Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
Activity One: The “consolidated republic” over a vast extent of territory
Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________
Directions: Read the following documents and complete the questions on the worksheet.
The Federal Farmer (Richard Henry Lee) No. 1, 8 October 1787
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=690&chapter=102313&la
yout=html&Itemid=27
The plan proposed appears to be partly federal, but principally however, calculated ultimately to
make the states one consolidated government.
The first interesting question, therefore suggested, is, how far the states can be consolidated into
one entire government on free principles. In considering this question extensive objects are to be taken
into view, and important changes in the forms of government to be carefully attended to in all their
consequences. The happiness of the people at large must be the great object with every honest
statesman, and he will direct every movement to this point. If we are so situated as a people, as not to be
able to enjoy equal happiness and advantages under one government, the consolidation of the states
cannot be admitted.
There are three different forms of free government under which the United States may exist as
one nation; and now is, perhaps, the time to determine to which we will direct our views. 1. Distinct
republics [or states] connected under a federal head. In this case the respective state governments must
be the principal guardians of the peoples rights, and exclusively regulate their internal police; in them
must rest the balance of government. The congress of the states, or federal head, must consist of
delegates amenable to, and removable by the respective states: This congress must have general
directing powers; powers to require men and monies of the states; to make treaties; peace and war; to
direct the operations of armies, &c. Under this federal modification of government, the powers of
congress would be rather advisory or recommendatory than coercive. 2. We may do away the federal
state governments, and form or consolidate all the states into one entire government, with one executive,
one judiciary, and one legislature, consisting of senators and representatives collected from all parts of
the union: In this case there would be a complete consolidation of the states. 3. We may consolidate the
states as to certain national objects, and leave them severally distinct independent republics, as to
internal police generally. Let the general government consist of an executive, a judiciary, and balanced
legislature, and its powers extend exclusively to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the seas to
commerce, imports, armies, navies, Indian affairs, peace and war, and to a few internal concerns of the
community; to the coin, post offices, weights and measures, a general plan for the militia, to
naturalization, and, perhaps to bankruptcies, leaving the internal police of the community, in other
respects, exclusively to the state governments; as the administration of justice in all causes arising
internally, the laying and collecting of internal taxes, and the forming of the militia according to a
general plan prescribed. In this case there would be a complete consolidation, quoad certain objects
only.
Touching the first, or federal plan, I do not think much can be said in its favor: The sovereignty
of the nation, without coercive and efficient powers to collect the strength of it, cannot always be
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
depended on to answer the purposes of government; and in a congress of representatives of foreign
states, there must necessarily be an unreasonable mixture of powers in the same hands.
As to the second, or complete consolidating plan, it deserves to be carefully considered at this
time by every American: If it be impracticable, it is a fatal error to model our governments, directing our
views ultimately to it.
The third plan, or partial consolidation, is, in my opinion, the only one that can secure the
freedom and happiness of this people. I once had some general ideas that the second plan was
practicable, but from long attention, and the proceedings of the convention, I am fully satisfied, that this
third plan is the only one we can with safety and propriety proceed upon. Making this the standard to
point out, with candor and fairness, the parts of the new constitution which appear to be improper, is my
object. The convention appears to have proposed the partial consolidation evidently with a view to
collect all powers ultimately, in the United States into one entire government; and from its views in this
respect, and from the tenacity of the small states to have an equal vote in the senate, probably originated
the greatest defects in the proposed plan.
Independent of the opinions of many great authors, that a free elective government cannot be
extended over large territories, a few reflections must evince, that one government and general
legislation alone never can extend equal benefits to all parts of the United States: Different laws,
customs, and opinions exist in the different states, which by a uniform system of laws would be
unreasonably invaded. The United States contain about a million of square miles, and in half a century
will, probably, contain ten millions of people; and from the center to the extremes is about 800 miles.
Before we do away the state governments or adopt measures that will tend to abolish them, and
to consolidate the states into one entire government several principles should be considered and facts
ascertained:—These, and my examination into the essential parts of the proposed plan, I shall pursue in
my next.
Brutus No. 1, 18 October 1787
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.com/library/index.asp?document=849
The first question that presents itself on the subject is, whether a confederated government be the
best for the United States or not? Or in other words, whether the thirteen United States should be
reduced to one great republic, governed by one legislature, and under the direction of one executive and
judicial; or whether they should continue thirteen confederated republics, under the direction and
controul of a supreme federal head for certain defined national purposes only?
This enquiry is important, because, although the government reported by the convention does not
go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly
and infallibly terminate in it…
Let us now proceed to enquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be best the thirteen United States
should be reduced to one great republic, or not? It is here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that
whatever government we adopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed as to secure the
liberty of the citizens of America, and such an one as to admit of a full, fair, and equal representation of
the people. The question then will be, whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such
principles, is practicable, and can be exercised over the whole United States, reduced into one state?
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who have ever thought or
wrote on the science of government, we shall be constrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot
succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these
encreasing in such rapid progression as that of the whole United States. Among the many illustrious
authorities which might be produced to this point, I shall content myself with quoting only two. The one
is the baron de Montesquieu, spirit of laws, chap. xvi. vol. I [book VIII]. "It is natural to a republic to
have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are men of large
fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single
subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by
oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a
large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and
depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and
more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected." Of the
same opinion is the marquis Beccarari.
History furnishes no example of a free republic, any thing like the extent of the United States.
The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in
process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that
their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever
existed in the world.
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
Question
Answer
According to the Federal Farmer,
what is the first possible form of
“free government under which
the United States may exist as
one nation”?
According to the Federal Farmer,
what is the second possible form
of “free government under which
the United States may exist as
one nation”?
According to the Federal Farmer,
what is the third possible form of
“free government under which
the United States may exist as
one nation”?
Which of these three “forms”
does the Federal Farmer prefer?
Why?
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
Why does the Federal Farmer
reject the other two possible
“forms” of government?
What reasons does Brutus give
against reducing the thirteen
states into “one great republic”?
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
Activity Two: Dangers of the extended republic
Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________
Reading Set A: Fear of despotism or anarchy under a consolidated government
Directions: Read the following documents and complete the questions on the worksheet.
Centinel No. 1, 5 October 1787
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.com/library/index.asp?document=1635
[I]f the united states are to be melted down into one empire, it becomes you to consider, whether
such a government, however constructed, would be eligible in so extended a territory; and whether it
would be practicable, consistent with freedom? It is the opinion of the greatest writers, that a very
extensive country cannot be governed on democratical principles, on any other plan, than a
confederation of a number of small republics, possessing all the powers of internal government, but
united in the management of their foreign and general concerns.
It would not be difficult to prove, that any thing short of despotism, could not bind so great a
country under one government; and that whatever plan you might, at the first setting out, establish, it
would issue in a despotism.
If one general government could be instituted and maintained on principles of freedom, it would
not be so competent to attend to the various local concerns and wants, of every particular district, as well
as the peculiar governments, who are nearer the scene, and possessed of superior means of information,
besides, if the business of the whole union is to be managed by one government, there would not be
time. Do we not already see, that the inhabitants in a number of larger states, who are remote from the
seat of government, are loudly complaining of the inconveniencies and disadvantages they are subjected
to on this account, and that, to enjoy the comforts of local government, they are separating into smaller
divisions.
Brutus No. 1, 18 October 1787
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.com/library/index.asp?document=849
The laws cannot be executed in a republic, of an extent equal to that of the United States, with
promptitude. The magistrates in every government must be supported in the execution of the laws, either
by an armed force, maintained at the public expence for that purpose; or by the people turning out to aid
the magistrate upon his command, in case of resistance.
In despotic governments, as well as in all the monarchies of Europe, standing armies are kept up
to execute the commands of the prince or the magistrate, and are employed for this purpose when
occasion requires: But they have always proved the destruction of liberty, and [are] abhorrent to the
spirit of a free republic…
A free republic will never keep a standing army to execute its laws. It must depend upon the
support of its citizens. But when a government is to receive its support from the aid of the citizens, it
must be so constructed as to have the confidence, respect, and affection of the people…[B]ut the people
will not be likely to have such confidence in their rulers, in a republic so extensive as the United States,
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
as necessary for these purposes. The confidence which the people have in their rulers, in a free republic,
arises from their knowing them, from their being responsible to them for their conduct, and from the
power they have of displacing them when they misbehave: but in a republic of the extent of this
continent, the people in general would be acquainted with very few of their rulers: the people at large
would know little of their proceedings, and it would be extremely difficult to change them. The people
in Georgia and New-Hampshire would not know one another's mind, and therefore could not act in
concert to enable them to effect a general change of representatives. The different parts of so extensive a
country could not possibly be made acquainted with the conduct of their representatives, nor be
informed of the reasons upon which measures were founded. The consequence will be, they will have no
confidence in their legislature, suspect them of ambitious views, be jealous of every measure they adopt,
and will not support the laws they pass. Hence the government will be nerveless and inefficient, and no
way will be left to render it otherwise, but by establishing an armed force to execute the laws at the point
of the bayonet — a government of all others the most to be dreaded…
In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon become above the
controul of the people, and abuse their power to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing
them…The command of all the troops and navy of the republic, the appointment of officers, the power
of pardoning offences, the collecting of all the public revenues, and the power of expending them, with a
number of other powers, must be lodged and exercised in every state, in the hands of a few. When these
are attended with great honor and emolument, as they always will be in large states, so as greatly to
interest men to pursue them, and to be proper objects for ambitious and designing men, such men will be
ever restless in their pursuit after them. They will use the power, when they have acquired it, to the
purposes of gratifying their own interest and ambition, and it is scarcely possible, in a very large
republic, to call them to account for their misconduct, or to prevent their abuse of power.
These are some of the reasons by which it appears, that a free republic cannot long subsist over a
country of the great extent of these states. If then this new constitution is calculated to consolidate the
thirteen states into one, as it evidently is, it ought not to be adopted.
Brutus No. 4, 29 November 1787
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.com/library/index.asp?document=1671
There can be no free government where the people are not possessed of the power of making the
laws by which they are governed, either in their own persons, or by others substituted in their stead.
Experience has taught mankind, that legislation by representatives is the most eligible, and the
only practicable mode in which the people of any country can exercise this right, either prudently or
beneficially. But then, it is a matter of the highest importance, in forming this representation, that it be
so constituted as to be capable of understanding the true interests of the society for which it acts, and so
disposed as to pursue the good and happiness of the people as its ultimate end…
The small number which is to compose this legislature, will not only expose it to the danger of
that kind of corruption, and undue influence, which will arise from the gift of places of honor and
emolument, or the more direct one of bribery, but it will also subject it to another kind of influence no
less fatal to the liberties of the people…[I]t will not possess the confidence of the people. The execution
of the laws in a free government must rest on this confidence, and this must be founded on the good
opinion they entertain of the framers of the laws…In order for the people safely to repose themselves on
their rulers, they should not only be of their own choice. But it is requisite they should be acquainted
with their abilities to manage the public concerns with wisdom. They should be satisfied that those who
represent them are men of integrity, who will pursue the good of the community with fidelity; and will
not be turned aside from their duty by private interest, or corrupted by undue influence; and that they
will have such a zeal for the good of those whom they represent, as to excite them to be diligent in their
service; but it is impossible the people of the United States should have sufficient knowledge of their
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
representatives, when the numbers are so few, to acquire any rational satisfaction on either of these
points. The people of this state will have very little acquaintance with those who may be chosen to
represent them; a great part of them will, probably, not know the characters of their own members, much
less that of a majority of those who will compose the federal assembly; they will consist of men, whose
names they have never heard, and whose talents and regard for the public good, they are total strangers
to; and they will have no persons so immediately of their choice so near them, of their neighbours and of
their own rank in life, that they can feel themselves secure in trusting their interests in their hands. The
representatives of the people cannot, as they now do, after they have passed laws, mix with the people,
and explain to them the motives which induced the adoption of any measure, point out its utility, and
remove objections or silence unreasonable clamours against it. — The number will be so small that but a
very few of the most sensible and respectable yeomanry of the country can ever have any knowledge of
them: being so far removed from the people, their station will be elevated and important, and they will
be considered as ambitious and designing. They will not be viewed by the people as part of themselves,
but as a body distinct from them, and having separate interests to pursue; the consequence will be, that a
perpetual jealousy will exist in the minds of the people against them; their conduct will be narrowly
watched; their measures scrutinized; and their laws opposed, evaded, or reluctantly obeyed…
If then this government should not derive support from the good will of the people, it must be
executed by force, or not executed at all; either case would lead to the total destruction of liberty.
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
Directions: Read the documents assigned for Activity Two (Reading Set A) and answer the questions
on the worksheet.
Question
Answer
What evidence does Centinel
give to suggest that a large
extended republic will result in
dissention or rebellion among
citizens?
In Brutus No. 1, why does Brutus
believe that in an extended
republic the government will
eventually have to use force to
rule the citizens?
In Brutus No. 1, why does Brutus
believe that rulers in an extended
republic will abuse their powers
and violate the rights of citizens?
In Brutus No. 4, what problems
will likely arise from having too
few representatives in
Congress?
In Brutus No. 4, why does Brutus
believe that an extended republic
will lead to an elite class of rulers
distinct from the people?
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
Activity Two: Dangers of the extended republic
Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________
Reading Set B: Disadvantages of the “remote states”
Directions: Read the following document and complete the questions on the worksheet.
The Federal Farmer (Richard Henry Lee) No. 2, 9 October 1787
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=690&chapter=102314&la
yout=html&Itemid=27
Dear Sir, The essential parts of a free and good government are a full and equal representation of
the people in the legislature, and the jury trial of the vicinage in the administration of justice—a full and
equal representation, is that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the people
themselves would were they all assembled—a fair representation, therefore, should be so regulated, that
every order of men in the community, according to the common course of elections, can have a share in
it—in order to allow professional men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, &c. to bring a just
proportion of their best informed men respectively into the legislature, the representation must be
considerably numerous—We have about 200 state senators in the United States, and a less number than
that of federal representatives cannot, clearly, be a full representation of this people, in the affairs of
internal taxation and police, were there but one legislature for the whole union. The representation
cannot be equal, or the situation of the people proper for one government only—if the extreme parts of
the society cannot be represented as fully as the central—It is apparently impracticable that this should
be the case in this extensive country—it would be impossible to collect a representation of the parts of
the country five, six, and seven hundred miles from the seat of government.
Under one general government alone, there could be but one judiciary, one supreme and a proper
number of inferior courts. I think it would be totally impracticable in this case to preserve a due
administration of justice, and the real benefits of the jury trial of the vicinage,—there are now supreme
courts in each state in the union; and a great number of county and other courts subordinate to each
supreme court—most of these supreme and inferior courts are itinerant, and hold their sessions in
different parts every year of their respective states, counties and districts—with all these moving courts,
our citizens, from the vast extent of the country must travel very considerable distances from home to
find the place where justice is administered. I am not for bringing justice so near to individuals as to
afford them any temptation to engage in law suits; though I think it one of the greatest benefits in a good
government, that each citizen should find a court of justice within a reasonable distance, perhaps, within
a day’s travel of his home; so that, without great inconveniences and enormous expences, he may have
the advantages of his witnesses and jury—it would be impracticable to derive these advantages from one
judiciary—the one supreme court at most could only set in the centre of the union, and move once a year
into the centre of the eastern and southern extremes of it—and, in this case, each citizen, on an average,
would travel 150 or 200 miles to find this court—that, however, inferior courts might be properly placed
in the different counties, and districts of the union, the appellate jurisdiction would be intolerable and
expensive.
If it were possible to consolidate the states, and preserve the features of a free government, still it
is evident that the middle states, the parts of the union, about the seat of government, would enjoy great
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
advantages, while the remote states would experience the many inconveniences of remote provinces.
Wealth, offices, and the benefits of government would collect in the centre: and the extreme states and
their principal towns, become much less important.
There are other considerations which tend to prove that the idea of one consolidated whole, on
free principles, is ill-founded—the laws of a free government rest on the confidence of the people, and
operate gently—and never can extend their influence very far—if they are executed on free principles,
about the centre, where the benefits of the government induce the people to support it voluntarily; yet
they must be executed on the principles of fear and force in the extremes—This has been the case with
every extensive republic of which we have any accurate account.
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
Directions: Read the document assigned for Activity Two (Reading Set B) and answer the questions on
the worksheet.
Question
Answer
According to the Federal Farmer,
what will be the greatest flaw
with representation in an
extended republic?
Why will the administration of
justice be a problem in the
extended republic according to
the Federal Farmer?
Why would the “remote states”
be at a disadvantage in the large
republic?
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
Activity Two: Dangers of the extended republic
Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________
Reading Set C: Representation and the diversity of interests
Directions: Read the following document and complete the questions on the worksheet.
Brutus No. 1, 18 October 1787
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.com/library/index.asp?document=849
Not only the opinion of the greatest men, and the experience of mankind, are against the idea of
an extensive republic, but a variety of reasons may be drawn from the reason and nature of things,
against it…In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the consent of the people, yet the
people do not declare their consent by themselves in person, but by representatives, chosen by them,
who are supposed to know the minds of their constituents, and to be possessed of integrity to declare this
mind. In every free government, the people must give their assent to the laws by which they are
governed…If the people are to give their assent to the laws, by persons chosen and appointed by them,
the manner of the choice and the number chosen, must be such, as to possess, be disposed, and
consequently qualified to declare the sentiments of the people; for if they do not know, or are not
disposed to speak the sentiments of the people, the people do not govern, but the sovereignty is in a few.
Now, in a large extended country, it is impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments,
and of integrity, to declare the minds of the people, without having it so numerous and unwieldly, as to
be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a democratic government.
The territory of the United States is of vast extent; it now contains near three millions of souls,
and is capable of containing much more than ten times that number. Is it practicable for a country, so
large and so numerous as they will soon become, to elect a representation, that will speak their
sentiments, without their becoming so numerous as to be incapable of transacting public business? It
certainly is not.
In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not
the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be
continually striving against those of the other. This will retard the operations of government, and prevent
such conclusions as will promote the public good. If we apply this remark to the condition of the United
States, we shall be convinced that it forbids that we should be one government. The United States
includes a variety of climates. The productions of the different parts of the union are very variant, and
their interests, of consequence, diverse. Their manners and habits differ as much as their climates and
productions; and their sentiments are by no means coincident. The laws and customs of the several states
are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some opposite; each would be in favor of its own interests
and customs, and, of consequence, a legislature, formed of representatives from the respective parts,
would not only be too numerous to act with any care or decision, but would be composed of such
heterogenous and discordant principles, as would constantly be contending with each other.
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Anti-federalist arguments against “a complete consolidation”
Directions: Read the document assigned for Activity Two (Reading Set C) and answer the questions on
the worksheet.
Question
Answer
What qualities does Brutus say
representatives should have in a
republic?
Why would representation in a
large republic prevent the people
from adequately giving their
“assent to the laws”?
What problems will a diversity of
interests cause in a large
republic?
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
Activity One: Controlling the “mortal disease” of popular governments
Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________
Reading Set A: The vices of republican government
Directions: Read the following documents and complete the questions on the worksheet.
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 9
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed09.htm
A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier
against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of
Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they
were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state
of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy…
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates of despotism have drawn
arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil
liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have
indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans…
But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of republican government were too just
copies of the originals from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised
models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to
abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like
most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well
understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular
distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the
institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation
of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or
have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful
means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections
lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems
of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a
principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I mean the
ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the
dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy.
James Madison, The Federalist No. 10
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed10.htm
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more
accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of
popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he
contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any
plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite
and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations…
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of
public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that
the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided,
not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no
foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree
true…These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a
factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other,
by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty
which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same
passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty
is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly
to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to
wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive
agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man
continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the
connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a
reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach
themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less
an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of
government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession
of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different
interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought
into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for
different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of
speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence
and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human
passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and
rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common
good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial
occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their
unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of
factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are
without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who
are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile
interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and
divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of
party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government…
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and
render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm…
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that
relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which
enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may
convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the
Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other
hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other
citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the
same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which
our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government
can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the
esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the
same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such
coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert
and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide,
we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control…
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
Activity One: Controlling the “mortal disease” of popular governments
Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________
Directions: Read the documents assigned for Activity One (Reading Set A) and answer the questions
on the worksheet.
Question
Answer
1. According to Alexander
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 9,
why have some Americans
criticized a republican form of
government?
2. What are the five improvements
to “the science of politics,”
according to Hamilton, that will
make the American republic work?
3. What evidence does James
Madison give in The Federalist No.
10 that American government has
been “tainted” by a “factious
spirit”?
4. How does Madison define a
“faction” in The Federalist No. 10?
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
5. What are the two possible
methods of removing the causes of
faction, according to Madison?
6. Why does Madison reject both
of these methods of removing the
causes of faction?
7. Why does Madison conclude
that the causes of faction cannot
be removed?
8. How does a republican form of
government control the effects of
minority faction, according to
Madison?
9. What are the two methods,
according to Madison, of
controlling the effects of majority
faction?
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
Activity One: Controlling the “mortal disease” of popular governments
Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________
Reading Set B: The benefits of “a large over a small republic”
Directions: Read the following document and complete the questions on the worksheet.
James Madison, The Federalist No. 10
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed10.htm
[A] pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who
assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A
common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a
communication and concert result from the form of government itself…Hence it is that such
democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible
with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they
have been violent in their deaths…
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens
a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which
it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy
which it must derive from the Union. The two great points of difference between a democracy and a
republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected
by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter
may be extended…
The [second] point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may
be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance
principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The
smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer
the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they
are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere,
and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
each other...
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in
controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic…The influence of factious
leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general
conflagration through the other States…[A] wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body
of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to
taint a particular county or district, than an entire State. In the extent and proper structure of the Union,
therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
Activity One: Controlling the “mortal disease” of popular governments
Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________
Directions: Read the document assigned for Activity One (Reading Set B) and answer the questions on
the worksheet.
Question
Answer
1. How does Madison define a “pure
democracy”?
2. How does Madison define a republic?
3. According to Madison, what are the
two great points of difference between a
“pure democracy” and a republic?
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
4. Why are “pure democracies” prone to
the problem of faction?
5. What are the two benefits of
“extending the sphere,” according to
Madison?
6. What effect does “extending the
sphere” have on the number of interests
to be found in the nation?
7. What are the benefits of having a
large rather than a small republic,
according to Madison?
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
Activity One: Controlling the “mortal disease” of popular governments
Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________
Reading Set C: “Extending the sphere” and multiplying interests
Directions: Read the following document and complete the questions on the worksheet.
James Madison, The Federalist No. 51
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed51.htm
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its
rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests
necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights
of the minority will be insecure.
There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community
independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so
many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole
very improbable, if not impracticable…The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of
the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the
society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of
individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.
In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It
consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The
degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be
presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same
government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the
sincere and considerate friends of republican government…Justice is the end of government. It is the
end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost
in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress
the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is
not secured against the violence of the stronger…
In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and
sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any
other principles than those of justice and the general good…It is no less certain than it is important,
notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided
it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the
REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious
modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
Activity One: Controlling the “mortal disease” of popular governments
Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________
Directions: Read the document assigned for Activity One (Reading Set C) and answer the questions on
the worksheet.
Question
Answer
1. What are the two dangers that society
(and the liberties and rights of citizens)
must be guarded against, according to
Madison?
2. What is it that makes “the rights of the
minority” most insecure, according to
Madison?
3. What are the two methods of preventing
the evil of faction, according to Madison?
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The Federalist defense of “extending the sphere”
4. Which method of preventing the evil of
faction does Madison prefer, and why?
5. Why does the extended republic make
“a coalition of a majority of the whole
society” less likely, according to Madison?
6. Why does “justice” require a solution to
the problem of majority faction?
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