Generations and Socialization into
Political Participation
Hanna Wass
M.Pol.Sci.
Doctoral Candidate
Department of Political Science
P.O. Box 54
Fin-00014 University of Helsinki
Tel. +358 9 191 24919
Fax. +358 9 191 24832
E-mail: [email protected]
Paper prepared for presentation at the Politics of Participation conference,
Helsinki, August 25-27, 2005.
Abstract
The study examines the differences in the socialization into political participation
between four generations using survey data gathered after the parliamentary elections of
2003 in Finland. The analysis is based on the assumption that low turnout amongst the
young is not a passing phenomenon but a generational feature partly due to a
particularly demobilizatory socializing process common to the whole age cohort. By
political socialization, we mean the learning process where an individual assumes
various political attitudes, values and patterns of actions stemming from his or her
environment. The results show that even though politics have had a relatively small role
during the formative years of the youngest generation, this generation has received most
encouragement for voting and the attitudinal change during an individual’s life span
towards voting and other forms of political participation has been most positive
amongst it. Moreover, the youngest generation currently holds more positive feelings
towards political participation than the oldest one. Consequently, the study shows that
even though there were no differences in the socialization between the generations, the
differences in the turnout would be quite similar than whilst taken account only sex and
socioeconomic factors. Based on these results we draw a conclusion that the factors
behind the low turnout amongst the young generations have to be searched elsewhere
instead of political socialization.
2
Introduction
The aim of this study is to examine the differences in the socialization into political
participation between four generations. By political socialization, we mean the learning
process where an individual assumes various political attitudes, values and patterns of
actions stemming from his or her environment. While the studies in the field of political
socialization have been somewhat rare lately, contemporary trends in turnout clearly
emphasize the importance of political socialization. This stems from the fact that
turnout does not seem to relate the individual’s life cycle as much as it used to do.
Instead, abstention has, to a certain extent, become a permanent feature in young adults’
political orientation partly due to a particularly demobilizatory socialization process
which is common to the whole age cohort (Anduiza 1999; see also Blais et al. 2004;
Franklin 2004; Lyons and Alexander 2000; Martikainen & Wass 2002). Consequently,
it is essential to pay attention to the differences in the socialization processes, and
especially socialization into political participation, amongst various generations.
Students of political science have for long been aware that political participation is
strongly connected with age alongside with socioeconomic and attitudinal factors. The
turnout has traditionally followed the curve of a semi-circle: the turnout is lowest in the
beginning of one’s adult life, rises with age and stays at that level during the middleage, then gradually decline when a person ages and meets certain physical infirmities
(Campell et al. 1960, 493-494; Milbrath & Goel 1977, 114). According to explanation
based on individual’s life cycle (see e.g. Campbell et al. 1960), low turnout amongst
young age cohorts is a transitory phenomenon as the turnout usually rises as a person
ages and adopts several “adult roles” (for general overview, see Highton & Wolfinger
2001, 202-203). Those roles consist of, inter alia, getting married, getting a permanent
job, having children and settling down which reduces residential mobility. All of these
changes mean a certain entrenchment of life circumstances. The claim is that when
particular personal needs, like finding a spouse and a job, have been satisfied, a person
can turn his or her attention towards the outside world (ibid.).
Recent empirical evidence does not, however, support this hypothesis. An extensive
study based on individual level register data from electoral wards for the parliamentary
elections of 1987 and 1999 in Finland shows that the turnout does no longer seem to
relate to an individual’s life cycle as much as it used to do (Martikainen & Wass 2002).1
To a certain extent, abstention seems to have become a permanent feature in young age
cohorts’ political behavior. Moreover, even while holding socioeconomic factors
constant, such as education, class, income and housing tenure, the lower turnout of
younger voters remain unexplained (Martikainen et al. 2005). As individual’s
socioeconomic status usually rises along with age, and those with a higher status vote
more likely than those with a lower status, the independent effect of age in turnout
refers that the life-cycle explanation needs to be accompanied. In compliance with the
explanation based on a generational effect (see e.g. Jennings & Niemi 1981, 120),
3
younger voters belong to a certain generation that does not attach very much importance
to the electoral process itself, or even feel themselves excluded or alienated from
politics, partly stemming from, a particularly demobilizatory socialization process
common to the whole age cohort (Anduiza 1999, 28). This explanation is compatible
with the paradox or the “puzzle” of declining turnout noted already over twenty years
ago (see Abramson & Aldrich 1982; Brody 1978). Although the young age cohorts are
better educated than their predecessors, the overall turnout is declining. Consequently, it
should be noticed that the younger age cohorts have socialized into the electoral
participation during the period when the turnout amongst older people was also
declining. Thus, the overall decline of the turnout is due to a complex interweavement
of life cycle, generational and period effects (Toivonen 2004, 366).
In the Mannheimian theoretical tradition, it is thought that generation is formed by a
certain “key experience” which occurs during its members’ formative years (see e.g.
Delli Carpini 1986, 8-9).2 Hence, it is important to detect which factors in the young age
cohorts’ socialization process have caused the fact that they do not find voting a very
appealing form of participation. In this article the question will be approached by
examining the differences amongst four generations regarding their socialization into
political participation. It should be pointed out that, on the one hand, political
socialization functions as a framework for the key experiences as it effects on the
impact of those experiences. On the other hand, political socialization may form a key
experience by definition. These are quite complicated questions, but the main standpoint
of this article is the idea that during a particular period of time, a particular political
atmosphere has prevailed, and it has had a large impact on various generations’ attitudes
towards political participation (see Grönlund et al. 2005).
Firstly, we will look at early socialization taking place in the adolescence. We will
analyze what kind of role the politics has had in the childhood of different generations.
It will also be explored how common the inheritance of a party identification from a
parent to child is amongst different generations. Secondly, the changes in the attitudes
towards participation during individual’s life cycle will be studied. Thirdly, political
socialization will be connected with the concept of generational consciousness as the
respondents are asked to compare their own attitude towards political participation visà-vis their views of the attitudes of others’ belonging to the same generation. Fourthly,
we will examine how much the differences in the turnout between four generations
examined can be explained by various socialization factors. The analyses are based on
survey data gathered after the parliamentary elections of 2003 in Finland.
The Concept of Political Socialization
The term political socialization first appeared in the study of political science in 1959
when Herbert Hyman published a book Political Socialization. Hyman defined the
4
concept as the learning of social patterns mediated by various socialization agencies
whose social positions this learning process corresponds (Hyman 1959, 25; see also
Dudley & Gitelson 2002, 175). In the study of political socialization, family, school,
friends and media have usually been counted as the most salient agencies of
socialization (Ljungberg 2003).
In his study of research tradition and future possibilities of political socialization,
Renshon (1992, 443) remarks that the attraction towards the field of political
socialization in 1960’s can much be explained by its compatibility with the
behavioralist approach at the time dominating in political science. According to Dahl
(1961), behavioralism, emulating natural science, emphasized four major points in
studying political process which all could be met by examining political socialization.
Firstly, the importance of an individual for the functioning of political institutions and
processes became acknowledged. Secondly, behavioralist approach emphasized the
importance of developing an interdisciplinary political theory. Thirdly, the systematic
measurement strategies were accentuated, and fourthly, the development of
generalizable theories regarding political behavior and its causes was aimed (Renshon
1992, 443).
Sapiro (2002, 2) states that the major theoretical justification for the study of political
socialization was found most explicitly in Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture (1963)
and in Easton’s system theory (1965, 1967). At the macro level, political socialization
was seen as a crucial mechanism for the development of the political culture (Almond &
Verba) that enables democratic institutions and practices to function or for development
of a diffuse support (Easton) of the political system. At the micro level, the research of
political socialization concentrated on patterns and processes which individuals engage
during their development and learning processes, and which contract their relationship
to the political context around them. While these two approaches to political
socialization are complementary, they have framed the research questions and methods,
at a certain extent, into different directions as those orientated at the micro level have
concentrated more on developmental and cognitive processes (Sapiro 2002, 2-3).
However, the concept of diffuse support was, at least to some degree, able to bridge the
gap between macro and micro level approaches (Dudley & Gitelson 2002, 176, referred
to Merelman 1972). In contrast to the specific support, diffuse support is not based on
the output of the political system but on the political attitudes and values citizens hold
towards the prevailing system and is thus essential for its stability. Childhood was
viewed as a basis for the diffuse support, and, consequently, much of the early worked
concentrated on children (Dudley & Gitelson 2002, 176).
In the following decade the study of political socialization flourished. In effect, it was
diversified to such a degree that in 1970 Greenstein declared that “Political socialization
is a growth stock” (ibid.). According to Greenstein (1970, 970-972), one could indicate
at least four prevailing usages for the concept of political socialization: 1) The study of
5
children’s political orientations; 2) The study of acquisition of prevailing norms; 3) The
study of any political learning, whether of conformity or deviance, and at any stage of
individual’s life cycle, and 4) Actual observations of socialization processes, in any
aforementioned meaning, taken in to account both the socialized and the socialization
agents. Hence, it became obvious that the study in the field needed some clarification.
In the late 1970’s, the study of political socialization begun to move into new direction
characterized by three interrelated foci (Niemi & Sobieszek, 1977, 210-211). First of all,
scholars in the field of political socialization started to pay more attention to the adult
life span recognizing that adult attitudes may change more substantially than was
acknowledged earlier. The second focus concerned the importance of the life cycle,
period effects and generational effects in explaining that change. The third focus was
also related to the first two as it emphasized the role of events and environment in
general as socialization agents (ibid.).
However, from the end of 1970’s the work related to political socialization declined
markedly (see e.g. Dudley & Gitelson 2002, 176) and is nowadays much more popular
amongst educationalists (Borg 2004, 76-77). The post-modernization theories, aimed at
describing the change that the Western societies were facing, gained ground. These
theories emphasized amongst other things, the value shift from materialist to postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1977), the loosening of traditional collective ties and thus
general individualization. The role of an individual was seen central in defining his or
her identity and it was recognized that these identities are not necessarily stable but
instead negotiable depending on the context. This discussion was somewhat
contradictory to the premises of the study of political socialization, which consider
political behavior as the result of a learning process where the individual adapts
different influences from outside.
The Debates on Political Socialization
The study of political socialization has also faced some critique (see Greenstein 1970,
273-276). According to Greenstein, it has been claimed that political socialization
studies have status quo bias. They are incapable of explaining the processes of patternmaintenance but not those for change. This criticism points to the branch which is
concentrated to study how people absorb prevailing norms. However, Greenstein states,
in addition to the fact that prevailing norms may be absorbed, it is also possible to learn
to reject them. A person’s behavior can be continuous or discontinuous with his or her
own generation or with the preceding generations. Moreover, at the level of political
processes and institutions, the effect of individual’s behavior, whether showing
continuity or not, may lead either to political continuity or change. In either case, the
behavior is partly due to situational stimuli and partly due to persons dispositions
regarding attitudes and values, the latter being undeniably learned or “socialized” (ibid.)
6
In effect, some changes in the political involvement and participation may be due to the
generational replacement stemming from the fact that the young age cohorts have
adapted essentially different values and patterns of behavior than the previous ones and
keep them throughout their life cycle (see Niemi & Sobieszek 1977, 226; Franklin
2004; Putnam 2000). Although a divergent development of the younger generation does
not necessarily, or not even usually, lead to generational cleavages, some potential for
that still exists (Niemi & Sobieszek 1977, 224). It is essential to recognize this potential
for “clash” between generations given that the Mannheimian model of generations can
been considered the first and foremost conflict theory as generations clearly differ from
each others due to different key experiences and their concomitant impact on attitudes
and values of each generation. However, due to the conservative sound of terms such as
“education”, “socializing” and “socialization” it has become more popular to talk about,
for example, “empowerment”, although the content of phenomenon under examination
has been the same (Borg 2004).
Besides having conservative bias, the study of political socialization can be criticized
for being normative. If we think, for example, political participation, and the “goal” for
a successful socialization process is an individual acting a certain way, we may ask
whose values this process ought to project. The various theories of democracy display
very differently the ideal amount of participation amongst citizens on one hand and the
ideal scope of participation on the other (see e.g. Dalton 1996; Setälä 2003).
Consequently, political socialization may very well be used as an explanatory variable
while examining the causes of differences in political participation between generations,
but we should be careful not to load any prescriptive value in it. To a certain extent,
political socialization is always a product of a period: while political participation was
more or less voting during the 1950’s and 1960’s, the action repertoire started to expand
heavily during the 1970’s, and has widened ever since (see e.g. van Deth 2001). Thus, it
is only natural that the image of the citizenship which political socialization process
produces varies between different generations. The claim of this study is that it is
exactly these differences in political socialization that account the differences in turnout
between various generations.
The Classification of Generations
The division of generations used in this article is generated by J.P. Roos (1987) based
on data of Finnish autobiographies. According to Roos, it is possible to identify four
Finnish generations: 1) those born in 1900-1919, the generation of war and want; 2)
those born in 1920-1930, the generation of reconstruction; 3) those born in 1940-1950,
the generation of transformation; and 4) those born in 1960, the generation of
suburban. The key experiences for the first one have been poverty, insecurity, and
illnesses, disintegration of families due to death of parents, short education and early
entering into working life. The life of the next generation has been somewhat similar
7
except they experienced some prosperity after the reconstruction. In our analyses, two
eldest generations have been combined as the amount of the first one is relatively small
in the data used here. Hence, together they form the generation of war and
reconstruction. During the parliamentary elections of 2003, they were 64 year-olds or
older.
Table 1 The Key Experiences of Finnish Generations
Generation
The generation of
war and want a
Year of birth
1900-1919
Age in 2003
Key experiences
war, want, the lack of or interrupted
education, early entering into working
life
The generation of
reconstruction a
1920-1939
The generation of
the transformation
1940-1959
34-43
industrialization, urbanization, widening
of education, rapid increases in
standard of life
The generation of
suburban
1960-1969
44-63
”non-experiences”, the lack of
experiences of illness, disasters and
wants, smoothness of life, yet recession
during early adulthood
The generation of
individual choice
1970-
64+
general individualization, the
acceleration of technological
development, competition, consumption
18-33
a
scarcity, rationing, gradual increment of
prosperity due to reconstruction
The generation of war and want and the generation of reconstruction have been combined as the amount
of the first one is relatively small. Together they form the generation of war and reconstruction.
Sources: Roos 1987, Purhonen 2002a (the generation of individual choice)
Compared to two the eldest generations, the life of the generation of transformation
(44-63 year-olds in 2003) has been essentially different. Most of them were born in the
countryside and moved to cities as adults, had longer education compared to their
ancestors, and became wealthier. The generation of suburban (34-44 year-olds in 2003)
also has its’ distinctive features. As a matter a fact, their life has been carefree to the
extent that it could be stated that their key experiences have been certain “nonexperiences”: their lives have been relatively steady and problems have been small.3
However, this generation has faced the worst economic recession of the post-war period
while being young adults in the beginning of 1990’s.
The youngest generation, those born in 1970’s and in the beginning of 1980’s (18-33
year-olds during the parliamentary elections of 2003), is more difficult to identify.
According to Purhonen (2002a, 15, referred to Hochschild 2000), they could be called
the generational of individual choice. Without going into this definition more in depth,
we can enumerate some of the possible key experiences for this generation such as the
8
economic recession in the beginning of 1990’s and Finland’s accession to the European
Union and globalization in general. In the youth barometer of 2004, partly similar age
group (15-29) most often named themselves as “it-generation” and “mobile-generation”
referring to the expansion of new technology (Wilska 2004, 102-103). However, one
unifying feature of this generation may be the lack of common experiences due to the
general individualization (see Purhonen 2002a, 15). However, the inability to name key
experiences can be caused by the temporal closeness as this generation has existed
much shorter period than the previous ones. The summary of the key experiences of
each generation is presented in table 1.
Data and Statistical Analysis
The analysis is based on survey data gathered after the parliamentary elections of 2003
in Finland. The first part of the data was collected via personal interviews (1.270
respondents). For the second part respondents were asked to independently fill so-called
omnibus section (753 respondents). The analysis presented here is mostly based on the
latter part of the data except for the variable concerning the inheritance of the party
choice which are from the first part of the data. This article is a part of a project
“Elections and Representative Democracy in Finland” funded by the Academy of
Finland (project 8104411).
The first part of the analysis is descriptive based on cross-tabulations. Each variable, 1)
the role of politics in the respondent’s childhood and adolescence; 2) the amount the
respondent received encouraging to vote from his or her parents; 3) the tendency to vote
the same party as the respondent’s father voted during respondent’s youth4; 4) the
attitudinal change towards voting; 5) the attitudinal change towards other forms of
political participation; and 6) the generational consciousness regarding to political
participation, is cross-tabulated by generation. The purpose of the cross-tabulations is to
examine the differences between the four different generations in their socialization
processes.
The second part of the analysis is explanatory. We will investigate the impact of three
socialization-related variables (the role of politics in the respondent’s childhood and
adolescence; the attitudinal change towards voting; and the current attitude towards
political participation5) on the relationship between the turnout and the age, i.e. will the
differences in the turnout between the generations remain after taken account the
differences in their socialization processes.6 This was done by using logistic regression
analysis with the first category of each variable as the reference category. The
dependent variable, turnout, was weighted separately for men and women in order to
correspond with the official turnout from electoral wards for the parliamentary elections
of 2003. This was necessary as people have a tendency to over-report their electoral
9
participation in surveys (see e.g. Martikainen & Yrjönen 1991, 82; and Pesonen et al
1993, 531 for Finland).
Results are presented in terms of odds ratios (ORs). “Odds” mean the probability to vote
divided by the probability of not voting. Correspondingly, “the odds ratio” is defined as
the ratio of odds in a certain category of an explanatory variable to the odds in the
reference category:
ORi=(pi/(1-pi))/(p0/(1-p0)),
where pi is the probability of voting in the ith category of an explanatory variable and p0
is the probability of voting in the reference category.
Empirical Analysis
Socialization during the Childhood and the Adolescence
Traditionally, the role of the childhood family has been seen as the primary source of
values and attitudes. However, this kind of “inject” model has also been re-examined
and it has been shown that different generations have developed their opinions
horizontally rather than vertically from a parent to child, due to similar experiences
(Connell 1972). Also e.g. Friedman et al. (1972) have noticed that the correlation in
social and political values between parents and children is low. As it comes to political
engagement, the socialization background, as measured by parents’ education and
occupations, does not seem to have a large impact (Jääsaari & Martikainen 1991). On
the other hand, an aforementioned survey study by Jääsaari and Martikainen shows that
parents’ electoral participation has a clear independent effect on youths’ political
interest (ibid., 42). Consequently, it seems quite obvious that the environment where an
individual grows up, consisting of family, school and various other social networks,
must have some role in shaping the individual’s image of society and his or her place in
it.
10
Table 2 The Answers to the Question “When you think of your childhood’s and
adolescence’s environment, how large role would you say politics had in it?” by
Generation (%)
Total
Large or
Rela-
No role
relative-
tively
at all
%
(n)
ly large
small
role
role
The generational of individual choice
16
51
33
100
(176)
The generation of suburban
30
46
25
100
(126)
The generation of transformation
27
51
23
100
(271)
The generation of war and reconstruction
25
56
19
100
(122)
Total
24
51
25
100
(695)
= 15.04 d.f. = 6 p = 0.02
The respondents’ views of the role of politics during the childhood and the adolescence
are presented in table 2. The most of the youth of today, the generation of individual
choice, are the children of the generation of transformation. As the latter grew up in an
atmosphere of active youth politics, assumingly this activism has been visible in the
childhood of their children. Table 2 shows, however, that the politics has clearly had the
smallest role in the youngest generation’s childhood and adolescence. Instead, politics
has played substantially larger role in the childhood’s and the adolescence’s
environment of the two middle generations. In this respect it seems very interesting that
only a quarter of the generation of war and reconstruction perceive the role of politics as
large or relatively large. Apparently the experiences of war have not been considered
political but, instead, perceived mostly as a day to day survival. Moreover, a certain
political prudence was distinctive to the post-war atmosphere which, at the level of
school and family, could have meant avoidance of delicate political questions. This
might have caused the fact that compared to the oldest generation, only a slightly larger
portion thinks that politics had a large role in their childhood.
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Table 3 The Answers to the Question ”Have your parents ever offered you any advices
or examples about the importance of voting” by Generation (%)
Often
Rarely
Total
Not at
all
%
(n)
The generational of individual choice
34
36
30
100
(163)
The generation of suburban
31
32
36
100
(118)
The generation of transformation
26
34
40
100
(251)
The generation of war and reconstruction
22
20
59
100
(118)
Total
28
32
40
100
(650)
= 25.92 d.f. = 6 p = 0.00
The advices or examples from one’s parents about the importance of voting do not seem
to be very common as shown in table 3. Forty percent of Finns have not received this
kind of guidance at all. However, it is worth noting that younger generations have
received more advice than the elder ones. This may be due to the fact that amongst the
younger generations the first voting experience and advices related to it are still fresh in
memory. On the other hand, the lesser interest towards electoral participation amongst
the young might have pressed the parents to emphasize the meaning of voting. The
parents of current youth belong to a generation, whose turnout is the highest of all
generations: for example in parliamentary elections of 1999, the turnout in the age
group of 45 to 54 year olds was 75 per cent and amongst 55 to 64 year olds 80 per cent
(Martikainen & Wass 2002, 47). As shown in table 2, the politics has the largest role in
the childhood and adolescence of approximately 50 year olds of today. Consequently, it
appears that they are trying to pass their children the sense of duty to vote which they
selves have adapted.
The respondents were also asked which party their mother and father voted during the
respondents’ adolescence. In table 4 a respondent’s father’s party choice is crosstabulated with the party choice of a respondent in the parliamentary elections of 2003.
We have used father’s party choice because more respondents were able to name that
than their mother’s party. This new variable consists of three categories: those voting
the same party than one’s father; those voting different party; and those who don’t know
their father’s party choice. The respondents whose fathers’ party no longer exists are
included in the second class. Those who reported non-voting in the parliamentary
elections of 2003 and those who were unwilling to name the party they voted are
excluded from the analysis.
12
Table 4 The Inheritance of Party Identification by Generation (%)
Voted
Voted
Does
the
diffe-
not
same
rent
know
party
party
father’s
than a
than
party
father
a
Total
%
(n)
father
The generational of individual choice
31
28
42
100
(233)
The generation of suburban
30
49
21
100
(159)
The generation of transformation
35
44
21
100
(335)
The generation of war and reconstruction
35
41
25
100
(158)
33
40
27
100
(885)
Total
= 39.90 d.f. = 6 p = 0.00
Table 4 shows that one third of the respondents have voted the same party as their
fathers used to vote, 40 per cent voted some other party and slightly over a quarter
didn’t know their fathers’ party choice. The generations don’t markedly differ from
each other regarding their inheritance to party identification. Moreover, there seems to
be quite little change over time: in the parliamentary elections of 1966 in Finland 40 per
cent voted the same party as their fathers and 24 per cent were unable to name their
fathers’ party (Pesonen 1972, 336). This comes as no surprise given that many studies
concerning the United States have shown that parents’ party identification plays a major
role in their children’s political orientation, although different political issues also have
a strong impact on the party choice strengthening with age (Niemi & Jennings 1991)
and the partisan inheritance eroded by the antipartisan period pressures of the late
1960’s and early 1970’s (Beck & Jenning 1991).
The large portion of those in the youngest generation who are not aware of their fathers’
party identification is, however, worth of further investigation. The fact that 42 per cent
of the generation of individual choice is unable to name their father’s party is a clear
signal of the “privatization” of politics. For instance, the eldest generation was born in a
society divided into halves due to the civil war in 1917-1918. In that context parents’
party preference was reflected in the whole family (see e.g. Jääsaari 1986, 263).
Nowadays the party choice seems to be a private matter even inside of the family and
one’s political views are not necessarily reflected in other forms of action and can not
be judged from outside. It is possible to give three alternative or supplementary
interpretations for this phenomenon. First of all, it might be the case that it has become
less common to talk about politics between the members of the family. Secondly, even
though some discussion takes place, children can’t “read” their parents’ party choice
13
from their opinions due to the lack of civic literacy (see. Milner 2002). The third option
is that children simply are not interested anymore in their parents’ political orientation
as they view their own political identity separately from those. In all of these cases, the
inheritance of the party identification becomes impossible because children can’t place
their parents on a political map.
The inheritance of the party choice looks somewhat different while examining only
those respondents who know their father’s party (data not shown here).7 Over half (53
%) of those in the generation of individual choice whom were able to name their
father’s party orientation, voted the same party in the parliamentary elections of 2003.
This seems reasonable as a part of this generation still lived at home during these
elections and had not exposed to other socialization agents such as tertiary education
and work at the same extent than the older ones. In no other generation the proportion of
those voting in accordance with their father’s party preference is that large. It is the
second largest in the generation of war and reconstruction (46 %), third largest amongst
the generation of transformation (44 %) and weakest in the generation of suburban. This
is somewhat surprising given that amongst the generation of suburban politics had
largest role during their adolescence compared to other generations. Moreover, they
have received more examples and advices concerning the importance of voting than any
other generation. For some reason, this kind of input has not been transferred into action
unlike to their parents. However, as the youngest generation is concerned, the role of the
socialization becomes clearly visible. Amongstst those whom thought the politics had a
large or a relatively large role during their adolescence, only 28 per cent didn’t know
their fathers’ political orientation. Amongstst those whom had often had directions
about the importance of voting only 24 per cent didn’t know their fathers’ party and 52
per cent voted the same party.
Socialization into Political Participation during Individual’s Life Cycle
As noted earlier in this article, an individual’s political socialization does not have a
certain end point but instead continues throughout one’s life cycle (Alapuro 1969, 6;
Jääsaari 1986, 172). Due to the change in individuals’ life circumstances or the societal
change in general, the attitudes towards political participation may be reconstituted. It is
possible to examine the differences in attitudes of persons of same age during the
different periods of time via attitudinal statements such as “I think one fulfills his civic
duty if he votes regularly” often stated in surveys. However, without a panel study we
cannot gain a full picture of how a particular individual’s views have changed during
his of her life span.
14
Current attitude towards political participation
The change in attitudes
towards political
+
participation during
+
+/-
-
the
the assenters
the eased
discoverers
individuals’ life cycle
offs
the
+/-
the neutrals
the critics
the
the rejecters
participants
the holders
-
disappointed
Figure 1 The Typology of Political Socialization.
+ positive / change into positive direction
+/- neutral / no change
- negative / change into negative direction
In figure 1 a respondent’s current attitude towards political participation has been crosstabulated with his or her view of the change that has occurred in these attitudes during
his or her life cycle. Hence, we obtain a typology consisting of nine categories which
represent different types of socialization. The socialization into electoral participation
based on that typology is presented in table 58 and the socialization into other forms of
political participation in table 69.
Table 5 The Change in the Attitudes Towards Electoral Participation During Life Cycle
by Generation (%)
The
The
The
The
The
The
ea-
parti-
neut-
cri-
hol-
dis-
re-
sen-
sed
ci-
rals
tics
ders
sa-
ject-
ters
offs
pants
poin-
ters
The
The
Tthe
dis-
as-
coverers
Total
%
(n)
teed
18-33
28
13
2
30
20
2
2
2
2
100
(171)
34-43
26
13
1
20
19
4
2
9
6
100
(127)
44-63
17
7
1
32
23
3
3
6
9
100
(263)
64+
18
11
4
24
21
4
4
7
7
100
(115)
Total
22
10
2
28
21
3
3
6
6
100
(676)
= 42.02 d.f. = 24 p = 0.01
18-33 The generational of individual choice
34-43 The generation of suburban
44-63 The generation of transformation
64+ The generation of war and reconstruction
15
Table 5 shows that every other Finns’ attitude towards electoral participation has
remained stable throughout his or her life. Most of those whose attitudes have changed
belong to a group called “the discoverers” meaning that their current positive standpoint
towards voting is a consequence of an alteration into a positive direction. The second
largest group is called “the assenters” consisting of those whose attitudes have changed
into a more positive direction but still are more neutral than positive. Those whose
views about electoral participation have changed into a more negative direction form
only about 15 per cent of respondents. This observation is somewhat surprising given
the decline in overall turnout during the past few decades. Moreover, the group “the
discoverers” is larger amongstst two second youngest generations than in the generation
of war and reconstruction. Although this positive attitude amongstst younger
generations does not necessarily seem be actualized into voting, as we will see later in
this article, at the attitudinal level these cohorts are very potential voters. It is also worth
of noting that “rejecters”, people whose current unfavorable attitude is due to an
attitudinal change into a more negative direction, form four times larger group amongst
generation of transformation (9 %) than they form amongst the generation of individual
choice (2 %).
Table 6 The Change in the Attitudes Towards Other Forms of Participation During Life
Cycle by Generation (%)
The
The
Tthe
The
The
The
The
The
The
dis-
as-
ea-
parti-
neut-
cri-
hol-
dis-
re-
cove-
sen-
sed
ci-
rals
tics
ders
sa-
ject-
rers
ters
offs
pants
poin-
ters
Total
%
(n)
teed
18-33
29
7
1
30
23
2
1
4
2
100
(168)
34-43
20
11
-
24
25
8
4
6
2
100
(123)
44-63
22
6
1
28
28
6
2
3
4
100
(253)
64+
17
4
3
28
24
8
4
9
5
100
(105)
Total
23
7
1
28
25
6
2
5
3
100
(649)
= 32.99 d.f. = 24 p = 0.10
18-33 The generational of individual choice
34-43 The generation of suburban
44-63 The generation of transformation
64+ The generation of war and reconstruction
The change in attitudes towards other forms of political participation is shown in table
6. As compared to the electoral participation, those whose views have remained the
same form even bigger group, 60 per cent, when it comes to other forms of political
participation. Over 50 per cent of respondents have currently either a positive or a
neutral standpoint towards other forms of political participation and there has not
16
occurred any change in these attitudes during their life span. Overall, the composition of
different groups is quite similar to those concerning the electoral participation.
However, it should be noted that the differences between generations are not
statistically significant (p=0.10). Notwithstanding, we can still get some indicators from
the differences by comparing expected and observed counts. The portion of “the
discoverers” is somewhat larger amongst the youngest generation as expected, and,
respectively, the portion of “the critics” is smaller, although it is even smaller amongst
“the holders”. This seems reasonable as the members of the youngest generation are
living the active phase of their lives (from 18 to 40 year-olds, see Roos 1987) also
concerning political awakening, and this phase is taking place during the period where a
lot of conversation about new forms of participation is going on. However, it is quite
fascinating that this kind of “discovery of participation” holds also for electoral
participation as well. This observation is compatible with the previous investigations:
the different forms of participation are rather supplementary with each other than
exclusionary (see e.g. Hellsten 2003).
In the eldest generation the portion of observed counts for “the discoverers” and “the
assenters” are smaller than expected, and respectively, larger for “the critics”, for “the
holders” and for “the disappointed”. Every fifth’s of the generation of war and
reconstruction attitude towards other forms of political participation have become more
negative, although only 16 per cent currently holds a negative outlook towards that kind
of participation. It could be the case that sometimes negative reporting in media about
the movements critical towards globalization has changed the image of civic action into
a less appealing or a less legitimate direction in the minds of the elderly.
Generational Consciousness and Political Participation
As mentioned in the introduction, the process of socialization is strongly connected with
the concept of generation. Certain shared key experiences that a birth cohort faces
during their formative years can shape its orientation towards the society into a similar
direction, at least to some extent (Mannheim 1952; Virtanen 1999; Virtanen 2001). One
reflection of this orientation is a political participation. For instance, the lower turnout
amongst the young can be caused by the certain demobilizatory socialization processes
(Anduiza 1999, 28). As a matter a fact, it is partly these demobilizatory socialization
processes which make them a generation. While thinking this way, the concept of
generational consciousness becomes essential. By generational consciousness we mean
the individuals’ idea that he or she belongs to a certain generation connected with a
special bond (see e.g. Purhonen 2002b; Wilska 2004). In order to talk about “voter
generations”, for instance, a member of a given age cohort should feel that his or her
orientation towards political participation is quite similar than his or her peers. The
statement “in my generation everybody votes” could be characteristic for this kind of
feeling.
17
Table 7 The Respondents Attitude towards Political Participation vis-à-vis His/Her
View of the Attitudes of Others’ Belonging to Same Generation by Generation (%)
+
+
+
+/-
+/-
+/-
-
-
-
+
+/-
-
+
+/-
-
+
+/-
-
%
(n)
18-33
28
15
16
5
20
10
2
1
3
100
(173)
34-43
31
9
6
14
21
7
2
4
6
100
(127)
44-63
43
9
2
16
16
3
4
2
5
100
(257)
64+
43
6
2
17
17
6
2
1
7
100
(109)
Total
37
10
7
13
18
6
3
2
5
100
(666)
Total
= 83.51 d.f. = 24 p = 0.00
18-33 The generational of individual choice
34-43 The generation of suburban
44-63 The generation of transformation
64+ The generation of war and reconstruction
+positive, +/- neutral, - negative
The bolded upper row of the column shows the respondents’ own attitude towards political participation
and the lower row his/her view of the attitudes of the others’ belonging to same generation.
In table 7 we examine how different generations feel about political participation
compared to their views of the attitudes of their peers. First of all, it is worth noting that
the amount of those identifying to their generation, regarding to political participation,
varies substantially between different generations. While 60 per cent of all respondents
consider their attitude similar to that of the others’ belonging to same generation, the
corresponding figure amongst the youngest generation is only 51 per cent and amongst
the oldest generation 67 per cent.10 Amongst the generation of transformation, the share
of identifiers is 64 per cent. This observation is compatible with the finding that
generational consciousness is larger amongst the so-called baby boomers, which refers
partly to the same age group than the generation of transformation, than amongst the
younger age cohorts (Purhonen 2002b, 39).11
Table 7 shows that over one third of Finns’ own attitude towards political participation
and the view of the attitudes of same generation are positive. Almost fifth belongs to a
category where a respondent’s own attitude is neutral and the image of other’s attitude
is similar. However, again the view about the compatibility of respondent’s own
orientation towards participation with his or her idea of that of his or her peers varies
according to generation. A dividing line seems to be the generation of suburban. The
youngest generation has much more positive attitude towards participation than they
think their peers have. It seems to be the opposite amongst the two oldest generations.
For instance, amongstst the generation of suburban, 14 per cent feel neutral towards
participation but thinks that others of the same generation have a positive attitude. In the
youngest generation only 6 per cent has a negative attitude as a whole of which three
18
per cent thinks that others have more positive attitude. The corresponding figures
amongstst the generation of transformation are 11 per cent of which six per cent see
their peers having more positive attitude.
During recent years, much attention has been paid in the public debate to the political
apathy amongst the young age groups. In the light of figures presented in table 7, at the
level of attitudes, this seems to be a myth that also young people themselves have
adopted. Amongst the youngest generation, 59 per cent have a positive attitude towards
participation but, at the same time, only 35 per cent assess that their peers have similar
views. Correspondingly, 29 per cent of this generation thinks that the representatives of
their generation have a negative standpoint towards political participation, although, on
the basis of respondents’ own views, no more than six per cent actually feels negatively
towards participation. In the generation of transformation only 10 per cent assesses that
others in their generation have negative standpoint concerning political participation
while 11 per cent actually feels that way. In this respect it is also worth of noting that
only 23 per cent of 15 to 29 year-olds thinks that their generation’s political influence
will grow in the future larger than their predecessors and half of them assesses that it
will remain the same than nowadays. This quite a pessimistic view might be a
consequence of the powerful role in the decision-making that the generation of
transformation had overtaken already in 1970’s (Wilska 2004, 108; for the political
influence of the baby-boomers see Borg & Ruostetsaari 2002).
In order to sum up, it appears that contemporary young adults’ image of their
generations’ views does not reflect the reality. Based on their own opinions, the younger
age cohorts could be more active than the elder generations. However, it almost seems
as this negative image of their peers’ views partly hinders them from actual
participation. On the other hand, this negative image is also a realistic one as the
representatives of the media and the scholars frequently discuss the lack of interest
towards participation amongstst the young. While this debate is certainly indispensable
and well-grounded, it is worth noting that it partly constitutes a self-concept of this
generation as a citizen and, more importantly, forms in part a socialization milieu for
younger ones.
Effects of Age and Socialization Factors on Turnout
In order to form a more comprehensive picture of the differences in the socialization
processes between different generations we will look at the effects of socialization
factors on turnout. The main point is to find out how these factors affect the differences
in turnout between various generations. Firstly, table 8 shows that the turnout amongst
the youngest generation (56 %) is substantially lower than amongst the elder ones, as
expected. Moreover, clear differences in the turnout can also be observed according to
the role of politics during respondent’s adolescence, the change in attitudes towards
19
voting and the current attitude towards political participation. The bivariate models
confirm these interpretations as all the differences between groups turn out to be
statistically significant and follow the same direction. In model 2 sex and three
socioeconomic variables (education, social class and income) have been adjusted. It
shows a similar result than a previous study (see Martikainen et al. 2005): compared to
the reference group of the youngest generation, clear differences between generations
can be detected even though the effect of generation is slightly attenuated amongst the
generation of suburban and amongst the generation of transformation after adjusting for
major socioeconomic factors.12 For the former the attenuation is 19 per cent and for the
latter five per cent. The fact that odds ratio of the generation of war and reconstruction
is slightly larger than before the adjustment emphasizes the point stated earlier: the
difference in turnout between the youngest and the eldest generation would be greater if
there were no socioeconomic differences between them given that the youngest
generation is better educated (see ibid., 17).
Model 3 shows that adjusting for generation and the role of politics during
adolescence in addition to the sex and the socioeconomic factors attenuate
differences in the odds ratios for voting between generations as compared to
youngest generation. Although some attenuation takes place, the results are
statistically significant.
the
the
the
not
In model 4 the change in the attitudes towards voting has been included in the analysis.
As compared to the previous model, this new variable increases the odds ratios for the
two middle generations (OR=1.96 and OR=2.48). However, the difference between the
youngest and the eldest generation is not statistically significant and the difference
between the youngest and the second youngest generation only slightly significant. In
order to interpret this finding it is worth of mentioning that amongst the reference
group, the generation of individual choice, 33 per cent of respondents’ attitudes towards
voting have changed into a more positive direction during their lives as the
corresponding figure for the generation of suburban is only 21 per cent and for the two
eldest generations 28 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. Hence, adding this variable
into analysis does not change a lot the original differences in odds ratios between the
various generations (model 2) but we can suspect that if the youngest generation hadn’t
have faced this change in attitudes into more positive direction, the differences would be
even greater.
In model 5 we can see that adjusting for the current attitude towards the political
participation strengthens the difference between the eldest generation and the generation
of individual choice (OR=3.15) and also between it and the second youngest generation
(OR=2.26). It should be noted, however, that the results are only slightly statistically
significant. The strengthening of the differences is due to the fact that the youngest
generation has much often a positive attitude towards political participation as 29 per
cent feels positive about it while amongst the generation of suburban the corresponding
20
figure is 16 per cent and amongst the eldest generation 17 per cent. However, in the
generation of transformation 39 per cent have a positive attitude towards political
participation. Even though this last model explains only 35 per cent of total variance in
the turnout it is not a cause of concern here as our purpose is not to explain the turnout
as such but to examine the effect of the socialization variables on the differences in
turnout between various generations.
All in all, these findings show that the differences in the turnout would be quite the
same amongst the elder generations and the youngest one even though there were no
differences in the socialization process, i.e. if the youngest generation had not changed
their attitudes towards voting into a more positive direction more often than other
generations and if it did not feel more positively towards political participation as the
generation of suburban and the generation of war and reconstruction. The elder
generations are clearly “better-offs” compared to the youngest one only in regards to the
role of politics during adolescence, but as we saw, it doesn’t have a statistically
significant effect on the odds ratios of voting amongst generations. The differences in
the turnout between generations show, for their part, that even their better position
regarding the socialization factors does not give a stimulus for voting for the large part
of the youngest generation, although inside the youngest generation the turnout is
substantially higher amongst those whose attitude towards electoral participation has
changed into a more positive direction and who feel positive about political
participation compared to those whom feel the opposite. Consequently, it appears that
the differences in the turnout between generations can not be explained by the
socialization related factors as they can not be explained by the socioeconomic factors
either.
21
Table 8 Effects of Age and Socialization Factors on Turnout. Turnout (%) and Odds
Ratios (OR) in Multivariate Models (** p<0.01, * p<0.05, (*) p<0.10).
Multivariate Models
Turnout
Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 3:
Model 4:
Model 5:
(%)
Bivariate
sex +
sex+
+ change
+ attitude
model
ses +
ses+
adjusted
gen +
role
Generation (gen)
The generation of individual choice
62
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
65
1.93**
1.75*
1.17
1.96(*)
2.26(*)
76
2.75**
2.67**
1.76(*)
2.48**
2.47*
74
2.31**
2.34*
2.09
2.40
3.15(*)
None
57
1.00
1,00
1,00
1.00
1.00
Relatively small
75
2.28**
2.20*
2.16**
1.66(*)
1.47
Large
79
2.81**
3.13**
2.95**
2.13*
1.48
More critical
39
1.00
1.00
-
1.00
1.00
No change
80
6.20**
5.79**
-
6.54**
5.07**
More positive
81
6.66**
7.77**
-
11.80**
6.50**
Critical
40
1.00
1.00
-
-
1.00
Neutral
64
2.73**
2.66*
-
-
1.73
Positive
89
11.92**
14.53**
-
-
7.08**
Constant
0.68
0.16**
0.92**
N
665
642
623
Nagelkerke R²
0.13
0.25
0.35
Cases predicted correctly (%)
82.5
85.1
85.4
(18-33)
The generation of suburban (3443)
The generation of transformation
(44-63)
The generation of war and
reconstruction (64+)
Role of Politics during the
Adolescence (role)
Change in Attitudes
towards Voting (change)
Current Attitude
towards Political Participation
(attitude)
Notes: The dependent variable is weighted separately for men and women in order to correspond with the
official turnout from the electoral wards for the parliamentary elections of 2003. Model 1 shows the
22
bivariate models including generation and socialization variables. The effect of these factors on turnout is
shown in odds ratios. Each category of generation and socialization variables is compared to the reference
group with an odds ratio of 1.00. Model 2 shows separately the odds ratios of voting in each categories of
generation and socialization variables while adjusting for sex and socioeconomic factors (ses).
Socioeconomic factors include education (1 = lower secondary education, 2 = upper secondary level
education and lowest level tertiary education, 3 = lower and higher level tertiary education), social class
(1 = manual workers, 2 = lower middle class, 3 = upper middle class, 4 = entrepreneurs, 5 = farmers, 6 =
pensioners, 7 = students, 8 = unemployed, 9 = others) and income per household (1 = lowest quartile, 2 =
second quartile, 3 = third quartile, 4 = fourth quartile). Model 3 simultaneously includes the effects of
sex, socioeconomic factors, generation and the role of politics during the adolescence. In model 4 the
effect of attitudinal change towards voting is added. Model 5 also includes the current attitude towards
political participation.
Conclusions
In this article we have examined the socialization into political participation amongst
four Finnish generations. The results show that as far as political participation is
concerned, the socialization processes of different generations clearly differ from each
another. However, these differences are hardly straightforward and consequently, their
interpretation can be somewhat challenging.
While looking at the early socialization, we can see that the role of politics in the
childhood and the adolescence has clearly been the smallest during the adolescence of
the youngest generation, the generation of individual choice. However, this generation
has received most advice about the importance of voting from their parents. Most of
their parents are in their 50’s, belonging to the generation whose adolescence politics
has a larger role and whose turnout is higher that the turnout at the aggregate level.
Consequently, it seems that this generation of transformation has tried to pass their
children the sense of obligation to participate which they have adopted themselves.
The inheritance of the party choice is somewhat more unusual amongst the two
youngest generations than it is amongst the elder ones. However, the fact that over forty
per cent of the youngest generation, the generation of individual choice, is not aware of
which party their father voted while they were young suggests that the decision to vote a
different party has not always been a conscious one. Instead, nowadays children seem to
be less aware about their parents’ political orientation reflecting certain privatization of
the politics. All in all, excluding the advices to vote, the results show that the role of the
family and the childhood environment as the socialization agents has declined with
time.
It is also worth noting that at the level of attitudes, the youngest generation has more
positive feelings towards political participation than the oldest one. Moreover,
23
attitudinal change during an individual’s life span towards voting and other forms of
political participation has been most positive amongst the youngest generation. While
almost one fifth’s attitude of the generation of transformation towards electoral
participation has changed into a more negative direction throughout their life span, the
corresponding figure amongst the youngest generation is only six per cent. However,
amongst every generation those whose attitudes have remained the same form the
majority.
As it comes to the generational consciousness concerning political participation,
generations once again differ from each other in a fascinating way. The younger
generations feel more positively about political participation compared to their views of
the attitudes of the others belonging to the same generation. Amongst the older
generations this ratio is opposite. On the other hand, it should be noted that generational
consciousness – in this case the compatibility of respondent’s own attitude with his or
her views of attitudes of the other representatives of the same generation – grows
linearly with age. While only a half of the youngest generation think that they are
typical members of their generation as it comes to political participation, the
corresponding figure amongst the generation of transformation is 64 per cent and
amongst the generation of war and reconstruction 67 per cent. Consequently, at the level
of attitudes, a relatively small interest towards political participation does not seem to
be a combining feature of the younger generation. If anything, it appears that the young
generations have adopted the image of the young age groups as being politically passive
which have been widely discussed in the media.
Finally, we examined how socialization-related factors affect to the differences in the
turnout between generations. The results show that the differences in the turnout would
be quite similar than whilst taken account only sex and socioeconomic factors.
Although the youngest generation is clearly “better-offs” regarding some of the
socialization factors, their low turnout show that they still can not find enough stimulus
to actually cast a vote. As has been shown earlier (Martikainen et al. 2005) and
confirmed here, the low turnout amongst the young can not be explained by their lower
socioeconomic status either. Consequently, the explanation for the tendency of the
young generation to vote less than the elder ones needs to be searched elsewhere. One
possibility is that the younger generation views the whole idea of representation in a
different way than their predecessors. This might be due to the increase in competence,
the difficulties of parties to represent voters whose interest are widely divided and the
appearance of so-called do-it-yourself politics. However, this remains a focus for a
further study.
24
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1
The data used in the referred study are compiled by Statistics Finland. Also the data on the
parliamentary elections of 1979, based on a sample of 185 voting districts (see Martikainen & Yrjönen
1984), was used.
2
Delli Carpini, as many others, refers to German sociologist Karl Mannheim, whose essay on generations
was first published in 1928 and transleted into English in 1952. The standing point of Mannheims’
concept analysis was to distinguish the biological generations from the generations based on common
experiences (see Virtanen 1999; Virtanen 2001). According to Mannheim, generation is a dynamic social
process consisting of three different levels which rise from bottom to top. The first of these is a biological
age cohort, the second is generation location and the third is called generation as actuality. The generation
location refers to the common basis of experiences shared amongst particular age cohort while the term
“generation as actulity” requires that these common ecperience has a mobilizatory effect on this cohort
and it actively participates in social movements characteristic to the period they live in (Mannheim 1952;
see also Virtanen 1999, 82-83).
3
The interpretation of key experiences of the suburban generation presented here is somewhat different
than the original by Roos (1981). According to Roos, the lack of experiences has been the common
feature for the generation of transformation. However, it seems reasonable to assume that certain easiness
of life has faced the older generation predominantly during their adulthood and, consequently, has been
the key feature of adolescence for their children which form the generation of suburban.
4
We have chosen a father’s party because more respondents were able to name it compared to mother’s
party.
5
It should be pointed out that the current attitude towards political participation seems to be a
conventional attitudinal variable. While this is certainly true, it can also be seen as the current end point
of the socialization into political participation, which, naturally, might change in the future. Moreover, the
main reason why the change in attitude towards voting and the current attitude towards political
participation are included separately is to gain more detailed and more easily readable analyses.
6
We have excluded the advices from the parents’ concerning the voting from the final model. This
variable somewhat skewed the whole model as for some unknown reason many of those who had not
voted in the elections 2003 decided not to answer on this question. Consequently, even the weighted
overall turnout amongstst those who answered this question was 92 per cent.
7
For this section I owe to Heikki Paloheimo.
8
The current attitude towards political participation has been measured by the question “How do you feel
about political participation?” The options were very positively, quite positively, not positively nor
negatively, quite negatively, very negatively and don’t know. This question is somewhat problematic as it
is not specified to electoral participation but instead it refers to political participation in general. While
interpreting the results one should keep in mind this inaccuracy in consepts. The attitude towards electoral
participation was measured by the question “How much your attitude towards electoral participation has
changed during your life?” The options were changed much more positive, changed somewhat more
positive, has not changed either more positive nor more negative, changed somewhat more positive,
changed much more postive.
9
The current attitude towards political participation is measured like similar way than in table 5. The
change towards other forms of political participation was measure by the question “How much your
attitude towards eother forms of political participation (e.g. contacting the officials, signing petitions,
29
participating in demonstrations) has changed during your life? The options were the same than with
electoral participation (see endnote 5).
10
It is worth of noting that in the Youth Barometer of 2004, only six per cent of the 15 to 29 year-olds
stated that do not belong to any generation (Wilska 2004, 102). Consequently, a generational
consciousness regarding to political participation seems to be surprisingly low amongst the young at least
the way measured here.
11
It was also noted in the referred study that generational consciousness of the baby boomers is larger
than their predecessor’ which does not seem to hold with political participation.
12
Percent attenuation after adjusting for other variables can be calculated using the formula: 100*((ORi1-
ORi2)/(ORi1-1)), where ORi1 denotes the odds ratio for social class is obtained from the unadjusted model
and ORi2 denotes the odds ratio for the same social class i obtained from the model that also includes the
adjusted variables. I owe to Pekka Martikainen for this calculation (see Martikainen et al. 2005).
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