Medellín Cartel
Increasing Political Power
Leo Goldman
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INDEX
Summary of the Issue ............................................................. 2-3
Related Legislation ................................................................. 4
Major Aspects of the Issue ..................................................... 5
Actors and Interests ................................................................ 6-7
Discussion Questions ............................................................. 8
Bibliography/Research Links ................................................. 9
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Summary of the Issue
In 1982, Pablo Escobar acquired legitimate political power by becoming a
member of Colombia’s parliament. However, when he was made to resign just two
years later, he no longer looked to the government to foster his ambition for gaining
power.
Now in August of 1989, the Medellin Cartel, Escobar’s multi-billion dollar,
international drug trading organization, is feared and powerful, but not necessarily
stable. While the cartel has massive cash flows and control of much of the
Colombian government, obstacles still force the cartel to constantly work towards
maintaining power and defending itself. Legal barriers, such as the uncorrupted
parts of the Colombian government and the US Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), threaten the cartel’s operations, and, in the case of the DEA, threaten
extradition. As Colombian drug traders continue supplying Americans with cocaine
and other illicit substances, the US government has more at stake and is driven to
get more involved for the sake of its citizens well-being.
Aside from the efforts of national governments, the Medellin Cartel must also
worry about other enemies, rivals going for market share and those seeking to end
the violence of Escobar’s organization. Members of the cartel have separated from
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Pablo Escobar and his violent, showman-like tendencies, but remain in the drug
trade as competitors seeking their own profits. As Escobar’s violence in Colombia
continues, many want to see the violence end Escobar’s life taken.
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Related Legislation
As the Medellin Cartel’s impact on the US grew, the DEA was eager to stop
Pablo Escobar and see out his extradition by the Colombian government.
Extradition was perhaps Escobar’s greatest fear, as he was famously quoted saying,
“I would rather have a grave in Colombia than a jail cell in the US.”
In September of 1979, the US and Colombia signed the Colombia
International Extradition Treaty with the United States, a sign of cooperation
between the two governments and broader grounds for extradition. With the
updated document, more actions related to the drug trade, such as aircraft hijacking
and obstruction of justice, became extraditable crimes, improving the US’s position
in the fight against cartels.
In 1982, the year the treaty was officially enforced and the same year Escobar
won a seat in the Colombian Congress, Escobar pressured Colombian politicians in
an attempt to undo the treaty and other powers the US had with regards to
extradition, but failed to do so as his position and actions in the cartel became
public and he was forced to leave office.
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Major Aspects of the Issue
There are many ways to go about acquiring political power, but the Medellin
Cartel must decide and prioritize which actions it will take to further its power. As
the cartel continuously seeks to evade government detection and intervention,
bribing officials or even running insiders for certain offices may prove helpful,
though with bribery there is always the chance of betrayal.
So far, the Medellin Cartel has used violence as a primary method of keeping
competitors away or citizens in check. Escobar’s men clearly do not mind behaving
violently if paid, but if another group, or groups, becomes powerful enough,
retaliation and full-fledged warfare between organizations is always possible.
With billions of dollars in cash flow, the Medellin Cartel is already quite
powerful, but economic power lies at the foundations of the group. New ways of
maximizing profits and increasing revenues will provide the cartel with more
resources and influence to work with, but successful operations will have to avoid
government detection and be protected from antagonistic intervention.
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Actors and Interests
Pablo Escobar - Born and raised in Colombia, Escobar turned away from
his studies to pursue his goal of fame and fortune from a criminal angle. Starting out
as a petty thief, Escobar quickly took advantage of the emerging cocaine trade and
became one of the most powerful men in Colombia and the world. Known for his
violent methods, Escobar now runs the Medellin Cartel, but greatly fears extradition
to the US.
Government of Colombia - At a time when the Medellin Cartel is incredibly
influential, many members of the Colombian government and army are on
Escobar’s payroll. However, ultimately the government would like to end Escobar’s
reign, as his men bring violence and drugs to Colombia.
US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) - The DEA will do
everything in their power to stop Escobar, who has been responsible for much of
the illegal drugs entering the US. Sending personnel to Colombia to help catch or
kill Escobar, the DEA would like to see Escobar extradited to the US and face the
American judicial system.
Cali Cartel - One of the Medellin Cartel’s rivals, the Cali Cartel was
founded by the Rodriguez Orejeula brothers, who previously worked for Pablo
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Escobar. The Cali Cartel has the advantage of being slightly less well-known than
the Medellin Cartel and the Cali Cartel is not afraid to compete violently in the drug
trade, potentially threatening Escobar’s operations.
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Discussion Questions
1. What are the Medellin Cartel’s biggest vulnerabilities?
2. What are the overall goals of the cartel, and what are the goals of its
individual members? Are they the same thing?
3. What are the costs and benefits of every action taken to gain power, legal or
otherwise?
4. How does a cartel lose economic power?
5. How, if at all, can the cartel ensure the loyalty of its members?
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Bibliography/Research Links
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cartel.asp
http://www.npr.org/2016/02/15/466491812/narconomics-how-the-drug-cartels-opera
te-like-wal-mart-and-mcdonalds
https://www.wsj.com/ad/cocainenomics
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/7/28/1367392/-The-Cocaine-King-Pablo-Esco
bar-and-the-Medellin-Cartel
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.ht
ml
http://www.biography.com/people/pablo-escobar-9542497
https://internationalextraditionblog.com/2011/04/14/colombia-extradition-treaty-withthe-united-states/