John Lewis Gaddis’ Hypotheses from We Now Know 1997
The diversification of power did more to shape the course
of the Cold War than did the balancing of power.
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Cold War theorists misunderstood the importance of multidimensional
assessments of power. They focused on the bipolar nature of the world
and looked at the balance of ‘power’ between the USA and the USSR,
predicting that whilst they remained ‘balanced’, the world would be a
stable and a safe place. In reality, the Cold War was multidimensional
both in terms of international politics (blocs were based on a variety of
actors especially in the West (ostpolitik, De Gaulle) but also in the East
(Hungary, Czechoslovakia) as well as in terms of internal politics since
military strength was just one measure of power (as were economy,
society, technology, internal divisions).
The USA and the USSR built empires after WWII, although
not of the same kind.
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Most Cold War historians point out that despite its ideological dislike
of imperialism, the USA constructed an Empire in the wake of WWII.
The debate is over the nature of this empire and whether it was
intentional or inadvertent. Was the empire the result of the drive to
dominate markets and capitalize on investment opportunities abroad, in
much the same that Britain had done (according to Hobson! and
Lenin!) Or was it an accidental by product of having to fill a power
vacuum in Europe, a reflexive response to perceived Soviet expansion?
Interestingly, theories now suggest that the Soviets too was partly
driven by an ideological desire to spread their system, but also to the
opportunities which presented themselves. Stalin hoped to bring China
on board, Khrushchev hoped for the same in the ‘Third World’.
Gaddis argues that the almost irrational fear of losing ground and the
‘falling dominoes’ that would be sparked influenced the Russians just
as much as the Americans, which is why Stalin pressured Mao to prop
up North Korea and why Castro ‘suicidally’ intervened on behalf of
Castro.
Lundestad proposed the idea that the Americans were invited to
dominate Western Europe and the Soviets imposed their will. Gaddis
readjusts this idea by suggesting that Stalin ‘hoped’ for an invitation
which never came, which explains his haphazard approach. Of course,
Lundestam’s empire by invitation has been criticized as ignoring the
reality in Western Europe after WWII which meant that the Europeans
had no choice but to accept the conditions placed upon their
acceptance of US aid.
Most commentators accept that in the Third World, both sides coerced,
repressed and responded to ‘invitations’ depending on the time and the
place. However, the key ‘battleground’ of the Cold War, i.e. where it
began and ended was not the Third World, but Europe, so Gaddis asks
why the US empire generated so much less hostility in Europe than the
Soviet empire.
Many people on both sides saw the conflict as one of good
versus evil, even if historians since have rarely done
so.
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Gaddis uses the case study of Germany to try to answer the question
posed in section 2.
It is beyond doubt that the Soviets were more brutal towards the
Germans than the western allies, which determined a pro western tilt
from the beginning of the ‘peace’. He argues that this is why the West
German regime established itself as legitimate government, but the
East German regime did not.
It seems to me, however, that this ignores the history of the fear of
communism in Germany.
Having said that, his main point is more that historians of the Cold
War have to remember that the perceptions of the ordinary people
involved in the events tend to get ignored by academics and that in
many cases their perceptions of their ‘conquerors’ played an important
role in how those ‘conquerors’ were able to (or were forced to) act
towards locals.
Democracy proved superior to autocracy in maintaining
coalitions
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Realists tend to view democracy as leading to compromise deals such
as the League of Nations and the Kellog-Briand pact which fail to take
the realities of the balance of power into account.
The most important ‘realist’ in the Cold War story, George Kennan,
couched his view of the post war world in an appreciation of the
realities of the new world order and the importance of realpolitik.
Kennan compared democracy to a dinosaur with a body the size of a
building and a brain the size of a pin; however, he expected America to
contain the rise of Communism whilst maintaining her WilsonianLiberal principles which he had criticized for being weak!!! This has
more to do with Kennan’s role as a policy maker rather than an
historian.
Gaddis claims that Kennan’s fear that the US would become “like
those with whom we are coping” never fully came true. He claims
that the US remained fairly true to her principles and often used them
to shape policy. He argues that democratization gave the ‘colonised’ a
stake in the success of the process. He uses Germany and NATO as
examples, claiming that the Americans adapted their policy to the local
conditions, giving the Europeans a “surprising amount of
influenceover structure and strategy.It is difficult to imagine the Soviet
Union acted similarly.” The Russians failed to gain popular support in
most of Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact was much more
centralized, there was “little sense of mutual interest, especially after
the events of 1956.”
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This leads Gaddis to claim that the centralized nature of the Soviet
empire was much more like the traditional formal empires of old,
whereas the cooperative nature of the US empire was “a new kind of
empire – a democratic empire – for the simple reason that they were,
by habit and history, democratic in their politics.”
Nuclear weapons exchanged destructiveness for duration.
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Nuclear weapons supposedly kept the Cold Ward from escalating. As
a result, crises that in other periods would have led to war, were no
longer worth the cost of war.
Gaddis accepts that the Nuclear deterrent worked, but thath there was a
price, “albeit one worth paying.”
He claims, with some justification, that by the early 1960s the Soviet
Union had become the monodimensional dinosaur that could never win
the Cold War. If that was the case, why did the conflict last for
another 30 years?
Nuclear weapons “encouraged the monodimensional measurement of
power”
In 1962, the USA had a 17-1 advantage in Nuclear warheads.
McNamara (Kennedy’s advisor) pointed out that this amounted to an
effective deterrent as the threat of one nuclear explosion on US soil
would deter Washington. The Soviets did not accept this and spent the
1960s seeking real parity.
The Cuban crisis convinced western leaders that their survival
depended on a balance of fear.
There was a tacit agreement to calculate strength in terms of nuclear
warheads which led to the “fixation on the nuclear arms race as the
focus of Soviet-American relations”
This fixation preserved the image of a formidable Soviet Union long
after its actual decline had set in.
Gaddis then posits that it was only when Reagan put pressure on the
Soviet system that it was finally shown for the veneer that it was.
Of course the system was failing before SDI and US aggression may
well have helped prolong the inevitable as conservative forces in the
politburo pointed to the need to be strong in the face of the new threat,
but it seems fair to suggest that the American acceptance of the ‘rules
of engagement’ helped entrench the two sides and thus prolong the
stand-off.
“Given the fact that they [Nuclear Weapons] did exist, the Cold War
could have ended with a bang at any point. It took decades to arrange a
whimper.” (Gaddis 1997)
As long as Stalin was running the USSR, a cold war was
unavoidable.
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Gaddis claims that “Stalin’s foreign policy cannot be separated from
his domestic practices or even his personal behavior”
He suggests that Stalin waged Cold Wars on several fronts,
internationally, within his party, within his country, even within his
family. “The cold war that we became to know was simply one of
many from his point of view.”
He does not suggest that the USA bears no responsibility for the nature
of the conflict, or that the US were not stupid to become drawn into
feckless conflicts like Vietnam and Nicuaragua, or the expenses of the
development of unusable weapons.
He does, however, suggest that with other leaders out of the picture,
the war could have been avoided, but Stalin’s unique personality and
unique situation within an authoritarian regime made some kind of
clash inevitable.
Détente was an illusion, there was no long peace, both
sides continued to practice brinksmanship despite
talking of rapprochement.
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The simple fact that the arms race was at its most intense throughout
the late 1960s and early 1970s; that Vietnam was in full flow; that the
Third World clashes continued in earnest suggests that détente was
simply a means to an end.
The Cold War developed its own ‘rules of engagement’ It
mattered little who was in power, both sides fostered
the notion that they would go to war if necessary,
despite not being willing to do so (brinksmanship
dominated relations between the two sides, even
during so called thaws).
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Gaddis argues that it mattered little who was in office, whether they
had a good personal relationship, the conflict existed outside the sphere
of personalities. For example, Eisenhower talked of a thaw, yet flew
spy missions and developed the idea of massive retaliation.
Khrushchev may have wanted peaceful coexistence, but he got Cuba
and Hungary.
The Cold War – Questions
Why did the Cold War not become hot? Was it Nuclear
weapons? Rational leadership? Had war become too
expensive?
How was the C.W. fought by non military means?
Propaganda, espionage, non-cooperation etc.
Why did the C.W. last so long beyond 1963?
Was the C.W. an ideological confrontation or simply a contest
for supremacy between Great powers? Was the struggle
based on politics? Economics? Strategic interests?
What role do personalities play? Did it matter who was in the
Kremlin or the White House, or did the C.W. develop
independently of leadership?
To what extent did smaller powers influence the policy
making of the Superpowers? (Korea, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, West Germany, France, Britain, Cuba)?
Was the C.W. an imperial conflict, simply a 20th Century
‘scramble for Africa’? Was the C.W. the culmination of
the age of empire?
How important was the power of perception?
To what extent was Soviet military strength a smokescreen
for a monodimensional entity which was rotten internally.
By the 1980’s Soviet society could no longer maintain the
expense of the arms race, especially in the face of the
potential costs of matching US technological advances and
the SDI.
Instead of US aggression in the early 1980s hastening the end
of the conflict, it simply hardened the Soviet response and
prolonged the last days of the Cold War.