You found that on Google?

You found that on Google?
Gaining awareness about “Google Hackers”
Johnny Long
[email protected]
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HUGE DISCLAIMER!
•The print version of this
presentation is much
smaller than the live
version!
• The live version shows many more techniques
and examples.
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What this is about
• We’ll be talking about how hackers can use Google to
locate vulnerable targets and sensitive information
• This process has been termed “Google hacking”
• We will be blowing through the basics
– After all, this is Blackhat! =)
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Advanced Operators
• Google advanced operators help refine searches
• Advanced operators use a syntax such as the following:
– operator:search_term
• Notice that there's no space between the operator, the
colon, and the search term
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Advanced Operators
• site: restrict a search to a specific web site or domain
– The web site to search must be supplied after the colon.
• filetype: search only within the text of a particular type of file
• link: search within hyperlinks
• cache: displays the version of a web page as it appeared
when Google crawled the site
• intitle: search for a term in the title of a document
• inurl: search only within the URL (web address) of a
document
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Search Characters
• Some characters:
•
•
•
•
•
( + ) force inclusion of a search term
( - ) exclude a search term
( “ ) use quotes around search phrases
( . ) a single-character wildcard
( * ) any word
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Site Crawling
• To find every web page Google has crawled for a specific
site, use the site: operator
site: microsoft.com
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Server Crawling
• To locate additional servers, subtract common hostnames
from the query
site: microsoft.com
-site:www.microsoft.com
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Directory Listings
• Directory listings can be a source of great information
intitle:index.of/admin
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Directory Listings
• Directory listings can provide server version information
intitle:index.of apache server.at
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Default Server Pages
• Web servers with default pages can serve as juicy targets
intitle:test.page.for.apache “it worked”
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Default Server Pages
• Web servers with default pages can serve as juicy targets
allintitle:Netscape FastTrack Server
Home Page
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Default Server Pages
• Web servers with default pages can serve as juicy targets
intitle:"Welcome to Windows 2000
Internet Services"
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Default Server Pages
• Web servers with default pages can serve as juicy targets
intitle:welcome.to.IIS.4.0
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Default Server Pages
• Web servers with default pages can serve as juicy targets
allintitle:Welcome to Windows XP
Server Internet Services
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Default Server Pages
• Web servers with default pages can serve as juicy targets
allintitle:”Welcome to Internet
Information Server”
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Default Server Pages
• Web servers with default pages can serve as juicy targets
allintitle:Netscape Enterprise Server
Home Page
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Default Server Pages
• Web servers with default pages can serve as juicy targets
allintitle:Netscape FASTTRACK
Server Home Page
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Default Documents
• Servers can also be profiled via default manuals and
documentation
intitle:"Apache HTTP Server"
intitle:"documentation"
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Error Messages
• Server profiling is easy with some error messages
intitle:"Error using Hypernews"
"Server Software"
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Error Messages
• CGI environment vars provide a great deal of information
• The generic way to find these pages is by focusing on the
trail left by the googlebot crawler
“HTTP_USER_AGENT=Googlebot”
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Error Messages
• after a generic search, we can narrow down to the fields we
find more interesting
“HTTP_USER_AGENT=Googlebot”
TNS_ADMIN
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Vulnerability Trolling
• Many attackers find vulnerable targets via Google
• A typical security advisory may look like this:
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Vulnerability Trolling
• A quick browse of the vendor’s website reveals a demo of
the product
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Vulnerability Trolling
• The demo page suggests one method for finding targets
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Vulnerability Trolling
• A quick intitle: search suggests more vectors…
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Vulnerability Trolling
• This search finds the documentation included with the product
• These sites are probably poorly configured
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Vulnerability Trolling
• Other searches are easy to discover as well…
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Vulnerability Trolling
• Other searches are easy to discover as well…
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Vulnerability Trolling
• Many times, a good search string is much simpler to come up
with
• Consider this advisory:
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Vulnerability Trolling
• A creative search finds vulnerable targets
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CGI Scanning
• In order to locate web vulnerabilities on a larger scale,
many attacker will use a ‘CGI’ scanner
• Most scanners read a data file and query target web
servers looking for the vulnerable files
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CGI Scanning
• A CGI scanner’s
vulnerability file…
• can be converted to
Google queries in a
number of different
ways:
/iisadmpwd/
/iisadmpwd/achg.htr
/iisadmpwd/aexp.htr
/iisadmpwd/aexp2.htr
/iisadmpwd/aexp2b.htr
inurl;/iisadmpwd/
inurl;/iisadmpwd/achg.htr
inurl;/iisadmpwd/aexp.htr
inurl;/iisadmpwd/aexp2.htr
inurl;/iisadmpwd/aexp2b.htr
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Vulnerability Trolling
• Regardless of the age of the vulerability, there are
usually vulnerable targets
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Port Scanning
• Although port numbers are sometimes found in the url, there’s
no easy way to scan just for a port number… the results are
much too copious
inurl:5800
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Port Scanning
• We can use creative queries to sniff out services that may be
listening on particular ports
• VNC Desktop, port 5800
"VNC Desktop" inurl:5800
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Port Scanning
• Webmin, port 10000
inurl:webmin inurl:10000
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Port Scanning
• Google can be used to find sites to do the
portscanning for you
• Consider the Network Query Tool
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Port Scanning
• NQT allows web users to perform traceroutes, rdns
lookups and port scans.
• This is the NQT program checking port 80 on
www.microsoft.com:
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Port Scanning
• Google can be used to locate servers running the NQT program,
nqt.php
• Once servers are harvested, they can be used to perform port scans
(usually through a web proxy)
• NQT also allows remote posts, so that more than one port can be
checked at a time
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Login Portals
• The most generic of login portals
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Login Portals
• Another very generic portal
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Login Portals
• Microsoft Outlook Web Access
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Login Portals
• Coldfusion Admin Page
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Login Portals
• Windows Remote Desktop
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Login Portals
• Citrix Metaframe
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SQL Information
• Gathering SQL usernames is simple with this search
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SQL Information
• This is an SQL dump made by phpmyadmin
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SQL Information
• This is a complete database schema dump, essentially a
complete database backup
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SQL Information
• This query will locate SQL schemas on the web
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SQL Information
• In addition, this query finds the words username and
password inside the SQL dump
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SQL Information
• This potent query finds SQL dumps wither username, user,
users or password as a table name
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SQL Information
• This graphical front-end to SQL is mis-configured to allow
anyone admin access
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SQL Information
• This search can be used by hackers to find SQL injection
targets
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SQL Information
• …another SQL injection target…
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SQL Information
• ..and another…
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SQL Information
• the mysql_connect function makes a database query with a
supplied username and password
• This file should not be on the web
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SQL Information
• In most cases, there’s nothing better for an SQL injector
than a complete line of SQL source code…
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SQL Information
• …except for really long lines of SQL code…
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Examples
• *** LIVE EXAMPLES REMOVED FROM PRINT VERSION***
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Prevention
• Do not put sensitive data on your web site, even temporarily
• Proactively check your web presence with Google on a
regular basis
• Use sites like http://johnny.ihackstuff.com to keep up on the
latest “Google Hacks”
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Prevention
• Use site: queries against each of your web hosts
• Don’t forget about hosts that do not have DNS names
• Scan each result page, ensuring that each and every page it
supposed to be in Google’s database
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Prevention
• Automate your scans with tools like sitedigger by
Foundstone
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Presentation Materials
• This is a condensed version of the actual presentation given
at the event
• For more information, please see:
http://johnny.ihackstuff.com
• Or contact:
Johnny Long
CSC Global Security Solutions
e-mail: [email protected]
• Private e-mail: [email protected]
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Information About Johnny
• Mr. Long has been involved in system security since a very early age, and
has accentuated his natural aptitude for computer technology through
involvement in major security efforts for the Department of Defense and
corporate America. A System Engineer with 10 years experience in most
areas of technical and functional support and system development, Mr.
Long possesses a strong background in many elements of network and
system operation as well as computer, network and physical security.
Equally adept in most aspects of Windows NT and UNIX systems as well
as many current technologies, Mr. Long has proven to be a very fast study
in the face of the ever-changing computer industry. An exceptionally
accomplished speaker and trainer, Mr. Long has the rare ability to present
highly technical material in a way that is beneficial for both technical and
non-technical audiences.
Mr. Long is currently employed by Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC).
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Thanks
•
•
•
•
Thanks to God for the gift of life.
Thanks to my wife for the gift of love.
Thanks to my kids for the gift of laughter.
Thanks to my friends for filling in the blanks.
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