Global and National Factors Facilitating the African Elephant
Poaching Crisis and the Economic and Social Implications for Africa
Allie Russell
California State University, Sacramento
Department of Environmental Studies
ENVS 190
18 May 2016
Table of Contents
Introduction.…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 2-5
Historical Perspective……………………………………………………………………………………... 5-7
Ecological Importance……………………………………………………………………………………… 7-10
Human and Elephant Conflicts…………………………………………………………………………. 10-11
Governmental Corruption……………………………………………………………………………….. 12-14
PIKE Correlation with Criminal Activity across Africa………………………………………. 14-20
One-off Sales…………………………………………………………………………………………………... 21-22
Demand for Ivory……………………………………………………………………………………………. 22-25
Possible Solutions…………………………………………………………………………………………... 25-28
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………... 28-29
Figures and Tables…………………………………………………………………………………………. 30-35
Citations………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 36-43
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Abstract
This report assesses the role and current conditions of African elephants among
regions of Africa and how the dramatic decline in their populations is affecting the African
landscape, native people, and the social interactions within elephant communities. Their
decline in the last 50 years can be greatly attributed to the demand for their ivory tusks,
leading to relentless elephant poaching. This is a comprehensive issue that has been
enabled globally as well as local contributors including, but not limited to, Africa’s
underdevelopment, governmental corruption, and a dominating presence of terrorist
groups.
Introduction
The African elephant, Loxodonta Africana, once roamed the entire continent of
Africa, numbering upwards of 27 million less than 200 years ago (Milner-Gulland and
Leader-Williams 1992). They are a highly intelligent species and through strong maternal
bonds, have established a complex family-based social system (Gobush et al. 2008), which
is the basis for their communal relationships. Africa is largely equatorial, making it
favorable for great diversity and abundance of species, all of which create a dynamic
ecosystem (Wasser et al. 2010). The African Elephant, as a keystone species, play a pivotal
role within the African landscape by supplying ecological services, enhancing the
biodiversity and health of an ecosystem (Wasser et al. 2010). Weighing upwards of six tons
(Chiyo et al. 2011), they are the largest terrestrial mammals in the world and thus require
expansive range, much of which occupy in the savannas, woodlands, acacia forests, as well
as the tropical forests of the equatorial Sub-Saharan region (Cumming et al. 1990). Over
evolutionary time, the diversity of habitats has created two genetically distinct elephant
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species, the African Elephant, roaming the vast savannas and its subspecies, the African
Forest Elephant, Loxodonta cyclotis (Blake et al. 2009), dwelling primarily in the dense
forests of Central and East Africa (Barnes et al. 1993). In addition to being smaller and
darker than the savanna, or bush, elephants, their tusks are also shorter and point
downwards, rather than curving upwards. Historically both elephant species have been
threatened by the encroachment of human populations both within Africa and through the
growth of economic development around the world (Roth and Douglas-Hamilton 1991),
leading to dozens of elephants being killed every day and ultimately their reclassification as
vulnerable on the IUCN Red List (Mace and Lande 1991).
Africa’s human population has grown exponentially since the 1950s and is projected
to be over 4 billion by 2100 (Gerland et al. 2014). This rapid acceleration and expansion of
human population has forced local communities to become more concentrated, which has
enabled continuing levels of impoverish conditions and high child mortality due to disease,
malnourishment, etc (Barnes et al. 1995). The lack of economic opportunity for the native
people, has forced villagers to rely on the crops, livestock, and natural resources around
them for subsistence. However their sole means of livelihood is often threatened by several
factors: underdevelopment, overpopulation, government instability, climatic conditions,
disease and high mortality, and the close proximity between local communities and Africa’s
wildlife, all of which greatly encourages localized poaching (Barnes et al. 1993, Keane et al.
2008).
Much of the African continent is underdeveloped and lacks the economic
capabilities and governmental structure to support such a large human population (Keane
et al. 2008). Underdevelopment has often led to governmental corruption and insufficient
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regulations and enforcement creating political instability, as is the case in many regions of
Africa (van Kooten 2008). Researchers have studied consequences of governmental
collapse, concluding that criminal groups utilize these periods of instability to commit high
levels of illegal activity for their financial gain (Keane et al. 2008, Bouché et al. 2011, CITES
and IUCN 2013). Criminal groups and armed militias equipped with automatic assault
weapons brutally poaching elephants for their ivory tusks are simply supplying what the
global market is currently demanding and succeeding because of weak regulations and
enforcement, corruption enabling trafficking, and a near guarantee of no prosecution
(Martin and Vigne 2011). The global demand for ivory, and consequently the poaching of
elephants, tends to correlate with an elevated global economy demanding foreign
resources including oil, cotton, natural gas, diamonds, and ivory (Blake et al. 2007), and an
increased presence of foreign, especially Chinese, investors in mining, timber, or
infrastructure development (Boafo and Sani 2011, Brennan and Kalsi 2015).
This accessibility has made it easier to supply and transport large shipments of
ivory to China undetected (Gao and Clark 2014). Additionally, the nation’s economic
growth and emerging middle class, eager to show their wealth, facilitates the demand and
idealized value of ivory (Brennan and Kalsi 2015). This demand has dramatically
diminished African elephant populations, and inevitably altered the physiology and social
interactions among elephant communities (Falconer 1981, Barnes et al. 1993). These
consequences have impacted African ecosystems and their diversity but also the people of
Africa, who may not appreciate the ecological benefits elephants offer (Lepper and
Schroenn Goebel 2010).
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Elephant poaching is a multifaceted, global crisis that is being enabled and
encouraged through resentment at the local level, at a national level through the corruption
and inabilities of African governments, and globally through the pervasive demand and
accessibility of ivory. Global cooperation and financial aid is essential to preserve and
restore natural habitats and the elephant populations currently remaining, but a strategic
plan on how to weaken and ultimately destroy the ivory trafficking chain (Figure 1) and
markets is vital. This paper will address the ecological and social consequences
surrounding elephant population depletions, as well as many of the local, national, and
global factors influencing elephant poaching in Africa and possible methods to combat this
issue.
Historical Perspective
There are only three species of elephants currently remaining on earth: the African
savanna elephant, the African forest elephant, and the Asian elephant (Bulte et al. 2004).
Many of its evolutionary ancestors such as mammoths and mastodons, have gone extinct
and only ocean-dwelling relatives, such as dugongs and manatees remain (Woolford et al.
2015). The family of Elephantidae originated in Africa before expanding throughout the
continents of Europe and Asia. Over time, however, their populations have been confined to
small areas in Asia and equatorial Africa, which is currently home to the largest elephant
population in the world (Barnes 1999).
African elephants have been extinct from North Africa since 600A.D due to heavy
poaching during the reign of Greek and Roman Empires to acquire their valuable ivory
tusks (Brennan and Kalsi 2015). Trade routes between Europe and Africa were rapidly
5
developing, enabling Europe to explore the resources within the forested East African
region around 900 A.D (Brennan and Kalsi 2015), leading to an unknown rate of poaching.
Statistics on the rate and levels of elephant poaching during these times, and the
subsequent centuries, are inadequate but it is estimated that by the early 19th century
elephant populations had recovered and reached their carrying capacity of around 27
million based on evidence that they were experiencing near pristine climatic conditions
and their habitat was largely untouched by humans (Milner-Gulland and Beddington 1993).
Trade between the United States and Africa developed through the 19th century due
to low shipping costs, rising wealth, and the mounting demand for slaves and elephant
ivory (Brennan and Kalsi 2015). As developing nations were acquiring more wealth, their
demand for expensive, exotic pieces, such as ivory chess sets, billiard balls, combs, and
pianos, grew making the elephant vulnerable to poaching (Milner-Gulland and LeaderWilliams 1992) and diminished Africa’s elephant populations, which numbered less than
12 million by the early 1900s (Douglas-Hamilton 1987). It was only until World War I and
II when major nations were at war, and when the American economy began to collapse
during the Great Depression, did elephant populations begin to recover and governments
began to establish protected reserves (Douglas-Hamilton 1987, Brennan and Kalsi 2015).
By that time, however, many elephant communities had been largely obliterated at
the hands of violent criminal groups, depleting their continent-wide numbers to roughly 3
to 5 million (Leader-Williams and Albon 1988, Keane et al. 2008). The ivory trade was
reinvigorated by the recovery of major nations and by the massive influx of weapons that
entered Africa through the 1970s and 1980s (Okello et al. 2008). The 1970s became known
as the “Ivory Holocaust,” as Japan, Europe, and the United States were heavily invested in
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the global ivory market causing mass exploitation of elephants, and the further rise of
“resistance movements” across Africa looking to benefit from the booming market (Okello
et al. 2008, Douglas-Hamilton 2009). Immense exploitation forced The Convention of
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna or Flora, CITES, to classify African
elephants as Appendix II, which states that unless the trade of the species is not more
effectively regulated or controlled, it is likely to be driven to extinction (Stiles 2004).
As poaching persisted through the 1980s and continent-wide populations dropped
below 610,000 individuals, CITES elected to elevate the status of African elephants to
Appendix I, which prohibited all international trade of the species or its parts (Bulte et al.
2007, Lemieux and Clarke 2009). It was predicted that the trade ban would ultimately
increase the value of ivory and therefore create an incentive to poach elephants (Bulte et al.
2007). Ultimately, it has been effective in particular regions of Africa more than others and
its future success is greatly dependent upon the level of corruption, governmental strength,
and status of existing elephant populations and the health of their habitat. In many ways
the issues surrounding Africa have created an endless cycle of violence against elephants
that is present today. More than 30,000 elephants were killed in 2015 at the hands of
poachers (Sheriff et al. 2015) and unless regulatory and enforcement strategies are
developed on a national and global scale, not only will elephant populations be threatened
but all of Africa’s wildlife.
Ecological Importance
The iconic stature and beauty of elephants is recognized worldwide as a symbol of
the African landscape, making them a flagship species, or ambassador, for this ecosystem
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(Wasser et al. 2010). These species, often viewed as charismatic, help to bring attention to
a particular habitat or environmental issue, which in turn raises the conservation efforts of
other vulnerable or endangered species living within human disturbed habitats. However,
previous efforts have not been sufficient to curtail the pressures encouraging elephant
population loss. It is important that the public not only appreciates the beauty of these
massive creatures but understands their role within an ecosystem and the intrinsic
benefits they offer. Elephants function as a keystone species, contributing to the health and
functionality of an ecosystem, by manipulating and transforming the environment in such a
way that benefits an abundance of species (Wasser et al. 2010). The inherent lifestyle of
elephants creates boundaries of distinct habitats of savannas and forests, thus enabling the
two African elephant species to remain genetically and physically distinguishable (Wasser
et al. 2015).
Elephant diet in the savannas consists of primarily grasses, herbs, and shrubs, as
well as fruits, while forests elephants are less herbivorous than the savanna species as they
are largely frugivorous, utilizing the fruit-bearing trees in their habitat (Blake et al. 2009).
Elephant herds can consume large amounts of fruit throughout their extensive range,
which makes them proficient seed dispersers through their droppings (Blake et al. 2009).
This encourages the continued growth and viability of forested regions of Africa, to
function as an important carbon sink and essential habitat for all forest dwelling plant and
animal species (Lewis et al. 2009). Their dung not only is a productive source of seed
dispersion but it is also highly nutritious, serving as a food source for many species and
enhancing the fertility of the soil, which benefits all plant and animals species, including
humans.
8
Elephants follow an annual migration pattern on their constant search for ample
food and water resources to provide for the entire herd (Blanc et al. 2007). To consume the
leaves and fruits of trees such as Acacia trees, elephants use their weight to completely
knock over the trees, exposing its nutritious roots and making the vegetation easily
accessible (Wasser et al. 2010). By doing so they are ensuring that the woodland habitat
does not begin to dominate the savannas, which would threaten the livelihood of many
species that rely on the expansive, open landscape of the savanna grasslands (Young et al.
2013). Savanna elephants instinctually follow migratory trails that have been left by
previous generations across their expansive range, and in doing so, their trails have created
extended impressions across the continent, acting as a beneficial fire breaker (Loarie et al.
2009). These large, robust creatures prevent vegetation from growing along their trails,
creating a virtual barrier at which point there is a lack of vegetation to accelerate the fire.
This vital role can protect entire ecosystems and local villages from devastating,
unpredictable wildfires that occur regularly, especially as some parts of Africa are enduring
a decades-long drought (Bouché et al. 2011).
Maintaining a reliable water source for all of Africa’s wildlife can be difficult,
especially during summer months and times of drought, but since elephants require an
extensive amount of water regularly they often resort to creating their own watering pools,
using their trunks and feet to bury into the ground in search of water (Loarie et al. 2009).
Elephants will also immerse themselves in their pools of water creating mud, which serves
as a protective layer over their skin to prevent sun damage (Barandongo 2015). Elephants
offer fundamental ecological services through creating communal watering holes and fire
barriers, reshaping and maintaining the savanna landscape, and providing stability to the
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forested ecosystems through successful seed dispersion, all of which enable the survival of
other species by the existence of healthy elephant populations in Africa.
Human and Elephant Conflicts
Local communities that heavily rely on natural resources, also benefit from the
ecological services provided by African elephants. Their efficiency in seed dispersion
maintains the forest habitat for all animal species including humans. Human populations
are greater in these moist, forested areas of Africa than the arid zones, primarily because of
the accessibility of resources including water and fertile soil (Parker and Graham 1989,
Barnes et al. 1993). Villages with dense populations tend to establish in the most protected
areas of African countries, which usually lie along the perimeters of wildlife reserves. This
provides natives with everything they need to survive off the land but it also puts them in
close proximity to the local wildlife (Mariki et al. 2015). Elephants tend to leave the
protection of the reserve during the night in search of another source of food and water,
leading to the most predominant cause of all human and elephant conflicts, crop raiding
(Webber et al. 2011).
As elephants roam beyond protected reserve boundaries, through their natural
range, they stumble through local villages, consequently destroying homes, fences, and
entire fields of crops and pasture (Barnes 1999). Studies have shown that male elephants
tend to be the main culprits of crop raiding, as they naturally express more aggressive
behavior than their female counterparts, especially when males become overly aggressive
during a period known as musth (Poole et al. 2011). Older and younger males
generationally compete within a herd because of sexual competition, and once male
10
elephants reach their adolescence, they will likely be driven away from the herd and forced
to be nomadic (Chiyo et al. 2011, Poole et al. 2011, Webber et al. 2011). These isolated
elephants migrate across an extended range looking for resources, typically through dense
forested areas, which often overlaps with local communities (Chiyo et al. 2011). The
proximity between the largest terrestrial mammal in the world and dense human
populations creates tense, often violent human-elephant conflicts. Researchers have
studied interactions between human and elephant populations and many have concluded
that these conflicts become more frequent when either population increases (Webber et al.
2011). The lack of adequate space has created resentment among the native people
towards the elephants, and has led the deaths of hundreds of elephants every year (Webber
et al. 2011).
Hostility towards elephants, fueled by relentless poverty and corrupt governmental
systems, has driven many locals to defy conservation authorities and regulations by
exploiting resources on protected lands, destroying government property, and by
intentionally killing elephants (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992, Mfunda and
Roslash 2010). Inadequate and underfunded enforcement driven by a corrupt government
has allowed these practices to go on and has provided no economic enticement for locals to
abide by anti-poaching laws (CITES and IUCN 2013). Many villagers, if not physically
participating, have often supported the illegal mass killings of elephants, as sighted in West
Kilimanjaro when 6 elephants were found killed while thousands of villagers gathered and
cheered (Mariki et al. 2015). It was later discovered that these elephants had been
swarmed by a group of locals on motorcycles, carrying torches, who eventually drove the
elephants off of a cliff (Mariki et al. 2015). Desperate frustration felt on behalf of native
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people, caused by the deeply impoverished nature of many African countries, has been
misdirected towards Africa’s wildlife, as they are the ones competing for resources and
adequate territory as a means of survival.
Governmental Corruption
The economic crisis and incessant poverty experienced in Africa has long been
thought to be due to political regimes purposefully concealing public funds and
simultaneously benefitting the elite (Gould 1980, Brennan and Kalsi 2015). Corruption
within an authoritarian system has created distrust and conflict among locals and their
government, as natives are faced with impoverished conditions, depleted natural
environment, consistent violence, and very few opportunities (Whitaker 1988, Klitgaard
1990, Barnes et al. 1995). With rapidly increasing human populations, a large portion of
the population is of a younger generation who are forced to survive among constant
violence and very limited employment opportunities, making them vulnerable to criminal
rebellions and recruitment by armed militias and resistance groups (Barnes et al. 1995,
Young 2007). Young male children are being recruited every day by these groups through
intimidation, threats, and violence, but many children have realized that they have limited
options and it might be their only means of survival (Young 2007).
Extended periods of violence and civil war has been driven by fear and greed, as
many nations and territories in Africa lack economic and employment opportunities for
their people, which has created governmental systems in constant financial crisis. They do
not have the resources to properly defend against and dismantle criminal groups, who are
using illegal means to purchase sophisticated equipment and weaponry to facilitate violent
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attacks (Burn et al. 2011). Governments lack the financial resources to adequately prepare
and defend against such attacks, putting all government workers and institutions, including
protected wildlife reserves, at risk (Brennan and Kalsi 2015). Many studies have cited that
government instability in Africa, driven by corrupt authoritarian systems (CITES and IUCN
2013, Brennan and Kalsi 2015, Ihwagi et al. 2015), has been a major precursor to violence
among native people and wildlife (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992, Bouché et al.
2010) (Figure 2).
Elephant population numbers across the continent began to be more heavily
monitored by the late 1970s, after elephant poaching rapidly accelerated following the
revival of global demand for ivory (Burn et al. 2011). The distribution and abundance of
elephant populations across African regions often directly correlates with the particular
region’s governmental stability and level of enforcement. Certain regions of Africa,
including West and Central Africa, who have historically established corrupt and
incompetent authoritarian political regimes (Barnes 1999, Bouché et al. 2010), have been
more susceptible to frequent violent conflicts and consequently their elephant populations
have been similarly impacted (Brennan and Kalsi 2015) (Figure 3). Throughout the mid to
late 1900s, West African countries of Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau
faced violent civil wars, predominantly driven by contempt towards the government, as it
was in Liberia during the 1990s when multiple resistance groups including the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the Movement for the Democracy of Liberia, and the
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) engaged in a 14 year conflict
(Reynolds 2015). This resulted in the displacement of millions, many of which have
13
recounted traumas such as rape, mutilation, and torture, while over a quarter million
people were killed (Parker 2015, Reynolds 2015).
Such conflict has been seen throughout Nigeria since oil was discovered in the mid
1950s, and has led to further impoverished conditions and environmental degradation as a
result of immense oil exploitation and a lack of governmental regulation (Vinck et al. 2011).
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria has an extensive reserve of crude oil, with many countries
and companies vying for access, inevitably causing immense environmental degradation
due to over-exploitation and government negligence (Vinck et al. 2011). The revenue
generated was never used to support local communities of Nigeria, but rather the profit fed
further corruption. This was found to be the case in the early 2000’s when the Nigerian
Anti-Corruption Agency estimated that over $14 billion, nearly 70% of the total revenue in
just 2003, was used to pay and bribe those with political and governmental power (Ejibunu
2007). Violent conflicts and civil wars have become more frequent throughout the West
African region, beginning in the early 1900s, threatening the health of the environment and
the survival of the people of West Africa and its wildlife species, including the depleted
elephant populations.
PIKE Correlation with Criminal Activity across Africa
Human encroachment, through agricultural and urban development, as well as
violent conflicts, has constricted the natural range of elephants throughout West Africa for
many decades (Barnes 1999). Habitat degradation has limited the wildlife biodiversity
throughout this region and has greatly controlled the elephant populations that can persist.
Elephant populations in West Africa are no longer found in large herds, but rather smaller,
14
more isolated groups in constant search for reliable vegetation (Barnes 1999, Gobush et al.
2008). Poachers often target the older, larger males and females in the herd, as their ivory
tusks will make a greater profit, and this has left many elephant herds throughout West
Africa unable to function in the same capacity with the loss of crucial elder members of
their herd, making the rest of the population more vulnerable to poaching (Chiyo et al.
2011, Mondol, Mailand et al. 2014). In the late 1990s and early 2000s CITES established the
Monitoring the Illegal Killings of Elephants, MIKE, program, which was designed to
evaluate elephant population trends and the proportion of deceased elephants that were
killed illegally, PIKE, within 45 sites across 27 countries and territories in Africa (Burn et al.
2011, CITES and IUCN 2013). PIKE estimates gradually increased, based on data collected
from all 45 sites across the African continent between 2002 and 2014 (Figure 4). The red
horizontal line seen in the figure indicates years in which 50% or half of the elephants
found showed signs that they had been illegally poached, which has been deemed an
unsustainable decline in elephant populations. Particular regions of Africa had elephant
populations and other wildlife that were most heavily affected due to a lack of
environmental protection and the constant presence of violent criminal groups.
Sites within West Africa revealed that based on the 434 carcasses recovered, illegal
poaching rates drastically increased, evidenced by a PIKE level of less than 0.2 in 2002
rising to over 0.85 by 2014 (CITES and IUCN 2013) (Figure 5). This indicates that an
estimated 85% of the elephant carcasses recovered showed signs of illegal poaching,
usually being that their tusks were violently removed, and that West Africa has consistently
threatened African elephant’s sustainability. Since West Africa has a dense human
population and unfavorable habitat for wildlife and particularly elephants, their population
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numbers have historically been less than other regions including Central Africa, East Africa,
and Southern Africa (Barnes 1999). However constant conflict and governmental unrest
has led the vast majority of elephant populations to disappear from West Africa (Bouché et
al. 2011)
Central Africa, consisting of the Central African Republic (CAR), Angola, Chad, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, and several other
smaller countries and territories (Wittemyer et al. 2014) is composed primarily of tropical
forests and rainforests, making it favorable to a highly abundant diversity of animal
species, including, but not limited to, gorillas, chimpanzees, hippopotamuses, white rhinos,
and forest elephants (Bouché et al. 2010, Young et al. 2015). The majority of elephant
deaths occurring within Central Africa have been done at the hands of poachers who use
the dense equatorial landscape to conceal their criminal activity. Almost two-thirds of all
violent conflicts that have occurred in Africa over the last 50 years have taken place within
forested areas, regardless of whether that land has been designated as protected (Donovan
et al. 2007). Habitat encroachment is a common threat among elephant populations in
Central Africa, as their forested habitat has been largely degraded and developed for
human purposes, isolating and exposing these large mammals (Beyers et al. 2011). The
migratory movements and patterns of elephants in this area have been greatly dictated by
the presence of humans, based on studies examining the distribution and abundance of
elephant dung across a particular region of Central Africa (Figure 6) (Blake et al. 2007,
Benítez-López et al. 2010) As human populations numbers rise and expand their territory,
elephant herds have adapted to avoid areas where there is a dense human population
(Benítez-López et al. 2010).
16
This strategy is most successful in protected areas such as reserves and national
parks, historically however this has done little to thwart the elephant population decline
due to a lack of governmental enforcement and dense vegetative landscape of Central
Africa concealing rampant criminal activity (Figure 7) (Barnes et al. 1995, Bouché et al.
2010). PIKE estimates in Central Africa, based on the recovery of 2,630 elephant carcasses,
have on average, increased from a 0.6 level in 2003, indicating roughly 60% of elephant
carcasses discovered had indications that they had been poached, to a estimate of 0.75, and
even as high as 0.9 by 2014 (CITES and IUCN 2013) (Figure 8).
This can mostly be attributed to terrorist groups such as the rebel group Séléka,
Janjaweed and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), who under the leadership of infamous
terrorist Joseph Kony, occupy Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR), DRC,
and Chad, some of the world’s most unstable nations (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, de
Villiers 2015). The insurgent group Séléka overthrew the CAR government in early 2013,
which led to the discovery of an elephant massacre, including the deaths of over 25
elephants, less than two months later (Tomolya 2014, de Villiers 2015). Less than one year
later, Togolese authorities confiscated well over four tons of elephant ivory, which had
been genetically traced back to the elephants that were killed in CAR (Tomolya 2014).
Joseph Kony, aimed at overthrowing the Ugandan government in order to establish
his version of Roman Catholism, began his reign of terror in the early 1980s (Dunn 2004).
At his command, LRA soldiers armed with machetes and assault weapons have killed
thousands of Ugandan people, mutilated women and young girls by raping them and
cutting off their breasts, ears, and lips, while abducting young boys to become trained
soldiers to commit the same atrocious crimes (Apuuli 2004, Haynes 2007). As with many
17
other terrorist groups in Africa, they have funded their criminal activity through illegal
poaching of large mammals, primarily elephants and rhinos, largely because of the global
demand for their parts (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999). Their army has established
themselves in Sudan, particularly because the corrupt government has offered resources
including food, weapons, and ammunition in exchange for military support during regional
strife (Haynes 2007). When the internal conflict was resolved, Kony moved his operations
to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), specifically the Garamba National Park
(Milburn 2016).
The DRC has endured violent civil wars and rampant terrorist activity for many
decades, due to institutional instability, resulting in a substantial loss of wildlife diversity
and conservation feasibility (Beyers et al. 2011). The Garamba National Park in the
northeast region of the DRC has been classified as a UNESCO World Heritage site because of
its immense biodiversity, with a large population of elephants, and its lush landscape
(Thorsell and Sigaty 2001). However, it became the home base for Joseph Kony and the
LRA from 2006-2008, while they acquired more ammunition and weaponry through the
poaching of elephants and more manpower through the abduction of new recruits (Baker
2011). Corrupt government agencies, including the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and
South Sudanese Armed Forces (SPLA), often have trade relationships with terrorist groups
because of the financial incentives and/or intimidation (Dunn 2004, Baker 2011). Kony’s
army traded ivory with Sudanese armies in order to acquire weaponry, including AK-47s,
and ammunition to continue their violent attacks on elephants and local communities
(Baker 2011). In late 2008, Kony released small armies of raiders throughout DRC and
18
Sudan, ultimately displacing thousands, brutally killing nearly 1,000 innocent villagers, and
abducting almost 200 young children (Beyers et al. 2011).
Ineffective governmental support has threatened local communities and protected
areas including national parks and reserves, as supervising rangers and officials struggle to
defend their borders (Leader-Williams and Albon 1988). The Zakouma National Park, near
the Chadian border, had lost an astounding 90% of its elephant population from 2002 to
2008, due to armed groups infiltrating the park’s borders, killing dozens of elephants in
one hunt (Poilecot et al. 2010). The Okapi Faunal Reserve (RFO), a protected reserve in the
north-eastern region of the DRC near the borders of Sudan and Uganda, was the site of
study before and after the war, as were many of national parks in the DRC including the
Garamba National Park, Maiko National Park, Kahuzi Biega National Park, and the Virugga
National Park (Beyers et al. 2011). Elephant population densities across these sites were
estimated before the mass exploitation of elephants during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as
before, during, and after violent civil wars, revealing that all the elephant populations in
these national parks were negatively affected, and even disappeared entirely due to civil
unrest (Table 1).
Human populations have affected the social behavior (Barnes et al. 1995) as well as
the distribution and abundance of elephant populations throughout much of Central Africa
and its protected land including the Lantoto National Park and Raddom National Park in
Sudan (UNEP 2006), Zemongo Reserve in CAR (Roulet 2004), Bili Uere Reserve and
Garamba National Park of the DRC (Beyers et al. 2011). Elephant poaching continues in
these areas, as outnumbered rangers with inferior weaponry are in a constant battle with
poachers to protect the land, the wildlife, and its people. Resistance groups who use
19
poaching as a means to finance their attacks have created alliances with government and
customs officials, business investors, and more in order to successfully transport their
massive loads of ivory tusks out of Africa and into the global market (CITES and IUCN
2013). A vast collection of trade routes and ports have been developed for ivory shipments
to remain concealed and their movements unpredictable to authorities (CITES and IUCN
2013) (Figure 9). Ivory traffickers have developed sophisticated concealment and
transport methods to move the ivory across several states and territories and have relied
on corrupt officials and a lack of national cooperation as a means to do so (van Kooten
2008, CITES and IUCN 2013).
Large mammals such as lions, giraffes, rhinos, and elephants tend to be the most
susceptible to poaching because their large size makes them easier to track and would offer
poachers a more substantial profit (CITES and IUCN 2013). The global demand for animal
products including elephant ivory has consequently encouraged the violent attacks and has
fueled the estimated $12 billion illegal wildlife trade (CITES and IUCN 2013). The ivory
tusk from a large bull elephant can be equivalent to the salary for over a decade’s worth of
unskilled working, making this brutal crime highly desirable for impoverished people and
criminal groups (Moyle 2014). Poachers utilize night-vision equipment, horses, vehicles,
and even helicopters to surround the elephants and quickly slaughter the entire herd
(Loarie et al. 2009). They use assault weapons financed by prior killings, to kill every viable
elephant, and violently remove their tusks using an axe, whether or not the elephant had
yet succumbed to its wounds (Burn et al. 2011). It is a vicious act that is facilitated by the
lack of proper governmental enforcement, but the physical act of poaching elephants for
20
ivory is overwhelmingly being driven by the global demand for ivory (Martin and Vigne
2011).
One-off Sales
By 1995, African elephant populations numbered above 615,000 continent wide,
but only 26% of their total range remained due to continuous fragmentation, degradation,
and exploitation (Said et al. 1995). Before the late 1990s, much of this was limited to
regions of West and Central Africa, which lost the greatest numbers of elephants and
overall biodiversity (Bouché et al. 2010, Bouché et al. 2011). Strong environmental
regulations and an increased enforcement of borders and within customs have been
successful in protecting elephants across many countries in Southern Africa including
South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana, whose elephant population rose from
20,000 to nearly 200,000 in less than thirty years (Skarpe et al. 2004). These countries
began stockpiling ivory tusks confiscated from large scale seizures during transport in
accordance with the ivory trade ban (van Kooten 2008). These countries, who were more
capable and driven to protect their wildlife, sought to down list the elephant populations
within their borders, who were well protected and healthy, from Appendix I to II (Wasser
et al. 2008). This would permit the sale of their stockpiled ivory into a legal global market,
with certain mandates including that the revenue generated from this sale would used
primarily for African elephant conservation efforts (Wasser et al. 2008, CITES and IUCN
2013). Despite the 1989 international ivory trade ban, CITES approved the first sale of
stockpiled ivory in 1997, creating a regulated rewards based system that provided
monetary incentives to those countries that successfully monitor their borders and enforce
21
strong environment regulations. The first sale of stockpiled ivory, known as one-off sales,
occurred in 1999 when nearly 50 tons of raw ivory, the equivalent of over 5,400 elephant
tusks seized in Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, was sold to Japan for $5 million (Bulte
et al. 2007).
Many have criticized CITES for down listing the status of elephants in countries
without consulting the bordering states and territories, who often share elephant
populations and may have objected to such a sale (Wasser et al. 2010). CITES anticipated
that the massive influx of ivory onto the market would diminish its value and therefore its
global demand (CITES and IUCN 2013), but rather it has seemed as though it has elevated
the value of ivory and stimulated the global demand, particularly in China. This
perpetuated further elephant poaching, directly affecting the most vulnerable populations
in the unstable, conflicted territories of West Africa, Central Africa, and parts of East Africa
(Bulte et al. 2007). The rate of elephant poaching in Africa began exceeding levels observed
during the 1970s and 1980s (Okello et al. 2008), leading to a decline of nearly 100,000
elephants in less three years between 1996 and 1998 (Lemieux and Clarke 2009). The
dramatic rise in poaching levels during this time is also evidenced by the increase in
frequency and scale of illegal ivory confiscations (Bulte et al. 2007) from known trading
ports across Africa, many of which were destined for China (Underwood et al. 2013)
(Figure 10).
Demand for Ivory
Ivory has historically been revered as culturally significant and prestigious in many
Asian customs and religions (Gao and Clark 2014), such as in Buddhists teachings that
22
believe ivory, symbolizing intelligence and good fortune, can scare away evil spirits (Gao
and Zheng 2012). But it wasn’t until the early 1990s when China’s gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita began increasing exponentially, that their demand for ivory rose as well.
Ivory has been aesthetically, medicinally, and economically revered in Chinese culture,
serving as a social symbol of wealth and prestige (Gao and Zheng 2012). This has been
reinforced through legislation, when in 2003, the Congress of China adopted the
Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, aimed to promote the
protection of a list of national cultural artifacts, including ivory (Gao and Clark 2014). Such
promotion was featured throughout the state funded media, encouraging the rapidly
emerging middle class to validate their wealth and status through the accumulation of
ivory (Brennan and Kalsi 2015). To promote the appreciation of culture and art, the
Congress of China established the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural
Heritage in 2003, which was to support the preservation of cultural symbols, including
ivory (Gao and Clark 2014). The Chinese government has heavily invested in the promotion
of the culturally significant and aesthetic value of ivory, which quickly created a greater
demand for ivory (Gao and Clark 2014).
For China to legally sell or trade ivory with Africa, they needed to become a CITES
approved trading nation but because China has a proven history of importing illegal ivory
(Underwood et al. 2013), they must convince CITES of their good intentions and support
against illegally obtained ivory, as opposed to ivory purchased through a one-off sale. China
has implemented CITES wildlife protection protocol for its own species since 1981 with
many successful outcomes (McFadden 1987). They also introduced the Ivory Registration
and Certification Policy in 2004, requiring that imported ivory must be sold with a permit
23
in order to assure its legality (CITES and IUCN 2013), both of which led to CITES support of
China becoming a trading nation. Despite the clear relationship between the rise in demand
for ivory in China, and the proportion of elephants killed illegally during the mid-2000s
(Underwood et al. 2013, Gao and Clark 2014), CITES approved the second one-off sale of
confiscated ivory in 2008 from South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, consisting
of nearly 108,000 kg of raw ivory, totaling over $15.5 million dollars (CITES and IUCN
2013). This transaction occurred with Japan and with the recently CITES approved trading
partner, China (CITES and IUCN 2013).
China operates three distinct ivory markets: white market, which includes legal
retailers and facilities primarily out of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, an auction based
grey market, and the black market, consisting of illegal shops and thriving online trading
sites (Wittemyer et al. 2014), which have grown 1000% from 2002 to 2014 (Moyle 2014).
Most legal Chinese vendors are keenly aware that it is illegal to sell ivory artifacts without
valid registration, however many have taken to selling their entire supply, which
unfortunately have often been resold onto the online illegal ivory market, encouraging and
facilitating its further success. (Gao and Clark 2014) (Table 2). Many have discovered
additional loopholes in the ivory registration policy, which has thus far lacked the adequate
enforcement to perform proper inspections to combat these issues (Vandergrift 2013).
There are far too many small and large vendors and distributors of ivory for China’s
ineffectively resourced law enforcement to inspect and monitor, which has enabled more
illegally sourced ivory to reach to legal, white markets, as well as grey and illegal black
markets (Huang and Weng 2014). Since individual ivory pieces are not physically marked
in any way, such as with an identification number that would correlate with the
24
accompanying permit, there are only photos to distinguish ivory pieces from each other
(Vandergrift 2013).
China’s reinvigorated cultural and aesthetic appeal for ivory has fueled its global
demand and has consequently enhanced its monetary value and its perceived social value
(Gao and Clark 2014). On the Chinese black market in 2010, raw ivory sold for an estimated
$750/kg, but by 2014 the price had risen to over $2,100/kg, which equated to roughly
$5,700/kg if sold through the white market (Martin and Vigne 2011). The increase in value
and demand for ivory from China, which has been heavily promoted by the Chinese
government and media, strongly correlates with the elevating PIKE trend seen in Africa for
nearly two decades (CITES and IUCN 2013). A drastic change in cultural and economic
ideology must occur with regards to how many people view ivory in many Asian cultures,
as well as in many parts of Europe, the United States, and Africa (Underwood et al. 2013), if
elephant populations are to be given an opportunity to ever recover and sustain their
populations in an environment that has been greatly depleted.
Possible Solutions
Since the crisis of African elephant poaching is a multifaceted issue, involving
violent terrorist groups, governmental corruption, and wealthy developed nations, the
possible ways in which to revitalize and protect African elephants must be equally
comprehensive. The trade ban of ivory in 1989, when African elephants were classified as
Appendix I, aimed to thwart the further decline of their populations; however, as many
have predicted, the trade ban inevitably created incentives for nations and territories to
stock-pile seized illegal ivory until its value increased. As the demand for ivory grew, so did
25
the monetary value of the hundreds of tons of ivory being stored by nations, many of which
have a history of corruption and poverty (Moyle and Stiles 2014). CITES eventually allowed
a portion of this ivory to be sold onto the global market, further stimulating poaching of
elephants. All African elephants must be classified as Appendix I, rather than Appendix I or
II, depending on which nation or territory the population generally resides, so that a
comprehensive trade ban is developed for all elephant ivory derived from Africa. The oneoff sales of ivory with major nations in 1997 and 2008 reinvigorated the demand for ivory
across many nations, placing elephants at further risk (Bulte et al. 2007).
Effective cooperation with major ivory importing nations must be established so
that the global perception and admiration of ivory does not further endanger elephant
populations. The media, particularly in China, has adopted marketing strategies to
encourage people to appreciate where ivory came from and the beauty elephants can offer,
rather than the perceived value of an ivory trinket (Gao and Clark 2014). Increasing public
awareness about the elephant poaching crisis is the easiest and best way to prevent further
poaching of elephants. Along with a change in ideology, effective global and national
regulations must be implemented that deter people from attempting to obtain ivory goods.
Proper enforcement of these regulations and legitimate global collaboration to prosecute
after illegal ivory seizures and distributions, is vital to diminish the elevated demand for
ivory around the world and threaten poachers enough to recede (CITES and IUCN 2013).
A change in cultural ideology and an increase in public awareness among developed
nations have proven to be a vital step in reducing the rate of elephant poaching in Africa,
but for Africa and its people to stop being victimized by corruption and violent terrorism,
there must be an economic shift that enables local people to have opportunities to improve
26
their lives and their status among developing nations. There needs to be global cooperation
and funding to reduce the levels of poverty experienced in some of the most depleted
environments in Africa, so that natives are not forced to exploit Africa’s wildlife to protect
and provide for their families. Proper education and sufficient economic opportunities for
communities would provide them with the skills and fortitude needed to continue
developing as a nation. Global financial aid is crucial to provide adequate resources for law
enforcement to protect the local people and wildlife from illegal activity. The more
resources made available to law enforcement in Africa, the better equipped and trained
they will be to eradicate the threat of African elephant poaching (Keane et al. 2008).
Without anti-poaching funding the demand for ivory will inevitably rise, as will the rate of
elephant poaching and deaths among anti-poaching rangers, who put their lives on the line
every day to protect the last remaining largest land mammals in the world (Beyers et al.
2011).
These rangers and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have funded
their efforts recognize the importance and economic worth of a healthy, vital ecosystem
(Coria and Calfucura 2012). Local people, who have been given no education or property
rights (van Kooten 2008), have been forced to exploit the natural resources around them,
even within protected reserves and national parks (Coria and Calfucura 2012). However
studies in Africa have shown that by encouraging ecotourism, local communities average
income can gradually increase if given support from NGOs (Lapeyre 2010, Lepper and
Schroenn Goebel 2010). The ecotourism industry is expanding approximately 10% each
year, which is three times faster than the entire tourism industry as a whole (Coria and
Calfucura 2012). This revenue would theoretically distributed among local communities to
27
support the development of infrastructure, schools, health clinics, etc (Lapeyre 2010).
However, many have noted that the revenue that has historically been obtained through
ecotourism has predominantly been more easily accessed by Africa’s elite rather than the
indigenous communities that truly need it, which has discouraged communal participation
in ecotourism in some regions of Africa (Lapeyre 2010).
Zimbabwe developed the Community Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in 1989, which aimed to give the native people of
Zimbabwe rights to their land and the natural resources within it (Child 1996). This
program involved more than a quarter of a million people all of whom have been given the
opportunity to develop their own ways of generating revenue that supports wildlife
management and conservation (Metcalfe 1994, Child 1996). This resulted in the
development of tourism operations, including safari and hunting tours, which are strictly
monitored by the wildlife department of in that particular region of Zimbabwe (Child
1996). The total revenue derived from these concessions is transferred directly to local
communities, who ultimately determine how the money is to be used, enhancing communal
participation and the economic opportunities for villagers (Metcalfe 1994). This is a system
if applied across all African nations and territories could feasibly be a successful method in
which to encourage the development of ecotourism and wildlife conservation projects.
Conclusion
Over two hundred years of elephant exploitation in Africa has caused local
populations to be completely eradicated and continent-wide populations to be heavily
decimated (Wittemyer et al. 2014). Conservation efforts to limit the rate of elephant
28
poaching have primarily focused on increasing on-the-ground anti-poaching enforcement
and seizures of ivory shipments, which ultimately have not reduced the global demand for
ivory (Keane et al. 2008). The elephant poaching crisis in Africa must be recognized as a
global, multi-faceted issue to sufficiently address all aspects encouraging and facilitating
the decline of elephant populations. The impoverished conditions and lack of economic
opportunity across much of Africa has left local communities at risk of violent criminal
groups and corrupt governments, deliberately defunding the poor communities, who have
only depleted natural resources around them to rely on (Bulte et al. 2004). Programs to
encourage the cooperation of local communities and national governments to promote
ecotourism and therefore the protection of all of Africa’s wildlife, such as CAMPFIRE, have
enabled locals to become more involved and enthusiastic to protect the keystone elephant
species (Metcalfe 1994). Ivory must be thought of as more than a culturally appreciated
trinket, but rather a symbol of human’s incessant, violent greed. An increase in public
awareness through media and governmental support, as well as financially supporting the
enforcement and monitoring of ivory distributions particularly in China, is vital to reduce
the global demand for ivory. Elephants are an iconic, keystone species that demands
human respect and deserves more than to be massacred for its parts.
29
Figures and Tables
Table 1. Historical elephant population estimates in the RFO and other MIKE sites in the
DRC, compared with population estimates before (1986-1996), during (1996-2003), and
after violent wars (2003-2009) (Blanc, Barnes et al. 2007, Beyers, Hart et al. 2011)
Table 2. Ranking of top ten domestic ivory importers and their degree and trend of
illegality within their ivory markets (CITES and IUCN 2013)
30
Figure 1. Contributing agents in African elephant poaching and ivory trafficking (Brennan
and Kalsi 2015).
Figure 2. Map illustrating the distribution of armed conflicts and political and social
tensions between 2010-2012, shown by the colored dots, much of which coinciding with
the known and possible elephant range of 2007, represented in green (CITES and IUCN
2013).
31
Figure 3. Estimated African elephant population numbers in West Africa between 19791989 and 1991-2007. (Stiles 2004, Blanc, Barnes et al. 2007)
Figure 4. PIKE trends across 45 MIKE sites in Africa from 2002 to 2014. Red horizontal line
indicates PIKE level of 50% which has been classified as unsustainable (CITES and IUCN
2013)
32
Figure 5. Estimated PIKE, Proportion of Illegally Killed Elephants, levels for 434 elephants
carcasses discovered in West Africa between 2002 and 2014. (CITES and IUCN 2013)
Figure 6. Elephant Dung Distribution (Green) and Human Frequency (Red)
throughout the Ndoki-Dzanga MIKE Site. Color intensity indicated the higher and lower
concentrations of elephant dung and human occurrence. (Blake, Strindberg et al. 2007)
33
Figure 7. Estimated African elephant population numbers in Central Africa between 19791989 and 1991-2007. (Stiles 2004, Blanc, Barnes et al. 2007)
Figure 8. Estimated PIKE, Proportion of Illegally Killed Elephants, levels for 2,630 elephants
carcasses discovered in Central Africa between 2003 and 2014. (CITES and IUCN 2013)
34
Figure 9. Illegal ivory trafficking routes and ports coinciding with known and possible
African elephant range (CITES and IUCN 2013).
Figure 10. Magnitude of ivory seizures obtained from 2009-2011, and the corresponding
origin area, transit area, and destination area (CITES and IUCN 2013).
35
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