The Invention of Modern Aesthetics:
From Leibniz to Kant
LARS-OLOF ÅHLBERG
Things known are to be known by the superior
faculty as the object of logic; things perceived [are
to be known by the inferior faculty, as the object]
of the science of perception, or aesthetic.
– Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1735)
Beauty … is sensuously given perfection. That
is why the theory of this sensuously given formperfection has been called aesthetics.
– Per Daniel Amadeus Atterbom (1837)
We can know more than we can tell.
– Michael Polanyi (1967)
I
Modern aesthetics as the philosophical and critical study of the
arts arose in 18th-century Europe, and is to a large extent a stepchild
of the Enlightenment. The middle and second half of the eighteenth
century saw the publication of a number of inluential works dealing
with different aspects of the arts, the perception and evaluation of
works of art, and the principles of criticism. »The theoretical endeavours of the European Enlightenment in regard to taste, the concept
of genius, imagination, the criticism of taste, the analysis of the sublime as well as the continued relexion on the old formula ‘ je ne sais
quoi’ form the background against which aesthetics establishes itself
as an independent discipline«, we read in the entry on aesthetics in
the encyclopaedia Ästhetische Grundbegriffe.1 The fact that the term
1
»Ästhetik/ästhetisch«, in Ästhetische Grundbegriffe: Historisches Wörterbuch in
sieben Bänden 1, Hrsg. Karlheinz Barck et al. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2000–), p. 321,
my transl. Dieter Kliche, the author of sections I to IV of this comprehensive article,
refers to the publication of Vico’s La Scienza Nuova (1744), Hume’s A Treatise of
Human Nature (1740) and his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748),
as well as Abbé Batteux’s Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même principe (1746),
Hogarth’s The Analysis of Beauty (1753), Condillac’s Traité des sensations (1754),
Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime and
Beautiful (1757) and Henry Home’s Elements of Criticism (1762), p. 317.
133
Lars-Olof Åhlberg
»aesthetics« was coined only in the eighteenth century to refer to
the philosophical analysis of perception and of art does of course not
mean that there was no aesthetics or philosophy of art before the eighteenth century; questions concerning the relationship between art and
reality, the nature of beauty, the nature of representation in tragedy,
music, sculpture and painting, and the principles of criticism were discussed by philosophers and writers already in ancient Greece, but the
establishment of »The Modern System of the Arts« is arguably a necessary precondition for the development of a systematic philosophical
aesthetics or philosophy of art.2 The concept of art was unknown in
Greek and Roman antiquity, or, rather, what we consider to be an art
form (painting and sculpture, for example) and works of art was categorized differently in antiquity, was brought under concepts different
from ours. Painting, sculpture, architecture, music and poetry, which
constitute the core of the modern system of the arts, were not regarded
as ine arts but – with the exception of poetry (and drama) – as sciences or crafts. The Greek word techné (
) and the Latin ars are
usually translated as »art«, which is inaccurate and somewhat anachronistic, since techné and ars included much that is not categorized as
art today and excluded much that belongs to the category of art today.
In contrast to the other »arts«, poetry (and literature in general) was
not regarded as a craft since inspiration and genius was required for
creating poetry, whereas the crafts demanded scientiic and practical
knowledge. »The medieval system of the arts« distinguished between
2
»Aesthetics« has often been considered to be synonymous or more or less synonymous with »philosophy of art«. In the introduction to his Lectures on Aesthetics Hegel
says that »these lectures are devoted to aesthetics, their subject [Gegenstand] is the
vast kingdom of beauty […] and more speciically the realm of ine art«. Hegel is not
entirely satisied with the term »aesthetics« since it means »the science of the senses«
or »the science of sensation«, but because the term »aesthetics« is an established one
Hegel uses it although »the real name of our science is the philosophy of art and
more speciically the philosophy of ine art«[italics in the original] (G. W. F. Hegel,
Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I, 1835, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer & Karl Markus Michel
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970, p. 13, my transl.). Cf. the following contemporary deinition of aesthetics: »In its modern meaning aesthetics is most frequently
understood as a philosophical discipline which is either a philosophy of aesthetic
phenomena (objects, qualities, experiences and values), or a philosophy of art (of
creativity, of artwork, and its perception) or a philosophy of art criticism taken broadly
(metacriticism), or, inally, a discipline which is concerned philosophically with all
three realms jointly« (Bohdan Dziemidok, »Aesthetics«, The Blackwell Dictionary
of Twentieth-Century Social Thought, eds. William Outhwaite & Tom Bottomore,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, p. 4), and Malcolm Budd claims that »[a]s the subject
[aesthetics] is now understood, it consists of two parts: the philosophy of art, and the
philosophy of aesthetic experience and character of objects or phenomena that are not
art« (Malcolm Budd, »Aesthetics«, The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol.
1, ed. Edward Craig, London: Routledge, 1998, p. 59).
134
The Invention of Modern Aesthetics: From Leibniz to Kant
the seven liberal arts (artes liberales) and the mechanical arts. The
liberal arts consisted of two parts, trivium (rhetoric, grammar and
dialectics or logic) and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy
and music). This division of the liberal arts originates with Martianus
Capella (5th century), who was inspired by the catalogue of the arts of
the Roman author, Terentius Varro (1st century BC), who, in addition
to the seven arts mentioned, included medicine as well as architecture
among the liberal arts. Only music, which was regarded as an art and a
science because harmony could be understood in mathematical terms,
was regarded as a liberal art whereas architecture, painting and sculpture were categorized with the non-liberal mechanical arts.
The publication of Abbé Batteux’s Les Beaux Arts réduits à
un même principe in 1746 symbolizes the end of the ancient and
medieval system of the arts, and the ine arts are inally separated
from craft and science.3 As Paul Oskar Kristeller points out the development of a systematic philosophy of art presupposes a consistent
categorization of certain human activities and artefacts as art.4 The
philosophy of art as a systematic inquiry into the nature of Art and
its functions emerges. In Batteux’s classiication of the arts, poetry,
music, painting, sculpture, and dance are treated as autonomous arts
having pleasure as their purpose achieved through the imitation of
nature, while rhetoric and architecture were »mixed« arts combining pleasure with utility. But it is with D’Alembert’s introduction, the
Discours préliminaire, to the Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire Raisonné
des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1751) that, according to Kristeller, the modern system of the arts (painting, sculpture, architecture,
poetry, music) is set forth in its inal form.5 The Encyclopédie and its
famous introduction, says Kristeller, »codiied the system of the ine
arts after and beyond Batteux and through its prestige and authority
gave it the widest possible currency all over Europe«.6
3
4
5
6
It is interesting to note that the English words »artisan« as well as »artist« derive
from the Latin »artista«, which referred to a craftsman or to someone engaged in the
study of the liberal arts.
Paul Oskar Kristeller, »The Modern System of the Arts«, 1951/52, in P. O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought II: Papers on Humanism and the Arts (New York: Harper
& Row, 1965), pp. 163–227.
»Parmi les arts libéraux qu’on a réduit à des principes, ceux qui se proposent
l’imitation de la nature ont été appelés beaux-arts, parce qu’ils ont principalement
l’agrément pour objet«, D’Alemebert writes (quoted from Kristeller, p. 202, n. 196).
The common principle which distinguishes the ine arts from the sciences and from
craft is the imitation of nature.
Kristeller, »The Modern System of the Arts«, p. 202.
135
Lars-Olof Åhlberg
II
The dichotomy and antithesis between aisthesis (a
, perception, sensation) and noesis (
, reason, knowledge) has had
a pervasive inluence on the development of Western thinking, the
contrast and conlict between reason and knowledge on the one hand
and perception and opinion on the other forms the background of
aesthetics as a philosophical discipline. Aesthetics as a philosophical discipline inaugurated by Alexander Baumgarten is a child of the
Enlightenment, and implies at the same time somewhat paradoxically
a critique of Enlightenment rationalism, since there is no room for the
cognitive value of aisthesis in Enlightenment rationalism. As Wolfgang Welsch points out, Baumgarten saw aesthetics as a complement
and correction of a one-sided rationalism,7 and some writers emphasize the continued relevance of aesthetics as a philosophy of culture
and as a critique of culture; in Brigitte Scheer’s view, for example,
aesthetics »repudiates the central paradigm of Western philosophy,
the traditional logocentric conception of rationality and the absolutiication of that conception«.8
None of the great rationalist philosophers Descartes, Leibniz,
Spinoza were much interested in the arts, nor did any of them show
any philosophical interest in the theoretical analysis of art and its functions, i.e. in aesthetics. Nevertheless, Leibniz’s scattered relexions and
remarks concerning the relationship between clear and confused ideas
and perceptions as contrasted with distinct (theoretical) ideas were of
the utmost importance for Alexander Baumgarten’s conception of the
new science of aesthetics, the science of the lower cognitive faculty
(gnoseologia inferior). As Jeffrey Barnouw remarks, Baumgarten’s
»launching of aesthetics as a formal discipline was important because
it provided a frame for a rich group of ideas that had been diffused
throughout Leibniz’s writings«.9 I shall therefore irst discuss Leibniz’s
7
8
9
»Baumgarten hat die Ästhetik als Korrekturdisziplin des einseitigen Rationalismus
konzipiert und begründet«, Welsch says (Wolfgang Welsch, Unsere postmoderne
Moderne, 4. Aul., Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993, p. 88).
Brigitte Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997), p. 1, my transl. Cf. Michael Kelly’s claim
to the effect that »aesthetics is uniquely situated to serve as a meeting place for
numerous academic disciplines and cultural traditions «, aesthetics is »the critical
relection on art, culture, and nature« (Michael Kelly, »Introduction«, Encyclopedia
of Aesthetics, 4 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, xi). I have discussed
some of these issues in my article »Aesthetics, Philosophy of Culture and ‘The Aesthetic Turn’«, Filozofski vestnik 2001, vol. 22, No. 2, »Aesthetics and Philosophy of
Culture«, pp. 21–42.
Jeffrey Barnouw, »The Beginnings of ‘Aesthetics’ and the Leibnizian Conception
of Sensation«, in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction of Art, ed.
Paul Mattick, Jr. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 82.
136
The Invention of Modern Aesthetics: From Leibniz to Kant
distinctions between clear and confused ideas and perceptions and their
relationship to what Leibniz regarded as distinct ideas before moving
on in the third section to Baumgarten’s foundation of aesthetics.
Leibniz’s analysis of obscure, clear and distinct ideas and concepts is a further development and modiication of a similar distinction
we ind in Descartes’ philosophy. In his most comprehensive work,
the Principia philosophiae (1644), Descartes distinguished between
clear ideas and distinct ideas, although the phrase »clear and distinct
ideas« occurs frequently in his other writings and is even employed
as a criterion of truth. Something is clear, he says, »which is present
and apparent to an attentive mind«, and something is distinct »which
is so precise and different from all other objects that it contains within
itself nothing but what is clear«.10 For a judgment to be incontrovertible, Descartes claims, it must be based on ideas which are both clear
and distinct. It is possible to have clear ideas (perceptions) of pain, for
example, without any real knowledge of the causes of the pain.11 Similarly we can have clear ideas (perceptions) of colours without any real
(distinct) knowledge of the causes of our perceptions.12 Leibniz’s discussion of clear and distinct ideas, is, however of greater importance
for Baumgarten’s endeavour to establish aesthetics as an autonomous
philosophical discipline. In his short treatise »Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis« (1684) Leibniz distinguishes between different kinds of and different degrees of knowledge, »[k]nowledge«, he
says, »is either obscure or clear; clear knowledge is either confused
or distinct; distinct knowledge is either inadequate or adequate, and
also either symbolic or intuitive«, the most perfect knowledge being
both adequate and intuitive.13 Knowledge is obscure, he contends,
when it does »not sufice for recognizing the thing represented, as
when I merely remember some lower or animal which I have once
seen but not well enough to recognize it when it is placed before me
and to distinguish it from similar ones«.14 When we recognize a thing
10
René Descartes, The Essential Descartes, 1976, ed. with an Introduction by Margaret D. Wilson (New York: Meridian, 1993), § 45, pp. 320–321.
11
»When, for instance, a severe pain is felt, the perception of this pain may be very
clear, and yet for all that not distinct, because it is usually confused by the sufferers
with the obscure judgment that they form upon its nature«, Descartes says (ibid.,
§ 46, p. 321). When we were young we »knew nothing distinctly, although [our
minds] perceived much suficiently clearly« (ibid., § 47, p. 321).
12
Ibid., § 70, p. 332. Having distinct knowledge of colours presumably presupposes
knowledge of the laws of the refraction of light and the wavelengths of particular
colours, for example that red has the wavelengt of 780–622 nanometers.
13
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, »Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas«, in G. W.
Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, A Selection translated and edited with an
introduction by Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), p. 291.
14
Ibid.
137
Lars-Olof Åhlberg
for what it is, when we are able to identity it as a thing of a certain
kind, we have clear knowledge. This clear knowledge can, however,
be either confused or distinct. »It is confused«, Leibniz says, »when
I cannot enumerate one by one the marks [i.e. deinitional properties]
which are suficient to distinguish the thing from others, even though
the thing may in truth have such marks and constituents into which its
concept can be resolved«.15 Leibniz offers our knowledge of colours,
odours, lavours and other particular objects perceived by the senses as
examples of this clear but confused kind of knowledge, since we do not
know them by their »marks« and cannot express our perceptual knowledge of them by formulating adequate deinitions although we are able
to distinguish clearly between different colours and lavours. This clear
but confused perceptual knowledge, »knowledge by acquaintance« in
Russellian idiom,16 cannot be taught, it can only be gained by experience: »we cannot explain to a blind man what red is, nor can we explain
such a quality to others except by bringing them into the presence of
the thing and making them see, smell, or taste it, or at least by reminding them of some similar perception they have had in the past«.17 And
then Leibniz makes one of his very few, and important, references to
the arts, when he compares this clear but confused perceptual knowledge of colours and lavours with our perception and judgments of
paintings, »we sometimes see painters«, Leibniz says, »and other artists correctly judge what has been done well or done badly«, although
they »are often unable to give a reason for their judgment but tell the
inquirer that the work which displeases them lacks ‘something, I know
not what’«.18 Leibniz thus draws attention to the parallel between our
perception of and judgments about colours and our perception of and
judgments about the »correctness« of artistic representations.
Leibniz’s use of the phrase »something, I know not what« ( je ne
sais quoi), which was a commonplace in the discussion of taste in the
seventeenth century, is of special interest here. The phrase refers to
the apprehension of qualities, which are clearly perceived although
we cannot account for them adequately nor express our perception of
them distinctly, i.e. by means of concepts. The phrase »je ne sais quoi«
was invoked in order to »suggest a gap between what can be felt and
what can be formulated in words«.19 As Barnouw remarks, this phrase
could mean different things, it was used in situations where the with15
Ibid.
Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, 1912 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1964), ch. V.
17
Leibniz, »Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas«, p. 291.
18
Ibid.
19
Barnouw, »The Beginnings of ‘Aesthetics’ and the Leibnizian Conception of Sensation«, p. 64.
16
138
The Invention of Modern Aesthetics: From Leibniz to Kant
holding of explicit judgment was deemed appropriate and allusion and
suggestion was more apposite; it was thus connected with l’esprit de
inesse as contrasted with l’esprit de géometrie, but it was also used to
refer to situations when certain phenomena were perceived to be »beyond words«, to be ineffable.20 The expression »je ne sais quoi«, has
two sources, one »in an urbane nescio quid of Cicero«, the other one
in »the nescio quid of mystical ineffability going back to Augustine«,
Barnouw maintains referring to the work of the historian of ideas,
Erich Köhler.21 The interest in the present context of l’esprit de inesse
and the apprehension of qualities dificult to discern, those that elicit
the »je ne sais quoi« lies in the fact that the exercise of the l’esprit de
inesse requires personal qualities similar to the ones characteristic of
Baumgarten’s felix aestheticus, a matter I will return to in a while.
The senses provide us, according to Leibniz, with acquaintance of colours, lavours, and the qualities of touch, but the senses
»do not make us know what these sensible qualities are or in what
they consist«, as he puts it in a letter to Queen Charlotte of Prussia
in 1702.22 We do not actually perceive what a colour such as red is in
reality although we are able to recognize red, since red may well be
»the revolving of certain small globules«, which are imperceptible.23
Perceived colours cannot be deined, or, to put it in Leibniz’s language,
we cannot account for the marks of the colour blue, for example, since
»marks to recognize blue […] could not be given if we had never seen
it«.24 Blue is its own mark, Leibniz claims, »[i]t is an I know not what
of which we are conscious, but for which we cannot account«.25 Our
knowledge of sensible qualities such as blue is clear and at the same
time confused, the concept of the sensible quality blue is clear but not
distinct since it cannot be deined by means of necessary and suficient
properties (marks). In his posthumously published treatise, Nouveaux
essais sur l’entendement humain, a systematic, critical commentary
on Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690),26 LeibIbid., pp. 61–62. The distinction between l’esprit de inesse and l’esprit de géometrie
was famously formulated by Blaise Pascal in the Pensées sur la religion, posthumously published in 1670. The former meant apprehending things without rules and
judgment, the latter judging things according to explicit rules and criteria.
21
Ibid., pp. 63–64.
22
G. W. Leibniz, Selections, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1951), p. 355.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid., p. 357.
25
Ibid.
26
The Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain was composed in 1704–1705 but remained unpublished until 1765. One reason for the delay was Locke’s death in 1704,
since one of Leibniz’s purposes in writing the work was to elicit a response from Locke.
20
139
Lars-Olof Åhlberg
niz illustrates the difference between distinct, precise knowledge and
practical, »tacit« knowledge invoking the example of a mathematician,
who »may have precise knowledge of the nature of nine- and ten-sided
igures, because he has means for constructing and studying them, yet
not be able to tell one from the other on sight«, whereas »a labourer or
an engineer, perhaps knowing little enough of the nature of the igures,
may have an advantage over a great geometrician in being able to tell
them apart just by looking and without counting«.27
Barnouw concludes his analysis of Leibniz’s views on the relationship between clear but confused knowledge and distinct knowledge by maintaining that all knowledge according to Leibniz »relies
at some points on factors that are felt but not focused on, a tacit or
aesthetic dimension«.28 It is noteworthy that Barnouw speaks of the
tacit or the aesthetic dimension, implying that aesthetic knowledge
and tacit knowledge, at least in this context, are the same. »Aesthetic«
here presumably means »that which pertains to perception and sensation« or »knowledge based on immediate apprehension of sensuous
qualities« or something similar. The identiication of the aesthetic
dimension with the tacit dimension of knowledge obviously trades on
the original Greek meaning of »aesthetic«, viz. that which pertains
to perception and sensation.29 This sense of »aesthetic«, however,
27
G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, translated and edited by
Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), p. 262. The following passage brings out very clearly Leibniz’s idea of
practical, or tacit knowledge as opposed to theoretical knowledge: »just as there
are porters and pedlars who will say what that their loads weigh, to within a pound
– the world’s ablest expert in statics could not do as well. It is true that this empiric’s
kind of knowledge, gained through long practice, can greatly facilitate swift action
such as the engineer often needs in emergencies where any delay would put him in
danger. Still, this clear image that one may have of a regular ten­sided igure or of a
99-pound weight – this accurate sense that one may have of them – consists merely
in a confused idea: it does not serve to reveal the nature and properties of the igure
or the weight; that requires a distinct idea« (ibid.).
28
Barnouw, »The Beginnings of ‘Aesthetics’ and the Leibnizian Conception of Sensation«, p. 87.
29
The phycisist and philosopher Michael Polanyi claims in his major work, Personal
Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1958) that knowledge is not exclusively based on observation, concepts and
explicit reasoning, but also on »tacit knowing«, complementing and integrating
explicit knowledge. The distinction between explicit and tacit knowldege can also
be found, albeit in a different form and with a different emphasis, in Gilbert Ryle’s
seminal discussion of »knowing-that« and knowing-how« (G. Ryle, The Concept of
Mind, 1949, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963, ch. II). See also M. Polanyi, The Tacit
Dimension, 1966 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967). Wittgenstein’s remarks
about the difference between knowing and saying are also highly relevant here (cf.
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, 2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell,
1967, transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, § 78, p. 36).
140
The Invention of Modern Aesthetics: From Leibniz to Kant
has nothing to do with art or the philosophy of art as such, a matter I
will return to in my discussion of Baumgarten’s aesthetics. The tacit
dimension, or, tacit knowledge, on the other hand, plays an important
role in what is perhaps somewhat misleadingly called »aesthetic appreciation« of art.
As we have seen Leibniz distinguishes between two forms of
confused ideas and two kinds of confused knowledge, obscure and
clear respectively, which in their turn are contrasted with distinct concepts and distinct knowledge. A concept is distinct, he says, when we
are in the possession of a nominal deinition of the concept, a deinition
which is »the enumeration of suficient marks«,30 in virtue of which we
are able to distinguish clearly those things that fall under the concept
from those that don’t. As an example of a distinct concept Leibniz offers »the kind of notion which assayers have of gold«, a notion, »which
enables them to distinguish gold from all other bodies by suficient
marks and observations«.31 We possess, Leibniz argues, such distinct
concepts of mathematical phenomena such as number and magnitude,
but also of mental phenomena such as hope and fear. The ability to offer a nominal deinition of a concept is usually the criterion of distinct
knowledge of the concept in question, the exception being primitive
concepts which are irreducible and lacking in requisite marks; but in
spite of this we can nevertheless have »distinct knowledge of an indeinable concept« Leibniz claims.32 Even if the concept is distinct and
our knowledge of the phenomena designated by the concept in question is a fortiori distinct, some of the components entering the deinition of the concept may not be distinct. In such cases knowledge is
distinct but inadequate, since it cannot be fully articulated. Only »when
every ingredient that enters into a distinct concept is itself known distinctly, or when an analysis is carried through to the end, knowledge
is adequate«, Leibniz claims.33 Leibniz’s ideal of knowledge is thus
extremely demanding, a complete (and correct) analysis of a concept
is the precondition for distinct knowledge, his ideal is the ideal of
complete and crystalline clarity, it is not for nothing that Leibniz is
regarded as the »arch-rationalist«. Leibniz realizes, however, that this
austere ideal of knowledge is rarely attained, for he doubts »that a perfect example of this [sc. adequate knowledge] can be given by man«,
adding that »our concept of numbers approaches it closely«.34
In his »Discours de métaphysique«, written two years after the
30
Leibniz, »Mediations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas«, p. 292.
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
31
141
Lars-Olof Åhlberg
»Meditationes« Leibniz again broaches the theme of confused versus
distinct concepts and knowledge, and illustrates the distinction with
an example from art: »[w]e sometimes know clearly, and without
having a doubt of any kind, if a poem or a picture is well done or
badly, because it has a certain ‘something, I know not what’ which
either satisies or repels us«.35 Our judgment that a poem or a picture
is well done is apparently not based on distinct concepts and distinct
knowledge, since there do not seem to be any criteria for judging a
poem or a painting to be good or bad, and criteria, Leibniz thinks,
are necessary for rational judgment. When the criteria used can be
explained, Leibniz says, my knowledge is distinct, and he again adduces the example of the assayer »who distinguishes the true gold
from the false by means of certain tests and marks which make up
the deinition of gold«.36 Nothing similar is envisaged by him in regard to art, apparently there are no criteria for judging a work to be
good or bad although he believes that »we sometimes know clearly,
and without having a doubt of any kind« that a work is good or bad.37
Leibniz’s succinct discussion of confused and distinct knowledge in
the »Discourse on Metaphysics« is even clearer and more precise than
his disquisition in »Mediations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas«. The
following quotation gives Leibniz’s whole discussion of the difference
between confused and distinct knowledge in a nutshell:
Of this kind [sc. distinct knowledge] is the knowledge of an assayer who distinguishes the true gold from the false by means of
certain tests and marks which make up the deinition of gold. But
distinct knowledge has degrees, for usually the concepts which
enter into the deinition would themselves need deinition and are
known only confusedly. But when everything which enters into a
deinition or distinct knowledge is known distinctly, down to the
primitive concepts [i.e. the indeinables], I call such knowledge
adequate. And when my mind grasps all the primitive ingredients
of a concept at once and distinctly, it possesses an intuitive knowledge. This is very rare, since for the most part human knowledge
is merely either confused or suppositive.38
It is clear that when it comes to matters of taste and of art there
are according to Leibniz no rational principles one can adduce in support of our judgments. We can have no adequate, let alone, intuitive
35
G. W. Leibniz, »Discourse on Metaphysics«, in Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and
Letters, pp. 318–319.
36
Ibid., p. 319.
37
Ibid., p. 318.
38
Ibid., p. 319.
142
The Invention of Modern Aesthetics: From Leibniz to Kant
knowledge (in Leibniz’s sense of adequate and intuitive) of works of
art as perceptible objects. Nevertheless Leibniz does think that art and
judgments of taste play an important and ineliminable role in human
life, in his review of Shaftesbury’s inluential treatise Characteristics
of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711) Leibniz remarks that »[t]aste
as distinguished from understanding consists of confused perceptions
for which one cannot give an adequate reason«, taste is akin to »an
instinct« that is formed by »nature and habit«.39 Leibniz shares Shaftesbury’s criticisms of those »who seek demonstrations everywhere,
and are incapable of seeing anything in everyday light«, they are
like »people who are called moon-blind because they can see only by
moonlight«.40 There is thus, in Leibniz’s opinion more to knowledge
than has been dreamt of in rationalist philosophy. The kind of knowledge afforded by sensuous experience and which relies on »assessment
by feeling« has, as Barnouw remarks, been little studied because of the
reason-blindness of so many prominent thinkers.41
One more aspect of Leibniz’s thinking is worth mentioning
here, his contention that there is a multitude of petites perceptions in
every sensuous experience. Every sensation is a composite of small
imperceptible sensations constituting an assemblage confus, grasped
by consciousness. Leibniz says that »at every moment there is in us
an ininity of perceptions, unaccompanied by awareness or relection«, this is so, he argues, because »these impressions are either too
minute or too numerous, or else too unvarying, so that they are not
suficiently distinctive on their own«.42 Their effects, or, rather, the
conjoined effect of these minute perceptions, is, however, perceptible. Leibniz offers the roaring of the sea as an example of a perception which consists of numerous minute imperceptible perceptions,
although »we must hear the parts which make up this whole, that is
the noise of each wave, although each of these little noises makes
itself known only when combined confusedly with all the others«.43
These minute perceptions are fused together into a perceptible whole.
»These minute perceptions«, says Leibniz, »constitute that je ne sais
quoi, those lavours, those images of sensible qualities, vivid in the
39
G. W. Leibniz, »Remarks on the Three Volumes Entitled Characteristics of Men,
Manners, Opinions, Times, … 1711«, 1712, in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers
and Letters, p. 634.
40
Ibid.
41
Barnow, »The Beginnings of ‘Aesthetics’ and the Leibnizian Conception of Sensation«, p. 95. Barnouw mentions Gracián, Pascal, Bouhours, Leibniz and Baumgarten among seventeenth and eighteenth century thinkers as exceptions to the
prevalent » reason-blindness« of the age.
42
Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, p. 53.
43
Ibid., p. 54.
143
Lars-Olof Åhlberg
aggregate but confused as to the parts«.44 These confused perceptions
and sensations are the objects of Baumgarten’s aesthetics, the gnoseologia inferior, that is, the theory of knowledge of the lower faculty, the
analogon rationis, the analogy of reason. Leibniz has been called »the
grandfather of ‘aesthetics’«,45 an exaggeration perhaps, for although
some of his views on sensation and perception foreshadow Baumgarten’s gnoseologia inferior and one remark on the delight in beauty
has a Kantian ring,46 he does not bring his analysis of knowledge and
perception to bear on our understanding of art in any systematic way,
which is unsurprising since Leibniz did not, and indeed could not,
distinguish clearly between art and craft since he did not have the
requisite conceptual resources at his disposal.47
III
Baumgarten was only twenty-one years of age when his dissertation, Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus
(1735), which has been called »the charter of modern philosophical
aesthetics«,48 was published. Among his later works, the Metaphysica (1739), which saw no less than seven editions between 1739 and
44
Ibid., pp. 54–55.
Barnouw, »The Beginnings of ‘Aesthetics’ and the Leibnizian Conception of Sensation«, p. 68.
46
In the »Praefatio codicis juris gentium diplomatici« (1693) there is a beautiful passage where Leibniz speaks of the contemplation of beauty which is delightful in
itself, adding that »a painting by Raphael is regarded with delight by those who
understand it and keep it before their eyes even if it brings no proit (riches), it is
like a symbol of love« (»Et uti pulchrorum Contemplatio ipsa jucunda est, pictaque
tabula Raphaelis intelligentem aficit, etsi nullos census ferat, adeo ut in oculis delitiisque feratur, quodam simulacro amoris«), Leibniz-Edition-Arbeitsstelle Potsdam
(Vorausedition des Bandes IV, 5: Politische Schriften ab 1693 ad usum colegialem),
p. 47, www.bbaw.de/vh/leibniz/potsdam/bin/biv5.pdf, my transl.
47
He speaks of art in the sense of techniques, skills and practical knowledge as contrasted to science, and sometimes »les arts« refer to crafts such as carpentry and
agriculture (Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, xlviii, note on »art«).
48
Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, »Introduction«, Relections on Poetry:
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, translated, with the Original Text, an Introduction, and Notes
by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1954), p. 4. I henceforth refer to the English translation as »Meditations«,
there is no reason to translate the Latin »Meditationes« differently; when referring to Baumgarten’s Latin original I write »Meditationes«. The Danish edition
of Baumgarten’s Meditationes includes a long intoductory essay by Søren Kjørup,
»Baumgarten og æstetikkens grundlæggelse« [Baumgarten and the foundation of
aesthetics] (A. G. Baumgarten, Filosoiske betragtninger over digtet, translated by
Per Aage Brandt in cooperation with Søren Kjørup, Copenhagen: Arena, 1968). I
have beneited greatly from Kjørup’s excellent essay (ibid., pp. 7–84).
45
144
The Invention of Modern Aesthetics: From Leibniz to Kant
1779,49 is an important source for our knowledge of his general philosophy and in particular of his views regarding the role of sensuous
knowledge in the fabric of human knowledge, but his major work on
aesthetics, the Aesthetica (1750, 1758) remained uninished. His views
became known primarily through the work of his pupil, Georg Friedrich
Meier, who presented and to a certain extent misrepresented Baumgarten’s views in Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften (1748).50
The purpose of Baumgarten’s Meditations is to give an outline
of his new science of aesthetics, which investigates sensation and perception with the purpose of formulating the special form of perfection
proper to them. Baumgarten presents his relections on aesthetics and
on poetry in axiomatic form, i.e. he uses the deductive method of
presentation and argument favoured by his teacher Christian Wolff,51
who in his turn was inluenced by Leibniz, although Leibniz rarely
formulated his thoughts in a systematic and axiomatic fashion.
More than one-fourth of the text of the Meditations consists of
deinitions, which are the axioms of his »system«, from these deinitions the other propositions (theorems) are deduced. Baumgarten’s language is, of course, informal, which means that he cannot escape the
vagueness and imprecision inherent in natural languages, in this case,
Latin. Consequently, it is not always easy to see that the conclusions
Baumgarten draws from his premisses (the deinitions) actually follow.
Baumgarten’s work is – with Spinoza’s Ethics, some of Leibniz’s writings and Wolff’s Latin works – »among the most determined efforts
ever put forth to think consecutively and rigorously on nonmathematical subject matters in an unformalized language«,52 Aschenbrenner and
Holther emphasize in their »Introduction« to the English translation
of the Meditations. But their use of »the deductive method […] gives
only an illusion of clarity«, on closer inspection there is »a profusion
of unclariied notions and a tangle of non sequiturs«, they conclude.53
49
Hans Rudolf Schweizer, »Einführung«, in A. G. Baumgarten, Texte zur Grundlegung
der Ästhetik, übersetzt und herausgegeben von Hans Rudolf Schweizer (Hamburg:
Felix Meiner, 1983), xiv. Kant lectured regulary on Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, and
regarded it as the most useful and thorough handbook of its kind (ibid., x).
50
Meier’s work was inspired by, and based on Baumagrten’s lectures on aesthetics
in 1742.
51
Wolff »is compared with thinkers such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz […] a
minor igure in the history of philosophy«, says Frederick Copelston, nevertheless
he is important in the German context, because »he acted as a kind of philosophical
educator of his nation«, in spite of the »aridity, dogmatism and formalism« of his
philosophy »his system was able to provide a school-philosophy for the German
universities until the rise of the Kantian criticism« (Frederick Copelston, A History
of Philosophy, vol. 6: Wolff to Kant, London: Burns & Oates, 1961, p. 114).
52
Aschenbrenner & Holther, »Introduction«, p. 16.
53
Ibid., p. 15.
145
Lars-Olof Åhlberg
Yet harping on the limitations of Baumgarten’s method, which was
soon abandoned in philosophy and the human sciences, blinds us to the
historical importance of his work and to the insights expressed.
Baumgarten takes over Leibniz’s and Wolff’s analysis of confused and distinct ideas and perceptions, but modiies the analysis for
his own purposes. Poetic ideas and poetic discourse are, according
to Baumgarten, clear but confused, or rather, should be clear (i.e. not
obscure) and confused; on the other hand, poetic discourse cannot
express distinct ideas in the Leibnizian sense, since poetic discourse
is not scientiic discourse. In § 15 of the Meditations he says that
»[s]ince poetic representations are clear representations, § 13, and
since they will be either distinct or confused, and since they are not
distinct, § 14, therefore, they are confused«,54 a statement that also
serves to illustrate his deductive mode of reasoning. Baumgarten
then goes on to distinguish between extensive and intensive clarity,
a distinction not to be found in Leibniz or Wolff. A representation
(repraesentatio)55 is intensively clear to the extent that it contains clear
and distinct determinations, a representation has extensive clarity if it
contains many confused (but clear) determinations:
§ 17. In extensively very clear representations more is represented
in a sensate way than in those less clear, § 16; therefore, they contribute more to the perfection of a poem, §7. For this reason extensively clearer representations are especially poetic, §11.56
From this it follows, Baumgarten believes, that
§ 18. The more determinate things are, the more their representations embrace. In fact, the more that is gathered together in a
confused representation, the more extensive clarity the representation has, §16, and the more poetic it is, §17. Therefore, for
things to be determined as far as possible when they are to be
represented in a poem is poetic, §11.57
Baumgarten, Relections on Poetry, § 15, p. 42; »§. XV. Quum clarae repraesentationes sunt poeticae §. 13. aut erunt distinctae aut confusae, iam distinctae non sunt
§. 14. ergo confusae.« (Mediationes, p. 9).
55
Baumgarten’s »representation« is a wide category including images, sense impressions, dreams (§§ 28–29, 37) as well as pictures (§ 39).
56
Ibid., § 17, p. 43; »§. XVII. In extensive clarissimis repraesentationibus plura
repraesentantur sensitive, quam in minus claris §. 16 ergo plura faciunt ad perfectionem poematis §. 7. Hinc repraesentationes extensive clariores sunt maxime
poeticae §. 11.« (Meditationes, p. 10).
57
Ibid., § 18, p. 43; »§. XVIII. Quo magis res determinantur, hoc repraesentationes
earum plura complectuntur; quo vero plura in repraesentatione confusa cumulantur, hoc it extensive clarior §. 16. magisque poetica §. 17. Ergo in poemate res
repraesentandas quantum pote, determinari poeticum §. 11.« (Mediationes, p. 10).
54
146
The Invention of Modern Aesthetics: From Leibniz to Kant
In the following paragraph, § 19, Baumgarten says that »[i]ndividuals are determined in every respect«, and that therefore
»particular representations are in the highest degree poetic«.58 The
clarity that poetry can achieve, extensive clarity, differs from logical
clarity; when poetry is said to be confused, we should keep in mind
that »confused« is not synonymous with »obscure«, »nebulous«,
»abstruse« and the like; it means rather that the »representations
are fused together and [are] not sharply discriminated«.59 Poetic
clarity has to do with vivid details and poetic representations are
fused together into a satisfying whole, as Aschenbrenner and Holther
explain, »[w]e should say today that the ideal poetic representation is a
highly condensed symbol, rich with ambiguity and as complex as the
poet can contrive«.60
A poem, Baumgarten claims, is »a perfect sensate discourse«
(§ 9), where »sensate discourse« means »discourse involving sensate
representations« (§ 4), the latter being deined as »representations received through the lower part of the cognitive faculty« (§ 3). Several
different intellectual activities concern themselves with poetry (and
with the arts in general) in various ways: »a poem«, says Baumgarten,
is »a perfect sensate discourse«, »poetics« is »the body of rules to
which a poem conforms and by »philosophical poetics« he means »the
science of poetics« (§ 9). In the penultimate paragraph of his treatise
Baumgarten then gives his deinition of aesthetics as »the science of
perception«, whose objects are things perceived and which »are to be
known by the inferior faculty« (§ 116). Aesthetics is thus concerned
with a form of knowledge, albeit of an inferior kind compared to rational (logical) knowledge, but this knowledge is a necessary precondition for the development of rational or logical knowledge as Baumgarten makes clear: logic has often been regarded as an aid for improving
our reason, but »since we know that distinct knowledge is based on
58
Ibid., § 19, p. 43; »§ XIX. Individua sunt omnimode determinata, ergo repraesentationes singulares sunt admodum poeticae § 18.« (Meditationes, p. 10).
59
Aschenbrenner & Holther, »Introduction«, p. 21. The distinction between intensive
and extensive clarity is also expounded in the Metaphysica § 531, where Baumgarten says that »an extensively clearer perception (image) is vivid. The vividness of
thought and presentation is brilliance […] the opposite of which is dryness« (»Extensive clarior perceptio est VIVIDA. Vividitas COGITATIONUM et ORATIONIS
NITOR […] est cuius oppositum est SICCITAS«), Texte zur Grundlegung der Ästhetik, pp. 14–15, my transl.
60
Aschenbrenner & Holther, »Introduction«, p. 22. Cf. Nelson Goodman’s theory of
»the ive symptoms of the aesthetic«: syntactic density, semantic density, relative
repleteness, exempliication and multiple and complex reference, where the
three irst symptoms have a certain afinity with Baumgarten’s »confused poetic
discourse« (Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978,
pp. 67–79).
147
Lars-Olof Åhlberg
sensuous knowledge, logic is in need of assistance from aesthetics if
our reason is to be improved«.61
Sensuous knowledge and sensuous representations have their
own rationality, there is in Baumgarten’s system a rational aspect to
sensation and perception and to »sensate« thinking, which he calls
»analogon rationis«, aesthetics is (among other things) the art of
thinking in analogy with reason.62 In the section on psychology (psychologia empirica) in the Metaphysica Baumgarten offers an analysis
of the mental and intellectual powers belonging to the lower cognitive
faculty. To the traditional faculties of sense, memory, and imagination,
found in Wolff’s Psychologia empirica, Baumgarten makes several additions, among them: acumen sensitivum (the ability to discriminate),
ingenium, which is the ability to discover similarities, the facultas ingendi, i.e. the power to imagine and to create imaginative representations, the facultas diiudicandi, which is the faculty of judgment.63 Some
of these »powers« or »faculties« as well as a few others are discussed in
Baumgarten’s Aesthetica in connection with his characterization of the
felix aestheticus, where »aestheticus« can hardly be translated as »aesthetician« nor as »aesthete«, although Baumgarten’s aestheticus has
something of both. Barnouw suggests »man of sensibility« as the best
translation,64 but perhaps we could simply say that the felix aestheticus
for Baumgarten is the ideal of a cultured man with developed intellectual, social and »aesthetic« sensibilities. In the Aesthetica Baumgarten
devotes much space to describing the felix aestheticus, emphazising
among other things the interplay of the higher and the lower cognitive
faculties, which implies that there is no conlict between the ability to
think logically (rationally) and »to think beautifully«,65 in other words
logic and »aesthetic« sensibility do not exclude one another.
61
A. G. Baumgarten, »Kollegium über die Ästhetik«, in A. G. Baumgarten, Texte zur
Grundlegung der Ästhetik, p. 80, my transl. of the German original: »Wir wissen
jetzt, daß die sinnliche Erkenntnis der Grund der deutlichen ist; soll also der ganze
Verstand gebessert werden, so muß die Ästhetik der Logik zu Hilfe kommen«. This
German text consists of student notes of Baumgarten’s lectures.
62
»Aesthetics is the science of sensuous knowledge and presentation« (»Scientia
sensitive cognoscendi et proponendi es AESTHETICA«), Baumgarten writes in
the Metaphysica § 533, characterizing this new »science« as »the logic of the lower
faculty of knowing, as the philosophy of the Graces and Muses, as the lower theory
of knowledge, as the art of thinking beautifully, as the art of thinking in analogy
with reason« (»Logica facultatis cognoscitivae inferioris, Philosophia gratiarum et
musarum, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulchre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis«), Texte zur
Grundlegung der Ästhetik, p. 16, my transl.
63
Metaphysica §§ 534–623, Texte zur Grundlegung der Ästhetik, pp. 17–65.
64
Barnouw, »The Beginnings of ‘Aesthetics’ and the Leibnizian Conception of Sensation«, p. 81, n. 76.
65
A. G. Baumgarten, Aesthetica, § 41, in A. G. Baumgarten, Theoretische Ästhetik.
148
The Invention of Modern Aesthetics: From Leibniz to Kant
Although Baumgarten is credited with the introduction of the term
»aesthetics« his philosophical achievement has been very differently assessed by different commentators. As Jeanette Emt remarks Baumgarten
is rarely mentioned as »the father of modern aesthetics« in »contemporary textbooks on aesthetics particularly in Great Britain and the United
States«; if he is mentioned at all, he is only credited with the invention
of the word »aesthetics«.66 And Kristeller points out that »Baumgarten
is famous for having coined the term aesthetics, but opinions differ as
to whether he must be considered the founder of that discipline or what
place he occupies in its history and development«, in fact, the »the
original meaning of the term aesthetics as coined by Baumgarten [the
theory of sensuous knowledge], has been all but forgotten by now«.67
Baumgarten was concerned exclusively with poetry in his early work,
and although he makes occasional references to the visual arts and
music in his Aesthetica, there is no full­ledged philosophy of art or a
theory of the arts in his writings. It is quite obvious, according to Kristeller, that »Baumgarten and Meier develop their actual theories only in
terms of poetry and eloquence and take nearly all their examples from
literature«.68 Kristeller considers Shaftesbury’s claim to be the founder
of modern aesthetics, and argues that there is some reason for considering him to be so, since »Shaftesbury was the irst major philosopher in
modern Europe in whose writings the discussion of the arts occupied a
prominent place«,69 but neither Baumgarten nor Shaftesbury formulated
a systematic philosophy of art covering all art forms.
Monroe Beardsley notes in his history of aesthetics that »[t]he
implications of Descartes’ philosophy in the ield of art (or one possible set of implications) were irst worked out by Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten«,70 a somewhat misleading statement since Leibniz’s and
Wolff’s philosophies were a more potent source of inspiration for
Baumgarten,71 but his judgment that »Baumgarten’s philosophically
reined and sophisticated concept of ‘sensate discourse’ […] deserves
Die grundlegenden Abschnitte aus der »Aesthetica« (1750/58), übersetzt und herausg. von Hans Rudolf Schweizer, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1988, p. 25.
66
Ewa Jeanette Emt, »Baumgarten och den moderna estetikens födelse« [Baumgarten and the Birth of Modern Aesthetics], Konsten och konstbegreppet [Art and the
Concept of Art] (Stockholm: Raster, 1996), p. 17, my transl.
67
Paul Oskar Kristeller, »Origins of Aesthetics: Historical and Conceptual Overview«, Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, vol. 3, ed. Michael Kelly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 425.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid., p. 424.
70
Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics from Classsical Greece to the Present: A Short
History (New York: Macmillan, 1966, p. 156.
71
Beardsley’s view that »Baumgarten [evidently] is making the most determined effort
thus far to distinguish between two fundamentally different types of discourse: the
149
Lars-Olof Åhlberg
to be regarded as a forward step toward a fundamental aesthetic theory«,72 seems apposite. Other commentators view Baumgarten, not as
the founder of aesthetics, but as the founder of German aesthetics. Copleston, for example, says that Baumgarten’s importance »lies in the
fact that he was the real founder of German aesthetic theory «,73 but he
was not »the father of aesthetics«, since »Shaftesbury and Hutcheson
[…] had already written on the subject in England«.74 Baumgarten,
nevertheless deserves credit, Copelston thinks, for »he paved the way
for a further development of aesthetic theory«, and »he saw that there
is a side of human life and activity which is a it object of philosophical
consideration but which cannot be understood by anyone who is determined to bring it into the sphere of abstract logical thinking on pain of
exclusion from philosophy altogether«.75
Baumgarten’s achievement has been well summarized by Luc
Ferry as follows: »The Aesthetica gave a philosophical formulation to
the themes already encountered, in a more literal form, in the French
debates between classicism and the aesthetics of sentiment«.76 The
artist’s involvement with the individual and particular, has no place in
Cartesian philosophy, as Ferry puts it, »we enter a realm Cartesian reason cannot grasp«, with Baumgarten, however, »the mediation between
reason and unreason, between the universal and the individual begins
to work itself out, thanks […] mainly to the idea of analogy, which
[…] permits us to build a bridge between the sensible and the intelligible worlds«.77 Baumgarten’s inluence and legacy is, nevertheless,
clear and distinct, or abstract, discourse of science, and the confused, though more or
less clear, discourse of poetry, which exists to render and realize sense experience«
(ibid., p. 158–159) is to the point, but Baumgarten’s distinction between clear and
distinct ideas and concepts is Leibnizian rather than Cartesian.
72
Ibid., p. 159.
73
Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 6, p. 115.
74
Ibid., p. 118.
75
Ibid., pp. 118–119. Some philosophers and historians of philosophy have belittled
Baumgarten’s work. The Neo-Kantian philosopher Wilhelm Windelband, for example, makes the following assessment of Baumgarten : »So erwuchs die Ästhetik als
philosophischer Wissenzweig nicht aus Interesse an ihrem Gegenstande, sondern mit
entschiedener Geringschätzung desselben […] auch vermochte dieser Rationalismus
[…] für die Theorie der Kunst kein anderes Prinzip als das sensualistische der Naturnachahmung aufzustellen und entwickelte dieses wesentlich in eine langweilige Poetik. Allein trotzdem bleibt es Baumgartens großes Verdienst, das Schöne zum erstenmal wieder systematisch aus den allgemeinsten Begriffen der Philosophie behandelt
und damit eine Disziplin begründet zu haben, der in der Weiterentwicklung besonders
der deutschen Philosophie eine so wichtige Rolle auch für die theoretische Lehren bestimmt war« (Wilhelm Windelband, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, Hrsg.
Heinz Heimsoeth, 15. Aul., Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1957, p. 414).
76
Luc Ferry, Homo Aestheticus: The Invention of Taste in the Democratic Age, 1990,
transl. Robert de Loaiza (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 76.
77
Ibid.
150
The Invention of Modern Aesthetics: From Leibniz to Kant
ambiguous, for his programme for aesthetics has been taken over only
in part by later philosophers and theorists. Aesthetics, in Baumgarten’s
deinition, is not only the science of sensible knowledge, but also the
theory of the liberal arts, the doctrine of inferior knowledge, the art of
beautiful thought and the art of the analogue of reason.78 Aesthetics
has, of course, mostly been conceived of as the philosophy of art, or, as
the theory of the arts, whereas Baumgarten’s idea of aesthetics as the
theory of sensuous knowledge has been all but ignored, moreover, he
did not develop a complete philosophy of art or a complete theory of
art comprising all the art forms.79
With Kant and his third critique, Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790),
we enter another world, and an entirely new phase in the development
of »aesthetic« thought and analysis. Kant’s use of the term »aesthetics«, however, is complicated, it is certainly not synonymous with
»philosophy of art« and is thus very different from, for example,
Schelling’s and Hegel’s conceptions. In the irst part of the »Transzendentale Elementarlehre«, the »transcendental aesthetics«, of the
Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787), »aesthetics« means »sensible« and
»that which pertains to the senses«. The transcendental aesthetics is
concerned with the analysis of the preconditions of sensuous experience, and has nothing to do with aesthetics in Baumgarten’s sense nor
with art and aesthetic experience.80 Kant explicitly rejects »aesthetics«
as a synonym for »the critique of taste«, since aesthetics is the fallacious attempt to bring »the critical assessment of beauty under rational
principles, and to elevate the principles of beauty into a science«,81
and Baumgarten, »the excellent analyst«, is singled out as harbouring
this illusion.82 In the Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant’s aim is to provide a
critique, i.e. an analysis of the conditions for the possibility of aesthetic
and teleological judgments. The work is thus divided into two major
78
»AESTHETICA (theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulchre
cogitandi, ars analogi rationis) est scientia cognitionis sensitivae«, Baumgarten,
Aesthetica, § 1, in Baumgarten, Theoretische Ästhetik, p. 2.
79
Baumgarten was criticized for privileging poetry and rhetoric in his »aesthetics«; in
his encyclopaedic work, Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Wissenschaften und Künste
(1771–1774), Johann Georg Sulzer complains that Baumgarten, because of his »limited knowledge of the arts did not by far describe all the expressions of beauty«, aesthetics is in his opinion »still an underdeveloped philosophical science« (quoted from
the article »Ästhetik/ästhetisch« in Ästhetische Grundbegriffe, p. 332, my transl.).
80
»Eine Wissenschaft von allen Prinzipien der Sinnlichkeit a priori nenne ich die
transzendentale Ästhetik«, Kant declares (Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1787, Hrsg. Karl Vorländer, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1956, p. 64).
81
Ibid., p. 65, my transl. The German original reads: »… die kritische Beurteilung des
Schönen unter Vernunfprinzipien zu bringen, und die Regeln derselben zur Wissenschaft zu erheben«.
82
Ibid.
151
Lars-Olof Åhlberg
parts with subdivisions. The irst part of the critique of aesthetic judgments is devoted to judgments of taste, in particular to judgments of
beauty, whereas the second part is concerned with judgments of the
sublime. The philosophical analysis of judgments of taste, which Kant
considered calling »The Critique of Taste«, is only to a minor degree
concerned with art and aesthetic judgments of art, most of the examples are in fact taken from nature, not from art. There are, however,
also relections on the value of various art forms and about the interrelationships between the arts, but on no account can Kant’s work be
considered a philosophy of art. The post-Kantian aesthetics of Schelling and Hegel is another matter. Baumgarten’s intriguing and insightful remark to the effect that the abstraction and generality aimed at by
scientiic and rational thought implies a loss in »material perfection«
was largely ignored by most 19th century philosophers of art,83 whose
aim was to construct a completely general philosophy of art concerned
with the essence of Art, which meant that the they frequently lost sight
of individual works of art and of the particularities of works of art. It
is the task of the philosophy of art »to attain philosophical knowledge
about the essential and general properties of the phenomenon under
study«, therefore »the plurality and heterogeneity of works of art must
not be allowed to disturb us«, since »the conceptual essence of the
phenomenon is the guiding-star«,84 says Hegel, and in a similar vein,
Schelling claimed that the philosopher is not concerned with works of
art, since »for the philosopher art is a necessary phenomenon emanating immediately from the absolute«.85 Baumgarten’s and Kant’s attention to detail and to the particularities of aesthetic, sensuous perception
and to the judgments of taste was replaced by an essentialist philosophy of art which eventually brought aesthetics and the philosophy of
art into disrepute. But that is another story.86
83
Baumgarten, Aesthetica § 560: »What is abstraction if not a loss« (»Quid enim est
abstractio, si iactura non est?«), in Baumgarten, Theoretische Ästhetik, p. 144.
84
Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik II, p. 264–265, my transl.
85
F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, 1802/3 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchhandlung, 1976), p. 384, my transl.
86
The story is told by Jean-Marie Schaeffer in Art of the Modern Age: Philosophy
of Art from Kant to Heidegger, 1992, transl. Steven Rendall (Princeton University
Press, 2000). The Swedish case is perhaps not untypical. Aesthetics was established
as an academic subject in 1833, the poet and philosopher P. D. A. Atterbom was appointed to the irst chair in aesthetics and poetics in 1835 at Uppsala University. At
the turn of the century there was a growing satisfaction with philosophical speculation of the Hegelian stripe and in 1917 aesthetics was abolished and replaced by two
new academic disciplines, history of literature and history of art. Aesthetics was
re-established at Uppsala University in 1953.
152
The Invention of Modern Aesthetics: From Leibniz to Kant
POVZETEK
Izumljenje moderne estetike
Od Leibniza do Kanta
»Estetiko« kot termin je skoval nemški ilozof, pripadnik wolffovske
šole, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten v svoji razpravi Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poemata pertinentibus [Filozofska razmišljanja o
nekaterih značilnostih pesmi] leta 1735. Baumgarten je razvil svojo koncepcijo estetike kot »teorijo čutnega spoznavanja«, nižjo epistemologijo (gnoseologia inferior) na ozadju Leibnizovega razločevanja med jasnimi, nejasnimi
in razločnimi idejami in precepcijami. Estetika, ki jo je Baumgarten naprej
razvijal v svoji obsežni in nedokončani Aesthetici (1751, 1758), je otrok razsvetljenstva, obenem pa tudi kritika togega racionalizma wolffovske ilozofske šole. V prvem delu prispevka so orisani začetki »modernega sistema
umetnosti«, ki je dokazljivo predpogoj za nastanek sistematične etstetike;
drugi del je posvečen analizi Leibnizovih distinkcij in njegovega nazora, da
je v čutnem zaznavanju zaobjeto neke vrste »tiho spoznavanje«; v tretjem
delu so obravnavane nekatere izstopajoče poteze Baumgartnove razprave,
njegove deinicije estetike kot znanosti čutnega spoznavanja in njegov ideal
felix aestheticus. Na kratko je obravnavana tudi Baumgartnova trditev, da je
utemeljitelj ilozofske estetike, pa tudi odnos Baumgartnove estetike do Kantovega načrta »kritike okusa« v Kritiki razsodne moči. Na koncu se prispevek
dotakne kontrasta med Baumgartnovo in Kantovo rabo termina estetika.
153