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Record: 31
Title:
How to Make Wars Acceptable.
Subject(s):
WAR, Declaration of; WORLD War, 1914-1918; WORLD War, 1939-1945
Source:
Peace & Change, Jan2000, Vol. 25 Issue 1, p1, 21p
Author(s):
Moerk, Ernst L.; Pincus, Faith
Abstract:
Qualitative analyses are presented of war-declaration speeches, announcing the
outbreak of World War I and World War II, given by the leaders of the major
belligerent powers. Because extended war preparations and the staging of casus
belli as justifications for war had made war a certainty, the artfully crafted speeches
did more than declare war. Both defenders and attackers projected guilt,
emphasized unity, produced a state of helpless conformity in citizens, and veiled
expected suffering through euphemisms, indicating a broadly established
vocabulary of motives. These similarities are contrasted with idiosyncratic features,
conditioned by history or dynamics within states. In contrast to the defenders, the
two attackers, Hitler and Mussolini, resorted extensively to mythology and
mythologized history to arouse enthusiasm and, by implication, to promise great
rewards.[ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
AN:
2797407
ISSN:
0149-0508
Full Text Word Count: 8556
Database:
Academic Search Elite
HOW TO MAKE WARS ACCEPTABLE
Qualitative analyses are presented of war-declaration speeches, announcing the outbreak of World War I
and World War II, given by the leaders of the major belligerent powers. Because extended war preparations
and the staging of casus belli as justifications for war had made war a certainty, the artfully crafted speeches
did more than declare war. Both defenders and attackers projected guilt, emphasized unity, produced a state
of helpless conformity in citizens, and veiled expected suffering through euphemisms, indicating a broadly
established vocabulary of motives. These similarities are contrasted with idiosyncratic features, conditioned
by history or dynamics within states. In contrast to the defenders, the two attackers, Hitler and Mussolini,
resorted extensively to mythology and mythologized history to arouse enthusiasm and, by implication, to
promise great rewards.
What inconceivable magic is it, which makes a man always ready at the first beat of the drum... to go without
resisting, often even with a kind of eagerness... in order to blow to pieces on the field of battle his brother?
--Joseph Comte de Maistre, 1884-87
What if they gave a war and nobody came!
--Slogan of the hippie generation of the 1960s
The question Maistre asked could be translated into more scientific terminology as: What can persuade
millions of men, and increasingly also women, to overcome the extremely powerful survival instinct and go to
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battle risking death or at least maiming, often seemingly gladly? It should have been quite obvious to a
soldier of the Middle Ages who led a group scaling a city or castle wall that he was going into certain death.
The same applied to soldiers of World War I "going over the rim" into the range of machine-gun fire.
Nevertheless, they did it by the hundreds of thousands, and many of them had enlisted as volunteers.
This study searches for some answers to these questions, focusing on an early step in the deadly chain of
events and on a narrow domain, that of war-declaration speeches. These speeches announce to entire
nations the certainty of thousands or hundreds of thousands of casualties (possibly even of millions-estimates reach fifty million for World War II). Why do the nations not rise unanimously in protest and revolt
against their leaders who impose such suffering on them, usually unnecessarily? What emotional and
cognitive stratagems do leaders employ in order to prevent and preempt protests?
Of course, war-declaration speeches are neither the only nor the most critical means of influence. Much
ground-breaking indoctrination had been performed earlier on, as explored by Peter Gay in The Cultivation
of Hatred, Walter Karp in The Politics of War, and many others.(n1) Casus belli (seemingly sufficient causes
for war) are often produced to make entrance into war more palatable and justifiable for the population. For
example, Wilson labored for several years, from the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 to the sinking of several
ships in 1917, before he managed to drag the United States into World War I. Even Hitler felt he needed to
have prisoners in Polish uniforms attack German positions in order to be able to pronounce "Ab heute wird
zuruckgeschossen" (From today on we will be shooting back). For Americans, Pearl Harbor is perhaps the
most "infamous" casus belli, and the "Gulf of Tonkin Incident," used by Johnson to drag the United States
into the Vietnam war, the most denounced. Casus belli are, therefore, a common phenomenon.
Focusing on the presidents' reports on these casus belli to the nation or to Congress, it becomes evident
that these incidents were employed specifically to convince the population that they had to accept entrance
into war. Woodrow Wilson, in his war declaration in 1917, intoned: "American ships have been sunk,
American lives taken ...." Franklin D. Roosevelt echoed this in 1941 by announcing: "The sudden criminal
attacks perpetrated by the Japanese... American soldiers and sailors have been killed by enemy action,
American ships have been sunk, American airplanes have been destroyed." The almost ritual enumeration
of injuries suffered suggests recourse to a revenge motive as a means to arouse the population, even if such
a "base motive" would not be formally admitted. Wars obviously will not undo the losses, and will result in
much larger losses. It appears people are so accustomed to the presidential argument from "protection of
life and property" to the initiation of war that they do not notice anymore the countersensical nature of this
argument: How can lives be protected by sending hundreds of thousands of soldiers into war! Protected by
two oceans, the United States only needed to keep its people at home to ensure the safety of almost all of
them. Revenge is a motive that accords well with age-old human tendencies to be stirred into action; and the
urge for revenge does not count future losses, which will be completely out of proportion to the past ones or
to those expected if peace were maintained. Casus belli and war-declaration speeches were successful in
all instances, often turning staunch antiwar opponents of the president into fervent supporters of the war.
Most citizens accepted the entrance into war readily and enthusiastically.
Having indicated that wars are prepared gradually and by diverse means, this investigation focuses on the
diverse themes and possible functions of war-declaration speeches. In "War Requested," Herbert Carson
has plausibly argued that the function of war declarations cannot be one of persuasion to go to war, because
the leader is really announcing a fait accompli.(n2) Both the preceding incidents and the earlier extensive
war preparations make clear that the wars to be announced were long planned by the leaders who would not
tolerate any resistance to their plans. The speeches analyzed support this argument. A terse announcement
"We are at war" would fulfill the same declarative function as a lengthy speech. Nevertheless, leaders
produced long and rhetorically sophisticated perorations. The varying forms and contents of these speeches
might provide preliminary answers to how leaders evaluated the attitudes of their subjects and how they
perceived their task of persuading the masses to support the war. As battle- and war-declaration speeches
build on an age-old and rather rigid vocabulary of motives,(n3) these persistent themes might reflect the
vulnerability of people more generally to persuasion for war.
This study is "preliminary," for comparative research on war-declaration speeches across nations and
periods is astonishingly restricted. Besides Carson's "War Requested" and the comments on it by James
Benjamin in "Rhetoric,"(n4) only the research of Robert Ivie seems to constitute a systematic program.(n5)
Campbell and Jamieson's chapter on "War Rhetoric," focusing on conflicting claims of Congress and the
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president, provides a brief but highly insightful analysis how the war rhetoric of U.S. presidents reflects
constitutional ambiguity in who may initiate hostilities.(n6) It therefore provides perspectives complementary
to the present analysis. The abundant research on presidential rhetoric, as recently integrated by Bostdorff
in The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis, by Jamieson and Birdsall in Presidential Debates, and
by Hart in The Sound of Leadership, or on Hitler's and Mussolini's general oratorial performance, has much
broader and different emphases, and is not directly relevant to the present topic.(n7)
METHODS
The Database
Ten speeches were included in this analysis based on the following criteria: length, year, speaker's station,
audience, topic, and country. To maintain consistency, speeches were chosen that were delivered by a
national leader on the brink of war to the country or to the congress/parliament. Five of these speeches
occurred at the onset of World War I and five at the onset of World War II. For World War I, Austria,
England, France, Germany, and the United States were chosen: Franz Josef's (1914) Speech to his
Peoples; D. L. George's (1914) Appeal to the Nation; Poincare's (1914) Declaration of War; Wilhelm II's
(1914) Address to the German People; and Woodrow Wilson's (1917) War Message.
World War II speeches were chosen from France, Germany, Italy, the United States, and the USSR:
Daladier's (1939) France Cannot Stand By; Hitler's (1939) Germany Could No Longer Remain Idle;
Mussolini's (1940) Speech to the Nation; Roosevelt's (1941) Challenge Speech; and Stalin's (1939) Speech
to the Nation.
All speeches chosen were given by either the Kaiser, the King, or the President/Prime Minister. In one case
(D. L. George), it was the future Prime Minister of the country. At the time of George's speech, he was the
Trade Board President and a popular pro-war speaker for England. He became England's Prime Minister
two years later, in 1916. The immediate audience for each speech was either the nation or the
congress/parliament. Because the speeches delivered in congress or parliament were widely reprinted and
rebroadcast to the public, they also addressed the entire nation. The central theme of every speech was the
initiation of war.
Data Analysis
The full investigation entails both a quantitative and a qualitative approach. This study presents only the
qualitative analyses. The speeches were of greatly unequal length, as diverse speakers added idiosyncratic
themes to the more common ones. Such idiosyncracies included a day-by-day discussion of diplomatic
endeavors to avoid war, or a detailed enumeration of available weapons systems and troop strengths. To
achieve length comparability between speeches, text was omitted from the longer speeches. Wherever this
was necessary, the omitted text related to these tangential themes. The focus of the present analysis is
therefore on the common hortatory and motivational themes.
RESULTS
First the features common to most of the speeches will be briefly summarized, then features that
differentiate between subgroups of speeches will be considered. Finally, the speeches of Hitler and
Mussolini will be discussed separately, because their situation was clearly different from that of the other
leaders. While all the other leaders could argue with considerable plausibility that the wars they declared
were defensive wars, either defending their homeland or a close ally, Hitler and Mussolini faced the task of
announcing a war they had rather freely initiated or joined. Their tasks of persuasion or justification would
logically seem more difficult, and therefore they would have structured their speeches differently.
Tables 1 and 2 are subdivided into three subsets to exemplify these themes separately. Table 1A provides
several examples of a well-worn dichotomy along the dimension of guilt: "blameworthy versus innocent," that
is, attacker versus attacked. Whether attacker or defender, all leaders felt obliged to pay obeisance to this
tendency to interpret behavior on a bad-good dimension. The attackers (Hitler, Mussolini) blamed the
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unreasonableness of the victors of World War I, and especially the Versailles Treaties, which presumably
forced them to take up arms in self-defense. The leaders of the countries invaded or quite directly menaced,
such as England, could argue convincingly that their country was attacked, by general consensus a
sufficient reason to defend oneself by means of war. As American citizens had died with the sinking of the
Lusitania and of other ships, as well as with the attack on Pearl Harbor, Wilson and Roosevelt felt justified in
portraying the United States as a defender of its citizens and their rights. Whether attacker or attacked, the
leader employed a "victimage rhetoric," based on the logic that "a people strongly committed to peace, but
simultaneously faced with the reality of war, must believe that the fault for any such disruption of their ideal
lies with others."(n8)
Table 1B summarizes attempts at assurance. A confrontation with powerful enemies would necessarily
result in fear and doubts whether they can be fought effectively. The response of the leaders is an emphasis
on two aspects of unity: unity within the nation, and unity with other nations or with all of humanity. The
audience is promised, "You don't stand alone," and with the universalization of the pending threat the
individual threat is somehow diluted. Besides reassurance, this message might have allowed some
distancing and denial of personal negative consequences--certainly for the delegates in parliaments, and
even for most of the civilians (before the experience of the extensive bombing of cities). As Moerk pointed
out in "Reward and Punishment," temporal distancing, that is, delay in the occurrence of "punishment," is a
common strategy for making initiations of war more palatable and for influencing decisions more generally.
(n9) It is also well known that delayed and uncertain punishment encourages common crime. A common
weakness in human future time perspective, the tendency to discount delayed effects, is therefore employed
here for the purposes of persuasion.
Finally, Table 1C demonstrates similar dangerously misleading distortions concerning the megadeaths, pain,
and suffering that wars certainly entail. Death and dying go completely unmentioned, and suffering is
referred to euphemistically. (The endeavor to hide all suffering from the population at home through
censorship of the mail from the front became even more extreme once the war had begun, as is well
known.) The most common euphemisms derive from religious terminology: mostly the word "sacrifice,"
which hallows the suffering that cannot be denied. For Christian audiences, the model of Jesus himself and
of well-known Christian martyrs resonates in this terminology. The same theme is also known from heroic
mythology of epic poetry. With such exalted models and in this meaning-context, nobody could easily refuse
a "minor sacrifice" for the great ends depicted! The rewards, "emerging already," as George asserts, are
"rich, noble, exalted" and entail "peace, safety, and freedom for the entire world," that is, they are
incomparably superior to the downplayed sacrifices.
Table 2 focuses on differences which are based either on personality and regime or on contextual
divergences. It is also subdivided into three sections. Table 2A presents the quotations from the three
speakers who openly admitted their concern with popular resistance. Their response to this danger differs
according to regime type and personality. Wilson threatens only "stern repression," which he carried out by
imprisoning many war resisters until long after the end of war. Stalin and Hitler were more ruthless in
threatening "a military tribunal" (what this meant under Stalin was well known from the purges of the 1930s)
and even "nothing but death." Since coming to power, Hitler too had shown that he had no qualms about
realizing his threats. Combining these threats with the fact of lack of choice for the listeners (documented in
Table 2B), it becomes understandable why so little active resistance to these war declarations was
encountered in most nations. Possibly Maistre was wrong, and people do not go to war "without resisting,
often even with a kind of eagerness"? Such an inference would be supported by historical evidence. It is
known from the time of Ancient Egypt that young men mutilated themselves trying to avoid service in the
military. And, while not daring to resist, the largest part of the German population seemed to have responded
sullenly and antagonistically. William Shirer wondered in 1939 Berlin, "How can a country go into a major
war with a population so dead against it?"(n10) And the Vietnam war resisters intoned: "Hell no, we won't
go." Conscientious objection is becoming ever more common.
Table 2B presents the highly constraining factor of lack of choice. Basically all the war announcements were
presented as faits accomplis. Realistically there was no hope to reverse the course of events once the
leader made the war-declaration speech. The only differences in the three subsections of Table 2B is
whether the leader announces "War has been declared/has begun" in a straightforward manner or employs
stylistically more sophisticated expressions. Yet differences exist even between the autocrats, Hitler and
Mussolini. Hitler announces the fact in referring to his own decisions ("I decided," "I will") whereas Mussolini
employs the passive voice, the pronoun "we," and adduces "fate" as the deciding factor.
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In contrast, the Allied leaders emphasize the necessity of defense--even if of other nations. Only Wilson
pretends that there is still a "choice we make for ourselves," but he strongly emphasizes which "choice we
cannot make." Only the utterances are different; the faits accomplis are the same. What resistance could the
rather powerless citizen, whether in a democracy or in an autocratic regime, hope to present in this
situation? Many of those who tried to resist were imprisoned for long periods in democracies or murdered in
autocracies.
Table 2C focuses briefly on two contextual differences. Both Daladier and Hitler had to be concerned with
the popular outlook on the capacity and morale of their armies. As known, there were extensive mutinies in
the French army in 1916, and Germany lost the First World War when her soldiers simply began to leave the
front and went home in October and November 1918. On November 3, 1918, the German fleet at Kiel had
mutinied. Both statements, therefore, stress the courage and fighting capabilities of the military.
Wilson faced the problem that slightly more than a quarter of the U.S. population was of German descent
and had immigrated not long before the outbreak of war.(n11) Now they were asked to fight and potentially
kill their past compatriots, maybe even their relatives. The enmity of the population had therefore to be
directed toward a small section of the German population, namely its government. When Wilson stresses
"we are... the sincere friends of the German people," it implies counterfactually that "we won't kill our sincere
friends, that is, your relatives," a distinction which might have--unrealistically--allayed the fears of Germans
in the United States.
Stalin's distinction between "the finest men and women of Germany" and "the treacherous acts of German
Fascists" would deserve extensive analysis. It cannot plausibly be assumed that he hoped to turn the
Germans against their leadership, especially as he confirmed that they "are enslaved by Hitlerite despots."
Could this passage have been a justification in the eyes of his own people, because it was only two years
earlier that Stalin had concluded the infamous Non-Aggression Pact with Germany? Stalin's government had
secretly trained the budding German military after World War I, despite the severe restrictions on military
forces imposed on the latter. Now this military was invading his country and destroying his own army.
Stalin's specific goals in making a distinction between people and leadership, however, need to be evaluated
from a broader perspective.
This topos might be very important because the differentiation of the people from the government has
become an increasingly prominent theme. It was used extensively by the United States in Vietnam, where
the people were presumably to be "pacified"; and President Bush employed it in the Gulf War, when he
promised to avoid "collateral damage." Although such a distinction had obviously been abandoned in the
fire-bombings and in the atomic bombing of cities in World War II, the rhetoric might, nevertheless, reflect a
moral civilizing process in the value systems acceptable in democracies. While it is well known that during
the Middle Ages murder, rape, and robbery in conquered cities and countries was generally accepted as the
right of the victor (the sacking of Rome in 1527 by the troops of Charles V, the protector of Christianity, is
only the most poignant example), at the moment of victory in World War II the Western Allies were widely
acclaimed for abstaining from these acts.
Hitler and Mussolini faced a somewhat more difficult task in confronting their subjects, as they were clearly
the initiators of warfare. Table 3 focuses on themes employed by Hitler. The first set of themes seems to
have been borrowed from Schonerer, an influential anti-Semite in Vienna at the time Hitler lived there. Hitler
also admired greatly the anti-Semite Karl Lueger, who employed similar topoi. These themes were also part
of the nationalist vocabulary more generally in the later part of the nineteenth century.
Threats and intimidation were most commonly employed against the Jews, but were also employed against
anybody who dared to resist the Nazi goals. While Schonerer could not yet execute these threats in the
Vienna of the Habsburgs (when he attempted it, he ended up in jail and his political career was terminated),
the Nazis had engaged in violent persecution of their opponents even before Hitler had come to power.
Hitler's threats against his own people ("Traitors--nothing but death") were therefore backed by much
preceding brutality.
Any term referring to "steel" or "iron" brought back the memory of "the Iron Chancellor," Bismarck, who had
achieved the union of the German Reich through "Blut und Eisen" (blood and iron). Hitler combines allusions
to Bismarck with a direct reference to Frederick "the Great," the real founder of Prussian power. These
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allusions to famous and victorious leaders entailed both threats for Germany's neighbors and promises of
victory for her citizens.
The next set of themes, Hitler's adoption of the sacrificial script of the Christian mass, might appear
somewhat surprising. The theme predominates in the frequent use of the term "sacrifice" (Opfer), a word
that resonates with Messopfer (the mass). Hitler also promises personal sacrifices, even of his life, like
Jesus "the Savior" (Heiland). "Heilig" (sacred), "der Heiland" (the Savior), and "das Heil der Seele" (the
salvation of the soul), all common religious terms, resonate in "Heil Hitler" and "Sieg Heil." In "Hitler's Muse,"
Jay Baird demonstrated from the poetry of Moeller that the recourse to the concept of the "sacred" was
common in German war poetry, and in Propaganda Technique in the World War, Harold Laswell provided
examples from other cultures.(n12) In employing this sacral language, the speakers allude to the weekly
experience of the population in Sunday sermons and therewith to something highly valued! Resurrection
(Wiederauferstheung) is obviously central in Christian beliefs (it appears also in Mussolini's speech) and the
Glaubensbekenntnis (credo) is part of every mass. In a broader perspective, it is also worthwhile to
remember the pageant at the Nurnberg Party Congress and especially Hitler's arrival by airplane out of white
clouds, like an angel coming down from the heavens, as recorded in Leni Riefenstahl's (1936) film, Triumph
of the Will.
Considering the rhetorical structure of his speech, it is surprising that Hitler employs the term "sacrifice" in a
concentrated manner toward the end. He differs in this respect from all the other leaders, who emphasized
victory, freedom, and other rewards, that is, "the light at the end of the tunnel," toward the conclusions of
their speeches. Added to this contrast is Hitler's rather condensed use of the term "Not" (privation, suffering,
want, peril) in the last two paragraphs of his speech. The suffering of Christ and his victory over it could be
alluded to here ("jeder Not Herr werden, keine Not ihn mehr zu zwingen vermag, die Not meistern" [to
overcome all peril, no suffering can force him, to master privations]). Yet, before this passage, Hitler partly
denies the threat of privations ("Wenn jemand aber glaubt, das wir vielleicht einer schweren Zeit
entgegengehen" [If, however, somebody thinks that we will encounter difficult times ....]) and argues through
the example of Frederick the Great how he too won after extensive suffering. A triad is therefore established:
Christ's suffering and his resurrection; Frederick the Great's struggles and victory; and Hitler's war and the
presumed--by analogy--victory. "Sieg Heil" are the last words in Hitler's speech.
In conclusion, considering the well-accepted terminology and principles deriving from Christian faith, it is little
wonder that the audience would not have felt justified in questioning or even rejecting these admonitions of
Hitler. It is, of course, well known that the Nazis also fell back on pagan religion and festivals and relied on
Germanic heroes as models in their propaganda. The SS was often likened to a religious order (like the
Crusading Orders), whose heroes were dedicated to sacrifice and who were pure, faithful to death, and
without weakness. The last words in Hitler's speech preceding "Sieg Heil," emphasizing that "our wills can
master every situation" and "our will power and our steel would be able to overcome any suffering," relate to
an additional conceptual frame that is alluded to by these specific words: Nietzsche's famous "will to power"
resonates in this terminology of Hitler, as it did in the title of the then-recent film Triumph of the Will.
That Hitler ends both these last paragraphs with an emphasis on "Not" is, however, still somewhat puzzling.
It might be related to the scene reported by Speer in his memoirs about an event on August 23, 1939, on the
Untersberg. While Hitler and others stood on the terrace of the Berghof, northern lights of unusual intensity
reddened the sky and bathed the faces and hands of the onlookers. Abruptly Hitler turned to one of his
adjutants and said: "Looks like a great deal of blood. This time we won't bring it off without violence."(n13)
Only a few days before the invasion of Poland, was Hitler afraid? "Not" (privations) was certainly vividly
remembered by all adult Germans from World War I and from the decades of suffering that followed.
Both Hitler and Mussolini also emphasize philosophical themes of the nineteenth century. This is the third
set of themes in Table 3. The Hegelian principle that the state stands in importance far above the individual,
is found in Hitler's assertion: "It is totally unimportant whether we live, but it is essential that Germany lives."
This was a central emphasis of the Nazi authoritarian system and was imposed on the population.
"Pflicht" (duty) and its fulfillment was a major theme in German philosophy since Kant, and the
"kategorischer Imperativ" (categorical imperative) was also part of the everyday vocabulary of the
bourgeoisie.
Whether common nationalist themes, religious scripts, or philosophical topoi, Hitler's speech, and Nazi
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propaganda more generally, combined them into a potent witches' brew, employing three levels of
persuasion. Threats and promises might have played best to the frustrated rabble who had suffered most
under earlier deprivations; religious themes appealed to the bourgeoisie and the pious lower classes; and
Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche resonated with the intellectuals. Nationalism probably found a positive echo in all
three, going back to the revolts against the Napoleonic occupation. As attention and memory have to be
selective when listening to lengthy speeches, each listener could retain those themes meaningful for him or
her.
Mussolini's speech contains several parallels to Hitler's. This speech was given in June 1940, almost a year
after Hitler's, so Mussolini could have copied some of Hitler's themes. Yet the specific formulations are
clearly Mussolini's own, and are adjusted to the specific Italian value system of the time. The idiosyncracies
refer mainly to topoi and values from ancient Rome, as seen in Table 4. Mussolini had employed very similar
topoi in 1914, when he agitated for entry into World War I. Also, the fasces were directly copied from ancient
Roman customs. Mussolini therefore emphasized a Third Reich, after the ancient Roman and the Medieval
one.
The allusions pertain not only to general themes but even to specific expressions. Mussolini exhorts his
listeners toward the end of his speech with "Popolo italiano! Corri alle armi," while "Arma virumque cano" (Of
arms and the man I sing) is the proverbial introduction of Vergil's Aeneid. "Corri . . . armi" and "Arma . . .
cano" reflect a poetic/rhetorical chiasmus, two phrases with reverse sequence of words, in addition to the
alliteration (corri/cano) and the assonance of the two o-vowels. Two sentences before this concluding
sentence of Mussolini's can be found another reminder of the first lines of the Aeneid: While Vergil traced
the travels of his hero, Aeneas, "from Troy... to Italy," from east to west, Mussolini sees his victory message
"winging from the Alps (Italy) to the Indian Ocean," reversing the direction of Aeneas' course and proceeding
even further with his recent conquest of Ethiopia. With "legioni" and "imperio" in the beginning of Mussolini's
speech and the resonance to Vergil's "arma virumque cano" in the last sentence, memories of the ancient
Roman Empire frame the speech.
Whereas most of the allusions to themes of antiquity do not need explanation, it might deserve emphasis
that Mussolini ends his speech emphasizing victory (vincere, vinceremos). This contrasts with Hitler's
emphasis on Not or "Opfer," as discussed above. In Mussolini's depiction of the future, suffering is barely
alluded to, while victory and "peace with justice... for the world" are emphasized as grand rewards, "peace
with justice" being an age-old wish-dream of socialism.
Mussolini, a former socialist, refers to socialist principles with the widely used image of "broken chains,"
symbolizing freedom from oppression. "Poor people laboring against starvers" refers to another common
socialist theme, justifying his decision for war.
Even more than Hitler, Mussolini harks back to philosophers from the nineteenth century: Kant, Hegel, and
Marx. Especially his reference to the upcoming conflict as "a phase in the logical development of the
revolution" reflects Hegelian and Marxian historicism. As the two most outstanding living Italian philosophers
(Croce during the early period, Gentile until his death) were sympathizers of Mussolini, and as Croce was an
important Hegelian, these allusions could provide justification in the eyes of intellectuals. The same applies
to the Kantian "categorical and obligatory order." With these three themes, Mussolini also aimed his speech
at all layers of society: the intellectuals with philosophy, the educated middle classes with all allusions to the
ancient Roman Empire, the lower classes with socialist themes, and all together with promises of victory and
lasting rewards.
DISCUSSION
Leaders of the twentieth century can make life-and-death decisions for many millions without giving those
who will be the main sufferers from war a chance to have their wishes known. World War II was started
despite profound war-weariness in all countries and despite strong American isolationism. A few notable
instances indicate European attitudes. William Shirer, observing the Germans in late August 1939,
wondered, "How can a country go into a major war with a population so dead against it?"(n14) Chamberlain
and Daladier were accorded triumphal receptions in England and France, respectively, when they returned
from Munich bringing "peace in our time." The years of appeasement from 1936 to 1939 and the German
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military's plan to remove Hitler from power in 1938 because he provoked extraordinary war risks are the
strongest evidence for war-weariness on both sides. Yet, despite their desire for peace, neither the peoples
of Europe nor those of the United States fought the autocracy of their leaders when the latter initiated war.
This almost imperial autocracy might be most obvious in the cases of Wilson, Hitler, and Roosevelt, who had
other options readily available.(n15) (Hitler is set intentionally between the two American presidents to show
that form of government does not seem to make a difference in the exclusion of citizens from this life-anddeath decision.) None of the leaders gave their peoples any voice through a referendum or vote; despite
strong voices arguing against war, the leaders made the decision autocratically--as President Clinton still
does with his repeated attacks on Iraq.
On the other hand, as the cases of Chamberlain or Daladier show, leaders themselves can feel quite
helpless in preventing the outbreaks of war, even if they had tried for a long time to respect the warweariness of their citizens. And all leaders tried to evoke the impression that they had no choice but to lead
their peoples into war. Some might even have believed it. This calamitous combination of real and
rhetorically emphasized helplessness of all layers of society might explain much of mankind's fatalistic
acceptance of war as an unavoidable, natural- or God-ordained event.
In addition to the leaders' conveying their expectance of national compliance, these analyses suggest
several additional functions for the speeches. Carson is close to the mark when he compares the leader
giving his speech with "a high priest in a ritual."(n16) One should add, "in a ritual of sacrifice." The
similarities surveyed in Table 1 indicate how this "high priest" intones formulas that are presumed
necessary, almost completely independent of speaker, of form of government, or of occasion. They confirm
Ivie's conclusion that "an enduring, relatively uniform vocabulary of motives for war" exists.(n17) In Ivie's
words, it entails aggression versus defense, rational action versus irrational enemies and diabolism, and
universalization of the threat. It is impressive to see how closely the despised Hitler resembles the admired,
idealistic Wilson, or the attacker Mussolini resembles the defender Daladier in the choice of themes. Leaders
produce "the rhetoric of victimage," of a wronged victim who is forced to sacrifice himself for a higher and
noble cause. Judeo-Christian religion provides an almost ideal mental basis for this ritualistic
pronouncement, as it is a religion both of sacrifice and of fighting and killing. The former is exemplified in the
sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and the latter in the Jahvev of the Old Testament or "the soldiers of Christ" from the
Crusades to the Opus Dei of the twentieth century. Getting killed as sacrificial lambs or martyrs is an intrinsic
part of this warrior mentality. Relying on a common basic ideology and employing the language of legitimate
motives, "belligerence could be expected to receive the sanction of the community."(n18)
To describe oneself as a victim, of course, one needs a villain. This is the opponent who is declared to have
unreasonably insisted on warfare. Again the similarities between Hitler and Mussolini, the clear-cut
attackers, and the leaders of the other nations, who had more justification to blame an attacker, are striking.
Yet the predominance of the denial-blame theme might be somewhat reassuring, as it indicates that leaders
no longer dare to brag about aggression and conquest--with the slight exception of Mussolini. This suggests
at least a change in rhetoric and probably also in mentality as compared to earlier eras up to Karl XII of
Sweden (1682-1718), Frederick II of Prussia (1712-1786), and Napoleon (1769-1821), when warfare meant
fame and "greatness" and did not need any excuse.
Although the war declarations present the population with faits accomplis, the common rhetorical opposition
between the evil and savage opponent and the self-sacrificing leader and his followers could fulfill an
additional psychological function. As the people will have to undergo much suffering and many deprivations,
this contrast provides them with a fully developed schema as to whom to blame, that is, against whom to
turn their aggression. It thereby establishes the basis for the intensive propaganda campaigns throughout
the war vilifying the opponent.(n19) That leaders might have further motives, such as historical justification
or the persuasion of neutrals, is not denied when emphasizing these themes.
A very basic function of danger and war is that of unifying those threatened. Unity, if possible with a large
number of allies or almost the entire world, also provides a sense of (partly false) assurance: "We are so
powerful, we will win easily." While the theme of unity is found in all speeches, it appears that the less unity
can be taken for granted, the more it is emphasized in the speeches. Daladier, remembering the serious
mutinies and revolts in the French army around 1916, stressed this theme. Wilson's threats were expressed
both against the twenty to thirty million U.S. citizens and nationals of German descent and against the
extensive resistance to war, which was continued by pacifists even after the United States became actively
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involved. And Hitler's direct threat of "death for traitors" has to be seen not only in the light of the preceding
violent conflicts between his followers and the communists but also against the strong aversion to war
predominant in Germany in 1939.(n20)
Another almost universal strategy of persuasion is the presentation of a false future-time perspective. With
the exception of Hitler, all speakers downplay the suffering of war, either by employing euphemisms or
through omissions. Not only is the denial by individual soldiers of the probability of death or injury well
known, allowing them psychologically to face almost certain death, but the leaders do all in their power to
intensify such distortions. Simultaneously they paint an overly glorious picture of the outcome. For example,
Mussolini promises "to give peace with justice to Italy, to Europe, and to the world." Wilson fought "the war to
end all wars." Even Hitler dared to assert after the invasion of Poland that "all of Europe experiences a new
happiness of peace." The war-ennobling and enabling functions of these distortions of the future deserve
further analysis, because they suggest that the popular lack of resistance might be based on considerable
self-deception. Vivid, realistic information might counteract these distortions. This principle is well known to
the military, as evident from the strict censorship of all reports from the battlefield, removing all evidence of
death and mutilation. When realistic information became available during the Vietnam war, it resulted in
increased war resistance in educated draftees, that is, in those with a better developed future-time
perspective.
Hitler and Mussolini, who were quite unambiguously the aggressors, differ from the rest of the speakers by
dwelling on history and mythology. Whether it is Mussolini harking back to the ancient Roman empire or
Hitler's reference to Frederick the Great as a model, famous and rewarding historical examples are evoked.
In this manner, the announced wars of conquest appear acceptable, even if the word "conquest" is not
acceptable any more. The mythological theme in Hitler's case is the Christian mass, with the sacrifice theme
that is closely reflected in the later section of his speech. In Mussolini's case, it is the presumed
decisiveness of an Aeneas and Caesar ("burned ships behind us," "the die is cast") and thereby the "winged
victory" theme, resulting in the "Pax Romana."
The weaker the justification and logical argument of the leader, the more he had to distract his audience
from logical analysis and attempt to arouse strong, emotionally laden connotations of greatness and victory
or, as in Hitler speech, of hallowed sacrifice for the good of the great nation. Content analyses of historically
important speeches need therefore to relate the contents to the prevalent mentalities of the audiences. One
could label the resulting approach a "resonance analysis," suggesting that beliefs, emotions, and
vulnerabilities, reflected in the culture of the audiences, need to be considered in evaluating leaders'
speeches.
To return to Maistre's question which introduces this essay, the fact that war-weary people had to be
presented with a fait accompli suggests that his emphasis on eagerness might not apply any more in the late
twentieth century, certainly not to all social groups and ideological orientations, as Moerk has explained in
"Socialism and Pacifism."(n21) With the possible exception of Italy and Mussolini (who waited to enter the
war until he thought a German victory assured), it is well documented historically that minimal eagerness for
war and strong aversion against it existed in the belligerent countries. This sentiment is reflected in the
threats uttered by some speakers against potential resisters and in the presentation by all of them of faits
accomplis based on dramatic casus belli. Yet despite this predominant war-weariness, some seventy million
perished in both wars--after casus belli and rousing speeches had led them down cul-de-sacs ending in
death.
NOTES
(n1.) Peter Gay, The Cultivation of Hatred (New York: Norton, 1993); Walter Karp, The Politics of War (New
York: Harper and Row, 1979).
(n2.) Herbert L. Carson, "War Requested: Wilson and Roosevelt," Central States Speech Journal 10 (1958):
28-32.
(n3.) Robert L. Ivie, "Presidential Motives for War," Quarterly Journal of Speech 60 (1974): 337-45.
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(n4.) James Benjamin, "Rhetoric and the Performative Act of Declaring War," Presidential Studies Quarterly
32 (1991): 73-84.
(n5.) Ivie, "Presidential Motives"; Robert Ivie, "Imagery of Savagery in American Justifications for War,"
Communication Monographs 47 (1980): 279-94; Ronald Hatzenbuchler and Robert L. Ivie, Congress
Declares War: Rhetoric, Leadership, and Partisanship in the Early Republic (Kent, Ohio: Kent State
University Press, 1993).
(n6.) Karlyn K. Campbell and Kathleen H. Jamieson, Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the
Genres of Governance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
(n7.) Denise M. Botsdorff, The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis (Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 1994); Kathleen H. Jamieson and David Birdsall, Presidential Debates: The Challenge of
Creating an Informed Electorate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Roderick Hart, The Sound of
Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
(n8.) Ivie, "Imagery of Savagery," 280, 281.
(n9.) Ernst L. Moerk, "Reward and Punishment as Causal Factors in War," Peace & Change 19 (1994): 25175.
(n10.) William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 1939-1941: The Rise of the Third Reich (1941; reprint, New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1997).
(n11.) Statistical Abstract of the United States 1919 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1920).
(n12.) Jay Baird, "Hitler's Muse: The Political Aesthetics of the Poet and Playwright Eberhard Wolfgang
Moeller," German Studies Review 17 (1994): 269-85; Harold Laswell, Propaganda Technique in the World
War (New York: Peter Smith, 1938).
(n13.) Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 168.
(n14.) Shirer, Berlin Diary, 98
(n15.) William Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor: The Making of the Second World War (London: Edward Arnold,
1985); Karp, The Politics of War; Frhr. von Richthofen Bolko, Kriegsschuld 1939-1941, die Schuld der
anderen (Vaterstettn, Germany: Arndt-Verlag, 1968-70).
(n16.) Carson, "War Requested," 28.
(n17.) Ivie, "Presidential Motives," 340.
(n18.) Hatzenbuchler and Ivie, Congress Declares War, 39.
(n19.) Sam Keene, Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination (New York: Harper and Row,
1986).
(n20.) Erhard Kloss, ed., Reden des Fuhrers (Munich: dtv, 1967).
(n21.) Ernst L. Moerk, "Socialism and Pacifism: Historical Relations, Value Homologies, and Implications of
Recent Political Developments, or the Return of History," Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology
3 (1977): 59-79.
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TABLE 1 Similarities and Uniformities
A Blame/justification
1. Obvious when invaded
Roosevelt:
"The attack on Pearl Harbor can be repeated.., along both our coast lines and against all the rest of the
hemisphere." Stalin: "The enemy continues to push forward"; "Grave danger hangs over our country."
Poincare:
"France has just been the object of a violent and premeditated attack"; "Our enemies will meet on their path
our valiant covering troops."
2. Special emphasis on grievances of the attacker (Mussolini, Hitler)
Franz Josef:
"A series of murderous plots.., a conspiracy.., was initiated and directed by Serbia."
Wilhelm II: "In the midst of peace the world attacks us."
Hitler:
"... with increased terrorism and pressure.., with a steady campaign of strangulation.., first economic and
political, and, in recent weeks, military" (in reference to Poland's actions in Danzig).
Mussolini:
"We take the field against the plutocratic and reactionary democracies who always have blocked the march
and frequently plotted against the existence of the Italian people."
3. Having tried to prevent war
Wilhelm II:
"It has been my zealous endeavor.., to preserve peace to the world."
Daladier:
"Even yesterday we were still trying to unite all the forces of good-will in order to avoid hostilities."
Hitler:
"I attempted.., to achieve alteration of this unbearable situation by peaceful proposals and revision."
Mussolini:
"The entire world is witness that the Italy of Fascism has done everything humanly possible to avoid the
tempest that envelopes Europe."
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B Unification: We/us = nation
1. We/our nation against the common foe
Franz Josef:
"I trust my people's.., sincerity and fidelity.., ready for the greatest sacrifices .... "
Wilson:
"We must.., our motive.., we have seen.., we are at the beginning ... and we shall fight for the things which
we have always carried nearest our hearts" [or] "to such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes,
every thing that we are and everything that we have."
Stalin:
"Above all it is essential that our people, the Soviet people, should understand the full immensity of the
danger that threatens our country."
Roosevelt:
"We are now in this war. We are all in it."
Daladier:
"It is not alone a question of our country's honor"; "to the union all Frenchmen reply"; "our duty is to finish
with enterprises of aggression and violence."
2. The nation is or must be united with other nations or all humanity
Wilhelm II:
"The enemy will not tolerate that we support our ally with unshaken loyalty."
Wilson:
"We are but one of the champions of mankind."
Stalin:
"In this war of liberation we shall not be alone .... It will be a united front of peoples standing for freedom and
against... Hitler's Fascist armies."
George:
"And it comes today to us all, in the form of the glow and thrill of a great movement for liberty, that impels
millions throughout Europe to the same noble end."
Poincare:
"And already from every part of the civilized world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her [France]."
C Understatement of pain/suffering vs. emphasis on glorious outcome
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1. Understatement through euphemisms
Roosevelt:
"Our forces.., are taking punishment."
Poincare:
"At the hour when the struggle is beginning."
Daladier:
"And later when we should have to accept the struggle."
2. Use of religious connotations: "sacrifice"
George:
"... and clad in glittering white, the great pinnacle of sacrifice pointing like a rugged finger to Heaven."
Stalin:
"The Red Army and the Red Navy are self-sacrificingly disputing every inch of Soviet soil."
Wilson:
"They are.., many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us."
Daladier:
"They are pacific men [French soldiers] but determined to make all sacrifices to defend the dignity and
freedom of France"; "and all those who have accepted the supreme sacrifice."
Mussolini:
"If today we have decided to take the risks and sacrifices of war."
3. Emphasis on glorious outcome and delayed future rewards
George:
"There is something infinitely greater and more enduring which is emerging already out of the great conflict-a new patriotism, richer, nobler, and more exalted than the old."
Wilson:
"We shall fight.., for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a
concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."
Mussolini:
"And we will conquer in order, finally, to give a new world of peace with justice to Italy, to Europe and to the
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universe."
TABLE 2 Differences/Contextual Influences
A Hitler, Stalin, and Wilson threatened punishment of traitorous citizens
Hitler:
"Whoever believes himself able.., to withstand this national command will fall. Traitors can expect nothing
but death."
Stalin:
"We must wage a ruthless fight against all disorganizers of the rear, deserters, panic-mongers, rumormongers .... all who by their panic-mongering and cowardice hinder the work of defense, no matter who they
are, must be immediately hauled before a military tribunal."
Wilson:
"If there should be disloyalty [among German Americans], it will be dealt with a firm hand of stern
repression."
B Fait accompli vs. reaction vs. pretend choice
1. Aggressors (autocratic governments) present war as fait accompli
Mussolini: "The hour destined by fate is sounding for us"; "a declaration of war has already been handed to
the Ambassadors of Great Britain and France." "We are taking up arms."
Hitler:
"I decided last night to communicate also to the British government that I could not find any inclination on the
part of the Polish government to enter with us into any really serious conversation. Therewith, an attempt at
mediation had failed"; "I will wage this fight--no matter against whom--until the security of the Reich and its
rights is achieved."
2. Defenders present governments as having had no choice
Wilhelm II:
"We shall defend ourselves to the last breath."
Daladier:
"At the moment when it could be hoped that these constantly renewed efforts [for peace] were going to be
crowned with success, Germany brutally reduced them to nothing." "Today the government has ordered
general mobilization"; "France and Britain cannot stand by and witness the destruction of a friendly people
which foreshadows other violent attacks."
George:
"We could not have avoided the present war without national dishonor."
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Roosevelt:
"Remember always that Germany and Italy... consider themselves at war with the United States at this
moment."
3. The decision already made is disguised as free choice still to be made
Wilson:
"Each nation must decide for itself... The choice we make for ourselves must be made with..."; "There is one
choice we cannot make.., we will not choose the path of submission."
C Daladier and Hitler comment on the army reflecting prior problems
Daladier:
"The example of dignity and courage which they [French soldiers] have set before the world." "Every one is
ready to do his duty with calm courage"; "the whole nation has answered the call with grave and resolute
calm."
Hitler:
"I have now labored over six years on construction of the German armed forces.., it today is the best
equipped and far above comparison with the forces of 1914"; "I want to assure the entire world that
November, 1918, will never again be repeated in German history."
D Differentiation of the enemy government from its people
Wilson:
"[We] fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples
included." "We are... the sincere friends of the German people... we have borne with their present
government through all these bitter months because of that friendship."
Stalin:
"All the finest men and women of Germany condemn the treacherous acts of German Fascists." "The aim ...
is not only the elimination of the danger.., but also to aid all European peoples who are groaning under the
yoke of German Fascism.... We shall not be alone. In this great war we shall have loyal allies ... including the
German people who are enslaved by Hitlerite despots."
TABLE 3 Selected Features of Hitler's Speech
Legend for Chart:
A - Sources and Parallels
B - Hitler's Speech
A
B
A Themes borrowed from Schonerer and nationalist ideology
Threats, insults, intimations of opponents as traitors
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"Whoever believes himself able...to withstand
this national command will fall. Traitors can
expect nothing but death."
Promises to clean up with an "iron fist"
"German steel will master any peril; German
women...with iron discipline...."
Frederick the Great of Prussia as a nationalist model
"... a Prussian king was successful after three
battles because he had a heart strong in its
faith .... "
B Religious themes
The selfless, self-sacrificing leader giving his own life
"I myself am today ready... to make any
personal sacrifice. I am ready at any time to
stake my life for my people and Germany."
Catholic symbols and worldviews
5 times "sacrifice" = "Opfer" cf. "Messopfer"
Easter
Wiederauferstheung (resurrection)
Credo in mass
Glaubensbekenntnis
Supreme trials, sacred obligations
"The most sacred and dearest coat..."
Jesus = "Heiland" (Savior)
Sieg Heil (Heil Hitler)
C Incorporation of nineteenth-century philosophy
Kant's "categorical imperative"
3 times "duty" = "Pflicht"
Hegel's primacy of the state
"An old fundamental principle: It is totally
unimportant whether we live, but it is essential
that Germany lives."
Table 4 Selected Features of Mussolini's Speech
Legend for Chart:
A - Source
B - Mussolini
A
B
A Direct quotations for ancient Roman sources
Roman Army
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"legions"
Caesar at the Rubicon
"the die is cast"
Vergil, Aeneid
"burned the ships behind us"
Common phrase
"solemnly declare"
Roman Empire
"Empire arisen a third time"
Pax Romana
"peace with justice to Italy, to Europe and to the world"
B Emphasis on socialist principles
Labor conflicts
"It is the conflict of poor, numerous peoples who labor
against starvers who ferociously cling to a monopoly of
riches and all gold on earth."
Freedom/revolution
broken chains
C Incorporation of nineteenth-century philosophy
Kant (categorical impressive)
"only one order categorical and obligatory for everyone"
Hegel (the stagewise evolution of the world spirit)
"a phase of the logical development of our evolution"
Hegel, Marx (dialectics)
conflict (often used), e.g., "a conflict between two ages,
two ideas"
D Terms resonating with ancient Roman history
strong, proud, compact (cf. with last line, the trinity:
tenacity, courage, valor re: Italian people)...wings enflamed
hearts (e.g., Hermes the winged messenger of Zeus, winged Nike
of Samothrace, the winged words--Homer).
~~~~~~~~
By Ernst L. Moerk and Faith Pincus
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