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The Link Between Syria and Ukraine
March 24, 2016 The fact that the two conflicts have become intertwined is not a coincidence.
By George Friedman
Summary John Kerry is in Moscow for talks on Syria and Ukraine, as leaders explore a
settlement in both countries. The Syrian and Ukrainian crises are more closely linked than they
appear, it would seem.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Moscow on Wednesday to meet with Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The meeting was arranged after a phone conversation between
U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin. This followed the Russian
decision to withdraw most of its force in Syria. At the time, it was reported that the Obama-Putin
conversation concerned Syria and Ukraine.
In my mind, Syria and Ukraine have been linked from the beginning. The actions of nations can
never be reduced to a single thread, but there are facts and logic pointing in this direction. The
Russians embarrassed the United States in Syria. The United States had spoken of a red line in
Syria that involved the use of chemical weapons. The Bashar al-Assad regime was accused of
using chemical weapons. Subsequently, the French and the British urged the United States to
conduct airstrikes against chemical stockpiles. The United States was considering a joint attack,
which the Russians vigorously opposed. When the British Parliament surprisingly voted against
authorizing air action, the United States reconsidered an attack, and there was none.
Moscow used this to make it appear that the United States had been blocked from attacking
Syria by the Russians. Putin wrote an editorial to that effect in the New York Times. Part of this
was a matter of ego, but there were more serious considerations as well. The United States was
appropriately concerned that a perception of U.S. weakness and Russian strength could affect
dynamics from Central Europe to Iran. Putin was taking victory laps, even though there was no
Russian victory, trying to generate this perception. The U.S. had to block him.
In my view, this affected U.S. behavior in Ukraine. There had been a long-standing commitment
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by the U.S. to support and even fund dissidents in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet
Union so the U.S.’s support of Ukrainian rebels was not a new policy. But the United States also
understood the importance of Ukraine to Russia. It understood that Putin was attempting to
reposition Russia as a great power and was using the Middle East as a very public pressure point
against the U.S. Pursuing an existing policy vigorously could hand the Russians a very public
defeat, negating Syria’s effect.
The U.S. chose to pursue its policy more vigorously than before. The Russians bungled their
strategy in Crimea, which ranged from not understanding the forces arrayed against the proRussian regime to an inability to create a strategy for protecting the regime. Their attempt at
triggering an uprising in the east failed, and their “seizure” of Crimea was a formality, given
their overwhelming strength there. While the Russians were reeling, the United States mounted
a campaign sketching the Russians as aggressors and brushing aside the notion that Russia had
fundamental interests in Ukraine. All this would likely have happened anyway, but it did not
happen without an awareness of Russian behavior in Syria. The awareness contributed to
decisions made by the U.S. in Ukraine.
Developments in Ukraine – plus the collapse of oil prices – reversed positions. Russia appeared
weaker and had to establish its credibility. It deployed about 70 aircraft and support personnel
to Syria. The decision was made in the context of a genuine Russian interest in Syria –
protecting the Assad regime – but it was bound up with broader considerations. What made it a
bold move was the complexity of the power projection and the fact the United States, which had
overwhelming air superiority in the region, would be forced to resist. Yet, as the Russians knew,
they couldn’t resist.
U.S. opposition to Assad was long-standing, but it predated the rise of the Islamic State. The
coalition it tried to create to resist Assad after the civil war broke out had failed to take hold. The
fall of Assad would have potentially opened the door for IS, and having IS take over Damascus
was not something the United States wanted. The United States could not reverse its position on
Assad for political reasons. But the Russian intervention solved the U.S.’s problem. The United
States had to condemn the Russians, building up Russian credibility for challenging the United
States. But the United States didn’t have to change its position on Assad because Assad’s
collapse could be postponed. The U.S. solved its strategic crisis in Syria by allowing Russia to
appear to defy American wishes. The Russians could reclaim the standing they lost in Ukraine.
Whether this was choreographed is unclear. But I find it hard to imagine Russia inserting aircraft
in Syria without consultation with the United States concerning intent and outcome.
What is certainly true was that Putin wanted to get the Ukrainian question back on the table. He
could afford frozen conflicts in South Ossetia or between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but Ukraine
was too vital to Russia’s interests as a buffer with the West. The Russian withdrawal was not
about Syria alone, but also about Ukraine. Putin needed to unfreeze the conflict without
appearing too weak.
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Syria is a marginal interest to the United States, as the Middle East has become of secondary
importance. During the Cold War, its interests were manifest both in terms of the Soviet Union
and maintaining the flow of oil. The Russian threat is far from the Soviet threat and Persian Gulf
oil is now far less important to the United States. It wants to contain IS, but this is not an
existential question to the United States. To the Russians, now as during the Cold War, the
Middle East is a means for creating pain for the United States that it can use in negotiating more
important matters.
Ukraine is the most significant national security issue for Russia, whereas the survival of Assad
is clearly secondary. For the United States, the issue in Ukraine, once the new regime was in
place, was simply to make certain that Russian forces didn’t deploy to the Carpathian Mountains
and thus didn’t appear to pose a threat to the West. For Russia, the heart of the Ukrainian issue
is that the Western alliance structure cannot spread into Ukraine, posing a threat to Russia. For
Germany, whose foreign minister just concluded a meeting with the Russians, the interest is not
creating a cold war to its east.
This creates what would appear to be a solvable problem. The solution would require multiple
steps. First, an agreement would have to be reached on military neutralization of Ukraine,
similar to the way Austria was treated in the Cold War. Ukraine can be part of the West
economically – assuming it can manage that – but not militarily. The Russians would disarm the
rebels, and Ukraine would agree to allow eastern Ukraine limited autonomy. Some contrivance
could be allowed in Crimea. The Ukrainians would not be happy, but Crimea would regain formal
sovereignty while Russia would retain effective control, which was much the case before the
crisis. This would end a conflict neither side could win. In Syria, the Alawites would lose Assad as
the leader of the country but the rest of the leadership would remain in place, blocking IS.
In imaging a settlement, I am imagining the conversations now being held in Moscow, as the
Syrian and Ukrainian crises, connected to each other in complex and unclear ways, are both
being addressed at the same time. Russia cannot afford the military buildup it needs in order to
deal with Ukraine militarily. Rising defense budgets and collapsing oil prices destroyed the
Soviet Union. Russia can’t afford both. The United States cannot dismantle the Alawite faction
while IS is still present in Syria. The Russians can dispense with Assad so long as they get what
the United States wants to have anyway – the Alawites intact. And the Germans have enough
problems in Europe not to want disruption to the east – or more Syrian refugees if possible.
Perhaps simply because they coincided, the Syrian and Ukrainian crises have been woven
together. I think it was more than coincidence. The dance that began with the fall of the proRussian Ukrainian government – but actually began in Georgia in 2008 – spread to involve the
Middle East, as did the Cold War. But in the end, this isn’t the Cold War and the Russians in
particular could not sustain the confrontation. So two conflicts, Syria and Ukraine, found
themselves woven together. And with the Russian exit we will now find out if it culminates in at
least a truce.
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