SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT POLICY INSTITUTE
(SDPI)
REPORT
ON
STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS ON THE
FUTURE OF AFGHAN REFUGEES
IN PAKISTAN
PRESENTED TO UNHCR
ISLAMABAD
SEPTEMBER 2006
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................i
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................iii
I.
Background and Rationale .........................................................................................1
1.
Setting the Context: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (1980-2006) ...................1
2.
Current Initiatives...........................................................................................3
3.
Rationale ........................................................................................................4
II.
Introduction to the Consultations...............................................................................5
1.
Objectives.......................................................................................................5
2.
Process followed/Methodology......................................................................5
3.
Media Dissemination......................................................................................6
III.
Key Discussions and Concerns at the Consultations .................................................7
Introduction ...................................................................................................7
1.
Legal Status of Refugees ................................................................................9
A.
Nationality/Registration .....................................................................9
B.
Revising the Tripartite Agreement ................................................... 11
C.
Refugee Status and the International Commitment ......................... 12
2.
Repatriation .................................................................................................. 13
A.
Barriers to Repa triation.................................................................... 13
i.
Political and Security Concerns ............................................ 14
ii.
Economic and Social Impediments to Return ...................... 14
B.
Measures for Non-Repatriating Afghans ........................................ 15
i.
Protection Concerns .............................................................. 16
ii.
Women’s Rights ................................................................... 16
iii.
Social Services...................................................................... 17
iv.
Livelihoods ........................................................................... 20
IV.
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 23
Annexure
1.
Focus Group Discussions with Afghan Refugee Members .....................................27
2.
Focus Group Discussions with Pakistani Members..................................................47
3.
Participants at the High-Level Meeting in Lahore ....................................................65
Acknowledgements
The SDPI team, believing in the intrinsic value of holding the dialogues on the future of the
Afghan refugees in Pakistan, made the multiple facets of this report possible. The team
consisted of (in alphabetical order) Shahbaz Bokhari, Nazish Brohi (consultant), Kiran Habib,
Saba Gul Khattak, and Saleem Shah. Mohammad Imran, Imran Khan, Fauzia Javed and
Irshad Tabassum facilitated different aspects of the program and corresponding logistical
arrangements.
We are grateful to the European Commission for financing this project and to UNHCR
personnel for their support at various stages of the consultations. In particular, Indrika
Ratwatte, Jahangir Durrani, Kazuhiro Kaneko, Salvatore Lombardo and Ewen Macleod
provided continuous input and help where needed.
This report would not have been possible without the support of all the participants who
agreed to give their time and energies to the roundtable discussions and who frequently went
out of their way to put us in touch with other civil society representatives whose input they
valued. We are grateful to them for their generosity, while noting that some expressed their
cynicism about the outcomes of such dialogues and others enthusiastically expressed their
belief and hope in the efficacy of the process.
i
Executive Summary
The impending end of the Tripartite Agreement1 provided a timely opportunity for broadbased consultations among stakeholders about possible solutions to the problems faced by the
approximately 3 million Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. The UNHCR requested the
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), an independent organization, to hold public
dialogues on the future policy options for the Afghan refugees. The objectives were to (i)
solicit a wide range of informed opinions; (ii) support an informed debate on future policy
options and (iii) identify viable policy options and propose them to policy-makers. Given that
there is no formal enunciation of the changing framework within which Afghan refugees
have lived in Pakistan, some of them since the early 1980s, this report provides the policy
context of the varying responses and initiatives undertaken by the Government of Pakistan
and UNHCR.
The consultations were held in two tiers: focus group discussions were held with Afghan and
Pakistani members, then recommendations from these meetings were debated at high-level
meetings among Pakistani stakeholders. Nearly 200 Afghan and Pakistani civil society
representatives participated in the discussions held in the federal and provincial capitals.2
The following section discusses the key issues and recommendations that emerged from the
consultations.
Policy Formulation
Very few of those who participated in the discussion were aware of the initiatives taken by
UNHCR and the Government of Pakistan (GoP). Both Afghan and Pakistani participants
voiced their concerns about the ad hoc manner in which the GoP, UNHCR and donors have
formulated policies relating to Afghan refugee matters.
There were clear gaps between how Pakistani civil society and Afghan refugees viewed the
situation of Afghans in Pakistan and the positions adopted by the GoP. The majority thought
that the policies were not transparent, having seldom been debated in the fora intended for
policy formulation such as Provincial or National Assemblies or at the local government
level. As a result, those engaged in policy formulation are not being held to account by those
affected by the process.
1
2
According to the Tripartite Agreement signed in 2003 between the UNHCR, Pakistan and Afghanistan, all Afghan
refugees were to repatriate by March 2006. The Agreement has been extended until December 2006 and is now
expected to be renewed for three more years, till 2009.
Journalists, trade and business associations, NGO workers and human rights activists, educationists, doctors,
engineers, political party representatives, elected local body members and retired government officials participated in
the discussions.
iii
Legal Status of Refugees
Three main legal issues emerged from the dialogues: that of granting the Afghans Pakistani
nationality; their status vis a vis the Tripartite Agreement; and the responsibilities of the
international community.
The legal problems stem from the absence of any identification documents issued by the
GoP, which is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. Afghans
can be apprehended under the Foreigners Registration Act (1946) which makes them
susceptible to police harassment.
Participants underscored the need for Pakistan to sign and adhere to international and
SAARC Conventions on refugees. In the absence of any such action, the participants
advocated that the principles of human rights law be applied to the Afghans in Pakistan.
Some participants suggested that Pakistan grant all refugees civil rights, although not
necessarily political rights, in the short and medium term. Some thought that there should be
a system similar to the US “green card” system and felt that this could be combined with a
process of registering all Afghan refugees.
All agreed that the Tripartite Agreement must be reviewed, revised and extended through
open debate within the countries concerned. The declining flow of aid from the international
community, combined with the push to repatriate, were perceived as a failure to honor
commitments and essentially unrealistic.
Repatriatio n
The major barriers to repatriation were identified as the lack of livelihood options, survival
skills, personal security and social services inside Afghanistan. Other factors included the
presence of foreign forces; regional power politics in Afghanistan; the harsh climate in
Afghanistan, that the generations who have not grown up there are unaccustomed to; the
“cultural disconnect” and the problems of adjusting to homeland conditions (especially for
second generation diaspora or refugee Afghans). All of these were identified as systemic
barriers to repatriation, which could be addressed only through gradual social change
combined with humane policies that acknowledge the difficulties faced by Afghans wishing
to return home.
Continued stay
Although opinion was divided over where the refugee populations in Pakistan should reside
and work, there was consensus that there should be no coercive repatriation. Nevertheless,
diverse opinions were expressed with regard to the continued stay of Afghans in Pakistan.
Several modalities were presented at the consultations on the issue of their extended stay.
Many Pakistani participants opposed this, referring especially to meager national resources.
They blamed the Afghans for driving wages downward and for exacerbating pressures upon
the fragile social sectors. They proposed that the international community, in particular the
USA—as it had been involved in the so-called Afghan Jihad since the beginning and had led
the recent armed intervention to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan—should
continue to shoulder responsibility for the Afghan refugees. They argued that the USA should
iv
also provide the Afghans with the option of migration to the US. Addressing the issue
emphasized during the 1980s, that Afghans are in Pakistan due to their Muslim identity,
participants pointed out that oil-rich Muslim countries are better placed than Pakistan to
absorb refugees.
In contrast, some Pakistani participants suggested that, according to citizenship laws and
international practice, Afghans were eligible to be citizens after seven years of residence in
Pakistan, while others said that the children born on Pakistani soil should be entitled to
citizenship.
Political parties were divided over the issue of citizenship and voting rights. Representatives
from areas with a concentration of Afghan refugees (especially in the NWFP) believed that
they should have the political mandate for the refugee population who consume
local/provincial resources. Other political parties, especially those from Balochistan, argued
for the Afghans’ speedy repatriation – albeit under terms acceptable to the Afghans - to
prevent new voting patterns from influencing local and provincial electoral politics.
Arguing for their right to stay and to become citizens, Afghan participants justified their
demand on economic and legal grounds. Displaying bitterness over the discrimination they
faced in the wage market and in the country in general, they argued that their presence would
not be a burden upon the Pakistan government if the well-off Afghans would contribute to a
fund for vulnerable Afghan groups, notably widows and children, and if they would pay taxes
to the Pakistan government.
Political Initiatives
A majority of participants emphasized the need for political solutions informed by
humanitarian principles for what they identified as a political crisis. They also emphasized
the need for ‘result and outcome-oriented’ dialogues.
A key political issue identified was interference in Afghanistan’s affairs by neighboring
countries as well as by western powers. The strained political relations between Afghanistan
and Pakistan were also noted as factors contributing to the ongoing difficulties for the
refugees.
Trade and Investment
Representatives of the business community emphasized the importance of trade with
Afghanistan, as well as the export of skilled Pakistani labor to Afghanistan. They argued that
increasing trade would enhance productive activities and generate goodwill, while
strengthening peaceful relations.
Political party representatives also supported the improvement of trade relations with some
advocating the continued existence of soft borders. Government representatives, however,
expressed concern about the Afghan government’s lukewarm response to increasing trade
and investment with Pakistan.
The Afghans’ unclear legal status – and the resulting unpredictability – prevent those who
have the resources from making secure long-term investments in Pakistan.
v
Recommendations
While specific recommendations are grouped together in the following sections, the report
first addresses the fundamental issue of the need for effective communication and for
political will in order to improve relations between Pakistanis and Afghans. Until Pakistanis
and Afghans – especially at the official level - devise ways of communicating more
effectively, and on better terms, with each other, tensions and misperceptions between the
two communities are unlikely to ease.
Debate on Public Policy
•
Channels for open debate and discussion about policies and frameworks – including
the rationales underlying key decisions - related to Afghan refugees must be
increased. Independent civil society organizations, whether through institutional
advocacy initiatives or the mass media, must raise the level of debate by regularly
drawing on the views of a wide cross section of stakeholders.
•
The government and relevant members of the international community should
systematically communicate their positions through simple and practical steps such as
putting information outlining their programmatic priorities on their websites, in
newsletters and annual reports. They should also hold meetings with stakeholders
when changes are being proposed and devised. Other steps can include regular
interaction with the print and electronic media to convey changed positions, as well as
using these channels to highlight the complexity and differences in views among
stakeholders, including the government, the international community and the refugee
and host communities.
Political Solutions
vi
•
Humane repatriation is feasible if the Afghan people evolve their own government
and governance structures rather than having to follow internationally sponsored
formulas.
•
Foreign interference and assistance to armed groups inside Afghanistan needs to stop.
This implies a fundamental change in regional politics.
•
Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan’s refugee-hosting policy should
be formulated through a transparent national debate in the different Provincial and
National assemblies rather than remain the sole prerogative of the Foreign Ministry
and the military.
•
The GoP should take into account the ground realities of Afghans in Pakistan, since
its positions affect Afghans’ present and future situations.
•
Afghan voices must be reflected in the formulation of any new approach to refugees.
•
Pakistan and Afghanistan must settle the Durand Line issue, by formally declaring it a
soft border (which it is for all practical purposes) and the flow of people and goods
should be free and without hindrance.
Legal Measures for all Refugees
•
Pakistan must adopt a refugee policy informed by the legal principles outlined in
international Refugee Conventions.
•
The Tripartite Agreement must be reviewed and revised. The Agreement should be
presented and debated in the National Parliament. The GoP should renew it only
after the National Assembly has approved it in its revised form.
•
Legal measures for Afghan refugees should provide the options of repatriation and
extension of stay under agreed-upon and more predictable circumstances.
•
All refugees must be provided with identification papers on a systematic and
efficient basis, valid for a limited time period. Upon expiry the owner may reapply
for extended stay or permanent residence and undertake to pay national taxes. The
GoP and the UNHCR should take responsibility for this process. This would ensure
protection from police harassment arising from the present ambiguous legal status of
refugees. The identification papers should make refugees eligible for civil but not
political, rights. This will prevent the political demography of Pakistan from being
changed in the immediate and medium terms.
•
Afghans should be issued identification papers which classify them as workers,
businesspersons, vulnerable widows and orphans, refugees, dependents, students and
so on. This classification will entitle the vulnerable to services, allow students access
to education and provide the basis for paying taxes for those who can afford it.
•
Legal status through the provision of work permits or identification papers and
establishing a minimum age for work, equal wage and minimum wage laws,
enforced for both Afghan and Pakistani workers, would ensure the uniform treatment
of Afghan and Pakistani labor and possibly raise wage levels. Equal treatment would
generate goodwill and thereby possibly ensure that Pakistani labor in Afghanistan
would also access a greater share of the labor market inside Afghanistan.
•
The GoP should seriously consider granting citizenship to second and third
generation Afghans.
Legal Measures for Women and Children
•
A single code of formal civil law should apply to Afghan refugee women in camps,
rather than the present four: sharia (Islamic) law, pukhtunwali/rasm (customary law),
Afghan law, and Pakistan law.
•
Women’s and children’s vulnerability to increased domestic violence, trafficking and
sex work resulting from lack of livelihood opportunities must be addressed by the
State as well as by local government and by civil society organizations.
•
Since children’s schooling is often neglected, because they are required to work and
earn for the family, community based organizations must actively work to enroll
child workers in schools. Those CBOs should also conduct campaigns against
vii
negative customs, and inform parents about the dangers of human trafficking and sex
work.
Social Sectors: Equality of Opportunity and Access
Refugees’ access to healthcare, education, clean water, sanitation and employment
opportunities should be equal to those of Pakistanis, meaning that they should be able to
access public sector services across the board. This would imply greater financial and human
investments due to pressures on these sectors. Some of these concerns can be addressed in the
following ways:
viii
•
Allow qualified Afghan professionals to practice in Pakistan by establishing a
professional registration process and instituting criteria for equivalence of degrees.
This would apply to Afghan doctors, nurses, technicians, teachers, engineers and
lawyers.
•
Include the teaching of Persian and Pushto as optional subjects in schools located in
refugee-hosting communities. This would help to ensure that those Afghans who
wish to return would be able to reintegrate successfully. It would also provide
employment opportunities for Afghan teachers and allay Afghan fears of loss of
identity and complete absorption into Pakistan. However, the syllabus should
continue to be the same as that of Pakistani institutions and not that of Afghan
schools.
•
The Afghan government should establish equivalence criteria for children and young
adults returning to the Afghan educational system. It is feared that a parallel system
of education in Pakistan (i.e., one for Afghans and another for Pakistanis) would be
impractical and lead to the “ghettoization” of “Afghan schools” in Pakistan.
•
The Pakistan government should encourage greater investments in the health and
education sectors through the public-private partnerships currently being pursued.
Similarly, multi- and bilateral donor organizations could contribute to the
establishment of a fund to operate existing Basic Health Units as well as District
Headquarter Hospitals in areas with significant numbers of Afghans.
•
The increased investments should be channeled through government line
departments. Local government officials (both administrators and elected
representatives) would have to be actively involved in the process of targeted
planning, designing and implementation.
•
Devising a system of health cards to keep track of diseases (especially those
requiring consistent follow-up, such as TB), and ensuring that proper treatment
continues no matter where the patient may shift, could effectively keep track of and
control the health problems the refugees face.
•
Arrangements should be made for child workers to attend school. In addition, special
measures should be taken to protect children from prevalent and epidemic diseases
and illness. Mass campaigns about public awareness of education, health and
sanitation issues should be launched.
•
Equality of opportunity and access in employment and other services must be
assured for all Afghans, especially for the poorest of the poor.
Business and Trade
•
Business and trade with Afghanistan needs to be enhanced at a faster pace than at
present, because officially recognized bilateral trade, and the fact that Afghanistan
could function as a transit route for increased trade with the Central Asian Republics,
would enhance Pakistan’s exports.
•
Investing in Afghanistan would be to the advantage of Pakistan, as it would give
them an added incentive for ensuring peace in Afghanistan and possibly the humane
process of repatriation.
•
Investment by Afghan refugees in businesses in Pakistan, and bringing Afghan
refugee business operators into the tax net, should be encouraged. This could lead to
greater trust, increased ties and economic benefits.
Role of the International Community
•
The international community should continue to shoulder its share of responsibility
for providing economic aid and moral support to the Afghans instead of pleading
“donor fatigue” and decreasing support. Similarly, the international community must
meet its commitments inside Afghanistan as well as support the Afghan refugees
residing in neighboring Iran and Pakistan.
ix
I
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
1.
Setting the Context: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (1980-2006)
This section provides the backdrop of the changing framework within which Afghan refugees
have lived in Pakistan. It discusses why the future options of Afghans residing in Pakistan
need to be addressed urgently by different stakeholders including the Afghans themselves. It
briefly explains the vacillating push and pull factors in Afghanistan and Pakistan over more
than two decades and emphasizes the need for longer-term sustainable solutions to the
prolonged refugee crisis.
Afghan refugees began to arrived in Pakistan soon after December 1979 when the Soviet
Union’s military forces entered Kabul. Pakistan’s military regime accepted Afghans en masse
as prima facie refugees and provided them protection under the principle of non refoulement
(no forced return). The international community provided generous humanitarian and military
aid to the Afghan cause.
The presence of Afghan refugees (fluctuating between an estimated 1.5 - 3.2 million over the
past 25 years), and the provision of considerable economic and military aid, prompted the
Pakistan government, at the outset of the refugee inflows, to set up institutional mechanisms
to address Afghan refugee affairs. However, the creation of the Afghan Commissionerate and
the appointment of Secretaries and Ministers for Refugee Affairs have not translated into the
enunciation of a clear-cut policy framework for resolving the refugee dilemma. In fact, no
South Asian country has a formal policy concerning refugees as none have signed the Geneva
Convention for Refugees or the subsequent 1967 Protocol for Refugees.
Pakistan’s treatment of refugees has been inconsistent and changeable, depending not upon a
clear-cut policy or law but upon changing sets of political imperatives related to internal
economic constraints, and regional and international pressures.
The Pakistan government’s responses to Afghan nationals have undergone significant
transformations: Pakistan welcomed Afghans throughout the 1980s and registered them as
refugees; it advocated repatriation in the 1990s when the mujahideen and later the Taliban
took over power in Afghanistan and foreign aid decreased. In 1998, following the attacks on
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the UN sanctions against the Taliban
1
regime, Pakistan sealed its border with Afghanistan and termed the new refugees economic
refugees, and insisted that the Afghan government should address the then prevalent famine
and drought in Afghanistan. Pakistan refused to allow new refugees to enter soon after the
US-led Allied bombing of Afghanistan, asserting that terrorists would enter its territory. It
finally allowed refugees in under international pressure but confined them to the inhospitable
border areas. More recently, following a census of Afghan refugees in March 2005, the
Pakistan government, while continuing to emphasize repatriation, is also exploring solutions
based on the ground reality that not all Afghans are likely to go back in the short term and
therefore need to be registered.
Despite the changing responses from the Pakistan government - that have taken place without
any formal policy declaration, Afghan refugee and other kinds of population movement to
and from Pakistan have largely been dictated by political conditions inside Afghanistan. Five
major waves of refugees flowed into Pakistan: The first wave, largely Pushtun, came when
the USSR intervened directly in Afghanistan; the second wave came from Kabul and other
urban centers after the mujahideen takeover and infighting within mujahideen ranks; the third
wave, consisting largely of ethnic and Shia minorities, came when the Taliban took control of
90% of Afghanistan by May 1996; the fourth wave came as a result of continued civil war
and the 1998 drought in Afghanistan; and the fifth wave came as a result of the U.S.-led
Allied bombing of Afghanistan in 2001-02. It is within the changing scenario of the Afghan
and Pakistani political and security landscapes that we find explanations for the slow or fast
pace of repatriation.
The framework for repatriation was first set in the Geneva Accords (five in number) signed
between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1988. These Accords also outlined a timetable for
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. It was widely assumed that the refugees would return
home after Soviet troops withdrew. The UNHCR initiated its repatriation program under
which a recorded two million Afghans repatriated between 1990 and 2000. However, refugee
flows continued into Pakistan in tandem with repatriation. The overthrow of the Najibullah
regime in 1992 and subsequent fighting among the mujahideen parties slowed the pace of
repatriation. In fact, some of those who had repatriated came back, along with new refugees
who came because of continued civil war, religious persecution, and, later, the onset of a
drought in 1997-98. At a time when Pakistan’s economic indicators showed worsening
trends, international humanitarian aid for Afghan refugees also shrank due the collapse of the
Soviet Union, related donor fatigue, and the need to channel scarce aid to Afghanistan itself.
Pakistan’s establishment, the media and some of the people became openly resentful of the
presence of the Afghan refugees. Afghans were popularly blamed for social ills such as the
rising incidence of crime, drug abuse, disease, prostitution and the widespread availability of
weapons. By early 2001, the government of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), with the
acquiescence of the national government, contemplated a policy of mass refoulement (forced
return of refugees). Although another 150,000 persons entered Pakistan soon after October
2001, 2.7 million repatriated to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005.
A Census conducted in 2005 showed that there were 3.02 million refugees in Pakistan
indicating that while repatriation has been taking place, refugee numbers have also swelled
largely due to refugees’ prolonged stay in Pakistan (almost 50 percent of the refugee
population are under 15 years of age) as well as the difficult conditions inside Afghanistan
that have forced many to return to Pakistan.
2
2.
Current Initiatives
The UNHCR-assisted Repatriation Program has been successful in facilitating the return of
approximately three million Afghans since the signing of the Bonn Agreement on December
5, 2001. However, it is evident from the presence of Afghans in Pakistan that repatriation
assistance alone could not address the complex issues ranging from limited absorption
capacities inside Afghanistan to economic integration in Pakistan. Therefore, while stressing
and continuing to provide support for repatriation, the UNHCR continued to support other
initiatives that would resolve the issue of return. The Tripartite Commission meetings and
finally the signing of the Tripartite Agreement (2003-6) between the UNHCR and the
Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan established a timeframe under which Afghan
refugees were to return to Afghanistan. Since the goal was far from achieved, the Tripartite
Agreement was extended to December 2006.
In 2004 UNHCR created the Afghan Comprehensive Solution Unit (ACSU) to develop
broader approaches to the resolution of the Afghan refugee issue in Pakistan and Iran. In
2003 the UNHCR initiated dialogues with relevant stakeholders and the Government of
Pakistan, aimed at finding comprehensive solutions for what was termed displacement from
Afghanistan. This initiative was based on three primary considerations: a) the future
management of population movements that are now increasingly migratory and economic
should be lodged within normalized regional and bilateral relations; b) continued
international engagement and support will nevertheless be required to develop and underpin
such a transition in view of its diverse challenges, and, c), there will be a refugee and
protection dimension to the post-2005 situation.
Two important initiatives of UNHCR were: a) the joint decision between the Pakistan
government and UNHCR to conduct a census of Afghan refugees in Pakistan under the aegis
of the GoP which was completed in March 2005; and, b) to conduct consultations with a
broad spectrum of civil society organizations in order to solicit opinions and build consensus
around the need for a new policy framework.
Further, the UNHCR view was that “the post 2005 situation should preferably be approached
as a migration and a development challenge.” The GoP, on the other hand, maintains that
redefining a refugee situation into a migration theme and transforming a humanitarian crisis
into a developmental issue with local integration as an objective is not tantamount to a
comprehensive solution. The Ministry of SAFRON (States and Frontier Regions) advocates a
three-pronged approach whereby it seeks: a) international assistance to ensure the sustainable
repatriation of Afghan refugees as the preferred solution; b) international assistance towards
the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan, particularly in the areas of potential
return; and c) assistance to the GoP in developing refugee-impacted areas and host
communities that have been adversely affected by the presence of Afghan refugees for an
extended period while emphatically ruling out local integration.
Given the current status of the refugee phenomenon, the GoP does not foresee that
repatriation will end in 2006 as c.2.6 million Afghans continue to reside in Pakistan. Even if
the current rate of repatriation (at 400,000 returnees per year) were maintained, it would take
approximately 7 years for all Afghans to repatriate, provided no ‘recycling’ takes place. The
UNHCR believes that the reasons many Afghans now remain in Pakistan has more to do with
the better economic and social conditions there than can be found in their homela nd. It is also
of the view that many Afghans living in Pakistan move freely back and forth to their
3
homeland and that many are actively involved in trade and commerce. As such, it questions
whether the majority of Afghans are still refugees strictu senso under international law. It
argues that international support for Afghans in Pakistan would be more effectively
mobilized around a new consensus that recognizes the need to address issues related to
population mobility and poverty as well as refugee protection and humanitarian assistance for
those who still require such support.
The question about the future of Afghan refugees is, therefore, critical at this point. The
fluidity of a Pakistani framework does not provide the refugees with any guarantees about
extended stay. The Government of Pakistan and UNHCR remain wary of each other’s
motivations in promoting a broader analysis and solutions proposed for the Afghan refugee
phenomenon. The broad consultations that SDPI conducted as part of the UNHCR initiative
for dialogue among civil society representatives provide insights into the views of different
stakeholders in different parts of the country.
3.
Rationale
Following the euphoria of the Bonn Agreement, all Afghans were expected to repatriate by
March 2006 in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement signed between the Governments of
Pakistan, Afghanistan and the UNHCR in 2003. Although the UNHCR reported that
approximately 3 million Afghans have returned since the repatriation process began, it is
clear that all of the Afghans presently residing in Pakistan are unlikely to return by December
2006 – when the current extension of the Tripartite Agreement expires.
The population of Afghans in Pakistan is equivalent to roughly two percent of the entire
population of Pakistan; the same ratio as the demographic density of FATA (Federally
Administered Tribal Areas). However, the Afghan population is not centralized but diffused
through different areas in the country, concentrated in two provinces, NWFP and
Balochistan, and within them, in the ethnically Pushtun areas. This in turn has impacted on
their engagement and relations with local people, with a higher degree of acceptance from the
Pushtun population, and varying degrees of resentment by other ethnic groups who see their
presence as strengthening a particular ethnicity by adding to their numbers, potentially
defining other groups as minorities.
It was therefore necessary to hold public consultations and dialogues with stakeholders and
policy-makers to devise sustainable solutions for the Afghans living in Pakistan beyond the
expiry of the Tripartite Agreement. This involved debating the legal status of the Afghan
refugees in Pakistan as well as looking into the interventions that the GoP needs to devise in
the different social sectors, including health, schooling and higher education, water supply,
employment generation, and women’s development and their protection from violence.
4
II
INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONSULTATIONS
1.
Objectives
The dialogue/consultation process undertaken by SDPI, while taking a rights-based approach
as its underlying principle, had the following objectives:
a. To solicit opinions and support an informed debate on future policy options to address the
issues related to Afghans in Pakistan among key opinion makers within government, the
private sector and civil society at the federal and provincial levels.
b. To identify viable policy options and propose recommendations to the Government of
Pakistan, the Government of Afghanistan, UNHCR and other stakeholders that could
contribute to the establishment of a new policy framework and supporting arrangements after
the end of the Tripartite Agreement in December 2006.
2.
Process Followed/Methodology
In the consultation process, SDPI engaged with nearly two hundred prominent men and
women, representing the different sections of civil society in Pakistan’s four provinces and
the federal capital as well as Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan.
A total of 13 meetings were held: of these 8 were focus group discussions while five were
high-profile meetings where input from the focus group discussions was discussed. The focus
group discussions were held separately with Pakistani and Afghan communities in Islamabad,
Quetta, Peshawar, Karachi and Lahore. The consolidated input from these discussions as well
as the high-profile meetings in the four provincial capitals formed the basis of
recommendations to policy makers at a final meeting organized in Islamabad.
For the focus group discussions, efforts were made to identify relevant community-based
people such as NGO field workers, social activists, journalists, doctors, teachers, traders and
shopkeepers, nationalists and trade union activists. Within these communities, we identified
people who work with Afghans or are affected by their presence. The Afghan community
5
leaders included similar professionals who were articulate about the needs, strengths and
weaknesses of their community.
The findings and conclusions were synopsized in a power point presentation and presented at
higher-level consultative meetings, held in the capital cities of each province. Lawyers,
political party representatives, heads of NGOs, educationists and senior journalists were
invited to these consultations. They were asked to provide further input and to add more
nuances based on feedback from the focus group discussions.
The responses were summarized in the form of a report presented at the national level
consultation held in Islamabad. Reactions and suggestions from the final meeting have been
incorporated into the main body of the present report.
The SDPI team coordinated and conducted each meeting, led by its Executive Director.
3.
Media Dissemination
Press releases were prepared and sent to newspapers to initiate wider public deliberation, and
the events were covered in most leading national newspapers. The meetings also received
coverage in some newspapers in Afghanistan. Further, radio coverage, especially with the
BBC Pushto service, took place while television networks, including the state run Pakistan
Television’s widely-viewed 9 p.m. news telecast, reported the high profile discussion in
Islamabad.
6
III
KEY DISCUSSIONS AND
CONCERNS AT THE
CONSULTATIONS
Introduction
Overall, the tacit understanding was that a significant number of Afghan refugees would
choose not to return to Afghanistan willingly. Consequently, people’s responses were three
tiered:
•
First, examining a range of structural barriers to repatriation including those that the
Karzai government is trying to address, like minimizing violence and creating
livelihood opportunities; those that cannot be changed through policy measures, such
as children’s inability to cope with changed and severe weather conditions; and
issues that have stymied the international community, like multiple claims on
properties, enmities stirred up due to past conflicts and the tradition of revenge.
•
Second, regarding the position and legal status of refugees and input for policy
decisions for their immediate future, exploring a range of options such as whether to
repatriate, legalize, naturalize, register and allow temporary stay, grant work visas or
institute deportation.
•
Third, proposing solutions for the refugees’ future and prospects in Pakistan,
predic ated on their continued presence in the country.
Despite the varied suggestions and nuanced concerns, there was a unanimous
acknowledgement that forced repatriation lacks legality and was both morally wrong and
practically unfeasible.
Throughout all the meetings, every participant felt that until fair policies and mechanisms
have been put in place and endorsed by the Afghan refugees, their refugee status should
remain unchanged.
7
All the groups, irrespective of profile, felt the Afghan refugees were still in need of refuge.
Citing the conflict and security failures in Afghanistan, one high level group pointed that
initiating the repatriation process before reconciliation was fundamentally naïve and
dangerous.
The Afghans and Pakistanis, across the board, stated that the policy-making process should
be openly and fully communicated, ensuring the participation of and consultation with the
key stakeholders: the Afghan refugees themselves and the host population, especially the
affected citizens of Pakistan. They felt that the failure of inter-governmental dialogue and
solutions was evident in the myopic and overly ambitious Tripartite Agreement, which was
dismissed by all respondents, who said that the crucial ingredients missing from it were
people’s voices and experiential realities.
In the high-level consultations, some groups resented the secrecy that shrouded Pakistan’s
Afghan policy, saying it should be debated in relevant Assemblies and Parliaments. One
participant summarized this position by saying that people were not asked about or involved
in the decision to accept refugees, but now they were being approached for a way out of the
dilemma.
The high-level consultations resulted in a convincing suggestion to categorize the Afghan
refugees in Pakistan as (a) those who wish to return and can be facilitated by special
measures, and (b) those who wish to stay on and integrate into Pakistan. Policies and
measures should be evolved accordingly. One meeting further resulted in the idea of detailed
categorization of refugees into vulnerable refugees (e.g., widows, orphans and the elderly),
economic migrants, workers, and nomads. It was suggested that registration should take place
according to such a categorization.
The Afghans in Karachi highlighted the neglect they faced in comparison with the services
provided to those who lived in NWFP and Balochistan, noting that refugees in camps
received attention, but those outside the camps were not provided any support by any official
or civil society organization. In Peshawar, where camps were present, the Afghans discussed
the corruption and failure of the Afghan leaders who misgoverned the camps.
Over the decades, the Afghans and Pakistanis have developed a mutually hostile coexistence, the underlying factors of which need to be resolved if a significant portion of the
refugees is to stay on. On the one hand they are united by a level of bonding and
understanding, with Pakistanis feeling sympathy towards and demanding justice for the
Afghans, and expressing anger at both governments and the international community on their
behalf. The Afghans, on the other hand, while appreciating Pakistan’s refuge and survival
options for them, assert their right to stay on, expressing religious solidarity and their positive
contribution to Pakistan’s economy. They also hold the Pakistan government responsible for
its support to certain groups within Afghanistan that continue to create insecurity within their
country.
Conflicting tensions with and resentment towards each other is also apparent, with Afghan
participants in Peshawar decrying the ‘second class’ status conferred on them; in Karachi,
speaking of social discrimination and negative attitudes against them, including police
harassment; in Quetta showing resentment against unequal wages and non-acceptance.
Similarly, Pakistanis in Karachi and Peshawar said they were suffering because of the refugee
8
population burden. They explained that refugees had brought in drugs, arms and ammunition,
and exacerbated crime and prostitution locally.
Some participants said that with the Afghans’ arrival, violence against women increased in
Pushtoon society, particularly in the tribal belt. In Quetta Pakistanis said that the Afghans
would distort political voting profiles and were already politically active in breach of refugee
regulations. The Afghans were also accused of being mercenary. Other Pakistanis said that
the host population should not suffer for its largesse, given the strain on resources. Pakistanis
posited not just humanitarian concerns about the treatment of and plans for Afghan refugees:
they also articulated their concern, grounded in the tangential nexus of poverty and the
refugee phenomenon in their lives. The Afghan population’s response was also predicated on
their experience of living within the socio-cultural contexts of the four provinces.
1.
LEGAL STATUS OF REFUGEES
The Government of Pakistan maintains that the Afghans residing in Pakistan are refugees.
However, their situation is ambiguous as no formal law or policy determines their legal
status. Refugees currently do not have any identification or registration papers and are often
susceptible to harassment and lock-ups when the Foreign Registration Act of 1946 is applied
to them.
Throughout all the meetings, every participant felt that until fair policies and mechanisms
were in place and endorsed by the Afghan refugees, their refugee status should remain
unchanged. Further, maintaining a soft border with Afghanistan as means of solving the
refugee problem was repeatedly echoed in Peshawar and to a lesser degree in the other
provincial capitals. The UNHCR contends that since there is a de facto soft border and that
Afghans can move freely back and forth, the Afghans are not being restrained or persecuted;
therefore, they no longer require the status and protection accorded to refugees.
A.
Nationality/Registration
•
Perceptions
The Afghans felt they were entitled to citizenship, as according to international norms, it was
granted after eight years, and they were well over that time limit. They all stated that the
absence of legal rights prevented them from availing amenities and services and put them at
risk of harassment from law enforcing agencies. They frequently face social and economic
discrimination in that their wages were lower than those of Pakistani workers. They noted
that the number of Afghans in the country was much higher than the Census reflected, as
many refused to register for fear that the information would be used to force their return.
They felt that legal recognition as nationals would provide them protection against all of
these factors.
Many Pakistanis also felt that Afghans had earned the right to be in the country if they chose
to remain, but it would be impractical to give them nationality as the country’s laws make
acquiring citizenship very difficult. However, a few but very articulate Pakistani participants
believed that Afghans are entitled to Pakistani citizenship under the clauses of the existing
citizenship laws. In high-level consultations, participants pointed out that Pakistan’s
citizenship laws are so strict that foreign men married to Pakistani women are not entitled to
citizenship. NARA (National Aliens Registration Authority) was discussed and cited as the
only option (albeit impractical since NARA did not include Afghans within its purview to
9
register when it was set up) which allowed ‘aliens’ to stay on and work for three years,
extendable for a fourth year, after which they faced criminal charges and imprisonment.
In the Pakistani group discussions there were some nationalist and ethnic divides where
Pakistani participants felt the Afghan refugees were in large numbers and not a marginal
group. They feared that this demographic strength would weigh heavily on the country’s
socio-economic politics in terms of resource allocation and voting patterns, leading to
political distortions, if they were given citizenship. They also pointed to water shortages and
dwindling livelihood and economic opportunities as major reasons for not accepting the
Afghans. This was true in cities such as Karachi where ethnicity and migration are pivots of
local politics, and in Quetta, where Baloch nationalism and antagonism towards other
ethnicities has been high because of the marginalization of the local population.
Maintaining the Durand Line as a soft border was echoed across all meetings and endorsed
by the Afghans, but was challenged by some Pakistanis on the grounds that it could lead to
terrorist movements and security threats.
•
Proposed Solutions
Many Afghans felt that they should be given citizenship, but were also open to other forms of
legal recognition. While some suggested that the legal status of refugees should not be
changed, others contended that Afghans would provide for themselves despite their extreme
poverty, so long as they received identity documents issued by UNHCR that entitled them to
facilities like health and education and basic amenities free of charge or lieu of nominal
payment. Some Afghans said they wanted citizenship to gain legal protection against
harassment.
At the grass roots as well as higher-level meetings, there were recommendations to grant
citizenship rights. However, the issue was hotly contested at the focus group meeting in
Karachi and the high-level meeting in Quetta. Political parties appear to have different
positions on the issue: while the Awami National Party (ANP) advocates citizenship rights,
the Balochistan National Party (BNP) insisted that the Afghans should be guests in Pakistan
and must return to their own land. Some Sindhi nationalists asserted that Karachi was already
under tremendous stress due to inter-provincial migration, so the proposal to absorb
thousands of Afghans and share scarce water and other resources with them was unrealistic.
At the high level meetings, all preferred to recommend registration rather than citizenship,
citing Constitutional and practical barriers. Most groups concurred that the refugees should
be registered as a means of facilitating their human rights. Many Pakistanis pointed out that
the model used for other migrant communities by National Alien Registration Authority
(NARA) was not successful since many chose not to register themselves. One reason given
was that it gave migrants yearly permits for a maximum of four years, after which they were
expected to return to their countries or face penalties. It was also suggested that the high
annual fee for registration/work permits be rationalized for Afghans, if the policy was to
succeed.
At a high level meeting, some members of the intelligentsia in Karachi and Islamabad
suggested that a system be designed in line with the green card process of the USA. This
would facilitate legal recognition of the Afghans, and would entitle them to social and
economic rights without granting them political rights (especially the right of vote). However,
the Nazim of Peshawar pointed to his administration’s dilemma in dealing with Afghan
10
refugees who cannot vote for any candidate but whose welfare falls upon the local
government. He explained that he had tried to establish a separate hospital for Afghans so the
pressure on Peshawar’s major hospitals would ease, but funds for this facility could not
legally be allocated from the local government budget.
The high level consultations resulted in a suggestion to categorize the Afghan refugees in
Pakistan as those who wish to return and can be facilitated by special measures, and those
who wish to stay on and integrate in Pakistan. Policies and measures should be evolved
accordingly. Granting Afghans civil rights but not voting rights was discussed and proposed
to be included as part of the registration process.
The Peshawar groups with a predominant Pushtun ethnicity said the Durand line should be
formally declared a soft border: people living on either side should have the right to cross the
border for work. Most of the Afghans felt they had a moral claim to dual citizenship and that
cross-border work and travel would ensure their eventual return.
B.
Revising the Tripartite Agreement
•
Perceptions
All groups, Afghans and Pakistanis, in all provinces felt that the Tripartite Agreement was
over-ambitious, as full repatriation could not be implemented. They considered that it should
be reviewed and revised as it had been approved and signed hurriedly: nor was it responsive
to ground realities. All of the Afghans were highly critical of the Tripartite Agreement and
felt it should have been more participatory and do-able.
•
Proposed Solutions
Recommendations included extending the repatriation window time through which UNHCR
should continue its support, and that the Afghan refugees should be actively involved in this
process.
In one discussion, the Afghan community pointed out that the attempt should be to first
repatriate the better off Afghans - the business men and traders - because they would create
the employment and other economic opportunities which would lure the more disadvantaged
people back to Afghanistan. They also suggested that the Tripartite Agreement should be
reviewed and revised after more lobbying and public debate and should be reshaped in light
of the Millennium Development Goals for 2015.
There were also proposals that international aid to Afghanistan be made conditional on the
government giving incentives for refugee return.
Overall, the recommendation of examining the Tripartite Agreement closely, conducting
public debate on it, as well as having the National Parliament review and reconsider the
different clauses, were considered the preferred solutions. Many participants agreed that there
should be lobbying for a more open Afghan policy in Pakistan and that people’s opinions
should be sought by the government.
11
C.
Refugee Status and International Commitment
Participants, both Afghan and Pakistani, imputed a far greater role to and reliance on the
international community based on the experience of the 1980s when international support to
the Afghan crisis was forthcoming on a large scale.
Participants were deeply resentful of decreased trends in international aid. They were
unaware that there is a fundamental change of opinion in the international community about
the nature of the Afghan refugee problem and the associated humanitarian crisis. The fact that
most of the international community now recognizes the Afghan government calls into
question the maintenance of a refugee status for Afghans and therefore the overall definition
of the problem. Bilateral and multilateral donors maintain that the Afghans, who first arrived
as a result of war and conflict, now face economic, social and cultural, rather than political,
impediments to return. Therefore there is now greater emphasis upon international support to
Afghans inside Afghanistan rather than those who have chosen to stay outside.
The expectation of the flow of humanitarian aid for refugees at levels similar to when the
crisis began is not borne out by actual experience. On the contrary, the flow of resources is
highest at the beginning of a crisis but declines over time as essential issues are addressed.
Moreover, humanitarian interventions associated with refugee situations tend to be short term
in their vision, aims, and impact. To expect refugee aid to address complex problems
stemming from the host country’s economic and social development may be misplaced. We
know that donor aid has not been a solution in many situations and in fact can potentially lead
to more problems than it may solve. Be that as it may, the overall perceptions of the Afghans
and Pakistanis were negative, as documented below.
•
Perceptions
Many Pakistanis and most Afghans felt that the Afghans had been exploited and used on the
global political chessboard, and now, when their ‘utility’ is at a minimum, the world is trying
to wash its hands of them. Participants felt that the international community has a moral
obligation to continue its support, and that the refugees’ problems were being minimized for
political expediency. Many felt that the current Afghan government was complicit in this
diminished attention. The members of all of the focus groups also felt that the international
community should continue its support.
•
Proposed Solutions
All the Afghan respondents were resistant to any change in their refugee status, as their need
for refuge was still ongoing. At all the high level consultations, the Pakistanis also concurred,
highlighting the international community’s obligations to the refugees.
Some participants identified the US as the morally-obliged funding party; others named Saudi
Arabia, since (i) it was also involved in exacerbating tensions through support of
retrogressive factions and (ii) as a Muslim country it was obligated to help another Muslim
country.
It was suggested by all that the Afghans’ refugee status and repatriation “window” time be
extended, with the Pakistanis suggesting a 3-year extension and the Afghans suggesting 8-10
years. As noted above, political party positions varied on the issue with some advocating
citizenship and others advocating return.
12
2.
REPATRIATION
The GoP has insisted on repatriation as the preferred solution. It has consistently opposed
local integration in view of the large numbers of refugees and Pakistan’s limited absorption
capacity. Simultaneously, it has implicitly acknowledged that the Afghan population in
Pakistan has changed in character. For instance, during the Taliban regime, Pakistan insisted
that the refugees trying to enter Pakistan were environmental and economic refugees, entirely
different from the first wave of refugees who were fleeing Soviet occupation.
Similarly, after the Afghan Refugee Census of March 2005, Pakistani policy-makers have
been open to suggestions of extended stay, given the unstable conditions inside Afghanistan,
especially in the rural areas from where the majority of the refugees come. The GoP has
recently (i.e., in 2006) proposed an extended repatriation strategy that would prevent
‘recycling’ without incurring ill will from amongst the Afghans as well as the international
community.
The UNHCR has continuously supported repatriation initiatives. However, it recognizes that
the profile of the Afghans who repatriate or move back is based on socio-economic factors.
UNHCR reports that 6 million people (or 30 percent of the Afghan population) have been
internally or externally displaced over the last 25 years of occupation and civil war. This has
led to changes within the Afghan Diaspora, where traditional power structures and centers
have been replaced, and where Afghans have developed new networks due to extended
displacement. The new generation of Afghans, born abroad, has a different relationship with
Afghanistan and cannot expect to reintegrate smoothly. Therefore, UNHCR proposes that the
complex issue of ‘refugeehood’ combined with migration requires a different policy
response. While it continues to prioritize protection and safe voluntary return, the UNHCR
has emphasized debate for the formulation of a new framework that addresses not only
refugee issues but also migration and labor emigration.
The issues raised in the stakeholders’ consultations throughout the four provinces of Pakistan
are discussed in detail in the following subsections.
A.
Barriers to Repatriation
Repatriation has been influenced by a number of factors related to political, economic and
social conditions inside Afghanistan and to the Afghans’ adjustment over the years to life in
Pakistan. Overall, the UNHCR records indicate that 4.2 million Afghans have been
repatriated back to Afghanistan since the repatriation initiative began in 1989-90.
The large presence of Afghans is explained by two main factors: the movement of people
back into Pakistan from Afghanistan due to adverse conditions at home and facilitated by a
porous border; and a 3% population growth rate. According the 2005 Census, eighty percent
of Afghans currently in Pakistan have been in Pakistan since 1985 or before. Nineteen
percent of the refugee population in 2005 was under five years of age and many more were
under 15 years of age. A considerable number of Afghans were born and have grown up in
Pakistan without any experience of living in Afghanistan. Many others were too young to
have any recollection of it. They have assimilated to local living conditions and Pakistani
culture overall, and have reservations about returning to an uncertain future, and a culture
they are not entirely familiar with. For the second generation Afghans in Pakistan, the host
country has always been home. This fact presents a considerable challenge to both the
13
Pakistan and Afghan governments which must agree on ways and means of providing schools
and employment opportunities to the younger generation of Afghans if repatriation is to
succeed.
i
Political and Security Concerns
•
Fragile Security Situation
The internecine warring, Taliban resurgence, warlord rivalries and the USA’s ‘deadly
salvation’ makes return inhospitable. All stakeholders acknowledged that stability and peace
in Afghanistan are prerequisites for refugee return to be permanent and viable.
•
Warlords
Many Afghans emphasized that the people they fled from were still in power and were now
allied with the government. They specifically cited the problem of continuing recruitment by
warlords, which would compromise their safety.
•
Foreign Forces
In the focus group discussions, the Afghans identified the US troops and the occupation of
their country as another reason they did not want to return, fearing violence, arbitrary
detention and arrest, and abusive behavior.
ii
Economic and Social Impediments to Return
•
The High Cost of Living
The Afghans noted that Afghanistan had become an extremely expensive country to live in
that provided them few avenues for survival. People cited the high property rental costs of
Kabul as a measure of high rates of inflation, noting that routine transactions required dollars
instead of the Afghani. The Afghans noted they did not have the skills or education levels to
earn that much money, and that places outside Kabul were difficult to live in due to lack of
services, infrastructure and security.
The Afghans living in Karachi also spoke of the high cost of repatriation itself, pointing out
that the UNHCR facilitation begins in Peshawar, while it costs them fifteen hundred rupees
per person to reach Peshawar.
•
Lack of Skills to Return
During the focus group discussions, Pakistanis noted that the qualified and educated Afghans
could choose to relocate to western countries, whereas the poorer, uneducated people who
had no other option, stayed on in Pakistan. Nor is this group of Afghans qualified to find
employment upon return. Some Afghans pointed out that skilled Pakistanis had found
employment in Afghanistan. Some raised the point that the decades they lived in refugee
camps should have been used to build their skills and capacities. The Afghans reiterated the
need for vocational training and life skills for income generating options, enabling them to
cope upon return.
•
Lack of Social Services Infrastructure
Most of the groups, at both the grass roots and high-level consultations, noted the gradual
collapse of social service infrastructure in Afghanistan over the years, stating that this has not
been rectified yet, and that, other than roads, no support service or significant form of
development progress had been implemented. Afghan participants felt there were few
livelihood opportunities, no amenities and infrastructure and no land for cultivation. One
14
participant stated, “Here we survive on a day-to-day basis, but in Afghanistan, even that is
not possible. There is no survival.” Many of the groups strongly expressed the need for the
international community to focus on ‘development aid rather than military aid.’
•
Climatic Concerns
Afghans explained that the climate of Afghanistan is a deterrent to repatriation, since children
born and brought up in Pakistan, especially second and third generation Afghans in Pakistan,
are used to milder winters. Afghans in cities such as Karachi and Islamabad emphasized that
their children could not survive the harsh winters of Afghanistan—a factor that is seldom
factored in by policy-makers. The doctors and NGO fie ld workers in the high-level meetings
attested to this, saying that people’s immune systems had altered.
•
Cultural and Traditional Factors
Though culture was cited specifically as a problem by one Afghan focus group, all the
Afghans mentioned a cultural basis for discrimination and violence against women as a
reason for not wanting to return. Afghan refugees in all provinces outlined the severely
repressive traditions regarding women. Returning would mean regression for the women in
their families, especially with regard to marriage practices (including forced marriages
decided by the extended family or jirgas), education, employment opportunities, sociocultural practices and local status and morality markers. In Peshawar specifically, they spoke
about disapproval of and sanctions against women-headed households and widows who had
no networks of family and friends within Afghanistan to help them to return, resettle and
survive. Pakistanis did not realize the intensification of violence and discrimination against
women in Afghanistan as a barrier to return, while the Afghans said that after 25 years of war
and forced migration, women were now used to being more independent. Similarly, the
youths who have grown up in Pakistan are unable to adjust to life in rural Afghanistan (from
where their parents hailed) because of differences in culture, the language of instruction at
school and life in urban environments.
B.
Measures for Non-Repatriating Afghans
The 2005 Census data portrays an interesting profile of Afghans who have not returned.
Thirty-five percent of Afghans presently in Pakistan arrived in 1980 from neighboring
provinces in Eastern and South Eastern Afghanistan, mostly from Nangarhar and Kandahar.
The remainder who hail from Kabul and the central provinces arrived during the 1990s. A
majority of those who had entered Pakistan in 2002 repatriated within two years. This means
that those who have stayed longer are the least likely to return. It can be argued that the
provinces they come from are still prone to violence and do not ensure security. It can also be
argued that the first wave are most comfortable because they are Pushtuns from neighboring
provinces of Afghanistan and, therefore, their comfort level with the language and culture is
high.
There are a number of implications for the host population as well. Afghans have mostly
settled in the less populous provinces of Pakistan. In Balochistan they constitute 10 percent of
the total population and in the NWFP they constitute 7.6 percent of the population. Within
each province, their concentrations may be higher in some areas than the provincial averages.
As mentioned previously, Afghans have a 3 percent population growth rate, which explains a
large proportion of under 15 year olds.
15
A vast majority of refugees cite the lack of shelter and livelihood opportunities as the main
reasons for not returning, while 21 percent cite lack of security as a major impediment to
repatriation. This indicates that rapid economic and infrastructure development is needed
within Afghanistan. Furthermore, it is clear that some of the reasons for staying on in
Pakistan pertain to under-development in the rural areas of the provinces from where the
majority of refugees originate. Economic and infrastructure underdevelopment pre-date the
Russian intervention, but the years of conflict and violence have worsened the situation.
Given the complexity of the picture, responses were also varied. There was hostility toward
Afghan refugees in Balochistan and Sindh but a more temperate attitude prevailed in Punjab
and NWFP. Nevertheless, participants across the board agreed that Pakistan has a moral and
ethical imperative, as well as a practical need, to develop repatriation strategies that would be
effective, assuming that a significant portion of the Afghan population would not voluntarily
return. On their part, Afghans were insecure about their stay and the discrimination they had
to endure as a result of their ambiguous legal status.
i
Protection Concerns
•
Perception
All Afghans emphasized that police harassment was routine as they were frequently detained
and asked to produce documents pertaining to their legal status. They highlighted the bribes
and extortion demanded from them, as no such documents had been issued to them in recent
years. Afghans in Quetta and Peshawar referred to the brief period of refoulement, while
those in Karachi spoke of living under threat of law enforcement agencies. The Pakistanis
also acknowledged this problem; however, people from the law enforcement agencies also
linked the high incidence of crimes to the presence of Afghan refugees and more so to the
absence of any legal documents of their identity.
•
Proposed Solutions
The Afghans and Pakistanis alike felt that a decision on legal status, and documents
demonstrating that status, would minimize harassment as well as crime.
Afghans suggested that Pakistan sign the UN Refugee Convention and that they be given
legal protection under international law. They also recommended the formation of
committees of Afghan refugees to look into these issues.
ii
Women’s Rights
•
Perceptions
The Afghans (especially the Dari-speakers) felt that returning to Afghanistan would be a
regression for the women of their communities. They recounted discriminatory practices such
as walwar (bride price), swara (exchange of women to settle disputes) and forced marriages.
Furthermore, Afghan women felt that even in Pakistan they were marginalized, both by the
government and general society, as well as by Afghan men, and were the most vulnerable
section of their society.
Some Pakistanis felt that violence against all women has risen since the arrival of refugees,
and that now domestic violence was more common and acceptable than the past, noting that
there were no formal or even informal institutions for the legal and psychological support of
Afghan women. This was especially so in view of the active discouragement from different
16
government authorities of the formation of women’s NGOs that would address Afghan
women’s rights rather than welfare alone.
•
Proposed solutions
The Afghans in three provinces urged that NGOs step forward to provide skill training and
capacity building of Afghan women. The Pakistanis suggested that they also address the issue
of domestic violence, oppressive traditional practices and violence against women in general,
for their uplift and empowerment.
iii
Social Services: Education
•
Perceptions
All respondents in all focus groups mentioned the scarcity of schools and the prohibitive
costs of education in Afghanistan. The general state of education in Pakistan was deemed
unsatisfactory overall by the high level consultations, but acknowledged as better than that in
Afghanistan, specifically for girls. However, all felt that a more responsive education system
needed to be devised for those who decide to stay. Pakistanis felt that it was a past injustice
that only a miniscule percentage of Afghan youth was allowed to attend higher educational
institutions in Pakistan, leaving the majority with little choice but to go to religious
seminaries (madaris), which were welcoming and supportive but indirectly fuelling the
extremist inclinations.
Regarding the medium of instruction, Pakistanis remained silent on these issues in some
meetings while in others suggesting that the options of learning Pushto and Persian might be
provided to Afghan children in schools in Pakistan.
Those living in Quetta (dealing with isolationist tendencies and ethnocentrism on the part of
the host community and tight-knit identities with its resultant politics) felt that refugee camps
should continue, and that there should be special schools for Afghan children, with the
medium of instruction being both Pushto and Persian. Afghan participants also said they
might not return to their hometowns as their children would encounter discrimination once
again as the ‘outsiders’ since they do not know the culture in Afghanistan.
In Karachi, where many diverse communities reside, there has been some degree of
assimilation. Afghans suggested that Afghan children should study in regular schools with
Persian and Pushto being offered as optional subjects. A greater emphasis was placed on
access and the number of schools available, with the suggestion of incentive-based education
for the poorer Afghans.
In Peshawar, on the other hand, since Pushto is widely spoken and understood, the medium of
instruction was not debated as an issue. The Afghans were more concerned with acquiring
degree equivalence between the two countries, so the professionals such as engineers,
doctors, nurses, technicians and lawyers who had qualified in Afghanistan could practice in
Pakistan, earn a living and ease the burden on local doctors and health facilities.
In addition, many Afghans expressed their concern about their children’s, and
grandchildren’s lack of knowledge of Afghan history, geography and culture. They were also
extremely concerned about the premature closure of donor-funded schools for Afghan
children in the Frontier province in 2005.
17
Proposed Solutions
•
All people consulted, Afghans and Pakistanis, at all levels agreed that Afghan children need
to be provided free, quality education. Pakistanis in one focus group discussion felt that the
child laborers need to be provided both free and incentive-based education to bring them to
schools.
At the ‘grass roots’ level, non-Pushtun Afghan respondents felt that Afghan children need
separate schools. In the NWFP Afghans suggested sending their children to regular Pakistani
schools. This is probably because Afghans are more comfortable with the culture in the
NWFP, which is more aligned with that of Afghanistan and so requires less adaptation. There
were also recommendations of entitling Afghan youth to small quotas in institutions of higher
learning.
At the high level meetings, Pakistanis argued that maintaining segregated education and
health systems was unacceptable, and that strategies should be devised to make Afghans part
of the mainstream.
Social Services: Health
•
Perceptions
There was wide recognition that the health needs of the refugee population, inadequate
services, and the severe strain on Pakistan’s existing health infrastructure need to be
addressed urgently. Many participants noted that the health budget has remained the same
while Pakistan’s population has doubled over the past 25 years.
Even though donor organizations have provided support to major hospitals and BHUs for
Afghans, the existing facilities do not have the capacity (in terms of personnel and
equipment) to cope with current needs. The participants at the Peshawar meeting were
concerned about the closure of UNHCR-supported health facilities for Afghans. All felt that
such facilities needed to be increased, not decreased. For example, it was pointed out that
sometimes there were two and even three patients in a hospital bed, making life and healing
very difficult for patients in addition to the difficulty hospitals face in replacing or repairing
beds and other equipment.
The shrinking funds available for health facilities for Afghans can only deepen the crisis of
health care provision. Participants pointed out that government hospitals were not issuing
birth certificates to Afghan children born in Pakistan. While many Afghans held the
government of Pakistan responsible for their welfare, others placed the onus for their well
being on the international community, saying it would be criminal neglect to roll back
support.
Participants said that many people continued to return from Afghanistan to avail the medical
facilities in Pakistan, given the lack of such services in their homeland. A related issue was
the low level of health awareness regarding sanitation, disease prevention and basic health
care: this is particularly significant since so many children, especially in Karachi, Islamabad
and Peshawar, were rag pickers and scavengers.
The Pakistanis in some focus groups mentioned the new strains of some diseases the refugee
influx has introduced into Pakistan, such as drug-resistant tuberculosis and particular strains
of malaria. However, they also acknowledged the infrastructure development and significant
18
financial assistance that the Afghan refugee presence had brought for Pakistan, which also
benefited the local population.
•
Proposed solutions
The need to improve existing health services and infrastructure was highlighted by all
respondents across all provinces, with a few proposing separate facilities for Pakistanis and
Afghans.
Some healthcare professionals suggested the introduction of health cards and special units
within hospitals, with the dual purposes of catering to Afghan refugees on the one hand and
tracking different contagious diseases on the other hand. Elaborate suggestions for different
colored cards that could indicate the cardholder’s disease history and his or her ability to pay
were also presented as a means of developing a database and screening system for Afghans in
Pakistan.
There were broad-based suggestions that qualified Afghan doctors and nurses should be
awarded equivalence degrees to practice in Pakistan. Alternatively, they could appear for a
standard examination to prove their equivalency. In Peshawar, it was suggested that military
hospitals should also allow the public to receive treatment to share the extra burden with the
civil/public hospitals.
The Medical Superintendent of the Mayo Hospital in Lahore asserted that the Punjab Health
Department could accommodate Afghan refugees and provide them free health care services
as was being done for Pakistanis under the existing budget. He also offered his advisory
services to hospitals in other cities so that his model can be replicated and more people can be
accommodated and provided free health care.
Another proposed solution was that the Afghan business community be allowed to construct
houses, health centers and educational institutions. Members of this community were
confident of achieving self-help, based on their practical experience of organizing groups and
subgroups to distribute aid.
The Afghans reiterated that NGOs should design mass health awareness campaigns regarding
disease prevention, basic health care and sanitation.
Social Services: Infrastructure
•
Perceptions
Many Pakistani participants summarized the dismal state of social services infrastructure in
Pakistan, noting that this would further suffer if the refugees stayed on and were legally
entitled to all services. All of the discussion groups expressed concern about the already
meager social sector allocations (especially for water, housing, electricity and hospitals) in
the country, and how these would be stretched even more thinly, adding to the state of crisis
in service delivery. This has already resulted in inter-provincial migration, tensions and
conflict, which would be exacerbated.
Many participants expressed concern about the consistently declining ability of the provinces
to cater to people’s basic needs, be they Afghan or Pakistani. Some participants suggested
that given the de facto sharing of services, it was imperative to regularize the legal status of
Afghans and provide them access to social services.
19
Some participants asserted that the Federal Government should make public the
advantages/gains and disadvantages/losses incurred by the different provinces and the federal
government as a result of the Afghan War. They argued that the loans that were written off
and the military and economic aid received by the government were distributed unequally
among the provinces.
•
Proposed solutions
The solutions proposed by Afghans and Pakistanis were varied, and were informed by their
provincial and ethnic affiliations.
It was proposed that until most Afghans repatriate, the Government of Pakistan should
pressure the international community to sustain funding and financially support GoP in its
obligations. This should translate into both specific support for refugees and support for
government infrastructure to enable it to deal justly with its affected population. It was
reiterated that without this support, there would be conflicts between Afghans and Pakistanis
and resentment against the state for not fulfilling its obligations: this may translate into
xenophobia and hostility against refugees. Some participants felt that such funding should in
fact not be routed through GoP but that independent committees or a Commission be
established to ensure smooth mechanisms and transparency.
One suggestion was that the NWFP should receive special funds or a quota from the Federal
government as compensation for absorbing a majority of the Afghan refugee population.
At the high level meetings, there were proposals for initiating dialogue between the local
communities and Afghan refugees to defuse tensions between them and to solve controversial
issues amicably. Many participants recommended that civil society organizations could act as
mediators between the host and refugee communities to help the vulnerable groups.
iv
Livelihoods: Labour and Employment
•
Perceptions
All groups expressed concern about decreasing wages and lower remuneration due to the
availability of abundant refugee labor. In Karachi, this was equally true of the Bangladeshi
and Burmese communities. The issue of Afghan workers in brick kilns was brought up, as
was the unequal treatment meted out to Afghan workers in mines, in orchards and as farm
labor.
The Pakistanis, however, chose not to acknowledge the role of Afghan labor in the economy
and its contributions to economic growth. It was the Afghans who highlighted the volume of
carpet exports. This in itself is indicative of friction at some level. This can be further
corroborated by the fact that the involvement of Afghan children in child labor was
acknowledged by all focus groups except the one in Karachi, where it is the most common
and where little empathy was exhibited.
The participants at various levels noted how most of the Afghans in Pakistan were relatively
less skilled with fewer resources. Many felt that women should be given skill building and
skill enhancement opportunities, as well as facilitation in developing a nexus with markets.
20
Afghans and Pakistanis also discussed the influx of Pakistani skilled and semi-skilled labor
into Afghanistan, especially in the construction industry. Overall, it was agreed that there
should be no nationality-based discrimination about wages in the two countries.
•
Proposed Solutions
Regarding the labor market distortions resulting in a depressed wage scale, the proposed
remedies ranged from regularizing the Afghans’ status; extending labor laws to them since
they are currently prevented from entering mainstream economic cycles; and giving them
specific work. Some labor representatives suggested that issuing them work permits would
enable Afghans to obtain equal wages and receive protection under the labor laws. All
Afghans demanded equal wages for equal work, comparable to Pakistani nationals.
Some people recommended settling Afghans in relatively sparsely inhabited areas, for
example, in newly established industrial areas like Gwadar. Alternately, others felt that the
Afghan population in Pakistan should be diffused and not allowed to concentrate in particular
areas, as being the majority in a locality the Afghan (read: “foreign”) population would have
its own dynamics.
A novel proposal was that, as the refugee crisis was allegedly created by the Pakistan army, it
should support them through the armed forces’ budget, and utilize Afghan labor in its
industrial units.
Some Pakistanis recognized that because of their refugee status, Afghans could not form
trade unions and existing Pakistani trade unions cannot advocate on their behalf. Therefore,
they advocated some form of protection to avoid exploitation of Afghan labor, especially in
the brick kiln industry where they have become bonded. 3
Livelihoods: Trade & Business
•
Perceptions
In the focus group discussions, the Pakistani participants said that the refugees control the
hotel and transport industries in the NWFP and are now trying to control wholesale markets
of imported items like cloth. Even in Karachi, they were predominant in the transport
industry. A few people ht ought that local businesses find it hard to compete with them. Some
Pakistani participants complained about the rising cost of daily food items (including wheat)
that were being exported and/or smuggled into Afghanistan. They also complained that the
prices of cement and bricks and other items in the construction industry had risen greatly
recently due to the demand in Afghanistan. However, this was countered by the suggestion of
opening up trade with India from where the same items were available much more
economically.
Afghans, on the other hand, mentioned their contribution to the Pakistan economy with carpet
exports in 2002 reaching over a hundred million dollars. Representatives of the Lahore
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) pointed to the five-fold increase in the volume
of trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan since 2002 and explained that it was to Pakistan’s
advantage to help in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. For this purpose LCCI has already
established an Afghan Cell.
3
ILO studies and other research show that the bonded labor issue does not impact Afghans in Pakistan significantly
since they are reluctant to take on loans and incur debt.
21
There was concern from government circles that the Afghan government displayed a
lukewarm attitude toward increasing trade with Pakistan. They complained that the Afghan
government was far friendlier toward India than Pakistan despite Afghanistan’s dependence
upon the transit trade through Pakistan.
•
Possible Solutions
All participants felt that Afghan refugees should pay taxes like the rest of Pakistanis, if they
were earning above a certain minimum amount. The Afghans in two provinces suggested that
revenue collected from them should be used for refugee welfare. In focus groups, Afghans
suggested that they also have a thriving business and trading class in Pakistan who could help
other vulnerable refugees, as could the Afghan diaspora in the west. They also said that
before including them in the tax bracket, they must be given legal protection and the right to
buy and own property and businesses.
Most of the Pakistani respondents agreed that the Afghans should be made to pay income and
relevant taxes, like other citizens. There was a general agreement that trade between Pakistan
and Afghanistan should increase, as it would benefit both countries.
22
IV
CONCLUSION
We conclude by emphasizing some of the key thematic areas that emerged from the
dialogues. In every locale, the intense debates helped highlight nuanced analyses, especially
from local perspectives, and valuable recommendations that would otherwise not be
expressed and would therefore not be available to GoP or UNHCR policy makers.
We take note of three overlapping areas within the policy context: the first relates to the
difference between formal policy objectives and ground realities and the need to share
information about key policy priorities or changes; the second relates to the differences in
perceptions and consequent tensions and lack of communication among key Pakistani and
Afghan stakeholders; the third relates to the role of the international community.
1. The dialogues revealed a number of significant gaps between policy objectives, ground
realities and stakeholder perceptions. The dialogues underscore the lack of basic knowledge
and communication among the four major stakeholders: Pakistani civil society
representatives; the key Pakistani government officials charged with creating initiatives to
resolve Afghan refugee issues; Multi- and bilateral institutions (especially the UNHCR)
providing support to Afghans in Pakistan; and the Afghans in Pakistan. Further, given the
different impacts of the policies pursued by thr GoP and UNHCR, there are also disparities in
the ways in which members of Pakistani civil society and the Afghan refugees experience
current policies and the situation of Afghans in Pakistan. Such differences also mean that
many of the recommendations made by the Afghans and Pakistanis may not complement the
GoP and UNHCR operating frameworks.
These disparities clearly underline the need for wider dissemination and clarification of the
objectives and specificities of each initiative or policy change. Holding frequent dialogues
would help policy-makers to take stock of stakeholder experience and to formulate policies
based in part on the ideas and experiences of the refugee community. Regular discussion
would also potentially address the widespread dissatisfaction with the ad hoc manner in
which Afghan refugee matters are formulated.
To cite one example of the ways in which ground realities need to be taken into account: it is
clear from the dialogues that the Afghan refugee community is not homogeneous and
therefore requires gradations within a larger policy framework to respond to their different
23
needs. Differences in language, levels of education, the ability to earn a living, gender, and
the length of time Afghans have lived in Pakistan, affect their perspectives on policies
relating to their futures. Although the majority of the Afghans – especially the women, the
children, the chronically ill and the illiterate - are extremely vulnerable and depend on
essentially insecure ways of earning a living, some Afghans in some places are well-off
and/or well-educated and could potentially make significant contributions to the well-being
of the Afghan community, if the policy environment were to allow this.
Pakistani civil society representatives view the current policies toward refugees as ineffective
and as immutable, and there is currently no way of holding the GoP and/or UNHCR
accountable for them. An approach which is representative of national consensus regarding a
policy toward Afghanistan and Afghan refugees might emerge if policy issues were informed
by open debate and discussion among a wide array of stakeholders, such as trade unions,
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, political parties, Provincial and National Assemblies
and of course Afghans living in Pakistan. Without this communication, the bitterness that was
displayed by Pakistanis against their own government and against the Afghans at many of the
meetings will continue.
2. The debates also revealed distrust and hostilities that must be addressed if viable and
humane policies are to be created and implemented. At present there is, on the one hand,
mutual antagonism between Afghans and Pakistanis (especially due to scarce natural
resources and access to government education and health facilities) and on the other a strong
desire to help people who are fellow Muslims with long-standing cultural ties. Some degree
of reconciliation, which addresses the underlying causes of the antagonism between
Pakistanis and the Afghan refugees, must be attempted. In the absence of such reconciliation
any proposed solution will be ineffectual.
Some of the antagonistic opinions expressed by Pakistani participants were also based on
political-party considerations and on the degree to which the presence of the Afghans was
thought to affect existing balances of power. These were strikingly evident in the dialogues in
Sindh and Balochistan. Many Afghans, on the other hand, saw themselves as being
deliberately excluded from mainstream society, denied access to security and to basic
services in Pakistan, and ignored by the international community. Policies on repatriation
were thought to be biased by the desire to have them return, without acknowledging the dire
conditions they would face in Afghanistan.
On the positive side, some opinions related to the degree to which there are cultural and
linguistic affinities between the host and refugee communities, with ethnicity and language
being the most significant markers of affinity.
3. Finally, the role of the international community needs to be properly and completely
understood by Pakistanis and Afghan refugees. It is also important for the international
community to understand the reasons for the negative attitudes and responses that have
developed amongst Pakistanis and Afghans as a result of reduced foreign aid and moral
support. There is widespread dislike of US policies toward Pakistan, especially in the context
of the Afghan Jihad and its subsequent fall-out; therefore, arguments about donor fatigue and
constraints, and shifting priorities for humanitarian aid over a 25-year period, are not enough
to persuade Pakistanis (in the face of the scarcity of resources and services and breakdowns
of civic amenities) that the obstacles to continued international assistance are reasonable.
24
The UNHCR must continue to work to ensure that its policies are congruent with the needs of
the refugee community and to work with the GoP to ensure that Afghans’ human and civil
rights are respected while they make decisions that are critical for their future well-being.
25
Annex 1
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS WITH AFGHAN REFUGEE
MEMBERS
27
1
Focus Group Discussion in Islamabad
May 3, 2005
Participants
S. No.
Name
Occupation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Mir Nawaz
Himaad
Nokhan Qandahary
Abdul Majid Akakhel
Khalil
Mohammad Sabir
Zalmay
Shah Amaan
Malik Noor Ali
Saad Qandahary
Shah Alam
Abdul Qadir
Inayat –ur- Rehman
Representative Afghan Refugees Camp Islamabad
Representative Afghan Refugees Camp Islamabad
Representative Afghan Refugees Camp Islamabad
Representative Afghan Refugees Camp Islamabad
Shop Keeper and Representative refugees Camp
Jobless refugee
Businessman
Daily wage worker
Representative Afghan Refugees Camp Islamabad
Representative Afghan Refugees Camp Islamabad
Representative Afghan Refugees Camp Islamabad
Shopkeeper at Refugee camp
Businessman
The presence of Afghan men, women and children, working in different capacities, is visible
in different localities and environs of Islamabad, where we held our first (pilot) focus group
discussion for the Afghan nationals.
However, it was a difficult task to approach and convince Afghan men and women,
irrespective of the locality they were living in, to meet with us, discuss their problems, and
share suggestions for finding viable and durable solutions. We sought out Afghan traders,
schoolteachers, doctors, NGO representatives and people from the camps and invited them to
attend the meeting, but the majority of them refused, saying they were too busy or
uninterested in attending such a meeting.
We explicitly stated our purpose and offered them transportation from their houses or
workplaces and eventually only a few reluctantly agreed to come to the meeting. They still
had reservations about the meeting. Even some of those who had confirmed they would
29
participate changed their minds at the last minute despite the fact that a female team member
personally went to pick them up. Most of them were educated, belonging to different
professions (health, education, business and NGOs). The only group that attended the
meeting, albeit reluctantly, were people from the camps, mainly Afghan community elders,
both men and women. Throughout the discussion, the Afghans emphasized their inability to
return to Afghanistan for various reasons. Later, they also spoke about the problems they face
in Pakistan, and suggested solutions.
Inability to Return
•
The reasons given for their inability to return to Afghanistan were mainly premised on
the lack of peace; issues of personal security; the lack of justice and issues of identity.
These are summarized below:
•
The commanders they fought against are now in power.
With no peace in Afghanistan, they are physically insecure; even the government is
•
insecure, as is evident from the fact that one of the most important and powerful
ministries - the Defense Ministry – was looted.
•
Either they are too poor or others now claim whatever little they had owned in
Afghanistan. They said that different people had laid claim to their land when
successive regimes were in power. The different governments had also allotted the
lands of people who had become refugees so that today there are no means of
ascertaining the legality of multiple claims dating to previous regimes. The Afghan
government has been unable to resolve the issue of multiple claims. They further
claimed that those who have access to the powerful in the present government (which
is not immune to corruption) are able to reallocate lands lawfully or otherwise. The
refugees are not hopeful of getting help from the present government or legal justice
for their claims.
•
For many Afghans, identity is a serious issue since their children and even
grandchildren were born in Pakistan. They were worried about the future of their
children. They cannot adjust in Afghanistan since the weather and social conditions
are totally alien to them. They are better off in katchi abadis (shanty towns) in
Pakistan than moving to so alien an environment. “Even if they are sent to
Afghanistan, the children will come back because they cannot survive there”, the
participants said.
•
The cultural aspect of dushmani (enmity) and badal (revenge) among Afghans is
another major factor of their insecurity. Most of the killings in Afghanistan today are
because of inter-generational badal. They explained that over the 25-year conflict
their fathers and grandfathers had killed or been killed; when they return, they are
expected to avenge those killings or be the targets of revenge. If they try to ignore
revenge, they are liable to be taunted for paighor (for being cowards, giving up on
revenge). They feel protected in Pakistan, and perceive returning to Afghanistan as a
death warrant.
•
“Humsaya” (neighborhood), familiarity and commonality of both cultures across
borders, is also a strong element of their close relationship with Pakistan and its
people.
•
There are economic reasons for not going back to Afghanistan, as their livelihoods
and business connections are now in Pakistan.
30
Problems in Pakistan
•
Afghans are insecure about their future and are uncertainty about their future status in
Pakistan. A degree of certainty is crucial if they are to take concrete steps about their
future.
•
Police harassment is a major source of insecurity. They complained that police take
bribes from the poorest, though not from women.
Other problems identified were: the lack of access to schools and education, lack of
•
healthcare facilities and hospitals, and lack of infrastructure for basic necessities such
as clean water.
•
The majority are unskilled, largely because very few were helped to acquire
marketable skills.
•
Hundreds of Afghan women, mostly widows, go to the langar (a place where food is
distributed among the poor) in Peshawar Mor in Islamabad to receive food for
themselves and their children. Alluding to their concerns about the morality of this
activity (and unspoken concerns about women’s activities), the Afghan men stated
that some of these women return home late at night in taxis.
Suggestions
Schools should be built for Afghan children. For child workers, there should be shifts
•
so they can work as well as acquire an education.
•
Healthcare facilities, including hospitals, should be provided to Afghans since they do
not have the capacity to build these themselves. Health awareness campaigns should
be launched for the Afghan community.
•
They stressed that if they were allowed to stay, they would be loyal to Pakistan, since
it had given them refuge, and would fight for its defense whether in Kashmir or
elsewhere.
•
Once they are certain about their future and their legal status in Pakistan is ensured,
the traders and businessmen could form a union of tajiran (traders), who could
contribute to ameliorating the conditions of their community and take care of the
needy among them. Some said that they are willing to pay 10% tax to the Government
of Pakistan.
•
Skill training should be given to Afghan women and men.
•
Clean drinking water should be provided to the people living in camps and other
temporary shelters.
•
Afghans should be given documents allowing them to stay in Pakistan legally.
•
Afghans born in Pakistan should be given Pakistani nationality. Under international
law, citizenship of the birthplace is given to children.
31
2
Focus Group Discussion in Peshawar
May 17, 2005
Participants
S. No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Name
Zuhra
Gulzai
Sarwar
Shah Agha
Tahmina Qadir
Ruqia Rahmani
Dr. Momend
M. Zubair Shafiqi
Fahima Rahimor
Qatian Qahir
Fariha Popal
Shukria Yasini
Wagma Saba
Najeeb Amir
Akmal Shams
Zuhal Alawi
Usman Sanjush
Shir Shah
Qateel Khugyani
Partawmina Hashemee
Nuzhat Sardar Ibrahim
Occupation
Master Trainer
Manager
Education Officer
HRM Officer
Doctor
Editor
Monitoring & Evaluation
Monitoring & Evaluation
Monitoring & Evaluation
Reporter
Reporter
Student
Secretary
Coordinator
Professor
Journalist
Director
Country Manager
Organization
BEFERE
ACBAR
Afghan Women Network
BEFERE
SDF
SDF
AOGH
Daily Sahar
IRC
IRC
IRC
Afghan Women Network
Pajwak
Radio Free Europe
Aryana University
Aryana University
Afghan Desk, HRCP
Aryana University
Afghan Women Resource Center
Afghan Women Resource Center
The FGD started with a brief round of introductions of the participants. Dr. Saba Gul Khattak
moderated the session and Saleem Shah facilitated the FGD. The main issues discussed are
presented below.
Security in Afghanistan
The fragile security situation in Afghanistan was termed a serious repatriation issue. The
participants said that the warlords, part of the Karzai government, control everything. There is
no peace, as warlords are fighting with each other. The participants quoted President Karzai as
saying that he cannot restore peace.
33
Referring to a recent incident of looting a Governor’s House, the participants asked how, if the
Afghan government could not protect his property, it could protect the people? They said that
50% of those who had repatriated in 2002 have come back due to security and economic
problems. The participants said that the Afghan government had handed over the land allotted to
returned refugees to a religious leader who distributed it among his militiamen. The participants
complained that those who destroyed Afghanistan are again in the government, adding that they
have occupied all the land in Kabul. In this situation, the participants asked, where should they
construct houses?
They termed the Americans more cruel than the Russians, since the Americans did not care about
their “traditions and religion” and noted that the Americans enter their houses without any notice,
adding that it was a “disgrace to our people”. The participants added, “Our people do not want to
get disgraced by US forces.” There is relative peace in Kabul but anarchy elsewhere in
Afghanistan. “Our lives, property and dignity all are at stake. We cannot take the risk to shift to
our country. We do not want to live in hunger and fear,” the participants said.
Economic Issues
The participants stated that there are no business and livelihood opportunities in Afghanistan,
adding that they need agricultural land and trade. However, there is no land available for
cultivation. They government and the international community were spending money only on
defense-related projects. “Our rulers and warlords are well off but ordinary people are living a
miserable life. There is nothing to do, no jobs, no trade or business activity. Every government
department is controlled by ex-warlords.”
They also complained about corrupt officials at the donor agencies, and added that the warlords
in the government have consumed the international funds collected in the name of Afghans for
the development of their country.
Labor Issues
The participants argued that Afghans are not a burden on Pakistan because they earn their
livelihood and provide cheap labor. They noted that they had experienced wage discrimination
compared to Pakistanis, and that there is no law to protect the wages and welfare issues of
refugees.
More than 80% of the Afghans in Peshawar own shops. They pay rent for shops and houses, and
pay for utility bills. They are a source of income for thousands of Pakistanis and Pakistan earns
millions of dollars from Afghan carpets.
The participants pointed out that Afghan businessmen, laborers, skilled people and even children
are contributing to Pakistan’s economy. “We are a source of income and therefore we need legal
protection. All other countries have provided legal protection to refugees to work in a secure
environment. We want such laws and legal protection in Pakistan,” they said.
Women’s and Children’s Issues
The participants said women were still extremely vulnerable in Afghanistan, pointing to cases of
stoning to death, rape and forced marriages. They said that women still have no legal rights in
Afghanistan, and the government is silent on women’s issues: women cannot operate a business
34
or access employment easily. Some of those present pointed out that, although the Taliban have
gone, women still feel they are living in the Taliban era.
The participants said their children are malnourished and compelled to work, most of them as rag
pickers, hotel boys and conductors. The children of the thousands of widows in refugee camps
have no option but to work in the extreme heat and cold. There are no schools for them and they
have no protection against harassment from the police and others. The participants said they were
against child labor but children are the only source of income for some families.
Education
Because the education system in Afghanistan is so inadequate, young people are illiterate and an
easy target for recruitment as fundamentalists. There are some schools in Kabul and other areas,
but they lack basic facilities and teaching materials and children are compelled to enroll in ‘open
sky’ schools.
The lack of peace and security was pointed out as the main issue at the educational institutions.
Two examples were given: one of a student belonging to an influential family who killed another
student. There were dozens of witnesses but no action was taken against him. Another student
thrashed his principal but no action was taken against him.
Health
Except in Kabul, there are no hospitals or dispensaries equipped with staff and necessary medical
equipment. Afghans have no other option but to travel to neighboring countries for treatment.
UNHCR and other international agencies have closed down schools and hospitals built for
refugees. The participants said they have no choice but to visit Pakistan hospitals as Pakistan does
not permit Afghan doctors to open hospitals or to work as registered doctors. They said Pakistan
was not only denying them the right to medical treatment but also over-burdening its own
hospitals.
Livelihoods
Although their lives were not good in Pakistan, at least they have food and shelter, but in
Afghanistan they have nothing. Houses are scarce and they have to pay the rent in dollars. There
is an acute water shortage. Foodstuff and daily life articles are barely available and are extremely
expensive.
Social and security Issues in Pakistan
Police harassment was a major problem for Afghans in Pakistan. They have to give bribes, and if
they do not, they have to face going to jail. The discussion was told that there are more than 500
Afghan refugees in police stations in Peshawar, 1,800 in Adiala Jail in Rawalpindi, and thousands
more in other parts of Pakistan.
The police also insult the refugees, demanding that they prove their identity or show a passport.
They have no any identity card or documents, as Pakistan never provided any such identity to
them. Those present demanded protection from police harassment.
35
In the camps, the participants accused leaders of taking bribes from their own people to solve
their problems, saying they were playing into the hands of UNHCR and Pakistani authorities.
They said they lack drinking water and cooking fuel. They demanded health and education
facilities, as well as sanitation systems. “We lack everything that a human being deserves in order
to live a dignified life,” they said.
The participants also complained about the negative attitude of Pakistanis towards them, saying
they are called “Kabuli” or mohajirs (refugees). “We feel disgraced and dishonored. This culture
should be changed. It needs advocacy and awareness campaigns. Decades of humiliation have
convinced our people that they are disgraced and second-rate people. We need an identity. We
need legal protection and respect” they said.
Since they have been living in Pakistan for two decades, their children now think of themselves
as Pakistanis. “They are more familiar with the leaders and founders of Pakistan than those of
Afghanistan. We have the right to get dual citizenship” they said.
The participants said that the Durand Line is not a border and people on the both sides should
have the right to cross it freely without any documents, including work permits. They said one
hundred thousand Pakistanis are working in Afghanistan and believed that there was nothing
wrong in it.
Tripartite Agreement
The participants termed the Tripartite Agreement inhumane and unjustified, arguing that it
ignored the ground realities in Afghanistan, and that the signatories did not realize the difficulties
of the people returning home. The first step, according to participants, should have been to
consult them. They said that UNHCR and other organizations had done little for the rehabilitation
of refugees in Afghanistan and that there was nothing in Afghanistan except insecurity. “We do
not accept this agreement and we do not want to repatriate to such an insecure environment. We
do not want to throw our children and families into fire,” they said.
They felt that the international community and donor agencies have abandoned Afghan refugees.
They said UN agencies like UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR should restart funding for Afghan
refugees. Expressing their frustration, they said that plans for the uplift and rehabilitation of
Afghanistan were only “in the documents”. In reality the situation is worsening with the passage
of time. Life is very hard for the poor in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, an Afghan family can have a
decent living on $200 a month, but in Afghanistan it is not possible even on $1,000 a month.
They felt that the war in Afghanistan was a political game between the two super powers. “The
world was not fighting for us but all were trying to safeguard and promote their own interests.
They ruined our country and now everyone is abandoning us. The repatriation agreement is also a
political decision. The international community should solve this issue on a humanitarian basis.
Repatriation is not possible in ten months,” the participants said.
According to the Census of 2005, there are more than 3 million refugees in Pakistan. UNHCR
had claimed that only 400,000 Afghans can be repatriated by March 2006. Questioning the fate of
the remaining 2,600,000 refugees, they concluded that the Agreement is unrealistic and needs to
be revised.
36
They also thought the census was flawed. “They did not visit every house and every person, even
in the camps”, which means that the number of refugees may exceed three million. “If they want
to repatriate refugees, first of all Pakistan should repatriate our business community and the rich
people,” the participants demanded.
Possible Solutions and Recommendations
•
The Tripartite Agreement should be renewed until 2015.
•
Committees of Afghan refugees, supported by Pakistan, should be formed to look into
issues of refugees. These committees should question President Karzai’s entitlement to
sign such an unrealistic and inhumane agreement.
•
Forming committees from both communities to advocate and lobby in solving the
problems of Afghans and helping in voluntary repatriation. These committees should
launch awareness programs for both Afghans and Pakistanis to live in harmony and
peace; to share resources and to respect each other.
•
The committees should actively participate in activities addressing political, economic,
social and other issues related to Afghan refugees and the population of the host country.
The committees should work to address women’s and child rights issues.
•
Legal status must be granted to Afghan refugees and legal protection should be given to
them under international law. Categorize the Afghans in Pakistan according to their first
arrival in Pakistan and grant them temporary legal status accordingly.
•
UNDP and other organizations should generate and provide funds for refugees. There
should be an in integrated program from UN and other international agencies/donors to
invest in the uplift and development of Afghans staying in Pakistan.
•
Refugees need to organize lobbies and groups. They should ask the US and other
countries about their interventions in Afghanistan. They should also convey to the US that
its forces should not be present in Afghanistan to protect and safeguard US national
interests at the expense of the people of Afghanistan.
•
The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan should reshape their policies for Afghan
refugees before their voluntary repatriation.
•
Afghan refugees should be granted dual citizenship and should have easy and free
movement across the Durand Line.
•
Pakistan should grant Afghan refugees work permits and their wages should be the same
as those of Pakistanis.
•
Schools and colleges should be set up for refugees in Pakistan and their children should
be facilitated in gaining admission to government schools.
The Afghan business community should be allowed to construct hospitals, health centers
•
and educational institutions for refugees.
•
Afghan businesses in Pakistan should be declared taxable. In this way they will not be a
burden on the resources of the host country.
•
Civil society can act as a mediator between the host and refugee communities to help the
vulnerable groups.
•
Awareness raising campaign for Pakistanis should be launched so that they could
understand the issues of refugees, enabling them to respect and protect the interests of
refugees.
37
3
Focus Group Discussion in Karachi
May 31, 2005
Participants at the Karachi Meetings
Sr. No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Name
Mr. Noorullah
Bejhan Musafir
Abdul Latif
Abdullah
Layan Noor
Meena Hussain Norazi
Aziza Aziz
Samina Rasikh
Laila
Humera Niazi
Azmat Ali
Profession
Doctor
Businessman
Private employee
School Administrator
Gynecologist
Teacher
Teacher
Teacher
Teacher
T eacher
College Principal
Gender
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Female
Female
Female
Male
Participants from Sohrab Goth, Karachi (2 June 2005).
This group of male participants was unable to participate in the discussions on May 31 as
Sohrab Goth became a no-go area due to the violence that erupted in Karachi on May 30. All
the participants had lived in Pakistan for 20 years or more. Three participants had lived in
Pakistan for 17, 18, and 19 years respectively.
Abdul Karim
Mohammad Rahim
Shams ul Alam
Anar Gul
Ali Mohammad
Haji Hazrat Gul
Haji Abdul Karim
Abdur Rehman
Scavenger
Mazdoor/Laborer
Spokesperson
Unskilled Laborer
Unskilled Laborer
Local spokesman
Local Leader
Unskilled Laborer
39
Background Information
One day before the meeting, violence erupted in Karachi, resulting in
severa l deaths and a curfew-like situation. Because some of the areas
participants were traveling from were declared ‘no-go’ areas, the meeting
was held in two venues on two days. Those able to attend the meeting on
the first day were mostly Persian speaking, educated professionals and
were living in relatively affluent parts of Karachi such as Gulshan e Iqbal.
Those attending the meeting on the second day were living in Sohrab Goth
(a low-income area with many kacha houses and associated with guns,
drugs and crimes), largely Pushto speaking, and generally poor. The
report below presents the findings from both meetings.
Both meetings began with the introduction of the participants, and the
aims and objectives of the meeting. Saba Gul Khattak and Shahbaz
Bokhari led both meetings.
Education
The groups termed education the most important issue for Afghans, and had a detailed
discussion on the education systems in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was pointed out that the
syllabus and the number of subjects are different in Afghanistan.
The medium of instruction was the second major issue. Afghan children are taught Urdu and
English as subjects, but their mother tongues, Pushto and Persian (the medium of instruction
in schools in Afghanistan), are ignored. They suggested Persian as a compulsory subject
along with English and Urdu for Afghan children in Pakistan. They also requested the
governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to give equal status to the degrees obtained from
either country.
A number of Afghan schools are functioning in Karachi but the schools are far away from
where the Afghans live, thus involving transport costs that poor Afghan cannot afford. For
many, private schooling is available close to home but the fees and the costs of uniform and
textbooks make the schools unaffordable. Poor Afghans, whose children are rag pickers, want
to educate them but cannot afford it. It was feared that lack of education would lead them
towards a life of crime. Girls’ education tends to be neglected, with those who can afford to
send their children only allowing them to attend for 2-3 years.
Health
Some participants emphasized that diseases are widespread in the absence of effective health
facilities. The majority of the school-aged children are rag pickers. They know little about
hygiene and are exposed to many kinds of diseases. Incentive-based education was suggested
as a solution to both education and health issues.
Environmental health is also poor. Everyone, especially the women, is ignorant of health
issues, hence the need for hygiene and health-awareness programs. Regular classes or
announcements on loudspeakers on preventive healthcare would be effective. A great many
Afghans have chronic diseases. The ‘doctors’ who treat them are not qualified, but they
charge very little.
40
There are some qualified Afghan health professionals who have their own clinics, but the
police harass them and demand bribes because they are not registered with the health
department. Measures to prevent this harassment, and to acknowledge their medical degrees,
were requested.
Identity
Many participants expressed their worries about maintaining their identity as Afghans,
especially for the generation that has grown up in Pakistan. They complained that their
children know nothing about Afghan history and that they will gradually lose all sense of
being Afghan. They fervently wanted their children to retain their Afghan identity. Some
participants noted that there were many more Afghans in Pakistan, especially in Karachi, than
the recent Census indicates. They explained that a number of Afghans (especially the
Pushtoons) did not identify themselves as Afghans.
Jehad in Afghanistan
Certain groups in Pakistan are motivating and arming Afghans youths, trying to convince
them that there is still a need to wage Jehad in Afghanistan. This trend needs to be stopped,
or Afghanistan will remain in the ‘dark ages’ for anther 25 years. The true spirit of Islam is
not being practiced: first, they were encouraged to engage in Jehad against Russia, and then
among themselves. Now is the time to change the meaning of Jehad into that of education.
That is the only way to reconstruct, re-develop and make Afghanistan prosperous. Those
present asserted that political, social and economic stability is only possible through
education.
Wage Discrimination
Afghan workers work long hours but receive lower wages than their Pakistani counterparts.
They should be paid the same wages as Pakistanis.
Police Harassment
Police harassment was discussed in detail. Afghan workers have to bribe police regularly,
because they do not have ID cards. The participants termed the police behavior “inhuman”
and “humiliating”.
Legal Issues
The participants had thought that the tripartite agreement was valid until 2009, and were
surprised to learn that it would lapse in 2006. They feel they are settled here and it would be
impossible to move them all within a short time. They requested all the parties - the
governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the UNHCR - to extend the agreement for
another ten years. Even if UNHCR stops its financial aid, the Afghans should be allowed to
stay for that time. Others argued that the donor assistance must continue.
Afghans who have settled in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian States have been given
citizenship, but in Pakistan, Afghans are still without any legal status after more than 23
years. It was requested that they should be given ID cards that would allow them access to
health and education facilities.
41
A minority of the participants said they needed some identification from UNHCR. Some
preferred to be mohajirs (refugees) and did not wish to become ansaar (hosts/citizens).
Women’s Rights
Women and girls, the most vulnerable segments of Afghan society, are facing every kind of
violence. Domestic violence is a routine and accepted reality for them. There are no formal or
informal institutions where the women can go for legal or psychological help. Those present
urged the establishment of institutions in Karachi to address the issue, adding that it was also
necessary to establish institutions to equip women with technical skills so they could earn.
Economic Problems of Repatriation
It is difficult for the Afghans living in Karachi to go back to Afghanistan as travel costs are
very high – Rs 1,500 per person to reach Peshawar. If they do go, the police harass them on
the way. Most of the Afghans living in Karachi are extremely poor. The UNHCR assistance
for the journey back is calculated on the basis of costs from Quetta or Peshawar, not Karachi.
UNHCR gave money in the past but there is no assistance now. Families wanting to return
have to sell their household assets cheaply, then pay much more to re-establish a household in
Afghanistan.
There were concerns that the Afghans living in Karachi are neglected, and
donations are given to Afghans living in the NWFP. There are very few
provide assistance to Afghans living in Karachi. It is the responsibility of
community to provide them with basic necessities, and NGOs should play a
Afghans.
that international
organizations to
the international
role in assisting
Other issues
Afghans living in Sohrab Goth have no electricity or water, although a water pipeline passes
through their locality. The thekedari (contract) system they are forced into is expensive and
exploitative. They requested that the Municipality provide them with direct connections so as
to reduce their costs.
Agricultural land in Afghanistan had been destroyed and the multiple claims to land and
property will take a long time to resolve. Peace and security are impossible while the old
warlords are still in power. People noted that their lives in Pakistan are comfortable, but that
in Afghanistan there are no means of survival in the absence of livelihoods and social
services. Whenever genuine peace and employment opportunities are restored they will
return to their homeland.
Climate was also noted as a reason for not returning, as Afghan children born in Pakistan
could not bear the hardships of the winter in Afghanistan. There is no social infrastructure.
One person added “at present, the government of Afghanistan is unable to pay the salaries of
its employees - how can it build a huge infrastructure for the masses?”
42
4
Focus Group Discussion in Quetta
June 5, 2005
Participants at the Quetta meeting
S. No.
1
Name
Mr. Sheki Masraf
2
3
4
Mr.Abdul Baqi
Abdul Wadood
Mr.Shafi Sahir
5
Mr.Haleem Khan
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Mr. Mohd Dawood
Doctor Hassan Gul
Engineer Akbar
Abdul Baqi
Ms. Mishgan
Bibi Asia
Ms/ Farozan
Mr. Abdul Dayan
Doctor Syed Aslam
Shah Bukhari
Haji Kudia Nazar
15
Profession
President Ariana development
Foundation
Tribal Elder
Teacher
President Afghan Teacher
Association
Principal Syed Jamaluddin
Afghani school
Shop Keeper
Medical Doctor
Engineer
Principal Millat School
Programme Manager ADF
Doctor
Health Supervisor
Social Activist
Political Activist
Gender
Male
Tribal elder
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Male
Male
The FGD, facilitated by Saleem Shah and Shahbaz Bukhari, began with introductions. The
following issues were discussed.
Security in Afghanistan
As in the FGD in Peshawar, the fragile security situation in Afghanistan was pointed out as a
serious issue in repatriation. The participants said there is no peace in any province,
particularly in the south. The Afghan government rules during the day and the Taliban rule at
night. The participants said they could not live in a war-like situation, adding that only those
who have guns and can fight back are safe and secure in Afghanistan.
43
Expressing disappointment about the American intervention, they said that the Americans are
doing nothing. They added that powerful people were illegally occupying their houses but
they cannot fight with them, adding that there was peace at the time of signing the
repatriation agreement two years ago, but “we are again at war.”
Livelihood Issues
Afghanistan is now a very expensive country. The average monthly salary is 2000 Afghanis
in Kabul, while the monthly house rent is US$ 3,000 to 3,500. The monthly rent of a single
room is US$ 100. Those present said they could not afford it. There is no house, no clean
drinking water, no gas, no electricity, no hospital and no school. In these conditions, the
participants asked, how they would live in Afghanistan? They said the only development is
the road between Kabul and Kandahar. The participants said there is no business in
Afghanistan, asking what would they do for a living once they had returned. Pointing to the
lack of development in Afghanistan, they said their basic issue is economic.
Women’s and Children’s Issues:
It was pointed out that Afghan women and children would suffer a lot after repatriation.
Many women are working in different fields in Pakistan. What will they do after repatriation?
They will not be allowed to work. Women, faced with severe difficulties in Afghanistan, will
face extreme miseries if repatriated.
The participants said they have lived in Pakistan for the last 25 years, bringing up their
children here. Their children are close and familiar to Pakistani culture and environment.
They know nothing about Afghanistan. Repatriating them would mean another displacement
as these children did not really belong to Afghanistan as they were not even born there.
Social and security Issues in Pakistan
Many participants said they have no complaints against the people of Pakistan. “They respect
us and we do not face problems because of them.” However, every country grants citizenship
to refugees after eight years of their stay. But Pakistan has not done so. Americans and
Germans have many Afghan refugees but they are not repatriating them.
The participants said Pakistani hospitals do not provide birth certificates to the Afghan
children born there, terming it injustice and discrimination. Under a policy, they said, their
children are being denied the right of nationality, adding that if Pakistan can grant nationality
to the Hazara, Bengali and Indian refugees, the Afghans should also have the right to get
Pakistani nationality. “We need some kind of identity. It is our right to get Pakistani
nationality.”
They said the government of Pakistan is responsible for their welfare and security. “We need
schools and health facilities. Pakistan and the international community should help us to
solve our problems. Pakistan should give us some identity. We are ready to pay taxes if we
get Pakistani nationality.” However, the taxes, the participants said, should be spent on health
and education of refugees.
44
The participants said Pakistan should not close the camps, adding it will increase burden on
Pakistan’s health, education and other civic facilities. “Pakistan should arrange funding for
our livelihood and other facilities at the camps.”
Tripartite Agreement
The participants said the tripartite agreement was not fair and they were not consulted, adding
that they migrated to Pakistan because of insecurity, and there is still war in Afghanistan.
“We need at least eight to ten years to repatriate.” They demanded that the UNHCR, and the
Afghan and Pakistani governments, must rethink the agreement.
They asked why Pakistan has not signed the refugees’ Convention. “Pakistan should sign the
refugees’ conventions. We do not accept the agreement. We have been ilving in camps for
years. We built houses, and now they want to send us back to camps. We are not going back.
We do not want to repatriate to an insecure environment.”
The participants were perturbed at being declared ‘displaced’. “Our refugee status must not
be changed till our voluntary repatriation.” They said a displaced person is vulnerable to
crimes and anti-social activities. They asserted that the move could create law and order
situation for Pakistan.
They asked the international donor agencies and the rich countries to help them, and restart
funding for Afghan refugees. They said UN, UNHCR and other organizations should
continue their assistance. “We need skills before repatriation. We can’t even afford the
expense of going back, as one has to pay at least Rs 40,000 for a single truck to journey to
Afghanistan. Who will pay this amount?”
In conclusion, the participants suggested that Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR should
rethink the Agreement.
45
Annex 2
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS WITH PAKISTANI MEMBERS
47
1
Focus Group Discussion in Islamabad
May 4, 2005
Participants
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Name
Naghma Imdad
Qaiser Siddiqui
Siddique Paracha
Dr. Imran Rasool Khan
Dr. Zafar Shaheen
Pervez Iqbal
Haji Javed
Naseer
Dr. Asif
Profession/ Organization
Savera
SHARP
Radio Pakistan
Holy Family Hospital
CBO representative
Labor Officer
Trade Unionist
Asst. Labor Officer
PIMS
The focus group discussion consisted of a comparative analysis of the perspectives of
Afghans and Pakistanis on the problems of repatriation, and short and medium term
solutions. Two points of view emerged from the discussions: one considered Afghans to be a
major burden on Pakistan and its resources, and the other was that Pakistan and its people are
also benefiting from the Afghans’ presence in various ways, the most evident being the
availability of cheap labor. Everyone present seemed to favor of the Afghans’ repatriation,
but wanted to ensure that the Afghan community does not suffer and has a say in the methods
utilised.
Numerous ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in repatriation were identified. There was consensus that
peace and security in Afghanistan must be ensured and that the law and order situation must
improve. The major problems in Afghanistan were identified as: underdevelopment, personal
and social insecurities, destruction of the land, and lack of infrastructure, employment
opportunities, facilities and services such as education and health care.
It was stressed that without security and economic and social development in Afghanistan,
repatriation is not possible. Furthermore, if people are repatriated against their will, it would
not be durable, as people would eventually return to Pakistan.
49
It was suggested that studies be undertaken to analyze previous trends of Afghan repatriation
from Pakistan, and the absorption capacities within the provinces of Afghanistan. Although
ideally repatriation should be a gradual process, this is not possible in the short term, as
Afghans have economic interests and livelihoods in Pakistan and they have become
accustomed to Pakistan’s environment and systems.
Labor and health issues were noted as sectoral concerns. It was emphasized that Afghan labor
is much cheaper than Pakistani labor, and that, like many other displaced groups around the
world, Afghans undertake work that Pakistanis shirk. One participant said: “Their productive
efficiency is more and still they charge less.” Viewed in a different light, we can say that they
are exploited, aid less and often endure very poor working conditions.
Child labor is another critical issue. There is high incidence of child labor in the Afghan
community, especially in families without parents.
Because of unhealthy and unsanitary living and working conditions, the Afghans’
‘temporary’ settlements are hubs of communicable diseases. This requires that a preventive
healthcare system be designed, with more emphasis on both preventive care and district level
hospital interventions.
The following suggestions were made:
•
The situation in Afghanistan must be improved through social development and
strengthening of the ‘pull’ factors that will attract people to return. This can be
accomplished by: ensuring peace and security; creating employment and business
opportunities; building infrastructure, providing the facilities and services necessary
for health care and education, and settling conflicts over lands and property through
government interventions.
•
Those public institutions in Pakistan that serve the needs of Afghans, in particular
health and education facilities, must be supported financially so they are able to cater
to the needs of everyone.
•
Afghans should be given an official identity that protects them from harassment and
ensures their right to services in Pakistan for a specified period (for example 5 to10
years) or until they are repatriated.
•
Either the Foreigners Act needs to be amended to include a definition of “refugee”, or
a Refugees Law should be created.
•
Another Tripartite Agreement should be signed. It should include legal, medical,
educational, infrastructure and skill-development assistance for Pakistan as long as
the Afghans are here.
All Afghans should be given work permits in Pakistan. This would provide them
•
security and protect them from exploitation and from police harassment.
•
Afghans should be given health cards entitling them to services in local hospitals.
•
The Afghan community should be encouraged and facilitated by INGOs, NGOs and
Pakistani institutions in their efforts to become self reliant.
Afghans would gain a sense of ownership through community participation. They can
•
be assisted to make committees within their community for decision-making,
donations and financial assistance for the needy.
•
There were suggestions for and against the Afghans paying taxes, with no conclusive
recommendation emerging.
50
•
•
•
•
•
•
Some participants suggested that Afghans should be given Pakistani citizenship since
they have been living here for so long, citing examples of countries where this has
happened. However, the majority of those present did not support this suggestion.
Either ‘refugee health centers’ should be established within existing hospitals or
separate health care facilities should be established. Refugee health centers could be
helpful in collecting and maintaining data on the refugees, which would feed into
designing preventive and curative healthcare systems for them. The care could be
provided by qualified members of the Afghan community and/or by NGOs, Pakistan
government institutions and donors.
Proper sanitation must be provided, as should safe drinking water.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) should be implemented properly
and children’s rights should be safeguarded with regard to education health and labor.
Education should be made compulsory under the CRC: that education should be
relevant, and should also provide children with skills that will enable them to earn a
decent living. Special schools should be established in Afghan localities and people
should volunteer as educators.
The human rights of Afghans should be ensured.
Donors should continue their financial assistance to Afghans.
51
2
Focus Group Discussion in Peshawar
May 18, 2005
The FGD began with a round of introductions. Participants belonged to different professions,
civil and government organizations, and came from the settled districts and tribal areas. Dr
Saba Gul Khattak moderated the discussion and Saleem Shah was the facilitator.
Participants
Name
Dr. Sarfraz Khan
Master Khan Habib
Ali Haider
Rifat Sarfraz
Zulfiqar Ali
Zarteef Khan
Zahoor Khan
Jameela Gillani
Israr Khan
Said Alam Masood
Sayed Liaqat Bacha
Muhammad Abid
Occupation
Professor
Shopkeeper
Doctor
Doctor
Journalist, Afghan Desk
Teacher/Coordinator
Deputy Director
Tribal Citizen
Doctor
General Secretary
Shopkeeper
Organization
University of Peshawar
Khyber Agency
Lady Reading Hospital
Private Clinic at University Town, Peshawar
Daily Dawn Bureau Office, Peshawar
HRCP Khyber Agency
Directorate of Commerce, Industries and Labor
HRCP Peshawar
Khyber Agency
Watan Trust
Mutahida Labor Federation
Gora Bazaar Peshawar
Labor Issues
Thousands of Afghan refugees are working in the non-formal sector, particularly in the brick
industry, earning meager wages. The discussion was told that as they did not come under the
purview of the ILO Convention and that Pakistani trade unions are unable to help them.
Because Afghans work for very low wages, wage rates for Pakistani labor are driven
downward, even in the formal sector. Despite this fact, it was felt that Afghans should not be
denied the right to work in Pakistan. It was also pointed out that at present thousands of
Pakistanis are working in Afghanistan.
It was stressed that people on both sides of the Durand Line should have the right to work in
both countries.
53
The idea of introducing work permits was presented as a way to help Afghans to obtain legal
status and protection under the labor laws. The participants said that all humanitarian and
other laws relating to refugees should be implemented and applied to facilitate Afghan
refugees.
The Afghan men and women also need skills-training. Afghan women need training centers
and institutes which will enable them to earn a living in their homes as well as nursing and
teaching. They also need markets for their products and in this way they can be helped to live
with dignity.
Health Issues
Participants from the medical profession said that when the Afghan refugees arrived in
NWFP, the international community established many hospitals and other health facilities for
them. They received free health care and other facilities. However, they also brought some
new diseases with them, including drug-resistant tuberculosis and a rare type of malaria.
Many Pakistanis were susceptible to these diseases.
International agencies funded Pakistani hospitals to compensate the burden of refugees. For
instance, Hayatabad Medical Complex was built with contributions from several donor
agencies. Likewise, the Lady Reading Hospital received US$ 2.8 million to construct a new
ward. Many District hospitals received large grants because of the influx of refugees, and
Pakistanis also received free treatment and vaccinations. Now all of these funds have been
withdrawn, leaving people without the care they need.
The participants said the Provincial Government was running the health care system that was
designed in the 1980s, and that hospitals are overloaded. Both the Pakistani and Afghan
populations have increased tremendously. No new hospitals are being opened. Also, as there
are no health facilities in Afghanistan, even repatriated Afghans are seeking care at hospitals
in Pakistan. The question of permission for Afghan doctors and nurses to practice in Pakistan
was also discussed and the government was asked to legalize their practice in Pakistan, as it
would help to reduce the burden on government hospitals.
The participants said that the international community has forgotten the Afghan refugees.
They called on the international community to help in rehabilitating the refugees and
lessening the burden of NWFP by allocating funds from the Afghan Development Fund for
the refugees in the areas where they are living.
It was also pointed out that the Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies had utilized funds
meant for the refugees, to promote their military and political agendas. In the NWFP, every
sector has been over burdened by the presence of the refugees.
Political Issues
Terming the Afghan war a political “game”, the participants said Afghan refugees are still the
victims of international politics. They cited the example of Pakistan, as they said, trying to
use Afghans against their own country: Pakistan has forcefully evacuated Afghan refugees
from camps in South Waziristan, but the Kacha Ghari Camp (in Peshawar) still houses
thousands of refugees. They said that in the past, Shamshato Camp (inear Peshawar) was
used for political purpose and is still controlled by the brother of Gulbadin Hikmatyaar.
54
Others noted that elders in the camps are actually working under the Afghan
Commissionerate and whenever that body orders them to move the people, they will take
them away to Afghanistan “like herds of animals”.
The participants said bitterly that when Dr. Najeebullah tried to convince Afghans in Pakistan
to repatriate (in the year 1991-2), Pakistan argued against repatriation and prevented them
from returning. They argued that the UNHCR, which should play the role of an international
agency, is playing a political role. UNHCR’s prolonged stay was perceived as a part of the
political game and an important part of Pakistan’s strategic interests.
Social Issues
The participants said that the refugees brought narcotics and heavy weapons with them, and
that there had been a sharp increase in violence against women when the Afghan refugees
settled in NWFP and in the Tribal Areas. They claimed that the Afghans also meddled in
internal politics and that their presence contributed to? facilitating and promoting religious
extremism in Pakistan. Afghans were also seen as warlike people, who became Mujahids, but
now they are mercenaries. The participants said they could kill anyone for money and added
that there are still Jihadi camps in the Tribal Areas, although they have been relocated. The
participants said the no one is interested in solving Afghans’ issues on humanitarian grounds.
Education Issues
There was a time when more than 1,400 students from the Tribal Areas were studying in
Afghanistan but now there are only 14. They termed ‘cruel and inhuman’ Pakistan’s policy of
not allowing Afghans to study at its educational institutions, noting that generations of
Afghans have lost the opportunity to go to schools, colleges and universities. Forced to
remain illiterate and ignorant, they are, however, allowed to enroll in Madrassas, and thus
become fodder for extremist forces. Both boys and girls both are allowed to attend
Madrassas, which they termed a conscious effort at religious indoctrination, which was a
dangerous policy for both countries. The participants felt strongly that Afghans should have
the right to study in Pakistani educational institutions and to be admitted to higher education
institutions on a quota system.
It was pointed out that there were many donor agencies and rich individuals who want to
finance and build an Afghan education system for the refugees but there are no mechanisms
in place to bring this about. The international community was asked to help in establishing
educational institutions. It is also important that Pakistan allow Afghans to enroll their
children in Pakistani schools.
Repatriation
In theory, the participants said, repatriation appears to be the best solution, but is practically
impossible because there is no peace, security or prosperity in Afghanistan. If Pakistan forces
Afghans to repatriate, they would return, as had happened two years ago. One example was
cited: in 2003, a refugee family crossed the border at Torkham 15 times and came back to
Pakistan. In this way they earned US$ 1,500 dollars, cheating the UNHCR and other agencies
paying a small sum of money for their repatriation. Those present said it is impossible to seal
the Durand Line, and therefore this ‘recycling’ was inevitable.
55
Trade & Business Issues
The participants said that refugees control the hotel and transport industries in the NWFP and
also trying to control the wholesale markets, such as that of cloth. It was also pointed out,
however, that the Afghans are a source of revenue for Pakistan. In 2002, the discussion was
told, Pakistan exported Afghan carpets worth US$ 123 million. However Pakistan ignores
this contribution and continues its policy of harassing Afghan refugees. When Iran offered
them the opportunity to live in Iran, hundreds of skilled Afghan men and women migrated
there, leading to a loss of US$ 100 million for Pakistan.
The participants stressed the need to design a policy of incentives for refugees, imposing
taxes on their earnings but also granting them legal protection and the right to buy land and
property in Pakistan.
Possible Solutions/ Recommendations
•
Refugees should have dual citizenship.
•
The Durand Line should be declared a soft border.
•
Work permits should be issued to the Afghan labor force.
•
The Afghan business community should be granted legal status and should pay taxes.
•
Pakistan should sign the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention.
•
The international community should regenerate funds for refugees, especially for
education, health and skill-development. Skill-oriented projects should be launched
before Afghans are repatriated.
•
Refugees should receive a share of the Afghan Development Fund.
•
The Afghan population should be distributed among all the provinces4
•
NWFP should get especial funds and quotas from Federal funds as compensation for
absorbing Afghan refugees
•
Dialogues between local communities and Afghan refugees should be initiated, so as
to defuse tensions and resolve controversial issues amicably.
4
56
“nearly 65 percent of those registered are in North West Frontier Province (NWFP); 20 percent in Balochistan; 10
percent in Punjab/Islamabad; 5 percent in Sindh and the rest in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (AJK).”
www.unhcr.org
3
Focus Group Discussion in Karachi
June 02, 2005
Participants
Sr. No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Name
Tayyaba Mahar
Naveeda
Amjad Rasool
Naseem Ahmed
Gohar Ali
Saeed Baloch
Habib Bux
Abdul Latif
Nazir Leghari
Ali Ahmed Rind
Zahid Baloch
Shabbir Soomro
Hassan Mansoor
Profession
Advocate
Social organizer, LHRLA
Program Manager, Azad Foundation
Edhi Foundation
PILER
Activist, Fisher Folk Forum
Activist, Fisher Folk Forum
Activist, Fisher Folk Forum
Journalist
Editor, Affair
Program Manager, Azad Foundation
Journalist, Ummat
Journalist, Daily Times
Gender
Female
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
The participants called for an understanding of the social dynamics of Karachi, which is
known as the city of migrants, to be understood as the basis of their perceptions of the
Afghan refugees. Different waves of migration – from the rural areas and from other
provinces, and influxes of Bengalis and Burmese, for example - have already over-populated
the city. It was pointed out that the issues of identity and legal status of these migrants have
not been solved, and they are discriminated against by members of local communities, the
police and Municipal authorities. Nor are they paid the same rates as Pakistani laborers. The
participants asked how, under these circumstances and coupled with scarce resources, it was
possible to accept the huge number of Afghan migrants.
They said that Karachi lacked social services, which leads to violence. They attributed
lengthy power outages, discontinuation of the water supply, and poor sewerage and sanitary
conditions, to the frequent agitation and violence that wracks the city.
The participants said it is not possible for the city to absorb a huge number of Afghan
refugees. They said there are already 3,500 kachi abadis (shanty towns) in Karachi that have
inadequate social infrastructure and lack electricity, sewerage, water, education and health.
57
Karachi is not willing to accept more unskilled people who lack resources, although Afghans
can be seen in every town of Sindh.
They noted that already-stagnant wages had been further diminished by the presence of the
Afghans, adding that the Afghans will only add to the number of impoverished people in
Pakistan, where already 40% of people live below the poverty line.
Some participants argued, however, that repatriation to Afghanistan is not the solution
because there are no social and economic opportunities in Afghanistan. It was suggested that
the Afghans be settled in newly established industrial estates like Gwadar, where there are
economic opportunities and plenty of land for settlements. The counter argument was that it
would and ultimately unbalance the social and political situation of the area. The conclusion
was that the Afghans should be settled in different cities, and that the Afghans should not be
concentrated anywhere.
It was also suggested that the international community, which claims to be concerned with
humanitarian issues and is pressuring Pakistan to integrate Afghans into Pakistan, should
share the burden. Afghans should be accepted as refugees in, or allowed to emigrate to,
different countries. The international community should pay the financial and social costs
that Pakistan has borne for so long. Saudi Arabia, for example, which was involved in the
negotiation process on Afghanistan’s future, should share the responsibilities.
On the issue of work permits, it was said that the NARA fee of Rs 5, 000 annually, was too
expensive for the Afghans, most of whom are extremely poor. It was proposed that there
should, instead, be a nominal fee for Afghans’ registration and issuance of annual work
permits.
The participants said the number of Afghans living in Pakistan is more than the total
population of many countries, which made it impossible for Pakistan to give legal status or
citizenship to such a huge number. They also asserted that the census figures were an underrepresentation of the Afghan population in Pakistan in general, and in Karachi in particular. A
majority of the participants urged the Government of Pakistan never to give legal status to
Afghans, warning that the country would face political and social repercussions.
In Pakistan, Afghans would require employment, health, education, housing and other social
services. This would require enormous sums and an expanded social infrastructure. Pakistan
already has overcrowded health and education facilities and unemployment is on the rise.
One solution proposed was that the Army provide 10% of its budget for rehabilitating the
Afghans. It was pointed out that the Army’s 58 industrial units do not pay taxes. These units
could provide jobs to Afghans in Pakistan.
Suggestions
•
International donations to Afghanistan should be conditional to the repatriation of
Afghans there. Pakistan should request the international community to continue
financial assistance to Afghans but it should not be through the GoP. There should be
an independent Commission or monitoring body to ensure that the financial aid is
reaching the deserving.
•
UNHCR should maintain its assistance until the repatriation is complete. There should
be a 3-4 year timeframe for repatriation.
58
•
•
•
•
All Afghans should register themselves with the concerned authorities in Pakistan.
Afghans should be repatriated to Afghanistan.
Development aid for Afghans must be used for reconstruction and establishing social
infrastructure in Afghanistan rather than Pakistan or elsewhere.
The United States is responsible for massive migration. It should be pressured not to
leave Afghans in isolation, and should bear all the costs of repatriation and
rehabilitation.
59
4
Focus Group Discussion in Quetta
June 04, 2005
Participants
Sr. No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Name
Adullah Haleem Nasir
Dawood Khan
Aminullah
Saeed Ali Shah
Abdul Jaleel
Nazar Mohammod
Ayub Tareen
Shah Hussain
Naimat Betani
Faiz Mohammod
11
12
Sulman Kakar
Abdul Sattar
13
14
15
Sultan Khan
Nasrullah
Ahad Agha
Profession
General Secretary, SCAMB
Field Coordinator, IDSP
Journalist, South Asian News Agency
Reporter, Baluchistan Times
Nazim, Zhob
Program Officer, CPD
Reporter, BBC Peshawar
Reporter, Daily Intikhab
Reporter, Frontier Post
Chairman, Sir Syed Education and Development
Society
Team Leader, CPD
General Secretary, Baluchistan Federation of Trade
Unions
President, Baluchistan Federation of Trade Unions
Coordinator, OXFAM
Baluchistan Social Forum
Gender
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
The participants showed their concern over the recent decision by UNHCR (Quetta) that two
large camps, with a total population of close to 80,000, will be closed down at the end of the
June 2005. The participants urged the UNHCR not to close down the camps because these
refugees have neither homes or livelihoods.
The Afghans have lived in this part of Balochistan for the last two decades, the majority in
Pashtoon areas. They have amalgamated into society and now dominate business in this
region. Many are more resourceful and powerful than the local community. They have
developed roots here and will never return to Afghanistan. Thousands of refugees who
repatriated came back because they did not have homes, livelihood opportunities or security
in Afghanistan.
61
Historically, this region was the part of (Afghanistan’s) Kandahar province but after the
Durand Line this region and its people were divided. It is not possible for any government to
stop this movement. That is why some of the participants emphasized that the Afghans
should be declared to be Pakistanis.
Education
There are 45 Afghan schools in Quetta. They operate independently and have both Afghan
teachers and the Afghan syllabus. However, they cannot operate all the schools indefinitely.
The GoP and UNHCR should provide alternative facilities if the UNHCR closes the two
refugee camps and the schools. There are complaints of refusal to give admission to Afghan
students already. The administration is helpless because they cannot accommodate students
beyond a certain capacity.
Health
Balochistan already has inadequate and over-crowded health facilities and it is extremely
difficult for anyone to get a bed in any public hospital. An influx of Afghans from the camps
will exacerbate the severity of the situation. It is the sole responsibility of UNHCR and GoP
to provide all necessary basic health facilities to Afghans, some of the participants asserted.
Special attention should be paid to the health needs of women.
Livelihoods
Lack of livelihood opportunities has always been a major issue in Balochistan and the
problem intensified after the refugees arrived. Some participants said the Afghans were
intentionally kept handicapped and poor like beggars. Now they are dependent on the world
community. They are not skilled people and have no future in Afghanistan. Particularly in the
current situation. Although more than 20,000 Punjabis are working in Kandahar, Afghans
cannot do the same jobs because they are unskilled.
The Afghans have made significant contributions to the economy, especially the local
economy. Business opportunities increased when they invested in different sectors. For
example, there were only two buses to Loralai before their arrival but now there are 70. The
Baloch were cultivating only wheat and maize but the Afghans introduced many kinds of
vegetable. They have converted barren land into fertile land.
A dark side of the picture is that the extreme poverty has forced many of the refugee women
to sell their bodies to earn something for their children. If the international community wants
to make the Afghans into a productive and self-reliant nation, then they should be equipped
with education and marketable skills.
Security
The participants said that Pashtoon Afghans are very insecure and fearful, both in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. There is no peace in Afghanistan. President Karzai rules Kandahar in
daylight only and after sunset the Taliban control it. They said that the Taliban still receive
support from Pakistan. On the other hand, in Pakistan, the police harass the Afghans at every
turn.
62
Identity
The participants argued that Pakistan should grant them citizenship because they have lived
here for the last 25 years. We have given citizenship to Indian and Iranian immigrants already
and the government should do the same for Afghans. Some participants noted that “our
people also lack basic facilities so granting Afghans nationality will not affect our province”.
Many Afghanis did not register themselves as Afghanis during the recent UNHCR census
because they feared forced repatriation, but at present they have no legal identity in Pakistan.
Political Issues
Some participants asserted that the whole refugee issue was political and that refugee camps
were used for political purposes. The situation in Afghanistan has worsened again and the
Taliban are still fighting. There are 50,000 Taliban in Pashtoonabad Camp, brought to this
area by intelligence agencies.
The concern was expressed that the Baloch might object to granting the Afghans Pakistani
nationality, as that will increase the Pashtoon population. Another participant said that we
should oppose their settlement in Punjab, but for a different reason: it will increase Punjab’s
population and consequently Punjabis will demand a further increase of their share of the
national pool which is decided on the basis of population.
Other Issues
Some participants said that instead of solving their political issues, we gave the Afghans guns
to fight each other. Fundamentalism, Madrassas and terrorism are the product of refugees
and our democratic institutions suffered greatly after their arrival. The Afghans did not create
these problems; rather, the international community, especially America and Pakistan, are
responsible. Those who brought them to Pakistan should take them back. Afghan
commanders are more influential than our people, yet our government still supports them.
Police can arrest a Pakistani without any hesitation but cannot arrest Afghan commanders.
Many participants said that the Afghans can buy a Pakistani national identity card (NIC) for
Rs 5,000 and a passport for Rs 10,000. Those who can pay bribes are now Pakistanis and
those who cannot remain refugees.
Recommendations
•
The international community should continue its funding. Our Assemblies should also
demand restoration of their status as refugees.
•
The Afghans operating businesses should pay taxes and the revenues should be spent
on the Afghans who are poor.
•
Some camps are now hiding places for criminals and those places should be closed
down.
•
The Afghans should have some kind of identity
•
The government should give citizenship to Afghans.
•
Skills-development programmes should be created, to enable Afghans to earn a living
while in Pakistan and to earn a living when they return.
63
•
•
•
64
Existing health and education facilities should be given more funding and local
hospitals and camp hospitals should be upgraded.
Their refugee status should be renewed for another 10 or 15 years.
The Durand line should be declared a soft border.
Annex 3
PARTCIPANTS AT THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING IN LAHORE
65
1.
Dr. Furrukh Abbas Khan,
Assistant Professor
Postcolonial & English Literature
Lahore University of Management
Sciences
Opposite Sector U, DHA
Lahore 54792
2.
Khawar Mumtaz
Shirkat Gah
68-Tipu Block
New Gardan Town, Lahore
3.
Mr. Mohammad Tehsin
SAP-Pakistan
Haseeb Memorial Trust Building
Nasirabad,
2 K.m Raiwind Road, Lahore
Political Parties/Independent
1.
2.
Zulfiqar Gondal
Farooq Tariq
NGO/Development Community
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Ms. Rani , Shirkat Gah
Mr. Jehsin, SAP
Atta-ullah-Shaikh
Zahid Islam
Saima Jasam
Rights-based Organization/Intellectuals
8.
9.
I.A Rehman, HRCP
Rashid Rehman
Educationists
4.
5.
Mr. Atta -ullah-Shaikh
Coordinator CCWR II
Aurat Foundation
8-B, LDA Garden View, Lahore
54000
Mr. Zahid Islam
Chairperson, Foundation for
Advancement of Community
Education (FACE)
26 C/ 1 Faisal Town, Lahore
10.
11.
Journalists
12.
13.
Ms. Saima Jasam
Heinrich Böll Foundation
76-B, Nisar Road, Cantt, Lahore
7.
Mr. I.A. Rehman
Director, Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan (HRCP)
Flat 13, 3rd Floor, Sharif Complex,
Main Market, Gulberg II, Lahore
8.
Ch. Mohammad Yaqoub
25 FB, Wahdat Colony, Lahore
9.
Dr. Sarosh Irfani
National College of Arts – NCA
4, The Mall, Lahore
Irshad Haqani
Najam Sethi/ Imtiaz Alam
Labour
14.
6.
Dr. Farrukh , LUMS
Dr. Sarosh Irfani
Ch. Mohammad Yaqoub
67