties
in Europe,
It was the view of the Policy Planning Staff that the
existing crisis resulted from the disruptive effects of the war on
the economic, political and social structure of Europe,
Further,
they strongly recommended aid to rebuild Europe— not just to fight
Communism, 27
it
The basic outline of the Policy Planning Staf^jfirst received
public attention when expressed by Dean Acheson on 8 May 1947 in
Cleveland, Mississippi,
Acheson gave what has been called a "pro­
logue" to the Marshall Plan; for in his speech he included the
basic elements of the proposal which was to be given fill develop­
ment and expression a month later by Secretary Marshall at Harvard,
In his speech Acheson made a series of observations regarding
the basic economic facts as the State Department perceived them.
28
In discussing the implications for United States policy, he empha­
sized that the reconstruction of Europe would have to be dealt with
as one problem.
He encouraged the United States to receive as large
26
Kennan, o£, cit,. p, 325.
^^Van Der Beugel, 0£, cit,. p, 41,
28
Van Der Beugel, 0£, cit,. pp, 47-48; and Acheson, 0£, cit,.
p. 46,
41
a volume of imports as possible in order to lessen the gap in the
balance of payments ; to undertake further emergency financing of
foreign purchases ; to concentrate on areas promising to be most
effective in building political and economic stability, namely,
Western Europe; and to accelerate the reconstruction of Germany
and Japan,
He also stated that European recovery could not be
complete until the various parts of Europe's economy were working
together in a harmonious whole; "a coordinated Europeem economy
remains a fundamental objective of our foreign policy,
29
Acheson's speech did not receive the attention it deserved
at the time, although it contained "seeds" of budding policy initia­
tives which later bloomed in Secretary Marshall's commencement
address at Harvard where he outlined a possible course of action
for the United States in dealing with the European crisis.
The key section of the Marshall Plan stated that it was already
evident that, before the United States government could proceed
much further in its efforts, Europe itself must demonstrate respon­
sible initiatives
To alleviate the situation and help start the European
world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement
among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the
situation and the part those countries themselves will take
in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be
undertaken by this government. It would be neither fitting
nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw
unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet
29
For the full text see In Quest of Peace and Security. Selected
Documents on American Foreign Policy. 19^-1951 (Department of State
Publications 42^5, 195l)f OT. 93-95.
42
economically. This is the business of the Europeans, The
initiative, I think, must come from Europe, The role of
this country should consist of friendly aid in the frafting
of a European program, ajid of later support of such a program
so far as it may be practical for us to do so, 30
This, then, was his proposals
that the countries of Europe agree
on a cooperative plan in order to utilize the full productive re­
sources of the continent, supported by whatever material assistance
the United States could render to make the plan successful.
While receiving immediate favorable reaction in Europe, the
Marshall Plan fell hard upon a Republican Congress dedicated to
reducing expenditures— not raising them.
There was deep concern,
not only in Congress but throughout the country, lest scarce Ameri­
can goods should be drained off the domestic market for foreign
consumption.
There was similar fear that the United States would
strain its financial and material resources only to pour its money
down a rat hole, and the additional worry that success of the pro­
gram might serve only to increase competition for American business.
President Truman received reports from a series of three com­
mittees which he had commissioned:
one, to study the state of the
natural resources; second, to evaluate the impact on the economy
of aid to other countries; and lastly, to identify the character
and quantities of resources available for aid to foreign countries.
On the basis of these reports President Trumam, informed Congress
that $580 million dollars would be required to take care of
immediate European needs until 31 March 1948, the earliest date on
3°ibid,
43
which the proposed plan could be made effective.
On 23 October 194? the President again met with the leaders
of Congress and informed them of his reasons for calling a special
session of Congress for November 17,
This action, he said, had
been taken partly so Congress might take steps to halt a rise in
domestic inflation, but primarily to meet the crises in Europe,
Interim assistance to Europe was vital, as was later made clear in
the President's radio address to the people in which he related
the consideration of a long-term program to aid Europe, but stressed
the urgency of immediate aid for some nations :
The most imminent danger exists in France and in Italy,
If the economies of these countries collapse and the people
succumb to totalitarianism pressures, there will be no oppor­
tunity for them or for us to look forward to their recovery
so essential to world peace, 31
The special session of Congress opened on November 17, and a month
later Congress approved as a stop-gap measure an Interim Aid Pro­
gram providing for a grant of $522 million dollars to France,
Italy, and Austria,
An additional $55 million dollars was appro­
priated on 31 March 1948, raising the total interim aid figure to
$577 million dollars.
Not all was sweetness and light, for there was much skepticism
and opposition.
Writing in the New York Times, William S, White,
^■^Truman, 0£, cit,, p, II7 ,
32
Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning
(Cornell University Press, 1955)1 P. 47,
44
stated that ”,,,hostility to the Marshall Plan is strongly favored
in all public forums,"
33
A great deal of opposition came from
such groups and organizations as the American Labor Party, the
National Economic Council, and the American Coalition, which was
composed of a number of fraternal, patriotic, and civic societies.
Individual opposition could be heard from Henry Haslitt (author);
Henry J, Taylor (radio commentator); and even Henry A, Wallace,
the Vice President,
The advocates of the aid plan were more numerous and better
organized.
As more people became familiar with the plan and its
need, opposition began to waver.
The list of organizations which
supported it was impressive, for it included the American Farm
Bureau Federation, the American Federation of Labor, the Congress
of Industrial Organizations and scores of other nationwide and
local groups, including business and industry, labor unions, educational councils, and religious and ethnic organizations,
34
The actions of the Communists also assisted in shaping the
favorable public reaction.
The Soviets realized quickly the
potential difficulty created by the Marshall Plan for the attain­
ment of their objectives in Europe,
From the time of its inception
to its endorsement by Congress, the Plan became the primary target
^& e w York Times. November 2, 194?.
34
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on United
States Foreign Policy for the Postwar, House of Representatives,
80th Congress, 2nd Session (1948^, pp. 1391-1409.
45
of Soviet propaganda.
All the weapons, short of war, in the
arsenal of the Soviets and the Gominform seemed to be directed
against it.
As they saw it, the goal of the Marshall Plan was
American hegemony in Europe,
36
On 26 February 1948 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
reported its findings and its draft bill to the Senate, and on
March 1 the Senate debate on the European Recovery Program (ERP)
was launched by a remarkable speech by Seantor Vandenberg,
With
emphasis being placed upon the need to assist developing European
unity, the debate ^in the Senate continued until March 1?, when that
body adopted the bill by a vote of 69 to 17.
On March 31 the House
of Representatives passed the bill by a margin of 255 votes.
Much of the support given to the Marshall Plan was based on
the firm hope of achieving European unity.
The desire on the part
of many Americans actually sprang from a variety of motives and
opinions.
Some hoped that America's power would be used to trans­
plant to the old world the ideals of federalism which had helped
the United States achieve its unique position.
Some thought that
unity provided the only possibility for Europe to resist Soviet
aggression and to end much of the internal bickering which had
brought the United States to Europe twice in this century.
Others
held the position that unity would help to establish a "single
^^New York Times. March 28, 1948, IV, p. 3.
See "Origins of the Gold War," Arthur Schlesinger, o£. cit..
In this article Schlesinger provides an outstanding discussion of
the conflicting perceptions of United States and Soviet actions in
Europe during the immediate postwar period.
46
market" which had been so instrumental in American economic develop­
ment,
Still others believed that a developing unity in Europe was
the only possible solution for making Germany healthy once again,
without a resurgence of militarism and nationalism, The handling of the EEÎP ftrom its inception to its final passage
indicated that the leadership within the administration recognized
the magnitude of the problem which faced the United States in 1948,
The issue was how to deal with troubled areas around the world
where crises were developing.
Specifically, it was a question of
how to develop a secure and workable free world system in which
hope, opportunity, and confidence in democratic ways of life could
be safe-guarded and strengthened.
The basic political objective was to strengthen and stabilize
institutions in Europe,
The speech by Marshall at Harvard and the
Economic Assistance Act of 1948 did clarify that there was no
aggressive interest against the Soviet Union or their people.
Threats to Western Europe would be countered by a program of con­
structive rebuilding, which would produce stability in Europe.
The
short-term economic objective was to help find a cure for Europe's
economic lack of viability by developing self-reliant economies
capable of maintaining acceptable standards of living without
indefinite help.
American objectives were directed towards meeting immediate
problems and therefore lacked long-range perspective, yet they
had a compensating strength.
The ERP was expressed as a coopera-
47
tlve venture and reflected no desire to impose conditions contrary
to the wishes and interests of the European people.
Moreover, one
could claim that the objectives of the Marshall Plan were ethically
sound.
This ethical soundness proved to be important in estab­
lishing the economic position of the United States and in invoking
confidence and eager actions on behalf of mutually advantageous
goals.
It was also possible that the short-term objectives of the
Marshall Plan could be achieved more quickly and less expensively
than anticipated.
Further, these objectives demonstrated that
important new ground was being covered in solving economic prob­
lems in other areas of the European economy; and that greater
goals, such as the eliminating of trade barriers and freeing Europe
from dependence upon outside aid, were beginning to be realized.
The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the soon-to-follow
Mutual Security Act all helped to create a forward movement in
American leadership and cooperation.
The concern for European
redevelopment and security, however, was not to be concluded with
these measurest
èVents were already occurring which would lead
to the formulation of the Brussels Pact and, at a later date, to
the formulation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NATO — and Korea
The United States had taken decisive action under the leader-
^^Price, o£. cit.. p. 404,
48
ship of the Truman Administration in dispatching aid to Greece and
Turkey.
Plan.
This was followed by developing and supporting the Marshall
Each of these actions of the United States assisted in the
formulation of the strategic concepts of "containment."
However,
as constructive as these programs were, there remained a third
step— NATO.
In the latter half of 194? at a second meeting of the Council
of Foreign Ministers held in London, the issue of German reunifi­
cation proved to be unresolvable because of the Soviet position.
In December, Marshall, in a luncheon meeting with the British
Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, heard Bevin express the concern
that Western Europe was in no position to defend itself against
potential military threats from the East.
In response to his query
as to what the United States could do about the problem, Marshall
advised the Europeans to follow basically the same formula that
had been used in the Marshall Plan:
the Europeans would come
together for their own protection, see what they could do, and then
turn to the United States and see what we could do to make up the
difference between what the situation required and what they were
OO
able to do themselves.
Some form of military framework was needed.
By early 1948 the
Soviet Union had present in Eastern Europe an estimated thirty
divisions.
Against them stood three and a half American and two
and a half British divisions performing throughout Germany police
and occupation duty.
France had at that time only six poorly
Charles,S.\Bohlep. The9Tr@heformation of American Foreign
Policy (New York: W, W. Norton & Company, Inc., 19^9), PP.92-93.
49
equipped divisions in its entire European army.
What was needed
was a collective security agreement which would be a political
commitment to go to war to assist any ally attacked.
In Washington
and Europe the United States monopoly of nuclear weapons encouraged
the hope that a political commitment to fight would be enough to
deter an attack upon or a subversive overthrow of an allied state>
but allied military weakness, when faced with the Communist over­
throw in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin, called this
confidence into question.
39
Taking Marshall's advice, the European nations, with the sym­
pathetic support of the United States, formally signed on 17 March
1948 the Brussels Treaty establishing a regional defense force for
Western Europe.
On that same day President Truman addressed a joint
session of Congress, procedded to welcome the Brussels Agreement
and expressed United States support and his own confidence that the
United States would, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations
such assistance as the situation required.
He reaffirmed that the
determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves
would be matched by an equal determination on the part of the United
States to help them protect themselves.
40
The Brussels Pact testified to Europe's willingness to subsume
^^Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation (New York* W. W. Norton
& Company, Inc., 19&9), P. 308,
40
Truman, 0£. cit., p. 241.
50
old nationalisms under a new system of international cooperation
which would defend Europe and convince the United States of the
wisdom of its help.
The Vandenberg Resolution
of 11 June 1948
essentially proclaimed American willingness to identify itself
with the new Europe.
However, neither United States assistance
nor European cooperation was considered adequate to deter the
potential expansionist energies of the Communist world.
The Soviet
Union had never looked more menacing than it did in the summer of
1948.
Yet, 1948 being an election year, both the Administration
and its Congressional supporters from both parties hesitated to
take a step that would allay Europe's insecurity : a formal alliance
with the Brussels Pact nations.
42
Only after the fall elections was the United States ready to
sign the North Atlantic Alliance Treaty on 4 April 1949.
Thus,
NATO was regarded as a logical development from, and a geographical
extension of, the Brussels Treaty, as well as a recognition by the
^ h e Resolution laid down in general terms the American
approach to the problem of security in Europe. The United States
government should further promote "the progressive development of
regional and other collective arrangements for individual and
collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles
and provisions of the Charter." It should make clear its own deter­
mination to exercise the right of individuals or collective selfdefense under Article 51, should any armed attack affecting its
national security take place. Finally, it should promote "associa­
tion of the United States by constitutional process, with such
regional and other collective arrangements as are based on contin­
uous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its
national security."
42
Lawrence Keflan,, NATO and the Policy of Containment, in
Problems in American Civilization, General editor, Edwin C. Rozwenc,
(Boston: D. G, Heath and Company, 1968), p. iv.
1
51
American public of the growing menace of the Soviet Union,
The
adoption of the Vandenberg Resolution appeared to be the turning
point on this matter.
However, not all in official positions were
free of skeptical feelings regarding the treaty,
George F. Kennan
wrote that he
saw, in the first place, no need for a full-fledged
reciprocal military alliance at that stage of the game. It
seemed, . , regrettable that attention should even be drawn
in a major way, in the circumstances of the moment, to the
relationships of military strength as between Russia and the
He then expressed a second reason for his concerni
I had little confidence in the value of written treaties
of alliance generally. I had seen too many instances in which
they had been forgotten, or disregarded, or found to be irrel­
evant, or distorted for ulterior purposes when the chips were
down,,,.What was needed, it seems to me, was a realistic con­
sciousness of where one's vital interests really lay. Given
that, military policy would flow correctly of its own accord—
it needed no legal oblications or prescriptions. 44
It was Kennan's view that the danger confronting the NATO part­
ners was a political danger— the spread of Communism by political
means— rather than a military danger.
The morale of Western Euro­
peans needed the strengthening that the alliance would give it,
but along with it went the danger of "a general preoccupation with
military affairs, to the detriment of economic recovery and of the
necessity for seeking a peaceful solution to Europe's difficulties.
Kennan saw this preoccupation with military affairs as being
^&ennan, 0£. cit., p, 40?.
44
Ibid.. p. 408.
^^Ibid.. p, 410.
52
widespread and disturbing.
It was not the main danger but it had
to be dealt with as a reality, perhaps even tolerated; for to pass
it over too lightly would be to encourage a measure of panic and
uncertainty among Europeans and play directly into the hands of the
Communists,
Kennan concluded that the need for alliances and rear­
mament in Western Europe was primarily a subjective one, arising
from the failure of the Western Europeans to understand correctly
their own position.
More recent historians suggest that to Ameri­
can leaders the value of the Soviet Union was precisely in their
carefully manipulated appearance of Bolshevik ferociousness which
they might employ to mobilize Congress and the public to sustain
expensive policies for other areas of the world where Russia or
its allied parties were quiet or even irrelevant.
46
Economically, the philosophy of American policy was based on
the notion that temporary United States aid would restore European
economic and social well-being and make it independent from further
American assistance, but not independent from American influence or
even dominance.
From the beginning of NATO, the United States chose
to build up this new organization on an Atlantic basis in which it
would participate as a full member.
In 1950, however, events were
to take place which were to change this rather placid outlook,
47
'
The attack by the armies of North Korea against the southern
half brought on a "whole new ballgame,"
In Europe the Korean
4A
Kolko, o£, cit.. p. 483.
47
Van Der Beugel, 0£. cit.. p. 257.
53
aggression gave rise to fear of an all-out war that no one had
previously regarded as a serious possibility— a fear that in the
light of subsequent events appears to have been unfounded.
At the
time, however, it seemed to some that Korea might be a mere prelude
to a broader attack, or that the conflict might spread without the
explicit intent of either side.
More carefully reserved was the
attitude of those who felt that the West was deliberately handicapping
itself in the Gold War as long as Europe was left defenseless.
The
outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 temporarily destroyed the
presupposition that America's atomic striking power would deter the
Soviet Union from instigating overt military aggression.
As a result
there began the first serious attempt to create the forces which
the military had prescribed as necessary for the defense against a
Soviet attack in Europe.
48
Perhaps this was overreaction on the part of both the United
States and Europe, but the estimation of the intentions of a poten­
tial aggressor is subject to sudden change from complacency to
alarm.
"The attack upon Korea," President Truman stated, "makes
it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the
use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now
use armed invasion and war." 49
Further, the Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, classified the
^^obert E. Osgood, NATO the Ehtangling Alliance (Chicago:
University
ity of Chicago Press, I962), pp. éo-697
^^Statement on June 27, 1950 (Department of State Bulletin.
XXII, July 3, 1950), p. 5.
54
Korean aggression as proof that international Communism would invade
any free nation within reach if it could get away with it.
He-
further concluded:
The real significance of the North Korean aggression is
this evidence that, even at the resultant risk of starting a
third world war, Communism is willing to resort to armed
aggression, whenever it believes it can win. 50
With such concern and apprehension being felt on both sides
of the Atlantic the decision was made to embark upon a major rearm­
ament program, to be followed in one form or another by all the
NATO countries.
When four additional American divisions were
scheduled to be added in 1951 to the two already there, the United
States was unmistakably committed to the defense of Europe.
This
impetus given to Western rearmament provided by Korea was immense ;
in fact, comparable force levels of that rearmament program have
been maintained ever since.
The appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as NATO
Supreme Commander in December 1950 and the creation of the Supreme
Headquarters of Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) in April of 1951, as
well as the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
among six European nations, underlined the fact that the Korean
war had brought about Western rearmament
as a new means for
unifying the nations of Western Europe,
Statement submitted to Senate Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings. Supplemental Appropriations for 1951. 81st Congress, 2nd
Session, p. 2?2.
^^David Rees, The Age of Containment: the Cold War (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 19&7), p.~ïï6.
55
Even before this show of Interest and effort, rearmament of
West Germany had been viewed as essential by the American govern­
ment because of the news of the successful testing of a Soviet
atomic weapon in September of 1949.
The Russian bomb showed that
the policy of relying on the American atomic monopoly to deter
attack would soon be obsolete.
In the following months an import­
ant decision was made in Washington— the decision to launch a
crash program to make the thermonuclear bomb, "the so-called
hydrogen or super-bomb," as President Truman referred to it when
announcing the decision on 31 January 1950.
*52
The Korean War, even more than the Soviet acquisition of
nuclear weapons, forced changes upon NATO,
In the first year of
the treaty, members assumed that the strength of the alliance lay
in America's promise to identify its own defense with Europe's.
The major deterrent against aggression was America's possession
of a nuclear weapon and the enemy's recognition that the Strategic
Air Command served all twelve allies.
Secretary of Defense Marshall
argued persuasively before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on the importance of an American military contribution to Europe's
sense of security.
But, his argument continued, with the Korean
conflict, the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent came
into question because the European allies were fearful that the
United States would not use nuclear weapons in any aggressive
^Ibid.. p. 47.
56
attempt on the part of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union to extend
their control into Western Europe,
tainment policy believable.
Nothihg less could make the con-
53
Developments following the outbreak of the Korean War completed
the transformation of NATO from a multilateral guaranty pact into
a semi-integrated military organization designed to redress t%ie
military balance on the continent.
However, when it became apparent'
that the Korean War was a limited war confined only to the Korean
peninsula and not a prelude to other aggression, European anxiety
gave way quickly to the fear that the United States might either
precipitate a world war or else become so fascinated by the Chinese
Communist threat in the Far East as to neglect her European commit­
ments. ^
The long and difficult period of stalemate which began
in the spring of 1951, removed much of the sense of urgency.
55
The fact of the matter was that the Korean War institutionalized
a set of operational premises that appeared to have validity yet
had not been accepted at the intellectual level.
Among these was
the possibility that the Sovèèt Union might resort to military
expansion if it were not checked by a strong visible countervailing
military power.
Also, the most interesting and challenging imbal­
ance to the Soviets was in Central Europe.
It was believed that
^^George C, Marshall, "Assignment of Ground Forces of the
United States to Duty in the European Area," Hearings, 82nd Congress,
1st Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951),
pp. 38-42.
54
-"Osgood, 0£. cit.. p. 75.
^^Ibid.
57
the global balance of power would shift in favor of the Soviets if
they were able to swallow the rest of Central Europe, specifically.
West Germany and Austria,
No other area on the edge of the Communist
world had such a critical function for the balance of power.
next most critical area on the Soviet periphery was Japan,
The
Finally,
it was believed that while attending to the power ratios focused
on the prime military-industrial regions, one could not neglect
local imbalances in secondary and tertiary areas,
56
It took the Korean war to give validity to these premises-not in proving them true— but in making them operational assumptions
upon which wartime and planning decisions were to be reached.
The
Administration's position was enunciated by Dean Acheson at a 28
November 1950 meeting of the National Security Council.
The
Soviet Union was behind every one of the Chinese Communist and
North Korean moves, said the Secretary of State.
The United States
was in competition with the Soviets all around the globe; thus,
Korea was a world matter, not merely a regional concern.
If we lost
sight of this fact, he warned, and allowed Russia to trap us on the
Asian mainland, we would risk sinking into a bottomless pit,^^
The Secretary of State, in a conference only a few weeks
later with the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, emphasized
the view that the central enemy was not China— but the Soviet Union.
The aggression by the North Koreans was not a local, spontaneous
•^Seyom Brown, Faces of Power (New York* Columbia University
Press, 1968), p, 55.
^^Truman, 0£. cit.. pp. 387-388.
58
maneuver, but a part of the larger Communist design to preoccupy
the United States in Asia so the Russians could have a freer hand
in Europe,
He advocated a position in which the United States must
not and would not distort its global priorities.
This position,
stripping it of its pretense, was a Europe-first emphasis and was
quite favorable to the British, who seemed to be just a bit anxious
that the United States might have already become overcommitted to
an increasingly costly Asian conflict and might engage in rash
action— such as a nuclear bombardment of China,
The testimony of General Omar Bradley
59
assessed the opera­
tional effects of the prosecution of the war itself on the premise
that the Soviets really had their military sights focused on Western
Europe,
The effects on advanced military planning and alliance
diplomacy also appeared significant.
President Truman telegraphed
General Douglas MacArthur near the final stages of their contro­
versy:
In reaching a final decision about Korea, I shall have
to give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet
Union and the need for a rapid expansion of our armed forces
to meet this great danger.
The Europe-oriented consequences of these premises were noticeable
in the increased efforts to change NATO from a security guaranty
pact into an international theatre army, most heavily deployed on
^®Brown, 0£, cit., p. 56.
^^To extend the fighting to the mainland of Asia would "involve
us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with
the wrong enemy." U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Service and Com­
mittee on Foreign Relations, Hearings * Military Situation in the Far
East. 82nd Congress, 1st session, 1951, PP. 731-732.
^°Truman, o£. cit.. p. 437.
59
the Central European front, the spot of crucial vulnerability in
the global balance.
This raised an entirely new spectre, for the
acceptance of this premise meant that United States diplomacy was
to be oriented toward gaining acceptance from the North Atlantic
Alliance partners for the rearmament of West Germany,
And this
rearmament would require— largely to reassure the French— a United
States commitment to the principle of integrated commands, within
which the German units would be unable to take independent action,
The United States perception of the changed scale of priorities,
at this point giving first place to the military components of the
power balance, was made explicit to recipients of Marshall Plan as­
sistance.
Further economic aid was to be made contingent upon the
alliance partner's conscientious attempt to fulfill its NATO rearm­
ament obligations.
This action was made legitimate when the
European Recovery Program was formally subordinated to "security"
considerations under the Mutual Security Act.
It was the position of the Defense Department that Europe could
not be defended without the willing and active participation of
Western Germany, but the State Department was more reserved in its
judgment.
Indeed, Secretary Acheson on 5 June 1950, before the
outbreak of war in Korea, in asking for Mutual Defense Assistance
^^Osgood, o£. cit.. pp. 78-79.
^^Ibid.. pp. 70-71.
-^Brown, 0£. cit.. p. 58.
60
funds, indicated that the United States would continue the policy
of German demilitarization:
of doing anything else.
it or revalued it.
"there is," he stated, "no discussion
That is our policy and we have not raised
64
By the end of July 1950 our allies, through the NATO deputies,
had been asked what they were prepared to do to strengthen their
own defense.
When the replies were put together, even including
substantial British and French efforts, the total available on the
central front in Europe fell far short of any candid military view
of an adequate defense.
However, in a quick switch in September 1950, the State Depart­
ment proposed incorporating about ten German divisions directly
under NATO command.
But tl-aroughout Europe, and especially in
France, strong opposition liad developed to rushing ahead with
German rearmament and membership in NATO before political safeguards
against German militarism had been created.
In order to postpone
German participation, the French Premier, Bene Pleven, made a counter
proposal, analogous to the "Schuman Plan" for economic integration
through a European Goal and Steel Community.
This plan would inte­
grate Germany's military contribution in a European framework
chiefly by confining German units to combat teams within interna­
tional divisions of a European army,
64
*Àcheson, o£. cit., pp. 435-436,
^^Ibid.
^^Osgood, 0£. cit., p. 85.
61
The United States, after first rejecting the Pleven scheme as
not feasible and unrealistic, later endorsed it in order to gain
French adherence to a German contribution.
However, the United
States endorsed it in the altered form of a European Defense Com­
munity, which would include German divisions integrated on a
basis of equality with other national forces.
67
The NorthcAtlantic allies convened in Lisbon in February 1952
to adopt an ambitious but unrealistic defense program.
Two major
contributions which had been accepted in principle— rearmament and
the participation of West Germany— depended upon the convergence
of the contributing nations' mutual political aims and their common
interest in securing America's commitment and material support,
rather than upon educated convictions about the military require­
ments of common defense.
It is not strange, then, that the over­
sized goals endorsed at Lisbon turned out to be only promises.
Yet
the rearmament effort, which was built upon those goals, eventually
led to two other results that were no less important for European
security and cohesion:
the membership of West Germany in NATO, and
the further commitment of the United States and Britain to the
defense of Continental Europe.
European Integration
In the post-war era it was the policy of the United States to
^?Ibid.
62
promote a policy of European integration.
This policy of unity
was viewed as not an end in itself but as a means to achieve
the long term objective of greater economic and political cooperation
among the nations of Europe and in conjunction with the United States.
United States policy between 19^5 and early 194? reflected the
universalist conceptions of the Roosevelt Administration which had
perceived a post-war period characterized by the "four policement of
the world" approach,
This period was further characterized by
the testing of the assumption which regulated United States responses
to East-West relationships, namely that Europe was to be considered
a zone of cooperation.
This attitude throughout 1945 and 1946 was
maintained in spite of the American inability to get along with the
Soviets over such issues as the termination of the Lend-Lease pro­
gram at the end of war which brought about a serious strain to United
States-Soviet relations.
69
Added to this was the stopping of
German reparations exchanges as a result of the Soviet failure to
maintain their commitments to the Western occupying powers,
A further aspect of the immediate post-war condition was the
formation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administra­
tion (UNRRA) to assist in the rebuilding of the many war-torn
^^These "four policemen" would be China, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union and the United States,
^^The Lend-Lease program was considered a war-time aid pro­
gram which was not to be extended into the post-war rebuilding of
Europe, Thus when it was halted other nations who were recipients
of this aid also suffered, most notably the British.
63
nations.
While this was a United Nations sponsored organization
it was soon dropped by the United States because Washington was
contributing 70^ of the funds and 90j5 of the goods to the program
while receiving a minimal voice-only one vote— in determining
the distribution of this assistance.
It was becoming more clear
to decision-makers in Washington that to give assistance through
the United Nations was not feasible and the continuation of a
bilateral approach to providing assistance was increasingly
unattractive.
United States foreign policy in 1946 remained rather constant.
There continued to be limited and measured responses to Soviet
actions in Eastern Europe and in Iran.
Also, during this year there
was no significant change in the policy assumptions— the United
States continued to seek a European-wide settlement.
Further, it
was within the context of the four-power relationship that the
United States preferred solving all of the problems in Germany.
But 1947 was to create a great deal of concern within the American
foreign policy establishment.
The year of 1947 would appear to have been a year of real trial
to the Truman Administration while offering not much hope.
Secretary
of State George C. Marshall's concern over the critical events in
Greece and Turkey was to prompt the Truman Doctrine;
70
and the
failure of the Council of Ministers meeting in Paris during the
70
See above, pages 23 through 37.
64
spring of that year only added to the concern.
As a result of that
meeting it was increasingly clear that the agreements arrived at in
the Potsdam Conference, while providing for four-power cooperation,
were not to he implemented.
While it was hoped that agreement could
be reached over plans to build toward the reunification of Germany
the meeting in Moscow failed to provide any hope that this would
ever occur,
A farther disappointment was the Soviet response to the American proposal of the Marshall Plan.
71
It was becoming more clear
in the United States that new approaches to the problem of rebuilding
Europe were required.
While the program was not intended to inter­
vene in the internal policies of nations it was meant to deal with
the disruptive effects of the economic, political and social structure
of Europe,
Also, very significantly, the Marshall Plan introduced
a new concept in providing assistance:
an American insistence on
the joint (united) character of the program,
But of consequence
in Soviet-American relations was the rejection of the bilateral
approach to aid which the Soviet Union had sought.
The United
States was initiating a new approach, an increasing priority upon
unity within Europe.
This program promised a continuance of Amer­
ican aid based upon European performance of growth; also, it pro­
vided for a European-wide system of aid, totally unacceptable to
the Soviet Union and rejected by each of the occupied nations in
^^See pages 37 through 47.
^^See page 4l above.
65
Eastern Europe.
It was the Marshall Plan which was to provide the transitional
step in United States policy.
This policy was to he European wide
in scope if possible; but when the Eastern European nations and the
Soviet Union failed to participate, it became necessary that the
program focus its attention upon the nations which made up Western
Europe.
Nevertheless, neither the French, British nor United States
wished to foreclose Soviet participation; neither were they willing,
however, to give up the possibilities of the program if the Soveits
totally rejected it.
In response to the Marshall Plan the Soviets moved in September
of 1947 to form the Gominform and initiated a strong propaganda
campaign in Western Europe against the Marshall Plan which achieved
only a limited success.
Then with the collapse of the fifth Foreign
Ministers meeting in November of 1947 United States foreign policy
was forced to recognize the realities of a divided Europe and to
concentrate its concern upon Western Europe.
Marshall believed that
it was necessary to establish a new balance of power in Europe in
order to deal effectively with the Soviet Union from a position of
strength.
It then became an underlying mammption of the United
States-European policy that there existed a need to restore a posture
of strength from which to reopen a dialogue with the Soviets.
To highlight this shift in United States policy President
73
Truman, in a speech on the European Recovery Program ' emphasized
^ & e w York Times. December 20, 1947.
66
the terms Western Europe and West Germany. Further, he initiated
the use of such terminology as "allies" a dear indication that
within the administration a shift of policy towards Europe was
being made.
Even with this shifting of attitude there continued
to exist two distinct levels of poliôy.
On the first level the
Truman Administration continued to prefer the resolution of conflict
through four-power policy decisions and the achievement of an allEuropean settlement if at all possible.
On the second level the
Administration pursued the merger of the Western occupation zones
of Germany as a back-up position if the four powers failed to
achieve a collective settlement; on this level the Administration
also pursued increased West European cooperation in the context
of the emergent balance of power posture.
Thus throughout the
period of 19^5 through 194? there was a movement from the fourpower framework toward a Western Europe framework as the princi­
pal focus of United States policy.
Through the European Recovery Program (ERP) the establishment
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
took place in 1948.
Of this effort Marshall took a rather restrained
view believing that the United States was in a transitional period
of policy and that the initiative for European recovery and the
future of Europe was to be the responsibility of the Europeans.
74
The OEEC came into existence in April, 1948, with a member­
ship of l6 countries. Essentially it began as a body for the distri­
bution of American aid on a joint basis, but it became concerned in a
broader way with the economic problems and recovery of Western Europe.
6?
This organization, while providing a multilateral framework for
harmonizing national views, did not provide a breakthrough in econ­
omic integration.
gration.
The British were least inclined towards inte­
In fact, Britain preferred that the OEEC be temporary and
limited to the time-frame of the ERP.
Nevertheless, the ERP was
continued in 1949 under United States congressional approval.
75
In the area of trade liberalization, substantial progress was
accomplished in lowering import quotas ; little, however, was achieved
in the area of tariff reduction.
In response to this condition
Paul Hoffman, Administrator for the Economic Cooperation Administra­
tion (ECA),
made a major speech demanding a greater degree of
European integration and movement toward tariff liberalization.
In
his presentation he strongly encouraged the integration of the
various European economies; it was, he felt, important to make the
Europeans aware that Congress was putting pressure toward European
integration by using the potential threat of the withdrawal of aid.
In response to these not too thinly veiled intimations the OEEC in
December 1949 did take action by reducing import quotas by
and
^^Extension of the European Recovery Program: 1949 Hearings
held in Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 81st Congress, 1st Session on S. 833 to amend
the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (Washington, D. C., G.P.C., 1974).
^^The ECA was the organization which administered all funds
appropriated by Congress for the European Recovery Program.
^^Paul Hoffman, in a speech before the Council of the OEEC
on July 25, 1948. See Van Der Beugel, o£, cit.« pp. I66-I67.
68
creating the European Payments Union (EPU)
78
to provide a ready
reserve of operating capital.
While the OEEC was not too significant in bringing about
European integration, it did make important contributions.
The
OEEC provided a basic stage of cooperation upon which, at a later
time, more ambitious plans for integration could be pursued.
Multi­
lateral cooperation was encouraged by the constant debate which
attended examination of each of the national plans.
Finally, the
OEEC gave the leadership in each government the opportunity to
become acquainted with their counterparts in the other governments
of Europe, an invaluable source of communication and cooperation.
In Europe the main problem had been one of a shortage of currency
and the ERP assisted in filling that gap along with bringing West
Germany into a West European framework as a partner at the con­
ference table,
A further step toward European integration was made when John
McCloy, the American High Commissioner in Germany, proposed during
October 1949 an international, private authority to control the
Ruhr, indicating that it should manage not only the German indus­
tries but also the heavy industries in all of Western Europe,
including Britain,
This proposal, initially,was
not received
well; in Britain, where the coal companies were nationalized and
similar plans were underway for the steel industry, it received a
The EJPU was created to form a multilateral reserve of hard
currency for trade deficits thereby providing a basis for economic
equilibrium.
69
hostile reaction.
But, with the encouragement of the United States,
European planners, particularly Jean Monnet of France, continued to
develop the concept until it emerged on 9 May 1950 as the Schuman
Plan for a European Coal and Steel Authority,
The plan was based
upon France and Germany; but it was also opened to other European
states, provided they accepted its general principles, and it soon
included the Benelux countries and Italy,
This proposal was very much in line with American policy on
the future of the European economy.
The Schuman Plan (as the ECSC
became known) represented a significant shift to the Europeans of
the inititive for integration.
While the ECSC was concerned with
the territorial questions regarding the Rhineland, Ruhr and the
Saar it also resolved some important political questions as well.
These questions centered in the need to incorporate West Germany
into a meaningful relationship with the West,
The problem was
that achieving this objective implied the inclusion of the Federal
Republic of Germany in terms of political participation and, further,
implied the possible need for German rearmament.
Finally, the
Schuman Plan was to create such a relationship between France and
the FRG as to make any further war between the two nations "impos­
sible."
By forming the ECSC a number of developments, sympathetic to
United States policy, emerged.
The ECSC was responsible for the
^^See Van Der Beugel,
cit.. pp. 230-248, for a more
complete discussion of these problems.
70
forming of the High Authority which shifted the control over Germany
into an integrated European framework.
As the FRG was being moved
closer toward the West, it expected political concessions, most
notably the cessation of Allied Occupational Controls with the
result of obtaining more political equality.
80
Secondly, the
Schuman Plan made possible the reconciliation between France and
the FRG, a point of increasing concern as the FRG began to redevelop
its capacity and resources.
Inevitably, then, this plan provided
the means by, which to achieve the integration of Germany into the
Western camp.
The net effect of the EGSC was to create an organization by
which European industry could be made more competitive.
The United
States continued to regard European unity as a long-term basic
solution to economic recovery through the development of supra­
national institutions and a harmonization of economic policies and
the EGSC represented a step in that direction.
Finally, it is important to discuss briefly the European
Defense Community (EDC) within the framework of American policy
regarding European unity.
While initially it had not been United
States policy to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany within a
European defense community, the United States did shift in its
policy toward the EDC approach ihlearly 1951.
This policy repre­
sented a shift from a support for general European cooperation
80
A complete analysis of the Schuman Plem may be found in
William Diebold's The Schuman Plan (New York* Frederick A,
Praeger, 1959).
71
increasingly to one of specific forms of European integration.
The
invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans was the stimulus behind
this particular shift in policy.
Prior to the Korean invasion the concern of the United States
had been economically oriented, but with the Berlin Blockade and
the Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia it became clear that there
existed no counter force in Europe against the Soviet Union,
As a
result of these circumstances there emerged a phased military
development.
This phased development resulted first in the formu­
lation of the Brussels Pact in March, 1948,
This Pact was a trad­
itional military alliance and was predicated upon the willingness
of European nations to be responsible for their own defense.
The
United States Senate gave additional support to this idea when in
June 1948 it passed the Vandenberg Resolution
providing the
United States greater flexibility in seeking a workable policy
with the nations of Western EJurope,
Further, the resolution required
that any United States aid be given on the basis of European selfhelp,
Nevertheless, the Brussels Pact remained limited in scope.
The next phase of military development, the European Defense
I
Community proposed by Rene Pleven of France, was inititally viewed
by the Truman Administration as a French delaying tactic to obstruct
German rearmament.
The administration preferred instead the direct
integration of German forces into NATO,
When this view proved to
be unrealistic the administration changed its support to the EDC
8l
See page 5Q above.
72
proposal which was intended to integrate the FRG into Western Europe
and maintain more effective control over West German military rearm­
ament,
United States policy emphasized European unity and the build­
ing up the defenses of Europe; for Korea had, it seemed, demonstrated
a Soviet willingness to use military force to invade other countries.
But the arming of the FRG through the EDC would achieve both objec­
tives and therefore became, during the latter years of the Truman
Administration, an important policy,
A more complete discussion of the rearmament of West Germany
On
will follow.
It is important at this point, however, to note
that the EDC was also an important part of the American focus
upon European unity.
Through the Truman years a great priority
was given to the ideal that European unity was an indispensable
factor not only for Atlantic strength but also for the interests
of the United States,
Further, it was believed that the German
problem could be resolved only within a Eîuropean framework similar
to the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan,
Finally, it was hoped,
somewhat erroneously, that economic integration would automatic­
ally lead to further political integration and the emergence of
a United States of Europe,
In each case the Marshall Plan, the EGSC and the EDC repre­
sented the highlights of United States interests in the economic
development and integration of Western Europe,
®^See pp. 79-84,
In its own way the
73
United States emphasis upon self-help and cooperative integration
found a place in the development of each of these programs while
at the same time, promoting its primary security interest in Europe,
To a large degree United States foreign policy leadership
since the Second World War had been fortunate in the substantial
coincidence between the nation's self-interest and the nation's
altruistic ideals.
It was in 194? that President Truman proclaimed
the doctrine that "it must be the policy of the United States to
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or outside pressures."
Under the cover of this
principle, Berlin was sustained by the American airlift in 19481949, and the United States committed itself to the defense of
Western Europe by the North Atlantic Treaty,
But, paradoxically,
during this period the Administration did not attempt to apply
the Truman Doctrine to events taking place in Eastern Europe or in
China,
The United States had committed itself to meet each
threat as it arose by such action as might be appropriate to the
particular time, place, and conditions.
No single pattern or
technique of resistance was prescribed; the particular form of
American response depended in essence upon the nature of the Soviet
Union,
The use of this principle of assistance quickly became
recognized as a selective policy and not as one embodying universal
application.
It was important that American leadership be devoted to Western
rown, o£, cit*, p, 17.
74
defense.
And the effort required coalition diplomacy at its best--
the recognition of common interests and the determination to defend them through common action and mutual sacrifice.
84
The
fear engendered by the Korean conflict enabled the administration
to win Congressional authorisation for defense measures that
Acheson had urged repeatedly during his months in office.
Despite its importance to Acheson, the Korean conflict did
not alter his or the administration’s Europe-first orientation.
They continued to believe that the chief deterrent to Communist
expansion and threats to American economic interests in Europe
rested in the collective unity of a strengthened North Atlantic
Community,
Throughout the Truman years the focus had been to re^
build, stabilize and develop as viable allies the nations of Western
Europe,
This had been begun through the Truman Doctrine, the Mar­
shall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and American
support for unified action on the part of Europeans,
It was to remain to be seen whether this basic commitment
to Western Europe would continue under the Eisenhower and Kennedy
Administrations,
84
Norman A, Graebner, ^ Uncertain Traditiont American Sec­
retaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc,, 19^1), p, 2?1,
2. The Eisenhower Years
The Eisenhower Administration arrived in Washington at a time
when great issues stirred the American people.
The Korean War,
having become an uncomfortable stalemate, caused much dissatisfaction
with the policies of the previous administration.
The fall of
Ghiang Kai-shek in China seemed to demonstrate the softness of the
previous administration and encouraged many voters to support the
military hero, Dwight D, Eisenhower, over the more intellectual,
and therefore questionable, Adlai Stevenson,
The Truman Administration had been successful in European
reconstruction and, initially, in encouraging unity among the
nations of Western Europe,
The Truman Doctrine had halted potent­
ially dangerous Communist activities in Greece and Turkey, and by
1952 the success of the Marshall Plan was obvious.
It was difficult
to realize in 1952, when NATO and the concept of collective defense
were accepted in the United States and Europe, just how much pessi­
mism existed on both sides of the Atlantic regarding the future of
NATO, ^
One reason for this pessimism was that the original plans
had been made in an atmosphere of gloom caused by the situation
in KoreaI the prospects in Korea appeared to be an eventual stale­
mate, at best; at worst, they hinted at involvement with the Soviet
One example of this pessimism may be illustrated by the un­
realistic force goals for European defense extablished at the NATO
conference in Lisbon, Portugal, in 1952. See above, page 61, These
estimates were based upon the best estimates of Soviet military
capability and not upon any clear analysis of Soviet political or
military intentions.
76
Union and the "beginning of World War III, most likely in Europe.
Many believed that overwhelming Soviet ground forces could, despite
the United States' possession of the atomic bomb, overrun Western
Europe in a matter of days.
As the Eisenhower Administration took office in January of
1953, a serious réévaluation cf United States policy and the use
of the security establishment in pursuit of a revised policy was
required.
To provide guidance in this process President Eisenhower
established five basic considerations for designing and employing
a security establishment.
These criterian were»
(1) I had long been convinced that the composition and struc­
ture of our military establishment should be based on the
assumption that the United States on its own initiative would
never start a war, , , ,
(2 ) , , , That since modern global wax would be catastrophic
beyond belief, America's military forces must be designed
primarily to deter a conflict, even though they might be
compelled later to fight, , , ,
(3) . , , That national security could not be measured in terms
of military strength alone. The relationship, for example,
between military and economic strength is intimate and indi­
visible, , , ,
(4) , , , That our armed forces must be modern, designed to
deter or wage the type of war to be expected in the mid­
twentieth century. No longer could we afford the folly, so
often indulged in in the past, of beginning war with the
weapons of the past, , . ,
(5) . . . That United States security policy should take into
account the need for membership in a system of alliances, 2
Dwight D, Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (New
York» Doubleday & Company, Inc,, 1963), PP. 535-535.
77
For his part Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
early in his tenure chose to characterize the dilemma of United
States foreign policy, which was to become more intense during
President Eisenhower's next eight years in office, as follows :
Perhaps some of you feel that your government is not
pushing political liberty as strongly as it should, I can
say to you three things * first, we are pushing for selfgovernment more than appears on the surface; secondly, where
we exercise restraint it is because of a reasoned conviction
that precipitate action would in fact not produce independence
but only transition to a captivity far worse than present de­
pendence; thirdly, we are alert to the possibility that the
Communist threat might grow into an excuse for delay, when it
is not an honest reason for delay. There are good and suffi­
cient reasons why the United States desires, in the United
_
Nations and elsewhere, to show unity with its Western allies, ^
In the case of the Eisenhower Administration there was little
indication of a need to change the substance of United States
relationships either with Western Europe or with the Soviet Union,
but to the new Republican administration there was a need to create
an image of a foreign policy radically different from that of the
predecessor.
To effect this new image, a number of new phrases
were introduced by the Eisenhower Administration into the foreign
policy lexicon* liberation, agonizing reappraisal, the new look,
brinkmanship, massive retaliation, disengagement, and others.
These new conceptions were geared to support existing presup­
positions of existing American policies vis-a-vis Western Europe*
the achievement of political security, military safety, and economic
3
•'Address by the Secretary of State to the Congress of Indus­
trial Organizations, Cleveland, Ohio, November 18, 1953, Department
of State Bulletin, November 30, 1953, PP. 741-744,
78
viability through European recovery and integration.
These were
the long-term objectives, but the means to attain them had re­
quired actions.
In giving effect to the Marshall Plan, the Euro­
pean Cooperation Act of 1948 and the amended form in April of 1949
set forth as United States policy the encouragement of European
economic cooperation and unification.
This policy was to become
firmly established as an element of national policy,
4
A strong,
unified Europe was considered vital to the interests of the United
States,
Further, the creation and formulation of NATO in 1948
added an additional military dimension to this sense of European
cooperation and Atlantic defense.
Taking advantage of the strength of unity provided by the
Marshall Plan and NATO, French Foreign Minister Schuman, in May of
1950, proposed a new plan by which the coal and steel production
of Prance, Germany, and other European nations would be placed under
a joint High Authority as a concrete measure which would lead to
a more united Europe,
While each of these developments affirmed
the American commitment to Western Europe events elsewhere in the
world were forcing upon the new administration the necessity of
change, not in its commitment, but in the emphasis by which Ameri­
can policy would be implemented.
It is to these new forms of
policy emphasis that this analysis now turns, discussing the "new
look" in Defense policy, the rearmament of the Federal Republic
of Germany, and the Eisenhower Administration's emphasis upon
European unity.
4
See below, pages IOI-II5,
79
Rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany
Anxieties caused by the Korean conflict apd the recognition
that any defense of Europe would require the support of Germany had
encouraged the United States to support the rearming of West Ger­
many; and the EDC ^ appeared to be a satisfactory means by which
to achieve this objective.
lems required attention.
To achieve this goal two basic prob­
First— not a major impediment— the West
German government proved reluctant to rearm, for it recognized the
potential damage to the goal of German reunification.
Secondly, Great Britain chose to remain outside this organi­
zation; and without British support the French, whose plan it was,
began to hesitate in granting its own acceptance.
This was the
situation when on 14 December 1953 Secretary Dulles declared at a
meeting of the North Atlantic Council*
If, however, the European Defense Community should not
become effective, if France and Germany remain apart, so that
they would again be potential enemies, then indeed there
would be grave doubt whether Continental Europe could be a
place of safety. That would compel an agonizing reappraisal
of the basic United States policy, °
This statement implied that given certain situations, the United
States might lose interest in the military defense of Europe and
leave Europe to its own fate.
This threat elicited much comment
^ h e EDC, or the European Defense Community was proposed in
1950 by Ren# Pleven, the French Premier,
^Hans J, Morgenthau, "John Foster Dulles," in Norman A,
Graebner, ed,, ^ Uncertain Tradition* American Secretaries of State
(New York* McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc,, 1961), p. 293.
/ y
;.
80
but little anxiety in Europe; and as an incentive for France to
ratify the EDC, it proved ineffective.
This threat simply was not
credible for one would need to assume that the United States had
committed itself to the defense of Europe because it happened to
approve of policies of certain European nations— and not because
it considered its own security dependent upon it.
or statesmen were willing to make this assumption.
Few observers
Even in 1953
it was clear to Europeans and Americans alike that the commitment
by the United States to defend Europe was not altruistic but that
the security of the United States itself required such a commitment.
For its part the French parliament did not feel threatened, and
7
proceeded to defeat the EDC treaty.
Questions quickly arose regarding the means by which the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) would be integrated into the
Western Alliance * Might not German rearmament take place anyway?
What was to be the position of the United Kingdom regarding Euro­
pean rearmament? and, what was to be the future of Western occupa­
tion of Germany since the EDC had been geared to the termination
of the occupational status?
In response to the defeat of the EDC, it was the British that
momentarily seized the reins and proposed the Western European
Union (WEU) which was to become the substitute for the fallen EDC,
Basically, the WEU extended the Brussels pact to include West Ger-
^A, H, Robertson, European Institutions (New York: Frederick
A, Praeger, 1966), p, 21,
81
many and Italy, thereby anchoring them more firmly to the West and
for all practical purposes diminishing the prospects of German re­
unification for the foreseeable future.
Further, under the WEU the
national armies would remain intact and NATO would assume military
control over these forces in time of war.
Even with basic approval
and acceptance of the WEU, a number of problems were to remain:
first, German recruitment for its new army would not begin until
1955) secondly, the French, heavily committed in Indochina until
1954 and in Algeria, were unable to meet the force goals desired
in Europe; and lastly, the British still were not sure just how
high a priority they were willing to place upon continental inte­
gration.
Although the rate of conventional rearmament had slowed, the
fulfillment of NATO's military plains still depended upon reducing
the disparity between Soviet and NATO forces.
To achieve this a
West German contribution of troops and material resources would be
indispensable.
This had been made more necessary by the adoption
by NATO of the "forward strategy,"
Under this concept, NATO forces
if attacked would meet the invading armies as far to the East as
possible and this meant German territory.
If the defense of Western
Europe was to begin in Germany, it seemed only reasonable that
German forces play a part in that defense.
Even the adoption in
1954 of "massive retaliation" as a strategic doctrine did little
to change that requirement.
In an attempt to allay German domestic
opposition to rearmament, the United States insisted, in support
of Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany, that the best assurance of
82
reunification lay in so strengthening the Federal Republic as to
present Soviet occupied Germany with an irresistible "attractive
power,"
8
To establish this basis of strength in Western Europe the WEU 9
was empowered to establish the maximum force levels of its members
on the recommendation of NATO's military authorities.
After all
signatories had ratified the new Brussels Treaty and a convention
provided for the continued stationing of allied forces in West Ger­
many, the FRG became a member of NATO,
With the FRG entering NATO
a number of outstanding issues were, through negotiation, brought
to resolution.
One issue that had remained between Germany and
France since World War I was the control of the Saar region.
Agreement
was reached over this problem, when the FRG achieved full sovereignty,
as well as the removal of all occupational forces,
A second issue was that, with the addition of West Germany to
the WEU, the establishment of a European army was abandoned.
This
approach was in keeping with basic views held by the French as
evidenced by their rejection of the EDO and by the British, who
had not supported the EDC,
Under this arrangement any unilateral
use of force was restricted and would be perceived as a threat to
the alliance; for if action was viewed in this light, then the
offending government would be forced to give up its rights under
the treaty.
^Ibid.. p, 91.
g
With the inclusion of the West German and Italian governments,
83
Further, as a part of Its commitment to Europe under the WEU
and the need to keep Germany under allied leadership. Great Britain
undertook to maintain four divisions on the continent.
She also
agreed not to withdraw these forces without the expressed consent
of the WEU,
As strong as this commitment appeared, the British,
ever mindful of their far-flung responsibilities, demanded two ex­
ceptions to the agreementi
to withdraw their troops in case of
either severe financial distress or an emergency which might arise
elsewhere.
However, it is important to observe that Britain did
make a strong commitment during a period of growing British pressure
for increased retrenchment from overseas responsibilities.
Finally, the allies agreed to give support to the FRG as the
only representative of the German people.
This was politically
important to Chancellor Adenauer, for it reaffirmed with many Ger­
mans the need to reunite the two Germanies,
Coupled with this was
the acceptance by the Allies of the position that only a final
peace conference could resolve the thorny boundary problems growing
out of the conditions of World War II,
This posture gave the FRG
increased confidence in maintaining a strong position concerning
the German Democratic Republic, for it reaffirmed Western European
support for the eventual reunification of Germany,
The most significant overtone to come from the Paris Agreements
was that from that point on, the defense posture of Western Europe
reinforced Atlantic development.
Under these conditions Great
Britain and the United States were bound more closely to the cooper­
ative defense of Europe,
While the United States had encouraged
84
the integration of economies through the Marshall Plan, now the
essential defense of Western Europe was placed on an integrative
basis; and Germany, defeated in 1945, now became a contributing
member to the strong line of defense needed in Western Europe,
Eisenhower and Defense Policy. 1953-1956
Throughout 1951 and 1952 NATO military preparations went for­
ward on the strength of the widely held view that 1954 would be
the "year of maximum peril" for Western Europe.
However, with the
change in administration, the reliance on a proposed conventional
force of fifty divisions was changed to an increased emphasis on
tactical nuclear weapons.
Further, these conditions and domestic
political considerations forced the Eisenhower Administration to
re-evaluate its position on military strategy and planning, placing
an increased emphasis upon strategic nuclear weapons.
In order for United States military planning to be put on a
more rational basis, compatible with both the economic availability
of resources and defense requirements, it was necessary for the
President to make a basic policy decision which was later announced
by Secretary of State Dulles : namely, that henceforth this nation
would "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly,
by means and at places of our own choosing,"
Further, the military
establishment could be modified to fit policy instead of having to
try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices ; "that permits us
a selection of means instead of a multiplication of means.
As a
result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security
85
at less cost,"
or to provide "more bang for the buck,"
Thus,
the "new look" as characterized by the conception of "massive
retaliation" was made a guiding force for United States defen­
sive strategy including American strategy for Western Europe,
Speaking of his own thinking on this issue President Eisen­
hower explained:
, , , We knew that the Soviets maintained something in
the neighborhood of 175 divisions active in Europe at all
times. The United States had twenty divisions, only five of
which were in Europe, Therefore, in view of the disparity
in the strengths of the opposing ground forces, it seemed
clear that only by the interposition of our nuclear weapons
could we promptly stop a major Communist aggression in that
area. Two more divisions or ten more divisions, on our
side, would not make very much difference against this
Soviet ground force.
But I was not pessimistic. My intention was firm: to
launch the Strategic Air Command immediately upon trustworthy
evidence of a general attack against the West, , , , ^^
Yet, around this "new" conception of defense policy a great
deal of debate and discussion developed centering on the recogni­
tion that the "new look" provided very little that was a departure
from previous policy.
It was Walter Lippmann who expressed on 18 March 1954 that
the "official explanations of the 'new look' have become so
voluminous that it is almost a career in itself to keep up with
them,"
Characterizing Dulles' speech as a "case of excessive
salesmanship," Lippmann concluded:
There is no doubt that the words of the text convey the
John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy,"
address to the Council on Foreign Relations, January 12, 1954, in
the Department of State Bulletin. January 25, 1954, pp, 107-110,
^^Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956. ou, cit., p, 542,
86
impression that something momentous and novel has been decided.
But everything that has been said since then by the Chiefs of
Staff, notably Admiral Carney, and no less so by Mr, Dulles
himself, make it plain that there has been no radical change
in our strategic policy, ^
What then was this "new look"?
On the same day as Lippmann's
article appeared, the Manchester Guardian stated that
The "new look" in American military strategy is mainly
old merchandise in a new package. There is really nothing
new in relying on "massive mobile retaliatory power" as the
principal safeguard of peace— nothing new, that is, except
the sales campaign by which the Administration is trying to
persuade the American people that some small changes make
the strategy of 1 9 ^ fundamentally sounder than the
strategy of 1953. ^
In attempting to clarify the significance of the "new look,"
Senator Mansfield and Secretary Dulles discussed the matter more
fully during the Senate Foreign Relations hearings on the announced
policies.
Their discussion proved instructive by furthering the
ambiguity surrounding the new policies.
And, on 19 March 1954
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the following
dialogue took place:
Senator Mansfield: Do you consider this new policy a new policy?
Secretary Dulles : It certainly has new aspects.
Senator: What are they?
Secretary: Well, I am sorry I cannot go into that here. All
I can say to you, and you will have to take it on faith, is
that a series of new decisions tiave been taken by the National
Security Council and many have been involved, close, and
difficult decisions, but there is today on the record a series
of decisions which are largely derived from this basic philos­
ophy which were not there a year and a half ago, l4
^^Editorial in the New York Times. March 18, 1954,
^^Editorial in the Manchester Guardian. March 18, 1954.
14
Morgenthau, o£, cit,, p, 295.
87
For all practical purposes the "new look" was buried beneath the
cloak of national security.
Nevertheless, as it related to NATO,
there was to be continued emphasis on tactical (introduced in Europe
in 1952) and strategic nuclear weapons, both of which would remain
under the control and authority of the United States,
The conven­
tional forces and weapons stationed in Europe as a part of the
American NATO commitment were to serve as a "trip-wire" for the
swift and sure nuclear forces.
This "new look" or "massive retaliation" with its heavy reli­
ance upon the American nuclear force operated upon two assumptions1
first, it was believed that the Soviet Union would not attack
Western Europe without attacking the United States at the same time.
Secondly, the Soviets were considered to be the weaker nuclear power.
On the basis of these assumptions the NATO council accepted and
adopted in December 1954 the new strategy of relying upon nuclear
weapons against any attack from the East, even if that attack was
with conventional arms.
This new policy, while increasing European
dependence upon the American strategic nuclear strinking force,
also had the effect of reducing allied incentives to build the
ground power that might mitigate this dependence.
While the incentives for expanding allied forces declined,
continued moves toward rearmament brought forward economic problems
Also considered was the irresistible urge of the new Repub­
lican administration to balance the federal budget. The emphasis
was to be placed in getting the most dramatic military effect with
the least cost— or, "more bang for the buck"; thus, an increased
emphasis on nuclear arms.
88
and political discontent in the NATO countries.
These nations were
just beginning to achieve real economic viability and to impose
heavy military costs upon them simply did not achieve much support,
A balance of payments problem began to develop, and along with it
there was a renewal of inflation in the prices of raw materials
and foodstuffs in both exporting and importing countries.
Such
a condition would lead the governments in Western Europe to cut
expenditures for civilian consumption and, in some cases, to
begin rationing and maintaining price and wage controls in order
to finance rearmament,
In this atmosphere of debate over increased force levels the
strategy of "massive retaliation" and the concept of the "new look"
received its first major challenge during the Suez and Hungarian
crises in the fall of 1956.
The attitude that the differences
that arose within the NATO Alliance were marginal and mainly over
tactical questions was seriously challenged by these two events.
To disagree completely about how to maintain Western control over
the Suez Canal was to differ over an important, not a marginal,
issue.
17
In Washington the Soviets were thought to be moving in such
a way as to achieve greater influence in the Middle East with its
vast oil resources and the Suez Canal,
Ironically, the Soviets
were doing this by the very device the United States had made
^^Osgood, 0£, cit,, p, 81,
17
Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power (New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1968), p, 101,
89
popular I the establishment of military dependency relationships
on the part of local regimes toward external big powers.
On the
other hand, the Eisenhower Administration believed it was import­
ant for the United States to demonstrate respect for the national­
istic feelings of the Middle East in order to avoid the local
political alienation of the West which would ease the way for
Soviet penetration.
The implications of this position were expressed in a series
of United States moves during 1955 amd 1956 which created ill feelings
with both the British and the French, and contributed significantly
to their split with the United States over Suez.
An early imple­
mentation of this position was the United States' embarrassed
avoidance of formal identification with its own offspring : the
Baghdad Pact,
IR
The British, who had joined the Pact, felt be­
trayed by this turnabout which Prime Minister Eden called an
American "failure to put its weight behind its friends in the
hope of being popular with its foes,"
ig
Further, France had been disappointed in the United States'
unwillingness to demonstrate any sympathy for the French position
in North Africa,
20
For Dulles, the British and the French were
^ h e purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to create a defense net­
work based upon the "northern tier" countries of Greece, Turkey,
Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, Thus the Baghdad Pact of 1955 forged a
defense chain that bound Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan with Britain and,
by virtue of British membership in NATO, with Greece and Turkey,
19
'Dwight D, Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace,
1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc,, 1965)1 iP.50.
20
Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London: Cassell & Co,, I96O),
pp. 374-375.
90
prisoners of their traditional colonial viewpoint as well as their
current economic interests in the area and therefore neither needed
nor deserved assistance in maintaining their colonial interests
in the Middle East,
Meanwhile, both the President and Secretary
Dulles believed that it was in American interests to keep their
eyes on the larger issue»
the East-West balance of power.
From the Suez crisis two important lessons were learned.
The
Suez crisis made clear that in the power struggle with the Soviets
the new nationalist regimes were to occupy a place of high priority
for United States foreign policy.
It was this realization which
created tension with the allies in Europe; for when their vital
interests were at stake they expected American support, not Amer­
ican disapproval.
Certainly each nation could be expected to
pursue its own interests, regardless of the Alliance, and the
Europeans took the view that controlling the Suez canal was a vital
Interest both for themselves and the United States,
Further, the
Eisenhower Administration also learned that the largest weights of
the global balance on the Western side (Britain and France) could
not be manipulated as if the Alliance was a hierarchy with the
United States at the apex; nor could the movement of these weights
be restricted to conflicts between the non-Communist and Communist
worlds.
The nearly simultaneous events in Eastern Europe with the
revolt by the Hungarian people and the subsequent crushing of that
revolt by the Soviet Army dramatically demonstrated the weakness
and ineffectiveness of relying upon the strategic military capa-
91
bllity of "massive retaliation" and "liberation,"
It is clear that
in the rhetoric of the 1952 election Dulles and Eisenhower disas­
sociated their policy of "liberation" from any encouragement to
armed revolt.
21
But during the fall of 1956 the Administration had neither
the intention nor the capability of intervening in Poland or Hungary,
and thereby established a precedent for the Johnson Administra­
tion's lack of action in support of the Dubchek government during
the Czechoslovakian crisis in August 1968,
Further, by not
acting during the Hungarian crisis the United States was tacitly
acknowledging the existing division of Europe into spheres of
influence as well as the ineffectiveness of "liberation" as any
more than a rhetorical device.
The Suez and Hungarian crises and the rapid development of
Soviet intercontinental strategic power produced the beginning
of an attitude within the Eisenhower Administration that the
international environment was in the throes of departure from
21
Grand strategy task forces appointed by the White House
in the spring of 1953 to explore the implications of alternative
strategies and come up with recommendations included one group
specifically assigned to the "liberation" alternatives. In the
initial terms of reference used by this group, the concept con­
veyed a rollback of existing Communist frontiers through political,
psychological, and economic warfare programs, along with paramili­
tary measures. But, when the reports of the groups were integrated
into one document and presented to the President for approval in
October of 1953, no part of the "liberation" alternative was incor­
porated, See also Paul Y Hammond, "NSC-681 Prologue to Rearma­
ment," in Warner R, Shilling, Paul Y, Hammond, and Glenn H, Snyder,
Strategy, Politics. and Defense Budgets (New Yorki Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1962), pp, 4i4-415, Also, for a clear articulation of
Dulles' policy of "Liberation" see John Foster Dulles, "A Policy
of Boldness," Life. XXXII (May 19, 1952), pp, l46-l60.
92
the relatively simple patterns of the early 1950's.
The change in
the military relationship from one of United States strategic
superiority balancing Communist military manpower, to one of mutual
deterrence at the strategic nuclear level was viewed as providing
the Communist powers with new opportunities to encourage local
instabilities in the non-Communist world.
Western capability of
controlling events within the non-Communist portion of the world
would, therefore, have to be based on more than the existing global
distribution of strategic military power.
The Eisenhower Adminis­
tration's realization that the emerging global distribution of
military power cancelled whatever leverage United States strategic
superiority might provide for Western influence over events in
Eastern Europe underlay the beginning, after Hungary, of efforts
by the United States to adjust its relationships with the Eastern
European regimes.
22
In this context the attempt by the Eisenhower Administration
to rely upon the "new look" as an answer for American strategic
policy proved to be little more than a different way of expressing
the heavy reliance upon strategic weapons by a means of deterrence.
Yet, this concept was obsolete even at its inception, for both the
Soviet capability of introducing intermediate range missiles into
Eastern Europe and the American inability to determine just what
kind of threat required a "massive retaliation" tended to neutralize
the United States in the implementation of its strategy,
22
Brown, 0£, cit,. pp, 124-125.
Further-
more, this concept proved to be little more than a reshaping of
defense policy while, at the same time, relying heavily upon foreign
policy assumptions carried over from the previous administration.
Thus as a new concept the "new look" — because of its inability to
be flexible under varying circumstances— provided very little
benefit in establishing a feasible defense strategy.
Nuclear Policy
With the realization both in Europe and in the United States
that the policy of "massive retaliation" remained ambiguous in its
interpretation and implementation there emerged a need to evaluate
nuclear policy within the alliance.
For his part. President
Eisenhower, recognizing the value of nuclear weapons to NATO defense
strategies, persuaded Congress to liberalize the Atomic Energy Act's
restrictions on dispensing information and equipment to the allies.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitted the President to direct
the Atomic Energy Commission to deliver atomic weapons to the
Department of Defense for such use as he deemed to be in the national
interest) but the Secretary of Defense could not give the weapons
to an ally for training except under the continual custody of
American nationals.
23 The motive for this rather modest measure
of nuclear diffusion arose from the decision that NATO should plan
on the basis of initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons
against forces ; if the allies were to be dependent upon this tactical
^^Osgood, 0£, cit,, p, 216,
'..S'
94
nuclear strategy, they would feel entitled to share at least the
essential information for carrying it out,
Dulles therefore
informed the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that there was
among the allies
a growing feeling of almost futility on their part unless
they can get more information than they now have about tactical
weapons. They know we have them and they know the enemy has
them, and they stand in between with no knowledge at all at
the present time; and it is extremely difficult to retain the
morale of the NATO force under the top command of General
Giruenther under the present conditions, , , , They tend to
feelI "what is the use of having any armies at all under
the present conditions?" 24
Another option available to the allies of the United States
was to build their own nuclear weapons.
Within the tight restric­
tions of the McMahon Act, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and its
amendments. Great Britain had been able to succeed in becoming
a privileged partner in receiving American nuclear assistance;
and every British advance in nuclear technology confronted the
United States with a rejection of the rationale of the act,
namely, to preserve American secrets,
British success in this
area, in turn, provided an additional incentive for France to
develop her own nuclear program; but France's inability to achieve
the same access to American nuclear technology proved to be an
additional grievance against the special Anglo-American partner­
ship,
The Suez War of 1956, in which both Britain and France
withdrew from Egypt in the face of American pressure and not too
subtle Soviet threats to drop bombs on London and Paris, strength-
24
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, To Amend the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, p, 702,
95
ened both governments' cases for building independent strategic
nuclear forces.
However strong the American intention to use nuclear weapons,
the Hungarian crisis of 195^ and the surrounding subsequent events
proved otherwise.
For all practical purposes the policy of massive
retaliation simply collapsed; and, as if to recognize this fact,
Dulles noted that "in the future it may be feasible to place less
reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power,"
In the fall of 1957i and following Sputnik,
2*5
it became impor­
tant that there be some readjustment of Europe's relation to the
United States within the NATO alliance.
Although EJurope's concern
over building national deterrent forces predated Sputnik, the mili­
tary problems raised by the new Soviet potential threw the whole
nuclear defense strategy of the United States into question.
Before Sputnik, American nuclear power had seemed to guarantee
Western European security.
After Sputnik, with American cities
vulnerable to Soviet attack, the United States needed Europe to
maintain her balance of power.
This led to one of the most hope­
ful of signs, the attempt to achieve Allied collaboration in an
effective NATO deterrent.
Yet, the more dependent on nuclear
weapons NATO became, the more imperative it became to refute any
25
John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States
Policy" Foreign Affairs. Vol 36, No. 1 (October, 1957), pp. 25-43,
^^By placing the Sputnik in orbit the Soviets demonstrated
their capability of placing a payload in space, but more importantly,
it clearly demonstrated the Soviet capability of utilizing Intercon­
tinental Balistic Missiles, placing the United States under potential
danger of missile attack.
96
suggestion that the American nuclear deterrent might not be used
in a time of crisis.
Thus, during the course of July 1957 Dulles indicated that he
wished to move toward a more effective device for discouraging the
spread of nuclear weapons production when he disclosed that the
United States was studying a plan for transferring custody of
nuclear stockpiles to NATO itself.
Under such a plan the allies
would have access to nuclear weapons without having to build their
own or remain totally dependent on the United States,
27 However,
the approach which the NATO Council approved required the negotia­
tion of bilateral agreements between the United States and her allies
in Europe in order to place American Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missiles (iRBMs) on their soil in accordance with NATO plans.
Also,
while the United States would retain custody of the warheads, the
ally would operate the missiles so that the decision to use them
would be joint,
A part of the predicament facing the United States
was the need to establish central control over the nuclear weapons
within the Alliance and it was seen as most important to minimize
the degree to which the allies could act autonomously in the nuclear
field.
This plan was not popular with the majority of nations in
NATO with the possible exception of Greece and Turkey,
Particularly,
this plan was not accepted, well by either the British or the French,
Britain opposed the plan even though it would not affect the British
deterrent force,
France even more strongly opposed the plan:
^^Washington Post, July 17, 1957.
the
97
French had little desire to he restricted by the American proscrip­
tions, and planning was already under way to develop an independent
force of their own.
Part of the Pressure for this "two-key" system came from NATO
itself, in the person of the Supreme Commander General Norstad,
an American general, as a means of limiting the desire for inde­
pendent nuclear forces.
In August 1959 he raised these questions:
How do we meet a growing but still somewhat confused and
conflicting desire among our European allies for a broader
sharing in the control of nuclear weapons? How can the alli­
ance as a whole be assured that such weapons will be available
to them in all reasonable circumstances for their defense,
the defense of Europe?
Recognizing France’s move toward an independent nuclear capability
and the great concern of other allies at the prospect of other
states following the example of France, he urged that the alliance
consider transferring the control of nuclear weapons to NATO itself,
as the fourth nuclear power.
He warned that his scheme would not
necessarily "influence the desire of some nations to pursue their
own quest for an atomic weapons capability," but he thought that
it "might very well remove a good part of the motivation of others
to do so,"
The problem of the multilateral control of nuclear weapons in
NATO had arisen with the Soviet achievement of a strategic capacity
to inflict unacceptable damage upon the United States if the United
28
Speech on December 6 , 1959, to the Institute of World Affairs
at the University of Southern California, NATO Letter. Vol, VIII
January I96O), p, 10,
Z^Ibid,
98
States were to strike at the Soviet Union in defense of the European
allies.
This factor threatened Allied willingness to remain entirely
dependent upon America's decision whether or not to use nuclear
weapons, both because of the fear that the United States might not
use them and thereby not go to the defensive aid of the distressed
allies and because of the conflicting fear that the United States
might use them and assist in bringing about great nuclear destruc­
tion upon European soil while possibly escaping nuclear damage
itself.
But if the control over nuclear weapons were to remain
under the United States then this problem would remain.
General Pierre M, Gallois, of France, in response to General
Norstad, proposed that the United States make nuclear weapons
available to allied governments (individually or in groups) under
dual control, with the agreement that America turn over the "key"
to the warheads under critical conditions which would be specified
in advance.
Following Gallois' line of thought, the only way to
make the threat of nuclear retaliation credible was for the nation
whose vital interests were threatened to have the power to retali­
ate,
However, if each ally were to depend entirely upon the inde­
pendent control of its own nuclear weapons, this would produce a
dangerous proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities and
would strain mutual defense obligations.
To avoid unnecessary
risks and to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons at the
expense of a considerable duplication of effort in research and
production, Gallois proposed that the United States give her allies
nuclear weapons under the safeguards of his scheme for combined
99
dual and unilateral control.
This plan proved unacceptable, for
the presupposition upon which it was based suggested that a nuclear
force under the control of the country directly threatened would be
a more credible deterrent than American striking forces or a joint
deterrent,
a presupposition not generally accepted by those gov­
ernments more interested in identifying their security interests
with the United States,
In the absence of any well organized and acceptable plan for
nuclear sharing, two courses seemed promising.
The first suggested
the acquiring of an "independent" nuclear capability in order to
avoid the liabilities of depending exclusively upon a decision by
the United States,
The second suggested an agreement for "disen­
gagement" with the Soviet Union, in order to alleviate the polit­
ical and military sources of NATO's security problems,
This new concept of "disengagement"
31
\ included, at various
^^Osgood, o£. clt,, p. 284,
31
Some of the proposals bearing the label of "disengagement"
called for nothing more than arms limitation and control in the
center of Europe, In this category the most notable was British
Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden's suggestion at the Geneva summit
conference in July 1955 ot "a demilitarized area between East and
West" and the proposals in 1957 and 1958 by the Polish Foreign
Minister Adam Rapacki of a "denuclearized zone," prohibiting the
production, stationing, and use of nuclear weapons and reducing
conventional forces in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanys,
Also, at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1957 Secre­
tary Dulles presented a plan to disperse IRBMs in Europe: such a
plan entailed the negotiation of bilateral agreements between the
United States and her allies for the placement on allied soil of
IRBMs, The fact that all elements of control remained eventually
in the hands of the U, S, made such an arragement undesirable to
most of the European allies. The exceptions were Britain, Italy
and Turkey, in whose countries negotiations were successful for
installing IRBMs, but installation was withheld pending the sub­
stitution of more modern Polaris missiles.
100
times, all of the following principles:
a) the withdrawal of Soviet
and American as well as other foreign troops from a zone including
the
two Germanys or beyond;
in such a zone;
many
b) the limitation and control of arms
c) a political settlement which would unify Ger­
anddetermine the restrictions, if any, upon her armaments
and upon her political commitments ; and d) some guaranty by the
United States, the. USSR, and other powers of the first three points,
George F, Kennan, an advocate of disengagement, claimed that
The time has come , , , for a fresh examination of the
main issues which lie between the Soviet Union and the West,
It is barely possible we might now find the approach to a
settlement~or at least to a more endurable situation— is not
so hopeless as it has long seemed to be,
He continued by stating that there can be no
Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe unless
this entire area can in some way be removed as an object in
the military rivalry of the great powers. But this at once
involves the German problems because it implies the withdrawal
of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany, and— so long as Ameri­
can and other Western forces remain in Western Germany— the
Russians must view their problem in Eastern Europe in direct
relation to the overall military equation between Russia and
the West, Any solution of the problem of the satellite area __
is thus dependent on a solution of the German problem itself,
Kennan then proceeded to challenge what he concluded to be
the questionable assumptions dominating American thinking,
Ameri­
cans, he felt, overrated the possibility of a Soviet attempt to
invade Western Europe; they also exaggerated the value of the
satellite armies as possible instruments of a Soviet offensive
weapon; they failed to take into account all the implications of
^^George F, Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West (New York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1958)r P# 35,
33Ibid,. p, 36,
101
the ICBMsj and, finally, they seriously underestimated the advant­
ages to the security of the West which would be achieved by a
Soviet military withdrawal.
This doctrine of disengagement, so
appealingly presented, elicited a strong response in Foreign Affaiirs
by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a noble cold warrior, speaking
as a Democratic spokesman on foreign policy,
34
Further, within
the Eisenhower Administration this doctrine received very little
serious attention and even less support as a serious alternative.
Failing to receive support from those in positions to make foreign
policy, "disengagement" was abandoned as a reasonable alternative.
Perhaps one explanation, as it might now appear, was not so much
the arguments of its proponents or its critics but the difficulty
of taking a major new diplomatic step in so complicated an area as
Western Europe in the midst of the Gold War,
European Unity
3*5
1953— 1961
As the Eisenhower Administration came into office in January
1953 it inherited a policy based upon achieving a greater sense of
unity among the allies of Western Europe,
The United States had
34
^ Dean Acheson, "The Illusion of Disengaigement," Foreign
Affairs, XXXVI (April 1958), pp. 371-382,
35
•'^"Disengagement" failed for a variety of reasons : such a
policy was totally unacceptable to West Germany, France and other
allies; it was also precluded by Russia's complete lack of interest
in a genuine accommodation at that time; further, such a policy
would impinge directly upon NATO's strategy and capabilities— in
fact, it would be destructive to the core of mutual interests
which provided the strength for the alliance.
102
been pursuing a policy which advocated European unity as an indis­
pensable factor for achieving greater strength within the Atlantic
Alliance, and therefore— within the cold war context— for pursuing
the best interests of the United States,
A refinement of this policy adopted by the Eisenhower Adminis­
tration was the recognition of the importance of West Germany to
the unity of Western Europe,
The new administration accepted the
belief that the problem of a divided Germany could be resolved
only within the larger European framework similar in concept to
the Schumann Plan— in which West Germany would be Integrated into
a coordinated program of Involvement.
Finally, the United States
took the view that economic integration would hopefully lead to
greater political integration and the possibility of a United
States of Eîurope,
This view was to prove of dubious value.
The policy of European unity was an important one in United
States projections for European development.
Among the events in
the development of this policy were the successful concluëion of
the Paris Conference of 195^ which united the FRG more closely to
the West, the support given to the achieving of the Treaties of
Rome (EEC and Euratom) in 1957, and the measured non-support given
to the proposed Free Trade Association (EFTA),
Each of these events
illustrates the basic thrust of United States policy— the drive
toward increased European unity.
The Paris agreements of 1954-55 were to provide an important
step in the integrative process in Europe, a central focus of
United States policy.
Under the Truman Administration it had been
103
considered important to strengthen the role which the Western zone
of Germany was to play in Western Defense,
And, then, the invasion
of Korea increased the anxiety of many strategists in the West to
rearm West Germany,
While West Germany was being integrated
economically (ECSC) into the Western sphere there existed the
need to include the FRG into a military and political framework.
After the defeat
of the European Defense Community the basic
strategy of United States policy remained the same (even if the
tactics did not), notably the support for supranational European
integration; and the only institution of this order, the ECSC, was
given constant support by the United States,
It was in the subse­
quent Paris Conference in October 195^ that the problem of the
German defense contribution and the membership of the sovereign
FRG within NATO was resolved.
Both of these issues were believed
vital to United States interests.
In this agreement the United States along with France and Great
Britain were successful in bringing West Germany into a fully inte­
grated Western defense program, attaching the FRG firmly to the
West,
By this agreement the Bonn government agreed to self-denial
on all ABC weapons,
tion by forceful means.
as well as giving up any chance of reunifica­
In return for these promises of self-denial,
however, the FRG gained its sovereignty and the end of the occupation,
*^6
ABC weapons included all Atomic, Bacteriological and Chem­
ical weaponry,
37
3?This
This was true with the exception of Berlin which remained
under the occupation of the "Big Four,"
104
During the negotiations of this agreement the role of the United
States was helpful.
This attitude was demonstrated by the warm
message sent on 10 March 1955 by President Eisenhower to each of
the Prime Ministers of the countries signatory to the WEU Treaty
and the message of congratulations which Secretary Dulles sent to
the Western powers after final agreement onthe
treaties was
reached— in which the Secretary referred tothe
event as a "shining
chapter in history,"
The achieving of agreement at Paris was
felt to have preserved the integrity of Allied defense in Europe,
The signing of the Paris Agreements of 1954-55 brought to an
end a period of American initiatives regarding European integration
and signaled a change to the posture of providing aid and support
for strong initiatives from Europe,
In this regard American
diplomacy became supportive of those movements and individuals
seeking new ways to achieve greater integration in Europe, but the
initiative for such activity was shifting to Europe,
An example
of this shifting can best be seen in the development and formula­
tion of the European Economic Community,
The development of the European Economic Community and Euratom
during 1955-1957 gave United States foreign policy new opportunities
to achieve its primary objective in Europe,
There was no American
initiative but there was what Max Beloff describes as an attempt
^^Department of State Bulletin. March 21, 1955, PP. 461-465,
39
Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel At the Brink,
John Foster Dulles * Command of American Power, (Garden City, N.Y,,
Doubleday & Co, Inc,, 19^0) p, 110,
105
"to avoid the appearance of any undue interest" When things in
Europe began to go ahead again with the Messina Conference of
June, 1955.
40
Yet, the American foreign policy establishment re­
mained strong in its desire to be as helpful as possible in achieving
further progress on the same conceptual level as that of the Schumann
Plan,
The literature of the 1950*s describing the new developments
in Europe on the whole agrees with the position taken by the United
States * that domestic or economic motivations must be subordinated
to the belief that "a strong, prosperous and more unified Western
Europe is in the best interests of the United States,"
4l
This
position represented a recognition of a strong compatibility of
interests between those of the nations of Western Europe and those
of the United States,
This policy was made more evident at the
convening of the Messina Conference,
This conference originally was called for the purpose of en­
larging the European Coal and Steel Community,
In their resolu­
tions of May 1955 the Six expressed the need to study and find new
ways of extending the powers of the ECSC leading to further integration.
42
At the Messina Conference the nations comprising the
40
Max Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe,
(Washington, D* C,, The Brookings Institution, I963) , p, È&.
^^iriam Camps, The European Common Mstrket and American
Foreign Policy. Memorandum No. 11, (Center of International Studies,
Princeton University, November, 1956).
42
A. H. Robertson, European Institutions. (London: Stevens
& Sons, Ltd,, 1959), P. 27,
106
ECSC
43
did unite to issue a resolution to establish a united Europe
by the means of merging economies and harmonizing social policies.
To implement this resolution Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium was chosen
to head a Committee of Governmental Representatives to assist in
working out the necessary arrangements.
Yet not all the Europeans were willing in their participation.
The French dragged their heels for they were not prepared to form­
ulate a firm treaty; they sought instead only a form of recommen­
dation leaning toward integration.
The British also demonstrated
reluctance for they sent to the conference only low-level officials
and remained disinclined toward joining any attempt at a European
merger.
Their policy continued to be one of either remaining aloof
to further negotiations or attempting to dilute the impact such
integration would have upon the British social and economic
structure,
American support for the decisions at the Messina Conference
was encouraging.
The Eisenhower Administration was pleased to
support European integration on the same conceptual basis as that
of the Schuman Plan and of the ill-fated EDC,
Administration
support for this program was demonstrated by two basic means.
First, the administration gave constant and public support to the
initiatives, and secondly, the American diplomatic machinery was
placed at the use of the Europeans in order to assist in putting
the resolutions of Messina into concrete form.
44
43
^Italy, West Germany, France, and the Benelux,
44
Van Der Beugel, 0£, cit,. p, 318,
107
Speaking publicly, Secretary Dulles in a news conference
strongly supported the view that the West should continue on the
road toward integration.
Further, he added:
I am not thinking in terms of the military unification,
although that is important, I am thinking more in terms of
the general development of the European idea and moving toward
a United States of Europe ih terms of economic and political
unity, ^5
Soon after, the Secretary again took the position that there was a
need for unity on a more intimate basis among the contin­
ental European nations themselves, , , , I was glad to find
on my last visit to Europe that the movement to develop along
these lines is taking on new vitality. That movement must
obtain its strength primarily from the peoples concerned. It
is, however, a development in which the United States had a
deep interest and which it is prepared to support if oppor­
tunity offers, ^
Then just a few months later the Secretary reiterated the same
theme in a speech on 23 April 1956 in New York,
We believe in the closer integration of some Western
European countries, such as represented by the Coal and
Steel Community , , , whereby the members would apply
community principles. Such European integration and the
development of NATO are complementary and not mutually
exclusive processes, ^7
It was thus clear that the Eisenhower Administration found in the
construction of the European Economic Community real hope for
future integration and in such a form as not to undo previous
achievements in that field.
President Eisenhower also spoke out in support of this policy
^•^he New York Times. December 6 , 1955.
46
Department of State, Press Release 683. December 8 , 1955.
47
Department of State Bulletin. April 30, 1956, pp. 706-7IO,
'■
•
y
108
of greater European unity.
In his State of the Union message for
1957 he took a strong stance:
We welcome the efforts of a number of our European friends
to achieve an integrated community to develop a common market.
We likewise welcome their cooperative effort in the field of
atomic energy, ^
This view continued to be found in a number of other communications
between the United States and the nations of Western Europe.
Even
though the EEC was potentially a trade rival of the United States,
that risk was to be assumed.
Would not increased integration in
Western Europe strengthen the European capacity to stand on its
own feet in both economic and political matters thereby decreasing
the need to rely upon the United States?
But, most significantly,
continued progress toward European integration had the advantage
of tying ever more closely the Bonn government to the West and
thereby strengthening the center of the defense in Europe against
encroachment by the Soviet Union,
Besides supporting the economic cooperation, the United States
also supported strongly the Spaak Report which grew out of the
Spaak Committee advocating the establishment of Euratom,
This
report stated clearly that the purposes of this proposed organi­
zation were to pursue the peaceful uses of atomic energy, to
develop research and production, to exchange technology and to
encourage investments in nuclear energy.
In the report there was
no hint or intention of using atomic energy for nuclear weapon
production.
48
House Document I, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957.
109
American interests regarding the creation of Euratom were
quick to assert themselves.
First, American commercial interests
were eager to sell their know-how and equipment to the new organi­
zation.
But, secondly— and most important— the United States was
very much concerned over the issue of control.
Van der Beugel
observes at this point that there existed a
tension between two American trends of thought, the
global approach and the regional one. While one trend sup­
ported the priority of a global control mechanism, the
other trend preferred the regional system. In the American
approach to Euratom, both tendencies were apparent, ^9
Thus while American support was given to the commercial interests
to invest in strengthening the movement toward integration, the
maintenance of control over nuclear technology remained very
strong in policy circles.
To respond to this dual concern in
February 1957 the "Three Wise Men," appointees of the negotiating
committee of Euratom, visited Washington to discuss the potential
for American assistance in the initial formulation of that organi­
zation.
At the conclusion of their visit a communiqué
was issued
which confirmed United States support for the initiative taken by
the Spaak Committee’s proposal for a bold and imaginative appli­
cation of nuclear energy; the communique also announced American
49
Van der Beugel, 0£, cit,. p, 322.
^^The "Three Wise Men" were Louis Armand, Franz Etzel and
Francesco Giordani,
^^Department of State Bulletin, February 25, 1957, pp. 306-
307.
110
willingness to allocate to Euratom a part of 20, 000 kilograms
of U-235 which President Eisenhower made available, in principle,
on 22 February 1956, ^
On 8 November 1958 the United States and
Euratom signed an agreement in Brussels in which the technical
know-how, the financial assistance, the sale of U-235 an<i the
essential issue of control were incorporated.
This agreement
was then soon referred to Congress with the strong support of the
Eisenhower Administration,
53
While American objectives of European integration in Europe
were successfully achieved during this administration as evidenced
by the formulation of the European Economic Community and Euratom
the pursuit of this policy did not meet with total success.
There
was a growing tension between the new EEC and the other members of
the OEEC,
There was also developing a concern over its own econ­
omic status— especially its deteriorating balance of payments pos­
ition,
It was becoming increasingly apparent that domestic economic
needs within the United States and the United States policy of
European economic integration represented conflicting interests.
Two areas of policy were not to be successful: promoters failed to
achieve wider European membership in the EEC, thereby necessitating
the formulation of the European Free Trade Açea (EFTA) ; and, later,
the Fouchet Plan failed to achieve political int%ration,
54
^Department of State.Bulletin. March 19, 1956, pp. 469-470,
•^^House Document 411, 85th Congress, 2nd Session,
^\he Fouchet Plan will be discussed below, see pages 146-160,
Ill
The proposal for a Free Trade Area was a parallel development
to the construction of the EEC.
The British, dissatisfied with the
limiting aspects of the EEC, and suspicious of being tied too
closely to the European continent, had rejected participation in
the EEC and instead began to promote a plan which would encompass
all members of the Organization for Europeaui Economic Cooperation
(OEEC),
Further they envisioned a Free Trade organization which
would not attempt to create a union as such but would provide purely
a free trade arrangement.
For the British, the Free Trade Area
proposals meant a reversal of their traditional OEEC policy that
tariffs should be the subject of global agreements and should take
place in the framework of GATT,
They could not be unaware,
however, that their initiative would lead to a delay in the process
of continental integration and could result in a system in which
the Common Market concept would be superseded by a free trade area.
The United States had welcomed the formulation of the EEC
without much concern over the possibilities of trade discrimination.
And, those who supported limiting integration to the framework of
the Six took advantage of the American position and presented
their pirograms and proposals in such a way that they were in sym­
pathy with American concern for discrimination against its economic
interests,
56
Thus the United States found itself in alliance with
"^^General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade,
56
"^Miriam Camps, The European Common Market and Free Trade
Area. (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1957),
P. 30,
112
the protectionist interests in Europe in opposition to those who
favored the more liberal approach to economic problems.
But United States policy did not overlook its own economic
interests.
The United States did support regional economic arrange­
ments in Europe with its resulting discriminatory aspects as long
as the dollar shortage had made this policy an obvious device to
strengthen its European partners.
Because this regionalism seemed
to promise real integration in the economic and subsequently in
the political fields, it had gained United States support.
One
author stated that
Britain’s reaction to the project for a Common Market
from 1956-58 threatened Europe’s developing union more
seriously, Britain was invited, but refused to join in
drafting the Rome Treaty, For the next two and a half years,
London pressed for a seventeen-nation Free Trade Area that
would have destroyed the European Economic Community before
it began to function, ^
This British proposal the United States was unwilling to accept.
The American attitude toward the Free Trade Area negotiations
was based mainly on its concern to preserve the integrity of what
it considered the most attractive form of European integration—
the Common Market— -and a reluctance to accept economic discrimin­
ation in Europe without the ultimate hope of a development in the
direction of a political community.
This United States attitude
was completely in line with the basic elements of its policy towards
the problem of European integration, for it had the strength of an
imaginative and constiructive approach.
Thus the United States was
^^Robert Kleinman, Atlantic Crisis. (New York: W, W, Norton,
1964), p, 82,
113
correct as evaluating the Free Trade Area as only a commercial
structure devoid of political overtones and perspectives.
In the
period following the breakdown of the negotiations on a Free Trade
Area in December 1958, the scene in Europe and the attitude of the
United States towards the European developments were dominated by
other events which strengthened significant tendencies*
the move
to convertibility of moàt European currencies, the deterioration
of the United States balance of payments, and the desire of Britain
to form the European Free Trade Association,
United States policy during the Eisenhower Administration
remained remarkably consistent in relation to European unity.
It
supported the continued economic growith and development of the
Eîuropean nations.
The objective of continued European integration
found real success as the Europeans were able to integrate firmly
within the European Economic Community and develop the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy through Euratom.
During the 1950's, as
years passed, it became clear that the Europeans were increasingly
able to stand on their own feet; both the EEC and the integration
of the FBG into NATO during the paris Agreements demonstrated
their willingness to take the steps necessary to achieve greater
unity and cooperation.
Perhaps the one real failure, in American
eyes, toward achieving the goal of European unity was the refusal
of Britain to play a more integrative role.
Not only did British
policy cause disruption— it also delayed a wider application of
the principle of integration in Europe,
Nevertheless, American policy as it related to European unity
114
was a success, perhaps too much of a success for as the Elsenhower
years drew to a close the Common Market was emerging as a potenti­
ally strong trade competitor with which the United States, in the
years to follow, would have to cope.
Significantly, basic American policies toward Europe carried
over from the 1940's were, in large measure, a success,
Europe
had recovered economically from the war, forming in the EEC an
economic community which would rival both the United States and
the Soviet Union,
Economic viability and European regional coop­
eration were encouraged on many fronts.
Further, NATO was consid­
ered a success, for not only had it tied the FBG to the Atlantic
Alliance but no Soviet-supported invasion of the Western sector
of Europe had occurred.
Therefore, Western Europe gained strength
politically, economically and militarily and increased substantially
its influence.
Such administration policies as the "new look,"
"massive retaliation," and "liberation" proved, however, to be
more rhetoric than substance.
The policies initiated under the Truman administration had
been maintained and implemented under Eisenhower's,
The major
differaaces existed in rhetoric and emphasis— primarily concern­
ing policies of containment and the use of nuclear weapons as a
part of the defense force of Europe,
Further, while the Truman
Administration had pursued policies aimed at bringing Germany into
a reunited Europe, the Eisenhower Administration, recognizing the
nonfeasibility of a reunited Europe, was able to integrate the
FRG into the Western Alliance and the European Economic Community,
115
The emphasis of United States foreign policy had remained with the
rebuilding and rédevelopment of Western Europe, and the contain­
ment of Communism,
Europe remained of vital importance to the
United States, for there the major degree of American attention
had been focused and commitment granted.
Political stability and economic viability gave Europe con­
fidence; each of the European allies felt the liberty to raise
serious questions of difference, to challenge assumptions and to
demand a new imaginative look at United States-European relations.
It is important, therefore, to analyze the Kennedy Administration
and its ability to meet these changing needs in Atlantic relations
so that the continuity with And divergence from the policies of the
previous administrations can more easily be determined and Ameri­
ca's commitment to Western Europe reexamined.
3,
The Kennedy Interlude
With the inauguration of John F. Kennedy as President of the
United States, a new era dawned in American foreign policy in rela­
tion to Western Europe,
A renewed interest was to be given to the
vital relationship which tied the nations of Western Europe with
the United States,
President Kennedy, eager to utilize the tools
of power and influence, had challenged the apparent lack of imagin­
ation and effective policy during the previous administration.
The new administration had the benefit of a great deal of
previous discussion within the Democratic party relating to foreign
affairs.
Much of this discussion had taken place within the Demo­
cratic Advisory Council ^ from which everged two leading but con­
flicting schools of thought.
Both positions opposed what they
considered the principal points of the Eisenhower-Dulles policies
— the dominant reliance on a concept of massive retaliation, its
faith in military security pacts to contain Communist expansion,
its intolerance of neutrals and its view of diplomacy as a subbranch of theology.
Beyond the points of consensus, there seemed
to be wide divergence on both diagnoses and prescriptions.
The first group was led by the former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson,
While nearly a decade had passed since he had been in
office, he sternly maintained the view that, in spite of the
passing of Premier Stalin, very little had changed in and with the
^ h e Democratic Advisory Council, a reform-oriented group
within the Democratic party, pursued an aggressive stance both in
attacking the Eisenhower Administration and in developing new
Democratic alternatives.
117
Soviet Union,
And, in arguing his position, he tended to regard
"hard" military measures as much more vital in the "Cold War" than
2
"softer" economic programs.
On the other side of the table were
such men as Adlai Stevenson, Averell Harriman, George F. Kennan,
John K, Galbraith, and Senators Mike Mansfield and J, William
Pulbright,
This group believed that the world had changed since
1950, that the Sino-Soviet conflict was real, that the current
"real" battleground was the underdeveloped areas of the world,
and that the military threat to Western Europe had declined.
For
them the policies of 1949-1952 no longer were adequate; the times
3
demanded initiative and new flexibility.
This réévaluation of United States foreign policy had been
prompted by earlier experiences.
the end of the Korean War,
One such occasion had come at
The Eisenhower Administration had
held to the view that the foundation of military strength was
economic strength, and that, in turn, depended upon a balanced
budget.
The result was the strategies developed under the
concepts of the "new look" and "massive retaliation,"
John Foster
Dulles summed it up when he declared that the United States had
abandoned the "traditional policy of meeting aggression by direct
and local opposition," and would depend in the future "primarily
upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and places
of our choosing,"
Thus, the United States fully intended to resist
2
Arthur M, Schlesinger, Jr,, A Thousand Days (New York;
Houghton Mifflin Company, I965), p. 280,
^Ibid,, p, 281,
'''■■■' 118
local aggression, not by limited war, but by nuclear strikes against
the Soviet Union or China,
Yet not once could President Eisenhower
find the case of local aggression to which nuclear warfare seemed
a suitable response; and Dulles, forced to back away from the idea
of strategic nuclear retaliation, undermined its credibility.
4
Flexible Response
The Kennedy Administration was forced to seek new answers to
old strategic issues and new policies where old ones had failed or
had become obsolete.
Thus, Kennedy and his advisors discarded
the obsolete doctrine of "massive retaliation" and replaced it
with what they referred to as the doctrine of graduated or "flex­
ible response," or the McNamara Doctrine, named after the Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara, the administration's chief sponsor
of the policy.
In essence this doctrine was the concept of choice;
if the President was to have a balanced range of forces from which
to select the most appropriate response for each situation, then
it was necessary to rebuild non-nuclear forces to the point where
a potential aggressor would be confronted with the same poor choice
Kennedy hoped to avoid;
escalation or humiliation. ^
It is important to distinguish between two very important
4
Ibid.
^Theodore G. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York; Harper & Row, I965),
p. 706.
119
aspects of the McNamara doctrine»
the first aspect was that of
"flexible response," which was a strategy that utilized both con­
ventional arms and nuclear arms with a clear preference for con­
ventional components of defense ; a second aspect was the desire for
a unified command of the Alliance's strategic forces, a downgrading
of separate national nuclear programs and with a direct increase
in reliance upon the American nuclear capacity which in turn was
controlled by a commitment to "flexible response,"
The concern over "flexible response," the strategy to utilize
both the nuclear threat and conventional arms, raised a great deal
of controversy.
In the Kennedy Administration the priority was
placed upon the establishment of a more credible deterrence.
This
emphasis was based upon the assumption that if defense policy is
geared to provide a greater variety of conventional options before
the use of nuclear weapons then such a policy would enhance the
concept of deterrence and the credibility of the American deterrent
force, ^
The point is that conventional weapons would provide a
more proportional response to any but a large scale nuclear attack,
and thus be more credible as a United States strategy; but of more
importance to credibility, they could be used without risking
destruction to the principal guaranteeing strategic capability
of the United States,
In order to achieve the acceptance of the McNamara Doctrine
For a more complete and exhaustive examination of the
McNamara Doctrine see William W, Kaufhann's The McNamara Strategy
(New York» Harper & Row, 1964), Of particular interest is Chapter
3 which explores the relationship that took place over this concept
among the NATO allies.
120
as policy the member nations of NATO would be required to reevalu­
ate their particular contribution to the NATO force levels and in
some cases enlarge their commitment to the development of a
stronger and more flexible conventional deterrent.
But Europeans
had grown accustomed to the concept, however viable, of an instant
nuclear response and the thought of first fighting a conventional
war before engaging the nuclear deterrent of the United States
created a real sense of anxiety among Europeans.
They perceived
that the Americans were raising the threshold of nuclear response,
which was, in fact, the case.
Prom this anxiety emerged a real fear that if the nuclear
threshold were to be raised, that it not be raised too high.
The
Europeans also feared that such a strategy would mean that any
war in Europe would be fought on European territory and possibly
avoid bringing war to the United States and to the Soviet Union.
This, it was believed, could only be a form of territorial dis­
crimination.
The Europeans were concerned over other issues as well.
The
McNamara Doctrine of "flexible response" also required a unified
control of the nuclear forces in Western Europe.
This centralized
control was required in order to coordinate the various nuclear
forces for the purposes of a unified system of targeting and
effective operation of both the conventional as well as the
nuclear forces.
But this concern over the unification of command
raised the controversy over nuclear control— or nuclear sharing—
a part of the entire debate over the new strategic doctrine.
121
A point of issue with the Europeans was the question over
whether this doctrine did, in fact, enhance deterrence in Europe,
While the United States advocated a unified command with a raised
nuclear threshold by emphasizing conventional forces, the Europeans
believed that the deterrent would be more credible with a firm,
authoritative commitment on the part of the United States of its
nuclear capability.
This the United States was willing to do but
under what conditions?
Certainly, the American troops stationed
in Europe constituted a type of commitment which could not be
ignored.
Further, the European awareness of the need for unified
control of both conventional and nuclear weapons led directly to
the consideration of various means by which this could be accom­
plished.
The European emphasis was to take the form of pursuing such
proposals as Secretary of State Christian Herter's in I96O when
he advocated a Multi-Lateral Force, but only
multi-lateral
control could be achieved, an unrealistic proposal to the new
Kennedy Administration.
For President Kennedy the emphasis had
to be placed upon the augmentation of conventional forces, for
he feared not only nuclear proliferation but increased European
demands for an expanded role in nuclear control.
Further, the
Kennedy Administration opposed such proposals for they would
have the significant effect of diluting United States control
over strategic forces.
Other political problems were present;
for example, would such a proposal alter the alliance role for
the FRG?
And, might not the French example of not wishing to
122
participate prove contagious among the allies?
This policy was reaffirmed in Ottawa by the President in May
1961, when he restated the Herter proposal but only on the condi­
tion that NATO’s non-nuclear goals be met,
Europeans, however,
were not eager to meet these force goals which would enhance the
conventional deterrent.
In his policy the President was more
concerned with providing the essential reassurance of United States
guarantees of defense, and much less concerned with the possibility
of sharing nuclear control.
Further, at the May I962 meeting of
NATO nations the United States committed five Polaris submarines
to SACEUH (but the submarines, it should be noted, were to remain
under the control of the United States),
This action also must
be viewed as an attempt to demonstrate that while the American
emphasis was upon upgrading the capability of conventional arms
the commitment to defend Europe remained firm.
The second aspect of the McNamara Doctrine centered upon the
concern of control over the strategic forces committed to the de­
fense of Western Europe,
In accordance with this concept and with'
the desire to unifV the Alliance's strategic forces, the Kennedy
Administration accelerated Eisenhower’s program to preserve an
adequate second-strike force, based primarily on concealment and
mobility of strategic nuclear weapons.
In declaring its new stra­
tegic doctrine, the new administration ruled out the initial use
of strategic nuclear weapons
7
and followed its predecessor in
^New York Times. March 29, I96I, p, I6 ,
123
formulating the essential requirements of a strategic second
strike force.
The doctrine of graduated response involved not
only raising the level of nuclear initiative and widening the
area of conventional warfare; it also involved employing a stra­
tegic counterforce phase as a part of the second-strike capability
and preceding the total disaster of counter-city strategy.
Com­
pared to the more extreme theory of massive retaliation, this
doctrine seemed moderate and comprehensive.
Further, the Kennedy
Administration made sizable efforts to insure the type of nuclear
superiority required by the McNamara Doctrine,
This was to be
achieved by building a reserve force capable of counter-city strikes
following a prior phase of nuclear exchanges aimed at the retalO
iatory forces, even if the enemy took the initiative.
The new McNamara Doctrine, as it concerned nuclear control,
however, left most Europeans more concerned than convinced.
This
feeling was only partly justified, for this doctrine constituted
a response to the conditions which had developed over the prior
ten years, namely the equal psychological vulnerability of Russia
and the United States,
As a result many Europeans had discovered
or were in the process of becoming aware that their security would
no longer be based on an automatic nuclear response by the United
States,
As Russia’s intercontinental nuclear capability became
recognized it became more clear to the Europeans that the United
O
Raymond Aron, The Great Debate (New York: Doubleday & Go,,
Inc,, 1965), p, 75. For a complete discussion of the rationality
of nuclear deterrence theory see Phillip Green, Deadly Logic
(Columbus: Ohio State Press, I966),
124
States— not Western Europe— would be the primary target in any
nuclear exchange.
It was this realization which caused Europeans
to raise doubts about the nuclear credibility of the United States,
Further, the McNamara Doctrine had the effect of forcing the Euro­
peans into realizing that their strategic situation was potentially
different from that of the United States, renewing national debates
regarding their roles as it related to the integration of commands
and the viability of collective action.
This debate took place
both in regard to the role of the United States and in regard to
Alliance strategic policy.
More specifically, while British opinion was divided on the
issue of nuclear strategy and maintaining an independent nuclear
force, the ruling Conservative Party appeared to face a dilemma.
Within the NATO sessions in Paris, the British representatives
spoke strongly for integration and collective action of defense
forces.
Yet within the House of Commons, Conservatives continued
to indulge in a number of the arguments not unlike those promoted
by De Gaullei
the future appeared uncertain, no country as great
as Britain could afford to be completely dependent on another coun­
try, and the United States should not always be expected to protect
what Great Britain considered as vital interests (i,e, the Suez
Canal),
Prime Minister MacMillan found himself in a dilemma * he
was unable to justify a military policy based upon an independent
deterrent, nor could he openly oppose American positions because
of the "special relationship" he had sought to maintain with the
United States,
Any abandonment of an independent deterrent force by the British
125
would give the Conservative Party the appearance of potential
suicide for any British national deterrent.
This was so even
though there existed little doubt among the Conservative Party,
as with most British political leaders, as to the credibility of
such a force vis-a-vis the Soviet Union,
To them, maintaining an
independent deterrent guaranteed little beyond international status
and certainly not security.
For the latter the nuclear power of
the United States provided the primary source.
But to agree with
the basic principles of the McNamara Doctrine did not require the
British to give up their independent national deterrent but to
coordinate the British deterrent force with othèr western military
o
forces including the American Strategic Air Command,
For their part the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany
also appeared in conflict over the McNamara Doctrine,
Officials,
and in particular Josef Strauss, responded negatively; at the
same time, many within the Social Democratic Party took a position
close to that of the American position.
Chancellor Adenauer har­
bored suspicions that the McNamara Doctrine might be a first step
toward American disengagement, at least atomic disengagement.
It
was fear of this disengagement that encouraged Defense Minister
Q
This was made more clear at the time of the Nassau Agreement
between President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan (December
1962) which centered upon the transferral of polaris missiles to the
British, The agreement stated that the British-built submarines
carrying the missiles would be assigned to the NATO command and,
upon its development, to a multilateral nuclear force. After this
agreement, increased umphasis was put upon the MLF, which is dis*
cussed below. The same arrangements were later extended to the
French, who refused them.
126
von Hassel to respond quickly and approve the Nassau Accord.
This offer of a multilateral force appeared to provide German
leaders a chance to become more familiar with the basics of nuclear
strategy, primarily because any Gennan program to develop an inde­
pendent deterrent would be out of the question.
The issue was not
the development of a strong viable multilateral force, but in an
atmosphere where the FRG feared United States nuclear disengage­
ment the Nassau Agreement gave hope to Bonn of some additional
evidence of American nuclear protection.
For the French the technical arguments appeared to be valid;
and when the Nassau Agreement, which reaffirmed Britain’s "special
relationship" with the United States, was extended somewhat tardily
to the French government, France had an opportunity to be on the
same strategic footing with Britain,
However, since it was not
presented as final or unchangeable, it could possibly serve as an
opening for further negotiations.
De Gaulle decided that his ob­
jective, an independent French deterrent, was incompatible with the
American objective of preserving the unity of an Atlantic command
over atomic or thermonuclear arms.
Thus the nuclear interests of
the United States and the French were not considered compatible.
De Gaulle did not explicitly take part in the controversy over
"total" versus "graduated response" in public, but his policy of
a vulnerable national deterrent, effective only against cities,
logically led to the advocacy of total response, a replay of Dulles'
doctrine of massive retaliation— but on a much smaller scale.
^^Aron, o£, cit,, p, 94,
127
The strategy expressed by the McNamara Doctrine aimed at
minimizing the risk of the use of the only weapons to which the
American mainland really vulnerable.
However, even when under­
stood completely, the McNamara Doctrine hurt the sensitivities
of not only the French but other Europeans quite ready to leave
the responsibilities of nuclear arms and their use to the United
States,
The Gaulliste viewed it as an attempt to introduce a
second-strike nuclear strategy and timed so as to administer a
coup de grace to their ambitions to build a force de frappe.
To the Germans it constituted a demand for greater efforts in the
field of conventional arms as a result of the flexible options
which the United States intended to have available, or the "pause"
which it was eager to obtain following the beginning of any •
hostilities.
Further, economic reasons made Eîuropeans hostile to
any increase in conventional arms, and they suspected this new
doctrine of being a move towards the "disatomization,"
or the
withdrawal of all atomic weapons from Europe,
This réévaluation and restructuring of United States and NATO
strategic policies was the result of a new recognition of reality.
Yet with the adoption of a policy of flexible response, problems
remained.
12
As orders went out from the administration to increase
Aron, 0£, cit,, p, I70, It was believed by those suggesting
this option that such a policy would grant the two superpowers suffi­
cient time and flexibility to wait until the last moment to decide
whether or not to commit nuclear weapons and thus possibly spare Europe
the destruction of engaging nuclear weapons too early in the conflict,
12
"Flexible response" was tacitly accepted as a policy of the
Kennedy Administration exercising its leadership in NATO; it, however,
was not formally adopted until the NATO meeting in December of 1967,
Ip
T-^
-
.
........
128
the number and Invulnerability of reprisal weapons, McNamara, in
January I963, announced the "progressive and probably continuing
decline in counterforce capability."
13
He continued by suggesting
that the administration did not accept the thesis of perfect
stability between invulnerable deterrents; for if they did, they
would have to bar the possibility of escalation, an inherent
impossibility.
As Russian missiles became hardened and more missile-equipped
submarines become operational, the United States' strategic counter­
force capability continued to decline.
Whatever advantages Russia
or the United States could derive either from improvement in the
volume-to-power ratio of thermonuclear warheads or from faster
interceptors or higher-altitude bombers, a substantial change
could be brought about only by a technological breakthrough that
would yield the beneficiary a capability sufficient, if not to
deprive the adversary of all retaliatory capability, at least to
create a substantial imbalance leading inevitably to his marked
inferiority in any test of wills.
At the center of the Kennedy approach to foreign policy was
the position that East-West competition was shifting to a new arenathe competition for influence over the direction of development in
the lesser developed areas of the world.
It was with respect to
this competition that the United States was in danger of falling
behind.
Yet, the Europe-first emphasis remained quite strong
^^Ibid,, p. 250,
129
among Democratic State Department alumni led by Dean Acheson,
When it came to developing programs of this new concern, the bur­
den of proof fell on those arguing for the allocation of a larger
proportion of both human and material resources to "containment"
in the underdeveloped world.
The Kennedy Administration took the position that any gap
between overseas commitments and the existing domestic economic
base needed to sustain them was in itself an argument for reduced
defense spending.
Thus, a contradiction in commitments or an un­
willingness to provide the United States with the widest array
of diplomatic and military tools in order to sustain the commit­
ments would endanger security in the long run and would only
reduce our level of global leadership.
A continued reliance on
methods designed to protect the home market from foreign competi­
tion would have consequences on United States economic strength
on the international scene.
"Economic isolation and political
leadership are whôlly incompatible," Kennedy stated in urging
Congress to grant him the broad tariff-reducing authority in the
administration's Trade Expansion bill of 1962.
The world was
experiencing the currents of change; and the key to American lead­
ership on the international level was to exploit this change
creatively,
Underlying the administration's defense policy was the assump­
tion that efforts and resources devoted to the various aspects of
14
Address by President Kennedy to the Congress, January 25,
1962, in House Document 314, 87th Congress, 2nd Session,
130
the nation's power such as national defense more often than not
complemented rather than detracted from other areas of the economy
in terms of national economic growth.
In his 26 March I96I special
message to Congress on the defense budget, there were a number of
explicit, and definitely stressed, pledges.
The United States
would not strike first in any conflict; the ability to fight
"limited wars" should be the primary mission of our overseas forces;
a potential opponent must know that "in the event of a major aggres­
sion that could hot be repulsed by conventional forces," we would
continue to be prepared to take whatever action with whatever
weapons were appropriate.
He must know that our response would
be "suitable, selective, swift, and effective."
With these statements President Kennedy had launched the new
administration on a course demanding a rethinking of allied nuclearconventional arms strategy.
Even with the increased priority
given to the lesser developed nations, harsh reality demanded that
vital United States interests remain in Western Europe.
quent events such as the Berlin Crisis of I96I,
Subse­
the Vienna
Summit conference of I96I with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
and, most notably. President Kennedy's visit to West Berlin
illustrated with graphic reality this necessity.
S. President, Special Message to Congress on the Defense
Budget, March 26, I96I, Public Papers of the Presidentst .Tnhn £,
Kennedy, I96I , pp. 231-2'^,
fine analysis of this crisis can be found in Robert M.
Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of I96I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni­
versity Press, 1973).
131
Movement and changes in policies were not restricted to the
realm of defense and nuclear strategy.
The whole of United States
interrelationships with the Western European nations as they
related to trade and political ties also proved to be important.
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of this réévaluation
was the development of the concept of "Atlantic Partnership."
It is to the discussion of this concept and its relationship
to the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 that Attention is now turned,
Atlantic Partnership and the Trade Expansion Act
By the latter years of Eisenhower's Administration, the
position of American balance of payments had become a matter of
grave concern to officials.
The balance of payments position of
the United States had changed from a surplus of $500 million dol­
lars in 1957 to a deficit of $3.52 billion in 1958, and then to
an even lower level of $3.74 billion for fiscal year 1959.
Added
to this condition was the slowdown in the American economy during
the latter years of the Republican administration,
The growing success of the new EEC and the growth of the rest
of Europe required that the United States make some moves to ease
the situation.
The first came when Douglas Dillon, Under-Secre­
tary of State, at a Special Economic Committee of the GEEC on 12
January i960 proposed that it was the desire of the United States
to change its aid burden to the lesser developed nations. He
17
'Ernst H. Van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic
Partnership (New York: Elsevier Publishing Go,, 1 ^ 6 7 7 pp. 335-336.
132
stated
There is great awareness in Western Europe of the increasing
role which Europe is bound to play in the provision of
development assistance to the newly developing areas of
the free world and that there exists a desire for cooperation
with the United States and other capital-exporting nations
in this common endeavor which is so vital to the preserva­
tion of freedom,
Further, Dillon asked the nations of Europe to help formulate a
successor organization to the OEEC, one in which the United States
would become a full member.
Thus, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development was formed in December of I96O, with
the purpose of providing a means whereby the more developed nations
could co-ordinate their respective foreign assistance programs.
This change, though small in itself, indicated the direction of
United States European policy.
As a result of the negotiations to form the new OECD, the
position of United States commerical and trade policy came more
into the open.
Again it was Douglas Dillon, the Under-Secretary
of State, who took the initiative.
He recommended a round of
tariff reductions and mutual concessions under the auspices of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
The formal United
States request was issued in May 1959 and the "Dillon Round" of
tariff negotiations began in Geneva in September i960.
It is
from the number of technical difficulties encountered in these
negotiations that the first ideas emerged of what was to become
the central proposition of "Atlantic Partnership" later in the
Ifl
Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, "Remarks before
the Special Committee, Paris, January 12," Department of State
Bulletin. ( February 1, 196O), p. 141.
133
Kennedy Administration,
The problem was trade negotiations.
United States negotiators
were limited by technical restrictions as a consequence of the 1958
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act,
It took from late 1958 until May
i960 to put a list of negotiable items together.
Further, as a
result of the 1958 legislation, the Tariff Commission had to re­
commend minimum rates for the protection of domestic industry.
This procedure, along with the fact that negotiations had to be
done on an item by item basis, resulted in lengthy and difficult
discussions.
The effect of all this was that the United States
was forced to negotiate separate agreements on every item.
On the other hand, the Common Market was able to negotiate
on broad categories of items.
Because of these two separate
approaches, the talks nearly collapsed until President Kennedy—
whose responsibility the talks had become— permitted the United
States representatives to put aside their own restrictions and
negotiate a reduction on $4,3 billion dollars of United States
sales, and also to reduce tariffs on $2.9 billion of European
imports.
19
Even with these agreements it was becoming apparent that
future negotiations would be very difficult if they had to be
continued on the basis of the Dillon round.
It had become increas­
ingly clear that as long as the EEC used its across-the-board (or
linear) method of negotiation and the United States was forced to
19
•^Congressional Quarterly Special Report. "The Trade Expansion
Act of 1962," November, 1962, p. 11.
134
rely on its item-by-item negotiating procedures, agreements would
be difficult.
Such agreements were of great importance in any
United States policy of re-orienting the "new" Europe toward an
Atlantic formulation, and President Kennedy seized upon this issue
of negotiating authority as the central factor of his European
policy.
Ideas, concepts, and foreign policies do not generate them­
selves,
They must be conceived, articulated and assimilated by
individuals.
exception.
The concept of"Atlantic Partnership" was not an
Those participating in the drafting of this policy
were drawn from the "new frontier" and from those who could trace
their dervice in government to the Mairshall Plan era.
Hence the
substantive content, as well as the rhetoric of "partnership," was
the product of many minds whose European expertise spanned the
entirety of the post-war period.
Further, a concept which proposes to be a foreign policy
generally consists of more than simply a plan to change trade and
tariff negotiation procedures and technicalities.
These indeed are
there, but such objectives are often wrapped in generalizations or
abstractions.
The concept of "Atlantic Partnership" appeared to
have at least four such generalizations surrounding it in late
i960 and in early I96I, particularly within the community of deci­
sion-makers.
Max Beloff suggests that the first of these statements repre­
sented ", , , a strong commitment to the view that the creation of
a United States of Europe should take precedence over all other con-
'' '
'
'
' "
:'
135
sidérations.
?o
In addition to this there was the idea that the
Treaty of Rome would or should lead to increased economic integra­
tion and strength which would result in or contribute to more
liberal world trade and a greater propensity on the part of Europe
to assist the United States in shouldering thé foreign aid burden,
A further assumption took the view that economic integration would
tend to lead to political integration, thereby producing a strong
West EuropeaJi balance to the Soviet Union,
to have been a general feeling that Britain
Finally, there appears
and perhaps the
Scandinavian NATO powers should become a part of the new European
community.
In fact, Beloff asserts that it was because of the
growing American concern about the division of Europe that United
States policy took on a more activist role toward Europe about
this time.
21
Although these views can be found in the late period
of the Eisenhower Administration, they remained only a part of the
conceptual milieu.
Into this rather general framework, the hard
realities of the Dillon round were placed and the idea of "Atlan­
tic Partnership" began to take on more concrete forms.
Perhaps of the many individuals who became involved in the
development of this policy
22
the most important was George Ball,
20
Max Beloff, The United States and ^ e Unity of Europe (Wash­
ington, D,C,: The Brookings Institution, 1963), p, 103,
21
Ibid,
22
This group included Dean Acheson; William Clayton, former
Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs under President Truman;
John MdCloy, former High Commissioner for Germany; former Secretary
of State Christian Herter; Douglas Dillon; and Eisenhower’s Chief
of the Policy Planning Council Robert Bowie,
136
the Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
Ball was to
emerge in the ensuing months as the chief proponent and spokesman
for "Atlantic Partnership," not only in this country but in Europe.
As a member of one of the foreign policy task-forces initiated by
Kennedy after his election in November I96O, Ball first expressed
the need for a readjustment of United States commercial policy in
the face of the new European economic framework.
23
However, the first proposal of substance appears to have come
from the special interdepartmental committee on NATO established
by Kennedy and chaired by Acheson,
Although the work of the com­
mittee was completed in May I96I, informal discussions continued,
Joseph Kraft reports that at one of these meetings in September,
Henry Owen of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council
clearly articulated the concept of "partnership,"
By fall, George
Ball was calling for nothing less than a radical revision of the
1958 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act,
He pressed for providing the
President with a broad negotiating authority which would include
a linear bargaining capability.
Ball suggested that the 1958
legislation be allowed to expire in 1963 and that Congress push
through a new Trade Expansion Act,
24
Yet, after internal debate
within the administration, it was decided to present "Atlantic
Partnership" in the form of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 before
23
For a discussion of these groups see "Pre-Inaugural Forces
Unprecedented in History," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
April 7, 1961, pp, 620-623,
-------- ------ ---24
Joseph Kraft, The Grand Design» From Common Myrket to At­
lantic Partnership. (New York» Harper and Brothers, I962), p, 27,
137
Congress in January 1962,
First, however, this concept had to be
sold to the public and to the various significant interests.
One of the earlier comments to be made on the subject of
trade expansion and the need for a retooling of the European
policy was made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Miami on October
11,
Two themes emerge which were to run throughout the continued
discussion.
First, the President must be provided with more flex­
ible and adaptable tariff-negotiating powers.
Secondly, Rusk
hinted at the eventual position to be taken by the administration
on domestic displacement which might result from a lowering of
tariff barriers and the resultant exposure of weaker industries
to external competition.
Rusk's remarks were followed on November 1 by the first
complete explanation of the general outline of what was to be
"Atlantic Partnership,"
Under-Secretary Ball began his speech to
the Forty-Eighth National Foreign Trade Convention in New York
with a brief message from President Kennedy,
The statement read
in part, "It is essential that we have new tools to deal with the
problems of international trade in a new and challenging world,"
The most significant aspect of future international trade.
Ball argued, was the emergence of the Common Market,
This develop­
ment was viewed as ushering in the beginning of an entirely new
era of world trade, especially should Britain enter the Common
Market,
In order to cope with these circumstances, the United
2<
-'"Message from President Kennedy to the 48th National Foreign
Trade Convention, November 1," Department of State Bulletin. (Nov­
ember 20, 1961), p, 833.
138
States had to stop domestic inflation, right the balance of pay­
ments deficit and stop the flow of American capital and industry
to Europe in its effort to get behind the common external tariff
wall of the European Economic Community,
All of these pressing needs, it was felt, could be met by a
readjustment of United States trade policy.
Ball observed, "One
of the most effective measures, as the Europeans have already
learned, is to repudiate protectionism, to open the doors and
windows of our economy to the competition we must face in world
markets.
27
By adopting a course aimed at the reduction of tariff
barriers and the elimination of other restrictive practices, it
was believed, the United States could maintain its competitive
position as well as its leadership of the Atlantic Alliance,
In
short, the expected internal economic readjustment which would
be brought about by new liberal trade policies would be on the
whole "healthy."
George Ball also believed the balance of payments problem
would diminish, as freer trade permitted the United States to
maintain and increase its already significant trade surplus.
Also,
since American business and industry would no longer have to go to
Europe, a stronger economic base at home, as well as stable labor.
^^See Chapter III "Economic Interest," below for a more com­
plete discussion of this issue as handled by the Johnson Administration,
27
George Ball, "Threshold of a New Trading World," Department
of State Bulletin, (November 20, I96I), p, 835,
28
Ibid,. p, 835.
'-T
-
'
'
139
and in the long rim, a growing labor market would be insured,
A
further benefit for labor was seen as deriving from an assumed
strengthening of what were already the strongest of American
industries.
The benefits for labor stemmed from the fact that
these same industries tended to pay the highest wages.
Finally, Ball closed with two other "essential" components of
any future policy.
Predictably, he called for expanding negotia­
tion powers for the President, including the capability for linear
negotiations.
In conclusion. Ball urged that similar trade negoti­
ations be instituted with nations other than Europe, particularly
the lesser developed countries.
Tariff barrier reduction would
then be viewed as non-discriminatory,
29
In a press conference on November 8 , President Kennedy revealed
that high level administration meetings were being conducted in
consideration of new trade policies.
He then disclosed what was
perhaps his basic concern in regard to United States international
trade»
I think that quite obviously we have to begin to realize how
important the Common Market is going to be to the economy of
the United States, One-third of our trade generally is in
Western Europe, and if the United States should be denied that
market, we will find a flight of capital from this country to
construct factories within that wall, or we find ourselves
in serious economic trouble.
The President continued»
I think that the people of this country must realize that the
Common Market is going to present us with major economic chal­
lenges and, I hope, opportunities, and that this country must be
ready to negotiate with the Common Market on a position of equality,
Z^Ibid,, p, 837,
30
President Kennedy's News Conference of November 8 , I961,
in the New York Times. November 9» 19^1, p. 14,
140
Finally, on 6 December I96I President Kennedy delivered what
may be regarded as the major address of the drive for support of
the new trade legislation which was in the offing.
The speech,
which was delivered before the National Association of Manufact­
urers in New York, revealed little that had not been revealed in
the previous month.
However, he chose this occasion to request
support from the nation's major industrialists, within the contest
of the Soviet-American struggle for the initiative in world affairs,
Kennedy noted that trade and economic growth afforded the United
States a unique opportunity to seize the initiative from the Soviet
Union,
Perhaps the new stimulus to economic growth would help in
tilting the economic conflict with Communism in favor of the West,
Furthermore, a new and more liberal policy could work to strengthen
the Atlantic Alliance,
Significantly, Kennedy sought to reduce anxiety of any who
might have inferred from the proposed trade expansion Act'tbàt the
United States was somehow moving toward a form of Atlantic Union
with Western Europe,
Kennedy stated emphatically what he was not
proposing * l) joining the European Economic Community; 2) altering
traditional United States concepts of sovereignty; 3) establishing
some sort of "rich man's" trade union; 4) establishing an Atlantic
Free Trade Area; 5) abandoning the United States' most-favorednation policies; or 6) altering or abandoning any of the United
31
John F, Kennedy, "The Hour of Decision: A New Approach to
American Trade Policy," Department of State Bulletin. (December 2*5.
1961), p. 1040,
141
States’ ties with other ftee world states or areas, particularly
the underdeveloped world.
Finally, the President emphasized that
he was not considering any form of unilateral tariff cuts.
Full
reciprocity would be a prerequisite of any United States tariff
reductions.
32
From this discussion of "Atlantic Partnership" three themes
began to emerge.
First was the recognition of the obvious fact—
that Europe was no longer the EJurope of the Marshall Plan era.
Further, this new Europe was one in which both challenge and
opportunity abounded.
Increased economic growth would then permit
Ehirope to assist in aiding the lesser developed nations^
Also,
such growth would help Western Europe to share a greater position
of defense.
The challenge lay primarily in the commercial danger
posed to the United States by a strong trading entity protected
by a high wall of common external tariffs.
The opportunities were
not as explicitly formulated, although presumably they were inherent
in an undefined Atlantic commercial concert,
A second theme repeatedly emphasized by Kennedy and others
was the need for new implements or machinery through which Europe
and the United States would establish renewed dialogue.
The most
essential tool was that of new and expanded tariff-negotiating
authority for the President,
Once again, the concept and the need
was not solely the product of the Kennedy Administration; it was,
however, the Kennedy Administration which politicized the need by
^^Ibid,, p, 1046,
142
actively and aggressively pursuing a broader negotiating authority
than that provided under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act,
The final theme was the relationship of the new Ehirope to
domestic economics,
administration.
A number of factors were stressed by the
The balance of payments problem and the ways in
which trade abroad might ease the situation through foreign sales
was one emphasis.
By lowering the tariff barriers, it was pro­
jected that the flow of American capital to Ehirope would be reduced.
Finally, there existed a definite awareness of the need to devise
some means for dealing with the
inevitable industrial and labor
displacements which would result from extensive tariff reductions.
Hence, we find that as the concept of "Atlantic Partnership"
came before the Congress in January 1962 it had begun to take a
rather substantive form,
Norman Graebner provides a perceptive
review of the status of the concept of "Atlantic Partnership" on
the eve of its Congressional debut ;
If the details of the new "Atlantic Partnership" were vague,
the vision indicated a Western Ehirope united in the Common
Market and moving toward political federation, joining with
the United States and the British Commonwealth to spur the
economic expansion of the free world through liberalized
trade agreements. The new prosperity would permit Ehirope
both to share the burden of aiding the under-developed nations
and to underwrite a greater portion of the costs of military
security. Ultimately, the new energy released through
economic growth would resolve the world-wide challenge of
Communism, 33
These last two points were significant to the American moti-
33
^^Norman Graebner, "The United States and Western Ehiropean
Unity," The Unity of Western Europe, ed. Jack D, Dowell (Olympia:
Washington State University Press, 1964), p, 46,
143
vation for the Trade Expansion Act,
American concern for the allies
of Western Europe to share in the costs of foreign assistance in
the lesser developed nations was vital, for the economic burden
had become
heavy.
Also, being responsible for a heavy share of
defense costs in Western Europe and maintaining high troop levels
made it important that the Europeans begin to share more equitably
in their own defense.
It was a strong desire to engage in part­
nership rather than to bear the
It was the Trade
burdens unilaterally.
Expansion Act of I962 that proved to be the
operational content of the concept of "Atlantic Partnerhip,"
Within
it can be found the provisions by which Kennedy hoped to approach
and bargain with Europe, as well as some significant assumptions
about the type of Europe the Kennedy Administration believed itself
to be dealing with.
The legislation was presented to Congress in his State of the
Union Address on January 11, in which Kennedy called for "a bold
new instrument of American trade policy,"
Kennedy continued.
If we move decisively, our factories and farms can increase
their sales to their richest, fastest-growing market. Our
exports will increase. Our balance of payments position will
improve. And we will have forged across the Atlantic a trading
partnership withvast resources for freedom, 34
In order to seize this initiative, he proposed a new five-year
trade expansion act.
President Kennedy emphasized two major points;
the gradual reduction and elimination of tariffs on all goods for
34
^U, S,, President, "State of the Union Address, January 11,
1962," Public Papers of the Presidents : John F, Kennedy, I962
(Washington, 6 ,C.; Government Printing Office,“1963)1 p. 14%
? . 'ly
, i ; v ™ ' =-
Y "
'
'
'
'
-
.
.......................................... ......
"T .
7 ,-'
■
" ~
144
which the United States and the Common Market accounted for 80%
of the world's total trade.
Secondly, other goods' tariffs were
to be reduced up to fifty percent— to be carried out within the
authority of new negotiating powers requested by the act
35
Kennedy
envisioned that a ftee flow of trade would strengthen the unity
of the West as the two huge markets reinforced and strengthened
each other.
In short, Kennedy felt that it was
time to write a new chapter in the evolution of the Atlantic
Community, The success of our forèign policy depends in large
measure upon the success of our foreign trade, and our main­
tenance of Western political unity depends in equally large
measure upon the degree of Western economic unity. An inte­
grated Western Europe, joining in trading partnership with
the United States, will further shift the world balance of
power to the side of freedom, 36
In addition to the importance of trade expansion for the unity
of the Western Alliance, the President also saw the measure as
being of significance for the position of the United States as
leader of that alliance.
Economic isolation and decline could
only result in a loss of political leadership.
Thus, it was
necessary that the United States maintain its commercial relevance
to Europe, for
In the next few years, the nations of West Europe will be
fixing basic economic and trading patterns vitally affecting
the future of our economy and hopes of our less-developed
friends, Basic political and military decisions of vital
interest to our security will be made. Unless we have this
S,, Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, "Recipro­
cal Trade Agreements Program; Message from the President of the
United States Relative to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program,"
8?th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962, p. 2,
3^Ibld,. p. 5.
1^5
authority to negotiate and have it this year— if we are
separated from the Common Market by high tariff barriers on
either side of the Atlantic--then we cannot hope to play an
effective part in those basic decisions. 37
Thus, it was in the interest of the United States to assure its
voice in these decisions which were seen as significant for the
alliance.
This could be done only by providing the President with
sufficient tariff-negotiating authority to bargain effectively with
the Common Market and thereby maintain the economic underpinning
for the United States' political role in Europe.
Consequently, the President asked for and eventually received
from Congress, a broad range of negotiating authority as well as
numerous adjustment powers with respect to domestic displacement
which might result from the tariff cuts which would presumably
result from the application of the negotiating authority.
Further,
it is interesting to note, the idea of the British presence in the
Common Market with whom the President would bargain through the
new authority granted to him by the Trade Expansion Act, was quite
implicit in the thinking of the Kennedy Administration.
inant supplier" authority
39
The "dom-
brought the assumption to the surface
and installed it as an integral part of the concept of "Atlantic
Partnership."
This assumption could not be considered the central
^^Ibid., p. 6.
^^Dean Rusk, "U.S. Trade Policy— Challenge and Opportunity,"
Department of State Bulletin. (February 5i 1962), p. 197.
39
•^^Under the "dominant supplier authority" the President
would be allowed to reduce or eliminate all tariffs on those pro­
ducts of which the United States and the European Economic Community
accounted for eighty per cent of the free world trade.
146
proposition of the new concept but it certainly was an important
consideration, for as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., recalling Kennedy's
attitude on the question, notedi
If Britain joined the Market, London could offset the eccen­
tricities of policy in Paris and Bonn; moreover, Britain,
with its world obligation, could keep the EEC from becoming
a high-tariff, inward-looking, white man's club. Above all,
with British membership, the Market could become the basis
for a true political federation of Europe. ^
However, this view indicated that
"partnership" was more
broadly
conceived than a mere plan for inserting the British into the
Common Market.
The bulk of data available indicates that the
primary concern of the Kennedy Administration was the assurance of
access to European markets for the United States through the estab­
lishment of a liberalized trade relationship between the two.
Atlantic Partnership and European Unity
Since early in the post-war period the United States had been
pursuing European integration in military, economic and the polit­
ical arenas of policy determination.
The Kennedy Administration
also adhered to the major assumptions which supported this concept
of integration.
Among these assumptions were important elements
of United States foreign policy.
First, it was believed
that
European unity continued to be an
indispensable factor in orderto
maintain Atlantic strength and the vital security interests of the
United States.
Secondly, the view was held strongly that to
achieve real unity in Europe the United Kingdom would, of necessity.
^Schlesinger, o£. cit.. p. 84^.
14?
need to be an important part.
Finally, it was believed that Atlan­
tic defense was indivisible and that there could be no real chal­
lenge to the nuclear hegemony of the United States.
For the Kennedy Administration Atlantic unity was not a long
range objective but neither was it viewed as a simple policy to
be easily achieved.
In order to achieve this consensus of European—
American policies the continued development of a united Europe
was necessary.
The concept of Atlantic partnerhip, in a real
sense, was an attempt to reaffirm American support for a united
Europe.
The failure of Western Europe to achieve greater unity
would only leave the impression that the Atlantic Community was
an American area of hegemony since the United States over­
shadowed the smaller European states militarily and economically.
Only a Europe which was united would be able to relate to the
United States as an equal and this disequilibrium be minimized.
Further, only a united Europe would be able to gather the
resources necessary to share equally with the United States the
burdens and responsibilities of maintaining the strength of the
non-Communist world.
Looking toward greater unity in Europe Pres­
ident Kennedy statedi
A united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in
the common defense, of responding more generously to the need
of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others
in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of currency and
commodities, and developing coordinated policies in all other
economic, diplomatic, and political areas. We see in Europe
a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality
in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and de­
fending a community of free nations. ^1
41
President Kennedy, "Address at Independence Hall," July 4,
1962, Public Papers of the President; John F. Kennedy. 1962, p. 538.
148
Thus, while stating the case for a relationship which would be
conducive for the Trade Expansion Act of I962 (as discussed above)
the administration was clearly establishing a position encouraging
the achievement of further unity in Western Europe,
But the nations of Western Europe had, during the previous
two administrations, developed great economic strength and the
capability of sharing the burdens of their further growth and
defense.
Would not encouragement towards greater unity, i.e.
political unification under the Fouchet Plan, or the admission of
Great Britain to the EEC, move in the direction of creating two
separate but equally powerful entities?
And, if this were to
occur would not there be potential risks for the United States
policy in dealing with such a powerful entity?
Underlying the
position of the United States was the rather optimistic assump­
tion which President Kennedy expressed in Philadelphia when he
stated, "We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival,
but as a partner."
42
The belief that Europe would be a partner
and not a rival was surely novel in its "conscious encouragement
by a major world power of the development of a coequal power,"
as J. Robert Schaetzel acknowledged in an August I962 speech; but
the Kennedy Administration's confidence in this new approach in
this new approach in international relationships was, to Schaetzel,
warranted by the international situation:
"We do this," he added,
Mwith full awareness that while Europe and the United States may
^^Ibid.
149
differ on tactics, there can be no disagreement on fundamental
objectives,"
Later in the same year it was further explained that this
optimism was supported by a network of transatlantic relationships.
Practically without exception these present-day leaders of
the new Europe are well disposed toward the United States,
We have a special advantage in dealing with the European
integration movement. A number of our key officials have
had close, long term professional and personal relationships
with the leading officials of the integration movement, ^
This optimistic evaluation was only a month later shattered by ;
the first major blow struck by President De Gaulle against further
integration in Europe.
In his press conference on 14 January
1963 he announced his veto against the British entrance into the
EEC: a blow not only to the British but to the concept of Atlantic
Partnership as conceived by the Kennedy Administration and as
understood in Europe.
Thus, he left little question about his
opinion that integration of defense efforts, as well as economic
interests, was unacceptable to him and that the independence for
France was vitally important.
This may be most clearly understood
in De Gaulle's assertion that "It is intolerable for a great State
to leave its destiny up to the decisions of another state, however
it may be."
43
Speech by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State J. Robert
Schaetzel at Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada, August 18, 1962, De­
partment of State Bulletin. Vol. 47, No. 1210, p. 353.
44
J. Robert Schaetzel, "Better Preparation for the Conduct of
Atlantic Community Affairs," Department of State, News Letter. Decem­
ber 1962, p. 14.
45
See Charles De Gaulle, Major Addresses. Statements and Press
Conferences. French Embassy, Press and Information Division, New York.,
Press Conference on April 11, I96I, p. 124.
150
Thus, the basic assumptions of United States policy toward
Europe received a significant blow.
Writing in I966, Ernst Van
der Beugel stated*
Today, the policies of the United States toward the process
of European integration and the problems of European and
Atlantic cooperation still find themselves in the aftermath
of the shock produced by the press conference of January
1963. While it seemed that the post-war development in
American— European relations was well on its way to a crowning
achievement, practically every basic assumption of that era
was challenged. The result was a sudden halt to a develop­
ment which responsible opinion in the United States and in
Europe considered as constructive and beneficial, 46
Indeed, the basic assumptions of American policy regarding European
unity were challenged, forcing the Kennedy Administration to reeval­
uate its position.
At the same time the administration expressed
strong regret about the exclusion of Great Britain from the process
of European integration.
This incident was viewed within the White
House as only a temporary halt as Secretary Rusk was to state* "But
it has not, as some commentators have dramatically asserted, left
our Atlantic policy in shambles.
On the contrary, the main lines
of that policy have become more than ever valid and urgent,"
47
Though damaged, the United States policy of achieving greater
European unity was not abandoned.
But the idea of partnership did
emphasize the necessity of Europe participating fully in the deci­
sions that would determine its future.
Further, the absence of
discussion between the United States and the Europeans would only
46
Van der Beugel, o£. cit.. p. 379.
47
'Address by Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the Regional
Conference in Los Angelos on February 13, 1963.
151
produce resentment and lead to a continuing crisis in European—
American relations.
Thus the concept of partnership sought to
recognize differences and to organize a continuing dialogue so as
to produce an institutionalized exchange of each other's views and
intentions with the aim of arriving at common decisions,
But this
view required mutual goodwill, indeed a scarce commodity in the
Atlantic Community after 14 January I963.
In this context the policy of the United States regarding
Europe called for clarification and this was done by the President
himself in his Frankfurt speech.
In that presentation he identified
one major thesis of policy to be that the United States could con­
structively deal only with a united Europe:
It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us all
against fragmentation of the Alliance. Only such a Europe will
permit full reciprocity of treatment across the Ocean, in facing
the Atlantic agenda. With only such a Europe can we have a
full give-and-take between equals, an equal sharing of respon­
sibilities, and an equal level of sacrifice, 4-8
A further principle of United States policy following the veto by
De Gaulle was the affirmation that how Europe was organized was to
be a matter to be decided by the Europeans themselves*
"It is
Europeans who are building Europe, , , . I repeat again— so that
there may be no misunderstanding— the choice of paths to the unity
of Europe is a choice which Europe must make,"
The
final assertion
was to place a heavy emphasis upon the round of tariff negotiations
following the Trade Expansion Act* "Another great economic challenge
48
Address by President John F. Kennedy at Frankfort, June
25, 1963» Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 44, no. 1256, p, II9 .
152
is the coming round of trade negotiations, , , , In short, these
negotiations are a test of our unity."
49
During I963 it became more clear that the French veto did have
a significant impact upon the concept of Atlantic Partnership as it
promoted European unity.
While the articulation of unity was unim­
peded the administration was to have increasing difficulty in pro­
viding the means by which the concept could realistically be imple­
mented.
Consequently, giving a more solid form to Atlantic Partner­
ship through promoting European unity literally became impossible.
To suggest, as President Kennedy did, that the United States
could form a meaningful partnership only with a united Europe was
to suggest that any form of European unity seemed to be desired
rather than a continuance of the existing forms of cooperation,
especially in foreign and military policy.
Such a suggestion
carried the implication that any foirm of integration was to be
desirable.
This certainly was not the case*
a Europe integrated
on a Gaullist model would not have been acceptable to the United
States.
But the American policy of seeking Atlantic Partnership through
the promotion of European unity continued to play an important role
in American thinking.
After the untimely death of President Kennedy,
President Johnson, delivering his first Message to the NATO Council
in December 19&3 stated*
^Ibid.
^°Van der Beugel, 0£. cit.. pp. 383-384,
153
To this end we welcome the emergence of a Europe growing in
unity and strength. For we know that only a uniting Europe
can he a strong Europe and only a strong Europe will be an
effective partner, 51
This statement illustrated not only the sense of the new Johnsonian
policy but was a strong indication of the continuity which had
existed in United States policy toward European integration.
Atlantic Partnership, a concept very difficult for the Kennedy
Administration to implement in concrete form, did create a new
conceptual framework for United States foreign policy.
was based upon two important assumptionsi
This policy
the need to deal with
a united Europe, and the possibility of treating a united Europe
as an equal.
Although it was admirable in conception, the European
movement toward greater integration suffered a substantial setback
from President De Gaulle's veto.
Did the concept of Atlantic Partnership carry military or
political implications?
Such implications seem to appear in
Kennedy's "Declaration of Interdependence" speech on 4 July 1962
in Philadelphia I
But I will say here and now . . . that the United States will
be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence, that we will
be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the ways and means
of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership between the new
union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union
founded here 175 years ago. 52
Such a statement carries with it the implications of something
^^Department of State Bulletin. January 6, 1964, pp. 29-30.
^Kennedy, "Address at Independence Hall," July 4, 1962,
0£. cit., p. 538.
154
more than liberalized trade relations between economic units,
Joseph Rraft observed in I962 that the "essence" of "Atlantic
Partnership" or the "grand design" was the " . . . creative harmony
between the United States and Europe for economic, military and
political purposes.
It would bring together in a working Atlantic
partnership two separate but equal entitles,"
53
It is fair to
observe that the economic boundaries had been established but not
the military or political issues.
It also seems clear that within the realm of defense and
nuclear deterrence strategy, no attempt was made to define pre­
cisely the relationship of "Partnership" to the new strategic
doctrines emerging within the Kennedy Administration,
In fact,
the major statement on the relationship between European and
United States strategic questions made it quite clear that whereas
the United States fully supported the desire for the movement
toward European unity, this did not mean that the United States
condoned an independent nuclear deterrent within that structure.
At the NATO ministerial conference in Athens in May I962 and at
Ann Arbor in a commencement address at the University of Michigan,
on June I6 , Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara observed,
"limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are danerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility
as a deterrent.
54
^^Krafb, 0£. cit.. p. 22.
54
"■^Robert S. McNamara, "Defense Arrangements of the North
Atlantic Community," Department of State Bulletin. July 9, 1962,
p. 68.
155
The primary strategic need was for centralized control under
the deterrent capability of the United States; McNamara stated *
The general strategy I have summarized magnifies the importance
of unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and
central direction. There must not be competing strategies to
meet the contingency of nuclear war. We are convinced that
a general nuclear war target system is indivisible and if,
despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best
hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign
against all of the enemy's nuclear capabilities, while retain­
ing reserve forces, all centrally controlled. 55
Given this premise, it is difficult to conceive of any military
relationship between the American deterrent and Europe, structured
on a basis other than complete American control of final decision­
making.
In spite of this, the "Europeanists" within the Kennedy Admin­
istration, led by George Ball, attempted to take the multilateral
force (MLF) idea implicit within the Nassau Agreement and make of
it a new unifying principle of "partnership,"
This drive became
particularly intense after De Gaulle's press conference in which he
denied British entrance in the Common Market,
Actually this concept was proposed in the closing days of the
Eisenhower Administration by Secretary of State Christian Herter
and reiterated by Kennedy at Ottawa on 1? May I96I.
It is im-
-^^Ibid.
56
This is accurate in spite of knowledge that some within the
Kennedy Administration (especially McGeorge Bundy) suggested that the
MLF might evolve toward eventual European control paralleling the
development of European political unity.
57
•^'John F. Kennedy, "Address before the Canadian Parliament,"
May 17, 1961, Public Papers of the President; John F. Kennedy. 1961.
----------------------------p. 385.
156
portant that Kennedy's commitment was conditional on ", , , agreed
NATO guidelines on
, , , control and use"— guidelines which were
never made operational.
Furthermore, Dean Rusk on 10 December
1962 was careful to point out that the MLF was in no way to be
taken to mean a total integration of United States forces with
some other military force,
Kennedy's position regarding the MLF was clear,
Schlesinger
has said of Kennedy's appraisal of the MLF;
As for the MLF per se, he really considered that so long as
the United States retained its veto, (and he never mentioned
renunciation as a possibility, though other members of his
government did), the MLF was something of a fake. Though he
was willing to try it, he could not see why the Europeans
would be interested in making enormous financial contributions
toward a force over which they had no real control, 58
In short, the entire idea of the multilateral force was grafted
onto the concept of "partnership" and was not an integral part of
it.
Essentially, the concept of "partnership" per se never dealt
with the problems of defense, strategy, and deterrent control.
The
"creative harmony" of which Joseph Kraft spoke was assumed and not
planned.
Like defense integration, the political and institutional im­
plications of "Atlantic Partnership" were never really developed.
Other than Kennedy's and Rusk's stating that the United States was
in no way considering joining the European Economic Community,
59
^^Schlesinger, 0£, cit.. p. 872.
^^Kennedy, "The Hour of Decision," 0£. cit., p, 1046; and
Dean Rusk, "America's Goal— A Community of Free Nations," Depart­
ment of State Bulletin. March 19, 1962, p. 452.
157
references to institutional ties are absent in the developmental
dialogue in the literature available on this subject.
Further,
references to the nature of political ties are conspicuously absent.
Only McGeorge Bundy in his speech on 6 December 19&1 dealt directly
with inferences of political integration of some form that might
be drawn from the concept.
Discussing the political future of the
Atlantic community and the newly emerging "Atlantic Partnership,"
Bundy reasoned;
The most productive way of conceiving the political future
of the Atlantic community is to think in terms of a partnership
between the United States, on the one hAnd, and a great Euro­
pean power on the other. This partnership would be directed to
the constructive and defensive tasks which must be discharged
if a genuine community of free nations is to be created; aid
to less developed areas, defense against Communist aggression.
It would not be an ingrown white man's club; it would rather
look outward to larger burdens and opportunities.
In short, there was no political future in the sense of an Atlantic
Union of some sort.
And, if there was any doubt remaining, Bundy
dispelled it by stating, "Such a partnership makes more sense than
a full-blown Atlantic Union which is still psychologically out of
range for the people of the United States."
Kennedy addressed himself to this same question on 25 June
1963 in Frankfurt while on his European tour.
He was much less
specific than Bundy, but it is clear that he viewed the question
of political development in terms of improving the consultative
^^McGeorge Bundy, "Policy for the Western Alliance— Berlin
and After," Department of State Bulletin. March 12, 1962, p. 423.
^^Ibid.
158
mechanisms of the alliance.
The political implications of "part­
nership" were defined in terms of the purposes of the alliance for
the most part.
Thus, it appears to have been the view of the
administration that the "Atlantic Partnerhip" did not entail any
form of political integration.
The Kennedy Administration's approach to European affairs was
built upon the idea of "partnerhip"; and "partnership" was from
its very beginning, essentially a doctrine of trade liberalization.
This, however, does not suggest that it was the only element within
the general policy, for there existed a much wider view of the
implications of an American-European commercial union, particularly
if the fruits of that Union could somehow be directed toward the
southern hemisphere.
Theodore Sorensen, in discussing Kennedy's position regarding
European relations, remarked:
The truth is that Kennedy himself did not look upon either the
Alliance or Atlantic harmony as an end in itself. He cared
about the concrete problems which the Alliance faced, such as
Berlin, trade negotiations and the American balance of payments. 63
Schlesinger also argues that Kennedy lacked any particular Atlantic
theories.
His basic attitude toward Europe was to do what he could to
strengthen the hand of modern-minded Europeans in their quest
for unity~not to tell Europe that it ought to do but to
adjust American policy to the needs and tempo of rational
European self-determination. 64
62
John P. Kennedy, "President's Remarks at the Paulskirche,"
June 25, 1963, Department of State Bulletin. July 22, I963, p. 122.
^Sorensen, 0£. cit., p. 633.
64
Schlesinger, o£. cit., p. 856.
159
Kennedy's views of the dynamics of "Atlantic Partnership" and
America's relationship with Western Europe were also tempered by
a predominant pragmatism.
He seemed to be very much aware of the
concrete and often mundane difficulties of building and maintaining
the Atlantic Community,
Perhaps his comments on the growth of the
Atlantic Alliance and Community in his State of the Union address
of 11 January 19&2 are illustrative of this.
The emergence of the new Europe is being matched by the
emergence of new ties across the Atlantic, It is a matter of
undramatic daily co-operation in hundreds of workaday tasks
, , , , The Atlantic Community grows, not like a volcanic
mountain, by one mighty explosion, but like a coral reef,
from the accumulating activity of all, °5
Kennedy’s comments on how "Partnership" was to be achieved made at
the Paulskirche, Frankfurt, on 25 June 19&3 are all instructive of
his own view of the development within United States-European
relations.
It will be achieved by concrete steps to solve the problems
that face us all: military, economic, and political. Partner­
ship is not a posture but a process, a continuous process
that grows stronger each year as we devote ourselves to
common tasks,
The commitment of the Kennedy Administration to the continued
growth and stabilization of the European allies was strong.
concepts, "flexible response" and "Atlantic Partnership,"
Both
were
examples of Kennedy's inherent pragmatism— a recognition of existing
^^Kennedy, "State of the Union Address, January 11, I962,"
0£. cit.. p. 13.
p. 120.
^^Kennedy, "President's Remarks at the Paulskirche," op. cit..
---
160
needs and conditions,
Europe was no longer the Europe of the
Marshall Plan and yet the need to provide security for the nations
of Europe, at the very least for our own interests, remained.
Conditions had changed by I96I fnom those of the mid-1940*s and
1950*5 ; and with the changes had arisen the need to revitalize
policies and programs by which to meet those changing conditions,
"Flexible response" and "Atlantic Partnership" cannot be viewed
as a lessening of United States commitment but as a restructuring
of the basic attitudes and means by which the United States would
henceforth deal with Europe,
I6l
Conclusion
A world power in the international system is a nation with
worldwide interests and the ability to pursue those interests.
The powerful are those who have large purposes and can accomplish
them.
Further, power, to be effective, must be respected,
A
nation's arsenal of power must have variety if it is to be perceived
by other nations as worthy of respect.
Thus, in dealing with the period between 194-5 and I963 and
the taking over the reins of government by President Johnson, the
following conclusion may be drawn;
most of the significant changes
in foreign policy from Truman through Kennedy can be attributed to
the changes in the American administrations and their foundations
of policy, i, e,, Truman's Containment, NATO, Marshall Plan; Eisen­
hower's Liberation, Massive Retaliation, etc,; and Kennedy's reli­
ance upon flexible response and Atlantic Partnership, rather than
to changes in the nation's basic self-interests— the survival,
development and security of the nations of Western Europe, ^
Each of the presidents during this period was fully aware
that he had to function within certain boundaries defined by his­
tory, the Constitution, his current political obligation to public
service, the survival of the society of which he was the leader,
and the continuance of that vague and rather difficult concept:
the "American way of life,"
Thus, the concept of national interest,
while quite difficult to provide with an acceptable operational
^Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power (New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1968), p, 2,
162
definition, is essential and very much a part of the American
political tradition.
While a definition for "national interest" may be given, the
concept is dependent for its operational definition and implemen­
tation upon a particular administration's perspective.
This is
influenced by such factors as basic concepts of liberty, ideas
on what makes the economy tick, and analysis of the capabilities
and intentions of potential foreign adversaries.
Further, the
presidential impulse to lead the nation away from situations where
ultimate choices regarding survival, liberty, and welfare have to
be made is a large part of the reason for the central thread of
continuity which flows through each of the three administrations.
However, coupled with this is another reason for continuity in
foreign policy.
Each of the three presidents has been quite per­
sistent in the view that the primary threat to this national
interest has been the feared spread of international Communism and
another world war.
Thus, this writer wishes to identify a series of operational
principles which suggest themselves from a survey of the three
administrations leading to the Johnson Administration,
1) Because the Soviet Union has been motivated to be the dom­
inant world power, with the desire to fashion, eventually, the
world into a single political system based on the Soviet model.
The desirability of containing the Soviets at least within
their sphere has never been seriously questioned; but the role
of the United States in this containment function has continued
to be a major issue,
2) Since in another world war the United States would quickly
become a prime target, world peace— or the avoidance of general
war between the United States and the Soviet Union— has become
an essential policy objective.
163
3) When the desire to contain Communism and the desire for
world peace have conflicted, the latter hasnot been permitted
to take precedence over the former.
Moves made by the Soviets soon after the conclusion of World War
II in Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Czechoslovakia forced the Truman
Administration to deal with the critical effect of military balances,
and to resist the Soviet desire to expand.
The Berlin blockade of
1948 apparently sealed the case for President Tiuman, who gave Sec­
retary of State Dean Acheson the approval to make explicit in the
North Atlantic Treaty the commitment of United States military power
to counter
any Soviet attempts to
in Eîurope,
Thus, the willingness
expand their military superiority
to forego evenourcommitment to
world peace, if necessary, in order to prevent the Soviets from
forcefully adding to themselves the vast power potential of Western
Eîurope, was by 1949 an explicit premise of United States foreign
policy.
Such explicit actions were possible with respect to Western
Eîurope, because its fall to the Soviets could be defined as 'Sur­
render," and carry serious economic consequences as well as polit­
ical and security dilemmas.
The Soviets could become the dominant
world power and eventually overpower the United States,
4) Thus, the "balance-of-power" became the critical concept
for determining the priority to be given in any specific
situation to containment of Communism or the avoidance of
world war, shouDd these two objectives appear impossible to
pursue at the same time.
All of the postwar administrations under study here appear to
agree on at least this much:
if a Communist success in a given
conflict would critically undermine the power of the non-Communist
world to dissuade the Communist world from further advances, then
164
presumably both the balance-of-power and the survival of the United
States would be at stake.
There was no question of where the
national interest would lie.
While not one of these administrations failed to establish
programs or policies upon the perceived "national interest," each
administration or group within the administration varied in their
concepts of power— or the essential ingredients and the most
appropriate uses of national power.
The record of United States
policy-making and crises behavior from Truman through Kennedy
shows that each administration relied heavily on the tools of
physical coercion— sometimes only as a background factor, sometimes
as a visible and active ingredient in a particular situation— in
order to control external threats to our national interests.
The
record also suggests major efforts by each administration to enlist
dependable allies in the struggle to prevent the Communist nations
from extending their control into new areas (i,e,, NATO, SEATO,
etc,).
Frequently the objective was to have such allies share
the burden of providing the coercive power we and they might need
to implement these shared interests.
Further, each of the admin­
istrations considered it necessary to be able to marshal: sufficient
global power to balance, if not outweigh, the power any combina­
tions of potential adversaries could mobilize.
Essential ingred­
ients of the global balance of power that each administration con­
sidered were the military power immediately available by the United
States, the economic conditions existent in relation to United
States economic interests, and whatever advance commitments of sup­
port from other nations the United States could obtain.
Finally,
165
a significant theme was United States support for unity in Western
Europe which provided the important connection between the early
attempts at unity (the Marshall Plan) to the later concepts of
Atlantic Community or Partnership with Europe.
To this extent there
was constancy over the period in some of the necessary means of
foreign policy, as well as constancy in fundamental purposes.
Indeed, this historical period of 194-5 to I963 was one charac­
terized by activism, but an activism marked by a kind of missionary
zeal that makes effective collaboration difficult,
Theodore Sor­
ensen has said of President Kennedy that he was at his best when
his responsibilities did not have to be shared.
To remove itself
from the danger of returning to an isolationist stand on inter­
national affairs during the immediate post-war period, the United
States had to feel that it was in control— whether as dominant
head of a coalition, enjoying the privileges of "multilateralizing"
its point of view, as in the days of President Truman; or, when
others tended to be too reluctant, slow, or divided to follow,
through unilateral actions, as was often Dulles' tendency (despite
all his pacts), and increasingly President Kennedy's,
It is im­
portant that when the United States awoke to the challenge of the
post-war world, its program of aid to Greece and Turkey was put
"in a world perspective," in the terms of a need to lead the fight
against Communism all over the globe.
When the United States
intervenes, wrote Stanley Hoffmann, it is with the belief in the
normality of its total leadership.
2
^Gulliver's Troubles (new York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1968), p, 193.
III. WESTERN EUROPE AND THE JOHNSONIAN ERA
1963 —
1968: ANALYTIC APPROACH
The dramatic events in Dallas, Texas, on 23 November 19&3,
brought to a close in a very sudden manner the life and administra­
tion of John F. Kennedy,
The new President, Lyndon B, Johnson,
attempted to carry out many of the policies of the man under whom
he had served; yet conditions could no longer remain the same.
Johnson brought to the oval office not only a unique personality
but also different tastes, interests, skills, concepts and ideals.
In this context Lyndon B, Johnson became responsible for Amer­
ican policies.
He inherited a boiling cauldron of potential diffi­
culties in both domestic and foreign policy fields.
The Civil
Rights movement was pressing for increased acceptance, while poverty
still remained widespread among a sizable minority of Americans,
In partial response to the assassination and as a result of the
skilled leadership of President Johnson, the Civil Rights acts of
1964 and 1965 represented the first legislative attack on racial
inequality since the period of the Reconstruction,
The problem of
poverty was given new emphasis, and a legislative program designed
to deal with the problems of the poor and the problems of the city
emerged.
The Kennedy and Johnson presidencies built their economic
policies solidly on Keynesian doctrine, which required government
to assume responsibility, through its fiscal and monetary policies,
for maintaining high levels of employment and economic growth.
The
result was a period of economic prosperity and national economic
167
growth averaging five per cent a year and resulting in an increase
in the per capita income in real terms by a striking 34^ for the
decade of the 1960's,
Other political developments indicated a growing unrest and
political alienation which threatened to polarize American society
and to destroy the established procedures and institutions of gov­
ernment,
The beginning of the "Free Speech Movement" at Berkeley
in 1964 and the Harlem disorders of the same year were the harbingers
of things yet to come.
The Watts riot of I965 ushered in the period
of ghetto riots, which had their fullest expression during the
summers of I967 and I968, when the inner cities of Los Angeles,
Newark, Detroit, Cleveland, and Washington, D, C,, erupted in vio­
lence to persons and property that spread finally to nearly two
hundred cities.
The escalation of the war in Vietnam and the growing unrest
and protest over this involvement resulted in a mass march on the
Pentagon in I968 and was accompanied by an increasingly militant
series of anti-war demonstrations and riots.
The assassinations
of Martin Luther King and Senator Robert Kennedy, riots on campuses,
and the violent confrontations at the Democratic Party convention
in Chicago in August of I968 introduced political strategies which,
if they were not new, reached new levels of intensity,
Americans
became familiar with such phrases as "confrontation," "disruption,"
and "political violence," all of which represented a danger of
national polarization and, indeed, the possibility that the polit­
ical system itself had ceased to be accepted as a legitimate frame­
work for the reconciliation of differences and the redress of
grievances.
168
One analytical perspective for viewing foreign policy focuses
on the domestic constraints and the internal political processes
of the nation and tends to stress the motives that shape a nation's
foreign policy goals; it puts the spotlight on sociocultural pre­
dispositions and institutional processes that lead to their formu­
lation and to the choice of a method for their implementation.
Thus, the international conduct of a nation tends to be regarded
as either irreversibly determined by its historical past and "poli­
tical culture" or shaped by the personal idiosyncrasies of the
decision-makers.
As a result, analytical emphasis rests on this
domestic system as a "subsystem" of the much larger international
system.
The analysis of foreign policy should focus on both the oppor­
tunities and limitations presented by the nation's external and in­
ternal environment.
When both dimensions are brought together, a
wider range of variables and a more complete analysis are possible.
It is becoming difficult or even meaningless to draw distinc­
tions between foreign policy and domestic policy.
Decision-makers
are aware of this difficulty and have begun to recognize that in
many political issues external events have a direct impact on the
allocation of values that traditionally have taken place within the
national political system, ^
This aspect becomes even more clear
in the operations of regional international organizations that are
1
A valuable discussion of this general approach may be found
in Wolfram F, Hanrieder's "Actor Objectives and International Sys­
tems," Journal of Politics. February, I965, pp, 109-132,
169
endowed with some measure of supranational authority, however limited.
The very nature of the nation-state has been subjected to farreaching changes.
As John Herz has argued, the previously existing
"hard shell" of physical, legal, and psychological boundaries,
which national systems have traditionally maintained against the
external environment, is becoming increasingly "permeated," because
of developments in modern weapons technology and the application
2
of economic and psychological warfare.
These various considerations, while not complete, illustrate
the fact that there is an increasing "interdependence" among
national actors within the system.
They illustrate a process of
interpenetration in which the traditonal boundaries separating the
nation-state from the surrounding international system are becoming
less clear.
It is not surprising that the relationship between
the external and internal dimensions of foreign policy has begun
3
to receive greater attention.
An examination of historical periods when decision-makers and
the analysts of American foreign policy have related foreign relations directly to the domestic socio-political milieu,
4
reveals
p
John H, Herz, International Pblitics in the Atomic Age (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959)» expecially Chapter 6 ,
^ruce M, Russett, Trends in World Politics (New York: Mac­
millan, 1965), chapter 4; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict
Behavior Within and Between Nations, I958-I96O," Journal of Conflict
Resolution. Vol. X (1966), pp, 41-64; and James N, Rosenau, ed,,
International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N,J,: Princeton
University Press, 1964JT
4
Frank L, Klingberg, "The Historical Alternation of Moods in
American Foreign Policy," World Politics. Vol. 4, No, 2, 1952.
170
the difficulty in separation for analysis.
However, there is an
advantage in separation, if only artificially, not only because
their subsequent correlation becomes sharper, but because the two
dimensions of government policy goals reach into significantly
different environments : the external— international— and the
internalr— domestic.
There are two concepts which appear to permit a useful rela­
tionship between important external and internal aspects of foreign
policy aims, and which allow the student to view foreign policy
as a continuous process.
The first is the concept of external
compatibility, the intent of which is to assess the degrees of
feasibility of foreign policy goals within the opportunities pro­
vided by the international system.
The second concept is domestic
policy consensus, which assesses the amount of agreement concerning
the ends and means of foreign policy in the internal political
system.
Compatibility implies that a particular objective has a
reasonable chance of realization if implemented with a policy that
an outside observer (i.e., another government) would deem appro­
priate.
The relative compatibility between goals can be established
by evaluating their respective individual compatibilities vis-a-vis
the international system.
Thus, the respective degrees of compat­
ibility between individual objectives and the international system
provide a basis for evaluating the degree of similarity among
goals sought by separate states.
The concept of consensus lacks this type of background.
There
. - ' l i a . . . ? J.
171
exists no standard of feasibility on the domestic political scene
which corresponds precisely to the one the operational contingencies
of the international system provide for the external dimensions of
foreign
policy goals.
The determinants of foreign policy projects
may be checked by ethical restraints, inadequate perception of
opportunities, and realistic perception of external limitations;
but the range of political goals that the members of a political
system can advocate and agree on is hypothetically limitless.
Further, the concept of consensus has other constraints which
have a direct effect upon the formulation of policy and the goals
which that policy pursues.
Among these limitations can be included
such vital aspects of American society as the national elections
and the choice of candidates who assist in forming this consensus.
Also Congress plays an increasing role in the support or criticism
of American foreign policy as do the opinion elites in the various
news media.
Each of these factors, as well as others, continues
to play an important function in assisting the policy makers to
develop the type of consensus most feasible to implement a reason­
able foreign policy, ^
Still, the differences between the two concepts of compatibil­
ity and consensus should not be overdone.
Compatibility is a con­
cept of international feasibility; and if consensus is defined as
the
existing measure of agreement on policy projects among the
relevant elements of a national system's decision-making process,
it necessarily imposes boundaries on the activities the political
system can pursue without risking fragmentation.
In that sense.
■Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1963
(Stanford, California : Stanford University Press , I967).
172
consensus is a standard of feasibility, especially in a democratic
political systems
it determines, in the long run, what foreign
policy goals a government can pursue without losing popular support
and office.
It is the effect of these two concepts that will be the basis
of evaluation of the Johnson Administration,
To evaluate this
administration's policies as they related to Europe and the effect
of domestic issues and problems upon these policies as they related
to consensus is the purpose of the first part of the analysis.
This analysis of domestic inputs shall attempt to analyse such
factors as the influence of the business community and, the national
debate over maintaining high force levels in Europe,
Did these
factors influence the administration'é policies toward Western
Europe?
What aspects of "consensus" or "compatibility" were added
to or detracted from the priority of Western Europe by these ele­
ments of domestic action?
In the second part of the analysis of the Johnson Administra­
tion, a series of international inputs will be made.
What was the
effect upon United States-Western European policy of the Non-Pro­
liferation Treaty, Détente, the Vietnam crisis, and the controversy
between the United States and General De Gaulle?
Were these fac­
tors such as to increase the domestic policy consensus concerning
Western Europe, as well as to encourage compatibility between the
vital nature of Western Europe and the security of the United
States?
These components were perhaps most important because they
would tend to influence foreign policy and involve the national
interests of the United States abroad more specifically.
173
Domestic inputs cannot be overlooked as important to the
formulation of foreign policy.
It is recognized by those who
are students of foreign policy that the president, the one ultim­
ately responsible for foreign policy at any given time, is limited
by public opinion— or the attitudes of the American people.
6
He,
in fact, is limited by the levels of tolerance of this broad
constituency.
Beyond the acceptable limits of tolerance he cannot
go and maintain the continued support of the public.
Thus a few
of those events and segments of domestic politics which affect the
limitations of public tolerance must be viewed and evaluated in
order to examine the effect which these domestic aspects had upon
American foreign policy— if any— in its relation with the nations
of Western Europe,
6i
V, 0. Key, Jr,, Public Opinion aind American Democracy (New
York: Alfred A, Knopf, I96I) j also see Gabriel Almond, American
People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt. Brace, I960).
A.
Internal and Special Interests:
Economic Interests
Economic interests and pressure groups— these both exert a
crucial influence in the formulation of foreign policy.
Particu­
larly is this so because of two distinct relationships which exist :
the relationship between the American business community and the
European economic structure; and the relationship between the
American economic elites and the American government.
The first
relationship has been one which required a compatibility of inter­
ests, and it is important to explore and evaluate the extent of
this compatibility, ^
The second is the relationship which exists
between the economic community and the Washington decision-makers
in regard to the problem of creating a policy consensus.
The
extent to which a consensus exists and to which the American econ­
omic elite exert influence over the decisions of American foreign
and economic policy is, at this point, important to the study.
The primary focus of this analysis will be upon the degree
to which there existed a consensus in policy between the economic
elites and the Johnson Administration,
In accomplishing this
objective, a preponderance of attention will be given to the "vol­
untary" investment control program of 10 February I965 and an
evaluation of the impact of the economic community upon this policy.
In this way an impoirtant aspect of the domestic political frame­
work will be provided, against which an extended analysis of Amer-
^While not the object of this study, such an issue is worthy
of its own analysis.
175
lean relations with Western Europe can he undertaken.
The importance of economic interests in the formulation of
American foreign policy is crucial.
In this regard George McGhee,
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, stated in a presentation the
vital relationship of both business and governments
There is but one sphere of action for both business and govern­
ment and that is the whole complex world of today, in which
the affairs of nations and individuals alike are interlocked.
Within that sphere, the interests and objectives of business
and government do not diverge but run parallel. 2
But the interests of big government and big business do not
always run parallel.
Such a simplistic perception of this rela­
tionship tends to overlook a number of considerations.
History is
replete with examples of conflicting interests between the admin­
istration and economic or business interests.
It overlooks com­
pletely the motivations for each institution which may diverge on
numerous occasions.
Further, while the government is pursuing the
national interest, it is not of itself a monolith; there exist—
3
often within a department or an agency— conflicting interests.
Finally, whatever interests the economic or business elites would
have must compete with the views and programs of Congress.
Thus,
to suggest that the "objectives of business and government do not
diverge but run parallel" is an oversimplification that must have
2
George C. McGhee, Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 51i
No. 1306, p. 18.
O
See Roger Hilsman's To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday
& Company, Inc., I967), particularly Chapters 1 and 2. Also con­
sult Burton M. Sapin's The Making of United States Foreign Policy
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1^6), published for the Brook­
ings Institution.
176
further analysis.
The distinction between nominal "support" of a policy and the
exertion of direct influence on policy-making will be clouded in
cases where a number of special interests are united in support
of a given foreign policy.
This tends to be more true when evi­
dence of such support is more than sufficient to counterbalance
the influence of special interests being exerted on policy-makers
by more intimate means.
Thus by evaluating the outputs of policy
it may be possible to understand the "effects" of these special
interests as encouraging, or discouraging, policy-makers to con­
tinue proceeding along self-chosen lines in contrast to influencing
policy in a specific direction to conform to the desires of an
interest group,
A further difficulty in understanding the impact of special
interests is found in the fact that such groups may have important
influence on foreign policy even when they remain silent.
At times
the silence of such groups that are quick to take a policy stand
may be construed as agreement or acquiescence in the course of
policy being pursued by the government.
Irrespective of these fkctors, one may suggest that the more
influential interest groups, while not so strong in direct influence
in the foreign policy process as in the domestic arena, are the
economic and legal elites— business organizations, trade associa-
See Bernard C, Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign
Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement (Princetont
Princeton University Press, 1957)t
177
tions, labor organizations, and law firms.
Two organizations which represent this general elite and have
many members of the economic and legal communities are the Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Council for Economic Development
(CED),
It would appear that the real impact of the business and
legal community upon the broad scope of policy formulation is sub­
stantial,
This is neither to suggest nor to imply a conspiracy
but to suggest that American foreign policy interests have become
inextricably tied to American financial and legal interests, most
specifically in EJurope, ^
Further, United States economic interests in Western Europe
are not in a position to decline,
J.-J. Servan-Schreiber suggests
that
Fifteen years from not it is quite possible that the
world's third greatest industrial power, just behind the
United States and Russia, will not be Europe, but American
Industry in Europe, Already, in the ninth year of the
Common Market, this European market is basically American
in organization, 7
^See Gabriel A, Almond, The American People and Foreign
Policy (New[ York: Frederick A, Praeger,I960); Gabriel Kolko,
"The Class Aàckground of Foreign Policy Makers" in Douglas M,
Fox's The Politics of U,S, Foreign Poligy Making (Pacific Pali­
sades, Calif,; Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc., 1971)t PP. 115-121.
^This point has been seriously argued by Joyce and Gabriel
Kolko in their recent book, The Limits of Power (New York: Harper
& Row, Publishers, 1972), an analysis of American foreign policy
from 19^5 to 195^.
J.-J, Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge (New York:
Atheneum, 1969)1 P. 1.
178
At the end of 1950 direct foreign investment by United States cor­
porations was 11,8 billion dollars, mostly committed to the petro­
leum and minerals industries of Canada, Latin America, and the
Middle East; but by the end of 1968 the figure had risen to sixtyfive billion.
Paralleling this tremendous growth were shifts in
the location and industrial structure of the investment.
Two-
thirds of the total, or 40,6 billion, were invested in manufactur­
ing, mercantile, and other non-extractive industries.
Almost
two-thirds of the 1968 figure, or 39.1 billion, was invested in
Western Europe,
8
Further, of the six thousand new businesses
started overseas by Americans during the period from 1958 through
1965, one-half were begun in Western Europe, ^
Beyond massive United States investments, it is the American
style in management that is unifying Europe,
One American business­
man asserted:
The Treaty of Rome is the sweetest deal ever to come out of
Europe, It's what brought us here. We're happy to be here.
We're making money. And we're going to make a lot more.
Whether the political negotiations in Brussels move ahead or
not, prospects in commerce and industry for us here are
greater than they are in the United States,
As early as 1963 it was being demonstrated that American firms con­
trolled a high percentage of the market in certain product areas
in Western Europe,
For example, American firms controlled 40 per-
^eil H, Jacoby, "The Multinational Corporation,"
Magazine, Vol, III, No. 3, May-June, 1970, p, 39.
Servan-Schreiber, loc, cit,
l°Ibid,, p, 3.
The Center
179
cent of the petroleum market, 65 percent of the production of films
and photographic paper, 65 percent of farm machinery, 65 percent
of tele-communications equipment, and 4-5 percent of synthetic rub­
ber, among others,
Neither business interest nor investment have
decreased since 1963.
It is significant that during I965 and I966
the total American investment rose by I7 percent in the United
States, by 21 percent in the rest of the world, but b y *40 percent
in the countries of the Common Market,
Further, American corporate investment abroad is concentrated
in the hands of the largest firms whose personnel not infreciuently
find their way to high level policy-making positions.
Of a total
investment of sixty-five billion dollars at the end of I968, the
five hundred largest American industrial corporations had invested
more than fifty billion.
Yet for the majority of these firms, the
foreign operations comprise a rather small part of their business.
The United States government has responded in many constructive
ways to support American-financed private enterprise abroad.
12
For the most part governmental policies have strongly encouraged
private foreign economies an^ hopefully, reduced political instabil­
ities,
Historically, this support has gone beyond economic or dip-
^^Ibid,
12
Various departments of government, most notably the De­
partments of State, Agriculture, Treasury and Commerce, are deeply
involved in negotiating treaties of commerce and friendship with
other countries, as well as with maintaining consular services,
in promoting American exports, in insuring against some risks
of investment in the less developed countries, and in supporting
international trade fairs.
180
lomatlc measures into the realm of military involvement.
13
Notwithstanding all that corporations and personnel have done,
it would appear that business has had little direct influence upon
United States foreign policy.
In fact, it may be argued that there
has been a strong "de-politicalization" of private foreign invest­
ment,
The
era of dollar diplomacy apparently is past; and when
an American corporation invests abroad, it carries its own risks.
The relationship between business and the United States policy in
the Middle East is instructive.
One of the largest concentrations
of American corporate investment is found in the petroleum industry
of Arab countries around the Persian Gulf and in North Africa,
Yet, the United States continued giving moral, economic and mili­
tary support to Israel, whose strategic and economic importance
to the United States is limited.
This behaviour aroused strong
hostility among the Arab states and elicited threats of expro­
priation of the property of American oil companies,
It must be noted that within the European countries, American
corporate investment forms less than five percent of the total exist­
ing business investments.
However, it is not the amount of invest­
ment that troubled Europeans but the deep penetration by American
companies into the highly technological sectors of their economies,
^The naval attack on the Barbary pirates in 1801, Admiral
Perry's visit to Japan in I85O, the American intervention in the
Boxer Rebellion in 1900, and various Itoine activities into the
Latin American republics serve only as historic examples.
^^Jacoby, o£, cit,. pp, 51-52,
ervan-8chrieber, 0£, cit,, pp, 10-30,
181
Worldwide, the value of the output of all foreign affiliates
of United States corporations was, in I968, approximately one
hundred and thirty billion dollars,
This amounted to four times
the United States level of exports of thirty-three billion in that
year, demonstrating that the major link of the United States to other
markets is through foreign production rather than foreign trade.
This capacity has marked United States industry abroad as potenti­
ally the third largest economy in the world outranked by only those
of the domestic United States and the Soviet Union,
Also, foreign
production of American firms has grown about ten percent a year,
twice as fast as many of the domestic economies.
How then might one evaluate the effect of this sizable impact
upon the nations of Western Europe?
It would be futile to suggest
that the physical presence in Europe of more than three thousand
American corporations with approximately forty thousand American
employees could not be significant.
17
In spite of criticism of
United States investments in Europe, there have proven to be signnificant economic results in the stimulation and growth of produc­
tion, incomes and living standards of many British, French and
other Europeans,
Also, American corporate investment has had a
See Judd Polk, The Internationalization of Production (New
York, U, S, Council of International Chamber of Commerce, Inc,,
May 7, 1969.
17
'These estimates are from Edward A, McCreary, The American­
ization of Europe (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964),
182
direct improving effect on both the efficiency of resource alloca­
tion and the balance of international payments of host countries,
which have benefited both from capital inflows and also from exports
generated by the foreign-owned affiliates,
18
The data suggests
that one of the thrusts of the American economic involvement on the
European continent has been the acceleration of a peaceful consumer
revolution.
Finally, affiliates of United States corporations have
generally earned higher rates of return on investment in Europe
than have local enterprises in the same industries, largely because
of management techniques rather than the comparative quality of
the products.
19
When one examines United States investment trends, he finds
that
American corporations invested during 1970 more than six
times the amount of capital on domestic operations than on those
abroad.
However, the ratio is slowly changing.
The rate of growth
of overseas investments over the years 1960-1970 was about twice
the rate of domestic expansion; whereas domestic investment in
plant and equipment increased 119 percent, investment by United
States owned companies increased by 247 percent.
20
These devel-
l8
John H, Dunning, The Role of American Investment in the
British Economy, Political and Economic Planning Broadsheet 507
(London, February, 1969), pp. 142-145,
l^ibid,. p. 130,
20
The United States in the Changing World Economy, Volume IIs
Background Material (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 29.
183
opments may be explained by considering a series of factors:
the
rapidly expanding markets to be found abroad, the belief of many
businessmen that these markets are less competitive, and the
probability of lower production costs.
Also, trade restrictions both at home and abroad have made it
more desirable to produce abroad than to produce at home and attempt
to export.
But— and this is most important— if American firms are
to participate in these foreign markets, competitive conditions
require localized production which in turn requires a direct in­
vestment,
Thus, private investments began, in the 1960's, to make
a determined impact upon the international monetary scene; when,
as a result, the dollar outflow created an imbalance, the Johnson
Administration was forced to give increased consideration to the
balance-of-payments problem.
21
The balance-of-payments problem was not only a national finan­
cial dilemma but an international monetary problem, with roots
resting in policies that the United States had taken to meet econ­
omic problems, political needs, and security objectives.
For the
United States, the balance-of-payments problem really was a prob­
lem of defense spending, foreign aid, international trade, and
investment abroad, with each of these interrelated elements having
cross effects.
Since 1950 the United States has run a basic
balance-of-payments deficit in almost every year.
21
In a normally
It should be added that there existed other sources of
dollar outflow, i, e, foreign aid, military assistance, import
costs and— most significantly— the economic investment being made
in Vietnam,
184
responsive monetary system (at least theoretically) this condition
should have resulted in an effective devaluation of the dollar.
Yet, between 1959 and 1970 the effect on the dollar was to raise
its value (4.7 percent) relative to other currencies ; this
resulted largely from devaluations on the part of other currencies.
22
Furthermore, since 1945 the United States has had a basic
annual balance
23
deficit ranging between 1,5 billion and 3 billion;
the persisting balance-of-payments dilemma resulted in the building
of foreign reserves and United States dollars abroad.
This con­
tinuous outflow of capital has been largely attributable to United
States private, direct, and other investment abroad, as well as
to governmental loans and grants.
Between the years of I963 and
1969 this annual balance deficit achieved its best figure in 1964
at a surplus of 0,2 billion and the poorest showing in I967 at a
deficit of 3.1 billion.
24
On 10 February I965 President Johnson presented a message to
Congress on the subject of the international balance of payments
and the United States gold position.
This message reaffirmed his
commitment to bring a balance to the payments problem, and he
00
The United States in the Changing World Economy, II, p, 29,
^^This basic annual balance is achieved by adding private
long-term capital movements and government grants and capital
transactions to the current account balance,
24
The United States in the Changing World Economy, II, p, 33,
185
further outlined ten specific means by which he hoped to do this.
25
This program was geared to the voluntary controlling of the outflow
of capital, both private and governmental, or the intaking of
foreign capital.
Only one, No, 7» hinted at the sizable expendi­
tures abroad by the military and defense establishment.
Each of
the regulations was to have direct effect upon reducing the
balance of payments deficit.
Also, the majority of these provisions
would have a direct influence upon the financial relationship
between the United States and the nations of Europe, the prime
beneficiaries of United States dollars abroad.
The primary impact
of these regulations would be felt in private investment and the
private financial sector.
26
Whether these controls over foreign investment would achieve
their objective and seirve American financial interests can be
questioned.
Large American multinational firms were able to raise
needed capital from foreign bankers or in the Euro-dollar market.
But the fôrce of these regulations fell on the smaller enterprises
unable to tap these financial resources.
25
Lyndon B, Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress on
International Balance of Payments," February 10, 1965, Public
Papers of the President: Lyndon B, Johnson, I965, pp, 170-177,
26
Ibid,, p, 171. These controls were primarily voluntary
but not entirely so. The President asked Congress to extend the
Interest Equalization Tax for two years beyond December 31, I965;
and to "broaden its coverage to non-bank credit of one-to-three
year maturity," Further, he requested new tax legislation to
increase the incentives for foreigners to invest in U, S. corpor­
ate securities. Finally, the President requested legislation to
limit the duty free exemptions of American tourists returning to
the United States, The final item was enacted by Congress and
signed on June 30, I965. The remainder of the provisions were
voluntary.
186
A basic objection raised to foreign investment controls was
that the deficit in the United States balance of payments which
the controls were designed to limit recedes when international
transactions are measured on an assets basis rather than on a
liquidity basis.
Thus, when an American company invests in a
foreign country, it acquires a long-term asset in return for which
it pays dollars— a short-term liability of the United States,
With the creation of the Special Drawing Rights ^DRs) from the
International Monetary Fund as a new form of international currency
reserve, dollar liquidity became less important.
Other factors, however, were major problems in resolving the
entire balance-of-payments deficit,
A leading concern created by
the deterioration of the balance of payments was the declining
trade position of the United States,
The trade surplus in the
early 1960's averaged more than 5 billion annually, achieving its
best level in 1964 of about 7 billion.
However, after 1964 the
trade balance slipped rapidly to a level of slightly more than 1
billion in I968 and 19&9, a cause for concern throughout the Amerloan business community.
27 During this same period the West
Germans and Japanese were sharply improving their positions to one
of surplus which for both, by 1971-1972, would reach a level of 3
billion dollars,
27
This slippage is partly attributable to the increased
shifting during this period in the patterns of foreign manufacturing,
This was the result of rapidly rising production, primarily in Japan
and in Europe,
28
The United States in the Changing World Economy, II, p, 33,
187
A second factor in the creation of the increased balance-ofpayments deficit was the sizable outlays abroad for our own military
forces, as well as for foreign economic aid and military assistance.
These combined expenditures resulted in an outflow of approximately
7,5 billion in 1968, a serious increase since the I965 level of
approximately 5 billion, a level it had held since about 1959.
Looking at this deficit geographically suggests that 1,2 billion
was spent in Europe and that most of the remainder went to the
Ear East, including Japan,
It is clear that there existed other
significant factors beyond private investment which played a con­
siderable role in determining the level of the balance of payments.
With all of these negative factors, there were also compensa­
tory considerations.
Perhaps the most striking in scope was the
income received from foreign direct investments which continuously
opened wider a favorable gap between it and the private investment
capital outflow.
29
If all private United States foreign investment
income earnings were counted, including bonds, stocks and short­
term assets, the United States gross income more than quintupled
in 20 years— from 1.5 billion in 1950 to 8,7 billion in 1970,
One important question then must be asked:
Why, when the income
to the United States of foreign investments was increasing rapidly
from approximately 4 billion in I963 to approximately 8 billion in
1969, was the administration so willing to cut the one area of
private investment which produced for the long term a significant
29
The surplus for 1970 was 1,6 billion as compared with 0,7
billion in 1970,,
188
return on the investment?
The answer appears to lie in the priorities of the Johnson
Administration,
In the final months of 1964 and with the signif­
icantly growing commitment during I965 and 1966 to the Vietnamese
conflict, the focus of attention was geared to providing the
essential economic resources for that war.
With increased allo­
cations being granted to defense-related industries, all the vital
signs of economic growth appeared to be present.
Under these
conditions the war in Vietnam was being fought on the basis of both
"guns and butter"; and the major economic impact of the war, namely
inflation, was only in the beginning stages.
Such allocations for
Vietnam were to reach a spending peak of approximately 30 billion
dollars during the I968-1969 period of United States commitment; :
but they resulted in the requirement to control inflation and to
provide the "butter" for American domestic economic life.
The
major sources of this economic instability were the Vietnamese
costs, capital flows (both public and private), and the area of
government outlays abroad (both military and foreign aid).
With regard to the first, there was little promise of any fin­
ancial return from Vietnam, and the expenditure of national wealth
only stimulated the development of domestic inflation.
Yet the
Johnson Administration was committed to pursuing a military reso­
lution in Vietnam, and to do so required a high economic priority.
This commitment demanded effective and remedial measures to control
30
The United States in the Changing World Economy, II, p, 36,
189
the problems attending inflation; yet the 10 February 19&5 guide­
lines did not really deal with the single major source of capital
outflow, the flow of dollars to Southeast Asia.
31
Secondly, spending for foreign aid and military assistance
abroad continued.
This too was a deficit commitment reaching the
level of approximately -7,4 billion in 1967 and improved only
slightly in I968 to -7,2 billion.
Even though a substantial por­
tion of these funds was in the form of loans, they still represented
a negative drain upon the balance of payments.
However, Congres­
sional committee hearings on appropriations, particularly those
concerned with military assistance, demonstrate the extent of the
American commitment to foreign governments, not only to supply arms
but to furnish the only means by which American "national security"
interests would be met.
These expenditures, it was argued, were
necessary to combat Communism and to maintain a guard against
Insecurity around the world.
Thus presented, it consistently
received a high priority; for few Congressmen were willing to vote
against "national security,"
32
Finally, the source of capital outflow most easily controlled
and least open to claims of "national security," was.the private
business sector and their invested interests abroad.
If the ad-
31
Dean Rusk, Hearings on Supplemental Foreign Assistance
Fiscal Year 1966— Vietnam, before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 09th Congress, 2nd Session on S, 2793» (Wash­
ington* GPO, 1966), pp, 563-577,
^^Ibid,
190
ministration could reduce the outflow of private investment, the
other priorities could then he met, hopefully, with a much greater
chance of meeting the problem of the balance of payments.
Since
about 60 percent (from 1964 until I969) of all direct investment
abroad would be in Europe or in Canada, any cut would run the risk
of significantly curtailing American financial planning and involve­
ment in these two areas.
But the Johnson Administration took the
position that any damage to the American financial interests would
be temporary and not long-term.
Direct investments abroad did de­
cline in 1965 and I966 and the impact on a reduction of the deficit
was evident.
However, in I967 the balance-of-payments deficit
grew to about -3,5 billion, only to jump the following year to a
surplus : an indication that the administration's policies had met
with measured success and that a partial consensus had been
attained, ^
What, then, was to be gained by the administration in re­
stricting the role of private business and investments abroad?
First, there was the hope that the outflow of capital would decrease
without serious damage to the return on already existing assets.
This did occur, for during the years of I965 through 1968 there
continued to be a steady increase in the income from private United
States investments abroad, even with the reduction in investments.
34
Secondly, the administration took the view that, in reducing invest-
^^The United States in the Changing World Economy. II, p, 32,
^\bid,, p, 36.
191
ments abroad, business would be
encouraged to
invest at home.The
stipulations placed upon the outflow of funds had the tendency to
encourage that type of action.
By investing at home, domestic
factors in the economy would bestrengthened, employment increased
and the rate of inflation slowed.
The immediate response of the business community was one of
relief and acceptance, but not enthusiasm.
Relief arose from the
fhct that the controls were "voluntary," whereas many had antici­
pated much stricter controls; and acceptance indicated that many
business leaders had already become convinced that the balance
of payments dilemma had gotten to the point of requiring strong
governmental action,
two basic reasons,
But the lack of enthusiasm resulted from
First, for many corporations a curtailing of
direct investment would not only hinder short-term operations but,
if continued, would have the effect not only of jeopardizing long­
term gains and endangering the number of dollars which they would
be able to repatriate eventually, but also of angering long-term
United States-European economic relations.
Secondly, some felt
that other viable alternatives should have been tried, including
cutting foreign aid and military assistance, as well as tightening
credit at home.
There was no question that leaders in business agreed that the
1964 deficit of 3 billion in the balance of payments had to be
eliminated,
William B, Murphy, President of Campbell Soup Go,,
^^"Self-Restraint, or Else," Business Week, February 13,
1965, No, I85O, pp, 25-26,
192
stated* "I think business will do everything it can to benefit our
balance of payments."
Later in the year other businessmen were
voicing the opinions that "the voluntary program should continue
almost indefinitely, , , " and "the program should be continued
as long as it is necessary to obtain a balance,"
37
These comments,
however, were among the more favorable responses, for many businessOO
men had already begun to express contrary views.
In general the "voluntary" controls were not liked.
Why hadn't
the administration tried to tighten credit at home, or cut back on
military spending or foreign aid?
The belief seemed to be that the
President was skirting around the primary issue causing the balance
of payments problem— military and foreign spending.
Further, it
was believed that by restricting private investment abroad the com­
petitive position of the United States in world markets would be
shaken.
In the long run, the income from foreign investments con-
siderably exceeded the outflow for new direct investments.
39
^^"Business Cool to Payments Program," Business Week, Febru­
ary 20, 1965, No, 1851,
"Business and the Balance of Payments," Dun's Review, 86,
(September 1965)» PP. 37-39.
38
^ Among these was the prestigious United States Chamber of
Commerce which was outspoken in their opposition to the voluntary
restrictions. They believed that such restrictions would have a
long-term detrimental impact upon the United States business community.
Regarding the National Association of Manufacturers there appears
to be no available indication of an official position. However,
the response given to the Secretary of the Treasury and to the former
Vice-President Richard Nixon at their annual meetings, December 2-4,
1965, would Indicate a not very strong support for the program, at
best. New York Times, December 2,3» and 4, 1965.
^^"Self-restraint, or Else," pp, 26-26,
193
On the whole, the leading businessmen were resigned to a long
spell of having their overseas investment drive severely limited,
and they quickly became acquainted with the various ways in which
their own company's balance of payments could be improved.
40
Even while American businessmen were coping with the "voluntary"
guidelines, the Europeans were responding to the guidelines of 10
February 19&5.
For many Europeans the problem was one of too much foreign
control, and most often this meant American control.
Also, while
there were other problems, both real and imagined, which Europeans
had with American business interests,
41
the move by President
Johnson to inhibit direct investments was taken as an indication
that he was determined to deal with the balance of payments.
Never­
theless the long-term effectiveness of his action was questioned,
for it was believed that the guidelines were directed at the effects
of the deficit of the balance of payments rather than the real causes
of such a deficit.
42
In a real sense the views of the Europeans
They could, for instance, increase exports, increase remit­
tance of foreign dividends, increase use of foreign currencies,
finance with foreign currencies the existing foreign investments,
and postpone or reduce dollar investment overseas,
^ ^ o r example, some Europesm industrialists felt helpless in
their struggle against American competition. Others believed Ameri­
can businessmen too insensitive and quite willing to step on Eîuropean
toes. There also was the problem of overemployment which led Europeans
to fear the encroachment of new industry and the threat of a loss of
workers to the new industry with the accompanying loss of production
and, of course, a loss of profits,
42
G, F, Karsten, "Should Europe Restrict U, S, Investments?"
Harvard Business Review, September-October, I965, 43, pp, 53~6l,
194
regarding the effect upon the balance of payments were similar to
those of most American businessmen,
Tert there was little question that the world of private busi­
ness would cooperate, as Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler
stated before the Virginia Bar Association in Hot Springs on 10
July 1965.
Referring to President Johnson's call to join
voluntarily in a national effort to limit the outflow of funds,
Secretary Fowler reported;
"that call has been heard— and heeded."
He continued by stating that notwithstanding
After a bad start in January, our balance-of-payments improved
in February following the President's message and showed a
surplus in March, in April, and in May, ^
He continued to advocate that those measures of 10 February 19&5
be kept in force until
rising returns from past investment abroad, our improved
climate for domestic employment of capital, enlarged avail­
ability of capital in markets abroad and growth in our trade
balance , , , place our accounts securely in equilibrium.
If the deficits continued, or the United States would lapse
into a prolonged deficit after a short period of surplus, then
the United States would have the effect of undermining world con­
fidence in the dollar and restricting its usefulness as a world
reserve and leading currency.
Dollars might then be used as claims
upon our gold reserves, depleting rather than supplementing world
43
Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Henry H, Fowler
before the Virginia Bar Association, July 10, I965, Department of
State Bulletin, August 2, I965, pp, 209-214,
^Ibld,
195
financial resources.
To prevent this from occurring Secretary
Fowler expressed further the belief that the United States must
reach and maintain an equilibrium in our payments as a matter of
the highest national priority.
The improvement was definite.
In
1964 the deficit on the liquidity basis reached almost -3 billion
dollars but substantially decreased to about -1,3 billion for
1965.
Improvement was being made, but it was in the area of pri-
vate investment that restrictions were experienced most directly.
About a year later, in speaking to the Board of Governors of
the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Secretary Fowler presented a second
and perhaps more realistic angle to the balance-of-payments problem.
He first observed ;
This year so far it
the balance-of-payments_7 Is running
at about the same rate '^as the previous year_7, despite a
rapid step-up of activity in Southeast Asia,
Then he continued by making a very significant statement :
If we have not made further progress in our balance-ofpayments position this year, the chief reason ig^the foreign
exchange costs of the shield of freedom, , , ,
This "shield of freedom" was à direct reference to the United States
involvement in Vietnam.
To attain a balance was the goal, and the
costs of Vietnam clearly made the task more difficult.
kC
^Statement by Secretary of the Treasury, Henry H, Fowler,
"The United States Balance of Payments and International Financial
Cooperation," September 28, I966, before the Board of Governors of
the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development in Washington, D, G,, Department of
State Bulletin, October 24, I966, pp. 626-633,
^Ibid,
196
On 12 December I966 President Johnson, in a memorandum to
Secretary Fowler, expressed regret that the time for restraint on
finances should have passed.
He indicated a partial explanation
not dissimilar to those previously expressed by Secretary Fowler,
While appreciative of the success of the voluntary program, he
felt it necessary to defend South Vietnam— with a substantial
increase in military participation and expenditures in Southeast
He added these words 1
Asia,
These expenditures have taken a heavy toll on our balance of
payments. After taking account of all direct and indirect
affects, we estimate that the cost of Vietnam to our balance
of payments may be well in excess of $1 billion a year.
Then he added:
Maintaining the shield of freedom in Vietnam does not relieve
us of the obligation to keep the outflow of dollars within
prudent limits. We must continue to make progress toward
equilibrium as far as the continued substantial costs of
Vietnam will permit. We will, therefore, call upon American
bankers and businessmen to continue their cooperation during
this period of difficulties,
There remained no question that the real dilemma engaging the
balance-of-payments was not necessarily the outflow of private
investment capital, but the constant expenses of Vietnam and the
domestic economic demands to meet the military requirements which
placed a growing burden upon the international monetary require­
ments,
While in 1965 and I966 the deficit declined to a level of
-1,3 billion, 1967 was to bring a significant enlargement in the
deficit of -3,6 billion.
4?
Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary,
December 12, I966,
197
^O
In 1965 President Johnson had instituted a program
for
limiting capital exports associated with foreign direct investment
and foreign lending.
Although the program was minimally successful,
it continued to be overshadowed by the large and growing foreign
exchange costs of Vietnam and other military programs, a rapid
rise In imports, and the continued pace of direct investment
abroad.
In spite of the measured gains from the voluntary program
there continued to be severe strains placed on the dollar and on
the international monetary system which demanded stronger provisions.
In order to cope with these strains. President Johnson, in
January I968, announced a set of controls and other measures,
The provisions of the previously voluntary program for foreign
direct investment were made mandatory.
The Federal Reserve foreign
credit restraint program was decreased, and the Board was given
standby authority to impose mandatory controls.
Further, the
Treasury Department was instructed to develop ways to curb foreign
travel, later resulting in an administration program to tax tourist
expenditures abroad and to reduce the value of allowable duty-free
purchases by United States tourists visiting abroad.
Increased
recourse was made to special financial transactions, including
military offset transactions, and to improve our balance of pay­
ments statistically without any impact on our real payments posi­
tion,
These limited transactions accounted for a 2,8 billion
48
See above, p, 184,
49
Lyndon B, Johnson, "Statement by the President Outlining a
Program of Action to Deal with the Balance of Payments," January 1,
1968, Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B, Johnson, 1968,
pp, 8-13.
198
statistical improvement in the balance of payments for 1968--far
short of the amount needed to balance the payments deficit,
A comparison of the balance-of-payments figures for 1964
through 1968 reveals a steady decline of the deficit with the ex­
ception of the year 19&7.
This decline can be largely attributed
to President Johnson's attempts to limit expenditures abroad and
the partial willingness of a few from the business community to
accept the 10 February 19^5 guidelines of the administration.
However, two interesting problems may be noticed.
Obviously the
more prominent was the exchange costs of the Vietnam commitment;
the other was the steady decline in foreign direct investment in
the United States by other countries.
Between I96O and I965 the
level of foreign direct investment dropped from about 36 billion
to about 32 billion; by 1970 the level had dropped even more sub­
stantially— to about 28 billion.
While this appeared to be a
rather steady decline, the effect was to deprive the United States
of an important source of capital inflow.
Within the Johnson Administration the possibility of placing
restrictions on the transfer of American technology overseas,
which was of importance to continued world development, was also
given consideration.
This move, it was believed, would add a new
and distressing dimension to the policy of restrictionism.
However,
in the 1970 Report of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, one
^ 1970 Joint Economic Report. Report of the Joint Economic
Committee Congress of the United States on the January 1970 Economic
Report of the President, March 1970, 91st Congress, 2nd Session
(Washington, D, G,, 1970), pp, 118-119,
199
year after the advent of the Republican Nixon Administration, the
minority (Republican) response took the view that
The continued limitation of lending to foreigners by financial
institutions and the restriction of corporate direct invest­
ment abroad is undermining the future strength of the United
States balance of payments, 51
The report continued by suggesting that curtailing the short- and
medium-term lending of banks and other financial institutions had
the effect of limiting the available credit for financing exports.
Should export markets be lost, then regaining those same markets
would be very difficult— much more difficult than simply maintaining
a share of that market.
They further took the position that the restriction of United
States direct investment abroad must eventually undermine this
country's balance-of-payments position through a decline in profits
and dividends from abroad, through a drop in earnings from the
sale of technology and managerial services, and through a loss of
exports to subsidiaries and foreigners making purchases through
United States dealer-subsidiaries.
The issue of direct foreign
investment centered on how soon these losses would begin to
accumulate and on how much damage they would inflict upon the
United States balance of payments.
The result of the direct
investment controls by the administration seems to have had less
effect on United States direct investment abroad than on the
shift of financing to foreign capital markets.
^^Ibid,. p, 40,
^Ibid,, p, 49,
With the enforce-
200
ment of investment restrictions, many private industries would
postpone their direct investments rather than seek financing
abroad.
The apparent relationship between trade and investment is
strong, if not precisely quantifiable.
Regarding this point a
National Industrial Conference Board Study observes ;
Total foreign investment, now approaching $100 billion, with
its related output which is still larger^ conètitutes a funda­
mental link between the U, S, economy and foreign economies
which is not only of greater magnitude than the $40 billion
of receipts and payments recorded annually in the balance of
payments, but it is a phenomenon with direct implications for
the world pattern of production and trade.
The growth of production abroad has been in fact accom­
panied by an increasing stream of exports from the United States,
reflecting not only the orientation of foreign subsidiaries
to supply sources within the United States, and the importance
of their location as a stimulus to the channel for other U, S ,
exports, but also a substantial factor in the level of output
in foreign countries, and hence in the rising level of foreign
demand for imports, 53
Thus the United States trading relationship benefits from increased
foreign demand for imports to the extent that American products are
compétitive in foreign markets or American firms are the exclusive
source of supply.
But to restrain capital movements committed to production had
the definite tendency to depress the level of trade.
However it
was not contradictory to restrict foreign investments while attempt­
ed
-'^ Statement of James G, Morton, former Special Assistant to
the Secretary of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment Controls, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic policy of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 91st Congress,
1st Session, March 26, 1969, (Washington, D, C,j GPO, I969), p, 5,
201
ing to expand exports if the objective is to seek short-term results.
That, however, was precisely the thrust of President Johnson's cap­
ital investment restrictions.
It appears to be an economic fact
of life that after an export market reaches a certain level, the
economics and other competitive factors very often dictate that
it be served from local production necessitating investment and
construction abroad.
In encouraging American manufacturers to
widen their export markets, the United States should have been
more mindful of the realities which might have required foreign
direct investment— and should therefore have fashioned compatible
trade and investment policies to encourage the maintenance of
overseas markets.
Further, the immediate requirements of achieving
an equilibrium in the balance of payments and the commitments to
the conflict in Southeast Asia made more long-range economic
policies expendable.
For a variety of reasons a number of American companies nor­
mally preferred to export rather than produce abroad.
In Western
Europe land costs were frequently expensive, skilled labor was in
short supply, the margin of profitability also began to diminish
and numerous other business circumstances made it more desirable
to produce at home.
On the other hand, trade barriers and other
unfair practices denying United States manufacturers equal access
to markets, as well as the pure economics of the profit and loss
margins, strongly influenced decisions to produce abroad.
The
reality of common walls around the Common Market played an import­
ant part in the large capital outflows for American investment into
Western Europe as opposed to relying upon increasing export trade.
202
Even so, the period from February 19&5 until January I968 did
show an improvement in the amount of dollars returned to the United
States in relation to the dollars invested in Europe,
Even with
limited cooperation the amount of dollars invested abroad was sign­
ificant.
The amount invested in Europe on 31 December 1964 on the
eve of the voluntary guidelines was 12, 129 million but by 31 Dec­
ember 1967 the investment had increased to I6 , 212 million.
Further,
the total investment in all foreign countries rose from 44, 480
million to 59i 486 million for the same period, ^
Clearly, while
some American businessmen reduced their Investments abroad or
found other means to finance their growth the broad spectrum of
American business continued to invest heavily abroad.
Nevertheless
it was not their cooperation, or lack of it, which alone caused
the balance-of-payments deficit to worsen throughout I966 and I967,
but the continued heavy costs and dollar outflow of the Vietnam
war, along with the requirements of continued military and foreign
aid assistance to other countries which combined to require more
stringent controls.
While the February 19&5 guidelines did lessen the pain of a
balance-of-payments deficit, such a program could not be expected
to correct the imbalance alone.
The reluctant but minima], support
of the business community was not sufficient to arrest the negative
trend in the United States* balance of payments; and with the admin­
istration's commitment of resources and men to Vietnam and South
•^Survey of Current Business. October, 1969, Department of
Commerce, p, 30.
203
east Asia, there had to be compensation for these deficits somewhere.
So, on 1 January I968 President Johnson announced a set of mandatory
controls over the outflow of dollars in the private sector of the
economy.
This new mandatory program was designed not to stop
foreign direct investment, but to limit the adverse balance-ofpayments' impact of such investments,
The direct Investment controls of 1 January I968 benefited
the balance-of-payments accounts in at least a small measure on
the basis of short-term assessment, but they appear to have been
detrimental to the balance of payments in the long run.
By the
structuring of the controls to include reinvested earnings as an
outflow, the internal cash flows and working capital of the United
States direct investor began to decrease; corporations were forced
to rely more heavily on foreign borrowings.
Approximately 2,1
billion dollars were borrowed through security issues during I968,
while another 400 million dollars in long-term funds were borrowed
through the foreign banking sector, ^
With cash flows restricted,
it became increasingly difficult for the United States direct
investor to keep up his traditional rate of return, and the cost of
■^■^"Statement by Charles E, Fiero, Director, Office of Foreign
Direct Investment," Senate Hearings before Subcommittee of the Com­
mittee on Appropriations, U,S, Senate, 90th Congress, 2nd Session,
Fiscal Year 19^9» June 13, 1968, (Washington, D, C,, GPO, I968),
p. 546,
■^^"Statement by the President Outlining a Program of Action
To Deal with the Balance of Payments Problem," January 1, I968,
Public Papers of the Presidents; 1968-19691 Lyndon B, Johnson,
(Washington, D, C, ; GIPO, 1970), pp, 8-I3 ,
204
doing business abroad continued to rise.
While Western Europe was the prime target for American capital
invested abroad, there is little evidence that American business
CO
interests suffered as a result of the Johnson restrictions,
A
brief decline in foreign capital was not substantial enough to
hinder either the economic development or the trading capacity
of the nations forming both the EEC and EPTA,
In fact, there were
voices being heard which expressed relief that the United States
business community had begun to relax its penetration of the
European economic world, ^
domination would lessen,
for in turn the level of American
This condition was to be short lived.
It would last only until the advent of the new Nixon Administration,
While the business community found it to their advantage to
work with the administration toward a greater consensus in the
establishment and adherence to economic policies, there were
other segments of the American populace who were raising other
questions.
One of the most significant were a number of leaders
in Congress as well as in other segments of society who were asking
why it was so necessary to maintain such a sizable force of mili-
^ This condition was due primarily to large borrowing by
United States firms in Europe which had the effect of Arcing up
the interest rates at a time when most European governments were
pursuing economic policies which were expansionist in nature and
therefore favored lower interest rates. Under these conditions it
was the business interests of Europe who were hurt by the rise in
these interest rates making this planned expansion less feasible
and less attractive,
*58
C, F, Karster, "Should Europe Restrict U, S, Investments?"
Harvard Business Review. Septeraber-October, 19&5, PP. 53-61,
205
tary personnel In Europe,
This debate arose at a time when costs
of the Vietnam war were increasing and the need to economize was
evident.
It is important to ask;
What impact did this debate
have upon the formulation of foreign policy?
Did their input
have any significant effect upon U, S.-European relations?
These
questions now provide the basis for the further discussion of
the domestic pressures upon American foreign policy.
United States Force Levels in Europe
Vietnam, and the American commitment to Vietnam, played a very
important role in the whole issue of whether or not to maintain the
level of American forces in Europe,
This was an issue which called
forth a great deal of public discussion and Congressional debate.
Should the United States continue to maintain nearly 300, 000 Amer­
ican troops in Western Europe while committing over half a million
men and large amounts of the public treasury to South Vietnam?
This question raised further issues because while the United
States was struggling against international communism in Vietnam,
the President, Lyndon B, Johnson, was active in pursuing a policy
of detente with the leading communist nation in the world, the Soviet
Union,
But the keeping of troops in Western Europe had long been
considered a vital link in maintaining the credibility of the NATO
alliance and maintaining the security of Europe,
After the creation of NATO in 1949 the United States during
1951-1952 bolstered its ground forces in Western Europe by four
divisions.
This was done in the belief that hostilities in Korea
implied a sharp increase in the Soviet threat to the countries of
Western Europe,
While by this time any fear of this threat appeared
unrealistic, yet public attitudes required a strong "anti-Gommunist"
stance— particularly through the means of increasing military forces.
Further, such action would encourage the continued linking of Western
^ h e early 1950's was a time of strong anti-Communist feeling.
The loss of China, the Korean war, along with other circumstances,
had created a public atmosphere in which Senator Joseph McCarthy
(D-Wisconsin) could launch his controversial hearings.
207
Europe to the United States and would have the effect of maintaining
the continued division of Europe.
By the middle of 1952, the size of United States forces had
reached nearly 350» 000; and Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel
stationed on or near the European continent in support of NATO grew
to more than 450, 000 during the Berlin crisis of I96I-I962,
Fur­
ther, dependents and United States civilian employees who accom­
panied these forces numbered at times in the several hundreds of
thousands; foreign nationals employed by these forces averaged,
over the years, close to 100, 000— a sizable contingent, expecially
for peacetime conditions.
2
The major part of these forces was stationed in West Germany,
where the equivalent of six divisions and a large Air Force contin­
gent carried a major portion of the defense burden in the strategic
central region of NATO's defenses.
The quantity and quality of
these forces fluctuated, but the American commitment to European
3
defense did not change despite a series of problems.
Over the years some necessary and overdue trimming of personnel
was accomplished.
Generally this was the result of dropping obsoles­
cent bases and various weapons systems, and of a more realistic
2
United States Troops in Europe, Report of the Combined Sub­
committee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees on
the subject of United States Troops in Europe to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services of the U,S, Senate
(Washington: GPO, I968), pp. 1-9,
3
A preoccupying balance-of-payments deficit which had begun
to assume serious proportions in 1958; the ever-growing demands of
the Vietnam war; the heavy military commitments elsewhere in the
world; and the rising costs of urgent domestic programs.
208
response to the cost effectiveness programs within the Department
of Defense,
Then in 1966-1967 the withdrawal of United States and
NATO installations from France permitted the return to the United
States of about 18, 000 military and civilian personnnel along with
about 21, 000 dependents.
Earlier, in I965, Vietnam had begun to
take a toll in both military equipment and men.
By I968, what was
referred to as a "limited redeployment" of units from Germany was
carried out by the United States,
About 33» 000 military personnel
were redeployed to bases in the United States with each of the units
remaining strategically committed to NATO,
This was in line with
McNamara's announced principle of "dual basing" in which each unit
would return to Germany for a short time once a year for exercises.
In 1968, eighteen years after President Truman first announced
that he had approved substantial increases in American forces in
Europe, the United States still had approximately 304, 000 military
troops stationed there.
Along with these forces in Europe were
260, 000 dependents (of whom an estimated I65, 000 were in Germany)
and over 10, 000 civilian employees of the Department of Defense,
If one were to make comparisons with the other members of NATO, by
most means of measurement, the United States had met its NATO com­
mitments in the past and was continuing to meet them.
However,
within the government were those who for many years had believed
that the NATO allies had been disappointing in their support of
NATO force goals.
4
^Ibid.
4
209
As early as April of 1951» the United States Senate passed
a "Senate Resolution" which expressed
the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security
of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners
makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad
such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appro­
priate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for
the joint defense of the North Atlantic area, 5
In other parts of that resolution, the Senate expressed concern
that the other members of NATO maintain and improve their defense
efforts with an "understanding" that the major contribution to
NATO’s ground forces in Europe would be made by the European members
of NATO,
In the years that followed. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy,
and Johnson pledged that the United States would maintain forces
in Europe as long as they were necessary and desired.
Further,
they expressed the expectation that the allies would also make
their full contributions to the NATO defense.
This being so, the
burdens and responsibilities of the NATO partnership would be
shared fairly.
Congressional critics ^ of this policy argued that the sharing
of the mutual defense burden had not been done equitably.
They
contended that United States forces were first sent to Europe in
substantial numbers when the countries of Western Europe had not
^Ibid.. pp, 104-105,
^Among the leading critics of this policy were found such
leaders as Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana), Senator Stuart
Symington (D-Missouri), Senator Wayne Morse (D-Oregon), Senator
George Aiken (R-Vermont), and James B, Pearson (R-Kansas),
210
yet recovered from World War II— and Europe was faced with little
ability to earn foreign exchange, the serious problem of the dollar
gap, and doubtful prospects for political and economic stability.
Nonetheless, substantial American forces remained in Europe while
most of the countries of Western Europe had not only recovered
from World War II but had reached new heights of economic prosperity.
And, while a few of these nations of Western Europe had accumulated
impressive reserves of gold and foreign exchange, Great Britain
and France continued to reduce their commitments in other areas
of the world.
All the while, a general mood of confidence in
Europe’s security began to take hold.
In spite of urgent pleas
by American as well as NATO political and military authorities,
the defense efforts of other NATO allies did not keep up with their
ability to contribute,
A number of critieria for evaluation may be used to arrive at
this conclusion,
^or example defense expenditures as a percentage
of the Gross National Product (GNP), defense expenditures per capita,
and the percentage of men of military age maintained full time in
uniform may be considered as rough indicators of the defense effort
of any given country.
The United States has been a wealthy nation; our real dollar
per capita GNP is far higher than that of even the most prosperous
members of NATO,
Moreover, United States defense expenditures and
the Armed Forces,; of the United States have expanded substantially
in order to meet the continuously rising requirements of the cold
war and specifically the Vietnam conflict.
Nevertheless, even
211
when the achievements and the burdens of the United States are taken
into account, the defense efforts of the NATO allies remain sub­
stantially lower,
United States defense expenditures as a percent­
age of GNP were almost ten percent, while NATO countries coming
closest to this percentage for the year of 196? were Portugal (6.3^),
France (6.4j^), Turkey (5.^)» and Britain (6.7%),
Other NATO
countries spent less than five percent of their per capita GNP on
7
defense.
A second criterion of measurement includes the defense expend­
itures of each ally on a per capita basis.
United States defense
expenditures per capita have remained more than three times higher
than
those of France, Which was the highest among the NATO allies.
And only Portugal had a greater percentage of its men of military
age in uniform than the United States,
Finally, the percentages
for most other NATO allies were less than half that for the United
States, ^
A further criterion in the discussion over troop commitments
to NATO concerned the United States' balance-of-payments deficit,
which from I960 through I966 reached 2,377 billion, and for the
first six months of I968, 810 millions of dollars.
From I96I
through 1966, there existed an annual 1,5 billion dollars balance-
7
U.S. Senate, Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and
Armed Services committees. United States Troops in Europe, Hearings
before the combined subcommittee, 90th Congress, 1st Session, April
26 and May 3» 1967, (Washington; GPO, I967), pp, 22-23.
8
United States Troops in Europe. Report, loc, cit.
212
of-payments deficit resulting from the United States defense sup­
port in Europe,
During the same period United States cash receipts from mili­
tary sales to the European allies averaged annually 900 million,
leaving an annual net foreign exchange gap of about 600 million
dollars.
Then, during the calendar year 196?, United States
defense expenditures going into Western Europe were about 1,6
billion dollars, with receipts from military sales totaling 900
million, of which only part was covered by West German purchases
of medium-term securities amounting to about 250 million.
With this background it is
9
rather easy to understand the
motivation on the part of various Congressional critics to cut
spending in Europe and also reduce the size of the United States
military force there.
Discussion of this issue, which had been
an annual topic of debate, came to a focal point in I966 and in
early I967 with the introduction of Senate Resolution 49; this—
the Mansfield Resolution— expressed the sense of the Senate with
respect to troop deployment in Europe and offered a number of
amendments,
^flt is the sense of the Senate that,_/ with changes and
improvements in the techniques of modern warfare and because
of the vast increase in capacity of the United States to
wage war and to move military forces and equipment by air,
a substantial reduction of United States forces permanently
stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting
^Ibid,
10
The Mansfield Resolution was introduced on January I9 ,
1967,
213
either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under
the North Atlantic Treaty,
Thus was launched an acrimonious and protractèdvdèbâte.
During the spring of I966 approximately I5 , 000 troops were
removed from Germany,
The requirements of Vietnam began to press
as the United States removed about twice that number of trained
personnel from Germany but replaced one-half the loss with relatively
unskilled personnel.
The response from the Bonn government was
immediate and strong— for, it was claimed, an important pillar of
American policy, consultation, had been overlooked.
In the minds
of Europeans, more important than the lack of consultation was the
nibbling fear that the Johnson Administration was withdrawing its
support for European union, that preoccupation with Vietnam was
clouding the necessities of a healthy American-European relation­
ship,
The New York Times reported on 1? April 1966s
, , , The paradox is that, while Washington is opposing
De Gaulle in NATO, its tactics are helping the French President
divide the only United Europe that exists, the Europe of the
Six, Moreover, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
had been able to argue that the United States opposes a united
Europe by pointing out that President Johnson never has repeated the Kennedy pledge of "equal" partnership with Europe,
To this chaarge Under-Secretary of State George Ball responded for
the administrations
, , , Washington is prepared to treat Europe as an equal,
but , , , true equality requires equality, in size and resources.
^^United States Troops in Europe. Hearings. op, cit,, pp, 1-2,
1?
1966,
VEqual Partnership with Europe," New York Times. April I7 ,
214
Only Europeans themselves, by uniting, can bring that about;
and President De Gaulle's policies are precisely what stand
in the way, ^3
While United States policy had advocated a unified Europe, still
it was not in the very basic interests of the United States for
Western Europe to be completely independent.
There were economic
and security advantages to be gained by a dependent Europe, although
not a divided alliance.
What was being advocated by the adminis­
tration was a greater role for the European nations as a collective
entity for the purpose of sharing the burdens and responsibilities
of NATO defense.
This the nations of Europe were unwilling to do
on the scale sought by Washington,
14
It was important— while the United States was becoming more
deeply involved in Vietnam— that these nations be more willing to
share the burdens of their own defense and thereby ease the pressure
upon the United States, especially since the nations of Western
Europe were becoming increasingly capable of taking on defense
burdens.
To some Europeans this policy had the earmarks of growing
United States independence; paradoxically, it was opposed by the
French because of their desire to act independently even of NATO,
The debate did not end soon but continued to focus attention
on United States-European relations, amidst major attention given
13
^Ibid, See also Max Frankel, "Senate Liberals Criticize
Ball as He Defends U,S, Policy on Europe and Atlantic Alliance,"
New York Times. July 14, I966,
14
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "The American Interest in
Europe," Department of State Bulletin. LVII, No, 1487,(December 2 5,
196% pp. 855-859.
215
to events in Vietnam.
During the last part of August 1966, in
an important off-year election campaign, the Senate Democratic
Policy Committee proposed that the United States substantially
reduce its force in Europe,
In reply the White House promptly
expressed its opposition to such a move,
In making their proposal public, the Democratic Policy
Committee did set forth a number of strong arguments for the
reduction of troop strength in Europei
the vast improvement in
the economic and military strength of Western Europe and its
improved capacity to defend itself; the lag in European force
levels thereby not meeting military commitments set by the NATO
allies; the gradual easing of tension between Eastern and Western
Europe; and the continued drain of United States gold reserves by
the maintenance of a large force in Europe,
Thus the policy com­
mittee argued that the United States was overextended militarily,
was spending too much abroad, and, in turn, was receiving little
assistance from these same allies,
During the hearings which dealt with both Senate Resolutions
49 and 83
in April 196?, Senator Henry Jackson (D-Washington)
^•^Hanson Baldwin, "NATO and 'Our Boys, ' The Debate Sharpens,"
New York Times, September 4, I966,
^^Richard Eder, "Thirteen Senators Urge Europe Troop Cut,"
New York Times, September 1, I966,
17
Sehate Résolution 83 provided for Study and Réévaluation
of United States-European Relations,
216
asked Secretary Robert McNamara as to the wisdom of the Senate's
taking action at that time on the Resolutions,
the position that it would be unwise.
The Secretary took
He continued:
I think there is such a ferment in Europe at this time that
such action by the Senate might well be misconstrued. The
foundation of the defense of Europe is, of course, the
political commitment of the United States to that defense.
For either the Western EJuropeans or the Soviets to begin to
doubt the force of that political commitment, I think our
own security would be impaired, and it would be almost as
serious for the Western Europeans to doubt it as it would
be for the Soviets to doubt it, , , ,
They are very much concerned by our actions, and they
are concerned not only as to their military impact but as an
indication of our political decisions; and I think, therefore,
that a resolution by the Senate at this time urging withdrawals
substantially larger than those we are proposing would have
serious political disadvantages to us, 18
The proposals of which the Secretary spoke and which the adminis­
tration put forward were a part of a plan which had been worked
out in tripartite discussions between the governments of Great
Britain, West Germany, and the United States,
Secretary McNamara
informed the Senate that the United States had taken the position
that, despite the improved East-West relations, the United States
did not favor reductions in the effectiveness of NATO military
forces and, specifically, the United States should not implement
any redeployments that would significantly affect the combat
capability of NATO for the relevant contingencies.
16-17,
19
^^United States Troops in Europe, Hearings, op, cit,, pp.
--
19
The tripartite talks had begun as a result of the diffi­
culties encountered during the fall of I966 with the German-United
States and the German-United Kingdom offset arrangements. Since
''
.
217
At the same session of the Senate hearings the Acting Secretary
of State Nicholas Katzenbach also appeared.
He reaffirmed and de­
fended the importance of American troops in Europe to the national
security interest of the United States,
His purpose was simple :
"To balance Soviet military preponderance,"
20
Secretary Katzen­
bach continued :
I say "American national interest" advisedly. In NATO,
our fundamental aims remain ; to deter any potential military
aggression; to defend against such aggression should it occur;
to lessen tension and improve East-West relations; and to pro­
vide the essential political strength and cohesion necessary
to help secure a lasting and stable settlement with the Soviet
(cont,) 1961 the United States and the Federal Republic
had maintained military off-set arrangements approximating 675 mil­
lion a year to cover the foreign-exchange costs of U,S, troop de­
ployments in Germany, However, after fulfilling the 196I-62 and
the 1963-64 agreements. Chancellor Erhard's government ran into
serious fiscal difficulty in the I965-66 period. Also, at the same
time, the U,S, was faced with an apparent slackening of effort by
the other NATO allies, (See United States Troops in Europe. Hearings.
op, cit,. p. 5.) The Johnson Administration presented an outline of
the plan being put forward by the United States in the course of the
trilateral discussions. This plan called for the redeployment to
the United States of about 35,000 of the 262,000 military personnel
which were at that time in Germany, With them would come 25,000
dependents, and the number of foreign nationals hired would be re­
duced by 5,000, The Army, with five divisions in Germany, would
be reduced by approximately two brigades of the 24th Infantry Division,
One brigade and some divisional command and control units would remain
in Germany at all times. The remainder of that division would be
redeployed from Germany to the United States, And the Air Force, with
three tactical fighter wings in Germany, would leave five squadrons
in Germany at all times and would redeploy to the United States the
four remaining squadrons. However, all the aircraft would be together
in Germany once a year for exercises. United States Troops in Europe.
Hearings, op, cit,. pp. 78-79.
20
General Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (new York;
Harper and Row, 1959), PP. 136-139.
f
'
218
Union and its allies.
And I might add there also, to provide a political frame­
work in which Europe can share with the United States in part­
nership dealing with some of the other problems, military and
economic which surround this world of ours today.
Unquestionably, achievement of these aims is to the direct
interest of our European allies. Unquestionably, our partici­
pation in NATO forces evidences the strength of our commitment
to them, 21
The Acting Secretary insisted strongly that
the United States
nuclear guarantee to Europe remained essential.
This guarantee
could be viewed as effective only if the United States were willing
to supplement "our nuclear steel with sufficient conventional
forces.
22
Any troop reduction that would tilt this essential
balance could involve risks.
As Secretary Rusk was to indicate later
in a letter to Senator Mansfield, ", , , all troops withdrawals are
politically sensitive signals and their significance can be misconstrued,"
23
Thus the administration continued to assert that
the United States must avoid any step that would risk giving the
Soviet Union an incorrect impression of American intentions,
Euro­
pean stability and sensitivities— as well as United States security—
could be threatened.
In the conclusion of his statement to the
Senate committee. Secretary Katzenbach stated*
This is a time when much of our attention and many of our
energies are focused on another part of the world. But these
21^ ited
^^irated States Troops in Europe. Hearings. op, cit,, pp,
43-44,
Z^ibid,. p, 44,
Z^lbid,, pp. 99-102,
219
responsibilities must not distract us from the simple truth*
Our relations with Europe have been and remain the gut of our
national security, 24
Thus, any troop withdrawals beyond the 35» 000 agreed to in the
tripartite discussions would have serious psychological effects
upon West Germany,
The agreement by the three NATO powers
26
was announced by the State Department on 2 May 19&7; it was only
two months later that Bonn announced the decision of the West
German cabinet to cut the German defense budget by the equivalent
of $2.3 billion for the period of 1968 to 1971.
If a reduction of
35» 000 American troops would create serious psychological effects
upon West Germany, then what explanation could be offered for Bonn's
cutting back on its own defense expenditures?
have serious psychological implications?
Would not this also
This action seriously
challenged the credibility of the administration and soon found a
very strong reaction from advocates of American troop reduction
both within Congress and without.
One result of this action would be a sizable reduction in
West German troop strength of some 40, 000 to 60, 000 men,
A fur­
ther result with direct impact upon the West German-United States
off-set agreements would be a reduction of planned German armament
purchases in the United States and Great Britain going beyond the
substantial reductions which had been predicted earlier in the
year.
Senator Mansfield found these possibilities disquieting
24
Ibid,. p, 45,
25
Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, and the United
States,
220
for a number of reasons»
In the first place, this decision, along with recent press
reports that Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada are seriously
considering reductions in their forces in West Germany, casts
a new and rather unfavorable light on the recently concluded
trilateral talks, , , , Obviously, the conclusions reached in
these negotiations were not based on the assumption that there
would be a major reduction of West German armed forces. In
fact, on April 26, Secretary McNamara told a meeting of the
combined subcommittee which I have the honor to chair, that
"There is no major reduction in military strength planned by
any of the major NATO countries that I know of,"
, , , Mr, President, I believe that it is not the mark
of sound political judgment that we should appear to take the
question of a possible threat in Western Europe more seriously
than those most directly concerned, I am sure that it is not
in our interest or in Germany's interest--that we should be
more militant about the defense of Germany than the Germans
themselves.
And finally.
The question of allied troops strength in Central Europe is
obviously a matter for multilateral discussion and NATO, But
the record shows, and it is a matter for regret, that more
often than not vital decisions affecting the levels and com­
bat capability of NATO forces have been taken unilaterally
by our European partners, 26
The Senator's criticism was strong but appeared to have little or
no effect upon the Johnson Administration,
Other factors were to
play a role.
Irrespective of the decisions in Bonn and the pressure from
the Senate, the basic administration position remained firm.
The
White House continued to argue that for political and military rea­
sons, the United States had concluded that substantial, balanced
NATO forces, including United States forces, were required.
The
question for the policy-makers, as well as for most Americans, was
2Ô
United States Troops in Europe. Hearings, op. cit,, p, 65,
221
not whether American forces were still needed on the ground in Europe
hut whether the present levels of those forces could be safely re­
duced,
With the redeployment of the 35i 000 additional military
troops and their dependents, the White House and the Pentagon con­
firmed that reductions were possible, while at the same time affirm­
ing that the level of conventional forces in NATO was about where
the United States believed it ought to be.
One aspect of administration rationale had to do with Soviet
perceptions of troop withdrawals and the way American policy-makers
perceived this problem in conjunction with the struggle going on
in Vietnam at that time.
The issue was essentially that of mutual
East-West troop withdrawals and Secretary Rusk, for one, saw little
possibility of this occurring.
Secretary Rusk took the position
that the Soviets would not willingly negotiate on mutual with­
drawals because such withdrawals in Central Europe would give the
appearance of releasing United States forces for duty in Vietnam
and would bring them under the severe criticism of China,
Thus,
this issue was not viewed as being a viable possibility in the
summer of I967 nor in the foreseeable future.
But with summer turning to fall, concern continued regarding
the economic difficulties which the U,S, balance-of-payments
deficit was continuing to play on the international scene,
During
this period there were attacks on the dollar in the European
currency markets, in response to which the administration announced
strong limitations on direct investment abroad, tourist travel, and
^’^Ibid,. p, 63,
222
other limitations as discussed above.
This was a direct attempt
to halt the flow of dollars going out of the United States to
Europe and to bring it more in line with the inflow of dollars
back to the United States,
The troop redeployment of 35i 000
men, which finally began on 1 January 19^8, further reduced this
problem.
Troop level commitments were giving way to economic
realities.
An initial reaction of the German press was an expression of
satisfaction that the United States was taking strong steps to
protect the dollar, a currency vital to the smooth operation of
the world's monetary system.
Die Welt, a conservative newspaper
from Hamburg, West Germany, expressed this view»
The government of the United States has begun the new year
with a good deed. She restored confidence to the world on
the currency front by overcoming the mistrust in regard to
the currency and the gold market which was threatening to
expand into a serious currency crisis. The great world
trade countries, with the Tederal Republic in the lead,
will greet this step, 2°
While Die Welt was being perhaps more gentle in its response than
subsequent events warranted, a business-oriented paper, the Handelsblatt suggested that a healthy dollar is a vital question for the
Western world but that it is not easy to work with the Americans
as long as it is a question of putting out the "little fires"
while leaving the "big fire" (Vietnam) alone;
Everyone knows that it is the Vietnam war which has caused
the greatest deficit in the American payments balance in the
postwar era. Entirely apart from the direct currency outflow
caused by this problematic war, it is not to be denied that
Die Welt. January 10, I968, as reported in the German Press
Review, Press Office of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of
Germany in Washington, D.G,
223
an economy so strongly Influenced by armament production as
in today the American economy, brings about powerful import
currents which leave their mark on the balance of payments.
The friends of the United States should not hesitate, in the
negotiations which have now started, to point out this con­
nection, 29
And other papers
30
expressed uneasiness regarding what was called
the "inevitable" American demands which would be made to pass over
to the Germans the cost of paying for the support of the American
troops in Germany,
Some expressed fears that the Federal Republic
would have to carry the main burden.
And increased burden-sharing,
for many West Germans, was not an attractive possibility.
President Johnson also instructed Secretary McNamara, as a part
of those economic measures announced in January, to engage in nego­
tiations as early as possible with the other NATO allies regarding
the most effective means of curtailing the currency costs of the
continued maintenance of the United States' garrisons in Europe,
From the Ekiropean perspective, this move appeared to contain
potentially explosive elements.
The principal problem was one
which involved a number of Western European nations,
M n y of the
European partners were also having their own financial difficulties.
At the beginning of 1968, this was particularly true of West Ger­
many, which had already placed nearly one-half billion dollars on
deposit in the United States for the pruchase of military equip­
ment but reasserted the position that it was very difficult to make
^^Handelsblatt. Ibid,
30
Hannoversche Presse. January 3, and the Bonner Rundschau.
January 3» Ibid.
224
new arms purchases, and further, there did exist limits to the
sale of more United States Treasury Certificates to the Bonn govern­
ment.
Also, the United States faced increased pressures on the dol­
lar during the spring of 1968, as well as the termination of the
off-set agreement with the Federal Republic arrived at in 1967,
The negotiators
31
for the United States were, however, able to
arrive at an agreement on German reimbursements to help cover
most of the annual foreign exchange costs of maintaining United
States forces and their dependents in West Germany,
lem remained;
32
One prob­
these arrangements increased Washington's long-run
bonded debt and, in any event, the total amount specified in the
agreement fell far short of the more than 800 million required to
maintain American forces in Europe,
33
Clearly this was a feeble
attempt at patching a spreading economic concern with a band-aid.
During February I968 the debate and discussion in the Senate
continued.
In these debates Senators Mike Mansfield, Stuart Sym­
ington, and James B, Pearson again took the lead in the continued
pressure to get the administration to reduce the number of troops
^^Eugene Rostow, UnderrSecretary of State, and Frederick
Deming, Under-Secretary of the Treasury,
^^For its part West Germany agreed to provide only $30.0 mil­
lion in off-set costs through the purchase of American military
equipment during the year beginning.on July 1, I968, However, Bonn's
Bundesbank would buy $$00 million in medium-range Treasury bonds and
a group of German commercial banks would purchase a lesser amount,
thereby easing the American payments deficit,
^^"Stopgap on Troop Costs," New York Times, June 14, I968,
22$
in Europe,
Expressing some of the frustration of the continued
call for more troops to be used in Vietnam and the continued cost
of maintaining a large garrison force in Europe, Senator Symington
askedI
If this defense of the free world against aggression is sound,
in addition to defending our own country 10, 000 miles from
home, we are also defending Japan, the Philippines, and scores
of other countries, especially those prosperous nations of
Europe which the United States has worked so hard for over 20
years to place in that position.
And what are these latter countries contributing to sup­
port our effort? The answer— not a single combat soldier in
Vietnam from any of them, despite the fact that these same
nations have grown steadily more prosperous under the umbrella
of our protection, while our own economy, primarily because
of the backbreaking cost of this Vietnam effort, is becoming
steadily more mired down with increasing fiscal and monetary
problems, ^4
Senator Symington recommended, not too subtly, that if more troops
were needed in Vietnam the United States should send the "already
trained men we have in Europe, rather than hastily trained youth
from this country,"
During the month of February, Washington was visitied by the
Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio,
His visit involved dis­
cussion regarding the future of NATO and the role of the United States
within that body, and reflected the concern of Europeans that the
United States was willing to permit commitments in Europe to stag­
nate while attempting to bring the Vietnam war to a conclusion.
Hr, Brosio sought from President Johnson assurances that NATO would
34
United States Troops in Europe, Report, op, cit,, p, 73,
See also the Congressional Record for February 27, 1968, Senate,,
226
not receive the short end of the carrot in the planning by the
United States government for the Vietnam conflict.
This was
prompted by the double role played by the United States»
the
leading power in NATO and, outside of NATO, the supporter of war
in Asia.
Further, discussions were prompted by the positions
taken by leading senators such as Mansfield and Symington and the
fear that such views would have an effect upon the administration
which, in turn, would prove injurious to NATO,
Within NATO, the redeployment had already begun to take place
with a part of the American first-line NATO-committed army and air
forces being returned to bases in the United States under the "dual
basing" concept.
But more important than this was the decision of
the fifteen NATO Ministers to consider balanced reductions, by
agreement or example, of the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in Europe,
The North Atlantic Council began studying how mutual reduction
could be accomplished without endangering the balance which they
believed maintained the peace.
This decision to make a serious approach to balance East-West
force reductions became part of a whole new political work program
that resulted from NATO's Study of the Future of the Alliance, or
the "Harmel Report," in I967, This report, as it dealt with mutual
force reductions, was a response to the need to prepare Western
strategy for the day when the Soviets, recognizing that military
pressure would no longer work in Europe, would be willing to talk
seriously about new political and military arrangements on that con-
^^Ibid,, pp, 77-81,
The Congressional Record, March 27, I968,
227
tinent.
After discussing the Harmel Report for about a year, the
Foreign Ministers of NATO agreed
To maintain the NATO defense system to deter Soviet military
militancy ih Europe, and to give special attention to the
newly dangerous state of affairs in the Mediterranean;
To make the North Atlantic Council a political clearing house
and center of initiative— for future European arrangements
(including settlement of the German question), and for next
steps (beyond the nuclear non-proliferation treaty) in arms
control and disarmament, 3?
The idea was to prepare a Western strategy for that day when both
the Soviets and the nations of NATO would be willing to talk about
new political arrangements for a durable peace in Europe,
The Johnson Administration saw distinct advantages in support
of the mutural force reductions in Eîurope,
By giving support to
this principle the administration had a very effective means by
which to counteract Senator Mansfield's desire to reduce troops
in Europe,
The administration argued that such reductions of
American troops as desired by the Senator could only take place
under the conditions of a similar Soviet withdrawal of troops from
Eastern Europe,
Further, achieving this objective would require
much time and diplomatic effort with no agreement assured.
To do
otherwise, to withdraw unilaterally from Western Europe, was
viewed as being irresponsible.
Finally the Johnson Administration maintained the position
that a balanced, mutual force reduction in both NATO and in the
Warsaw Pact countries would be the best hope for substantial troop
and expense reductions.
3^Ibid.
This was the thrust of the discussions on
228
this general topic which were held by the NATO Foreign Ministers
meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, just prior to the invasion of Czecho­
slovakia,
It was at this point that American policy stood when
Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia on the 20th of August, 1968,
While arguments abounded as to the need of reducing the
United States troop strength in Europe and an increased relaxation
appeared to be developing between Eastern Europe and the West, the
invasion by the Soviets temporarily halted this debate.
Senator
Mansfield again took the floor of the Senate on September 13i and
while reminding the Senate of the great reduction in cost that
troop withdrawals from Europe would bring about, he reluctantly
took the position that for the short term there was no point in
continuing to advocate a reduction in the level of these forces.
He emphasized the values to be gained by granting the Europeans
a greater opportunity to assume a larger share of the burden of
their own defense which might result in closer cooperation among
them.
He believed that a reduction, as soon as feasible, would
contribute to reducing the danger of catastrophic error which would
be possible with the presence of hundreds of thousands of foreign
troops confronting each other.
In addition, the Senator believed
any reductions in Western Europe would increase the pressures for,
and might well bring about, reductions of Soviet forces in the
Eastern European countries, with or without negotiations.
Recog­
nizing all of this he took a new postioni
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has had the effect
of deferring these results, , , , We can hardly make substantial
reductions in United States' forces in Western Europe while
the Soviets have vastly increased their forces in Eastern
229
European countries and have done so, furthermore, in connection
with the military steamrollering of the independence of a small
country. . , .
Nevertheless, a reduction in the U.S. contingents in Europe
in present circumstances could he subject to misinterpretation
in both West and East, and might conceivably lead to serious
miscalculations. That is a risk which, it seems to me, we
would be unwarranted in taking at this time, in our interests
and in the interests of peace.
But the Senate Majority leader placed the administration on notice
that he had not abandoned his view that such a large force in Europe
remained anachronistic,
"Even now, the time is right for a search
for substantial savings in the cost of the Eruopean deployment,"
37
Thus, as the year I968 drew to a close, the promise of a new
administration committed to a "revitalization" of the Atlantic
community did not alter the policy of the United States on holding
the line against any further substantial reductions of United
States troop strength.
In reality, the Johnson Administration had
not, since 1964, been averse to trimming military strength in Europe,
While in 1964 military forces numbered about 370, 000, they had
declined to 300, 000 by January of I969. Hence, there had been a
steady decline since 196I in the number of United States troops
remaining in Europe,
It may further be noted that any discussion of the need to
withdraw troops, while it had its strong and powerful critics in
Congress, never hinted at the suggestion of lessening the essen­
tial commitment of the United States to the defense of Western
Europe,
That commitment remained firm, and senator after senator
37
^'United States Troops in Europe. Report, op, cit,, p, 98,
230
reaffirmed his support.
The controversial issues were those of
the need for such a sizable contingent of troops long after the
threat to Western Europe had, in the minds of many, passed into
history, and the economic loss which accompanied the stationing
of so large a force in Europe,
The United States commitment to Western Europe with regard
to maintaining sizable troop strength did remain firm.
The John­
son Administration had on a number of occasions reaffirmed the
primary commitment to the defense of Western Europe,
Further, it
was viewed that a substantial pullout of American forces would
reinforce doubts over the credibility of the American nuclear de­
terrent and American willingness to come to the defense of Europe.
Also, any pullback from Europe might convince the Soviets that they
could profit without paying the price at the negotiating table.
As a result of this scenario, the United States might then encounter
a tougher Soviet position in the Middle East, in Berlin and in the
arms control talks (SALT),
Strategically, the relative advantages of maintaining approx­
imate equality of conventional power remained substantial.
By
1968 it had become generally recognized within the government that
the opposing forces in Europe were roughly equal.
Such a strategic
position, it was believed, would give NATO a higher degree of con­
fidence in dealing successfully with possible conflicts which
might develop.
It was becoming clear that a rough equality of
forces was a condition that both sides could accept politically.
38
United States Troops in Europe. Report. op, cit, pp, 14104,
231
For, if the forces on both sides were equal and generally agreed
to be so, then neither side needed to feel threatened and the
relationship could be stabilized.
Finally, it appears that the executive branch was concerned
that Congress, and particularly the Senate, should not be able to
take effective control of any phase of foreign policy out of the
hands of the President,
To permit the Congress to force the issue
too strongly would have been totally unacceptable to the various
executive departments, but particularly to President Johnson,
On one point both Congress and the administration did agree.
Both emphasized that the important point was not the number of
troops in Europe, but how and when and under what circumstances
any future American withdrawals would be carried out.
The con­
sensus was that the United States should avoid any appearance of
undermining the credibility of its nuclear commitment in the eyes
of both the Soviets and America's European allies.
B,
International and Foreign Policy Factors
The purpose of this study is not to draw sharp lines of dis­
tinction between domestic influences from within the national
sub-system and stimuli upon the foreign policy process which emerge
from the international environment.
To do so ,is only to delude
oneself into believing that such an exercise can be done, for those
actively engaged in the analysis of policy are aware that the
interrelationship of domestic and foreign influences is continuous;
domestic issues often have a substantial effect upon the fomulation
of foreign attitudes toward the United States; and, in many domestic
issues, external events have a significant impact on the allocation
of values that takes place within the national sub-system.
Important to our study is the degree of "compatibility" be­
tween the international system and the inputs from that system
with the policy objectives of the national sub-system, or, in this
study, the United States,
Compatibility is intended to assess
the feasibility of foreign policy goals within the limitations and
opportunities of the international system.
It attempts to describe
the limits of what is politically possible— of what is politically
feasible.
This compatibility between goals can be established by
evaluating the national compatibilities in relation to the inter­
national system.
Thus, the degree of compatibility between
national objectives and the international system provides a basis
for evaluating the respective goals of national policy,
A number of international issues were to facé the Johnson Ad­
ministration after the change of administrations necessitated by
the events on 22 November 1963.
Among the more serious of these
were concern over NATO and the controversy between the United
States and Charles De Gaulle ; the apparent developing progress in
detente with the Soviet Union, as indicated by President Johnson's
7 October I966 "bridge building" speech; the influence of the
rapidly increasing American involvement in Vietnam together with
the fear of many Europeans that the United States was over-extended;
and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT),
It is these international issues to which the focus of dis­
cussion is now directed.
It is important to discuss each of them,
in order to illustrate the nature and validity of the Johnson Admin­
istration's identification of America's national security with
commitment to the priority of Western Europe,
Few issues so domin­
ated American-European relations during the Johnson Administration
as did the relationship between the United States and France,
This
confrontation was of significant dimensions, and De Gaulle's rela­
tionship to NATO proved to be a major controversial issue.
The
direct impact of this controversy on American attitudes helped
determine United States policy.
NATO Policy and Charles De Gaulle
"In politics a community of hatred is almost always
the foundation of friendships,"
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, founded during the
height of the cold war on the basis of compatible interests as
a counter to Soviet power in Europe,
2
in more recent years had
become somewhat complacent and fragmented at a time of growing
prosperity among its members and reasonably harmonious East-West
coexistence.
The vision that the NATO alliance and the European
Common Market would lead to the political unification of Europe'
fell victim to growing national rivalries among partners and to
French President Charles De Gaulle's distrust of his Anglo-Saxon
allies— the United States and Britain,
De Gaulle's desire for a European third force that could
achieve an accommodation with the United States and the Communist
bloc gradually began to strike a responsive chord.
This effort
at rapprochement with the East and disagreement over strategic
philosophy led France out of NATO's military operations.
The United States' commitment, strategy and use of nuclear
weapons in conjunction with the provisions of the treaty also had
aroused discussion during the 19$0's and early 1960's,
The United
States had supplied its NATO-related forces with tactical or
^Michael Curtis, Western European Integration (New York:
Harper & Row, 19&5), p, 71,
2
Among these interests would be political stability, economic
prosperity and a defense against potential bommunist aggression.
235
battlefield nuclear weapons, but had maintained its long-range
strategic force of missiles, Polaris submarines and bombers in
reserve, all under United States control.
The NATO forces were
generally considered by military and political leaders both in the
United States and in Europe to be outmanned and outgunned by their
3
Communist bloc foes.
Any engagement fought with conventional
forces between the East and the West would create a critical pre­
dicament:
whether to use NATO's tactical nuclear weapons or to face
the prospect of being overrun.
4
Because of Western Europe's vital
importance to the United States, any such confrontation might even­
tually escalate into a global nuclear war.
Since credibility of the NATO nuclear deterrent rested upon
the United States' will to use its nuclear capability, cross cur­
rents of anxiety developed in Europe over United States strategy,
Europeans had been concerned that the United States' response to
an attack on NATO might not be automatic and that great destruction
might occur before the Americans would consider using nuclear
weapons.
Even with a prompt reaction by the United States, nuclear
force, Europe would be the scene of this atomic battlefield.
Western Europe thus found itself on the horns of a dilemma and the
^See above , pp,
206-231.
4
This position was specifically encouraged by Europeans who
desired continuation of American support— as well as military
leaders and their loyal supporters in Congress, Mr, Alain Enthoven
and K, Wayne Smith go a long way toward dispelling this view in
their excellent analysis of defense spending. How Much Is Enough?
(New York: Harper & Row, 19?l),
236
United States found itself being both sought and rejected for the
same reason— its nuclear deterrent.
Further, the introduction of
the McNamara Doctrine ^ did little to dispel the anxieties of the
Europeans who sought a more automatic response from the United
States.
The unsettled state of NATO's nuclear strategy was proving
to be a serious point of contention within the Alliance,
United States Policy in Europe
Into this climate of question and uncertainty of December I963,
Lyndon Johnson addressed himself to the problem of United StatesEuropean relations.
Promising to give as much attention to "West-
East" relations as he intended to give to "East-West" relations
during 1964, he identified the central task to be faced if Atlantic
unity was not to give in to the nagging low grade fever that
threatened it.
That task as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson
phrased it was "to get the Atlantic Community moving again," ^
President Johnson reaffirmed President Kennedy's pledge that
six American divisions would remain "so long as they were needed,"
President Johson emphasized that "there is no doubt that these
forces would continue to be needed under the existing circumstances,"
U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1968. 90th Congress (Washington, GPO, I967). See also Hearings
of the Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Years I965-67,
For addititional analysis on this point, see Alain C, Enthoven and
K, Wayne Smith, 0£, cit,
^"And to Western Unity," New York Times. December 18, I963,
237
Thus, the new President was clearly confirming the commitment of
United States' security
interests in Europe and the importance of
n
continued efforts and cooperation with the European allies.
To this American military commitment, the President added a
rededication to imaginative programs designed to unite Europeans
with each other and with America for an attack on "all the great
and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of
free nations,"
Further, he discussed such aspects of Atlantic
relations as the need for "a balanced NATO defense" of nuclear
and non-nuclear forces.
And, in order to achieve these objectives,
he proceeded to invoke the Kennedy "goal of Atlantic Partnership"
in monetary affairs, in assistance to developing areas and in
g
trade.
Thus the President enunciated a clear position regarding
United States-European relations, even though this reaffirmation
was rather conventional, to assure Western Europe of the continuity
of United States policy.
For the most part, this had been rhetoric and public posturing,
for the President found that not all was in order when he took com­
mand,
There existed a number of reasons for this condition.
First,
the NATO alliance appeared to be suffering from its very success.
By 1963-1964 the Alliance lacked challenge, for the Soviet Union
was not seriously viewed as an eminent military threat,
A second
?Ibid,
g
For a valuable discussion of the whole issue of assistance
to lesser developed nations, see John Pincus, T m d e , Aid and Devel­
opment (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196?),
—%
238
problem was the continuous question of NATO's nuclear structure in
a period of bipolar deterrence,
European leaders were interested
in gaining a wider measure of active participation in strategic
planning regardless of their perception of the validity of the Amerlean commitment.
9
The economic resurgence of Western Europe and the revival of
national pride also brought threats to the compatibility of Alliance
relationships.
And while Europeans recognized the obvious differ­
ences in power relationships, they still expected their interests,
judgments and sensitivites to be respected by the United States,
Theo Sommer, toward the end of Johnson's first year in office,
described the determination of many Europeans :
In the military field they demand a voice in the formulation
of alliance strategy, in the political field they want a
place in the Western mechanism for crises management. Also
there is a vague yearning for some system of pre-crisis man­
agement— a system, that is, for common intelligence and
policy assessments transcending the geographical limits of
NATO's treaty area as well as for the management of intra­
alliance differences in times of relative quiet,
The exception to this statement may be found in various
Hearings on Defense Appropriations where the continuous spectre
of bommunist aggression hung heavy when funds needed for the
Defense of Europe were discussed,
^^A number of leaders among the West German elite seemed to
fear that the United States might fail to take sufficient account of
German interests and simply take German allegiance for granted, Karl
Deutsch, Roy Macridis, Lewis Edinger and Richard L. Merritt, France,
Germany, and the Western Alliance » A Study of Elite Attitudes on
European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scrib­
ner's Sons, 1967), p, 153.
^^Theo Sommer, "For an Atlantic Future," Foreign Affairs. 43:
(October, 1964), p. 118, At this time Theo Sommer was the Political
Editor of the German newspaper Die Zeit.
239
What was needed within the Alliance was a re-establishment of both
a military and a political consensus.
Efforts were initiated to deal with the non-military aspects
of NATO and to encourage the idea of an Atlantic Community,
Speak­
ing at the Evangelische Akadamie on 2$ November 1963, George C,
McGhee addressed himself to this issue.
He indicated that the NATO
treaty called for more than a common defense, for it also
provides specifically for political consultation on all matters
of mutual interest. These provisions have been increasingly
invoked. Regular political consultations in the NATO Council
have enabled the member nations to adjust policy differences
and develop common views on the broader problems that confront
them in the world today, , , , There is, of course, a difference
between the consciousness of community expressed in NATO, the
OECD (Organization for European Economic Cooperation and Developement), and other institutions of an Atlantic character and
the consciousness of identity expressed in the various European
communities, , , , We in the United States have considered them
to be complementary, ^2
Thus a real concern for United States foreign policy was the strength­
ening of political consultation in Atlantic affairs.
Military co-op­
eration had been sufficient but security was far more than a military
matter; political and economic co-operation
13
were essential if
the prospects for detente could ever be realized.
Furthermore,
member states would need to consult together in the early stages
of the formulation of policy.
14
1?
George G, McGhee, "The United States of America and the
Atlantic Partnership," Department of State Bulletin. XLIX (December
23, 1963, PP. 954-9.
^^Karl Deutsch, _et, al,, p, 86, Table 5.7. Nevertheless, the
whole problem of nuclear sharing continued to be a matter of strong
concern,
H, Robertson, European Institutions (New York; Frederick
A, Praeger, 1966), pp, 101-2,
240
The problem faced by the President and his advisors was that
a Europe which would be a full partner was only emerging, yet the
Europeans wanted and expected to be treated as equal partners because
they had been encouraged in this thinking by President Kennedy,
The best efforts to consult with the European allies or keep them
informed could not compensate for the belief that European interests
were also at stake.
Recognizing this concern, George G, McGhee
stated:
The destinies of North America and Europe are so obviously
and closely bound together that we have no real choice but
to cooperate. Our defense is tightly organized and planned
within the NATO framework. Interdependence is not an empty
phrase but a present reality. And along with the development
of increasingly close Atlantic ties in NATO and OECD, there
has been a steady movement toward unity in Europe, ^5
If the Alliance was to achieve military security or support common
diplomatic and political interests, it would have to develop greater
cohesion and coordination among its members— a political task.
Allied cohesion under those circumstances then would be measured
not only by strategic collaboration but also by political cooper­
ation, the two being interdependent.
The MLF (Multi-Lateral Force)
NATO had been built around a rather firm core of compatible
security and military interests:
but its members did not always
agree upon the means of fulfilling those interests; nor did they
always find the political consequences of promoting those interests
mutually acceptable.
Such a case was that of the Multi-Lateral
^-^George C. McGhee, 0£, cit., p, 958,
' . y / ' / .
241
Nuclear Force (MLF).
TA
With the passing of President Kennedy the
advocates of the MLF within the Johnson Administration seized upon
the opportunity to urge the Johnson White House to give support for
this program.
De Gaulle's January 1963 press conference and his rejection
of Great Britain's bid into the Common Market had forced the United
States to reassess its position regarding further European integra­
tion and the basic assumptions upon which it had been based.
De
Gaulle's statement had the effect of seriously challenging the
rather easily accepted assumptions upon which United States policy
in Europe had been determined.
remained valid,
17
While the assumptions themselves
it was the implementation of policy which had
In concrete form the Multi-Lateral Force, was an American
proposal for a flotilla of surface ships (25),. under NATO command,
which would be armed with Polaris missiles, and whose atomic war­
heads would be under United States control. But the employment
and deployment of the missiles would be subject to close and con­
tinuing consultation among the NATO Alliance partners who wanted
to participate and share in the expense.
This proposal had been based upon a number of assumptions.
First, it was believed that many Europeans desired a larger role
in their nuclear defenses, A second assumption insisted that the
wrong way to increase the role of other nations in their nuclear
defense was for each member of NATO to develop its own independent
nuclear deterrent. And finally, it was assumed that the only way
for the non-nuclear nations to achieve a larger sense of partici­
pation would be through the joint ownership and mixed-manning of
a multi-lateral nuclear force. See Philip L, Geyelin, Lyndon B .
Johnson and the World (New York: Frederick A, Praeger, Inc,, I966),
p, 161.
17
First, the unity of Europe was an indispensable factor for
Atlantic strength and stability, as well as a vital interest of the
United States. Secondly, the German problem would only be resolved
in a framework similar to the Schumann-Monnet concept, that of an
integrative control, A further assumption argued that a spillover
^
":w
242
failed to achieve desired goals.
New proposals and ideas were essential if allied integration
was to be encouraged.
The problems of nuclear sharing and allied
coordination regarding nuclear weapons in planning and strategic
decision-making with non-nuclear powers seemed to find, at first,
a potential answer in the MLF,
A most attractive feature of the
assumptions underlying the MLF rationale was the possibility of
preventing other allies— most notably the West German government—
from following England and France in developing independent nuclear
forces,
even though Bonn in 1955 had renounced all intent to
construct or use nuclear power for military purposes.
If proliferation
was to be limited, then the TffiF negotiations had to accept in
principle the claims of non-nuclear allies to participate in the
exercise of nuclear control.
The MLF emerged as a result of serious
discussions within NATO over nuclear deterrence, defense options
and the need for unified and controlled use of force.
Deterrence,
to be effective, had to be based upon credibility; and the Kennedy
Administration had tried to restore this credibility through a
(cont,)effect was quite natural and that economic inte­
gration would automatically lead to greater political integration
and the emergence of a form of United States of Europe— an assump­
tion based more on hope than objective fact,
A fourth premise concluded that Great Britain would need to
be a part of any United Europe, a development not to be realized
until 1973. And finally, Atlantic defense was considered indivis­
ible, and no significant challenge to the nuclear hegemony of the
United States could be accepted,
1ft
"Excerpts from Ball’s Speech," New York Times, May 8,
1964,
243
strong emphasis on flexible response.
To be credible, the United
States must be able to respond proportionally to whatever might
occur.
This concept was not viewed enthusiastically by the French,
although it could be more easily accepted if it were a part of a
general reform within NATO in the direction of American-BritishFrench control.
In this way France would be assured a larger role
in matters of global strategy.
19
On the other hand, from the
German viewpoint the I'lLF not only gave the Germans themselves
greater access to nuclear weapons— it also gave European NATO
nations greater influence over the strategic forces of the Alliance,
To Americans, the MLF appeared to be the least objectionable means
of meeting demands for greater European influence in NATO and would
prevent direct German access to nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, two serious problems for the MLF persisted:
problem of control and the evolution of the force.
the
After De Gaulle's
January 19&3 statements there appeared to be little promise of
European political unity which could emerge within the foreseeable
future,
A basic problem was that of political agreement to inte­
grative commands— hot the issue of strategic policy.
This point
was made clear to the Johnson Administration when during the tenth
annual conference of NATO Parliamentarians this body voted a re­
jection of the MLF,
In response the Washington Post reported that
this vote
left behind the wreclcage of a cherished American official
theory that there is widespread European support for the
proposed mixed-manned nuclear rocket-carrying surface fleet
known as the MLF,
^^Deutsch,
al,, 0£, cit,, pp, 113 and 194,
244
The article continued:
European reactions today suggest an even greater danger from
the American standpoint ; that the MLF, instead of dividing
Europe, will unite it— against the Atlantic concept, French
President De Gaulle's , , , theme of dangers of American dom­
ination seem suddenly, under the impetus of the MLF discussions,
to have burst into flame, 20
Britain was added to the growing list of the opposition when Prime
Minister Harold Wilson announced a severe blow to the MLF,
Wilson
told the House of Commons that his labor government believed
a mixed-manned surface fleet adds nothing to Western strength,
is likely to cause dissipation of strength in the Alliance,
and may add to the difficulties of East-West agreement, 21
The MLF had not won enthusiastic support in Europe with the
possible exception of the Bonn government.
De Gaulle completely
rejected the idea and the British tried to find a more reasonable
alternative, such as the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF),
Even so
throughout 1964 the advocates of the MLF proposal became increasingly
adamant in support of the program.
ton by Prime Minister Harold Wilson
Not until the visit to Washing23
did the administration relax
pn
"NATO Vote on MLF Contradicts U,S, Theory," Washington
Post. November 21, 1964,
^^John Hightower, "NATO Fleet Plan Upset by British Opposi­
tion," Washington Star. November 24, 1964,
22
The ANF would bring together— under a unified command—
bombers, submarines, fleets and other possible means of delivering
nuclear weapons. Under this concept. United States approval would
be required before either bombs or missiles could be used,
23
This visit took place during December 7 and 8 , 1964,
245
its support for the HLF,
24
During this meeting the Prime Minister informed the President
that the continued push of the MLF by the United States was begin­
ning to be counter-productive and was injuring the administration's
image in Europe,
Even the West Germans, who had supported the con­
cept most strongly, were beginning to realize that any advantages
which were to be gained would be outweighed by the political costs
which continued support might incur.
The problem for Chancellor
Erhard was that during the fall of 1964 his Christian Democratic
Party was seriously divided on this issue.
Thus it became apparent
that with national elections less than a year away a choice on
the issue of the MLF should be deferred.
2S
Other considerations caused President Johnson to drop his
support of the MLF,
There existed in Congress considerable re­
sistance to nuclear sharing and any changes in United States law
required to establish an allied nuclear force would receive strong
opposition.
Moreover, it appears that the proposal for the MLF
had been built upon the premise that Europeans would accept a form
of illusion regarding nuclear sharingj under HLF, the concept of
sharing was considerably weakened by the requirement that the
United States maintain full veto power.
This illusion the Europeans
were unwilling to accept.
The Kennedy Administration's major problem in its approach to
24
For an interesting perspective of this meeting and the
events surrounding it see Geyelin, pp. I59-I8O,
Z^lbid,. p, 167.
rv
^
.. .
246
NATO relations as illustrated by the MLF had been the turning of
a policy idea into a crusade* if the MLF did not pass then it would
be seen as a defeat for Washington and a victory for Moscow,
In
addition, it was believed that had more earnest attention been
given to some of the major issues before the Alliance
27
notably*
a divided Germany; Alliance nuclear control; a nuclear and recalci­
trant China; how to end the Vietnamese War; and whether, in the
long run, it would be possible to save the British pound; then
perhaps more substantive results could have emerged from the MLF,
28
President Johnson realized by early December 1964 that the
success of the MLF was tenuous at best and urged that an effort
be made to reunify the policies and programs of NATO,
Recognizing
that full support of the European allies was necessary to achieve
this goal, the President asserted that the United States believed
the defense of the West to be "indivisible," but wanted the most
complete consultation within the Alliance on views about how the
26
G, L, Sulzberger, "Crises in the West* 1* Three Blind Mice,"
New York Times. November 251 1964,
^^C, L, Sulzberger, "Problems Behind the Problems," New York
Times. December 9» 1964.
28
Geyelin, 0£, cit,, p, I65, states that on every count the
MLF was deficient*
", , , including the test of military efficiency, in its early
stage; its nuclear "sharing" would be illusory, for it would
be a long time before Europe was sufficiently cohesive to
operate a collective nuclear force, and a long time before
the United States would be ready to surrender any significant
part of its monopoly of control over warheads, , , , The
whole idea invited ridicule. It became known in some
European circles as the "multilateral farce,"
247
nuclear defense of the Alliance could be organized,
attention to European sensitivities because
Johnson gave
he was sure that the
United States would approve no defense plan that could not receive
acceptance by both Britain and West Germany; nor would the President
agree to any program that had not been discussed in advance, and
in detail, with France,
The policy of the Johnson Administration was to encourage the
maximum unity in Europe, and nothing proposed in Washington for
the development of the Atlantic Alliance should be interpreted as
opposing the economic and political integration of Europe,
In an
attempt to pacify the French, no one was to use "pressure tactics"
on the allies, and the United States was not interested in estab­
lishing "special arrangements" with any single ally or in confronting
anyone with "deadlines" for the acceptance of United States" pro­
posals,
Finally, no plan would be approved if it did not leave the
door open for any ally (e,g,, France) to join in the defense of the
Atlantic Community at any time in the future.
29
These policies seemed to put a more relaxed tone on American
efforts for achieving greater unity in Atlantic affairs.
Further,
they may be viewed as clearing the board and providing more flex­
ibility, just prior to the beginning of Johnson's own term as
President, opening his own options for cooperative actions for the
months to follow.
The declaration of this policy had the effect,
at least publicly, of cooling the zeal of MLF enthusiasts in the
^^"President Urges Full U.S. Effort to Remedy NATO," New
York Times. December 21, 1964,
248
Departments of State and Defense and elsewhere within the adminis­
tration,
The MLF was thus permitted to die a quiet and unregretted
death.
Nuclear Planning
It was significant that the President's State of the Union
Address on 4 January I965, when referring to foreign affairs, dealt
heavily with European issues.
While expressing a desire to visit
Europe in I965, the President also expressed hope that leaders from
the Soviet Union might visit the United States and communicate
directly with the American people via television.
He foreshadowed
his October I966 "bridge building" speech by including American
desires to increase peaceful trade with the countries of Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union,
Of further interest was his refer­
ence to the Atlantic Community,
Here he referred to the need to
strengthen the Alliance and the "great unfinished task , , , the
reunification of Germany through self-determination, "
SO
The
obvious omission of any mention of the MLF confirmed earlier im­
pressions both in the United States and in Europe of a more relaxed attitude in Washington,
31
The necessity of continuing the goal of twenty years— a Europe
growing in strength, unity, and coordination with the United States
30
Richard P, Stebbins and Elaine P, Adam, eds. Documents on
American Foreign Relations, I965, Published by the Gouncil on
Foreign Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp, 1-7,
31
"Europe Awaits Visit of American 'Atlanticist,'" Christian
Science Monitor, January 6 , I965,
249
— was restated.
The President thus asserted a policy based upon
the realities of compatible interests, values, dangers, and
expectations.
He re-emphasized the "realities" and cast aside
the nuclear sharing proposal of Kennedy's Administration with the
hope of launching a new approach to European affairs.
But as desirable as this expression of policy was, new doubts
began to cast their shadow over its potential achievement; for no
new specific initiatives were being offered to stimulate debate
and dialogue.
As early as 4 July 1964 Business Week reported;
The Grand Design envisioned steadily strengthened the
close economic, political, and military ties the United
States already had established with Western Europe, But
today the United States cannot even be certain that the At­
lantic Partnership will hold together on its present basis.
Tearing at its fabric are strong nationalist forces in Europe,
These forces center in France, and they rise from the deter­
mination of President De Gaulle and his followers to recover
the pivotal world role the Europeans once played,
These expressions of growing nationalism
33 were not new but had
become quite obvious in the relationships among the allies at the
major levels of coordination and had proved detrimental to resolving
the primary strategic problems of nuclear sharing.
The State Department, in responding to the issues of nuclear
32
"Trouble in the Atlantic Community," Business Week, July
4, 1964,
33In France this was particularly true, for the Gaullists
who favored national decision-making as the dominant attitude to­
ward France's relationship in Europe also disapproved of NATO in
its existing form and opposed the MLF while at the same time gave
strong support to De Gaulle's force de frappe. If there was to be
a firm relationship in Europe, it necessarily must fall within the
boundaries of a loose federation, and certainly Britain would be
excluded from any such arrangement, Deutsch, 0£, cit,, pp, 34-35.
250
sharing and NATO defense, stated that the United States was con­
sulting with our NATO allies as to how nuclear defense could be
adapted to the changing nature of the threat to the Alliance:
This requires a flexible posture which can generate the type
and degree of force that is needed, , , , We are also ready
to discuss how NATO's organization can be adjusted to changing
conditions within the West, notably to the growing strength
of our European allies. If the EJuropean countries wish to
play a larger role, possibly as a collective entity, in
sharing the burdens and responsibilities of NATO defense,
they will find us receptive.
In adapting NATO to change, we should have in mind the
basic principle on which it is based: that common action is
the key to success in dealing with common problems, 34
In the hope of maintaining a spirit of cooperative pursuit, the
United States brought to their NATO allies a further proposal for
the sharing of nuclear power.
With the HLF all but forgotten, the
Johnson Administration was to seize upon an opportunity to reassert
its interests and commitment to finding solution to strategic
planning and nuclear weapons control.
The specific initiative was taken by Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, and at first this initiative promised to be a
strong one.
Seeking the confidence of the European allies, McNamara
proposed that a group be established within NATO and be empowered
to discuss Alliance nuclear strategy and defense planning.
Further,
this group would be empowered to "examine means of increasing
Allied participation in various aspects of nuclear planning and
consultation,"
35
This proposal for a committee on nuclear sharing
34
Dean Rusk, "Our Atlantic Policy," Department of State Bul­
letin. (March 22, 19^5).
35
^^This group also became known as the "McNamara Committee,"
251
served two objectives, ^
First, it sought to help meet the
serious European concern for a share in Alliance nuclear strategy.
37
This, it was hoped, would hold the Alliance together more closely.
The second objective was meant to test De Gaulle's interest in an
enlarged role for France in the Alliance,
38
This proposal was an
attempt to call the bluff of President De Gaulle, for he had been
demanding just such a role since he had returned to power in 1958,
The Gaullist view of the issue emphasized that the United
States had dominated the Alliance defense strategy since its form­
ation with American nuclear weapons as its backbone.
There was no
certainty that an American president would fire nuclear rockets
at the Soviet Union in the event of a European war because he
•^(cont,) See the New York Times, June 1, 19&5. See also the
Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S, McNamara before a joint
session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Sub­
committee on Department of Defense Appropriations for the Fiscal
Year 1968-72 Defense Program and I968 Defense Budget, January 23,
1967, (Washington, D,G., GPO, I967), p, 28,
^^Established on a temporary basis in November I965, the new
plan called for the establishment of a permanent ministerial committee
within the NATO council to plan overall nuclear strategy for the
Alliance, The committee would give nations like West Germany, which
had^ been restless over its lack of a nuclear role, a voice in plan­
ning NATO nuclear strategy without actually placing any new "fingers"
on the nuclear trigger. No NATO member would gain any physical con­
trol over strategic nuclear weapons under the new plan,
Carlyle Morgan, "U.S. Proposes NATO Share-A-Power," Christ­
ian Science Monitor. June 3, I965.
OQ
In September 1958» De Gaulle proposed a global Directorate
composed of the United States, Great Britain and France, The United
States rejected this with the argument that it could not designate
one of its European partners to speak for the others. No attempt
was made to explore De Gaulle's reaction to the possibility of a
wider forum.
,
V
TTY"
252
would only invite a rain of Soviet rockets in return.
If this were
so, and the Gaullists argued that it was, then France could no
longer count on the United States for its nuclear deterrent and
maintain its national decision-making authority.
Further, they
believed that the integration of military forces was a myth, for
the American nuclear force would— and the Gaullist position was
correct at this point— remain under strict American control.
39
The Soviet threat to Western Europe had diminished, and therefore
it was time for France to take the lead in opèning a useful dialogue between the West and Eastern Europe,
40
In opposing this view, Washington accepted the assumption
that NATO itself was indispensable.
Joint military planning would
remain essential for the very reason that the Soviet threat had
diminished— proving the deterrent value of NATO,
To relax this
barrier, it was believed, would only invite disaster.
If the
objective was to reach across to Eastern Europe, then it was vital
to keep Western Europe united and strong and thus better able to
bargain with Moscow.
Finally, although the United States would
retain final control of nuclear weapons. Western Europeans would
be permitted a greater share in planning their use through joint
39
^^It must be clarified, however, that not all Frenchmen ac­
cepted this point of view; for a majority of Frenchmen (52^) did
not believe that a national deterrent was a pre-requisite of a
country's indipendence (Deutsch, pp, 96-97, Table 6,1); and a heavy
percentage expressed a preference for some form of integrated
military force as the best defense against a military threat
(Deutsch, p. 98),
40
David K. Willis, "Silver Lining Seen in NATO Storm Cloud,"
Christian Science Monitor, June 6 , I966.
253
strategic planning and by resolving policy differences within the
McNamara dommittee.
When Secretary of Defense Robert S, McNamara spoke to a con­
gressional subcommittee concerning the attitude of the European
allies toward United States control of nuclear weapons, he indicated
that no responsible political leader of Western Europe had asked
that the United States give up its veto power over the use of
nuclear weapons.
He stated that this "is not the central issue,"
The real problem centered on the degree of allied participation
in the planning and the use of these weapons.
Going further he
stated:
This nation does not have plans for delegating control over
nuclear weapons to other single nations or groups of nations
nor has the Federal Republic asked for a transfer of such
authority,
He concluded by reaffirming the position that the veto power over
the use of nuclear weapons rested firmly with the President of the
United States,
This fact had not disturbed the NATO allies nor had
there been a request that this position be modified.
As the McNamara committee gained increased support in Europe,
discussion of such ideas as the MLF and the ANF faded into obscur­
ity,
It was at the NATO Council meeting in December I966 that the
allies agreed to establish a permanent organization to deal with
41
Ibid,
42
The Atlantic Alliance. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
National Security and International Operations of the Committee on
Government Operations of the United States Senate, 89th Congress,
2nd Session, (Washington: GPO, I966), p, 205.
254
nuclear affairs, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee.
This com­
mittee would have an open membership within the NATO alliance, and
it was hoped that Prance would be willing to participate,
Further,
the Council established a seven-member Nuclear Planning Group
which included Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, and the United
States, with three other members serving on a rotating basis.
43
It was the purpose of the Nuclear Planning Group to conduct
detailed studies and prepare policy proposals which would then be
considered by the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee,
This plan
was an attempt to resolve European interests for an enlarged role
in nuclear planning while at the same time skirting such alliance
problems as European ownership and control over nuclear weapons,
It was in this context that the Nuclear Planning Group be­
gan to deal with a large variety of issues before the Alliance,
Among these issues were the procedures and problems for the devel­
opment of plans ; command and control arrangements ; targeting pro­
cedures; consequences of using tactical forces under various situ­
ations ; and the tactical and strategic resources of the Alliance,
Thus the focus was upon the role of tactical nuclear weapons in
Europe and their relation to the general purpose or conventional
forces,
In effect, the MLF was dead; and emerging much stronger from
its ruins was a far more rational approach to the problems of
nuclear sharing and planning.
Even so, a very large problem existed:
relations with France— not only of NATO, but, even more specifically.
43
New York Times, December 15» 1966,
■
255
of the United States,
Withdrawal of NATO From France
An important part of the problem separating France and the
other members of the Alliance had focused upon the issue of nuclear
planning and control, ^
If nuclear control was one of the most
contentious issues in NATO, the increasingly independent attitude
of France caused the most consternation,
K, Couve" de Kurville,
the French Foreign Minister, had confessed that France was a
difficult, though loyal, ally.
Certainly her actions helped to
limit any coordinated policy for NATO,
Among these actions was
General De Gaulle's challenge to United States' strategic policy;
he stressed the view that the United States was unlikely to risk
This issue was very much on the minds of the West Germans
as well; if NATO strategy called for a heavy reliance upon strategic
considerations, then they too wished to have a voice in the control
and use of such weapons. In November I963, 56% of a sample of West
German adults wanted the European NATO countries to obtain influence
over the use of NATO nuclear deterrent forces; 21^ were willing to
leave such decisions to the President of the United States, Elisa­
beth Noelle and Ench Peter Neumann, Jahrbuch der Offentlichen
Meinung, 1958-1964 (Allensback and Bonn; Verlag Fur Demoskopie,
1965), P. 541,
^^In 1959 France removed her Mediterranean fleet from NATO
operational control; in 1964 she removed naval officers from staff
posts in NATO naval commands, failed to appoint an officer to the
post of naval deputy to SACEUR (normally held by a French admiral),
and refused to participate in a unified air-defense system for
continental Western Europe, Then, in June of 1964, France decided
to use a smaller caliber ammunition than that agreed upon by NATO
for light weapons. Earlier, in 1959, she refused to permit stock­
piling of nuclear warheads on French soil unless she were given some
share of control; France argued in support of the breakup of inte­
grated NATO commands and forces, and a return to purely national
units; she failed to contribute more than one-third of her promised
number of conventional forces.
256
its own existence for that of Europe, ^
He further opposed a
return to large conventional forces, continued the development
of the French independent deterrent, and refused to join the
proposed multi-lateral force.
His attitude toward the organiza­
tion of NATO ifas not philosophically different from that which he
had adopted with regard to other European organizations.
Opposing
the whole concept of integrated commands, he argued for a planning
staff which would coordinate national forces instead of commanding them.
47
Such an arrangement would leave French forces clearly
under French control and not under an integrated command to which
French political leadership must of necessity be responsive.
Into this atmosphere of disagreement within the Alliance
President De Gaulle made an additional declaration of independence
from both the United States and from NATO,
President De Gaulle
sent his decision to President Johnson, and this message of 7
March ip66 produced an immediate Atlantic crisis.
In this message
De Gaulle announced his intentions to withdraw the French forces
assigned to NATO and his desire to liave the allies withdraw their
permanent installations from France ; at the same time, he reasserted
his attachment to the Atlantic Alliances
France proposes to reassume on her territory the full exercise
of her sovereignty, which is at present impaired by the per-
46
This appears to be a reasonable charge from the European
point of view, but it is a charge which American policy-makers have
rejected on a number of occasions. The stationing of 300, 000
American troops in Europe has been used to further contradict the
validity of any such charge,
47
Curtis, 0£, cit,. p, 91.
257
inanent presence of allied military elements or by the regular
use that is made of her airspace, to terminate her participa­
tion in the"integrated" commands and no longer to place
forces at the disposal of NATO, 4°
This letter only intensified the criticism of De Gaulle and France
within the United States,
Both public opinion and the responses
of Congressmen were questioning and hostile.
How could France who
had gained so much from United States protection and support behave
in such a unilateral manner?
How could France be so ungrateful?
This was to be the thrust of the issue from the point of view of
many Americans,
It appearedof little consequence that the French
no longer wished to remain "subservient" to American Interests and
foreign policy objectives originating in Washington,
In responding to De Gaulle, President Johnson asserted that
the United States "with.M3 of her other allies" would press for­
ward without France "to preserve and to strengthen" the North
Atlantic Treaty alliance and organization,
49
This was done with­
out offering any further new initiatives or disclosing details of
American or allied plans to deal with the crisis.
However, as
spring progressed it was already clear that NATO, of necessity,
was taking on a new appearance.
48
Letter from General De Gaulle to President Lyndon B, John­
son, March 7, 19&5; In French Foreign Policy* Official Statements.
Speeches and Gommunigues, 1966 {New York: Ambassade De France*
Service de Presse et d' Information), p, 24,
49
The Second Reply from President Johnson to General De Gaulle,
March 22, 1966, French Foreign Policy, op, cit,, pp, 32-33» and
Richard P, Stebbins and Elaine P, Adam, eds,, Documents on American
Foreign Relations, 1966 (New York: Harper & Row, 19^7), PP. 113-115.
258
While there did develop reports of a "new NATO,"
what was
regarded as most important for the United States-French relations
was the fear that Paris and Washington would remain deep in argu­
ment over a series of legal points.
The United States claimed that
Prance had broken international law by terminating four NATO treat­
ies so sharply, but Paris remained firm and silent,
^
The crisis, however, permitted the conclusion that the experi­
ences within NATO had been sobering as well as instructive and re­
assuring,
One who took this view was John Leddy, Assistant Secre­
tary of State for European Affairs, who stated*
We have seen the firm opposition of one member state to con­
tinue a relationship which it feels impairs its freedom of
action even in a single, although important, aspect of national
policy. This determination to achieve greater freedom of
national action at whatever cost is not encouraging. It serves
to undermine our common security and to divide us. It tells
us a great deal about the chances that a broader system of
political, economic, or security unity embracing the United
States would have.
Yet there is reason for reassurance, too. The threat to
NATO unity has brought home to us all the real value of the
institution. The unanimity of strong support for NATO and for
^ Plans were for the political as well as military operations
to move north to Belgium from Paris and remain on the continent,
instead of possibly going to London, A second factor which became
more clear was the determination of the United States not to give
up control over its own nuclear weapons, but to continue to sharpen
the concept of the McNamara committee for nuclear consultation.
Third, Bonn would at least begin to move toward the very center of
the alliance. With France pursuing a separate path, Germany's
strategic geography and sizable population simply demanded greater
prominence. It appeared that NATO would proceed through a period
of substantial change, A hopeful sign was the recognition of the
remaining fourteen members that changes must come on the political
side while joint military plans were pulled together,
■^^David Willis, loo, cit.
259
its fundamental concepts among the fourteen is persuasive
evidence that this powerful Atlantic bond still holds, 52
During this crisis the administration considered the possibility
of real gains to be achieved by the pending division in NATO,
These new political developments were difficult for such men
as Dean Acheson and John J, McGloy to accept.
These men had been
with NATO at its beginning and were, in 1966, still in positions
to influence the policy of the United States,
They reacted quite
skeptically to any attempt to shift the emphasis to more political
concerns; for instead of seeing American policy advance, they
believed that such emphasis would destroy the advantages gained
throughout the long years of containment and the NATO emphasis upon
military deterrence.
Further, they believed the action of France
illustrated the breakdown of the Alliance which they had helped to
construct.
During a television interview Mr, Acheson termed De Gaulle's
position "utter nonsense,"
by many other Americans;
This view reflected the opinions held
that joint military planning was the
lesson of 1914 and 1918; that the way to win concessions from
Moscow was to stand firm and to stand together, not to scatter and
act individually ; and that uncontrolled nationalism in France could
well lead to dangerous nationalism in West Germany,
Although
President Johnson privately shared these views, he and other
John Leddy, Department of State Bulletin. (April 25, 1966),
pp, 627-674; A statement made before a subcommittee of the Senate
Gommittee on Foreign Relations on March 24, 1966, during hearings
on Senate Resolution 128, a resolution establishing a Commission
for a Stronger Atlantic Union,
260
officials did not publicly emphasize General De Gaulle's waywardness
as Mr, Acheson had.
Attempting to maintain his options, the Presi­
dent insisted upon no open verbal attack upon France by members of
his administration, lest such an attack irretrievably close possibilities of communication.
53
As the spring of I966 progressed, the mood in Washington re­
garding NATO and France was becoming anxious.
remained firm but polite.
The State Department
Annoyance seemed to be the emerging
attitude taken by different members of Congress who were less re­
strained vocalists on foreign policy matters and strongly criti­
cized De Gaulle, accusing him of ingratitude, nationalism and
wrong thinking.
Senator Henry M, Jackson (D-Washington), Chairman
of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Opera­
tions of the Committee on Governmental Operations of the United
States Senate, held hearings which indicated the depth of congressional feeling.
54
Among the first witnesses to appear before the
Jackson committee were former Secretaries of State Christian A,
Herter and Dean Acheson, who both asserted a view in favor of the
existing NATO alliance without any substantive change,
Herter,
however, broadened his comments to include strong criticism of
Gaullist economic policies as well.
Another development involving the Senate further demonstrated
that the De Gaulle position continued to create serious criticism.
^^Millis, loc. cit,
54
ïiîÊ Atlantic Alliance, op. cit.
261
Senator Stuart Symington (D-Missouri) claimed that the United States
was then overcommitted around the world— militarily, politically,
and economically.
To this point Senate Majority leader Mike Mans­
field (D-Montana) agreed,
Senator Mansfield claimed that he
believed the American forces in Europe could well be cut back
from five divisions to one or two and still maintain effective
deterrence
^
What both Senators Symington and Mansfield were
proposing was a serious cut in the number of troops to be stationed
there.
To be sure these remarks did not go unnoticed in European
capitals,
Complicating the crisis with De Gaulle was a member of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Wayne Hays (D-Ohio), who made
headlines with a fiery speech before the Council of Europe in
Strasbourg, Germany, charging that President De Gaulle was trying
to destroy NATO,
Two Gaullist delegates to the council called his
speech "impolite, anti-European, and insolent," to which Mr, Hays
responded that American public opinion was becoming much harsher
than words he had used,
See United States Troops in Europe. Hearings before the
Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services Com­
mittees on the subject of United States Troops in Europe, U.S.
Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, April 26, May 3, 196? (Washing­
ton; GPO, 1967).
^This expression aroused considerable consternation in West
Germany, where a strong American presence was considered essential
to deterring Soviet aggression. The earlier withdrawal, in I966,
of 15, 000 American military specialists to help the Vietnam war
effort had raised cries of protest,
57
David K, Willis, "De Gaulle Policies Attacked," Christian
Science Monitor. May 7, I966,
262
As a result of the severe criticism from all sides, a slight
thaw in the relationships between Prance and her allies within the
NATO alliance did emerge in early May of I966, The French decided
to make a series of moves which had the effect of easing tensions
and were therefore most welcomed by the NATO allies.
58
Each of
these moves was viewed not as a change in French policy but as a
relaxation of the harshness in the debate between France and the
United States; the moves were, however, received as gestures of
goodwill.
It was Walter Lippmann who retuned a note of realistic per­
ception to the entire debate with De Gaulle,
He wrote:
In high quarters in Washington there is some feeling that
we have more than enough to worry about in Vietnam, and that
we ought not to have to take on also General De Gaulle and
the reconstruction of NATO, Granting that someday it will
be desirable to bring NATO up to date, why must we think of
it now, when the President is so preoccupied, when the Sec­
retary of State is so weary, and when nothing seems to be
happening in Europe, if only General De Gaulle would let the
sleeping dog lie.
Voicing frustration with the high officialdom of Washington, he
proceeded to remind his readers that there was a rising feeling in
^ Carlyle Morgan, "French Thaw Hinted Toward NATO Bloc,"
Christian Science Monitor. May 5, 1955. Also, the French indicated
that they would be taking part in NATO air exercises in June of that
year (1966), The authoritative French Review of National Defense,
in an issue covering several aspects of the Atlantic crisis, stated
that there was to be no new spectacular French initiative against
NATO, A third move of this welcomed thaw was the visit of United
Nations Secretary-General U Thant to President De Gaulle in late
April, which opened the prospect of De Gaulle's visiting the United
Nations in New York after his June trip to Moscow, To this possi­
bility President Johnson responded with a statement that he would
be glad to see the French President if he would go to the U,N,
Finally, General De Gaulle's meeting with Senator Frank Church on
May 4 gave extra validity to the Senator's study tour of NATO prob­
lems,
263
Europe of frustration with the United States,
He continued:
It is unreasonable not to recognize that the French complaints
and criticism of our military relations with Europe have sub­
stance and that they cannot be dismissed as the nonsense of a
querulous old man. The problem is a real problem, and it becomes
ever more urgent as the United States— acting unilaterally—
escalates the war in Asia and proclaims its global responsi­
bilities, 39
Just as clearly heard was the voice of Prime Minister Lester
Pearson of Canada,Speaking in Springfield, Illinois, on Saturday,
11 June 1966, Mr, Pearson cautioned the American people :
We should not try to throw all the blame on France and General
De Gaulle for recent NATO developments, , , , France, and not
only France, feels that Continental Europe is now strong enough
(in large part because of the general assistance of the U.S.A.)
to be given its rightful share in the control of the policies
of the Alliance,
While Prance is not alone in this feeling, only De Gaulle
has translated it into policy and action, , , ,
In short, to rail
demanding, for France,
equal to that of Great
the U.S.A., is to show
situation, 80
at General De Gaulle, because he is
a position in the Atlantic Alliance
Britain and somewhat closer to that of
a dangerous misunderstanding of the
Thus the Canadian Prime Minister made the point that it was incon­
ceivable that one could have a strong defense or a viable alliance
in Europe without the full participation of France,
When modera­
tion was able to prevail, there continued to exist the belief that
the only way to meet the challenge was by keeping an "open chair"
■^^Walter Lippmann, Time, May 9» 1966, p, 23.
^^The Atlantic Alliance, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
National Security and International Operations of the Committee on
Government Operations of the U, S, Senate, Op,,cit,, pp, 172-173.
264
for France to re-enter NATO military councils in the future— potenti­
ally the day when President De Gaulle would no longer be in command
of French policy.
With all of the various issues, domestic as well as foreign,
particularly Vietnam, confronting the President, NATO and its future
remained vital.
This was clearly demonstrated during the summer
and fall of I966 in various ways.
During June both Secretaries
Rusk and McNamara appeared before the Jackson subcommittee.
Sec­
retary Rusk's testimony centered on the prior meeting of the North
Atlantic Alliance in Brussels, the first such meeting since De
Gaulle had announced France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated
defense system and issued the demand for NATO and American military
installations and personnel to leave France,
Speaking with a great
deal of optimism, he discussed the response of the remaining members:
The other fourteen members of the Alliance had declared
on March 18 their unanimous resolve to preserve and improve
NATO's integrated military organization. At Brussels, meeting
first as fourteen and then with France, they reaffirmed
that determination and began to make the necessary readjust­
ments.
This was a critical test of the vitality of NATO, And I
believe it is accuràte to say that NATO passed this test with
confidence, I returned home with confidence, I returned home
with renewed faith that NATO will prove equal to the challenges
that lie ahead.
Reaffirming the United States' position and the importance of NATO to
American interests. Secretary Rusk, in response to questioning, re­
affirmed the primacy of the American commitment to the Western Buro-
^^Ibid.. p, 150,
265
pean alliance,
I don't think that I would agree that they (European allies)
are more dependent on NATO than we are, because the security
interests and the security capabilities of the United States
are gravely involved with the security of Western Europe,
Speaking on this same issue less than a week later. Secretary
McNamara emphasized this same theme:
One of your witnesses (Secretary Rusk) has made the point that
the Atlantic Alliance is the expression, not the cause, of
mutual interdependence of Europe and North America, I agree
with that. The fundamental consideration for us is that it
is a vital security interest of the United States that no
potentially hostile power should dominate. Western Europe
is a fundamental interest of the United States, far surpassing
any matter of formal treaty arrangements, that Europe should
remain free and secure. The United States will under all
circumstances help to protect that security and that freedom. 63
Having said this he continued:
This is not a one-way street, however. It is equally
important to the free nations of Europe that the United
States should remain free, strong, and able to contribute
to European security, Americans and Europeans are, as a
matter of physical fact, mutually dependent, "4
These interests may be evaluated in another way.
If it is
safe to assume that the I'lay financial resources are allocated (i,e,,
in the national budget) indicates national priorities, then the
testimony of Secretary McNamara is even more revealing.
The fol­
lowing exchange between Senator Ribicoff (D-Gonnecticut) and the
secretary took place on 21 June 1966i
Senator Ribicoff:
^^Ibid,, p, 180,
^^Ibid,, p, 186,
^Ibid,
Mr, Secretary, how much does the-United
266
States spend on European defense each year?
Secretary McNamaras It is not really possible to allocate
our total defense budget but in fiscal 1966 it will run in
terms of expenditures something on the order of $54, $55
billion to various geographical areas of the world,
I think one way to look at it is to say that roughly
half of our ground forces are committed to Western European
defense and therefore you might say something on the order
of half of our military budget is in support of NATO,
Senators
dollars?
Secretary:
In other words, roughly about $25 or $26 billion
Yes, sir, something on that order,
It is, however, quite obvious from a study of the complete
hearings and the report of the subcommittee
that regardless of
the strength, cost, or validity of the Americajfi commitment to
Europe, President De Gaulle was viewed by most Americans as a
villain.
It was he and France that received most of the critical
barbs from American politicians— e,g,, ", , , most visible cracks
have been produced by President De Gaulle's wrecking hammer," or
", , , quite apart from the sabot France has thrown into the
NATO works,"
Notwithstanding the debate at the highest levels of government,
American policy toward the "disruptive" ally remained, for the most
^^Ibid.. p. 199.
^^The Atlantic Alliance: Unfinished Business. A Study sub­
mitted by the Subcommittee on National Security and International
Operations to the Gommittee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate,
90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. G,: GPO, I967),
^"^Ibid.. p, 2,
^^Ibid,. p. 5.
267
part, constant.
Since De Gaulle had returned in I958, the cordiality
of relations between the United'States and France had diminished to
the point that effective resolution of major problems and issues
seemed to be the exception rather than the rule.
This being so,
it bacame the hope of the Johnson Administration to seek the return
of Prance to full participation in the integrated military command
system of NATO,
Room was left open for France if and when she
would desire to return.
It was essential for the United States
to provide continued support for an expanded, integrated, and open
Western European community which would include France as a fully
participating and cooperating member.
One means of achieving
this was an acceptance of France's role as a partner in the EEC
and other European economic and political organizations,
A further part of Johnsonian policy was the desire to encourage
the French in their efforts at bridge-building with Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union with whom they had had traditionally good re­
lations,
This effort would hopefully strengthen rather than
weaken Western Europe’s security and prosperity.
Such moves toward
the East would further support United States efforts to ease tenm
sions between East and West and support the major policy position
with Europe on 7 October I966
through a policy of detente.
It
was hoped that by maintaining an active dialogue with the French
on the needs and problems of the developing nations, NATO could
encourage French participation in bilateral and multi-lateral pro­
grams of economic assistance, particularly as these programs applied
to France's former colonies in Africa,
268
The disruptions in the relationship between France and the
United States illustrate the fact that American policies have not
been altogether successful or acceptable to allied powers.
The
failure to maintain Prance as a military partner in NATOs the in­
ability to keep France from disrupting Western integration; and
the inability to harmonize United States-French positions on such
issues as Vietnam, non-proliferation, recognition of Communist
China and Cuba, as well as other issues— all these underscore the
difficult problem of non-compatible interests on the part of these
two government.
President Johnson's belief in the Atlantic Alliance as con­
ceived by both former Secretaries I-larshall and Acheson was just
as deep and committed as was President Kennedy's,
President Ken­
nedy's policy appeared to be one which built up the various "parts"
of the alliance— even to the point of building it into parts.
The
Kennedy Administration was known as pro-Common Market, to the
degree of urging that Britain be admitted without too much regard
for what the British themselves wanted or for the existing attitudes
of the six nations comprising that body.
It was this attitude,
along with the Nassau Pact and the pressure upon the EEC members
to admit Great Britain which helped convince the French that the
American influence over European political and economic integration
was not compatible with their interests.
The traditional concept,
however, was one in which Atlantic security received primary emphasis
after which a Common Market and a federated Europe could develop
if and when it would be feasible.
This type of Atlantic development
269
was viewed as coining within, and not in oppostion to, the over-all
interests of the Alliance,
Perhaps the supposed Marshall-Acheson concept was more in the
thoughts of government spokesmen, commentators and other interpret­
ers of public policy than in the minds of the architects themselves.
This may be possible, for it appears there existed hopes in 1949
that more recently are merely memories.
What the Alliance lacked
was not determination to resist Soviet encroachments on Western
Europe, or even on Berlin,
It continued to lack an inspired drive
to develop from within, to improve and strengthen its methods of
consultation, to upgrade the Atlantic Council, to widen the areas
of its influence in economics, social, and cultural relations— or
at least to promote links between it and other organizations or
agencies in those fields so as to lay the foundations for a real
and strong Atlantica,
The reasons for the lack of an inspired drive to reform NATO
from within are twofold.
First, the Vietnam War was, by I966,
requiring increasingly huge amounts of American resources and time,
as well as official concern with the foreign relations of the United
States,
Increasingly the Johnson Administration was preoccupied
with both Vietnam and the problems of domestic unrest.
The second
explanation is that with these other concerns the Johnson Adminis­
tration was maintaining a "holding pattern" in Western Europe, an
attempt to maintain the status quo with the nations of Europe,
Moreover, it was obvious that American initiatives in Europe could
not get around President De Gaulles
the attitudes and actions
270
taken by the French leader tended to keep America’s policy makers
on the defensive.
Even so, NATO remained a viable defensive organization.
ever, the Alliance raised a series of difficult
postwar Europe:
How­
questions about
Just what were the elements of a German solution?
Could the current East-West stalemate in Europe be replaced by a
better security system? And how should nuclear weapons already in
Europe be used and controlled in a time of war?
Perhaps if any principle stands out during the Johnson Adminis­
tration's handling of NATO affairs and the tensions with Prance,
it would have to be that in order to institutionalize within the
international environment one must have a compatibility of policies
among the participating nations.
In the relationship of the United
States with the French, the incompatibility of policies led to con­
stant friction involving verbal broadsides and mutual accusations.
Nevertheless, even with this debate and conflict, the United States'
commitment to the Alliance remained firm.
An important and related issue that stimulated much policy
debate was the issue of East-West detente and its potential impli­
cations for the Western Alliance and the unity of the West,
The
United States had begun to pursue a policy which was meant to
increase entree into iron curtain countries and to reduce tensions
between the United States and Europe",
Would detente be viewed as
a means of by-passing European allies in order to achieve objectives
it was supposed to bring, or would it be viewed as a necessary corol­
lary to American-European relations?
These questions provide the
271
focus for the continuation of this study.
The-United States, De^tente and Europe
During the early 1960's a shift of attitude toward the Soviet
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe began to take place within
the United States,
This shift became more apparent as a result of
the climactic experience of the Cuban missile crisis and the in­
creased realization that the super-powers, in order to avoid a
conflict from which neither would emerge, must exercise greater
caution and prudence.
As a result of this realization, there
emerged an era of United States-Soviet relations characterized by
greater consultation, relaxed tensions, and a new emphasis on dis­
cussions leading hopefully toward an eventual reduction of arms.
This was labeled as an era of detente, and for some there was a
cautious acceptance of this new relationship.
Washington's interest in an American-Soviet detente, as illustrated
by such accomplishments as the negotiation of the Nuclear
Test Ban
Agreement (1963) and the "hot line" hookup, demonstrated a growing
commitment to improve relations with the Soviet Union.
In late
February 19&4 Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, explained the need
for the West to alter its treatment of the Communist states.
The
purpose of the United States, he urged, must be "to encourage
evolution within the Communist world toward national independence,
peaceful co-operation, and open societies." ^
Soon after, on
March 10, Under-Secretary of State Averell Harriman amplified Rusk's
definition of the United States' objectives;
"Sfew York Times. February 26, 1964, p. 10,
273
We hope to see, and are trying to encourage, a progressive
loosening of external authority over Eastern European countries
and the continuing reassertion of national autonomy and diver­
sity, We believe such evolution is a slow but sure way toward
freedom and national independence, , , , Our policy is to
encourage the evolution now in progress by using every kind
of peaceful contact available, 2
This statement was soon followed by a second statement of
assurance from Secretary Rusk in which he asserted that there was
no true detente between the United States and the Soviet Union and
that there were no secret talks between the Soviet Union and the
3
United States concerning the fate of Europe,
But it was secret
talks which disturbed the European leaders— especially those ti:iat
led, first, to the development of the Non-proliferation Treaty and,
later, to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT),
Finally, on
31 May 1964 President Johnson in a speech emphasized a new concept
of "building bridges to the East," and he linked eventual German
reunification with the essential improvement in relations with
Eastern Europe:
"It is our belief that wise and skillful devel­
opment of relationships with the nations of Eastern Europe can speed
the day when Germany will be reunited,"
4
On closer examination United States policy during this time
was either a "declaratory"
posture
or a naive non-recognition of
2
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co,, 19&3), p, 122 (fn),
3
This view was given in a speech to the NATO Ministerial
Council on May 9» 1964, See the Department of State Bulletin,
(May 25, 1964), pp, 810-815,
^Brzezinski, loc, cit.
274
the existing facts of European political life.
By linking the
problem of a divided Germany to that of a divided Europe, the United
States was able to put off the day of reckoning for pursuing a
non-achievable policy— reunification.
The future of a divided EJurope and a divided Germany was the
primary issue which affected the future of Europe during the 1950's
and into the period of the Johnson Administration,
Divided, Germany
constituted a threat to order and security in Europe because of
the tensions that invariably existed between the two halves.
United,
judging from the past performances in two wars, she could be
equally dangerous.
Yet, the policy of the United States was to seek
the unification of Germany, a major topic of negotiation between
the United States and the Soviet Union prior to and including the
Geneva Conference of 1955.
^
At that time and until the Kennedy Administration, it was
believed that detente could be achieved only as a result of
German unification.
This problem of a divided Germany would have
to be resolved first before other problems could be resolved.
The
^At the Geneva Conference in 1955t the Soviets made a last
effort to change the status quo policy regarding Germany, They
proposed the recognition of the existence for both German states
giving equal status to both. Further they advocated a house­
keeping military force and a neutralization of the government on
both sides. This was a direct attempt to prevent Germany from
rearming and thereby becoming a strength in the Western alliance.
However, the West countered with the Eden Plan which provided for:
l) a European-wide security pact— inaddition to existing agree­
ments; 2) an arms control agreement for the security of Germany
and her neighbors, and 3) a denuclearized area around Germany,
Both the Soviet plan and the Eden plan were rejected,for neither
side was willing to see Germany neutralized and in the West it was
becoming increasingly important that West Germany be incorporated
into the NATO alliance.
275
emphasis on detente was not diminished, but the emphasis on timing
did change.
Detente could be achieved first with the reunification
of Germany to follow— a policy that had the practical effect of
tolerating the status quo. Realistically, the Germans all along
had been concerned that détente be based upon the continued division
of Germany.
From the point of view of the United States, the problem of
German reunification must be considered as an aspect of United
States relations with Western Europe, the Soviet Union and with
the "Soviet bloc" in Eastern Europe,
In this context it was un­
likely that a short-term solution to the problem would be avail­
able,
Russia would no more allow a united Germany within either
the Western market or the Western alliance system than would the
United States permit the opposite.
Further, the United States was
not prepared to lose the defense potential of the FRG, a loss
which would occur if West Germany were to be militarily neutralized.
Over the long run, American interests in the necessary condi­
tions and safeguards which would be vital to any German reunifica­
tion were similar to those of other governments in Western Europe,
These interests necessitated that the United States remain free to
advocate the principle of German reunification while leaving the
specifics of timing and the difficulty of any such arrangements
to the unfolding of future events.
Also, there appeared to be very
few, if any, statesmen outside of Germany who seriously sought
German unification.
Certainly the potential implications of a
reunited Germany were grave; and most Europeans, including General
De Gaulle, were unwilling to face those possibilities.
Was it in
276
the interests of either the United States or the Soviet Union to
contend with a reunited Germany?
There is no serious evidence to
suggest that it was.
The Committee on Government Operations of the Senate, seeing
no way that the reunification of Germany could be a practical
goal of policy, stated clearly their position:
reunification,
they reasoned,
cannot be bought with any concessions consistent with German
national interests or Western interests. It cannot be com­
pelled by measures short of war. It cannot be imagined except
in the context of a general Ehiropean settlement. And such a
settlement requires a change in the Soviet conception of
Russian national interests— at a minimum a reliable change in
the means by which the Soviet leaders pursue their goals,
A European settlement will be the product of Western
strength, firmness, and patience, coupled with a willingness
on each side to give and accept appropriate guarantees of the
security of the other. The failure to obtain a settlement is
not to be explained by a refusal of the West to recognize the
legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, It is not explained
by a lack of imagination in the West, It is not, as some now
find it fashionable to say, a lack of "bright ideas" or
"brilliant policy proposals" but a lack of Soviet interests
in any terms that do not take as a premise the continued Soviet
hold on the Warsaw Pact countries, and, in particular. East
Germany, °
Detente was to be considered as a kind of temporary easing of rela­
tions, a recognition of the existing territorial interests of the
super powers— essentially a status quo position.
neither a permanent nor a substantive change.
Détente implied
It would be a part
of a larger process bringing about the easing of relations between
East and West,
This conception was more an expression of hope than
U,S, Congress, Senate, A Study by the Subcommittee on National
Security and International Operations, The Atlantic Alliance : Basic
Issues. 89th Congress, February 18, 1966 (Washington: GPO, 19ôSyj
Pi 5.
277
a description of political realities.
How, then, might one evaluate the attitudes of Europeans toward
a detente with the Soviet Union and closer ties with the countries
of Eastern Europe?
The I967 Mid-East crisis and the buildup of
Soviet seapower in the Mediterranean caused Western Europeans to
re-examine their fear, or lack of it, of the Communist menace to
Western Europe,
The cold war in Europe had lost its old meaning
of posing a serious military threat to either side.
Thus, Western
Europe's unity of purpose, which was originally b o m out of econ­
omic weakness and a fear of Soviet aggression, had turned to an
internal conflict over interests, objectives and priorities.
At
the same time the nations in Eastern Europe were beginning to feel
more free, as evidenced by their giving vent to an increase in
nationalism and in making moves away from strict Soviet dominance.
This sense of relaxation was based more on an assessment of
Soviet intentions than on any decline in Soviet military power.
The Soviet Union was more interested in holding its political "bloc"
together and pursuing a flanking policy in the Mediterranean than
in continuing a direct threat to Western Europe,
As for the United
States, a relaxation of tensions with the Soviets and closer ties
with Eastern Europe would serve the interests of the United States
and of Western Europe in a number of ways.
Detente would take the tension out of the cold war with its
harsh rhetoric and would potentially reduce the level of military
confrontation in Europe— a Europe weary of war and constant tension
and a Europe which did not wish to be an arena of conflict between
278
the two super-powers,
A further consideration was that détente .
would offer an opportunity to soften the barriers of ideology and
7
to prepare the ground for an eventual European settlement.
In
a relaxed atmosphere the countries of Eastern Europe would feel
sufficiently secure from Western aggression to seek greater independ­
ence from Russia and to reach out for new associations with the
Western world.
Further, detente would achieve a broad East-West settlement
limiting European fears of an American-Soviet power duopoly and of
Western Europe's becoming a greater part of an "American hegemony,"
Detente was viewed as tending to decrease American domination of
the European business scene which many Europeans, and especially
0
the French, openly deplored.
Also, it would be in Western Europe's
economic interests to strengthen the move toward new opportunities
of trade and investment with the Eastern European countries and,
g
in enlarging Western European markets,
make them less dependent
7
This would be most agreeable to France, for De Gaulle sought
the leadership of a confederation of states within a "Europe from
the Atlantic to the Urals" without the dominating presence of the
United States, On a more practical level, he was interested in
opening of ties between Eastern Europe and France as evidenced by
his visits to Russia during June 1966 and Poland in September I967,
8For a more thorough examination of this point of view from
the European perspective, see J.-J, Servan-Schreiber's The American
Challenge (New York* Atheneum House, Inc., I968).
9
The countries of Western Europe wished to avoid the additional
costs of a conventional buildup for a military confrontation they
considered to be improbable. This was especially true of Britain,
who needed to focus her attention on internal financial problems
and could ill afford to finance further buildup of military strength.
279
on overseas trade.
While there were advantages to be gained by détente, there
were serious negative considerations which prompted caution.
An
acknowledged relaxation would cut both ways regarding bloc unity.
Fear of the Soviet Union had been most effective in uniting the
Western alliance; but as détente would lead to disunity in the
Communist sphere, it would have the same tendency to divide the
Western alliance,
Viewed as a means to encourage nationalism,
detente would put less pressure on Western Europeans to unite
politically,
A second consideration was the apprehension that a détente
which led in the direction of a rapprochement between the United
States and the Soviet Union could very well lead to a situation
where, by the means of a bilateral agreement, the two super powers
would settle European problems, especially the German question,
without giving adeciuate voice to European interests, needs, or desires.
These considerations were not the only ones affecting the de­
bate over detente.
On both sides of the Atlantic, wide differences
Thus it was not mere coincidence that the French controversy
in NATO over strategic policies and in the Common Market rejection
of Great Britain occurred within this atmosphere of relaxation in
Europe,
^^This idea ran counter to the desires of the Benelux nations
who were leaders in working for a politically and economically inte­
grated Western Europe. A more nationalistic Europe could be exploited
by Soviet diplomacy with a view toward Europe's neutralization. If
this were to occur, it would have the effect of removing West Ger­
many as a barrier against possible future Soviet threats. This as­
surance was required, for without it the course of European unity
would be in serious jeopardy.
280
existed in the estimates of the potential Soviet threat.
The Western
European estimates were lower than those of the United States,
12
and the debate over these estimates proved to be an important factor
in the tensions developing within the alliance.
The political intentions of Moscow and other Communist govern­
ments in Eastern Europe were viewed with skepticism.
But their
military intentions were viewed with more assurance.
President
Johnson followed a course of action based upon the assumption
that the Soviet Union was not interested in provoking a crisis or
planning an attack in Europe,
But in doing so, the President was
not convinced that the Soviet government would resist the tempta­
tion posed by any military vacuum or even by military wealtness in
Western Europe,
To Johnson, the need to maintain a stable number
of American troops in Europe seemed vital.
The United States made no secret of its view that the political
responsibilities of a nuclear power alter its approach to interna­
tional relationships in a way that is not reflected in the policies
of non-nuclear nations.
13
There was, then, a strong desire to
move increasingly toward détente with the Soviet Union,
The Johnson
12
Alain C, Enthoven and K. Wayne'Smith, How Much Is Enough?
(New York* Harper k How, 1972), pp, 133-135, 140-142,
13
Nuclear nations must exercise greater caution in the use
of military force, both in terms of the amount of military power
they develop and in terms of the conflicts into which they inter­
ject their strength. It would appear that since World War II nuclear
power has proved to be an inhibiting factor upon their willingness
to engage in conflict. Further, when any nuclear power does engage
in conflict, the levels of escalation are carefully scrutinized and
monitored,
281
Administration believed that the Soviets also recognized the respon­
sibilities of being a nuclear power; it was hoped, therefore, that
the Soviet Union, despite its ideological hostility to the United
States, was/ at that time, moving toward a position where it would
be more willing to negotiate specific agreements providing larger
base for a more solid detente.
Thus the Johnson Administration,
as Iiad the Kennedy Administration, continued to seek areas of
mutual interest, including the area of a nuclear non-proliferation
treaty with Moscow,
14
The principles of United States foreign policy since 194? which
A speech by Leonid I, Brezhnev before the. Conference of
Communist and Workers' parties of Europe at Karlovy Vary, Czecho­
slovakia, on 24 April 19&7 is of particular interest. This speech
is an excellent example of Soviet foreign policy regarding NATO
during this period. In his speech he issued a call to all loyal
socialists to help bring an end to the NATO alliance by 1969* "In
our opinion, it is quite correct that Communists and all progressive
forces should try to use this circumstance to develop still more
widely the struggle against the preservation of this aggressive
bloc" (p, 9). While attacking both the United States and NATO as
evidences of imperialism and a threat to the workers of the world,
still he expressed areas of potential compatibility of interests
between the East and the West, Among these he included: an inter­
national treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, then
under negotiation; further cooperation in the field of economy,
science and technology, as well as culture; the peaceful use of
atomic energy ; common problems such as purification of European
rivers and seas and common efforts to cope with such diseases as
cancer and cardiovascular diseases. Finally, he advocated an
attempt to liquidate the military organizations (both NATO and the
Warsaw Pact) through the military development of mutually advan­
tageous relations with the capitalist countries of Europe on the
basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, in the interests
of a durable peace and the security of peoples. Speech by Leonid
I, Brezhnev, April 24, I967, The Soviet View of NATO, prepared for
the use of the Subcommittee on National Security and International
Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, U,S, Senate,
90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington* GPO, I966),
282
were based upon the concept of containment had had the effect of
cutting off significant feaceful initiatives between the Communist
and the Western worlds.
In the period before the Hungarian invasion
of 1956, the Eisenhower Administration had rejected the notion that
any Eastern European regime was a legitimate member of the diplomatic
community.
Even the formation of closer ties with Poland after 1956
had strong "liberationist" overtones.
But during the Johnson Admin­
istration, a different posture was assumed— one which encouraged
an intensification of interaction with Eastern Europe,
1*5
This posture of interaction was generally well received in the
United States with the possible exception of Congress and in Western
Europe, not only for reasons of political improvement but also the po­
tential economic advantages to be gained tlirough improved relations.
The lone exception was the West German government, which feared that such
a policy could lead to the possibility of the Johnson Administration's
considering diplomatic recognition of the East German regime.
If detente
was to proceed, it would have to take place within a broad policy
framework.
During the forepart of 1966, the administration began to
speak more openly and continuously about "building bridges" in
United States relationships with Eastern Europe,
By so doing, the
Johnson Administration helped close the door of old policy assump­
tions, primarily those that argued that by maintaining a hostile
and non-cooperative position toward Eastern Europe that bloc would
Lyndon Johnson's 7 October I966 speech on European rela­
tions, if not the first statement, is certainly the most notable
and illustrative of the strong desire to reestablish more friendly
relations with Eastern Europe. See below, pp. 286,
283
eventually see the error of its ways and become more cooperative
with the United States,
A more rational approach would place the
burden for new policy initiatives and creative policy upon American
or Western European initiatives.
The status quo of a divided Europe
was thus granted a strong measure of legitimacy by no less than the
American President,
In dedicating the George C, Marshall Research Library at the
Virginia Military Institute on 23 May 1964, President Johnson
recalled that to General Marshall "permanent peace depended upon
rebuilding all European civilization within its historic boundaries,"
The correctness of I^arshall's conviction had not changed.
The
President continued:
Today we work to carry on the vision of the Marshall Plan,
First, to strengthen the ability of every European people to
select and shape its own society. Second, to bring every
European nation closer to its neighbors in the relationship
of peace. This will not be achieved by sudden settlement or
dramatic deed. But the nations of Eastern Europe are begin­
ning to assert their own identity,
For President Johnson the time had arrived to convey explicitly
that there was a shift in emphasis taking place in the United States'
response to events in Eastern Europe, and the policy of opening new
initiatives to the East was found to give this shift the look of a
coherent policy:
We will continue to
has divided us from
increased trade, of
We do this for four
"build bridges" across the gulf which
Eastern Europe, They will be bridges of
ideas, of visitors, and of humanitarian aid.
reasons: First, to open new relationships
^^Lyndon 3, Johnson, address of May 23, 1964, Department of
State Bulletin. (June 15, 1964), pp, 922-924,
284
to countries seeking increased independence yet unable to risk
isolation. Second, to open the minds of a new generation to
the values and visions of the Western civilization from which
they come and to which they belong. Third, to give freer play
to the powerful forces of legitimate national pride— the
strongest barrier to the ambition of any country to dominate
another. Fourth, to demonstrate that , , , the prospects of
progress for Eastern Europe lie in a wider relationship with
the West, I?
Between this time and the delivering of his I966 State of the
Union address. President Johnson worked at laying the groundwork
for the formal declaration of such a policy.
The barrier to an
expanded program of East-West relations and trade was the congres1Q
sional legislation of 19511
denying the administration authority
to apply the same tariff schedules to goods from Gommunist countries
as to identical goods from other countries.
As a part of his new
legislative program the President stated that we should
follow this principle by building bridges to Eastern Europe,
And I will ask the Congress for authority to remove the special
tariff restrictions which are a barrier to increasing trade
between East and the West, "
Gradually, and somewhat fitfully, the United States was in the
process of moving toward the European policy Zbigniew Brzezinski
had advocated since I96I, and had been calling "peaceful engagement,"
This policy was viewed as an alternative to containment; to Dean
l?Ibid.
^^See below, p, 293, for a more complete enumeration of
legislative restrictions,
19
Lyndon B, Johnson, Message before Congress, January 12,
I9Ô6 , in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, January
17, 1966, p, 34,
285
Acheson's view of "negotiation from superiority," which was predi­
cated on some kind of Soviet rollback of her iron curtain because
of the overwhelming military superiority of the West; and to
Dulles' "Liberation" which assumed a collapse, possibly violent,
of the Communist societies due to their internal conditions.
The
policy of "peaceful engagement" assumed the capacity of the Com­
munist societies for positive change in the direction of greater
pluralism internally and a more benign posture toward the outside
world— if they were provided with the proper environment and inducements to evolve in that manner.
20
The Hon, George W, Ball, then Under-Secretary of State,
clearly stated the policy assumptions of the administration.
In
discussing the United States' policy toward Europe, he noted that
the principal question, the one of priority for national interests,
is "what kind of Europe and what kind of Atlantic world do we want?"
European and world conditions had changed in the post World War II
period, but the basic assumptions of American policies regarding
20
For a complete discussion of the entire concept of "Peace­
ful Engagement" see Zbigniew Brzezinski"s work. Alternative to Parti­
tion, cited above. In his view a more proper environment and induce­
ments to achieve "peaceful engagement" would include the following
principles. First, it would be vital to maintain Western military
strength sufficient to deter Soviet provocations to Western interests.
Second, it was believed very important to abandon any posture, military
or political, that would convey an intention of inducing a "defection"
to the Western side by any of the current Soviet allies or economic
partners East of the Elbe, A third vital step would be a shifting
of the Western timetable for German reunification, making it the
end result of the mending of the split of Europe, rather than the
precondition for a European settlement. And finally, he recommended
a vigorous expansion of economic ties and cultural contacts between
the West and Eastern Europe, the latter as the necessary concomitant
of closer commercial relationships.
286
European relations remained relevant to the current policies and
programs,
Those assumptions were:
a)
European unity and Atlantic Partnership have relevance
not only for the stability of the West but for the achieve­
ment of a secure settlement between East and West;
b)
The obvious preconditions to a settlement are changes in
the attitude of the Soviet Government;
c)
We should be realistic about the kind of settlement that
we are looking for, , , , What we must achieve is a settle­
ment embodying ôùhditiôns that will assure its permanence;
d)
No secure settlement of Europe can leave the German people
divided;
e) , , , It is important that we expand multilateral ties; and
f) We believe that justice, peace, and stability in Western
Europe have been advanced by reconciliation between the
Germans and their Western neighbors . , , and friendly
relations with the East, 21
Two observations can be made regarding the statement of such
assumptions.
First, each of these statements presupposes an idea
or concept of the kind of Europe the United States wanted.
The
policy of the United States was not working in a vacuum of non­
recognized principles but had a structure upon which it was based.
The second observation deals with the greater difficulty*
these
principles must find expression in meaningful policies and construc­
tive means of implementation.
To this latter point the speech by
22
President Johnson on 7 October 1?66
addressed itself, for it was
21
Statement by Hon, George W, Ball, Under-Secretary of State,
Department of State, Hearings on United States Policy Toward Europe,
before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States
Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington* GPO, 1966), pp, 304312,
22
Speech by President Lyndon B, Johnson to the National Con­
ference of Editorial Writers, New York ^ity, October 7 , 1966; "Making
Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task," Depaxtment of State Bulletin.
(October 24, I966), pp, 622-625.
287
an explicit statement of European policy.
In this speech the President identified three areas in which
advancements were to he made.
The first was the essential modern­
ization of NATO and the strengthening of other Atlantic organiza­
tions.
Secondly, he encouraged the further integration of the
Western European Community,
And lastly, he spoke of the need to
"quicken progress in East-West relations,"
The need was to bind
the divisions of a divided Europe, as well as a divided Germany,
The matter of highest national priority and concern was that
of keeping "NATO strong and abreast of the times,"
achieve this unified strength included;
Steps to
streamlining NATO command
arrangements ; moving to create a nuclear planning committee ; in­
creasing the logistics of supply across the Atlantic, and reas­
sessing conventional and nuclear strategy of the Alliance,
these steps were pursued, further means were sought;
Although
arranging
for closer consultations, providing common resources for science
and technology,
23
and working to accelerate the growth of the
lesser developed states.
The second priority stated was the pursuit of unity in the
West,
"To pursue that unity," President Johnson stated, "is
neither to postpone nor neglect the search for peace,"
He con­
tinued by stating his rationale for this view:
a)
A united Western Europe can be our equal partner in helping
to build a peaceful and just world order;
23
"How U.S. Industry is Penetrating Europe,"
World Report (February 6 , I967), pp, 44-52,
U.S. News &
~
288
b)
A united Western Europe can move more confidently in peace­
ful initiatives toward the East; and
c)
Unity can provide a framework within which a unified Ger­
many could be a full partner without arousing ancient
fears,
The weaknesses of this rhetoric are clear, for they appear to be
based upon weak suppositions.
Although in economic relations
this doctrine of "equal partnership" has proven itself to be
feasible, in military and defense matters the principle has proved
less feasible,
Harold van B, Cleveland illustrates this point;
If a Europe existed able to provide a sufficient deterrent
force of its own, a military partnership would be superfluous.
The two powers might find it convenient from time to time to
form an alignment against the Soviet Union or Communist China,
in a manner characteristic of the multipolar politics of the
European powers in the last century.
He continues by explaining that
the concept of equal partnership in the military sphere seems
unrealistic, because partnership (close cooperation) would be
unnecessary if Europe were equal and because equality is „c
unnecessary if partnership is Western Europe's objective.
Thus, partnership there might be, but hardly equality— certainly
not an equality in sharing political responsibilities.
The second question raised is whether a common policy could
be achieved toward the East until there existed not only greater
economic unity but increased political union,
A significant aspect
of such union would necessarily be an agreement on compatible
24
President Johnson, "I-laking Europe Whole:
Task," 0£, cit,, p, 624,
25
An Unfinished
^-^Harold
Harold van B, C
Cleveland,. The. Atlantic ____
Idea and Its European Rivals (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp, 159“l6o.
289
economic, foreign, and defense policies.
The question of political
union evoked too many threats to national sovereignty and the re­
surgence of national emotions which a number of European states
were unwilling to surrender.
Lastly, there is the issue of whether a "full partner" status
for Germany in a Western European context might not actually con­
tradict the limited value of the second point.
If such a status
were to be the case, would Eastern European fears, or for that
matter Soviet fears, be strengthened or lessened by increased Ger­
man partnership in a Western union?
Would her chances for achieving
reunification with East Germany be greater or less by more integrated
ties with the West?
One is struck by the forcefulness of the rhe­
toric but left with an uneasy reaction as to the validity of such
propositions for the successful implementation of the declared
objectives.
The third major area of policy priority is concerned with
improving the East-West environment.
of emphasis:
Three phrases mark the points
"measured firmness," "peaceful engagement," and
"building bridges,"
President Johnson maintained that only through
the continued use of "measured firmness"
could flexibility in
United States policy and a hope for the future of Europe be main­
tained,
'To establish peaceful relations with the East and to achieve
26
Illustrative of this principle was the United States' policy
during the Berlin Crisis,. For a complete discussion of this crisis
see Robert M, Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of I96I. (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1973).
'
290
a reconciliation, "a shift from the narrow concept of coexistence
to the broader vision of peaceful engagement" was essential.
27
The concern was to pursue healthier economic and cultural relations
with the Gommunist States and to gain increased authority to negotiate trade agreements.
28
This relationship would lead through
the process of "peaceful engagement" to the building of bridges
toward that region.
could be implemented:
Many means existed by which this process
easing of Polish debts to the United States ;
using the Export-Import Bank to finance American exports for the
Soviet Italian Fiat auto plant and similar opportunities; encourag­
ing greater civil air cooperation with the Soviet Union; liberal­
izing travel to Communist countries; continuing and increasing
exchange of scientific data; and achieving agreement on banning the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
As admirable as these suggestions
were, problems continued to arise.
One of the more significant issues raised by these proposals
was exhibited in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in October 1966, soon after
the speech by President Johnson,
This issue concerned the perceived
dichotomy of interests in the increased relations with Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, while at the same time fighting
"Communist aggression" in Vietnam,
Mr, Walter J, Stoessel, Jr,,
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for European Affairs, testified
27
Brzezinski, 0£, cit,, pp, 132-175.
28
Proposed East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966, Department
of State Bulletin. (May 30, 1966), p, 838,
291
before the committee and gave the administration's position on
that issue.
He stated that resistance to Gommunist aggression
is only one part of our strategy in seeking a peaceful
world. It is equally our purpose to show the Gommunist
countries that their best interests lie in the promoting the
well-being of their proples through peaceful, constructive
relations with the free world. Thus, while we withstand
Communist aggression in Vietnam, we seek other areas which
offer promising prospects for mutually beneficial EastWest relationships, 29
The objective explicit in this statement was the adoption of a
flexible policy toward Eastern Europe,
A clear statement of policy does have value as a basis for
judging actions and decisions which are made.
However, these
statements have only served to illustrate a number of problems.
Primary among the difficulties faced by the United States in im­
proving relations with Europe were those of making progress in the
Kennedy Round trade negotiations; achieving a nuclear non-prolifer­
ation treaty ; stabilizing the balance of payments ; maintaining mone­
tary stabilization and reform; relating policies in Europe to
United States priorities in Vietnam; modifying NATO and the Atlantic
Alliance; and developing more favorable relations with France,
Unfortunately, the United States' approach to Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union continued to be characterized by a series of
apparent contradictions.
On the one hand, the executive branch—
hoping to increase the westward orientation of Eastern Europe and.
29
'Statement of Walter J, Stoessel, Jr,, Hearings on Recent
Developments in Bast-West Relations, Before the Subcommittee on
Europe of the Committee on Forei^ Affairs of the House of Represent­
atives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: GPO, 1966), pp, 8-9,
292
in the ensuing relaxing of tensions, reduce the military threat to
Western Europe and ease the burden of military expenditures— en­
couraged, in a modest way, peaceful evolution in Eastern Europe,
The goal of those policies was the gradual reconciliation of Europe,
the reduction of Soviet military presence in the eastern part of
the continent, and the possible unification of Germany,
On the
other hand, the President's authority to continue on this course
had been restricted by various provisions of the Foreign Assistance
Act (1948), the Export Control Act (1949), the Battle Act (1951),
officially called the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of
1951, as well as by many riders to annual appropriations bills
and even to such measures as the Food-for-Peace-Program (1954,
PL 480),
These restrictions were based on the prior assumptions
that peaceful relations with Eastern Europe added strength to the
Communist governments of that area; that without trade. Communism
in Eastern Europe would fall apart ; and that, in the end, there
would be no possibility of any lasting settlement and peace in
Europe without the uprooting of the Gommunist regimes on that
continent.
Nevertheless, the response by Congress to the administration's
drive to open broader trade relations with Eastern Europe was cool.
In both houses there was little interest to increase the President's
authority by supporting the East-West Trade Relations Act of I966,
This proposed legislation would have given the President authority
to extend favorable tariff treatment to European Communist nations
(except East Germany) if he thought it would be in the national
293
interest.
But during 1966, when this legislation was proposed.
Congress virtually ignored the proposal and did not begin hearings
on the measure.
While the administration hoped for a complete
discussion, there could be little doubt that Congressmen did not
want to engage in debate or even vote for such a measure during
an election year.
Throughout 196? and 1968, other than hearings in both houses,
there was no action taken to ease restrictions against trading with
Communist nations.
The President's repeated requests made in
earlier years to remove legal barriers to increased East-West
trade were not taken seriously; Congress, worried by Communist
activities in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia (1968), did not respond.
Hearings which were held by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
on Europe
30
and the Senate Banking and Currency Subcommittee on
International Finance
31
were designed to provide Congress inform­
ation on trade between the East and West in preparation for debate
on the Export Control Act which was due to expire in I969 and not
as an encouragement to open new areas of East-West trade.
Thus while seeking to build bridges with the Eastern European
30
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee
on Foreign Affâirs, East-West Trade, U,S, House of Representatives,
90th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D,C,i GPO, 1968), See also
Basic Documents on East-West Trade, Subcommittee on Europe of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U,S, House of Representatives, August
1968 (Washington, D,C,: GPO, I968),
31
Hearings before the Senate Banking and Currency Subcommittee,
International Finance. U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (Wash­
ington, D,C.i GPO, 1908),
294
nations, President Johnson encountered unrelenting opposition in
the area of East-West trade.
Even so, the premise that the recon­
ciliation of Europe was impossible without the replacement of the
Communist regimes of the continent was to fall into disuse.
The
initiatives of West Germany (since approximately 1964) served to
support the conviction of Europeans that the basic political and
security problems of their continent rested in an increasing
accommodation between the East and West, in tying Eastern Europe
closer to the West, and in thus speeding the evolution of its
Communist systems into something more nearly approaching our
Western models of society.
Thé United States^ along with France,
had been in the forefront of East-West detente and only later had
the West German position grudgingly shifted toward that policy.
Their resistance had been out of a concern that the whole issue
of reunification would be sidetracked, and in fact it was.
If then the attitude of the Johnson Administration had arrived
at a point of at least tacitly accepting the Western European per­
ception of Eastern Europe as a reduced military threat, there could
be hope for achieving further agreement in the pursuit of détente
between the East and West,
A significant pillar in the policy of
detente was the desire to achieve a limitation both on the spread
and on the use of nuclear weapons and military nuclear technology.
To achieve this objective the United States sought to bring into
being the next subject of this analysis, the Nuclear Non-Proliferr­
ât ion Treaty,
Nuclear Non-proliferation Tr^ty
On 1 July 1968 after years of effort, the Nuclear Non-prolif­
eration Treaty (NPT) was opened for signing in the East Room of the
White House,
In Moscow and in London identical documents were
opened, and a number of nations signed their commitment to accept
the limitations
imposed by that agreement.
In the United States,
however, formal debate over the Treaty had not yet begun.
2
Eight days later President Johnson sent a "Special Message to
the Senate Urging Consent to the Ratification of the Nuclear Non-
Articles I and II of the Non-proliferation Treaty include the
basic limitations found within the Treaty and in doing so establish
the Treaty's definition of non-proliferation.
Article I states : "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or ex­
plosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
or control over such weapons or explosive devices,"
Article II states : "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the
Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices,"
Article III provided for the verification of compliance with the
treaty by means of international safeguards designed to insure that
nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices. It was this article which was
important within the United States— Western European relationship.
See page 308, fn 27,
While other articles of the Treaty identified other stipulations,
the first two articles provide the basic concept of non-proliferation,
Lyndon B, Johnson, "Remarks at the Signing of the Nuclear Non-prolif­
eration Treaty, July 1, I968," Public Papers of the Presidentsi Lyndon
B, Johnson. I968-I969. II, pp. 763-765,
^Ibid.
296
proliferation Treaty,"
3
Soon thereafter the Senate Foreign Rela­
tions Committee initiated hearings to determine whether the Senate
should give its consent.
In all, the submission of the Treaty was
a triumph for President Johnson's policy of detente and illustrated
the administrations great concern for the regulation and control
of nuclear weapons.
It had been in 1946 that the late Senator Brian McMahon (D-Gonnecticut) introduced the first basic United States law to regulate
atomic power, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
This law sought to pro­
hibit the conveyance of nuclear weapons design and fabrication infor­
mation to any other country.
The year 1946 saw numerous other at­
tempts to achieve international control over atomic power, the most
notable of which was the "Baruch Plan,"
4
This plan proposed putting
international control over all "dangerous" nuclear materials.
To
this plan the Soviet Union objected and submitted its own ideas; thus,
for the first time the problem of verification was forced into con­
sideration.
The next major approach to be taken was voiced on 8 December
1953 when President Eisenhower submitted his "Atoms for Peace" proposai to the United Nations General Assembly,
In this plan the
3
■'^Lyndon B, Johnson, "Special Message to the Senate Urging
Consent to the Ratification of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,"
July 9, 1968, o£, cit., pp. 801-803,
4
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, A Decade of American
Foreign Policy, 1940-49. 81st Congress, 1st Session (Washington,
B.C.; 1950), pp. IO79-IO87,
^Dwight D, Eisenhower, Mandate for Change ; 1953-1956 (Garden
City, N,Y,i Doubleday, I963), pp. 252, 254,
297
President proposed the establishment of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to protect against diversion of the peaceful
atom to military use.
This organization was eventually established
in 1957 and became the same agency later charged with safeguarding
the NPT. ^
The United States Congress in 1954, at President Eisenhower's
request, enacted the Atomic Energy Act,
the amended McMahon Act,
7
which was a successor to
This new act loosened some of the earlier
restrictions against the dissemination of atomic energy information;
it permitted greater flexibility in the use of information and
materials for the development of defense plans, for the training
of personnel, and for the evaluation of nuclear weapon capabilities
of potential enemies.
In 1955 a further approach to atomic safeguards was proposed
g
by President Elsenhower in his "Open Skies" plan.
This plan
called for reciprocal aerial inspection of the United States and
the Soviet Union and the exchange of military blueprints by the
two countries.
This plan was not accepted by the Soviets who re­
jected aerial inspection of Soviet territory— again the problem of
verification.
Despite the Soviet rejection of successive safeguard
proposals during the mid-1950's, negotiators representing the major
^Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Statute of the Internanational Atomic Energy Agency, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washing­
ton, D.G.j 1957).
'Eisenhower, o£, cit,, p, 369
^Ibid,. pp. 620-622,
298
powers continued in their attempts to reach agreement on partial
disarmament measures.
Although some of their attempts were unsuc­
cessful, the United States and the Soviet Union did sign, in 1958,
an agreement providing for an elaborate control system to verify
compliance and provide a ban on all nuclear tests.
This too proved
unsuccessful, for those charged with the negotiations were unable
to agree on a treaty which would set up the institutions and pro­
cedures required by the control system— again it was the verifica­
tion issue which proved to be the major obstacle.
In 1961, the Soviet Union resumed testing and broke, without
notice, the informal suspension of tests which had been observed
for three y^rs.
By I962 new advances ^ made it possible to develop
more feasible verification methods, and both the United States and
the Soviets agreed that a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space and under water could be verified by national means.
Thus on
5 August 1963 the "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in Atmosphere,
in Outer Space and Underwater" was signed in Moscow,
Soon after the death of President Kennedy, President Johnson
proposed a group of related measures to stop the nuclear arms race
and prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
In his
message to the Geneva Disarmament Committee, the President proposed
Q
Among these was the "black box" which entailed installation of
sealed scientific devices within the borders of the nuclear powers,
that would enable observers to determine whether nuclear testing was
being carried on, in defiance of an agreement prohibiting it,
^^See the text of President Kennedy's speech, in the New York
Tiroes. July 27, 19^3.
299
an international agreement "to stop the spread of nuclear weapons
to nations not now controlling them" and to guarantee "that all
transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place
under effective international safeguards."
Since World War II United States policy had been one which
pursued the ideal of disarmament and arms control.
The reality of
the cold war, however, forced heavy reliance upon nuclear weapons
and an arms race which only heightened the distinctions between
Efeist and West,
The continual threat of nuclear destruction had
forced nuclear powers to be more cautious in handling and spreading
information and material.
In 1964 at the beginning of the negotia­
tions for the NPT, five nations had a nuclear capacityj
States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China,
the United
It was Important
for future international stability that limitations upon the spread
of nuclear weapons be accepted by the nations of the world.
With this concern over the continued threat of nuclear power,
the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and fourteen other
nations were willing to sit down at Geneva and negotiate.
Antici­
pating the conference. President Johnson wrote to Chairman Khrushchevs
Let us emphasize. Instead, our agreement on the importance
your letter of December 31 places on preserving and strength­
ening peace— and on the need to accompany efforts for disarma­
ment with new efforts to remove the causes of friction and to
improve the world's machinery for peacefully settling disputes.
In this spirit, let us both present new proposals to the Geneva
Disarmament Conference in pursuit of the objectives we have
L y n d o n B, Johnson, Message of President Johnson to the Con­
ference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, January 21,
1964, Department of State Bulletin. February 10, 1964, pp. 224-225.
300
previously identifiedj
— to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons ;
— to end the production of fissionable material for
weapons ;
— to transfer large amounts of fissionable materials to
peaceful purposes ;
— to ban all nuclear weapons tests;
— to place limitations on nuclear weapons systems;
— to reduce the risk of war by accident or design;
— to move toward general disarmament.
In these expressions to the chairman, the Johnson Administration's
hopes for the conference are clearly stated.
But would achieving
those objectives be in the best interests of the United States and
of the allies within the Atlantic Alliance?
In considering the Atlantic Alliance a series of problems for
United States policy had to be confrontedj
the role and nature of
nuclear power status in the international system and the problem of
nuclear sharing within the Alliance; the compatibility of national
interests between the United States and her allies in the Western
Alliance, and between the United States and the Soviet Union with
implications for potential Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) ;
the specific relationship with Western Europe and the problems
attending
United States-German relations ; and the United States-
French controversy.
An agreement of the kind spelled out in Johnson's letter would
incur liabilities.
The costs involved would be a vital consideration
in the negotiation process.
First, an NPT would create interference
12
Lyndon B, Johnson, Letter to Chairman Khrushchev on the Eve
of the Reopening of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, January 20,
1964, Public Papers of the Presidentst Lyndon B, Johnson. 19631964. I (Washington, D.C.i GPO, 1965), PP. 153-155.
301
with the exploitation of the atom for peaceful purposes.
The
difficulty of establishing adequate controls and verification pro­
cedures, together with fear of compromising weapons designs, remained
a part of this risk— a risk that required a high degree of United
States-Soviet cooperation if a non-proliferation program was to be
successful,
13
A second problem was potential damage to existing defensive
alliances.
Within NATO there was concern that detente would lead
to a weakening of the United States commitment to Western Europe,
The problem was even more acute for the Federal Republic of Germany,
for detente could lead to a tacit formalization of the status quo
in Central Europe,
14
The costs to United States policy interests in achieving such
an arrangement particularly affected NATO relationships, relation­
ships already beset by difficult problems.
Could the United States
afford the tensions within NATO which an NPT would possibly bring?
Prior to the NPT it was a national decision— that is, a decision
subject only to the discretion of the President and the Congress—
whether the United States would use its nuclear assets in helping
other countries to develop nuclear weapons.
By signing the NPT,
the United States would, of course, surrender this national preroga­
tive— an important consideration, even though the United States had
excercised this prerogative only once during the previous twenty-
^^illiam C, Poster, "New Directions in Arms Control and Dis­
armament," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 43, No. 4, 1965, pp, 587-6OI,
^^Ibld,
302
four years.
As far as the effect of the NPT upon NATO was concerned, the
Johnson Administration argued that it would be good, not bad, nor
would the NPT preclude the eventual possibility of a united Europe
with the capability of a common defense policy and political unity.
The United States and Great Britain had cooperated in
developing the atomic bomb during World War II and thus Great
Britain was permitted to "share” many American nuclear secrets.
^^In an earlier draft the United States supported the view that
the signator " . . . undertook not to take any action which would cause
an increase in the total number of states and other organizations
having independent power to use nuclear weapons (and) not to assist
any non-nuclear state in the manufacture of nuclear weapons." This
position was the initial United States position although it was not
a part of the final draft of the NPT.
Secretary Rusk in his testimony in support of the NPT indicated
that the NPT, in its final form, prohibited transfer to any recopient
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or control over them. It prohibited
not only the transfer of bombs and warheads, but also of other nuclear
explosive devices, because a nuclear explosive device intended for
peaceful purposes could be used as a weapon or easily adapted for
such use. Further, and most important to the nations of Europe, the
Secretary stated ". . . it does not deal with the problem of European
unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state
to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new feder­
ated European state would have to control all of its external security
functions, including defense and all foreign policy matters relating
to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to
assume all governmental functions." This position had been held in
earlier drafts of the NPT. But with the final version of the NPT this
whole issue was seriously clouded by the United States acceptance of
Article I which imposed strict limitations upon nuclear proliferation.
See Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, Non-proliferation Treaty. 90th Congress, 2nd
Session, July 10, I968, p. 5-6.
Later in his testimony Secretary Rusk stated in response to a
question dealing with the effect the treaty would have on NATO that
the NPT would not "affect the deployment of U.S.— owned and controlled
nuclear weapons on the territory of our allies and the existing arrange­
ments under which those weapons are present." Nor would the NPT "affect
the closest consultation in . . . the Nuclear Committee of NATO on
all of the problems of strategy and the decisions which have to be
made in that field. It ^would_7 not, of course, apply to a
situation of war." Finally, Secretary Rusk urged that it would "not
303
While the United States took the position which Rusk articulated,
this was not the only reasonable interpretation of Article I.
This
view was not necessarily valid for a new federal European state in
possession of nuclear information and materials could very easily
be considered in violation of the NPT, and would be so perceived
by the Soviet Union.
Of primary concern to both the United States and the nations
of Western Europe was the construction of Articles I and II of the
treaty containing the two basic agreements: (l) not to proliferate
and (ll) not to acquire nuclear weapons.
T9
The United States
attempted to calm European fears by explaining the precise limita­
tions of those articles and by taking the position that these
articles dealt only with what was prohibited,
T8
not with what was
(cont.) interfere with the development of European unity if
that unity moves to a significant unity involving a single control
over the defense and foreign policy of the participating countries,"
He then strongly affirmed " . . . that this treaty enhances the
security of NATO, becouse they, too, have an interest in the non­
proliferation of nuclear weapons," Rusk, o£, cit.. p. 21,
^^See p. 295i above.
T8
Nevertheless, there remained real concern that negotiations
between Euratom and the IAEA would permit Euratom a principal role
in implementing the terms of the NPT in Western Europe. Further, it
was understandable that there continued to be concern over the pos­
sibility that the IAEA would be given powers which would seriously
undercut the authority of Euratom, Although this concern existed,
it is this writer's judgment that this did not create an insurmount­
able problem for any of the member nations of Euratom with the
possible exception of France, a nuclear power that refused to be a
signatory of the treaty on the grounds of its won national interests.
For a complete discussion of the potential impact of the NPT and
its regulatory provisions through the IAEA upon Euratom see Ellen G,
Collier, "Effects on the Non-Proliferation Treaty on International
Institutions," in Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pt. II, February 18, and 20,
1969, PP. 4 6 2 ^ 5 .
304
permitted.
A further concern centered on the issue of safe­
guards for the treaty (Article III) and the conflicting agencies
for providing those safeguards, either the IAEA or, in Western
Europe, Euratom,
It was felt that to permit the IAEA to operate within Western
Europe would result in abandonment of the Euratom system established
by the Common Market countries.
This the European governments were
unwilling to permit, and a test of the willingness of Eturope and
America to consult and cooperate was required.
To resolve this
dilemma, the North Atlantic Council achieved a compromise which
was acceptable to the Soviet Union and the other nations partici­
pating in the Geneva conference.
Discussing allied consultations
and cooperation, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, stated, "In sum,
the treaty that was negotiated took the concerns of our NATO allies
into account and, I believe, went as far as we could to satisfy
those concerns,"
20
And these concerns were important.
Article III, relevant to
safeguards, was of primary concern to the NATO allies.
Throughout
the negotiations of the treaty, the United States sought a solution
that was satisfactory to itself, to the NATO allies and, at the
same time, to the Soviet Union,
The problem arose because, in the
early stages of negotiation, the Common Market nations were reluctant
to permit the IAEA safeguard system to function in their countries.
19
See fn no, 15, above,
20
Rusk, 0£, cit,, p, 5,
305
They feared that such an action would result in abandonment of the
European system and have unfavorable effects on progress toward
European unity.
Accordingly, the United States assumed the position
that both systems should be permitted to continue ; but from the
beginning of the negotiations, the Soviets opposed any idea of ac­
cepting Euratom safeguards under the treaty : Euratom safeguards,
the Soviets contended, amounted only to self-inspection of Euratom
members.
Negotiations over this part of the treaty stalled until the
early fall of I967, During this period there were extensive con­
sultations and negotiations in the North Atlantic Council, in Euratom,
and in the capitals of the Alliance members.
Then the United States,
on November 2, submitted a revised compromise draft, which was sup­
ported by the North Atlantic Council as a basis of negotiations.
Finally, on 18 January I968, after a month's recess of the 18-nation
Disarmament Committee, the Soviet Union agreed to this draft.
While
requiring each non-nuclear signatory to negotiate with the IAEA, the
treaty did not in any way seriously hamper the interests of the Eur­
atom members in continuing their research and technology in the
field of nuclear energy.
Thus under the compromise each non-nuclear
nation would negotiate independently its own arrangements with the
IAEA,
21
In this manner the Western European nations would be free
21
Each signatory to the treaty was permitted the "inalienable
right" to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful ptirposes without discrimination and in conformity with the
first two articles of the treaty (Article IV)
Further, under Article III each non-nuclear signator was com­
mitted to accept certain safeguards as would be established in an
agreement negotiated with the IAEA for the purpose of verification
306
to continue under the provisions of Euratom and also within their
independently negotiated guidelines with the IAEA,
European inter­
ests had been protected and the compromise provisions of the treaty
can be credited in part to the essential consultation which had
occurred.
The problem of consultations between allies was vital
for this had been an area where Western Europeans had been most
critical of United States' actions.
It was clear to American policy makers that the priorities
sought by the United States in the NPT would highlight the necessary
advantages to be gained: namely, to
Commit the nations of the world which do not now have
nuclear weapons, not to produce or receive them in the future;
Assure equally that such nations have the full peaceful
benefits of the atom;
Provide assurance, through international safeguards, that
the peaceful nuclear activities of states which have not al­
ready developed nuclear weapons will not be diverted to make
such weapons; and
Give recognition to the determination of the parties that
the treaty should lead to further progress toward arms control
and disarmament, 22
(cont,)of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under
the treaty. This was to be accomplished so as to prevent diversion
of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.
Paragraph 3 of Article III stated that the safeguards were de­
signed so as "to avoid hampering the economic or technological
development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field
of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange
of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or produc4
tion of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with
the provisions of this Article," Clearly it was this third paragraph
in conjunction with Article IV which provided the flexibility which
was required to permit the nations' committees under Euratom to
continue their efforts but now under a joint system of international
system of safeguards,
22
Statement by the Hon, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, Hearings
before the Cpmmittee on Foreign Relations, U,S, Senate, Non-Prolifer­
ation Treaty. 90th Congress, 2nd Session, July 10, 1%, 12, and 17, 1968,
Pt, I (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968), p, 4,
307
Also the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate
took the view that:
The treaty is a recognition by the United States, Great
Britain, and the Soviet Union of a common interest in building
barriers to the very real threat of mutual annihilation in­
herent in any Increase in the number of countries controlling
the use of nuclear weapons, 23
There did appear to be a strong compatibility of interests within
the Atlantic Alliance,
Members of the Alliance recognized that a
move toward regulating nuclear power, coordinated within a larger
picture of detente, would assist in bringing about moderation
within the international system, particularly within East-West
relationships in Europe.
Even so, there continued to be serious
considerations raised by members of NATO,
These concerns of the various NATO allies were not taken
lightly,
Ti'fo nations most affected were France and Germany, and
for different reasons.
on different levels.
For Germany the problems with the NPT were
First, Germany did not want the United States
and the Soviet Union making decisions affecting her future without
her participation.
Secondly, although Germany had voluntarily given
up an interest in nuclear weaponry in 1955» still, for the future,
she wished to keep her options unrestricted.
But, regardless of
the outcome of the treaty, the United States would need to maintain
a strong commitment to the security of West Germany,
24
This, in
^Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Majority Report),
"The Pending Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty" in the Congressional
Digest, Vol. 48, No, 14, January I969» P. 10,
24
German Press Review. Press Office of the Embassy of the Fed­
eral Republic of Germany in Washington, D.C., September 6, I967,
308
the final analysis, was the crucial issue.
Throughout I968 and into 1969, Bonn had a number of reservations
concerning the provisions of the NPT.
Accompanying this criticism,
however, was a growing sense of finality about eventual German acqui­
escence in signing the document.
When the announcement was made on
18 January I968 that the United States and the Soviet Union had
agreed on a joint draft of the proposed treaty. West Germany was
quick to voice her misgivings.
When, she wanted to know, would the
great powers agree on concrete steps toward limiting their own nuclear
armaments?
25
Why had the announcement of this new draft been given
to the NATO partners only three hours before the scheduled meeting
at Geneva?
Obviously the problem of consultatlng
not been entirely resolved.
allies had
Further, there was concern over Article
III, or the control article of the treaty ; for this potentially
controversial article was not yet clear.
27
^^Westdeutsche Allgemeine, January 19, 1968, German Press
Review. Januai^ 24, I968, This view was editorially expresse3%
^^Frankfurter Rundschau. January 19 and 20, I968, Ibid,
27
This article, one of the more controversial in the treaty,
dealt with the establishment of procedures to ensure that non-nuclearweapon states were not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses
to the manufacturre of weapons. Under the terms of this article,
each of these states undertook to accept safeguards "as set forth
in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with the Statute of the
IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system," The Non-nuclear-weapon
states were permitted to work out the agreements for safeguards
with the IAEA either individually or collectively. However, nothing
in the article made the nuclear-weapon states liable to arrange­
ments for safeguards.
309
Much discussion of the NPT in Europe tended to he critical of
the draft treaty and raised the issue of potential nuclear black­
mail by the Soviet Union,
It raised an even more basic question:
"Of what use to us is the Non-proliferation Treaty?"
There is no question that the new draft is an improvement
over the original draft, or better expressed, there are less
disadvantages in the new draft, , , , But the super-powers do
not pledge themselves even to a beginning of nuclear disarma­
ment, , , , That a roan such as Professor Hallstein compares
the treaty to the agreements at Yalta , , , should be a signal
of alarm to all those who are concerned about the future of
Europe, 28
This anxiety bordering on mild paranoia became even more intense
with the belief that the NPT ifas really a device to enable the
United States and the Soviet Union to share the rule of the world.
In spite of all the critical comment, the events of 1968
moved on.
Pressure was felt by West Germany from both the United
States and the Soviets to accept and sign the treaty,
American
pressure took the form of reports that the United States might
cut off supplies of enriched uranium and nuclear fuel for atomic
power plants to nations like West Germany which delayed signing
the treaty.
Although this threat was officially denied by both
governments, doubts and suspicions lingered.
If true, this threat
would have the effect of shifting the nuclear industry to France:
for it would be outside the restrictions of the treaty because
France was a nuclear power and refused to sign the treaty.
28
Die Zeit, January 26, 1968, German Press Review, January
31, 1968,
29
German Press Review. February 14, I968,
29
310
Soviet pressure, on the other hand, took the form of insisting
that the West Germans formally renounce nuclear ambitions.
While
Germany had done so in order to gain entrance into NATO, the Soviet
Union insisted that the 1954 agreement no longer applied.
Also,
during the fall of I968 the Soviets declared that the Brezhnev
Doctrine gave the Soviets the right to intervene in the affairs of
"anti-socialist forces" under conditions of post-war agreements,
including the United Nations Charter,
30
All of these pressures
were used by the Christian Democratic Union as a rationale for
withholding West German acceptance.
31
On March, two weeks before the Geneva Disarmament Conference
was scheduled to complete its efforts on the NPT,
Foreign Minister
Brandt commented on the protection problem and technological
development :
I hope that the text concerning the last point ^disarma­
ment and arms control_7 will be more clearly formulated, and
that the nuclear-armed powers will find a satisfactory answer
to the question of how the danger of threat and extortion
with atomic weapons may be met. We further believe that
the procedural provisions of the treaty must be designed to
30
From before the Czechoslovakian invasion of August 20,
1968, until early in 19&9 the Soviets exerted a great deal of pres­
sure upon the Bonn government by a number of means. In September
1968, the CPSU leadership first asserted the right to Soviet inter­
vention against counter-revolutionary "anti-socialist forces" where
ever they might manifest themselves. In several subsequent state­
ments Leonid Brezhnev set no territorial limits to this doctrine
raising the question if this doctrine meant that even Yugoslavia,
and perhaps other countries outside the Warsaw Pact, constituted
potential targets for Soviet military action. In Bonn these
statements were viewed with real concern.
^ ^ h e Washington Post, February 7, 19&9,
311
accord with the rapid technological development. Contributing
to this could be a conference every five years, in which the
implementation of the treaty would be discussed. Regarding
the supply of atomic fuels, I do not share the concern expres­
sed here. The present draft contains no clauses to justify.
such concern. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that
the United States would not abide by its long-term delivery
contracts with Euratom, ^
Indeed, it was the position of the United States that American comraitments to Euratom would not be affected by the treaty.
33
But as the time for decision approached, it was clear that
the issues faced by the Germans remained very much what they had
been:
that the nuclear have-nots must submit themselves to a
definitive renunciation ; that because of this condition nuclear
blackmail would be possible; and that renunciation of nuclear
weapons could have eventual detrimental effects on the scientific
and economic development of the non-nuclear states.
West Germany,
in the spring of 1968, was in no position either to reject or to
accept the form of the treaty as it was presented to the United
Nations General Assembly,
Therefore, Bonn chose to wait until
after the Geneva Conference of the non-nuclear powers which
was scheduled to begin on August 29,
It was important to wait
and observe not only the proceedings of this conference but the
deliberations of the United States Senate Foreign Relations committee
and the eventual decision of the entire Senate,
32
An Interview with Foreign Minister Willy Brandt in the
Run^chau Am Sonntag. March 4, 1968, German Press Review. March 6,
Ï9SS
33
-^-^Testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, loc, cit.
312
The French, for their part, had other concerns.
They demanded
that France continue to support and control their own nuclear wea­
pons program rather than be affected by the NPT.
Speaking before
the French National Assembly, Premier Pompidou predicted disastrous
consequences for all nations' if the negotiations in Geneva should
result in adoption of the NPT:
"Let us not be asked to approve the system in which the
two great powers that are over-armed in nuclear weapons— the
United States and the USSR— would organize the disarmament of
the others, for that is firstly a mockery of disarmament,
secondly a fundamental danger to peace. That system would
oblige all the disarmed countries to split into two blocs,
each taking shelter under the protective wing it would have
chosen; sooner or later, this situation would lead us to
confrontation, which would be disastrous and fatal for
humanity." 34
Thus Premier Pompidou's statement is clear, for France the greater
danger for humanity lay in the unlimited nuclear power of the
United States and the USSR.
The question was one which required
consideration as to how the super-powers could be brought to a point
of lowering the levels of their own armaments.
For the Gaullist government the issue was disarmament— a total
disarmament which included all nations and the disarming of nuclear
weapons.
Only then would France feel secure.
An agreement which
only limited nuclear weapons in the hands of the existing nuclear
nations, thereby creating a monopoly, was insufficient.
In discus­
sing the problem of nondissemination, Mr, Gourve de Murville
34
Statement by Premier Pompidou before the National Assembly,
April 20, 1967, French Foreign Policy, Ambassade de France, Service
de Presse et d'information, New York City, January-June I967, p. 58,
313
remarked that
"Nondissemination is, assuredly, a problem, , , ,but it
is not disarmament, and we think that we should not, by taking
paths of this kind, lead the world into misunderstanding, that
is, make it believe that there is disarmament where there is
in fact only a strengthening of the monopolies of the great
powers. And I do not want to begin thinking that it is less
dangerous for a great power like the United States, Soviet
Russia, later China, to have the means of destroying the
world than to see the small countries possess nuclear weapons
that would only have the capacity of reaching their immedi­
ate neighbors," 35
To these views the Americans maintained a continued emphasis
on non-proliferation and detente, but in such a framework as not
to disrupt the NATO Alliance,
Nevertheless the commitment of the
American nuclear guarantee remained a vital element to the nonnuclear members of the Atlantic Alliance,
Throughout the negotiation of the NPT, the United States
insisted the treaty would not be permitted to affect adversely
the ability of the United States to meet mutual defense obligations.
Secretary of Defense Clsirk Clifford before the NATO Nuclear Planning
Group ministerial meeting at the Hague during April I968 took a
firm stand.
He assumed the position that
The United States Government holds the view that the entry
into force of the Non-proliferation Treaty will not interfere
with the work of the Nuclear Planning Group, The U.S. Govern­
ment intends to continue to pursue actively the work of the
Interview
"Inter-Opinions"),
de France, Service
uary -June 1967, p,
with Mr, Courve de Murville to the ORTF (Program
January ?, 19&7, French Foreign Policy, Ambassade
de Presse et d ’information, New York City, Jan­
6.
^^Karl W, Deutsch, et. a3^,, France Germany and the Western
Alliance (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, I967), p. 302.
314
Nuclear Planning Group and to seek to find solutions satis­
factory to its non-nuclear partners in NATO, It also is the
view of the U.S. Government that the Non-proliferation Treaty
will not hinder the further development of nuclear defense
arrangements within the alliance compatible with Articles
I and II of the Non-proliferation Treaty,"
The United States believed that the Non-proliferation Treaty did
not affect existing security arrangements in any way, that American security interests were therefore not endangered,
the treaty was compatible with Alliance policy.
38
and that
It had been
through consultations that the formulation of the treaty had been
possible; and it was also through consultations that credible
relations with Western Europe regarding its defense and the Amer­
ican commitment there had been maintained.
The 18-nation Geneva conference received strong support when
it submitted its draft treaty to the United Nations as U.N. Security
Council Resolution 255.
3Q
Soon thereafter on 1 July I968 the
treaty was signed in Washington, Moscow and London.
That same day.
President Johnson was able to announce the further agreement be­
tween the United States and the Soviet Union to begin talks regarding
arms limitations (SALT),
This significant agreement was viewed by
37
Paul H Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Statement before
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Non-proliferation Treaty, op,
cit,, p, 56,
og
This point was confirmed by the testimonies of Secretary
Rusk, Paul Nitze and the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Earle G, Wheeler, Non-Proliferation Treaty, loc, cit,
39
^^This resolution was the form in which the NPT was brought
before the U.N. General Assembly on June 19, 1968,
315
some European sources ^
as a means not only to create a good climate
for signing the Non-proliferation Treaty hut also to allay the mis­
givings which both Bonn and Paris had regarding the limitations of
the NPT; agreement was also seen as a means of placing limits
upon the spiraling nuclear arms race.
4l
But the announcement of
pending SALT talks was more than that, for the announcement was a
culmination of the United States' attempt to achieve a policy of
détente with the Soviet Union,
The SALT talks grew out of far
greater interests than European desires for East-West arms limit­
ations.
In announcing these talks both the United States and the Soviet
Union professed to realize that continued expenditures on heavy
armament programs could only have an ill effect upon their respective
societies.
Further, the Johnson Administration had already made
indications of the pending Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program
which it would propose to Congress; for it was already loiown that
Moscow was defended by an anti-missile defense system.
It was
vital to both super powers to limit if at all possible the levels
of arms escalation.
Achieving an agreement on the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons could be only a step in the process toward regu-
^^Die Welt. July 2, 1968, German Press Review. July 3» 1968,
^^In fact. Article VI obligated both the Soviet Union and
the United States to demonstrate good faith in seeking arms limit­
ation as an inducement to maximize adherence to the NPT, In effect
the linkage between the NPT and SALT were to entail obligations of
restraint fôt nuclear "haves" and the "have-nots," notably reduc­
tions for the haves (SALT) and denial for the have-nots (NPT),
316
lating nuclear weapons altogether.
It is in this sense that the
NPT had a profound impact, for it provided not only a greater sense
of compatibility with the Soviet Union but also a framework for
constructing such a pillar of detente.
The NPT, when sent to the Senate for its consent, precipitated
debate both during the sessions of committee hearings and on the
floor of the Senate,
The discussion— by NPT proponents— centered
upon minimizing international instability through non-proliferation
and emphasizing the opportunities for detente with the Soviet Union
which the treaty would facilitate.
Contrary argument centered upon
the problems such an agreement might create in regard to our NATO
Alliance and the lessening of options available to United States
policy makers.
42
The Senate's discussion of the treaty hit a real snag in August
when two events took place.
The first was the invasion of Czecho­
slovakia by the Soviet Union, and the second was the conference at
Geneva of the non-nuclear powers.
43
When Soviet forces moved into
Czechoslovakia, thereby creating a crisis in Central Europe, the
Senate was unwilling to accept the treaty and permitted it to
be carried over into the 91st Congress for further hearings and
See the Testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Non-Proliferation Treaty,
loc, cit.
^^The invasion occurred on August 20, 1968, and the 92
nation conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States took place under
the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly in Geneva from
August 29 to September,28, 1968.
317
debate, ^
This delay allowed a number of conditions to develop.
First,
it permitted a new administration to be elected, assume office and
then determine the national interests of the United States in re­
lation to the treaty.
The wait also permitted the dust to settle
around the Czechoslovakian invasion and enabled the policy makers
to determine realistically the extent of the Soviet threat to the
United States and its allies in Europe,
Finally, the wait was a
warning signal to the Soviets that American ratification of the
treaty would not be automatic, regardless of Soviet actions.
The second event, the Geneva conference for non-nuclear powers,
met under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly soon
after the Czech invasion.
To this meeting the nuclear powers were
invited and each, with the exception of China, was present as a
non-voting participant.
Among the topics considered by the con­
ference were the security of non-nuclear-weapon states, nuclearfree zones, measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and to secure nuclear disarmament, means of promoting peaceful uses
of nuclear energy among non-nuclear states, nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes and the application of their benefits to non­
nuclear states.
All of these topics were of concern to nations
hh.
See Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, NonProliferation Treaty. Part II, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Ses­
sion, February Ï8 and 20, I969 (Washington, D, C,, GPO, I969),
^■^Charles R, Gellner, "The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States, 1968; A Survey of Views and Proposals," Non-proliferation
Treaty. Part'll, o£, cit,. pp, 450-461,
318
who were considering giving up their claims for nuclear power.
The
major thrust of the conference appeared to raise a vital questions
with the NPT and the signature of most of the non-nuclear nations
of the world to that treaty, how then could the non-nuclear nations
hope to insure the security of their futures? ^
This conference was held in an atmosphere of strong reservation
by the super-powers.
The nuclear powers feared the questioning of
their agreements, and in particular the security aspects (Article
III) of the treaty and its reliability.
At this particular time,
only days following the invasion, the Soviets were not interested
in having the word of a "peace-loving" nation questioned.
The
problem faced by both super-powers was to convince the conference
of the integrity of their intentions, a most difficult task immed­
iately after the inability and the unwillingness of the Security
Council to guarantee the security of a non-nuclear nation (Czecho­
slovakia) against "aggression" by a nuclear power, the Soviet
Union,
To this action by the Soviets, the German Foreign Minister,
Willy Brandt, indirectly linked the question of Bonn's signing
the NPT to both "our economic interests" and "our security,"
While indicating that there was no direct connection between the
46
The answer, however inadequate, took the form of recog­
nizing that in the existing state of international relations, it
was impractical to obtain a security guarantee from the nuclearweapon states stronger than their pledges of security assurance
and the Security Council resolution of June 19, Thus, the only
thing to do was to reaffirm basic principles of international law:
a limited and hardly satisfactory arswer— but perhaps realistic.
319
Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and the German decision on the
NPT, he did believe that an indirect relationship existed.
The
crisis, he continued, furnished "an example of threat through
force of arm,"
47
Bonn officially was willing to sign the NPT and was satisfied
both with the assurances given by the United States within the
treaty and with the clarification of existing security arrange­
ments,
But there was no rush to do so— especially with the
delay of the United States Senate to approve the NPT,
There was
no desire on the part of Bonn to be "more Catholic than the Pope,"
or more American than the Senate,
49
During the fall of 1968, the attention of most Americans was
turned toward the presidential election.
Republican candidate
Richard H, Nixon supported the NPT in his policy statements, but
counseled the Senate not to rush to approve the treaty,
With
the coming into office of the new Nixon Administration, new
hearings were held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which
soon reported out the NPT by a majority vote, and on 13 March I969,
47
"The Invasion of Czechoslovakia and Europe's Future," The
Bulletin. Vol, I6 , No, 31» Bonn, August 27» 1968, p, 233.
48
Dean Rusk, Non-proliferation' Treaty, loc, cit. See also.
West Deutsche Allegemelne, July 11, I966, The Bulletin, Vol, I6 ,
No, 25» Bonn, July 16, I968, "Rusk's Interpretation of Atomic
Treaty Studied in Bonn," p, I87,
^^Tagesspiegel. August 28, I968, German Press Review. Septem­
ber 4, 19607 Also see The Bulletin, Vol. 16', No, 31» Bonn, August
27» 1968,
■^*^"The Pending Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty," The Congres­
sional Digest, op, cit,. p, 1,
320
the NPT was formally accepted and approved by the Senate, with a
vote of 83 yeas to 15 nays.
However, during the hearings, on
Frbruary 18, the reluctance of Germany was reemphasized.
Secretary
of State William Rogers was faced with the following statement by
Herr Strauss, the German Finance Ministers
As long as the Soviet Union Insists on imposing the victor's
rights over the loser of World War II contained in Article 53
and 107 of the Charter, it must be presumed that for the Soviet
Union the non-proliferation treaty may also serve to discrimin­
ate against and threaten the Federal Republic of Germany. 52
Because of Washington's disagreement with the Soviet interpretation
of those articles. Secretary Rogers privately discussed with a repre­
sentative of the Soviet Government the possibility of the Soviet Union's
assuming a different position on this issue, especially since this
issue was important to Bonn's position on the treaty.
Soon after,
Secretary Rogers reported, the Soviets did offer some assurances
to the Bonn government.
54
The Soviet motivations for this move at that time were varied.
One could not overlook the encouragement given to the Soviets by
^^Congressional Record, March 13, 1969, S. 283I.
^^Non-proliferation Treaty. Part II, p. 341. The Soviets claimed
they had a right to intervene in West
Germany undercertainconditions
of postwar agreements, including the UnitedNations charter. This
threat has been taken by the CDU as a
major rationale for withholding
the German signature.
^^Ibid.
5^Dan Morgan, "Soviets Offer Terms to Bonn on Atom Pact,"
The Washington Post, February 7, 19&9, At the time the actual Soviet
concessions were not revealed. One possibility mentioned by exper­
ienced observers was that West German ratification would satisfy
Moscow's longstanding demands that Bonn give proof of its renunciation
of access to nuclear weapons. Another possibility would be a revised
Soviet interpretation of international law and the United Nations
charter that would rule out Soviet nuclear "blackmail" of West Germany.
321
the United States government.
Also, there was growing concern in
Moscow over the increased hardening of positions against ratifica­
tion by the Germans and the possible rejection of the treaty.
Finally,
the Soviets interjected themselves neatly into the approaching Ger­
man elections by helping to make the treaty a major foreign policy
issue between the Christian Democrats, who opposed signing under
existing circumstances, and the Social Democrats, who favored acceptance of the treaty.
But whatever the motives of the Soviets the
change in the Soviet attitude was welcomed by the Bonn government.
The West German election in the fall of 1969 brought Social
Democrat Willy Brandt, a strong advocate of the DPT, to the position
of leadership as Chancellor of the Bonn government.
Soon thereafter
the German government signed the KPT, and a major hurdle in the
allied acceptance of the NPT was past.
Was the pursuit of the NPT an example of compatible interests
on the part of the United States and its European allies?
The
treaty had the effect of improving the chances of detente between
East and West as well as moderating Soviet rhetoric against the
Bonn government, thereby reducing criticism in West Germany.
significantly, the treaty led directly to an agreement
More
between
^^Ibid.
^^Non-proliferation Treaty. Part I, p. 7. The United States
had sought negotiations on a number of issues since early 1964. How­
ever, it was the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, before the
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union who indicated that the Soviet
Union was willing to engage in such talks. Subsequently, on July 1,
1968, the day the NPT was signed. Premier Kosygin referred to a
Soviet memorandom to other governments which stated1 "The Soviet
Government declares its readiness to conduct an exchange of opinion
with interested states on mutual limitations and subsequent reduc­
tion of strategic means of delivery of nuclesu: weapons." Further,
President Johnson at the ceremony of the signing of the ÎJPT, remarked.
322
the two super-powers to engage in arms limitation talks (SALT).
This advancement was clearly within the range of compatible interests
of both the Soviet Union and the United States,
Was the Western Alliance adversely affected?
Did the NPT fall
within the range of compatible interests of the NATO allies?
It
is unlikely that the Western Alliance was adversely affected by
the NPT.
Host NATO nations had signed on 1 July I968.
or soon
thereafter, with the most notable exceptions of Germany, France,
and Italy.
When Germany and Italy eventually signed, France, a
nuclear state, remained the only NATO ally not to sign the treaty.
The NPT only encouraged further French differences with the United
States, but relations with France while they had been correct had
not been very friendly in the months preceding the formal signing
of the treaty.
France's policy had been firmly established.
More
(cont.) "I am gratified to be able to report and announce
to the world a significant agreement— an agreement that we have
actively sought and worked for since January 1964» Agreement has
been reached between the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future
into discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offen­
sive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of de­
fense against ballistic missiles." Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at
the Signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, loc. cit.
It is clear that achieving discussion on arms limitations was
a priority of President Johnson. Also under consideration was the
construction of a major Anti-Ballistic Missile system (ABM) on the
part of both super-powers. Thus, if such discussions could be
initiated not only would a semblance of nuclear parity be achieved
but an expensive spiral in the arms race would be eliminated. It
was the NPT which provided a stepping stone for the two super­
powers, creating an internationally accepted foundation upon which
to base the limitation of nuclear arms.
^^The following nations signed on July 1, I968» United States,
Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom. Canada
signed on August 2, I968.
323
vulnerable and sensitive had been the situation of the Bonn govern­
ment,
Bonn had been caught between East and West, with the threat­
ening nature of the Czech invasion and the Brezhnev Doctrine to
consider.
The interests of the West Germans rested firmly in the
strong and firm commitment from the United States to protect, with
nuclear strength if necessary, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Repeatedly, during hearings and debates on the treaty, the
Johnson Administration
and later the Nixon Administration
reaffirmed that the NPT would not have a deleterious effect on
United States commitments to the NATO allies, politically
militarily.
or
Much of the Bonn hesitation had not centered on the
credibility of the United States commitment, although this too was
questioned, but upon the nature of the relationship between Bonn
and Moscow,
In both Bonn and Moscow, for different and somewhat
opposing motivations, the governments were able to achieve an under­
standing based on mutuality of interest in the acceptance of the
treaty.
In spite of Vietnam, Europeans were impressed that the United
States and the Soviet Union could agree,
and that this agreement
might lead to further moves toward disarmament by the super-powers.
The NATO Alliance was not seriously endangered, and the roads to
further European relations were not damaged,
58
Hearings, Non-proliferation Treaty, Part I,
59
Hearings, Non-proliferation Treaty, Part II,
^^Vorwarts , January 25, 1968, German Press Review, January
31, 1968.
324
It would appear that a compatibility of national interests
existed among almost all the nations of the Western Alliance,
The
United States had helped bring a moderating effect to the interna­
tional system and protected the viability of the NATO Alliance
with its security arrangements— all while the Vietnam conflict was
heating to its greatest intensity.
Vietnam»
Crisis of Commitment (?)
Perhaps no single war in American history has affected the
culture and life of the people of the United States as has the
Vietnam conflict.
Internal upheaval involving riots, campus demon­
strations and an apparent polarization of society proved to he
only a part of the impact and spin-off of Vietnam,
But these same conditions were also calling into question the
compatibility of policy interests of the United States and those
of the allies in the Atlantic Alliance.
American involvement in
Vietnam had the clear potential of injuring United States rela­
tions because of the failure of Europeans to realize that America's
problem was their problem— although they recognized that that in­
volvement carried direct implications for them.
Most important
upon Alliance relations was the impression that American attention
was directed elsewhere, ^
Was Ehirope being ignored?
What would happen to some of the basic issues confronting the
Alliance, issues such as nuclear sharing, detente, American-French
relations, and economic relations?
worsen?
Would these policy difficulties
Or would the issues themselves atrophy as a result of
American inattention?
Perhaps most important was the question of whether the Western
Europeans could retain their confidence in American values and per­
spective— in short, American leadership.
These were crucial areas
"European Journey," New York Times, November 21, I966; "A
Search for Solutions to European Problems," Wall Street Journal,
September 2, I965; "Vietnam," Deadlock Shatters the U.S.A.'s World
Peace-keeping Modes of Thinking," The German Tribune, April 6 , I968,
326
of concern} for in order to maintain that confidence, the Johnson
Administration would he expected to demonstrate the compatibility
of its policies with those of its Eîuropean allies.
This was a
difficult task under the pressures of Vietnam and the tensions
present in society.
Nevertheless, United States involvement in Indochina had been
a fact of international life since the post World War II period.
During the decade from 19^5 to 1954 and the fall of the French at
Dienbienphu, United States policy supported the French government
in their attempt to reestablish their authority over the former
colonies of Indochina,
This period was characterized by a growing
concern with the steady pressure being felt from the growth of the
"international Communist movement."
To protect what it viewed as
its security interests in Southeast Asia, the United States, in
1954, entered into the SEATO
2
agreement— an agreement that was
3
itself a response to the unsatisfactory Geneva Pact of 1954.
South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Parties to
this Treaty included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the
United States. By protocol Cambodia, Laos and the free territory
under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam were added for the
purpose of Article IV (basic principles of protective assistance)
of the treaty.
3
-^It was as a result of the Geneva Pact that free elections
were to decide the future government of Vietnam, However, the
elections never took place because of United States insistence and
the Eisenhower Administration's support of the existing Diem regime.
This action effectively separated Vietnam into two parts— a prelude
to the Vietnam War of the 1960's and the attempt on the part of
North Vietnam to reunite that country.
327
From 1954 onward, until late 1964 and early I965 American com­
mitments and interests to the weak and unstable regimes of South
Vietnam increased.
Successive administrations explained that the
United States had been asked for aid against Communist aggression
and there existed the need to contain the aggressors.
Further,
the United States desired to protect its own security which was
believed to be significantly tied to the peace of Asia,
America,
it was felt, must support the "cause of freedom" in Vietnam.
What­
ever the validity of these principles, there could be no doubt
of the growing commitment of resources from the United States to
achieving these objectives half a world away.
k
While each of the post World War II administrations had partici­
pated in a policy involving the United States' interests in South
Vietnam, it was the Kennedy Administration which introduced approx­
imately 15, 000 military advisors into South Vietnam; and after the
political and military situation grew much worse in late 1964, the
buildup of American forces under President Johnson eventually reached
over 550, 000 men by 1969.
Clearly there had been a change from the
political assistance of the earlier years (1954-1962) to heavy mili­
tary aid and the subsequent persuasion of Saigon to accept the Ameri­
canization" of the war as a necessity if eventual defeat was to be
avoided, ^
4
U.S. Congress Senate, Supplemental Foreign Assistance Fiscal
Year 1 9 ^ — Vietnam, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 09th Congress, 2nd Session, Part I, (Washington; GPO, I966),
pp. 563-576, See the Statement of Dean Rusk.
York;
^The Pentagon Papers as published by the New York Times (New
Bantam Books, Inc., 1971), PP. 79-157.
328
From a look at the Budget of the United States, the authori­
tative allocation of resources and demonstration of national values,
it is clear that the United States placed real value upon its mili­
tary commitment,
A jump of over $7 billion in the defense budget
between FY I965 and FY 1966 reflected the growing commitment of
both arms and men to Vietnam,
And by FY 19&9 the cost of the Viet­
nam conflict was nearly $29 billion dollars, an onerous load for
the American taxpayer to carry, ^
While defense budgets reflect a
rapid growth during the middle and late 1960's, additional supplemental funds were sought to support the war effort.
7
At the same
time a large number of social and domestic spending programs which
account for keeping the percentage of the entire budget outlays
g
in an approximate equilibrium were begun.
The United States absorbed other costs as well.
The cost of
25, 000 American dead and many thousands more who were wounded was
very heavy.
These battle casualties during the Johnson Administra­
tion were the most graphic and tragic cost of the war.
Besides the
lives lost and treasure expended, the declining strength of the
dollar brought about by inflation and the growing balance-of-payments
^The U.S. Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1972, (Washington, B.C.:
GPO, 197Ï7T
n
'Supplemental Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year 1966— Vietnam,
op, cit.
8
U.S. Senate, Impact of the War in Southeast Asia on the U. S,
Economy, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st ”
Congress, 2nd Session, Part II (Washington, D, C. 1 GPO, 1970), p, 219,
329
deficit caused the United States great concern.
Further, there
was a cost to American prestige all over the world, and both
publicly and privately the United States continued to receive
Q
criticism for its role in Vietnam,
There was a rapidly increas­
ing volume of this criticism at home over the continuing cost of
the war, a recognition that this particular international involvement and its attendant rationale were becoming questionable.
10
Yet, as this criticism gained strength, the Johnson Adminis­
tration’s most staunch supporters
continued to argue the legit­
imacy of the United States' effort as a commitment long in devel­
opment and strong in its requirement for the security of Southeast
Asia and the national security interests of the United States, This
commitment and its fulfillment would demonstrate to the world— in
particular our European allies— that once committed to the protection of free people the United States would not retreat.
12
The
American willingness to "contain" Communist aggression could not
9
Most notable among the foreign critics was President Charles
De Gaulle of France, His censorious comments can be found in his
public statements and news conferences of this period. See French
Foreign Policy, Official Statements. Speeches & Communiques. 19581969, (New York » Ambassade de France).
”
^*^See the Hearings on the Supplemental Foreign Assistance.
Fiscal Year 1966, loc. cit,
^^Among them were major figures in the Administration such
as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
and Special Assistant to the President Walter Rostow,
12
Dean Rusk, Supplementel Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year
1966— Vietnam, op. cit.. p. 563.
330
be denied!
it was a requirement of international life.
It was Secretary of State Dean Rusk who declared,
The issue in Southeast Asia becomes worldwide because we
must make clear that the United States keeps its word
wherever it is pledged, 13
The impact of this commitment was to have far-reaching effects
internationally.
Among European allies there was concern over
the effect of the American commitment in Vietnam upon European
relations with the United States, as well as upon the problem
of detente and the changing nature of Communism.
To the Johnson Administration, it was important that the
United States maintain what was viewed as its commitments under
SEATO in order to convince Europeans of the reliability of the
American commitment toward Europe, and in particular the security
commitments in NATO.
Yet even though a spokesman
for the Bonn government issued
a prompt and positive welcome to President Johnson's peace initia­
tive,
the Frankfurter Allgemeine a few days later raised the
issue bluntlyI
Since the last change in American policy, the almost silent
question is being raised among the alliesi And how secure
l^Ibid., p. 576.
14
The Bulletin, Issued by the Press and Information Officer
of the German Federal Government, Vol. I6 , No. 13, (April 9, 1968),
P. 89.
^•^he President's Address to the Nation Announcing Steps to
Limit the Wax in Vietnam and Reporting His Decision Not to Seek Reelection, Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B, Johnson, 19681969, Vol, I, (Washington, D.C.! GPO, I969), pp. ^9-476,
331
are we? This is not petty distrust ; it is simply a matter
of quite undmmatic seriousness, growing out of sober
experience.
And how ■'would such a policy as the President's new initiative
affect Europe?
It would make clear thât the American world power,
after a deep military commitment to the protection of an ally,
under the SEATO treaty, could substantially change its policy.
If
this view were accurate, it would tend to substantiate the view of
those in Europe— most notably President Charles De Gaulle— who
warned against unconditional submission to the American protective
power and renunciation of the capability of independent action.
Further, by his not only announcing a peace initiative but by
his also deciding
to withdraw from politics, the President posed
the problem of a political vacuum in American-European relations.
It would be difficult for the European allies of the United States
to have occasion to join in the decisions of American foreign
policy when there was doubt of that policy's being adopted by
Johnson's successor.
Another indication of European concern about the American commitment centered on Manlio Brosio's earlier visit to Washington.
17
This visit was undertaken because of the perceived double role of
the United States as the leading power both in NATO and in the war
in Asia.
Brosio's visit to Washington was essentially to attain
16
Frankfurter Allgemeine. April 6, 1968.
17
This visit by Manlio Brosio, Secretary General, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, took place on December 5i 1967.
332
assurances from President Johnson that NATO would not get the short
end of the stick in planning.
Certainly only a strong viable alliance
would be in a position to seek, and achieve, any successful negotiation of a mutual troop withdrawal with the Soviet Union,
As the war in Vietnam wore on, Europeans did, in fact, express
concern in I968 over the lack of creative policy— or lack of atten­
tion to European matters.
But even these criticisms were coupled
with a realization that the United States was deeply committed to
resolving the conflict in South Vietnam,
Thus, the attitude in
Europe was more of frustration and disappointment over the obvious
gaps in United States policy and less over any fear of America's
unwillingness to meet its commitments to NATO,
The growing realization that Vietnamese problems could not be
resolved by a military victory but would have to be resolved by a
political solution added more fuel to discontent and frustration
in Washington and was heard both within the administration and in
the halls of Congress,
One object of this vexation was the un­
willingness of America's allies to assist in resisting the Communist
aggression in Southeast Asia.
Did NATO have a role to play in
T_8
The amount of concern in Europe over America's honoring the
NATO agreement was minimal, Particularly was this true when compared
with the SEATO arrangement, for the military arrangements under NATO
literally insured American involvement in Europe. This was not seen
as applicable to American commitments under SEATO, The only action
required by that treaty was the consulting with one another and
following through with each country's governmental process before
being committed to military action. Thus for the Europeans there
was not a direct correlation between the United States' commitment
under the two treaties.
333
Southeast Asia?
This was a question being raised for consideration,
particularly while the United States was contributing so much to
European defense.
Speaking to a Senate committee, Acting Secretary
of State George W. Ball tried to account for the indifference of
the United States' NATO allies:
To the extent that the Atlantic nations may not be totally
sympathetic with our position in South Vietnam, I would say
that they do not feel the same pressure of responsibility
that we feel.
He continued:
Some of the other member nations of NATO are not in a posi­
tion where they themselves are carrying out responsibilities
of any consequence in Southeast Asia or in that entire part
of the world. They do not therefore feel the same urgency
that we feel about it. ^9
President Johnson, in the Joint Statement following discus­
sions with Chancellor Erhard, spoke of the needs in Vietnam and
the
efforts of the governments of South Vietnam and the United
States, together with their allies, to bring about a peace­
ful and just settlement.
And he expressed appreciation of the aid given by the Federal Republic of Germany.
20
It is of interest to notice the President's
use of the phrase "together with their allies"— which could be
^U.S, Senate, United States Policy Towards Europe. Hearings
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Testimony of George Ball,
Acting Secretary of State, June 30, 1966, (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1966), p. 266.
20
Lyndon B. Johnson and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, A Joint
Communique in Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson.
1965, Vol. II (Washington, B.C.: GPO, I966), pp. II65-ÎI67.
334
interpreted as an expression of appreciation and as an implied re­
quest for more aid from the allies of the United States,
A few
days earlier, the President, in referring to Britain as "co-chair­
man of the Geneva Conference," had described the British renewal
of the "quest for peace" as a positive move— another statement
that implies the President's desire that the European allies play
a role in resolving the Vietnam war.
21
But the attitude of the NATO allies was one of quiet disagree­
ment, with the exception of Charles De Gaulle, who was quite vocal
in his opposition to the continued United States activities in
Vietnam,
22
President De Gaulle left no doubt that he believed
United States involvement in South Vietnam to be a wrong policy.
Even so, France did contribute FR 1, 060, 000 for technical and
economic development in South Vietnam beginning in I960.
The
Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, was not enthusiastic—
but moderately supportive, a matter of compatible policy interests.
Nevertheless, Bonn did not see the value of making significant
contributions:
West Germany's financial aid and technical
23
^^Ibid., pp. 1157-1158. On this occasion the President shared
the platform with Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the United Kingdom.
22
Charles De Gaulle, Speech by General De Gaulle in Phompenh,
French Foreign Policy » Official Statements. Speeches and Communi­
ques. (New York; Ambassade De France» Service de Presse et d' In­
formation, 1966), pp. 109-111. See also the French-Cambodian Declar­
ation of September 2, I966, pp. 111-112. See also the French Foreign
Policy : Official Statements. Speeches and Communiques. Volumes for
the years I967 and Ï968.
23
For a complete listing of contributions by nations of the
free world, see the Hearings on the Supplemental Foreign Assistance
Fiscal Year 1966. op. cit., pp. 63-68.
335
assistance were, at best, token effort.
Although Great Britain made a few mild public statements on
behalf on the American effort and gave some token aid, her essen­
tial position was that of non-support for the wax effort in Viet­
nam; on this issue, her interests were not compatible with Amer­
ican policy.
Great Britain had interests in Southeast Asia, but
they were concentrated in I4alaysia,
While the Wilson government
did not support the United States in its military efforts, it did
assist in attempts to achieve a settlement for Vietnam.
24
On
the whole, the NATO nations' support was sparse and limited to
diplomatic cooperation, and to token economic, technical or
medical aid.
The Bonn government alone gave vocal support of the
United States mission in South Vietnam.
This lack of support from the allies in NATO may be explained
by the fact that the allies were convinced that the United States
was not committed to the defense of Europe as an act of choice,
but as an act of necessity.
Thus, while they might question the
wisdom of the Americans and their policy in Vietnam, they did not
fear a loss of American commitment to Europe,
Although the governments of Western Europe were not disposed
either to make major contributions to the Vietnamese effort or to
go much beyond technical and moral support, their criticisms of
United States policy may have been the result of causes other than
24
/
Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rine­
hart and Winston, 1971)» PP. 250-253. Also see Appendix A, No. VI,
Vietnam Major Peace Initiatives, pp. 579-589.
336
lack of sympathy or enthusiasm.
First, Europeans viewed the United
States as the outsider in Vietnam,
The Johnson Administration's
insistance that the act of aggression took place from the north
found only limited acceptance.
And for the United States to respond
so massively with military force only made American involvement
suffer by comparison:
the intervention of the United States was
far more conspicuous than was that of North Vietnam,
25
A second difficulty was related to the fact that the United
States was the most powerful nation in the world engaged exten­
sively in combat with a third-or fourth-rate military power with
limited resources.
For many Europeans this comparison could not
help placing the United States at a serious psychological disad­
vantage.
Further, there were those who believed that America's
actions had not matched her calls for peace.
For while there had
been frequent calls for a peaceful settlement and the President had
been tempted by unconditional peace talks, the United States con­
tinued to expand the war, allowing its escalation to ever higher
levels.
All this led to the questioning of the United States'
intentions as well as her motives.
This attitude could only lead
to a decline in the type of moral leadership which the United States
wished to maintain.
French Foreign Policy. Official Speeches and Communiques.
January-DecemberV Ï967» Ambassade De France, Service de Presse et
d' Information: New York. See statements by President Charles De
Gaulle on Vietnam.
^^United States Policy Toward Europe, op. cit., p. 288.
337
European Confidence in United States Leadership
Nagging questions regarding America's problems did raise the
problem of European confidence in America,
It was believed that
the United States, as powerful as it was, must eventually give way
to the Viet Cong and that, regardless of American wealth, even the
United States could not in the long term afford to spend so many
dollars abroad.
Domestically, the Europeans believed that the
race riots undermined American strength and debilitated its capacity
to act, partly by the reawakening tendencies towards isolationism
and protectionism.
Perhaps even more imprtant than the Eîuropean
attitudes toward United States policies were the concerns over
America's self-confidence, her own self-image.
27
Three major causes produced those conditions:
race riots,
the flight of the dollar, and military misfortunes in Vietnam.
Certainly the success of the Tet offensive during February I968
did little to inspire confidence in the success of American policy.
All of these helped precipitate a recognition on the part of Pres­
ident .Johnson for the need to step aside.
Nevertheless, European concern dealt more with the American
self concept and with the wisdom of pursuing policies which were
not proving productive.
On the other hand, there was little
threat to what they believed to be the American commitment to
Western Europe through NATO.
Important to both Europeans and Amer­
icans was the realization that the events in Vietnam were forcing
^^United States Policy Toward Europe, op. cit., p. 262.
338
not only the United States but the entire NATO alliance to reappraise
their strategy, and thereby to take a fresh look at the problem of
security.
These values of American self-confidence, strategic pol­
icy, economic and social stability all came to play an important
part in challenging the moral leadership of the United States,
It
was precisely this point of moral leadership which troubled the
United States and particularly the members of the Johnson Adminis­
tration,
Speaking on the issue of European assistance. Secretary Rusk
emphasized the need to preserve the security of the North Atlantic
Community.
He asserted that the common security of the North Atlan­
tic nations
is involved also in what happens in Africa, the Middle East,
Latin America, South Asia, and the Western Pacific. They have
a vital common interest in the defeat of active aggression in
Southeast Asia, They have a common interest with the free
peoples of the developing world in putting an end to aggression
by the infiltration of arms and trained fighting men across
national frontiers.
The North Atlantic nations should recognize those vital
common interests and join in supporting them, 28
On 23 February I966 President Johnson affirmed in strong language
the support given to the Vietnamese effort by five of the allies
of the SEATO agreement; but it still remained the concern of
official Washington that the NATO allies had not been of greater
aid—
and, in truth, a number of ships carrying cargo to North
Vietnamese ports were flying flags of European registry.
29
pO
Dean Rusk, "Our Atlantic Policy," an Address before the
Cleveland Council on World Affkirs, March 6,1965, Department of
State Bulletin. (March 22, 1965, pp. 427-431.
29
^Supplementary Foreign Assistance, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
339
Time and again the suggestion was made that in order to meet
military requirements in Vietnam the troops stationed in Europe
should be used— that there existed no real fear of an immediate
Soviet military attack on Western Europe.
30
For, if the Europeans
were not willing to make more sizable expenditures for NATO defense,
then the United States should not be more willing to shoulder the
large financial costs of European defense than Europeans, especially
with Vietnam absorbing so much of the United States' military
expenditures and effort.
31
The Europeans, without exception, believed that their security
was dependent on American commitments, backed by the presence of
substantial United States forces on the Continent.
Thus, an appre­
ciable reduction in United States forces would arouse fears of Amer­
ican disengagement and doubts about the feasibility of NATO security
arrangements.
Further, the likelihood, if not the certainty, was
that American troop withdrawals would lead not to an increase in
Western Europe's defense effort, but rather to a net decrease.
Beyond that were other considerations i American forces in Europe
did perform a symbolic function, and the United States must take
care that a withdrawal would not be interpreted as a reduction of
the American interest in Europe; also, these forces must not be
30
See the U.S. Senate, United States Troops in Europe. Hearings
before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Aimed Ser­
vices Committee, April 26 and May 3» 196? (Washington, D.C.i GPO,
1967).
^^See "United States Force Levels in Europe," pp. 206-231.
340
reduced as a result of unilateral American budgetary decisions.
32
To Congressional committees, in interviews or in speeches,
the thrust remained the same— that a withdrawal from Vietnam would
result in a severe loss of the United States' "credibility" and
prestige.
accept.
This was a cost President Johnson was unwilling to
In a message to Congress requesting a supplemental appro­
priation for Vietnam the President asserted;
we are directly committed to the defense of South Vietnam, In
1954 we signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.
That treaty committed us to act to meet aggression against
South Vietnam. The Senate ratified that treaty and that obli­
gation by a vote of 82 to 1 .
Claiming that this was a war of liberation and not a civil war, he
continued1
But we will not be fooled or deceived, in
in the world where we%have a commitment.
war against the independence of nations.
as we have met other shifting dangers for
Vietnam or any place
This kind of war is
And we will meet it,
more than a generation.
On another occasion the President expressed what he believed to be
the moral imperative in the Vietnam conflict:
We are there because for all our shortcomings, for all our
failings as a Nation, and a people, we remain fixed on the
the pursuit of freedom as a deep and moral obligation that
will not let us go. 34
^^Hans Josef Strick, "NATO Officials Anxious at Member-State
Tendency to Reduce Troop Strengths," Sueddeutsche Zeitung. May 9»
1968.
33
^^Lyndon B. Johnson, Message from the President to the Con­
gress regarding the Supplemental Appropriation for Vietnam, May 4,
1965, Department of State Bulletin. (May 24, 19^5)» pp. 822-825.
34
Lyndon B. Johnson, "Why We Are in Vietnam," Telephone Remarks
by the President to the AFL-CIO Convention, December 9» I965, in
Documents on American Foreign Relations 1965. edited by Richard P.
Stebbins (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 189-191.
341
Although this line of argument was used frequently, the issue was
stated even more firmly by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee during the Winter of I966. Speaking of the
United States* position in Vietnam he claimed that
Our commitments to South Vietnam were not taken in isolation
but are part of a systematic effort in the post-war period to
assure a stable peace.
The issue in Southeast Asia becomes worldwide because we
must make clear that the United States keeps its word whereever it is pledged, 35
A few months later, in a joint statement made by the President
and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany
this same theme emerged;
President Johnson informed Chancellor Erhard of the current
situation in Vietnam, Chancellor Erhard reiterated his view
that the assistance given by the United States to Vietnam's
resistance against aggression is important to the entire free
world. Chancellor Erhard stated that in his view the efforts
and sacrifices made by the United States in Vietnam provide
assurance of the seriousness, with which the United States
regards its international commitments, . .
3°
It was important for the administration to interpret the
struggle in Vietnam in moralistic terms— how else could they hope
to maintain the legitimacy of the support of the American people?
It was also important to utilize the argument of maintaining the
"strength of the United States commitment,"
for it was important
to minimize dissent abroad by giving this policy in a global con-
^•^Supplemental Foreign Assistance 1966— Vietnam, op. cit.,
p. 576.
86
Lyndon B. Johnson and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, A Joint
Communiqué in Public Papers of the Presidents. Vol. II, loc. cit.
342
text.
Great value was placed on what other nations perceived of
American security commitments in other areas of the world.
37
Apparently at no time did those making policy seriously raise
questions which were vital to making such commitments of resources:
Was the involvement in Indochina vital to American security inter­
ests and, if so, how vital?
Could the situation in South Vietnam
he saved militarily, given the nature of the Saigon government and
its seeming lack of popular support?
Vietnam worth?
And what cost, if any, was
It was the "realistic" nature of these questions
which needed to be faced,
A reading of the Pentagon Papers suggests strongly that these
questions never were seriously raised during the formulation of
policies and the escalation of armed involvement.
American policies
were based upon responding to situations and conditions rather than
first determining the extent to which Vietnam should be a priority
of national interest.
for discussion.
The normative part of the issue was not open
As a result not only did the United States escalate
its military involvement but it also escalated its rhetorical com­
mitments by invoking such moral pressures as:
assisting a small
country to achieve independence, resisting outside aggression, re­
sisting Chinese .expansion through its client. North Vietnam, and,
finally— when other explanations failed— preserving the credibility
of the American promise to keep all commitments.
37
88
See both the Hearings on the Supplemental Foreign Assistance.
Fiscal Year 1966— Vietnam, loc. cit., and United States Policy Toward
Europe, loc. cit.
^®The Pentagon Papers, loc. cit.
343
How unfortunate It was that this rhetoric was believed to be
necessary because of the lack of both domestic consensus and foreign
compatibility with the war effort— because, that is, of the need to
gain support for a policy of tenuous national interest.
The Communist
monolith was a concept no longer accepted by the official policy­
makers within the administration.
It became, therefore, increasingly
difficult to understand the strong move to achieve détente with the
Soviet Union on many issues including the Test Ban agreement, the
Non-proliferation Treaty, and "building bridges" in Europe while,
at the same time, protracting the struggle against a small, weak
nationalistic Communistic regime in Hanoi in a "holy war" over the
future of Vietnam,
What had become clear was the need for the United States to
arrive at some form of accommodation with both the Soviet Union and
with China, since both of these governments were involved in giving
support to North Vietnam.
39
Any settlement in Southeast Asia de­
pended upon the cooperation of these governments.
For Europeans this was a serious and difficult situation.
The
United States had committed over half a million men and billions
of dollars to the effort in Vietnam— an issue considered "most im­
portant" by Americans in 19&7 and I968. The army had withdrawn
15, 000 troops from the American contingent in Europe for transfer
and training for Vietnam (I966) ;
the Congress was seriously
^^Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs.
Vol. 46, No. 1, October I967, pp. 111-125.
^^See psge 213.
344
discussing substantial troop reductions for the sake of lowering the
financial costs and minimizing the balance-of-payments deficit visU-vis Europe.
Further, from the European point of view, too much
emphasis was being given to Vietnam, a nation whose political align­
ments were of little significance to American security interests—
alignments that could be construed as vital only if the validity of
the "domino theory" made it imperative for American involvement to
maintain the status quo.
This is a crucial issue for this study and can be verified on
the basis of rather cursory examination of both the memoirs of
President Johnson, The Vantage Point,
42
and the Public Papers of
the President. Lyndon B. Johnson,for the years of I963 through 1969.
This question of a lack of attention to European affairs— or, con­
versely, inordinate concern with Vietnam— can best be evaluated by
the priority which President Johnson placed upon the various areas
of public policy.
The allocation of space in President Johnson's
recent autobiographical explanation of his administration is
instructive— though, of course, it should not be considered definitive.
One might conclude that the amount of space in his book would indicate
either, first, the extent to which he considered each subject as
demanding priority during his administration or, secondly, the degree
to which his policies and actions during those years needed further
clarification or justification.
^^See Pages 206-231.
^^Ibid.
If our conclusion is the first of
345
these two possibilities, the results are interesting and helpful;
if it is the latter, our conclusion only highlights the extent to
which goals of the administration had not been made clear to or
been accepted by the American people.
Issue Area
No, of Chapters
Pages
5
134
11
315
Vietnam (only)
5
201
Europe
2
46
Social or Domestic Issues
Foreign Relations (all)*
Other
7
43
*includes the Vietnam Chapters
Clearly, foreign issues dominated President Johnson's thinking; and
the issue that loomed largest in his view was the troublesome prob­
lem of Vietnam, which dominated five chapters and 200 pages— over
one-third of the entire book.
It was this issue which President
Johnson wanted to clarify to posterity.
Single chapters of varied
length were given to such subjects as the Caribbean, food crises in
India, Israel's six-day war, and regionalism (Latin America),
Finally,
two chapters were devoted to Europe and the thawing of the Cold War
(a total of 46 pages). By contrast, European relations took a back
seat to the predicament of Vietnamese involvement.
Also, as com­
pared to Vietnam, even the social issues (war on poverty, civil
rights legislation, economy, etc.), received much less attention than
Vietnam.
Admittedly, it is dangerous to draw firm conclusions from
The Vantage Point. op. cit.
346
such evidence.
Nevertheless, one might speculate that, indeed, Viet­
nam was not only an obsession with many Ajqericans— it was also a
preoccupation df the President,
Also instructive as to the President's priorities is the extent
to which the budgetary allocations and supplementary requests re­
flected the President's policies,
A clear definition of those allo­
cations can be seen in the chart in Appendix A.
The most significant
areas of increased appropriation were the functional areas of national
defense, education and manpower, health and community development, and
housing.
It is most significant that the two functional areas most
concerned with the Office of Economic Opportunity increased from 0.2^
to 2.3^ in 1968 and then decreased in 1969 to l.lfo, while Education
and Manpower went from 1,5% in 1964 to 3,8% in 1968 and 3.5^ in I969.
Also, expenditures for Health increased from 1,5% in 1964 to 6.3^ in
» 1969, an important and significant increase.
44
At the same time
defense spending remained at a stable level of 44^ of the national
budget.
In light of the statements made by President Johnson in the
Public Papers of the Presidents.
4*5
the charge by the Europeans that
44
/
See Appendix A, page 376.
4*)
■'See chart on following page. The utterances fall into dif­
ferent categories of public s'tatements. They include "Major State­
ments" of policy— i.e., lengthy policy pronouncements such as Presi­
dent Johnson's October 6, 1966, "Bridge Building" speech; "Brief
Statements" of three or fewer pages; announcements made at news con­
ferences; Presidential Unit citations; and a variety of other types
(for example, there is the category of questions to which the Presi­
dent responded either in the news conferences or in interviews as re­
corded in this source). It should be noted that there are no exact
347
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348
the American President was too busy with Vietnam to be very attentive
to the concerns of Ehirope achieves a degree of credibility.
Clearly
the greatest area of attention was that given to Vietnam if one con­
siders major speeches or policy statements, brief statements, and
the number of questions directed at Vietnam during the many news con46
ferences.
Further, the total number of statements on Vietnam is
significantly larger than those given to European-related matters
(39.7^ and 11.1# respectively).
Nevertheless, except for Vietnam,
the attention given European matters is significantly greater than
that given to any other single geographic region or foreign policy
,
issue.
47
^(cont,) boundaries separating these categoriess on occasion,
it has been necessary to rely on thoughtful subjective choice in
determining the category in which to place a public statement. At any
rate, the distribution represents my own analysis, not that of a
secondary source.
46
It is true, of course, that in news conferences the questions
may reflect more the interest of the questioner than the intent of the
President to discuss the issue. Nevertheless, the time consumed as
well as the energy expended in responding cannot help but identify
the primary concerns before the President.
47
There would appear to be an exception, namely "other foreign
policy areas." This category was a catch-all for issues which did
not fit into the broad perspective but more often were dealt with
on the basis of a given period of time, i.e., American involvement
in the Dominican Republic, the I 967 Arab-Israel'War, and relationships
with various nations in Latin America, especially Mexico; also,
statements concerning the United Nations or nations outside the
subject of this study (Japan, Indonesia, Australia, etc.) were all
lumped into this single category. Finally, it should be noted that
President Johnson was frequently visited by dignitaries from Latin
America and Africa; and there’were, in'addition^ visits whidh Pres­
ident Johnson made to foreign nations not considered a part of this
study. No single subject area came close to approximating the
total of statements relating to European relations.
349
When each category of statements is analized a number of
interesting aspects emerge.
The examination of the "major state­
ments" on the psurt of the President is a case in point.
There did
"Major Statements" on foreign policy issues by
President Johnson, 19^3— 19&9
1963-64
Europe
3
Vietnam
4
Foreign Aid
—
Int. Economics
5
Detente & U.S.USSR
3
Civil Rights
4
1965
1966 1967
—
Dominican Rep,
—
Total
20
Pet.
—
1
5
9.2
6
1
—
3
14
25.9
1
3
2
7
12.9
4
11
20,4
3
5.5
9
16.6
2
—
—
3
1
—
—
—
—
1
1
1
Total
1
NPT & Disarmament
Other F.P.
Areas
1968-69
2
14
—
—
5
3
1
1
—
12
2
3.7
1
1.8
2
3.7
54
99.7
appear to be a sizable number of major policy statements or speeches
included in this particular resource.
Of the total of fifty-four
statements cataloged 25.9% concerned Vietnam, clearly a substantial
percentage over those identified with Ehirope (9.2%).
It would
also appear that there was more administration concern over foreign
aid, international economics, civil rights and Vietnam than with
Europe as measured by this yard stick.
Clearly there is more con­
cern with international economics (although not totally unrelated
to European affairs) than to the relations with the European allies.
This may be partially understood in the light of the United States'
350
growing balance-of-payments problem during the Johnson Administra­
tion.
Notwithstanding these considerations, however, the strongest
concern remained the concern for Vietnamt
the ratio of statements
on Vietnam as compared to statements on European affairs is 3)1, a
significant difference.
Of a total of just over four hundred "brief statements," 133
(33.1%) were concerned with Vietnam.
Another one-third of the
"Brief Statements" on foreign policy issues by
President Johnson, 19&3--19&9
1968-69
Total
5
6
2
34
8.4
17
28
17
56
133
33.1
4
3
2
2
3.7
3
2
1
5
15
11
2.7
1965
Europe
14
7
Vietnam
15
4
Foreign Aid
Int. Economics
1966
1967
1963-64
>
Pet,
Detente & U.S.USSR
3
3
1
3
2
12
2,9
Civil Rights
6
8
5
3
14
36
8.9
NPT & Disarm­
ament
3
5
1
3
5
17
4.2
46
23
17
13
30
129
32.1
13
1
—
—-
14
3.4
83
63
48
116
401
Other F.P.
Areas
Dominican Rep.
Total
91
99.4%
total dealt with foreign policy issues unrelated to this study.
All statements on Europe amounted to only 8.4% of the total with
the bulk (14) occurring in the first full year of President John­
son's Administration when there existed a concern over the future
of the Multi-lateral Force.
Taking the figures in this category
at face value can be misleading, for a large percentage of the
statements relating
to Vietnam are unit citations given to
351
military units for their particular contribution in Vietnam and do
not represent, in themselves, a statement of policy— but because
of their numbers they represent a notable commitment of emphasis
and time on the part of the President,
Finally, it should be pointed out that the President expressed
a slightly higher percentage of concern with civil rights and civil
liberty issues (8,9%) than with European affairs,
It is of inter­
est to note that the increasing concern in this area between 19&3
and 1969 was simultaneous with a decreasing concern over European
issues.
This may be understood in the light of the growing domestic
unrest in the United States and the requirements of domestic policy
to be concerned not only with "law and order" but with Vietnam
policy as the prospect of the election of I968 began to close upon
the administration.
Perhaps the most significant category of statements were those
made as a part of the Presidential news conferences, or, in a few
instances, those made in interviews with representatives of the
various media,
The subject of Vietnam dominated the questioning
in foreign affairs (55%)} indeed the ratio of Vietnam-related
questions to Europe-related questions was better than 7*1 in favor
of Vietnam.
Not only that,
there was more concern with civil
rights and civil disorders (11.5%) than with European affairs (6 .9#).
Even when the subject of relations with the Soviet Union (7.1%) is
added to the number of questions on Europe the percentage (l4%)
still remains substantially less than the percentage on Vietnam.
This suggests not only a heavy concentration of administrative
352
attention, but also the reality of public interest.
Presidential Press Conferences and Interviews. I963—69
(in numbers of questions and responses)
1963-64
1965
1966
1967
1968-69
Total
Pet.
Europe
26
5
15
3
10
59
6.9
Vietnam
47
62
174
131
65
479
55.0
—
1
2
6
0.7
10
—-
—
13
23
2.6
Foreign Aid
3
Int. Economics
—
Detente & U.S. USSR
21
9
5
20
7
62
7.1
Civil Rights
21
29
17
22
11
100
11.5
NPT & Disarm­
ament
—
1
1
5
2
9
1.0
Other F.P.
Areas
44
12
29
18
19
122
14.0
——
6
——
—•
6
0.7
128
248
201
127
866
99.5
Dominican Rep.
162
Total
While it was clear in some news conferences that the Pres­
ident wished to discuss Vietnam, it is just as clear that, on
occasion, he preferred discussing other topics but was repeat­
edly brought back to Vietnam by representatives of the news media.
Thus a Study of news conference and interview questions may be,
in themselves, misleading and should not be evaluated in isolation.
However, when these evaluations are examined in toto a trend
is evident.
Further, a comparison of this survey with President
Johnson's The Vantage Point leads to an inescapable conclusion1
President Johnson's time was heavily dominated by Vietnam and
American policy there— American concerns in Europe simply did not
demand the requirements of time and attention.
353
Combined with these attitudes was the concern to achieve detente
with the Soviet Union,
President Johnson's desire was to achieve a
relationship with the Soviets which could lead to talks concerned
with limiting strategic arms,
a success which would be regarded
as a crowning achievement of his administration,
created problems with the European allies.
But detente
Fear was expressed
that for the United States, achieving detente and a settlement in
Vietnam was of overriding importance.
Further, the financial
interests and relationships within the Alliance, and the subse­
quent impact on the dollar, did little to solidify the cooperative
efforts of the Alliance,
NATO would continue but at what cost?
Part of the cost would
be the continued separation of France from coordinated military
efforts as a part of NATO.
And the problems of sharing nuclear
control within the Alliance and the dominance of the United States
on this issue remained divisive— an additional cost.
A third
cost was the continuing disagreement over the financial demands of
maintaining the force levels within Europe, a problem aggravated
by the subsequent balance-of-payments difficulties faced by the
United States.
It was in each of these three areas that the Johnson
Administration lost ground in its important relations with Europe.
These areas of Western European and Atlantic Alliance concern
rsdeived
less attention, as the Johnson Administration pursued its
own priorities:
detente with the Soviet Union and heavy commitment
in South Vietnam.
^^The Vantage Point. pp. 489-491.
354
Other costs emerged from the American, commitment to Vietnam
and the priority of detente.
Among these was the worsening during
the 1960's of America's relationship with France and President
De Gaulle,
While these relationships remained firm and polite, the
policies of both countries regarding both Vietnam and French
participation in the NATO military structure were far from com­
patible,
Also, the mounting costs of fighting a war in Southeast
Asia had severely strained the economic and commercial relationships;
causing continuing deficits in the balance of payments.
The re­
duction of funds flowing abroad for American business investments,
while not severe, did force American business interests in Europe
to find other financial resources,
A
further issue which was permitted to stalemate was that of
nuclear sharing.
Although the McNamara Committee was formulated
and functioned within NATO, the reality of preserving nuclear
control in the hands of the United States remained.
And Bonn and
other West European capitals would have to accept that reality,
however disagreeable they might be.
It must be noted that at no time was the commitment to defend
Europe or, more specifically, the Federal Republic of Germany
brought under question (although during and after the Czech invasion
repeated assurances of the United States commitment were sought).
Long before the Johnson Administration, it had been established
that Western European security was not to be jeopardized.
aspect of policy was not challenged.
That
Europe and its security re­
mained of primary interest to the Johnson Administration; yet
the major thrust of attention, determined by the pressing issues
355
of the moment, was directed elsewhere— towards Vietnam— and perhaps
at some of the spin-offs of the Vietnam conflict:
and disorder,
domestic upheaval
It is not this discussion's purpose to criticize
President Johnson's dealing with these problems but it is vital to
point out the substantial problems faced by the administration during
the years 1964-1968,
One conclusion may be drawn:
President Johnson, because of the
pressing nature of his other demands, could deal with Europe only on
a superficial basis by putting band aids on Atlantic problems.
This
was true in the case of the McNamara Committee, which supported
meetings of the Alliance soon after the Czech invasion; the adminstrations maintaining troop levels and the status quo on many policy
issues, these in spite of apparent European unwillingness, to support
force levels.
But this rather cosmetic approach did not conflict with
the United States' maintaining Europe and its security as a prime na­
tional security priority second only to that of its own domestic security,
Vietnam, without question, proved to be the major concern of the
Johnson Administration; but in no way did it lessen the priority given
to the vital security relationship which had developed since World War
II highlighted by the heavy economic burden, both public and private, and
the political and military interests invested there.
Because of this
commitment to Vietnam and a feeling by Europeans that they were
49
President Johnson's efforts to relieve poverty and to solve
problems relating to equal opportunity were considerable and should
also be acknowledged.
His administration's achievements on behalf
of these domestic issues were notable accomplishments.
356
not being given sufficient attention, the belief that the United
States should "reorder its priorities" was not without logic,
The Republican candidate for the Presidency in 1968, Richard M,
Nixon, promised to reorder the nation's attention and concern
toward Europe,
His view emphasized the assumption that President
Johnson had neglected the relationships of the United States with
the nations of the Atlantic Alliance,
To be sure, the perceptions
of the new administration included the requirement of rebuilding
the relationships within the Atlantic Alliance,
President Johnson's attention had been consumed by Vietnam and
the turmoil which had taken place at home.
When President Johnson
turned toward Europe, his priority was to achieve detente with the
Soviet Union while struggling to maintain the status quo in Western
Europe; hence, perhaps understandably, the charge of American
"neglect,"
Was President Nixon's approach to be significantly different?
The appointment of Dr. Henry Kissinger as the President's special
advisor for foreign affairs at least raised the hopes of many in
Europe,
More important, was it vital that the new President's
attitude and response toward Europe be different?
To resolve these
questions, the attention of this research will focus upon the
major conclusions of this paper.
^^For an excellent discussion of this problem read C, 0,
Lerche, Last Chance in Europe (Chicago; Quadrangle Books, 196?),
■^^The President's News Conference of January 27, 1969. Public
Papers of the Presidents; Richard M, Nixon, 1969. (Washington;
GPO, 1971), pp. 15-23.
IV,
CONCLUSION;
A "NEGLECTED" EUROPE 7,
In the United States of the 1960's certain developments in­
fluenced the attitudes and actions of Americans toward the inter­
national scene.
As the Johnson Administration began to grasp the
reins of authority and power, new strong events forced attention
to other than domestic priorities.
The war in Vietnam increasingly
required more resources, and the administration renewed attempts
to explain and rationalize American foreign policy.
To arouse
American support for a war— of dubious national interest— half­
way around the world the policy makers in Washington invoked the
ideological nature of the struggle with Communism,
Domestically, Americans were aware of the disparity between
the promise ernd performance in the area of civil liberties.
Non­
violent racial demonstrations had escalated into more violent
confrontations and riots which would bring suffering and destruc­
tion to millions of Americans,
Added to these conditions was the
growing intensity of those opposed to the war in Vietnam,
Combined,
these two forces were sufficient to arouse public dissatisfaction
to a point that President Johnson was forced to give up his desire
to seek a second full term as President, ^
Throughout the 1960's American foreign policy began to shift
toward detente, a reduction of tensions between the United States
and the Soviet Union,
The Kennedy Administration had been respon­
sible for beginning this shift, and the Cuban Missile Crisis had
Public Papers of the President. Lyndon B, Johnson. I968-I969.
Vol, I, (Washington, D, G,: GPO, 19^9), pp, 469-476,
I
t
s
'
358
further illuminated the fact that the two great super-powers could
no longer afford the luxury of prolonged hostility and potential
conflict.
Detente was the relationship sought, and for President
Johnson such a relationship with the Soviet Union became an imper­
ative,
The various commercial treaties, the signing of the NPT,
the President's cautious response to the Soviet invasion of Czech­
oslovakia, and his intense desire to begin the SALT talks were all
Illustrative of President Johnson's continued commitment to a
policy of detente, ^
The problem, at least with some Europeans,
was that decisions might be made without adequate concern for the
3
interests of the European allies.
They feared that the United
States and Soviet Union would arrive at decisions over the heads
of the states of Western Europe,
Detente, as a policy, had taken
on a priority of its own and had become important to American
national interests.
As President Johnson's term neared its end, there were charges
against him by Europeans and by some American observers that Amer­
ican policies in Europe had not demonstrated creative
2
Lyndon B, Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York:
hart and Winston, 1971), pp, 489-49l7
leadership, ^
Holt Rine­
^See Chapter on "Unite# States, Détente and Europe,',' pp, 272294,
4
"Europe Worries about ’Fortress America'" The New York Times.
November 12, 19&7, See also "European Journey," The New York Times.
November 21, 19&6; Francis M, Bator, "The Politics of Alliance; The
United States and Western Europe," in Kermit Gordon, ed,, Agenda for
the Nation (New York; Doubleday & Company, Inc,, 1968), pp, 335372,
359
The United States was relying too heavily upon maintaining the
nature of European relationships by accepting the status quo while
at the same time working to achieve detente with the Soviet Union
and win a war in Vietnam,
The question remained:
Were President
Johnson and his administration, by their inattention ^
and their
emphasis upon both detente and the events in Vietnam, neglecting
Europe and American Alliance relationships in Western Europe?
During the election campaign of 1968, it was the intent of the
Republican candidate for the presidency, Richard M. Nixon, to pro­
pose a number of changes in American foreign policy which he would
implement if elected.
Most significant among his promises was
his intention of implementing a "secret" plan to bring about the
end of the American involvement in Vietnam,
Also, candidate Nixon
promised to reaffirm the vital nature of relationships which had
existed between the United States and the nations of Western Europe,
and to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance.
This last issue had been raised by Charles 0, Lerche, Jr., in
his final work. Last Chance in Europe:
When Europeans wonder today if the United States is inter­
ested in them any longer, they are really asking whether Europe
in its own right has any standing in American eyes— or must
it be reconciled to being judged in terms of its role, as de­
fined by Washington, in a.global (that is, extra-European)
struggle with Communism? °
^See "Vietnam:
Crisis of Commitment,"
pp. 325-356.
^Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., Last Chance in Europe (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 196?), p. 30.
360
As early as February 1962, expressions of concern had been heard
regarding United States' attitudes toward Europe,
Even at this
early da^te it was believed that the United States was neglecting
or even doing harm to the interests of the Europeans in favor of
placating neutral nations and being more affable to Communist
nations.
7
In 1965 as President Johnson was completing his first full
year as President and was looking forward to a full term in office,
the Christian Science Monitor began asking if the Johnson govern­
ment was ignoring Western Europe as the President concentrated on
Vietnam,
It was the opinion of this article that the Johnson Ad­
ministration had no coherent policy for Europe, and that the Pres­
ident had withdrawn from European politics, having no deep interest
in American relations there. ®
One American official, supportive of the President, yet recog­
nizing the problems facing the administration, stated:
Our policy for Western Europe is quiet and nonactive. These
Johnson years are an extension of the Kennedy years. John
Kennedy made the major shifts away from the Republican years
including the re-orientation toward Moscow,
We can't have a sliarp change very often. Now the allies
demand respect and are still looking for a consensus on the
continent. We must wait, 9
7
"European Allies Feel U.S. Neglects Them," Washington Post,
February 20, I962.
g
Robert R. Brunn, "Europe— and United States,"
Science Monitor. April 1, I965.
Christian
g
Ibid, The government official responsible for this quota­
tion is unidentified within the article.
361
This analysis appears to he at least partially accurate, for certain
emerging features reveal a basic pattern of concerns regarding Euro­
pean policy;
1) During the Kennedy Administration the focus of American
priorities shifted toward achieving détente with the Soviet
Union;
2) European concern over Americaji inattention remained con­
sistent ftom the early 1960's throughout the remainder of the
decade ;
3) Europe's rebuilding, economically and politically, per­
mitted the nations of Western Europe to progress without
major policy initiatives from the United States;
4) Vietnam served the function of_focusing United States'
attention upon a portion of the globe other than Western
Europe.
Clearly, the pattern was established;
a pattern whioh permitted
Vietnam to push Europe into the background of American public
interest and priority,
A squabble over access rights to West Berlin and a demonstra­
tion of temper by President De Gaulle attracted smaller headlines
and shorter news stories than the increasing American military
preparations for a larger role in South Vietnam with its rising
casualty lists.
This would remain the situation as long as the
status quo between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe
permitted tensions to be released elsewhere.
During November 1966 the New York Times, recognizing the prob­
lem of American inattention toward Europe, made the following
criticism;
President Johnson's recently announced decision to visit
Europe reflects recognition of a general deterioration in
Amerioan relations with the NATO allies. The President's
voyage next spring, though long overdue, undoubtedly can help
stop the rot.
362
The real trouble is much more profound. It stems less from
failure to lead than from the mechanics of leadership and,
even more, from Europe's mystification over where it is being
led. 10
This projected European visit, along with the "Building Bridges"
speech of 6 October 1966, could only be interpreted as an attempt
on the part of the Johnson Administration to re-establish some of
the lost momentum in United States-European affairs.
Unfortunately,
the President never actually made this bridge-building visit; the
criticisms of United Stales' inattention remained unanswered, the
problems unresolved.
But the news media were not the only source for identifying
the problems of American-European tensions.
a series of books probed this problem.
Throughout the 1960's
The academic community
was not only aware of a problem but was attempting to respond
constructively.
Outstanding analysts of European affairs continued
to highlight the changing requirements of a necessary relationship
with the allies in Western Europe and to call for a re-evaluation
of United States policies toward Europe.
They gave evidence
that the United States was in trouble in its Atlantic relationships
and attempted to draw attention to the problem.
11
Significant among these contributions was the work by Lerche,
in which he claimed that American involvement in Southeast Asia
^^"European Journey, " New York Times, November 21, I966.
^^See Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York:
Doubleday & Go., Inc., I965); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alternative to
Partition (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., I965); Charles 0, Lerche,
Jr., 0£. clt. ; and Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles (New York;
McGraw-Hill Co., I968).
-Tv:.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
363
had placed serious strains upon relations with the European states,
Lèrche believed that the United States was pursuing a secondary
mission in Vietnam while neglecting major interests in Europe,
ilsreover, Lerche argued, to the degree that European problems were
dealt with, they wsre considered perfunctorily, with the use of
tired cliches, sterile rhetoric and few substantive Initiatives,
The problem was that "the war comes first,"
12
Lerche maintained that the issue for Europeans was that of
status, of being treated as equal partners— not an easy task, for
the implication of parity was the removal of those aspects of re­
lationship which created stratification within the Alliance, such
as nuclear control.
It was precisely at those points that the
United States was unwilling to make the necessary reforms that would
provide for an equality of status, not of role.
13
Among the allies existed areas of divergence and mutuality of
interests in Atlantic relationships.
dissatisfied.
The Bonn government had been
Whether the issue was reunification or the relation­
ship between the two sectors of Germany, there had been a large gap
between what "was" and what the majority of Germans believed "ought"
T_2
Lerche, 0£. cit., pp. 26-27.
^^IMd., pp. 186-187. Lerche contends that "Equality of status
is demonstrated by equality of deference, and here the problem be­
comes most difficult. For the United States to change its attitudes
toward its allies is in one sense the easiest and quickest reform;
but practically, such a reversal in outlook is one of the most dif­
ficult changes to bring about. It is no easy matter for a people
who have grown accustomed to receiving more deference than they
give in return suddenly to content themselves with parity."
364
to be.
For the West Gemans this perceptual problem during the
middle and late 1960's was of most pressing importance.
European governments were frustrated.
14
Other
Many, especially the
Gaulliste, believed that the structural relationship which existed
between the United States and the Europeans condemned Europe to an
excessive dependence upon America.
It was neither safe, dignified,
nor good for Europe's vitality to remain indefinitely dependent
upon the United States.
Others were concerned with economic pene­
tration or with the harsh realities of technology and defense.
The relationship with the Soviet Union also created hazards.
The Europeans, no less than the Americans and the Soviets, had be­
come aware of the problems which a continuing military confronta­
tion— with Berlin a constant point of international focus— would
create between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe.
Further, the nature and shape of Eastern Europe were changing; the
insecurities felt after the Czech invasion had an impact upon the
structure of stability on the entire continent.
Other policy differences also contributed to the stress be­
tween Europe and the United States, creating serious problems—
14
Karl Deutsch, et al., France. Germany, and the Western Al­
liance (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Inc., I967), p. 128.
^ ^ o r a complete discussion from a European perspective of
this issue, see J.-J. Servan Schrieber, The American Challenge.
(New York: Atheneum, I967),
^^Prancis M. Bator, "The Politics of Alliance:
States and Western Europe'," 0£. cit.. pp. 340-341.
The United
365
problems which the Johnson Administration was, however, able to cope
with as it faced such issues as the difficult relationship with
France within the Alliance; the management of nuclear sharing so
as to meet both the desires of Europeans and the realities of
nuclear control; and the continued displeasure
the nature of consultations.
of Europeans over
But in coping with these issues the
administration was basically maintaining a "holding operation"
upon United States-European relationships * very little that was
new or creative was initiated in these areas of policy difference.
The concern over detente and United States-Soviet relations
may be one exception to this conclusion.
Nevertheless, the Euro­
pean allies remained dissatisfied over the nature of consultation
which existed between themselves and the United States.
The fear that the United States would sacrifice European
security interests for improved relations with Soviet Russia ap­
peared to be real.
The concern over achieving the Non-proliferation
Treaty, the anxiety over the rather relaxed American response to
the Czech invasion,
17
and the pressing desire by President Johnson
^It must be noted, however, that the Europeans themselves
were not advocating a strong response but were concerned over Pres­
ident Johnson's mild reaction to the invasion prompted by the more
dominant concern for beginning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
which had been announced on July 1, 1968— a further move toward
detente. While President Johnson spoke strongly about the Soviets
not unleashing the 'dogs of war" the concern had passed from the
Czech Invasion to the possibilities of further military action
possibly in Rumania, an Eastern European nation which had also
experienced a liberalization and was making more friendly overtures
to the West. The President, caught by the fait accompli of the in­
vasion was further concerned by the implications of European instability
to the carefully nurtured plans of achieving agreements in nuclear
disarmament. The time for strong reactions regarding Czechoslovakia
had passed— it was the future which mattered then.
366
to begin talks in order to bring limitations on arms, all demonstrated
the relative importance of detente as well as unity within the
Alliance concluded that these two areas of policy concern were not
mutually exclusive.
The report took the position that the primary
task of the NATO Alliance was to maintain the security and defenses
of the Alliance.
Secondly, the report encouraged the members to
work together toward finding settlements to issues which separated
Eastern and Western Europe.
Thus both policies were to have priority.
That detente was of vital importance President Johnson illus­
trated with the implementation of his foreign policy.
Also of long­
standing importance was the military security, as well as the
growth in economic and political unity of the European governments.
This priority was not threatened by Johnsonian policies; for Amer­
ioan interests in Western Europe had, since 1945, made Western
European security and growth the number one foreign policy priority
of the United States.
It was not the commitment to European security
which was being challenged in Europe— but the role of American lead­
ership.
The charge against the United States was not that of pulling
its own weight in solving a number of practical problems, for in
some areas the United States has been accused of pulling too hard
in the direction which Washington preferred.
18
At issue was the
belief that the United States had failed to generate a sense of
momentum in the pursuit of joint purposes and compatible policies
necessary to the continuing viability of the Alliance.
19
'
^^This was particularly the case regarding the British entry
into the Common Market and the pursuit of political unification.
19
Another charge against the United States was that it vacillated
on specific proposals of its own creation, i.e., the MLF,
36?
But even if the United States had not engendered new momentum
into the Atlantic relationships had Western Europe been neglected?
It is the judgement of this writer that "neglect" is too strong
a description for the relationship which existed between the United
States and Western Europe during the Johnson Administration.
This
dissertation begins with certain presuppositions which imply
neglect but which, as a result of the intervening research, are
not able to stand on their own strength.
reasons for this.
There are a number of
To prove neglect this writer has found it
necessary to prove that Western Europe has "suffered" as a result
of United States inattention and American concern over détente, the
war in Vietnam and other domestic concerns.
This research has not
been able to accomplish this objective.
Further, American diplomacy continued with Western Europe in
depth and in its usual sophisticated complexity.
significant advancements were being made:
Also, a number of
the successful comple­
tion of the Kennedy Round in the spring of 196?; the greater con­
tribution of Western European assistance for third world nations;
the successful reorganization of NATO after the withdrawal of the
French forces; and the growing independence and political stability
of the Common Market nations which brought them into a strong
competitive posture with the United States.
All of these factors,
as well as others, strongly suggest that American inattention,
or the lack of creative leadership from the United States, did
little to hinder the continued development of the nations of
Western Europe.
36?
As President Johnson's Administration came to an end and as
the anticipation of a new administration's approach to foreign
relations was contemplated, Europeans expressed hope for a new day
in European-American relationships,
"After what Mr, Nixon has
been saying in past years, one can expect that he will develop an
intense relationship with Europe,"
Kurt Kiesinger,
20
spoke West German Chancellor
And the Chancellor's anticipation appears to
have been borne out in the initial actions taken by the new Ameri­
can President.
During the election campaign, candidate Nixon placed a high
priority upon re-establishing new ties with the Europeans, upon
working with NATO in such a way as not to hinder the efforts to
improve American relations with the Soviets and Eastern Europe.
Mr. Nixon's desire was to improve diplomatic coordination, to coordinate American-Western European policy more closely.
21
Thus the
new administration was:looked to for a renewal of American interest
in Western Europe, but it was much too early to determine whether
Mr. Nixon could provide new leadership while avoiding American domin­
ation of Atlantic relationships.
In candidate Nixon's promise to provide new leadership was a
clear implication of the need for a realignment of United States
20
"Europe Hopes For a Bit More Attention Under Nixon," loc.
cit.
Z^Ibid.
Z^Ibld.
priorities.
The question remained, as to what form the renewed
emphasis upon Atlantic relations would take.
Further, would this
reformation of American policy substantially change the nature of
the relationship between the European capitals and Washington?
The most central feature of the first year of the Nixon Admin­
istration was two separate visits which President Nixon made to the
European continent.
The marked absence from Europe of President
Johnson during his term in office
23
had carried a clear signal
to many European capitals of a lack of presidential interest in
Europe because of the emphasis on Vietnam, which drained both
Johnson's time and energy.
Increasingly the Johnson Administration
had been faced by trouble both at home as well as abroad.
upon taking office, the new President announced
24
But,
that he personally
would make a visit to Europe with the avowed purpose of strengthen­
ing and revitalizing the Atlantic relations.
Further, he announced
that he would seek European (primarily French and West German)
support for the Non-proliferation Treaty.
23
President Johnson did make one short visit to Europe during
his time as President. His visit came at the time of former Chan­
cellor Konrad Adenauer's death during the spring of I967, This visit,
while short, did provide both President Johnson and his Special
Assistant Walter Rostow an opportunity to talk briefly with various
European leaders.
24
The President's News Conference, February 6, 1969, Public
Papere of the PTOsidentst Richard M, Nixon. 1969 (Washington: GPO,
1970), pp. 66-751 At this conference Nixon announced that he would
visit Europe on February 23-28, 1969.
Z^ibid.
«
3^
Beyond these stated purposes a visit to Europe would underline
the renewed commitment to the close relationship between the allies
in Europe and the United States,
The visit with the heads of state
in Western Europe would provide an opportunity to define common
purposes and lay the groundwork for further meetings which would
take place in the following months.
From this visit to Europe
a number of accomplishments were anticipated*
among the most
important was the desire toe open a new era of consultation and to
create an atmosphere of greater trust.
27
This was to be a repet­
itive theme which would be heard during those days of preparation
and visit.
The Eiuropeans also viewed the prospective visit by President
Nixon as an indication of a shift in emphasis toward Europe and
toward improved relations, the visit having been seen as a demonstration of United States' interest in Europe and in Berlin,
28
Also, the trip emphasized the importance of Europe as well as the
United States' need for Europe and the Atlantic Partnership,
Nixon's
visit ooiiM change the political image of the Alliance from one of
stagnation to one of movement,
29
^
26
Richard M, Nixon, Statement on the Forthcoming Visit to
Western Europe, February 6, I969, Ibid,, pp, 76-77.
27
'Richard M, Nixon, Remarks to Reporters on the Forthcoming
European Trip, February 22, 1969, Ibid,. pp, I26-131,
28
German Press Review. Press Office of the German Embassy,
Washington, D, G,, February 12, I969.
^*Rh#inisoher Merlcur. February 21, I969, German Press
Review. February 26, I969.
371
But not all European comments were enthusiastic.
'
Some took
the position that in order to re-establish mutual interest at a
level which would be acceptable, it was incumbent upon the United
States to wind down American involvement in Vietnam,
30
Others
questioned whether or not the new President would be able to quiet
or even resolve the domestic problems sufficiently to devote the
required time to European interests.
31
In general the visit was anticipated by the Europeans, who
saw in it, only a month after Nixon's inauguration, a new chance
for Atlantic relationships to take on substance and meaning.
On
departing for Europe the President spoke of the need to seek the
advice and counsel 6f friends,
32
Before the North Atlantic Council,
the President spoke of partnership, the requirements of consulta^
tion,
and the need for the Alliance to adapt to the changing
conditions and the new requirements which had come as a result of
34
success,^
Moving to Germany, the President reasserted the old goal
of American policy*
the devotion and dedication of America to
achieving a united Germany, a strengthened Alliance, and the mutual
^^Frankfurter Rundschau. January 21, 1969, Ibid,, January 29, I969.
^^British Weeklies. British Information Services, October 24,
1968,
32.
“Richard M, Nixon, Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base on
Departing for Europe, February 23, 19&9, Public Papers of the
Presidents : Richard M, Nixon. 19o9. ep, cit,, p, 132 ,
^%ichard M, Nixon, Remarks to the North Atlantic Council in
Brussels, Pètroary
‘1969. I M d », ppi 134-136,
^Ibid,
373.
dedication to the principles of independence and freedom for all
peoples of Europe.
35
Finally, in France on February 28, the visiting President re­
affirmed the traditional values of "ally" and "friendship" in rela­
tion to France and to De Gaulle, and in so doing he emphasized the
desire to seek wisdom and guidance in the French capital. ^
On
returning to Washington, the President concentrated his remarks on
the new sense of "trust" which had been established in Atlantic
relations, and on the opening of new channels of communication and
consultation.
37
In reviewing his visit to Europe, the President identified
what he considered to be the achievements of his trip.
He stated
that relations with France (De Gaulle) were improved;
He (De Gaulle) believes that Europe should have an inde­
pendent position in its own right. And, frankly, I believe
that, too, I think most Europeans believe that, I think
the time when it served our interests to have the United Stetes
as the dominant power in an alliance— that time Is gone,
Throughout the visit the President gave strong support for NATO and
for European unity.
Nevertheless, the new administration recognized
^%ichard M, Nixon, Remarks on Arrival at the Airport in
Cologne, February 26, 1969, Ibid,, p, 151,
Richard M, Nixon, Remarks on Arrival at the Airport in
Paris, February 28, 1969, Ibid., pp. I66-I67,
37
Richsird H, Nixon, Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base on
Returning from Europe, March 2, I969, Ibid,. p, I76,
38
Richard M, Nixon, The President's News Conference of
March 4, 19&9, Ibid,, p, 193,
that European unity coaid not be imposed by the United States but
must be sought by the Europeans themselves.
39
But the President was not finished in demonstrating a return
to European interests.
Two months later, before the Commemorative
Session of the NATO Council, the President spoke of the fundamental
nature of the NATO Alliance and suggested new areas of concern for
it.
Reaffirming American support for NATO, he reminded the Council
that Ehirope's security was America's security and that the Alliance
must adjust to the conditions of its success.
There existed the
need to harmonize economic and political policies as
well as the
need to turn the attention of the Alliance to non-military areas.
Finally, reiterating the need to improve consultations among
allies, he struck a responsive chord among the members of the
council.
40
Indeed, President Nixon made a strong attempt to mend the
fences that, in the minds of many, badly needed to be mended,
Europeans, while expressing realistic fears over the lasting
effects of the renewed relationship, also believed that the Ameri­
can President had demonstrated a sense of reliability; in him
they saw a man in whose support and commitment they could have
confidence.
4l
39lbid,
40
Richard M, Nixon, Address at the Cemmomorative Session of
the North Atlantic Council, April 10, 1969, Ibid., pp, 272-2?6,
^^estdeutsche Allgemeine, February 27, 1969, German Press
Review , March 5, 1969,
One other event must he given special attention in reviewing
President Nixon's first year in office and the impact of the new’
administration upon European relations.
This event was the visit
of President Nixon to Rumania in early August of 1969. The avowed
purpose was to seek new understanding, take new initiatives in
Eastern Europe, and improve communication between the two nations.
42
But there appear to have been more explicit reasons for visit­
ing Rumania,
Since August of I968 there had been concern that the
Soviets might take an action in Rumania similar to that taken in
Czechoslovakia; a visit would affirm Western support for the
liberalization which was progressing in that country.
Such a
visit could hardly be interpreted other than a diplomatic "put-down"
of the Soviet Union,
Also, with Soviet warships maneuvering off
American coasts, the visit would provide a counter-balance for the
United States to demonstrate friendship with Rumania, a member of
Eastern Ehirope and within the Soviet sphere of influence.
The Rumanian visit was also a demonstration of the desire to
continue "building bridges" in Eastern Europe, an important part
of Western policy.
At this same time the Sino-Soviet border con­
flict was tense and little was expected from any bilateral talks
with the Soviets,
President Nixon was, rather subtly, sending
positive signals to the Peking government.
This act would have the
effect of forcing the Soviets to evaluate their policies and per­
haps relax a bit more their relationship with the People's Republic
42
Richard M, Nixon, Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen,
July 25, 1969. Public fepers of the Presidents : Richard M, Nixon
1969 (Washington, D. C., 1970), pp, 5^-55^,
375
of China.
43
Each of the above events, and others,
44
gave the impression
that the President was, in truth, attempting to direct attention
away from Vietnam and place more emphasis upon American relation­
ships with the European continent.
The question was to remain*
Gould the momentum of this first year be continued, or would the
domestic concerns and the decisions to be made on Vietnam eventu­
ally engulf President Nixon as they had President Johnson?
Further,
was this attention being shown Europe substantive or was it to
prove more cosmetic in nature?
After nine months in office, it was observed that the American
President had not been successful in substantially reducing Ameri­
can involvement in Vietnam and the strains upon an increasingly
inflationary economy had not lessened.
President Nixon had not yet
brought to a halt the divisiveness within American society, the
domestic crisis of social disorder and protest.
45
Thus the United States was in a position where the perform­
ance in Atlantic relationships would be encumbered in achieving the
promise of those first few months.
However, President Nixon did
attempt to inject new life into Atlantic relations and new con­
fidence in American leadership and interest in Europe,
The
^^British Weeklies. July 4, I969, and August 8, I969,
44
Among these must be included the appointment of Dr, Henry
Kissinger as President Nixon's choice to direct the National Security
Council, Further the appointment of Robert Ellsworth as the United
States' ambassador to NATO signaled to many Europeans a renewed
emphasis and interest in Europe,
^^British Weeklies. October 24, I969.
376
assignment of Dr, Henry Kissinger as the President's choice to
direct the National Security Council and Kissinger's rapport with
Europeans could he viewed, at that time, only in a positive manner.
But the overriding problem of European-American relations would
continue with the new administration: Western Europe had become
too strong to put up uncomplainingly with the American-European
relationship of the 1950's which was essentially a relationship
of the leader and the led.
Whether or not President Nixon would be able to sustain his
thrust in European relations of that first year in office, or
succumb to the demands and pressures of military Involvement in
Vietnam, there remained no question of the vital nature of the
American commitment to Europe's security and welfare.
The import­
ance of a growing and strong Europe remained to the United States
a vital national interest.
3#
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