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From Universalism to Managerial Coordination
Major Power Regulation of the Use of Force
Konstantinos Travlos
Ozyegin University
Cooperation among major powers in order to regulate an aspect of international relations has been
central to questions of global governance. In peace science the focus has been on the efficacy of
major power regulation of the use of force. The hope is that the study of regulation’s success or
failure on one aspect of international relations may give guidelines for regulation of other aspects,
like climate change. However, fruitful study requires variables that can capture the quality of major
power regulation of the use of force. I argue that Peter Wallensteen’s “universalism-particularism”
system level variable-concept is one of the few that captures the quality of major power regulation of
the use of force. However, it suffers from issues that limit its potential contribution to the study of
governance. For that reason it is updated via the concept of managerial coordination, and the
measurement instrument scale of major power managerial coordination intensity (MPMCI). This
improves on the original variable on granularity, replicability, and an expanded temporal range. I
show that puzzling findings concerning minor power conflict from prior analyses were artifacts of
operationalization. Using MPMCI I find that cooperation is associated with decrease also in minor
power conflict.
Can states, especially the major powers coordinate at the level of the system to regulate the use
of violent force in order to foster peace? Could such regulation and its synergies explain the decrease
in the incidence of war that is debated in the field (The Forum: The Decline of War, 2013)? Can
successful regulation of the use of force give us insights on regulating other international issues, like
climate change? To answer these questions we must first have a variable that captures the variation in
the quality of major power coordination to regulate the distribution of the use of force in the
international system. To evaluate the efficacy of such regulatory regimes, we need to be able to
“measure” how major powers regulate who can use force, for what purpose, and at what intensity.
I argue that to date the only variable to capture this element of global governance is
Wallensteen’s “universalism-particularism” concept (1984). Because of this it is necessary to address
several issues with the extant operationalization of the concept, the binary “universalismparticularism” variable. These issues refer to granularity, replicability, and temporal domain, and limit
the contribution it can make to the study of peace.
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Wallensteen argued that “universalism” existed when the major powers eschewed the
particular advantages of unilateral attempts to resolve international issues, and instead endeavored to
coordinate with the other major powers in order to create resolution that would have universal major
power support. Such policies should be associated with a decrease in the use of force in the
international system. Their lack, termed “particularism”, on the other hand should be associated with
an increase in the use of force.
In this manuscript I update and enrich “universalism-particularism” via the concept of
managerial coordination and a measurement instrument tied to, the scale of major power managerial
coordination intensity (MPMCI). This update increases granularity, replicability, and temporal domain
compared to the original operationalization.
To provide support for a progressive shift from “universalism-particularism” to managerial
coordination, I use MPMCI to address the puzzling findings of analyses of military activity under
“universalism” and “particularism” by Wallensteen (1984) and Schahczenski (1991). They found that
minor-minor power and minor-major power conflicts, as well as extra-state wars, did not abate during
“universalism”. They attributed this to how “universalism” functions. I argue that the results may be
an artifact of the binary variable used. Using MPMCI in the original 1816-1976 period, I find
indicators that this is indeed the case, as increasing managerial coordination has a pacific association
with interstate conflict onset. The use of MPMCI can produce a revised understanding of the link
between major power regulatory activity and interstate conflict.
“Universalism”, “Particularism”, and their Legacy
Wallensteen’s concept and variable are examples of what Dinna Zinnes calls system level
configurational variables (1980). These are the network of political actions states use for managing the
political consequences of the distribution of structural attributes – the political culture of the system
(Vasquez 1983). Different political cultures can be war or peace inducing, depending on the
alternatives to war they contain. In this case “universalism” is pacific, and “particularism” bellicose.
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Wallensteen evaluated this dichotomy by operationalizing the concepts using expert historical
opinion for the 1816-1976 periods, and analyzing conflict dynamics in the different periods (1984).
He found that periods of “universalism” did indeed see less major power war than periods of
“particularism”. Thanks to these findings the concepts influence several subsequent studies of peace
and conflict (Gochman 1993; Raymond 1997; Vasquez and Gibler 2001; Siverson and Ward 2000;
Chan 2005; Delahunty 2007; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Vasquez and Kang 2012; Valeriano and
Maness 2015). Of more focus are those papers that used Wallensteen’s variable for analysis.
The first empirical evaluation using “universalism” and “particularism” was by Schahczenski
(1991). He argued that Wallensteen was more interested in periodization, rather than explanation with
his concepts. Schahczenski was cautioning against assuming a causal relationship between
“universalism-particularism” and peace and war. He analyzed major power and minor power war and
militarized interstate dispute (MID) frequency, severity, and duration by periods of “universalism” and
“particularism”. His findings largely confirmed those of Wallensteen. “Universalism” tended to be
associated with less major power conflict. “Particularism” had the opposite association. This
pacification did not seem to extend to minor power conflict and extra-state warfare.
Valeriano revisited Wallensteen’s concepts in his critical evaluation of offensive realism
(2001). He found that the likelihood of major power dyads engaging in conflict was lower during
“universalism” compared with “particularism”. Vasquez found indicators that territorial disputes and
arms races were less likely to take place in periods of “universalism” compared to periods of
“particularism” (2001). The concepts were also used in analyses of globalization and armed conflict
(Buhaug and Gleditsch 2006), and asymmetrical territorial conflict (Resnick 2013).
These studies are indicative of the analytical potential of the concept. At the same time they
also bring forth the limitations of the current operationalization, one that has not kept pace with the
increasing sophistication of quantitative conflict analysis. The main culprit is the use of expert
opinion, and the connection between the variables and the mechanisms of the conceptual story.
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Conceptually, Wallensteen’s analysis of what “universalism” entailed in policies was abstract.
He does use the Geopolitk-Realpolitik-Idealpolitk-Kapitalopolitik framework to differentiate behavior
in the two different periods, but this was executed inductively. The analysis sought to show how the
periods were different, instead of why they were different (1984, 252-253). This is why Schahczenski
argued that this is foremost periodization schema, rather than an explanatory concept. This is not
absolutely correct, as Wallensteen does spend space explaining the dynamics of each specific period,
and why there are differences between major power relations and mixed status/minor power relations.
However, these are not represented in the binary variable, nor is there an explanatory story about how
“universalist” policies foster peace.
Empirically, the binary nature of the variable restricts its ability to capture the variation in
major power behavior. Wallensteen does note differences between different periods of “universalism”,
but these are not apparent at the coding stage. The variable lacks the granularity to capture such
variations in “universalism”. The procedure that produced the variable – expert opinion – is not
readily replicable. Furthermore it restricts the temporal domain of any study using the variables to the
1815-1976 period. Expanding it would require further use of expert opinion. These issues limit the
efficacy of the variable.
I address these issues by attempting a progressive shift based on Wallensteen’s “universalismparticularism” concept. To do this I use the concept of major power managerial coordination. This
concept captures a specific empirical form of “universalism”, engagement in consultation,
multilateralism and the avoidance of adversarial coordination. I operationalize the concept with the
Scale of Major Power Managerial Coordination Intensity (MPMCI). This six point instrument captures
variations of “universalism” and “particularism”, providing more gradations than the original binary
variable. I compile it based on extant datasets, which expand the temporal domain to the 1715-2010
period. It is also easily replicable.
The need to update the concepts is made necessary by the singular role that “universalismparticularism” fill for the study of international conflict. It is one of the few system level variables
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trying to capture in a holistic way the quality of major power regulation of the status quo in the
distribution of the use of force. Most other variables that look at the regulation of the use of force at
the system level either focus on the number of intergovernmental organizations, or summitry, or the
particular action of major powers. Few take all of these together like “universalism” and
“particularism”. Furthermore, available system level variables like those of Braumoeller(2012) or
Boix (2011) focus on other aspects of the status-quo than the distribution of the use of force.
This is important. While all dimensions of the status-quo are interrelated the tools that are used
to regulate one aspect may not be applicable to others. And whether the regulation of the distribution
of material capabilities or of political regimes shall be pacific or not is contingent on the regulation of
the distribution of the use of force. Only Wallensteen’s concept tried to touch on this dimension, and it
is for this reason that it is worthwhile updating it via major power managerial coordination.
Major Power Managerial Coordination
The concept of major power coordination begins from considering how antagonistic major
powers foster international conflict (Chiba et al. 2014). They do this in two ways. They can use their
material capabilities to make the use of force by minor powers cheaper. Alliances and arms transfers
are types of this behavior. The other way is to use their prestige and influence to protect minor powers
from the censure of international regimes for their actions. Modern examples of such activity are US
protection of Israel from international censure, and Russian guarantees of the safety of Serbia. These
actions make the use of force cheap, inhibit a clear understanding of the distribution of capabilities,
and strengthen hardliners. These in turn foster conflict.
Antagonistic major powers engage in these policies because minor powers can be allies or
proxies in their adversarial relations. They can also be used as leverage with other major powers. Such
support not only facilitates the use of force, but also creates large networks of linked disputes that
foster the escalation and diffusion of war (Vasquez 1993, Senese and Vasquez 2008). Thus entangled,
major powers find themselves in war due to events that started as minor power disputes.
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These linked conflicts increase the likelihood of complex major power wars (Valeriano and
Vasquez 2010). These massive conflicts may lead to wars that can threaten the dominant domestic
position of major power elites. War may lead to war-weary constituencies overthrowing the
governments that led them into it. It may also fan the fires of social revolution. Wallensteen noted that
most periods of “universalism” were preceded by large scale major power war, often accompanied by
radical regime changes in major powers (1984, 253-255).Thus due to war-weariness or fear of the
radical potential of war, major power elites may come to seek ways to restrict the use of force in
international relations (Jervis 1985, Schroeder 1994, Author 2014). One way to do so is major power
managerial coordination. But what does managerial coordination entail?
For managerial coordination to work as a pacifying factor in international relations the major
powers engaged in it must avoid activities that extend the use of force in the system. Major powers
whose elites are afflicted by aversion to war would need nothing more than bilateral channels in order
to avoid direct confrontation, since the motive for conflict is dampened. Why then managerial
coordination? Because in a system of uncertainty, due to conflict linkages, minor power disputes may
drag these major powers into conflict. There is a lag in foreign policy, and the networks of violence
created by major powers during periods of “particularism” may last well into periods of
“universalism”. Managerial coordination is thus the attempt of the major powers to regulate the use of
force among minor powers and between them and minor powers so as to avoid a diffusion of violence
in their relationships.
To manage the distribution of the use of force in the system, major powers can engage in three
policies. These are consultation, multilateralism, and the avoidance of adversarial coordination.
Consultation is the act of regularized exchange of views and ideas on international issues. The goal is
to decrease the uncertainty inherent in private information, so that powers at least know something
about the preferences of the other powers (Jervis 1985, 75). Refusal to participate is in itself a signal to
those powers that do so, and to the audience of minor powers. At the very least consultation permits
the major powers to engineer the insulation of their affairs from minor power conflicts (Steiner
2004,193).
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Multilateralism is taking consultation to the next step. Here, the goal of discussion is to
coordinate major power activity with the goal of resolving an issue in a manner conducive to the
pacific maintenance of the status-quo among the powers. The goal is to decrease the likelihood of
unilateral activity by major powers, activity that might lead to unforeseen escalation and diffusion
(Jerivs 1985, 71-72, 73-76).
Finally, the major powers must dismantle the adversarial alliances that dominated their
relationships between aversion to war led them to managerial coordination. Avoiding overt adversarial
alliances is a signal to minor powers that they cannot rely of major power adversarial relationships for
succor, and that major power engagement in consultation and multilateralism are robust efforts and not
part of their adversarial relationships. major (Richardson 1993: 228-230; Jervis 1985, 73).
A historical example of consultation is the Vienna Congress System between 1816 and 1848.
Of multilateralism is the Quadruple alliance from 1818 to 1822 after France was made a de-facto
member. Examples of adversarial alliances were the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance. These three
activities increase the ability of the major powers to make the efficient choice in Jervis concert
formation Prisoner’s Dilemma game (1992, 720-721). Combining the three creates a major power
managerial coordination regime which is the highest form of “universalism” possible in an anarchic
international system. The intensity of the engagement of the major powers in combinations of
consultation, multilateralism, and avoidance of adversarial coordination varies. It is this variation that
the scale of major power managerial coordination intensity (MPMCI) tries to capture.
The Scale of Major Power Coordination Intensity (MPMCI)
The main variable of interest in this project is the intensity of collective major power
regulation of the distribution of the use of force in the international system. The instrument attempts to
capture whether major power interaction is characterized by policies in pursuit of antagonism or by
attempts at managerial coordination. It does so by capturing collective major power participation in
consultation, multilateralism and the avoidance of adversarial coordination. The more powers that
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participate the stronger managerial coordination is, fostering “universalism”. The fewer that do so, the
weaker it is, fostering “particularism”.
First we need to operationalize each element of managerial coordination. I operationalize
consultation as the shared membership of the major powers in intergovernmental organizations with a
security mandate, like the UN, or in large congresses that try to resolve international issues by creating
informal regimes and norms, like the Berlin Congresses. I count consultation as existent if at least all
major powers bar one are members. Membership in such regimes, whatever the motives behind it,
tends to lock-in at least some regimes for managing issues within the confines of the status-quo. The
powers essentially project a picture (purposeful or not) of adhering to the constitution of international
relations created by the congress (Randle, 1987). Deviation from this picture will be costly, as the
deviant is likely to be branded a pariah.
I operationalize multilateralism by the shared membership of the major powers in alliances
that do not officially target a non-member major power. Alliances are defined according to the
Alliance Treaty Provision project definition for the post-1815 period and according to Gibler for the
pre-1815 period (1999). I consider multilateralism to exist if at least all major powers bar one are
members. Membership in such an alliance is a powerful indicator of the preference of major powers
for consultation, but also for coordinated action in resolving conflicts. This is because inclusive major
power alliances are hard to create and cost foreign policy freedom. Major power allies are not as easily
ignored as minor power allies. If the goal is just consultation, less restrictive alternative regimes exist.
Consultation and multilateralism are coded for the participation of major powers. Concerning
avoidance of adversarial coordination, I code the failure of the major powers to succeed in this. I do
this because I operationalize adversarial coordination before 1945 by major power membership in
major power alliances that officially target a non-member major power. Since alliances are rare events,
coding their avoidance would produce an overabundance of positives. Instead, I prefer to capture their
failure to avoid adversarial coordination, which is a powerful indicator of “particularism”. I consider
this to be the case if at least one alliance of such a character exists between at least two major powers.
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Alliances are coded by ATOP-Gibler definitions. Such adversarial alliances are clear indicators of
enmity and “particularism”.
I cannot use such alliances as an operationalization in the post-1945 period. This is because
the norm of the illegality of offensive alliances has led to states avoiding overt stipulations of targets
in alliance provisions. The adversarial character is implicit, not explicit, which raises issue of
reliability in using them as indicators of adversarial coordination. This norm holds even for legal
defensive pacts. Consequently, an alternative operational variable is needed after 1945.
This alternative is Linked Strategic Rivalries (Colaresi et al. 2008). Strategic Rivalry is a
condition during which two states exhibit rhetoric and policy activity that indicates mutual perceptions
of threat. It is a weaker identifier of enmity than adversarial alliances due to the lack of the connection
that alliances have between threat and military means. However, it still entails open declarations of
enmity.
The problem is that strategic rivalry can last for a very long time, including multiple centuries.
Not all those periods are characterized by heightened enmity. What is needed is a way to capture
periods of intense adversarial coordination within strategic rivalries. The answer is linked rivalries. In
these cases two states that have the same strategic rival link their rivalries via alliance. While there
may be no overt declarations of hostility, the coordination of the policies of the two states is more
likely to be considered adversarial by their common rival. Consequently, after 1945, I use major power
linked strategic rivalry as the operationalization for adversarial coordination
I consider consultation and multilateralism equal and complementary in effect. When both are
present there is a pacific synergy. Consultation provides alternatives to the use of force for resolving
international issues, and the managerial alliance makes consultation credible. Credible alternatives to
force are a factor for peace in international relations (Vasquez 1993(1997)). Can the pacifying
influence of multilateralism and consultation overcome the conflictual influence of adversarial
coordination (adversarial major power alliances)? By itself, each of them should be overwhelmed by
adversarial coordination. This does not preclude opponents cooperating, but their antagonism will
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always create openings for minor powers to leverage major power enmity into support for their
military adventurism. On the other hand, the combination of the two should be able to exercise a
pacific influence despite adversarial coordination, but one more dampened than when it is absent. The
scale must be able to capture these dynamics.
To capture these dynamics I code in each system year the presence of consultation,
multilateralism, or failure to avoid adversarial coordination. Consultation is coded (1), multilateralism
is coded (1), and failure to avoid adversarial coordination is coded (-1.5). I then annually combine the
scores, which gives me the value of managerial coordination intensity. This way, the combined
influence of consultation and multilateralism will give a positive score even in the face of adversarial
coordination, but in isolation each one will not preclude a negative score in the presence of adversarial
coordination. The combination of the three variables creates a scale of six categories that correspond
to the six possible values of their summation. Categories with higher values represent more intense
major power managerial coordination. The combinations are tabulated in Table 1. Each numerical
category is also given a name, and an exemplary case.
Table 1 Scale of major power coordination intensity (MPMCI).
Intensity of
Coordination
Category Name
Intensity of
Coordination
Category Value
(linear
adjustment)
Managerial Alliance
(Multilateralism)
“Universalist
Regime”
2 (4)=
1
+
1
+
0
1(3)=
1
+
0
+
0
“Managerial
Regulation”
Shared Membership in
International Pacific
Institutions and Regimes
(Consultation)
Adversarial
Alliances
(Adversarial
Coordination)
Example
Early Vienna
Congress
1816-1822
Later Vienna
Congress
1841-1853
1(3)=
0
+
1
+
0
“Bounded
Regulation”
0.5 (2.5)=
1
+
1
+
-1.5
“Regulatory
Indifference”
0 (2)=
0
+
0
+
0
League of
Nations
1922-1934
“Particularist
Regulation”
-0.5 (1.5)=
1
+
0
+
-1.5
-0.5(1.5)=
0
+
1
+
-1.5
Detente Cold
War Period
1971-1989
-1.5 (0.5)=
0
+
0
+
-1.5
“Adversarial
Particularism”
N/A
Main Cold War
Period
1950-1970
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To facilitate statistical work I add a 2 to the final value for each year, so that the scale has a
minimum of 0.5 and a maximum of 4, instead of -1.5 and 2.
The category represented by the highest value of 2, is named “Universalist Regime,” as it is
the strongest instance of Wallensteen’s “universalism”. It represents the major powers engaged in all
three elements of managerial coordination, establishing a regime. The exemplary case is the Vienna
System between 1816 and 1822.
The category represented by value 1 of the scale is named “Managerial Regulation”. During
such periods the major powers are engaged in either consultation or multilateralism, but not in both.
They still avoid adversarial alliances. The exemplary case is the Later Vienna System between 1841
and1853. During this period the alliance system that underpinned the Congress system had atrophied,
but the powers were still engaged in regular consultation.
The category represented by value 0.5 is labeled “Bounded Regulation”. It represents periods
of major power engagement in combined consultation/multilateralism but also of failure to avoid
adversarial coordination. Thus the regulation of the international system is bounded by the
particularistic interests of the major powers. Major power behavior in the 1715-2010 period has not
approximated this category yet.
The category with value 0 is labeled “Regulatory Indifference”. This represents the major
powers not engaging in adversarial alliances, nor collectively in the cooperative elements of
managerial coordination. This does not preclude a small number of major powers trying regulating the
system, but such attempts are those of a minority. The League of Nations period is the anchor case.
The category with value -0.5 is labeled “Particularistic Regulation”. In these periods, the
major powers are engaged in one of the two cooperative elements of managerial coordination, but also
have failed to avoid adversarial alliances. This usually means that any attempts at using regulatory
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mechanisms are in the pursuit of the particularistic goals of the major powers instead of the decrease
of international conflict. It is a period of cooperation among adversaries like the Cold War Détente.
The category with the value of -1.5 is labeled “Adversarial Particularism”. It is the strongest
example of “particularism”; the major powers are exclusively engaged in adversarial coordination. The
early cold war period between 1950 and 1971 is the example of this.
The temporal range of the scale is the 1715-2010 period, restricted due to current data
availability. Major power status for 1816-2010 is taken from the Correlates of War Major Power
dataset (COW Major2011).1 For 1715-1815 I rely on the Levy list of major powers (Gibler 1999).
For 1816-2010 alliance membership is taken from the Alliance Participant dataset of the
Alliance Treaty Obligations Provision project (ATOP.3). I use it to locate major power managerial
alliances, and major power adversarial alliances. There are 3 major power managerial alliances in the
1816-2010 period.2 There are 23 adversarial alliances in the same period.3 For 1715-1815 I coded the
two types of alliances using the data and documentation provided by Gilber (1999, 2008). In this
period there were 12 adversarial alliances and 0 managerial alliances.4
As explained, after 1945 I cannot use adversarial alliances to operationalize adversarial
coordination. Instead I use major power linked strategic rivalries. First, I locate all major power
strategic rivalries after 1945 (Colaresi et al. 2008). There were 7 major power strategic rivalries.5 I
1
Correlates of War Project. 2008. “State System Membership List, v2011.” Online, http://correlatesofwar.org. I make a
significant change. COW lists France as a major power in 1816-1818 and 1871-1873. But that is a fallacy because large areas
of France were occupied during the periods as a result of military defeats. Since COW does not list France as a major power
in 1941-1944, or Germany from 1918 to 1925, both of which faced a similar situation, I see no justification for not doing so
with France in 1816-1818 and 1871-1873.
2
The ATOP id numbers for the managerial alliances are 1035 (The Quadruple Alliance), 1110 (1840 Treaty Concerning
Mehmet Ali) ,2095 (1921 Treaty between the UK, France, Japan, and the United States)
3
The ATOP id numbers for adversarial alliances are 1065,1160, 1165, 1170,1180,1190,1215, 1265,1270, 1295, 1300, 1350,
1365, 2025,2040, 2350,2355,2360, 2395, 2535, 2540,2550,2555. There is one alliance in the ATOP dataset that has explicit
major power targets, has more than one major power member, and is not coded as adversarial. This is the alliance with ATOP
id. 2310. The reason is that the explicit targets (France, Germany) are also members of the alliance. The alliance was a nonaggression treaty with a defensive clause concerning Belgium. It lasted from 1925 to 1937. Three ATOP alliances that have
at least two major power members, and do not have explicit major power targets but are coded as adversarial are the 1856
alliance for guaranteeing the Paris Treaty that ended the Crimean War, which implicitly targets Russia as the only excluded
power (ATOP id. 1195), the 1914 agreement among the entente powers not to sign individual peace treaties with the Central
Powers (ATOP id. 2015), and NATO before 1990.
4
Their Gibler id numbers are 1055,1060,1066,1067,1070,1081,1087,1095,1125,1127,1128,1131
5 Anglo-Russian Rivalry (1778-1956),Soviet-United States Rivalry (1945-1989), Chinese-US rivalry (1949-1972), ChineseSoviet Rivalry (1958-1989), Japan-China Rivalry (1996-2011), China-Untied States Rivalry (1996-2011), and Russia-United
States Rivalry (2007-2011).
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then use the ATOP project to locate major power alliances that link major powers with common rivals
after 1945. There are 15 potential alliances in the post-1945 period.6 Bringing the two sets of
information together we have the following Major Power Linked Strategic Rivalries.
a) 1949-1950, Alliance 3030 (USSR-China) links the Soviet Union-US (1945-1989) and ChinaUS Rivalries (1949-1972).
b) 1950-1972(1980), Alliance 3200 (USSR-China) links the Soviet Union-US (1945-1989) and
China-US Rivalries (1949-1972).
c) (1960)1996-2011, Alliance 3375 (USA-Japan) links the Japan-China (1996-2011), and ChinaUntied States (1996-2011) rivalries.
d) 1949-1956(1989), Alliance 3180 (NATO, US-UK) links the Anglo-Soviet (1945-1956) and
US-Soviet (1945-1989) Rivalries
e) 1962-1964, Alliance 3460 (China-US) links the Chinese-Soviet(1958-1989) and US-Soviet
Rivalries (1945-1989)
The above list indicates the existence of major power linked strategic rivalries in 1949-1972
and 1996-2011.
To operationalize consultation, I use shared major power membership in intergovernmental
pacific or security institutions. This was coded using data from the Multilateral Treaties of Pacific
Settlement (MTOP) dataset v1.4 (Hensel 2001, 2005).7 Only intergovernmental institutions that have a
security mandate and have acted on that security mandate are included. This is because major power
membership in intergovernmental institutions that have no mandate on political-security issues does
not give any signal about their adherence to pacific managerial regimes. Membership in inactive
institutions also provides no signal, as membership is not costly.
I locate active institutions using the lists compiled by Hansen, Mitchell and Nementh (2008)
and Bercovitch and Schneider (2000). This produces a list of 20 active peace institutions in the 18162008 periods, which can be found in the online appendix. I then determine major power membership
using MTOP. A review of the literature does not lead me to believe that the character of these regimes
has changed in the 2008-2010 period.
6
The ATOP Ids of these alliances are 3030, 3055, 3200,3375,2535,2575, 3130, 3180,3260, 3222.,3460, 3470,
3740,3755,3815
7
Available online at http://data.icow.org
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Consultation also includes participation in large international congresses and peace treaties
(like Westphalia in 1648). A major power is considered a member of such an informal institution if it
took part in its inaugurating meeting or in subsequent meetings, and then for a ten year period after the
last meeting. This membership criterion comes from Randle’s argument that membership in
international congresses also is membership in the constitution of regimes created in them (1987:32,
35, 59-61). The ten year rule accounts for the weakening of regimes that lack institutionalized form
due to the passage of time. There were no such IGOs in the 1715-1815 period. The treaties and
congresses that meet the above requirements and the sources of membership information are presented
in the Online Appendix.
Table 2 summarizes the operationalization schema, matching elements of coordination with
variables used and their sources.
Table 2 Operationalizing Managerial Coordination
Element of Managerial
Coordination
Multilateralism
Variable
Temporal Range
Sources
Major Power Managerial
Alliance
1715-1815
Gibler 1999,2010
1816-2010
ATOP
1715-1815
None
1816-2010
Hansen, Mitchell and
Nementh (2008)
;Bercovitch and Schneider
(2000)
1715-1815
None
1816-2010
Various
1715-1815
Gibler 1999,2010
1816-1945
ATOP
1946-2010
ATOP and Colaresi et al.
(2008)
Membership in Active IGOs
Consultation
Membership in Peace
Congresses
Major Power Adversarial
Alliances
Adversarial Coordination
Major Power Linked Strategic
Rivalries
Using the above operationalization I note the following distribution of system years on
MPMCI values in the 1715-2010 period. Major power interaction fell within the category of
“Adversarial Particularism”, the lowest level of intensity in 81 of the 296 systems years in the 1715-
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
15
2010 period.8 It fell within the category of “Particularistic Regulation” in 94 years of the period.9
Major power interaction fit the category of “Regulatory Indifference” in 57 years of the period.10. No
years of “Bounded Regulation” occurred. “Managerial Regulation” occurred in 55 years of the
period.11 “Universalist Regulation”, the highest intensity of major power managerial coordination,
occured in 9 years of the period.12 This distribution is graphically presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Scale of Major Power Coordination in the 1715-2010 period.
Universalism and Managerial Coordination
I argued that the creation of a more granular instrument would permit us to explore the black
boxes of “universalism” and “particularism”, and perhaps explain the findings of Wallensteen and
Schahczenski concerning major-minor and minor-minor conflict. To begin, I mapped MPMCI periods
on the periods of “universalism” and “particularism” that Wallensteen had. The results are in Table 3.
The results indicate the benefits of granularity. Generally speaking the extremes of the scale
“Universalist Regime” and “Adversarial Particularism” map well with “universalism” and
“particularism”. But the behaviors captured by the in-between levels tell a story much different to the
binary original.
8
These are the periods between 1715-1763, 1807-1815, 1859-1866, 1895-1898, 1918, 1935-1939, 1941-1945.
These are the periods between 1833-1839, 1854-1858, 1867-1877, 1882-1894, 1899-1917, 1949-1972, 1996-2010
10
These were 1764-1806, 1922-1934, 1940.
11
These were 1823-1832, 1841-1853, 1878-1881,1919-1920,1946-1948, 1973-1995
12
These were 1816-1822, 1827-1829, 1840, 1921
9
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
16
Table 3 Mapping “universalism” and “particularism” on MPMCI, 1816-1976
MPMCI Category
“Universalist Regime”
Universalism Years
9
Particularism Years
0
“Managerial Regulation”
28
8
“Bounded Regulation”
NA
NA
“Regulatory Indifference”
11
3
“Particularist Regulation”
37
42
“Adversarial Particularism”
1
22
While both “Managerial Regulation” and “Bounded Regulation” see a predominance of years
of “universalism”, both also contain years of “particularism”. The source of Wallensteen’s and
Schahczenski’s minor power conflict findings may reside here. “Particularistic Regulation” is
dominated by year of “particularism”, but also has some years of “universalism”. This complexity is
logical as these categories capture major power activity that tries to balance between adversarial and
managerial coordination. But it is not captured by the original binary variable.
Evaluating Validity: Some indicators
Correlations indicate that each element of MPMCI captures a distinct behavior. The maximum
correlation between two elements is 21%, and covariance is less than 0.10.
External validity is evaluated by a small set of tests using indicators of the use of international
force among the major powers. These are the onset of major power wars and major power rivalries, as
these are behaviors that managerial coordination should inhibit. “Universalist Regime” and
“Managerial Coordination” should not be characterized by major power wars or the onsets of rivalry,
if the explanatory story behind managerial coordination is valid.
I use the Correlates of War data for the 1816-2010 period, and the Levy Great Power War data
for the 1715-1815(1994) , to locate major power war onsets. I use the Klein, Goertz and Diehl
conceptualization to locate major power rivalry onsets in the 1816-2010 period (2006). I then tabulate
onset frequency for each type of violence on the six categories of MPMCI. The results are in Table 4.
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
17
As the results in the table indicate, wars between major powers tend to occur within those categories
of the scale that are characterized by the absence of managerial coordination.
Table 4 MPMCI and War and Rivalry onset
MPMCI Scale
Number of Major
power War
Onsets
0
Percentage
Number of Rivalry
Onsets
Percentage
0%
3
2.5%
“Managerial
Regulation”
0
0%
35
30%
“Bounded Regulation”
NA
NA
NA
NA
“Regulatory
Indifference”
4
19%
5
4%
“Particularistic
Regulation”
5
25%
61
52.5 %
“Adversarial
Particularism”
9
56%
13
11%
Totals
18
100%
117
100%
“Universalist Regime”
Eighty percent of wars take place in periods of “Particularistic Regulation” and “Adversarial
Particularism”. None take place in periods of “Universalist Regime” or “Managerial Regulation”. We
also notice that the vast majority of rivalry onsets, about 60%, take part during system years which are
characterized by a lack of major power engagement in the cooperative elements of managerial
coordination. Increasing managerial coordination does correspond to an unwillingness of the major
powers to use force amongst themselves.
The question to address now is whether the use of MPMCI can lead to new insights which the
old variable obscured. To do this I revisit the analyses done by Wallensteen (1984), and Schahczenski
(1991).
Universalism, Managerial Coordination and Minor Power conflict
The puzzle I hope to resolve was the lack of differentiation between periods of “universalism”
and “particularism” concerning major-minor and minor-minor violent interstate conflict. Wallensteen
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
18
found that “universalist” periods saw less pacific major-minor relationships, (1984:247-249,255).
Schahczenski found further indicators of the continued militancy of all types of international
relationships, with the exception of major-major, irrespective of periods of “universalism” or
“particularism” (1991:306).
Both Wallensteen and Schahczenski posit that major power cooperation is associated with
increased interference in minor power issues and increased extra-systemic adventures (1984, 1991).
The peace among the major powers is bought at the expense of minor powers and polities outside the
system. This echoes past arguments made against the policies of European Congress systems
(Advocate of Peace 1922). However, these results may be revised now.
The findings in Table 3 indicated that at least 37 years coded by Wallensteen as
“universalism” are actually characterized by policies that fit the category “Particularist Regulation” in
MPMCI. This is the second most conflictual category in MPMCI. Also 8 years of “Particularism” fall
in the “Managerial Regulation” category, the second most cooperative category. Thus there are
reasons to argue that the Wallensteen and Schahczenski findings rather than representing policy
choices may be artifacts of the lack of granularity in the original binary variable.
To evaluate this I replicate some of Wallensteen’s and Schahczenski’s 1816-1976 analyses but
using MPMCI categories. The only change is that I used the updated Correlates of War data for war
and dispute information. In Table 5, I focus on the findings Wallensteen reported in Table II
(1984:246). The first two columns are for “universalism” and “particularism”. The rest are MPMCI
categories. The findings indicate that the two most cooperative MPMCI categories see fewer majorminor wars compared to the two least cooperative categories. Indeed the average number of wars per
category behaves as the explanatory story would expect, with the average increasing as managerial
coordination decreases.
When it comes to minor-minor wars “Universalist Regime” experienced none, but
“Managerial Regulation” experienced an average similar to that of “Particularist Regulation”. were
both substantially smaller than the average of “Adversarial Particularism”. Opening the block box of
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
19
“universalism” and “particularism” indicates that the major powers do avoid warfare with minor
powers during periods of intense managerial coordination. It also indicates that the most cooperative
and most adversarial periods differ when it comes to war between the minor powers, but intermediate
categories do not.
Table 5 Replicating Wallensteen, 1816-1976
Universalism
Particularism
“Universalist
Regime”
“Managerial
Regulation”
“Regulatory
Indifference”
“Particularist
Regulation”
“Adversarial
Particularism”
MajorMajor Wars
0
10
0
0
1
8
6
MajorMinor Wars
10
16
0
7
4
25
14
MinorMinor Wars
18
30
0
11
3
23
11
Length
Years
86
74
9
36
14
79
23
0
0.21
0
0
0.07
0.10
0.26
0.11
0.21
0
0.19
0.28
0.31
0.60
0.20
0.40
0
0.30
0.21
0.29
0.47
Average
Major/Majo
r
Average
Major/Mino
r
Average
Minor/Mino
r
In Table 6, I replicate part of the analyses presented by Schahczenski in Table IV (1991:307).
For the sake of brevity, I collapse his specific periods of “universalism” and “particularism” into the
parent categories. I also only focus on conflict frequency. The first two columns contain
Schahczenski’s numbers. We immediately see that the average number of disputes in “universalism”
periods is larger than that of “particularism” periods. This is also the case with Extra-systemic wars.
Table 6 Replicating Schahczenski’s Analysis, 1816-1976
Universalism
Dispute
Frequency
594(6.9)
378(5.1)
“Universalist
Regime”
28(3.1)
Interstate
Wars
25(0.29)
38(0.51)
0(0)
18(0.50)
8(0.57)
56(0.70)
31(1.34)
Major Power
Wars
0(0)
11(0.14)
0(0)
7(0.19)
5(0.35)
33(0.41)
20(0.86)
Extra-Systemic
Wars
33(0.38)
17(0.22)
6(0.66)
22(0.61)
5(0.35)
48(0.60)
11(0.47)
74
9
36
14
79
23
Years
86
period means in parentheses
Particularism
“Managerial
Regulation”
225(6.25)
“Regulatory
Indifference”
132(9.4)
“Particularist
Regulation”
889(11.2)
“Adversarial
Particularism”
257(11.1)
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
20
Once we open the black box we see that the most cooperative MPMCI category, ”Universalist
Regime” is bereft of both interstate and major power wars. As we decrease in coordination intensity
the average numbers per conflict type go up. Still the second most cooperative category, “Managerial
Coordination” experiences a smaller average number of wars compared to the less cooperative
categories. “Adversarial Particularism”, the least cooperative category, is also the most war-prone.
These patterns also hold for dispute frequency. Schahczenski’s findings on this front were driven by
periods of low managerial coordination coded as “universalism” by expert opinion. Instead, as the
major powers increase their engagement in managerial coordination the international system becomes
less likely to experience conflict.
This is not the case with polities outside that system. Extra-systemic wars take place in all
categories of MPMCI. What is more distressing is that the two most cooperative MPMCI categories
do not seem to be any different than the least cooperative when it comes to extra-systemic war
frequency. Indeed they experience more conflicts of this type than the least cooperative category. In
this case both the Wallensteen and Schahczenski findings are independent of operationalization. But
when it comes to conflict within the interstate system, the original findings seem an artifact of
operationalization. Updating “universalism-particularism” via “major power managerial coordination”
can lead to new insights.
Conclusion
Wallensteen’s “universalism” and “particularism” concept provided peace and conflict studies
with one of the few system level variables for capturing the quality of major power regulation of the
use of force in international politics. Limitations of the original concept restricted the usefulness of the
variable to the 1816-1976 period. Because there are no alternative system level variables that capture
what Wallensteen captures, I embarked on enriching and extending the original concepts.
To do this, I focused on a specific set of policies that predominate in periods of
“universalism”, major power managerial coordination. I presented an explanatory story about why the
major powers would engage in managerial coordination, and how they use it to regulate the
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
21
distribution of the use of force in the international system. I then presented a novel measure that
captures the variation in managerial coordination intensity from “universalism” to “particularism” and
situations in between. This is the scale of major power managerial coordination intensity. This
instrument is replicable, has more granularity than the original variable, and can be used in the 17152010 period.
I then used this instrument to resolve a puzzle located by studies using the original binary
variable. This was that periods of “universalism” did not differ from periods of “particularism” when it
came to conflict between minor and major powers, between minor powers, and major power extrasystemic wars. Using MPMCI shows that the original findings on major-minor conflict, and minorminor conflict were artefacts of the binary character of the variable used. When MPMCI is used,
increased managerial coordination is accompanied with decreased conflict within the international
system. The findings on extra-systemic wars on the other hand were similar in both
operationalizations. Using MPMCI did shed new light to old findings.
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Online Appendix
From Universalism to Managerial Coordination
Major Power Regulation of the Use of Force
Table 1 Active International Peace Organizations 1816-2008.
Institution
United Nations
European Union
League of Nations
Central Commission of Navigation on the Rhine
Organization of African Unity (African Union)
Arab League
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
International Court of Justice
Permanent Court of Arbitration
Inter-American Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration
Central American Court of Justice
ODED (Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
Baltic Assembly
Commonwealth and Judicial Council of the Imperial Privy Council
NATO (only from 1990)
OPEC
Islamic Conference Organization ICO
OEEC
Arab Maghreb Union
Organization of American States (OAS)
Life
1946-Present
1958-present
1920-1946
1815-present
1963-present
1945-Present
1922-1946
1946-Present
1899-Present
1929-Present
1907-1918
2001-Present
1994-Present
1931-Present
1949-Present
1961-Pesent
1973-Present
1946-1961
1989-Present
1951-present
Table 2 Informal Peace and Institutions and Congresses 1715-2010.
Institution
Period of activity (in parentheses last
meeting)
The Congress of Europe
The Congress of Panama
Pan-American Meetings
The London Conference
The Berlin System
The Hague System
1815-1858(1848)
1826-1836(1826)
1847-1874 (1864)
1867-1877(1867)
1878-1894(1884)
1899-1917(1907)
Membership info for the Congress of Europe, London Conference and Berlin system is extracted from
the Britannica Encyclopedia 15th edition (1985) and Langer’s The Encyclopedia of World History
(1986). Membership of the Hague System was compiled from the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(www.pca-cpa.org/), and MTOP. Information about the membership of the Pan-American Meetings
and the Congress of Panama was compiled from OAS (http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp). These
congresses are the main great regulatory congresses of the 1715-2010 period which had the ambition
of engendering a system of periodic meetings. I decided to err on the side of completeness and
included even congresses that had no major power members, in order to avoid the issue of replicability
that would come from relying on historical opinion of what counts as a congress.
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
25
Increases in managerial coordination and specific major power action
1763: AUH and FRN terminate alliance id1002
1816: Creation of Quadruple Alliance (AUH, UK, RUS, GMY)
nd
1840: Attempt at managerial alliance during 2 Eastern Crisis id1110 (AUH,GMY,RUS,UK)
1867: London Conference (All major powers)
1878: Berlin Conference(all great powers)
1899: Hague Conferences (All major powers)
1919: League of Nations (All major powers)
1921: Creation of alliance concerning Pacific id2095 (UK,USA,JPN,FRN)
1946: UN (all major powers)
1973: the PRC(China) becomes a UN member
DATA
Linked
MP
Strategic
Rivalry
(post
1945)
Adverserial
Coordination
Managerial
Alliance
Present
Managerial
Alliance
id(number
of major
power
members)
Alliance
Linking
Rivals
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1055
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1
1055
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1720
1
1055
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1721
1
1055
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1722
1
1055
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1723
1
1055
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1724
1
1055
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1725
1
1066
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1726
1
1066
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1727
1
1066
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1728
1
1066
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1729
1
1066
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1730
1
1066
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1731
1
1066
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1732
1
1066
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1733
1
1066
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1734
1
1067
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1735
1
1067
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1736
1
1067
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1737
1
1067
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1738
1
1067
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
Adverserial
Alliance
Present
Adverserial
Alliance
ID(longest
standing)
1715
1
1055
.
1716
1
1055
1717
1
1055
1718
1
1719
year
Major
Power
Shared IGO
Membership
Institution of Joint
Membership
(number of major
power members)
Scale
Sc
Adj
(Sca
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
26
1739
1
1067
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1740
1
1067
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1741
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1742
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1743
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1744
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1745
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1746
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1747
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1748
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1749
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1750
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1751
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1752
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1753
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1754
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1755
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1756
1
1081
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1757
1
1095
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1758
1
1095
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1759
1
1095
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1760
1
1095
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1761
1
1095
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1762
1
1095
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1763
1
1095
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1764
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1765
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1766
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1767
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1768
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1769
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1770
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1771
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1772
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1773
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1774
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1775
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1776
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1777
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1778
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1779
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1780
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1781
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1782
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1783
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1784
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
27
1785
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1786
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1787
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1788
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1789
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1790
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1791
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1792
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1793
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1794
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1795
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1796
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1797
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1798
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1799
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1800
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1801
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1802
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1803
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1804
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1805
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1806
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
0
1807
1
1125
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1808
1
1125
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1809
1
1125
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1810
1
1125
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1811
1
1125
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1812
1
1125
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1813
1
1128
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1814
1
1128
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1815
1
1128
.
.
1.5
0
1005(3)
0
-1.5
1816
0
0
.
.
0
1
1035(5)
1
Vienna System (4)
2
1817
0
0
.
.
0
1
1035(5)
1
Vienna System (4)
2
1818
0
0
.
.
0
1
1035(5)
1
Vienna System (4)
2
1819
0
0
.
.
0
1
1035(5)
1
Vienna System (5)
2
1820
0
0
.
.
0
1
1035(5)
1
Vienna System (5)
2
1821
0
0
.
.
0
1
1035(5)
1
Vienna System (5)
2
1822
0
0
.
.
0
1
1035(5)
1
Vienna System (5)
2
1823
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1824
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1825
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1826
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1827
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1828
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1829
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1830
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
28
1831
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1832
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1833
1
1065
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1834
1
1065
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1835
1
1065
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1836
1
1065
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1837
1
1065
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1838
1
1065
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1839
1
1065
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1840
0
0
.
.
0
1
1
Vienna System (5)
2
1841
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1842
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1843
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1844
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1845
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1846
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1847
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1848
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1849
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1850
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1851
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1852
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1853
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
1
1854
1
1160
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1855
1
1160
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1856
1
1160
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1857
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1858
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Vienna System (5)
-0.5
1859
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1860
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1861
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1862
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1863
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1864
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1865
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1866
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1110(4)
1867
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1868
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1869
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1870
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1871
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1872
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1873
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1874
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
-1.5
London Conference
(6)
London Conference
(6)
London Conference
(6)
London Conference
(6)
London Conference
(5)
London Conference
(5)
London Conference
(5)
London Conference
(6)
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
29
1875
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1876
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1877
1
1195
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
London Conference
(6)
London Conference
(6)
London Conference
(6)
1878
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Berlin System (6)
1
1879
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Berlin System (6)
1
1880
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Berlin System (6)
1
1881
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
Berlin System (6)
1
1882
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (6)
-0.5
1883
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (6)
-0.5
1884
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1885
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1886
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1887
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1888
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1889
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1890
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1891
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1892
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1893
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1894
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
Berlin System (5)
-0.5
1895
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1896
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1897
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
-1.5
1898
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1899
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1900
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1901
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1902
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1903
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1904
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1905
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1906
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1907
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1908
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1909
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1910
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1911
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1912
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1913
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1914
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-1.5
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
30
1915
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1916
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1917
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
1
1918
1
1350
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1919
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
1920
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
1
1921
0
0
.
.
0
1
1922
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1923
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1924
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1925
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1926
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1927
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1928
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1929
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1930
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1931
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1932
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1933
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1934
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1935
1
2350
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1936
1
2360
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1937
1
2360
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1938
1
2360
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1939
1
2360
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1940
0
0
.
.
0
0
0
0
1941
1
2535
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1942
1
2535
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1943
1
2535
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1944
1
2535
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
1945
1
2535
.
.
1.5
0
0
0
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
The Hague
System(8)
League of Nations
(4)
League of Nations
(4)
League of Nations
(4)
League of Nations
(4)
League of Nations
(4)
League of Nations
(4)
League of Nations
(4)
League of Nations
(5)
League of Nations
(5)
League of Nations
(5)
League of Nations
(5)
League of Nations
(5)
League of Nations
(5)
League of Nations
(5)
League of Nations
(5)
League of Nations
(3)
League of Nations
(4)
League of Nations
(4)
League of Nations
(4)
League of Nations
(3)
League of Nations
(3)
League of Nations
(2)
League of Nations
(2)
League of Nations
(2)
League of Nations
(2)
League of Nations
(2)
League of Nations
(2)
League of Nations
(2)
1946
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
1
1947
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
1
1948
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
1
1949
1
3180
1
3030
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1950
1
3180
1
3030
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1951
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
2095(4)
1
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-1.5
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
0
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
31
1952
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1953
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1954
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1955
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1956
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1957
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1958
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1959
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1960
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1961
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1962
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1963
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1964
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1965
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1966
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1967
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1968
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1969
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1970
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(4)
-0.5
1971
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
-0.5
1972
1
3180
1
3200
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
-0.5
1973
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1974
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1975
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1976
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1977
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1978
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1979
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1980
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1981
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1982
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1983
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1984
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1985
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1986
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1987
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1988
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1989
1
3180
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1990
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(5)
1
1991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
1
1992
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
1
1993
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
1
1994
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
1
1995
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
1
1996
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
1997
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
32
1998
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
1999
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2000
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2001
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2002
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2003
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2004
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2005
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2006
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2007
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2008
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2009
0
0
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
2010
1
3180
1
3375
1.5
0
0
1
United Nations(7)
-0.5
DATA TEST
year
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
Scale
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Scale Adjusted
(Scale+2)
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Numberof
Major vs.
Major
COW
Wars
Number
of Major
vs. Minor
COW
Wars
Number of
Minor vs.
Minor COW
Wars
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1
1
1
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
1
1
1
1
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
3
3
3
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
3
3
3
3
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
2
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
33
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-1.5
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
0
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
-1.5
1
1
1
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
1
1
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
0.5
3
3
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
2
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
3
3
3
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
3
3
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
2
2
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
2
1
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
34
Peace Science 2015 Draft(Please do not cite without permission of author)
1975
1976
1
1
3
3
0
0
0
0
1
0
35