NO. A-03-000522
IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS
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STATE OF NEBRASKA,
Appellee,
vs.
WALDO F. WARRINER,
Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF KNOX COUNTY, NEBRASKA,
Before the Honorable Patrick G. Rogers, District Judge
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF KNOX COUNTY, NEBRASKA.
Before the Honorable Philip R. Riley, County Judge
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Prepared and submitted by:
Ronald E. Temple #20625
Gatz, Fitzgerald, Vetter & Temple
100 N. 13th Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1407
Norfolk, Nebraska 68702-1407
(402) 371-7770
Email: [email protected]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF BASIS OF JURISDICTION ................................ 1
Statute Conferring Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Facts Established Appealable Order ................................. 1
Date of Entry of Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Date of Filing Post-Judgment Motions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Date of Filing Notice of Appeal and
Date of Deposit of Docket Fee ................................ 1
Interlocutory Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Issues Actually Tried in the Courts Below
and How They Were Decided . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW .............................................. 4
STATEMENTS OF FACTS .............................................. 6
ARGUMENTS
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN THE APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
II.
THE COUNTY COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S
OBJECTION, AT THE TIME OF THE TRIAL, TO EVIDENCE GATHERED
FROM THE STOP OF THE APPELLANT'S VEHICLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
NEBRASKA CASES CITED
Ortiz, 257 Neb. at 793, 600 N.W.2d at 815 ................................. 8
State v. Childs, 242 Neb. 426, 495 N.W.2d 475 (1993) ..................... 9, 13
State v. Chronister, 3 Neb.App. 281, 526 N.W.2d 98 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 9
State v. Ebberson, 209 Neb. 41, 45, 305 N.W.2d 904, 907 (1981) ......... 6, 10, 13
State v. Jasper, 237 Neb. 754, 759, 467 N.W.2d 855, 859 (1991) .............. 13
State v. Kelley, 265 Neb. 563, 658 N.W.2d 279 (2003) ........................ 3
State v. Keup, 265 Neb. 96, 655 N.W.2d 25 (2003) ........................... 4
State v. Konfrst, 251 Neb. 214, 556 N.W.2d 250 (1996) ....................... 8
State v. McCleery, 251 Neb. 940, 560 N.W.2d 789 (1997} ..................... 4
State v. Ortiz, 257 Neb. 784, 600 N.W.2d 805 (1999) ......................... 8
State v. Ranson, 245 Neb. 71, 511 N.W.2d 97 (1994) ......................... 8
State v. Staten, 238 Neb. 13, 18,469 N.W.2d 112, 116 (1991) ............. 5, 9, 13
OTHER CITES AND JURISDICTIONS
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d
660 (1979) ........................................................ 5, 9
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,99 S.Ct. 1391,59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ......... 9
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ... 3
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) .............. 5, 9
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35
L.Ed.734(1891) .................................................... 4,8
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STATUTES CITED
§ 25-1912(1), R.R.S. 1995 .............................................. 1
§§60-601 to 60-6,374 ............................................... 7, 11
§60-6,230 R.R.S, 1998.......................................... 10, 11, 12
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STATEMENT OF BASIS OF JURISDICTION
{1) Statute Conferring Jurisdiction
The appellant respectfully submits that§ 25-1912(1 ), R.R.S. 1995, provides
the statutory authority for the appeal from the District Court of Knox County, Nebraska.
(2) Facts Establishing Appealable Order
The appellant submits that the Order of the District Court of Knox County,
Nebraska, (T22-23) is a final appealable Order for the reason that it affirmed the decision
of the County Court of Knox County, Nebraska, which adjudged the appellant guilty of the
crime of Driving While Intoxicated, a Class W Misdemeanor. (T22-23). These Orders
affected a substantial right of the appellant, disposed of the whole merits of the case and
left nothing for further consideration of the Court.
(a) Date of Entry of Judgment
The Honorable Patrick G. Rogers of the Seventh Judicial District entered his
Order on appeal from the County Court of Knox County, Nebraska, on AprilS, 2003. (T23).
(b) Date of Filing Post-Judgment Motions
No post-judgment motions were filed by either party.
(c) Date of Filing Notice of Appeal and
Date of Deposit of Docket Fee
The appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on May 6, 2003. On that same date,
the appellant deposited with the Clerk of the District Court of Knox County, Nebraska, the
requisite docket fee and cash in lieu of cost bond.
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(d) Interlocutory Appeal
The Order of the District Court of Knox County, Nebraska, on appeal from
the County Court of Knox County, Nebraska, does not adjudicate fewer than all the claims
in this matter nor does it adjudicate the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
( 1) Nature of the Case
The appellant, on April 25, 2002, was charged in the County Court of Knox
County, Nebraska, with Driving While Intoxicated, a Class W Misdemeanor. (T1) On May
28, 2002, the appellant appeared in the County Court of Knox County (T2) and entered a
plea of not guilty to the pending charges. (T3) On May 31, 2001, the appellant, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Suppress any and all evidence obtained from the appellant on
the basis that the stop of the appellant's vehicle was not based upon reasonable suspicion
and therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, §7 of the Nebraska Constitution. (T4). On July 23, 2002, a hearing was held on
the appellant's Motion to Suppress. (T7). On October 28, 2002, the Honorable Philip R.
Riley concluded that the appellant's Motion to Suppress should be overruled in its entirety.
(T8-9) On January 22, 2003, a trial to the court was held before the Honorable Philip R.
Riley. (T12-13). On that same date, the Honorable Philip R. Riley pronounced the verdict
in open court and found the appellant guilty of Driving While Intoxicated and sentenced
the appellant accordingly. (T12-13)
On January 22, 2003, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in the County
Court of Knox County, Nebraska, indicating his intention to appeal the ruling of Judge
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Riley to the District Court of Knox County, Nebraska. (T16).
On April 1, 2003, the
Honorable Patrick G. Rogers held a hearing on the appellant's appeal from Judge Riley's
ruling and, more specifically, the ruling of Judge Riley overruling the appellant's Motion
to Suppress. (T22-23). On AprilS, 2003, Judge Rogers concluded that the judgment of
the Knox County Court finding the appellant guilty of the charge of Driving While
Intoxicated should be affirmed. (T23). The appellant now appeals from the decision of
Judge Rogers.
(2) Issues Actually Tried in the Courts Below
and How They Were Decided
The issues tried before the Honorable Philip R. Riley and the Honorable
Patrick G. Rogers of the Seventh Judicial District were whether the evidence from the stop
of the appellant's vehicle should be suppressed. The County Court of Knox County,
Nebraska, concluded that the appellant's Motion to Suppress should be overruled in all
respects and the District Court of Knox County, Nebraska, on appeal, concluded the same.
It is from this Order that the appellant now appeals.
(3) Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, ultimate
determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo by an appellate court, while
findings of historical fact are reviewed for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences
drawn from those facts by the trial judge. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116
S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 {1996); State v. Kelley, 265 Neb. 563, 658 N.W.2d 279
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(2003); State v. Keup, 265 Neb. 96, 655 N.W.2d 25 {2003); State v. McCleery, 251 Neb.
940, 560 N.W.2d 789 (1997).
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
For his assignments of error, the appellant asserts that the County Court of Knox
County, Nebraska, erred:
1.
In failing to sustain the appellant's Motion to Suppress; and
2.
In failing to sustain appellant's objection, at the time of the trial, to evidence
gathered from the stop of the appellant's vehicle.
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW
A MOTORIST ON A PUBLIC HIGHWAY IS GUARANTEED FREEDOM FROM
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES .
U.S. CONST. amend. IV
NEB. CONST. art. I,§ 7.
NO RIGHT IS HELD MORE SACRED, OR IS MORE CAREFULLY GUARDED, BY THE
COMMON LAW, THAN THE RIGHT OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL TO THE POSSESSION AND
CONTROL OF HIS OWN PERSON, FREE FROM ALL RESTRAINT OR INTERFERENCE
OF OTHERS, UNLESS BY CLEAR AND UNQUESTIONABLE AUTHORITY OF LAW.
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 LEd. 734
(1891 ).
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THE STOP OF A MOVING VEHICLE BY A POLICE OFFICER AND THE SUBSEQUENT
DETENTION OF ITS OCCUPANT CONSTITUTES A SEIZURE WITHIN THE MEANING
OFTHEFOURTHANDFOURTEENTHAMENDMENTSEVENTHOUGHTHEPURPOSE
OF THE STOP IS LIMITED AND THE DETENTION IS QUITE BRIEF.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 {1979).
LIMITED INVESTIGATORY STOPS ARE PERMISSIBLE ONLY UPON A REASONABLE
SUSPICION, SUPPORTED BY SPECIFIC AND ARTICULABLE FACTS, THAT THE
PERSON IS, WAS, OR IS ABOUT TO BE ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,20 L.Ed.2d 889 {1968)
State v. Chronister, 3 Neb.App. 281, 526 N.W.2d 98 (1995).
REASONABLE SUSPICION ENTAILS SOME MINIMAL LEVEL OF OBJECTIVE
JUSTIFICATION FOR DETENTION, SOMETHING MORE THAN AN INCHOATE AND
UNPARTICULARIZED SUSPICION OR HUNCH, BUT LESS THAN THE LEVEL OF
SUSPICION REQUIRED FOR PROBABLE CAUSE.
State v. Staten, 238 Neb. 13, 18,469 N.W.2d 112, 116 (1991).
IN DETERMINING WHETHER A POLICE OFFICER HAS A CONSTJTUTIONALLY
PERMISSIBLE REASON TO STOP A PERSON ON A PUBLIC STREET, A COURT MUST
ASSESS THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE STOP,
INCLUDING "ALL OF THE OBJECTIVE OBSERVATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS, AS
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WELL AS THE SUSPICION DRAWN BY A TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED POLICE
OFFICER BY INFERENCE AND DEDUCTION THAT THE INDIVIDUAL STOPPED IS OR
HAS BEEN OR IS ABOUT TO BE ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR.
State v. Ebberson, 209 Neb. 41, 45, 305 N.W.2d 904, 907 (1981).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wallace Holz is a police officer for the City of Bloomfield, Nebraska. (BE 2:67). He has been an officer for approximately four (4) years. (BE 2:8). On April 10, 2002,
Officer Holz was on duty with the Bloomfield Police Department. (BE 2:11 ). Officer Holz
was at the police station in Bloomfield at the time. (BE 2:13). At approximately 2:25a.m.
(BE 2:11 ), he observed a maroon pickup coming from the east traveling west. (BE 2:1820). When the maroon pickup passed his office, he observed the vehicle to be driving
"with its hazards on." (BE 2:24-25). The vehicle had its headlights and taillights on at the
time. (BE 3:4-7).
After making that observation, Officer Holz immediately left the office and
pursued the maroon pickup. (BE 3:9-1 0). The officer caught up to the maroon pickup
approximately four (4) blocks from the edge of the "city limits" of Bloomfield, Nebraska. (BE
3: 12-14).
Officer Holz was near the intersection of West Main and First Street when he
caught up to the maroon pickup and activated his red lights. (BE 3: 16). The hazard lights
of the maroon pickup were still on at that time. (BE 3:18-19).
The maroon pickup
continued and left the territorial limits of the City of Bloomfield. (BE 4:1 0). Officer Holz
followed the maroon pickup outside of the City of Bloomfield and the vehicle eventually
stopped. (BE 4: 15-17). At that time, Officer Holz approached the maroon pickup. (BE
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4: 19). The driver of the maroon pickup was identified as Waldo Warriner, the appellant
herein. (BE 4:21 ). As Officer Holz was following the appellant's vehicle before it stopped
outside the city limits of Bloomfield, Nebraska, Officer Holz observed the vehicle to touch
the center line twice and the white line once. (BE 6:23-25).
Officer Holz could not,
however, recall whether the vehicle's movements occurred inside or outside the city limits
of Bloomfield, Nebraska. (BE 11 :22-23). Officer Holz did, though, have his red lights
activated prior to leaving the city limits of Bloomfield, Nebraska. (BE 12:1). To the point
in time where Officer Holz left his territorial jurisdiction, the only observations Officer Holz
believed to be illegal were that the vehicle had its "hazards" on. (BE 8:23, 10:25). There
is no question that, where Officer Holz stopped the appellant's vehicle, was outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Bloomfield, Nebraska. (BE 12:6).
ARGUMENT
1.
THE COUNTY COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN THE APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
2.
THE COUNTY COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S
OBJECTION, AT THE TIME OF THE TRIAL, TO EVIDENCE GATHERED FROM
THE STOP OF THE APPELLANT'S VEHICLE.
The issue before this Court is two-fold: (1) is the operation of a motor vehicle
with its "hazards" on a violation of the Nebraska Rules of the Road. §§60-601 to 606,37 4?; (2) if it is not, did Officer Holz have the statutory authority to pursue the appellant's
vehicle outside of his territorial jurisdiction, i.e., the City of Bloomfield, Nebraska? Both
of these issues appear to be one of first impression as the appellant has not located any
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case law in Nebraska which has specifically discussed these two (2) issues. The trial
court, as well as the intermediate appellate court, both determined that the operation of a
motor vehicle with its hazards on constituted a violation of the Nebraska Rules of the
Road. (T9, T23). The appellant disagrees and asks this Court to reverse the decision of
the District Court of Knox County, Nebraska, which affirmed the decision of County Court
of Knox County, Nebraska, regarding the appellant's Motion to Suppress.
As the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated in State v. Ortiz, 257 Neb. 784,
600 N.W.2d 805 (1999):
In Nebraska, freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures is guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. IV and Neb.
Canst. art. I,§§ 7. State v. Konfrst, 251 Neb. 214, 556 N.W.2d
250 (1996). The Fourth Amendment and Neb. Const. art. I, §§
7, prohibit only unreasonable searches and seizures. These
constitutional provisions do not protect citizens from all
governmental intrusion, but only from unreasonable intrusions.
State v. Ranson, 245 Neb. 71,511 N.W.2d 97 (1994).
Ortiz, 257 Neb. at 793, 600 N. W.2d at 815. "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001,35 LEd. 734 (1891).
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The United States Supreme Court and the Nebraska Supreme Court have
consistently held that a motorist on a public highway or street may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy within a motor vehicle. See, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99
S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Childs, 242 Neb. 426, 495 N.W.2d 475 (1993).
It is well-settled that the stop of a moving vehicle by a police officer and the subsequent
detention of its occupant constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the detention
is quite brief. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653,99 S.Ct. 1391,1395,59 L.Ed.2d
660 (1979).
Under both the United States and Nebraska Constitutions, limited
investigatory stops are permissible only upon a reasonable suspicion, supported by
specific and articulable facts, that the person is, was, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 l.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v.
Chronister, 3 Neb.App. 281, 526 N.W.2d 98 (1995). "Reasonable suspicion entails some
minimal level of objective justification for detention, something more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but Jess than the level of suspicion required for
probable cause." State v. Staten, 238 Neb. 13, 18, 469 N. W.2d 112, 116 ( 1991 ).
In
determining whether a police officer has a constitutionaHy permissible reason to stop a
person on a public street, a court must assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the stop, including "all of the objective observations and considerations, as well as the
suspicion drawn by a trained and experienced police officer by inference and deduction
9
that the individual stopped is or has been or is about to be engaged in criminal behavior."
State v. Ebberson, 209 Neb. 41, 45,305 N.W.2d 904,907 (1981).
The trial court, in its written opinion, gave two (2) reasons for its conclusion
that Officer Holz had reasonable suspicion to stop the appellant's vehicle:
In the present case, the officer observed the defendant
operating his motor vehicle with all of the hazard lights
flashing. Had the vehicle been sitting by the side of the road
with its hazard lights flashing that might not have been
particularly suspect. Since there was no apparent reason for
the hazard light to be flashing, this could have legitimately
raised a red flag in the eyes of the officer which might lead him
to believe that he should investigate further.
Even if the defendant does not wish to accept that rational
(sic), the Court finds it clear that Section 60-6,230 R.R.S. was
violated. That section as quoted above provides that you
cannot operate a motor vehicle with any rotating or flashing
lights thereon.
None of the exceptions applied (sic) and
therefore there was a violation of the statute.
(T9).
The Knox County District Court, sitting as an intermediate appellate court,
concluded that simply that the "operation of the motor vehicle with its hazard lights
10
flashing while driving down the highway is a violation of [§60-6,230, RR. S. 1998] and gave
the officer reasonable suspicion and probable cause to pursue this investigation." (T23)
§60-6,230, R.R.S. 1998, provides:
(1) Except as provided in sections 60-6,231 to 60-6,233 and
subsections (4) and (5) of this section, no person shall operate
any motor vehicle or any equipment of any description on any
highway in this state with any rotating or flashing light.
(2) Except for stop lights and directional signals, which may be
red, yellow, or amber, no person shall display any color of light
other than red on the rear of any motor vehicle or any
equipment of any kind on any highway within this state.
(3) Blue and green lights may be displayed on vehicles of the
Military Department for purpose of convoy control when on any
state emergency mission.
(4) A single flashing white light may be displayed on the roof
of school transportation vehicles during extremely adverse
weather conditions.
(5) Blue and amber rotating or flashing lights may be displayed
on vehicles used for the movement of snow when operated by
the Department of Roads or any local authority.
/d.
11
The appellant respectfully requests this Court to conclude, on de novo
review, that Officer Holz did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a limited
investigatory stop of the appellant's vehicle. Both the trial court and the intermediate
appellate court were clearly wrong in the interpretation of §60-6,230, R.R.S. 1998. This
statute does not even refer to hazard lights. Indeed, the statute appears to be clearly
aimed toward the regulation of colored flashing lights, such as blue and green flashing
lights. The statute is not designed to regulate the flashing of directional signals.
In fact, it appears that the lower courts in this case were misunderstood as
to what a hazard light really is. As this Court is aware, "hazard" lights are nothing more
than all four (4) directional signals flashing at once. It is a standard piece of equipment
on a motor vehicle. The use of the hazard lights is not a violation of the Nebraska Rules
of the Road. Instead, there are many instances where a motorist may use his hazard
lights. The motorist may be escorting another vehicle. The motorist may have a problem
with the lights on his vehicle and may need the hazards on to alert other vehicles. The
motorist may be traveling slower than the usual course of traffic and may want the hazards
on to warn other drivers to this fact. Contrary to the holding of the courts below, there are
several instances where the use of hazard lights may be justified.
There is no statute in Nebraska which prohibits the use of hazard lights while
operating the motor vehicle and, accordingly, this Court must conclude that Officer Holz's
seizure of the appellant's vehicle was without reasonable suspicion. The evidence is clear
as to Officer Holz' intent, i.e., he "immediately" pursued the appellant's vehicle and
intended to stop the appellant's vehicle based solely on his belief that the use of hazard
12
lights is illegal. There is no evidence to lead a trained and experienced police officer in
this case to the conclusion that Mr. Warriner was or was about to be engaged in criminal
behavior. State v. Ebberson, 209 Neb. 41, 45, 305 N.W.2d 904, 907 (1981). At best,
Officer Holz had an "unparticularized suspicion" that some criminal activity might be afoot.
See generally State v. Staten, 238 Neb. 13, 18, 469 N. W.2d 112, 116 ( 1991 ).
Any argument by the State of Nebraska that a motorist's use of hazard lights
at night gives rise to "a particularized suspicion of lawbreaking" is constitutionally infirm
as well. Indeed, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in State v. Childs, 242 Neb. 426, 495
N.W.2d 475 (1993), observed:
If the State's argument that an In Transit plate furnishes a
particularized suspicion of lawbreaking, and, therefore,
criminal activity, the result would be a constitutionally suspect
presumption that every motorist who uses In Transit decals is
presumed to be a lawbreaker involved in criminal activity. Yet,
the presumption of innocence, although unarticulated in the
U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, is a basic component of a
defendant's fair trial and, therefore, an aspect of due process
in the criminal justice system.
Childs, supra (quoting State v. Jasper, 237 Neb. 754, 759,467 N.W.2d 855, 859 (1991)).
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in overruling the appellant's Motion to Suppress and
further erred in admitting, at trial, the evidence obtained from the seizure of the appellant's
13
vehicle. This Court should reverse the decision of the Knox County District Court, on
appeal from the County Court of Knox County, and should remand the case for further
proceedings.
BY~,~~~~~--~~-----------Ron ld E. Te
GA
I
Je
FITZGERA
#20625
' VETTER & TEMPLE
100 North 13th Str · t, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1407
Norfolk, NE 68702-1407
(402) 371-7770
email: [email protected]
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