Master Thesis Political Science - International Relations
June 2013
Supervisor: Dr. Ursula E. Daxecker
Second Reader: Dr. Julia Bader
Territorial Disputes and the Emergence
of Interstate Rivalry
A Theory on Domestic Incentives
Lonneke Verheul
Abstract
Quantitative scholars have shown in earlier research that territorial disputes are often the
origin of the emergence of interstate rivalry. My thesis seeks to answer why this is so often
the case, by outlining a theoretical mechanism which links territorial disputes to rivalry
emergence. I have employed a theory-building case study to find this theoretical mechanism.
Through an in-depth study of the rivalry between China and Japan, I have found that
territorial disputes often lead to the emergence of interstate rivalry due to domestic incentives
present in both states involved in the rivalry. These incentives are: 1. The incentive for state
leaders to act tough over territorial disputes due to pressure from domestic interest groups; 2.
The incentive for state leaders to take a strong foreign policy stance over territorial issues so
as to divert attention from domestic turmoil; and 3. The incentive for state leaders to act
aggressively over territorial issues so as to strengthen central state power and legitimacy in
the face of domestic challenges. By acting tough, state leaders force the bilateral relationship
into a spiral of negative experiences, from which it is difficult to escape.
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Table of Contents
Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 3
Literature Review .................................................................................................................................... 5
Identifying Rivals and Rivalries ............................................................................................................ 5
The Origins of Interstate Rivalry .......................................................................................................... 6
Rivalry Maintenance............................................................................................................................ 7
Interstate Rivalry and Conflict Escalation............................................................................................ 8
A Theory on Domestic Incentives ............................................................................................................ 9
Research Design .................................................................................................................................... 12
Case Study: The China-Japan Rivalry ..................................................................................................... 14
A Short History .................................................................................................................................. 14
Japan.................................................................................................................................................. 15
Domestic Pressure Groups ............................................................................................................ 15
Diversionary Tactic ........................................................................................................................ 19
Nation-building .............................................................................................................................. 21
China .................................................................................................................................................. 22
Domestic Pressure Groups ............................................................................................................ 22
Diversionary Tactic ........................................................................................................................ 26
Nation-building .............................................................................................................................. 27
Alternative Explanations ....................................................................................................................... 28
Illustrative Cases .................................................................................................................................... 31
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 33
References ............................................................................................................................................. 36
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Introduction
In September 2012, the Japanese government made the decision to buy three islands in
the East China Sea from its private owner. Within a day, it had fanned the flames of a new
bout of territorial conflict with China, which has been going on for decades. While Japan
claims the these Senkaku or Diaoyu islands as its own, and has been administering them since
1972, China vehemently opposes this claim. Chinese citizens and state leaders believe that the
islands belong to China's territory as according to historical records, and that Japan illegally
obtained them through its territorial conquest before and during the Second World War
(Drysdale 2012). Ever since Japan and China re-established diplomatic relations in 1970s,
flare-ups of this conflict have taken place every couple of years. In addition, scholars and
foreign policy magazines have recently been casting the bilateral conflicts over the islands in
a context of increasing Sino-Japanese rivalry, which has been going on for over a century
(Cha 2012). Why are China and Japan's territorial conflicts linked to a context of rivalry? And
if territorial conflicts and rivalry are so intimately related, what can we do to understand these
situations better and to deal with them more positively?
My thesis argues that the study of interstate rivalry can be helpful in understanding
this China-Japan rivalry. Scholars studying the phenomenon of interstate rivalry have found
that 75% of all interstate conflicts take place between a small number of rival states. They
have also found that territorial conflicts are often a key cause of rivalry emergence and
development (Rasler and Thompson 2006, 159). Given these findings, it is practically relevant
to study the relationship between territorial conflicts and rivalry. Since territorial conflicts
often lead to rivalry development, and interstate conflicts often take place within the context
of rivalry, studying such relations may help policymakers manage conflict. Consequently, this
research may be useful in preventing and mediating conflict situations such as the one
between China and Japan. At the same time, studying the relationship between territorial
disputes and rivalry emergence is also theoretically relevant. The literature on interstate
rivalry has not yet done an in-depth analysis on the origins of interstate rivalry. More
specifically, it has largely failed to give an explanation for why territorial disputes so often
lead to the emergence of interstate rivalries. I therefore attempt to fill this gap in the literature
by answering why territorial disputes lead to the emergence and development of interstate
rivalry.
In answering this question, my thesis will outline the causal mechanism that ties
territorial disputes to the emergence of rivalry. By assuming that territory is of intrinsic value
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to several actors within a state, I will argue that domestic incentives are the key explanation
for why territorial disputes can lead to rivalry emergence. Based on the case study of the SinoJapanese rivalry, I argue that state leaders face a package of three domestic incentives that
lead them to take uncompromising or even aggressive policy stances on territorial disputes.
The first incentive state leaders face is the incentive to take a strong foreign policy position
over territorial disputes due to pressure from domestic interest groups. These groups have
certain interests and beliefs about territorial issues, and can push state leaders to act upon
them. In the China-Japan relationship, for example, Japan's old military class believed that it
could maintain its privileged position in Japanese society through a foreign policy of
territorial expansion (Beasley 1987, 8). Due to its social standing at home, this military class
was able to force the government into undertaking a forceful expedition to Taiwan.
The second incentive is the incentive for state leaders to act tough over territorial
issues so as to divert attention from domestic turmoil. When state leaders face low domestic
support for their rule, they can divert attention from these issues through the use of territorial
disputes. Thus, in the case findings I highlight how the Japanese government was facing
divisive issues surrounding political participation at home (Gordon 2003, 81). It diverted
attention from these problems by escalating territorial issues with China over Korea in
response. Finally, there is the incentive to use territorial issues to bolster up state power and
legitimacy in the face of domestic challenges and/or institutional weaknesses. If state leaders
face domestic challenges to their rule or if they have weak legitimacy, they may exploit
territorial disputes to strengthen state power. In the Sino-Japanese rivalry, for example, the
Chinese government confronted rebellions which were challenging its state power and state
legitimacy. Because the government could not lose more legitimacy by losing Chinesecontrolled territory, it had to take a strong foreign policy position against Japan over Korea
(Paine 2003, 358). By discussing my theoretical framework in this way, I argue that
uncompromising attitudes over territorial issues may lead to the emergence of interstate
rivalry over time if not properly mediated.
The structure of this thesis will be as follows: in the first section, I will discuss earlier
research on the topic of interstate rivalry, outlining the strengths and weaknesses of the
different works. Second, I will return to the theoretical argument on domestic incentives,
outlining its details as well as stating the three main hypotheses of the theory. The third
section will focus on research design. It discusses the research method used to develop the
theoretical argument outlined above, namely the theory-building case study. In addition, this
section will address the steps of the research as well as the sources used to conduct it. The
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fourth section will focus entirely on highlighting the theoretical dynamics present in the case
of the China-Japan rivalry. It will show, in great depth, how the theory was developed and
how the domestic incentives for each country work. In the fifth section, I will introduce some
alternative theoretical explanations for the link between territorial disputes and interstate
rivalry, and explain why the theoretical argument on domestic incentives is better able to
explain rivalry emergence. Finally, I will discuss two other rivalry cases to illustrate how the
theoretical argument applies to other rivalries. My thesis will then conclude by highlighting
the possible directions for future research as well as the implications of my thesis for
policymakers.
Literature Review
Instead of assuming that all actors in the international system are equally likely to
clash, independent of their previous relations, researchers of interstate rivalry argue that most
of the conflict in the international system takes place between a small number of feuding
dyads. These scholars assert that, in order to understand this interstate conflict, we need to
understand how rivalries operate. Thus, they focus on explaining the following four topics:
how to identify rivals and rivalries, how and why rivalries emerge, how and why rivalries are
maintained, and how rivalries are conducive to conflict escalation. This following literature
review will address these different research topics in order.
Identifying Rivals and Rivalries
As part of the research agenda on interstate rivalry, several scholars have developed
particular ways of identifying rivals and measuring rivalry. Each has their advantages and
disadvantages. The first approach, developed by Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, defines
enduring rivalry as "a competition between states that involves six or more militarized
disputes between the same state during a period of 20 years." (1995, 33). This approach thus
identifies rivals by the amount of militarized disputes two states share in a certain time span.
This differs from a second approach developed by Scott Bennett. He identifies rivalries as a
situation in which dyads disagree over several connected issues between them over an
extended period of time (Bennett 1996, 160). These issues become drawn out, leading states
to commit resources to oppose the adversary and to challenge the status quo (Bennett 1996,
160). Policy disagreements become numerous, and eventually the states involved in a rivalry
start to consider each other a primary threat to their security and policy goals (Bennett 1996,
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160). In comparison to Goertz and Diehl's definition of rivalry, this definition is more issueoriented.
The final approach for identifying rivals is that of William Thompson, who takes a
perceptual perspective on interstate rivalry. He identifies rivals as dyads in which both states
perceive each other as a) competitors, b) a source of threats that may become militarized, and
c) as enemies (Thompson 2001, 558). This is remarkably different from the approaches of
Goertz and Diehl, and Bennett, since this definition focuses on the perceptions of state leaders
and citizens towards the other state in a rivalry. There are disadvantages to such an
identification of rivalry. Thompson examines evidence about whom actors describe as their
rivals, and thus did an extensive study of foreign policy and diplomatic history literature
(Thompson 2001, 562-563). This is an intensive method of data collection, and also requires
more interpretation of the evidence than with the other approaches. Goertz and Diehl's
approach, for example, requires less interpretation as they deal with numerical data on the
number of militarized disputes within a dyad. However, Thompson's approach also enjoys
great advantages: it captures the non-military dimensions of interstate rivalry. The approaches
of Goertz and Diehl, and Bennett, define rivalries largely in military terms. Thus, Thompson's
identification of rivals and rivalries is more comprehensive.
The Origins of Interstate Rivalry
Next to the identification of rivals, the literature also examines the emergence and
development of interstate rivalries. Scholars of this topic agree that rivalries often originate
from territorial disputes. Vasquez and Leskiw thus demonstrate through their data sets that
states who have territorial disputes are more likely to become enduring rivals. However, this
only holds for rivals who are equal in status and power (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001, 313).
Similarly, Rasler and Thompson also find that rivalries are more often linked to the onset of
territorial conflicts, after which they lead to further conflict escalation (Rasler and Thompson
2006, 159). These large quantitative studies thus show that territorial disputes often serve as
the origins of enduring rivalry. However, they do not specify why or how territorial disputes
have this effect. The causal mechanism linking territorial disputes to interstate rivalries
remains largely unexplored, and therefore understanding of this process remains vague.
There are two scholars who have tried to address this problem in their work. They
outline a theoretical framework linking territorial disputes to interstate rivalry, and test their
mechanism using case study research. Paul Hensel looks at the Bolivia-Paraguay rivalry from
the point of view of evolutionary theory. He argues that when there is a salient issue (such as
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a territorial dispute) over which two states have conflicting claims and over which disputes
accumulate, the issue and the rivalry are likely to become increasingly important in the
domestic political debate (Hensel 2001, 185). Public opinion and institutional ratification
measures start to constrain state leader's foreign policy towards the rival. A leader must either
adapt his policy preferences to deal with the rivalry and with domestic constraints, becoming
more hawkish, or he will be selected out of office (Hensel 2001, 211). State leaders embroiled
in territorial disputes can thus be pulled into a spiral of uncompromising behaviour, leading to
conflict sequences and eventually enduring rivalries.
Cameron Thies looks at a different causal mechanism that links territorial disputes to
the emergence of enduring rivalries. Thies argues, by looking at the Argentine-Chile rivalry,
that a state's elites can fuel a form of territorial nationalism, which is the root cause of the
emergence of interstate rivalries (2001, 409). His thesis is that territorial nationalism is a
condition in which national identity revolves primarily around the attachment and control of
specific pieces of territory, making other parties who claim those pieces an enemy (Thies
2001, 411). This symbolic attachment to territory is fuelled by state elites and dispersed
through the population through education and mass media, socializing average citizens as well
as future state leaders (Thies 2001, 422). This type of mindset then becomes institutionalized,
leading to rivalry development and maintenance. As this discussion shows, both Hensel and
Thies find domestic dynamics to be crucial in explaining the link between territorial disputes
and rivalry emergence.
Rivalry Maintenance
The largest part of the literature on interstate rivalry focuses on the topic of the
maintenance of rivalries: what are the dynamics of enduring rivalries and what are the factors
that perpetuate rivalries? Many of the dynamics and factors discussed in the literature on
rivalry emergence return in these explanations of rivalry maintenance. For example, Michael
Colaresi finds that domestic incentives lead state leaders to perpetuate rivalries. State leaders
face political punishment by citizens if they overcooperate or undercompete with their
adversary; if they do this, their selectorate will replace them with the hawkish opposition.
Therefore, the state leader either has to become more hawkish himself or he will be replaced
by a hawkish leader (Colaresi 2004, 566). Thus, (the threat of) leadership turnover acts as an
incentive for rivalry maintenance. Similar explanations of domestic incentives also appear in
explanations for rivalry emergence. This suggests that the factors that lead to the emergence
of interstate rivalry development carry on into the future of the rivalry.
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In addition, scholars point to the effect of territorial disputes in maintaining interstate
rivalry. Douglas Stinnett and Paul Diehl argue that a combination of different factors increase
the likelihood of rivalry maintenance: when the rivalry takes place between two major or
recently independent states that have an initial military dispute over territorial claims that ends
in a stalemate, it will most likely become advanced (Stinnett and Diehl 2001, 736).
Additionally, Gary Goertz, Bradford Jones and Paul Diehl argue that rivalries are maintained
because of three reasons: initial disputes between the two states end in a stalemate outcome,
states get more locked into their behaviour as the rivalry progresses, and the rivalry revolves
around conflicting territorial claims (Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2005, 766-767). This discussion
again suggest that territorial disputes not only lead to the emergence of interstate rivalries, but
that they also increase the likelihood that a rivalry becomes long-lasting. Initial issues and
dynamics thus carry on into the rivalry, showing that work on rivalry maintenance is also
relevant for understanding the onset of rivalries: the same dynamics might be present at both
points in time in the rivalry relationship.
There are also other explanations for why rivalries become enduring. Zeev Maoz and
Ben Mor find that enduring rivalries develop because of the learning experiences of both
states involved. They define four types of states within a rivalry: those satisfied with the status
quo who have the capabilities to defend it; those who are satisfied with the status quo but
which do not have the capabilities to defend it; those who are dissatisfied with the status quo
and have the capabilities to challenge it; and those who are dissatisfied with the status quo but
do not have the capabilities to challenge it (1996, 147). Interactions between these types of
states lead to different rivalry dynamics, and states can change type during the rivalry as well.
Rivalries are maintained because of these type changes, which happen through learning about
the adversary's behaviour or through exogenous changes (transformations in status quo
satisfaction or the capabilities of actors) (Maoz and Mor 1996, 155). Different power and
satisfaction levels thus influence rivalry maintenance over time. This theoretical argument is
also in line with Colaresi and Thompson, who argue that the incidence and context of
previous crises within a bilateral relationship increase the likelihood of subsequent crises, thus
maintaining rivalries (2002, 1194). Again, these are dynamics which may also be at play
when a rivalry emerges, and thus are crucial to understand.
Interstate Rivalry and Conflict Escalation
Finally, another part of the academic literature on interstate rivalry treats rivalry as an
explanatory variable for conflict escalation, war proneness and war occurrence. John Vasquez
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and Christopher Leskiw thus argue that enduring rivals are more likely to go to war than other
states involved in military conflict (2001, 313). James Klein, Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl
likewise demonstrate that the emergence of rivalry gives rise to wars and disputes in the
future, because the states involved base their behaviour on their joint history and expect that
mutual conflict will continue in the future (Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006, 334-335). Thus,
these data show that interstate rivals are more war-prone than other state dyads.
In addition, scholars again highlight the role of territorial disputes within interstate
rivalries. They show that rivalry in combination with conflicting territorial claims can often
lead to conflict escalation and the occurrence of war. For example, Karen Rasler and William
Thompson assert that rivalry plays an important role in conflict escalation, especially when
the rivals are contiguous states with contested territorial claims (2006, 159). Similarly,
Vasquez and Leskiw show that long-enduring rivals who disagree over territorial disputes are
more likely to go to war, especially if they are minor power rivals (2001, 313). However, the
articles discussing rivalry maintenance and conflict escalation remain unclear on where these
territorial disputes enter into the rivalry sequence. This is a weakness of research on these
specific topics, as it does not discuss the origins of interstate rivalries and the large role
territorial disputes play in this. Thus, it becomes relevant to broaden the research on the link
between territorial disputes as the origin of interstate rivalry.
A Theory on Domestic Incentives
In line with Vasquez and Leskiw (2001) and Rasler and Thompson (2006), my thesis
argues that the presence of territorial disputes increases the likelihood that interstate rivalry
will emerge. This is because of three domestic incentives that state leaders may face when
engaged in territorial disputes. Firstly, domestic pressure groups may push state leaders to act
uncompromising or even aggressive toward to the other party in the territorial dispute.
Secondly, state leaders may act tough in territorial disputes because they want to use these
disputes to divert attention from divisive domestic issues connected to domestic turmoil.
Thirdly, state leaders may become hawkish in territorial disputes when they face domestic
challenges and/or institutional weakness, in order to strengthen central state power. In all of
these cases, state leaders are pushed to act uncompromising and aggressive towards their
adversary in a territorial dispute, behaviour which can lead to a spiral of negative experiences
in their bilateral relations. If these dynamics are not properly mediated, an interstate rivalry
will likely emerge.
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With regard to the first incentive, research on domestic interest groups posits that
foreign policy is partly the result of officials trying to satisfy domestic pressures (Putnam
1988, 434). At the national level, several domestic groups with specific interests, beliefs, and
demands pressure the government to carry out the policies they favour (Putnam 1988, 434). In
line with this theoretical argument, these interest groups can also pressure a state's
government to follow an aggressive policy towards a particular state over a territorial issue.
They may favour an aggressive policy stance for several reasons. Maybe the group will
benefit from its state owning that territory, or it may believe that owning this territory is
crucial for the state's national strength or for maintaining the state's territorial integrity. If
these pressure groups are influential enough, state leaders may be forced to listen to their
demands regardless of their own interests and beliefs. If they do not take an aggressive stance
toward the adversary in a territorial dispute, they risk losing legitimacy or being removed
from power (Colaresi 2004, 566). In short, due to the pressure from domestic interest groups
state leaders take uncompromising and aggressive foreign policy positions towards the
adversary in a territorial dispute. This may lead to the development of enemy images on both
sides and to the emergence of interstate rivalry if the dispute is not properly mediated on the
international level.
For the second domestic incentive, which is closely related to the first, diversionary
theory states that state leaders may attempt to divert attention from domestic problems and
turmoil by engaging in conflict with other states (Enterlinde and Gleditsch 2000, 26).
Contentious political issues may cause domestic division and low public support for the state's
government. By engaging in conflict with other states, the government can knowingly create a
clear outside threat for the state to fight against. This will create the rally-around-the-flag
effect, where the public is more likely to rally around state leaders when faced with an outside
enemy (Mitchell and Prins 2004, 939). This type of dynamic can thus help state leaders to
increase domestic unity and support for their rule. Drawing on such an argument, state leaders
have an incentive to divert attention to territorial issues in order to regain popular unity
around their government. As a result, they will act more uncompromising or aggressive
towards their adversary in a territorial dispute if they face contentious domestic issues and
domestic turmoil. This aggressive behaviour may lead to the development of enemy images in
their adversary and to the emergence of interstate rivalry if not properly managed.
For the final incentive, which follows from the first and second incentive, research on
the bellicist approach states that strong external threats are a great stimulus for centralizing
state power and building institutional capacity. This is because external threats allow state
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leaders to augment the extractive capacity of the state (Thies 2005, 452). Following from this
line of thinking, state leaders have an incentive to act tough over territorial disputes when they
want to strengthen state power and maintain their political legitimacy. If they face potential
domestic challenges to their rule, or the institutional capacity and hold on power of their
government is shaky, they have a reason to create or exploit foreign conflict, including
territorial disputes. This is because the threat from a territorial dispute will be a great stimulus
to strengthen state power as well as the state's legitimacy. In short, because of domestic
challenges and institutional weakness political leaders take uncompromising and aggressive
foreign policy positions towards the adversary in a territorial dispute. Again, this behaviour
may lead to the development of enemy images by their adversary, leading to a spiral of
negative exchanges in their bilateral relationship. If these dynamics are not properly managed,
this may eventually lead to the emergence of interstate rivalry.
Thus, if state leaders face these three domestic incentives, which in practice are
difficult to separate and do overlap a great deal, territorial disputes become more difficult to
solve. Both parties enter a history of hawkish behaviour. Extended over time, such behaviour
lock-in gives rise to mutual negative perceptions within the states involved. State leaders and
citizens, based on the past experiences of the bilateral relationship, develop current and future
expectations about the behaviour of their adversary (Thompson 2001, 569). Given that states
involved in one or several territorial disputes will have a history dominated by conflict, these
expectations will be negative. State leaders and citizens will hence start to view each other as
competitors, as a source of threat which may lead to conflict, and as enemies over time. These
are William Thompson's requirements for the identification of interstate rivalry (2001, 560).
In short, if neither the states involved nor a third party can mediate the aggressive behaviour
or enemy perceptions of both states, interstate rivalry may develop due to domestic pressures
over territorial issues.
Following this theoretical argument, my thesis will outline the following hypotheses
on the link between territorial disputes and the emergence of interstate rivalry:
H 1 : Territorial conflicts are more likely to lead to the emergence of interstate rivalry
if state leaders face pressure from domestic interest groups to act uncompromising or
aggressive during one or more territorial disputes.
H 2 : Territorial conflicts are more likely to lead to the emergence of interstate rivalry
if state leaders face contentious political issues and/or low popular support at home.
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H 3 : Territorial conflicts are more likely to lead to the emergence of interstate rivalry if
state leaders face domestic challenges to their rule and/or weak state institutions and
legitimacy.
In the next section, I will outline how I came to develop these hypotheses.
Research Design
To develop the theoretical arguments and hypotheses outlined above, I used the case
study method. A large part of the literature on the origins of interstate rivalries uses large-N,
quantitative research methods to study the topic. Consequently, the causal mechanisms
linking territorial disputes to the emergence of rivalry are lacking. While quantitative research
methods excel at highlighting correlations across a large number of units, giving the research
a broad scope and making the results generalizable, it cannot dig deeper into a case to give a
detailed pathway linking the two variables of interest (Gerring 2004, 347-349). The
theoretical explanation linking territorial disputes to the emergence of rivalry is thus
underspecified. The case study method can remedy this problem. It has the advantage that it
provides an in-depth, detailed analysis which allows one to trace the paths linking territorial
disputes to interstate rivalry. This is why my theory-building case study research is an
important addition to the literature.
The theory-building case study is exploratory in nature. Theory-building case studies
are most useful when the state of theory in other research on the topic is weak, due to the
limits of existing data and theory (Lieberman 2005, 443). Thus, the researcher, using an
inductive approach through the study of a single case, develops new theoretical arguments
explaining the varied outcomes of interest and specifying the pathways that lead to this
outcome (Lieberman 2005, 443). To develop this new theory, there are several methods a
researcher can use, including the study of deviant cases, case comparison, and the study of a
single case over time (Mahoney 2007, 126). In selecting the single case, random selection
should be avoided, since the researcher's background, historical knowledge, or language skills
concerning a particular case can be crucial in developing a good theory (Lieberman 2005,
447). In short, the theory-building case study is a method in which the researcher studies a
case of which he or she has extensive knowledge, and from which he develops a theoretical
argument that accounts for varied outcomes.
In line with these considerations, I have selected the interstate rivalry between China
and Japan to develop my theoretical argument. The choice of the China-Japan rivalry is in line
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with the demands of the methodology, since I have an extensive knowledge of Japan's history
and the history of China-Japan relations. I also have some knowledge of the Japanese
language. In addition, the China-Japan rivalry is part of many lists on interstate rivalries,
including those developed by William Thompson, and Diehl and Goertz (Thompson 2001,
571). The rivalry is thus a representative case of interstate rivalry. Still, rivalry identification
methods cannot account completely for the Sino-Japanese case: the rivalry's termination dates
all fall around the end of World War II (Thompson 2001, 571), and considering the hostile
relationship between China and Japan at the moment, this seems unconvincing. Thus, the
China-Japan rivalry is both a representative case as well as an exceptional one.
By studying China-Japan relations over time, I traced the causal mechanisms tying
territorial disputes to the emergence of interstate rivalry and developed my theoretical
argument. Specifically, I first did an extensive literature review on the topic of interstate
rivalry and territorial disputes. Here I focused on building a theoretical map that could help
me orient myself within the large amount of information on the China-Japan rivalry. Next, I
studied primary and secondary sources on the history of Japan and China, as well as on the
history of their bilateral relations. Finally, I returned to more general theories on International
Relations and International Conflict to formulate my theoretical argument. In this way, my
research was an iterative process through which I engaged with the case through theory, as
well as with the theory through the case.
Despite using a method that excels at highlighting a causal chain, during the iterative
process of studying the Sino-Japanese rivalry the causal sequence linking territorial disputes
to interstate rivalry remained difficult to determine. It was hard to pinpoint the exact point in
time when the Sino-Japanese rivalry emerged, and it was especially difficult to find out what
the exact causal sequence leading to the emergence was. Do territorial disputes directly
trigger the three domestic incentives described above, which then lead to the emergence of
interstate rivalry? Or do territorial disputes and domestic incentives appear at the same time,
and interact to lead to a rivalry? In my opinion, the China-Japan rivalry shows that territorial
disputes acted as a catalyst for domestic incentives to come to the fore. Japan already had
long-standing but slumbering territorial issues with China over the Ryūkyū Islands and Korea.
Domestic incentives led Japan to become the aggressor on these issues while China, as the
status-quo great power in the region, reacted to Japanese actions in line with its own domestic
incentives. I will outline this dynamic further in the next section.
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Case Study: The China-Japan Rivalry
A Short History
Before Japan started on its modernization course in the 19th century, it was part of a
regional system in which China was the leading power. China was the Middle Kingdom, and
Japan was a tributary state to it. Through these tributary relations, Japan adopted Chinese
cultural developments and methods of political organization. Although the Japanese had great
respect for Chinese culture because of this, by the 19th century they grew frustrated with the
lower status the Chinese bestowed upon them. From the 16th century on Japanese leaders
directly challenged this status by cutting tributary ties with China, secretly subverting Chinese
control over the Ryūkyū Kingdom, and by organizing forceful expeditions to Korea.
After the fall of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1868, Japan's new state leaders started to
reform its political, social and economic institutions along western standards. These reforms
contributed to Japan's rise in international society. However, its rise also set Japan on a
collision course with China, which was set back by domestic problems and turmoil. After
1868 Japan started to challenge China's superiority in the Asian region, a trend which lead to
diplomatic and military clashes between the two states. In the 1870s, Japan's political leaders
challenged China's sovereignty over both the Ryūkyū Kingdom and Taiwan: they ordered an
expedition to Taiwan in 1874 to punish the Taiwanese for killing 54 Ryūkyū nationals years
earlier, and forcefully annexed the Ryūkyū Islands in 1879.
In the 1880s, Japanese and Chinese attention started to turn to Korea. Korea was
China's most important tributary state, and the Qing government traditionally held a lot of
influence there. In the 1880s its policies toward Korea became more intrusive, as the Qing
sent political advisors to the Korean court and stationed troops in Seoul. Japan similarly
sought to increase its influence in Korea by sending diplomatic and military delegates to
Seoul. When a coup threatened the Korean court in 1882, China and Japan clashed
diplomatically because of Chinese interference in putting down the coup. In 1884 a reformist
coup followed, this time supported by the Japanese delegation in Seoul. During the uprising,
which eventually failed, Chinese and Japanese soldiers met in a military clash in Seoul. Over
the next decade, Chinese influence in Korea only continued to increase.
By 1894, these conflicting interests in Korea led China and Japan to war. During the
1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War both parties treated each other with extreme cruelty. Japan
won the war decisively, while China lost all its influence in Korea and Taiwan. After the war,
Japan increasingly started to involve itself in China's domestic affairs. It helped put down the
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anti-foreign Boxer movement in 1900, in which Japanese representatives to China were killed.
Five years later, Japan emerged victorious in a war with Russia, gaining Russian leaseholds in
China's north-eastern province Manchuria. In 1915, Japan's state leaders issued the Twentyone Demands, a document of 21 articles that granted Japan imperial privileges in China. This
was such a humiliation for the Chinese people that it lead to years of popular, anti-imperialist
protest. Eventually Japan's meddling in China lead the Japanese army to stage the Manchurian
Incident of 1931, with which the Second Sino-Japanese War began.
Japan
Domestic Pressure Groups
An important pressure group forcing the Japanese government to continuously act
aggressively towards China over the territorial issues described above, was the Japanese army.
Before the imperialist powers forced Japan to open up in 1854 after two centuries of isolation,
the warrior class held a favourable position in Japanese society and had a large influence on
Japanese politics. After the opening of Japan, these warriors lost a large amount of political
and social power. With the dawn of a new Japanese government and a new political system,
the samurai warriors had lost their income based on government stipends. They were also
deprived of their elite position in society after the government disbanded the old class system
(Gordon 2003, 65-66). Due to these changes, many samurai became unemployed and
eventually frustrated with the government reforms (Paine 2003, 93). Consequently, the old
military class was looking to renew the influence it traditionally held. It believed that
territorial acquisition was a useful strategy for reaching this goal: the army's involvement in
territorial expansion and international rivalries would increase its power domestically
(Beasley 1987, 8). At the same time, the samurai and the military leaders genuinely believed
that territories like the Ryūkyū Islands, Taiwan, and Korea were of strategic value for Japan's
protection and future expansion (Zachmann 2009, 16). Hence, the old samurai class started to
push for territorial expansion.
The pressure these warriors and the army put on the government became visible
during the 1870s. During this period, Japan's military leaders were advocating that the
Japanese government allow an expedition to Korea, arguing that this would open Korea and
increase Japanese influence there. Since they were convinced that Japan needed to acquire
influence in Korea to defend the homeland, they pushed the government to undertake
expeditions (De Bary, Gluck and Tiedemann 2005, 682-683). One of the samurai suggested
15
that the Meiji government send thirty samurai battalions to Korea to open it for trade and
show Japan's glory and prestige to the world, while another committed ritual suicide to put
pressure on the government for an expedition (Foo Chien 1967, 20). Since Korea was a
crucial tributary state for China, the cautious Meiji government could not give into the army's
demand, as it might lead to war. To avoid losing the support of the army, Japanese leaders
instead organized a punitive expedition to Taiwan in 1873-1874 to punish the Taiwanese
aborigines for killing 54 Ryūkyū sailors. It also challenged Chinese sovereignty over the
Ryūkyū Islands, eventually leading to their forceful annexation in 1879. Japan's political
leaders saw this as a way to satisfy the warrior class' demands (Halliday 1975, 84). Thus, the
samurai and army's pressure led the government to escalate certain territorial issues with
China.
Several key political players and factions within and outside the Meiji government
also provided the necessary pressure for Japanese state leaders to act aggressively in their
territorial disputes. Some of Japan's key political leaders within and outside the government
were paranoid about a weak Japan facing a world with imperial great powers. Territorial
expansion, in their eyes, would increase national strength, and help to increase Japan's
security by preventing its neighbours from falling into western hands (Duus 1998, 16-17).
Moreover, these political players believed territorial acquisition would enhance Japan's
prestige and influence abroad, which might lead to a more equal relationship with the western
powers in the future (Duus 1989, xx). At the same time, advocates for a strong foreign policy
in the Japanese parliament, believing the same thing, pushed the government to act more
aggressively towards China (Zachmann 2009, 154). Since some of these political players had
crucial positions within the new governmental system, Japan took a strong foreign policy
stance over territorial issues with China. Thus, when the Korean court rejected Japan's request
to open Korea for trade in 1873, Japanese state leaders organized a punitive mission to Korea.
The supporters of this mission within the Japanese government meant to win their country a
leading position in Asia by successfully challenging China's supremacy in Korea; and to
forestall Britain and Russia gaining a foothold near Japan (Hsü 1995, 334). The strong foreign
policy towards China was hence also a product of the beliefs of key political leaders and the
pressure of foreign policy extremists.
Two closely related pressure groups which also influenced Japan's political leaders
were Japanese intellectuals and Japanese newspaper editors. In the first category, there were
several schools of thought within Japan that advocated a strong foreign policy over territorial
issues. The realist school, for example, believed in the Darwinian idea of the 'strong eat the
16
weak', meaning that Japan should be on the side of the strong. As China was Japan's
competitor politically and civilizationally, representatives of several schools demanded that
the government go to war with China over the territorial issues described above (Zachmann
2009, 24-25). They also openly supported the progressive faction in Korea, which in 1884
attempted to overthrow the Chinese-supported conservative Korean court (Foo Chien 1967,
148). Similarly, after the Sino-Japanese War of 1884-1885, they called on the government to
help China reform, even through threats of force (Zachmann 2009, 154). The second pressure
group, the newspaper editors, came to believe from the 1870s that China was a worthy rival to
Japan, but also saw the country in a negative light. Thus, they repeatedly attacked China in
their articles in order to enflame public opinion and to force the Japanese government into
action over territorial disputes. (Zachmann 2009, 20). For example, when the government
announced in June 1894 that it would send troops to Korea, the newspapers started to attack
the Qing government for its oppressive behaviour in Korea (Zachmann 2009, 33). Thus, both
intellectuals and newspaper editors put pressure on the government to act on their negative
beliefs, and take an aggressive stance on territorial disputes.
The general public also acted as an important pressure group that contributed to the
escalation of territorial issues into interstate rivalry. It had many motivations for this. One of
the underlying causes that led the general public to pressure the Meiji government into acting
aggressively, was its anger over China's seemingly condescending attitude toward Japan.
Japanese citizens resented the fact that the Chinese continually looked down on the Japanese
people, as expressed by the continued Chinese references to the Japanese as "small islandbarbarians" (Zachmann 2009, 30). In addition, they perceived slights from the Chinese Qing
government towards Japan on many occasions. For example, the general public was furious
that Chinese soldiers had put down the reformist coup of 1884 in Korea, which was supported
by the Japanese representatives and soldiers there (Zachmann 2009, 16). People started to
demand that the Meiji government intervene in Korea and force Korea and China to civilize
(Paine 2003, 94). Ten years later, the assassination of pro-Japanese Korean coup leader Kim
Ok-kyun became another explosive issue. Citizens were riled up over this event because Kim
had fled to Japan after the 1884 coup, and was thus under Japanese protection. When in 1894
he was lured to Shanghai by a fellow Korean and assassinated, ordinary Japanese considered
the assassination a direct affront to Japan (Hsü 1995, 338). To them Kim had been a guest of
the Japanese government, and the Chinese had failed to protect him. In addition, the Chinese
government had returned Kim's body to Korea and tolerated its dismemberment by the
17
Korean courtiers. The public thus felt that the Chinese had gone out of their way to insult the
Japanese in every possible manner (Paine 2003, 96-99). It was boiling over with anger.
These events show led the general public to clamour for a strong foreign policy
towards China over territorial disputes. Due to China's attitude and such events as described
above, as well as due their growing sense of nationalism, the Japanese started to demand from
1870 on that the government undertake foreign adventures (Paine 2003, 92). They started to
push the Meiji government to change its cautious foreign policy into a more active one. After
the Kim Ok-kyun assassination, the general public became frenzied for war and demanded a
war of chastisement with China. When the government finally announced war and the SinoJapanese War of 1894-1895 started, the public did not want it to end too soon (Zachmann
2009, 33-35). At the end of the war, the Japanese public put pressure on the government to
negotiate peace terms commensurate with Japan's victories in the field. It wanted the peace
terms to humble and humiliate China, forcing it to lose face (Paine 2003, 248-249). Thus the
Japanese public was a key pressure group that pushed the Japanese government to take an
aggressive stand against Korean and Chinese slights (Paine 2003, 92). This led the
government to take a strong foreign policy position over the territorial issues with China.
Several Japanese societies echoed these dynamics that were present among ordinary
Japanese citizens. From the end of the 1880s, secret societies such as the Genyōsha were
goading Japan's political leaders into taking a strong foreign policy stance. The Genyōsha
were trying to agitate for Japanese military expansion and conquest in Asia, and to this end
tried to bring China and Japan into a war over Korea (De Bary, Gluck and Tiedemann 2005,
949-950). This eventually led the secret society to encourage the Tonghak rebellion of 1894 in
Korea, so as to give the Japanese government a pretext for sending army troops to Korea (Hsü
1995, 338). When the Tonghak rebellion broke out and the Chinese government sent troops to
Korea to put it down, the Japanese government reacted in kind. Japan's political leaders
argued that the Chinese had not notified Japan in advance of its troop stationing (Hsü 1995,
339). This situation led to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Thus, the Genyōsha as well
as the public pressured the Meiji government into starting a war with China, and hence to act
aggressively over territorial disputes.
When the Sino-Japanese War had finished with the decisive victory by Japan, the two
governments had to negotiate a peace treaty. As a result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which
concluded the war, the Qing dynasty lost all influence in Korea to Japan, while Japan also
took Taiwan and the north-eastern Liaodong Peninsula. These aggressive terms were the
result of interest group pressure on the Japanese government. The cession of Liaodong
18
Peninsula paid heed to the demands of both the Japanese army and the navy, who wanted the
peninsula to facilitate the domination of Korea and Beijing in the future. The demand for
sovereignty over Taiwan was voiced by both the navy and the political parties, who wanted
Taiwan as a base for future advance to South Asia. (Hsü 1995, 341). These pressure group
demands at home forced the Japanese negotiators to ask the Chinese representative for such
aggressive peace terms. The ceding of so much Chinese territory to Japan added even more
bilateral territorial issues to the ones already in existence. The Chinese reacted very
negatively to losing so much territory to Japan. Consequently, a state of interstate rivalry
between China and Japan emerged due to China's negative past experiences with Japanese
aggression over territorial disputes.
Another Japanese pressure group emerged over the course of the first years of the
Sino-Japanese rivalry. It also pressured the Japanese government to escalate its territorial
disputes with China and thus develop the rivalry further. During Japan's modernization over
the course of the second half of the 19th century, there had emerged a new class of capitalist
entrepreneurs within the country, who had an increasing influence on Japanese politics. This
new capitalist class initially was not enthusiastic about the strategy of territorial expansion
which the Japanese government was following, as it lead to interstate disputes that could
affect their foreign trade. However, the entrepreneurs eventually shifted their opinion and
began to support the expansionist strategy (Beasley 1987, 6-7). Since Japan was still largely
an agrarian society, these entrepreneurs could not sell their products at home; they needed to
find markets abroad (Halliday 1975, 100). Territorial expansion could help them well in this
regard. In addition, Japan did not possess enough raw materials for industrial production, and
thus territorial expansion would help the entrepreneurs in acquiring these as well (Halliday
1975, 101). For this reason, Japan's capitalist class provided an additional pressure group that
pushed Japan's political leaders even more into the direction of territorial expansion. The
government thus had several interest groups pressure them into acting aggressively towards
China in their territorial disputes, leading to the development of enemy images of Japan in
China. This influenced the emergence and development of a Sino-Japanese rivalry.
Diversionary Tactic
Japan's political leaders also confronted several contentious domestic issues that
divided the general public and lowered support for their rule. First and foremost, they faced
unrest among the traditional elite, the warrior classes. These warrior classes were discontented
by their dwindling political and social influence in the modern era, following a period in
19
which they had held an elite position in society (Gordon 2003, 65-66). This discontent
expressed itself into incidents such as the Satsuma rebellion of 1877. This was a revolt of
unemployed samurai warriors aimed at overthrowing the new imperial government, which
had taken away their privileges and salary (Gordon 2003, 87). State leaders hence saw a
strategy of territorial expansion as a chance to solve this unrest and political opposition
among the warrior class. They believed that diverting warriors' discontent to conflicts over
territorial issues would give them an outlet for their feelings. External conflict would divert
the samurais' attention from their domestic problems, calm the situation at home, and help the
government gain more support for their policies in the process (Halliday 1975, 84). Thus, with
the punitive mission to Korea in 1873, as well as the expedition to Taiwan in 1873-1874, the
Japanese government provided the samurai class with an outlet for their discontent (Hsü 1995,
334). Especially Korea became an important foreign policy issue in this regard for the Meiji
government during the 1870s (Paine 2003, 91). As this discussion shows, the diversionary
incentive led Japan's political leaders to act aggressive over its territorial issues.
A second domestic problem from which the Japanese political leaders wanted to divert
critical attention was the issue of political representation and economic fortunes. During the
1870s, "the movement for freedom and people's rights" had come into being in Japan. This
movement demanded popular participation in the Japanese political system. It wanted to reach
this goal by forcing Japan's political leaders to write and promulgate a constitution and to set
up a parliament (Gordon 2003, 81). By 1880, nearly two hundred political organizations had
formed to bring about this goal. These eventually all merged together into two political groups,
which resembled national political parties in all but the election incentive (Gordon 2003, 81).
The popular groups held rallies and petitions to put pressure on the government to make a
constitution. After the emperor in 1881 announced that a constitution would be written and
promulgated by 1890, the movement rallied around the issue of the unequal treaties between
Japan and the west (Gordon 2003, 91). During the 1880s the government was also facing
peasant uprisings in the countryside. These took place as a result of the peasantry's discontent
over poverty and their class struggle with the landlords (Gordon 2003, 87). To divert attention
from issues which caused domestic unrest as well as resentment towards the government,
Japan's political leaders hence escalated certain territorial issues with China, such as with
Taiwan and the Ryūkyū Islands conflicts in the 1870s and Korea in the 1880s.
During the 1890s, both political repression and economic fortunes were still problems
which the Meiji government had to divert domestic attention from. Even though Japan's
political leaders had set up new political institutions, had promulgated a constitution, and had
20
set up a parliament, in practice the system was not representative. Political parties in the
parliament were angry with the cabinet, because actual political power was still in the hands
of the Japanese cabinet and the elder statesmen who had reformed the country since the 1860s
(Paine 2003, 88). The political parties thus tried to obstruct the parliament and criticize the
reforms of the Meiji government, in order to have at least some influence on state proceedings.
However, the cabinet dissolved the parliament time and again: in 1891, 1893, and 1894 (Paine
2003, 89). At the same time, public opinion was split over the controversial issue of the
growing Chinese migrant population in Japan. The Japanese public was unhappy with this
trend, because it feared that the migrants would take away jobs as cheap labour (Zachmann
2009, 23). Thus, both political repression and economic fortunes constituted divisive social
issues in the 1890s, from which Japan's state leaders had to divert attention to regain public
unity. They tried to achieve this by escalating territorial issues with China over Korea, which
eventually led to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 (Zachmann 2009, 33). And they were
correct: the general public greeted the war with great enthusiasm, and the political parties
immediately fell into line to support the government (Paine 2003, 135). Thus, the diversionary
incentive led the Japanese government to take an aggressive foreign policy stance over
territorial issues with China, which led to war and eventually interstate rivalry.
Nation-building
As outlined above, the Japanese government was facing domestic challenges to its rule
in the second half of the 19th century. The Meiji government was dealing with challenges
from the general public over popular representation. Even more importantly, it faced
insurgencies aimed at overthrowing its rule from both the disenfranchised samurai warrior
class and the peasantry (Gordon 2003, 81; Gordon 2003, 87). Meanwhile, central state power
and the institutional capacity of the Japanese state was still in the process of being built up.
After the regime change of 1868, Japan's political leaders had started Japan on a
modernization drive by building political and social institutions along western standards.
They were convinced that Japan's highest priorities in reforming were the building of a
constitutional system, a modern military system, large-scale factories to usher in
industrialization, as well as good national education (De Bary, Gluck, and Tiedemann 2005,
682). Hence, the leaders overhauled the military, built a new educational system that
emphasized nationalism, and built a new political system based on western models. These
changes had the result that the Meiji government had a shaky grasp on political power. The
new institutions and the reform programme were unpopular among many Japanese citizens, as
21
the domestic disturbances showed, and thus the government needed a foreign policy success
to consolidate power domestically (Paine 2003, 92). The Japanese government needed foreign
threats and foreign policy success to legitimize its power and reform programme. To reach
this goal, territorial disputes could prove useful.
Thus, the government undertook a strategy of territorial expansion with the aim of
consolidating popular loyalty to the government, centralizing state power, and building
institutional capacity. The Meiji government hoped that a strategy of territorial expansion and
external conflict would help legitimize the state and mitigate domestic challenges to its rule,
by uniting the people behind the state and providing them with a new national identity (De
Bary, Gluck and Tiedemann 205, 948-949). As early as the 1870s, Japan's leaders thus
undertook punitive missions to Korea and Taiwan that challenged China's sovereignty over
these two states, which were a crucial part of its tributary system (Hsü 1995, 317). During
these years, especially the government's Korea policy, focusing on the opening up of Korea,
was considered crucial to gain legitimacy (Paine 2003, 92). Not twenty years later, Japan's
political leaders instigated the Sino-Japanese War in order to consolidate its power. Japanese
officials believed that victory in the war with China would propel Japan into the ranks of the
great powers, thus helping the government and the reform programme obtain legitimacy
(Paine 2003, 131). As this analysis shows, the Japanese government also acted aggressively
over its territorial disputes with China so as to consolidate its political rule at home. This, as
we will see in the following section, would lead to the development of enemy images
concerning Japan among the Chinese.
China
Domestic Pressure Groups
In the Chinese case, too, were several domestic pressure groups which pushed China's
political leaders to take an uncompromising stance over territorial issues. First and foremost
among these were China's foreign policy officials. After Japan's expedition against Taiwan in
1874 and Japan's forceful annexation of the Ryūkyū Islands in 1879, these officials expressed
the belief that China's tributary states were in danger from a Japanese threat. Thus, main
foreign policy expert Li Hongzhang believed that if China remained inactive over the Ryūkyū
annexation, Japan would attack Korea next, and then finally Beijing (Zachmann 2009, 15).
This was a problem for China, because Li and other strategists were convinced that Korea was
an essential buffer for Chinese defences. Experts in the Zongli Yamen, China's Foreign Office,
22
believed that China had to intervene in Korea so as to prevent it from falling into Japanese
hands (Foo Chien 1967, 63). Hence, several foreign policy experts pushed China's state
leaders, mainly the Emperor and Empress Dowager, to take an uncompromising and even
aggressive foreign policy position towards Japan over territorial issues. The Zongli Yamen
advised the Emperor to take a more active stance on Korea in 1879 (Foo Chien 1967, 63). By
the end of the 1880s, China's foreign minister in Tokyo called on the Qing court to take over
Korea's foreign affairs (Foo Chien 1967, 68). And near the start of the Sino-Japanese War of
1894-1895, the Zongli Yamen also advised the Emperor to declare war on Japan, in order to
punish Japan's arrogance in Korea and to divert ridicule for China (Paine 2003, 137). China's
political leaders listened to this advice: in the 1880s China started to actively intervene in
Korean politics, and a decade later it started a war with Japan. Japan's challenging of the
Chinese status quo in its tributary states and pressure from foreign policy experts following it
had thus led the Qing government to act hawkish.
Another pressure group which pushed the government to take a tough policy stance
over its territorial disputes with Japan was the Chinese thinking class. This class included
government officials from all levels of government as well as intellectuals in general, who
stood at the top of the domestic class hierarchy in China. Many Chinese officials believed in a
world order in which China was the Middle Kingdom, the most civilized state in the world,
and other states were simply barbarians (Wakeman 1975, 111). Because of this thinking, they
were greatly prejudiced towards Japan. China's government officials routinely referred to the
Japanese as "dwarf pirates", and they looked down on Japan as an inferior country not to be
taken seriously (Paine 2003, 99-100). In addition, during the 1870s and 1880s these officials
became convinced that there was a danger of foreign incursions from Japan and Russia on
Korea (Foo Chien 1967, 61). China's government officials as well as several Chinese authors
resented Japan for its expedition against Taiwan in 1874, its annexation of the Ryūkyū Islands
in 1879, and for the concessions it got from Korea after a 1882 coup in the latter country.
They saw these events as attempts to provoke trouble with China (Qiqian 2002, 259-260). The
thinking class felt humiliated by these attempts as well as by half a century of barbarian
encroachment, including that of the great powers. These feelings of humiliation and a sense of
injustice fuelled demands for revenge among the Chinese (Hsü 1995, 387-388). They thus
wanted China to demonstrate that it had overcome its earlier territorial losses and was a great
empire once again (Foo Chien 1967, 130). This shows that there were several beliefs and
interests motivating the thinking class's pressure on the Qing court to take a tough stance on
territorial issues.
23
This tough stance was visible in all territorial issues, including those with Japan. For
example, during the dispute with France in 1884 over the control of China's crucial tributary
state of Annam, the Chinese literati demanded that the Qing court take an uncompromising
position so as to discourage other imperialist powers from taking crucial territory from China
in the future (Hsü 1995, 327). For disputes with Japan, they also put pressure on the throne.
After Japan's 1874 attack on Taiwan, several Chinese authors, such as Chen Qiyuan and Ying
Baoshi, argued that the government should attack the Japanese homeland to avoid further
Japanese incursions (Qiqian 2002, 259-260). Similarly, during the 1870s and 1880s
government officials demanded that the emperor adopt a more active policy toward Korea
instead of the earlier one of detachment (Foo Chien 1967, 61). The Qing government was thus
led into stationing troops in Korea, appointing Chinese advisors to the Korean court, and
providing financial assistance to Korea (Foo Chien 1967, 134). A decade later, an extremist
foreign policy faction in the Qing government pressured the Chinese emperor to take an
aggressive stance over Korea and influenced him to go to war. A similar faction supporting
the Empress Dowager at the Qing court also lobbied for an aggressive foreign policy towards
Japan (Paine 2003, 127-129). These Chinese literati believed that China could crush Japan in
the Sino-Japanese War, and thus put in memorials to the throne calling for China to attack the
Japanese homeland (Paine 2003, 232). These examples show that the Chinese thinking class
demanded that the government take a firm foreign policy stance in its territorial disputes with
Japan.
After the Sino-Japanese War, the same interest group voiced opposition towards the
Qing court against the ratification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that had concluded the war.
Provincial officials had already pressed the Qing negotiators into negotiation inflexibility by
recommending that China should continue the war if the Japanese asked for a cession of
territory in its peace terms (Paine 2003, 259). When the final treaty contained exactly such
peace terms, the Chinese officials and literati again put pressure on the government to act
tough towards Japan. Students, aspirants and degree-holders began to form associations to
mobilize public opinion against the treaty, despite the fact that the Qing government had a ban
on political organizations (Wakeman 1975, 199). Chinese scholars and officials accused the
Qing negotiator of selling China out, while the governor-general of Nanking pushed the
Chinese court not to ratify the treaty. Hundreds of provincial graduates sent petitions to the
court, demanding the rejection of the treaty and the continuation of fighting (Hsü 1995, 342).
These feelings of resentment put China's political leaders in a difficult position, as they were
not in the position to act uncompromising over its territorial dispute with Japan after their loss
24
of the Sino-Japanese War. Whereas the pressure of the thinking class had pushed the
leadership to take an uncompromising policy stance over the dispute in Korea, the Chinese
government could no longer take such a stance and lost some legitimacy. The humiliation the
Chinese felt at the hand of the Japanese quickly translated into an anti-Japan sentiment, and
also fuelled anti-foreignism in general. Hence, the tough stances over a territorial dispute led
to the formation of interstate rivalry.
These negative sentiments towards Japan were also fuelled by the general antiforeignism that already permeated the Chinese population before the war. Chinese citizens
expressed public anger over western and Japanese imperialism and its effects. They had
suffered many economic hardships due to imperialist domination and influence on the
Chinese economy, and they feared China's imminent extinction due to the imperialist
encroachment upon China's territory (Hsü 1995, 437). Due to such feelings, the general public
too clamoured for war with France over Annam (Hsü 1995, 327). They too were agitated over
the cession of Chinese territory after the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and their discontent spread
throughout the entire Qing empire (Wakeman 1975, 199). Local Taiwanese rebelled against
the Japanese government after the cession of Taiwan due to the Sino-Japanese War, refusing
to cede the island (Hsü 1995, 342). This anti-foreignism among the general public eventually
led to the Boxer rebellion of 1900, a violent movement aimed at the foreign legations in China.
The Boxers murdered many foreign representatives, including the chancellor of the Japanese
legation in China (Hsü 1995, 388). Chinese citizens had developed enemy images of Japan.
The anti-foreign groups, who had come into existence due to the imperialist
encroachments upon China's territory, thus pushed the Qing government to act aggressively
towards all foreigners, including the Japanese. The court started to support the anti-foreign
sentiment, and during the Boxer rebellion foreign diplomats even believed that the court
intended to kill all foreigners in the capital (Hsü 1995, 387). The conservative faction at the
court became another interest group that pushed for an all-out attack on foreign legations, as it
considered that to be only way to remove the national humiliations of half a century (Hsü
1995, 394). As this discussion shows, the territorial disputes that Japan had escalated at first
led China's domestic pressure groups to push the Chinese government to take an
uncompromising stance against Japan in return. When such a stance was no longer possible,
the negative experiences with Japan led these interest groups to develop enemy images of
Japan and to push the government into retaliating. This negative spiral contributed to the
emergence of a Sino-Japanese rivalry.
25
Diversionary Tactic
The diversionary tactic also played a small part in escalating the territorial issues with
Japan and in bringing out Chinese enemy images towards Japan. In the second half of the 19th
century, the Qing government was facing dwindling support for its rule at home. The prospect
of social disorder was very prevalent due to the banditry that ravaged the country. In addition,
the central and local governments faced popular discontent over the large amount of
government corruption and the empty government treasuries (Wakeman 1975, 106). Another
divisive domestic issue was China's population growth. China's population was booming, but
the amount of arable land in the provinces remained the same or even decreased due to natural
disasters. This lead to increasing hardship for peasants, as they became unemployed and the
prices of products were rising rapidly (Hsü 1995, 222). This was a source of great unrest in
Qing society, and due to such problems the Qing government faced many domestic rebellions
from 1850 to 1880. The most famous one of these was the Taiping Rebellion of 1850-1864,
which fuelled other rebellions across the empire (Wakeman 1975, 145), such as the Nien
Rebellion (1851-1868), the Moslem Rebellion (1855-1873) and the Tungan Rebellion (18621878). The government also faced anti-foreign riots in Tientsin (Wakeman 1975, 185). Thus,
China's political leaders confronted much popular discontent concerning domestic troubles
with their regime.
In the face of so much domestic discontent over their rule, China's political leaders had
an incentive to use territorial disputes and anti-foreignism over territorial concessions to
divert attention from domestic problems. This was particularly the case after the SinoJapanese War, when the China-Japan rivalry began emerging. For example, after the SinoJapanese War, part of the reason for why the Qing government tolerated the anti-foreign
movements was out of a desire to divert attention from the domestic problems discussed
above and to get the people to support the Qing Dynasty (Wakeman 1975, 221). Although the
court was at first hesitant to support the Boxer movement, as it was aimed against both
foreigners and the dynasty, it eventually made up its mind. The Empress Dowager tried to
shift the anger of its citizens away from the Qing court and completely towards the foreigners
(Paine 2003, 312-313). Thus, the court supported and joined the Boxer movement's
destruction of the foreign imperialist legations in China partially as a way to stimulate support
for the regime among the general public (Hsü 1995, 395). By using territorial disputes as well
as feelings of anti-foreignism, the government hence hoped to divert attention from domestic
problems. It exploited the negative feelings towards the imperialist powers among the
26
population. This eventually led to a negative spiral in Sino-Japanese relations and the
emergence of interstate rivalry.
Nation-building
As shown above, the Qing government was facing domestic challenges to its rule as
well as experiencing a shaky grasp on political power. This made the position of China's
political leaders tenuous. Up until the 1880s, there had been several rebellions against Qing
rule due to the increasing hardship for the peasantry, a result of unemployment, inflation,
corruption, and natural disasters (Hsü 1995, 221). These rebellions, such as the Taiping
rebellion, had attempted to overthrow Qing rule. They had also weakened the power of the
central state apparatus, by ushering in a move of power away from the political centre and
towards the local level political leaders. For example, the Qing government had had to give a
large amount of military and police powers to the local gentry in the provinces. As a result,
after the rebellions the central government no longer had a central army, and had to call upon
local militia in times of trouble (Wakeman 1975, 35). Similarly, the Manchu Qing dynasty
faced many challenges from Han Chinese, who wanted to overthrow the foreign dynasty (Hsü
1995, 8). At the same time, the government was facing foreign aggression and imperialism,
which highlighted its weakness in protecting its own territory. Consequently, Chinese citizens
and scholars perceived these developments under Qing rule as symptoms of the internal
weaknesses of China and the nearing end of the Qing dynasty (Hsü 1995, 221). The Qing
were hence facing an unstable environment domestically, as well as weak institutional
capacity. They had little grasp on power, and due to the many domestic problems it lacked
legitimacy.
Once the period of domestic rebellions from 1850 to 1880 had passed, the Qing
leaders tried to strengthen the power of the central state and tried to regain state legitimacy.
Parties within the government called for a Self-strengthening movement for China. The
advocates of this movement promoted modernization along western standards, so as to enable
China to resist foreign aggression as well as to suppress domestic unrest and rebellion (Hsü
1995, 288). However, these changes made the domestic environment even more unstable.
There was disagreement between the conservative and reformist factions at court over how
this reform should come about. Consequently, the reforms proposed were only surface
measures. This shows that domestically, the Qing court was unable to strengthen itself. It was
therefore imperative that it act uncompromisingly in its territorial disputes with other states,
including Japan. When Japan annexed the Ryūkyū Islands and started increasing its influence
27
in Korea, the territorial issues became a matter of prestige. The Qing court knew that it had to
act uncompromising in disputes over these tributary states. If it showed that it was unable to
control problems in its tributary states, it would lose its legitimacy as a suzerain completely
(Paine 2003, 120). China's political leaders thus had to respect the sovereign-tributary
relationship it had with its vassal states, and act tough over them, since breaking this
relationship would have undermined their mandate to rule (Paine 2003, 358). Thus in 1894,
the Qing Dynasty was forced to send troops to Korea to put down the Tonghak Rebellion at
the Korean court's request. To do otherwise would have meant the abandonment of the
suzerain-tributary relationship with Korea, a loss of face and legitimacy for the Qing Dynasty,
and the loss of Korea as a defensive buffer zone (Paine 2003, 124). Thus, nation-building
incentives eventually led to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.
When the Sino-Japanese War took a wrong turn for China, the Qing government saw
that its tough foreign policy stance would not help it maintain legitimacy. The Chinese army
and navy experienced loss after loss from Japanese hands. The Qing government had issued
false victory reports that completely misrepresented the situation on the ground long into the
conflict. Its dynasty was on the verge of being overthrown by the Han Chinese, so the court
had to manipulate domestic sentiments so that the Han would remain loyal in the face of a
foreign threat (Paine 2003, 161). In this way the Qing dynasty tried to stay into power. When
China lost the war, the dynasty first tried to revive the reform movement to strengthen central
state power (Zachmann 2009, 90-91). When this failed, it turned to exploit the anti-foreignism
brewing among the population to consolidate its power. The conservative faction aligned with
the Empress Dowager, for example, determined to make no more concessions to foreign
powers (Hsü 1995, 387). In addition, the Qing government was open to supporting the Boxer
movement in 1900, so as to consolidate the dynasty's legitimacy (Wakeman 1975, 221). It
allowed the killing of many foreigners on Chinese soil, including Japanese. Thus, China's
state leaders' desire to remain in power led them to take an uncompromising stance on
territorial issues including those with Japan, as well as to exploiting the enemy images among
China over Japan and other imperialist powers. This eventually lead to the emergence of a
Sino-Japanese interstate rivalry.
Alternative Explanations
During the research phase of my thesis, it would have been possible to develop other
theoretical explanations for how territorial disputes influence the emergence of interstate
28
rivalry. Three alternative explanations came to the forefront: a theoretical argument about
clashing identities, one about the power of dispute accumulation, and one about the effect of
nationalism in territorial disputes. All three explanations seem to be present in the SinoJapanese case study. In this section I will show what these alternative explanations are, how
they are apparent in the case study, and why my theoretical argument explains the link
between territorial disputes and rivalry emergence better.
A first alternative explanation for the link between territorial disputes and interstate
rivalry is one based on identity politics. At its core, it would state that territorial conflicts are
more likely to lead to the emergence of interstate rivalry if state members see their state and
national identity as superior compared to their adversary. When state leaders believe they are
superior to the other party, they may act with impunity towards it in their bilateral relations.
This can lead to a similar attitude in the adversary, resulting in the escalation of territorial
disputes and eventually the development of interstate rivalry. For example, both China and
Japan displayed a superiority complex towards each other in the time period discussed above.
In the eyes of the Chinese, China was a true civilization, and all other countries were
barbarians placed beneath them in the world hierarchy (Wakeman 1975, 111). After they lost
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Chinese found it especially humiliating that they
had to cede territory to the Japanese, who were "dwarf bandits" who had once copied their
culture from China (Wakeman 1975, 192). Similarly, the Japanese in their turn thought that
China had become a backwards civilization, whereas Japan was now a successful modern
nation. Japan's thinking class wrote essays on why the Japanese nation was superior to China:
for example, China was an ethnically diverse nation whereas Japan was ethnically pure (De
Bary, Gluck and Tiedemann 2005, 492-493). Thus, these clashing visions of both China and
Japan toward their adversary and on their own place in the world may have contributed to the
escalation of their territorial disputes and to the emergence of the Sino-Japanese rivalry.
However, this alternative theoretical argument for why territorial conflicts often lead
to interstate rivalry would not be as comprehensive an explanation as the one developed
through the Sino-Japanese case study. The theory I have developed focuses on domestic
incentives, and could thus also account for the particular dynamic of an identity approach.
The first domestic incentive, which states that state leaders act uncompromisingly and
aggressively over territorial disputes because they are forced to act so by domestic pressure
groups, could include the explanation above. These domestic pressure groups can easily
believe that their nation is superior to the adversary, and therefore push the government to
take aggressive policy stances in their territorial conflicts. In addition, the theoretical
29
framework used above also leaves room for additional motivations for escalating territorial
conflict besides the pressure group incentive. It can thus give a more in-depth discussion of
the emergence of interstate rivalry as a result of territorial disputes. In this way, my theoretical
argument is better able to explain the situation at hand.
A second alternative explanation for the influence that territorial disputes have on the
development of interstate rivalries, would be an argument of accumulative conflicts. This
argument would state that territorial conflicts are more likely to lead to the emergence of
interstate rivalry the more disputes accumulate over the issue. In other words, when territorial
disputes between two states accumulate (either disputes over the same territorial issue, or over
several territorial issues), then the emergence of rivalry becomes more likely. This is because
the negative experiences among two states in a bilateral relationship start to overshadow the
positive ones, leading to the development of enemy images and hence rivalry. This argument
can be illustrated by the example of the Sino-Japanese rivalry. When the territorial conflicts
between China and Japan became numerous, namely when the two had had conflicts over
Taiwan, the Ryūkyū Islands, and Korea, the emergence of rivalry was not far behind. By the
end of the 19th century, conflicts had accumulated to the point that a rivalry emerged. The
larger the amount of bilateral territorial disputes, the more likely rivalry emergence became.
However, here again the theoretical framework outlined in my thesis provides a better
explanation for the emergence of rivalry due to territorial disputes. In this case, my theoretical
argument provides a more in-depth analysis of the link between territorial conflict and rivalry
emergence. First, unlike this alternative theory it provides motivations for the development of
rivalry by focusing on domestic incentives, thereby explaining why conflict accumulation
takes place. In addition, it can also explain why the likelihood of rivalry emergence would
increase with the amount of outstanding disputes. The argument of accumulative conflict
merely states that the more conflict, the more likely rivalry becomes. However, my
explanation focusing on domestic incentives would posit that state leader engage in a large
amount of territorial conflicts when they have domestic incentives to do so. It also explains
that rivalry emergence becomes more likely with more disputes because negative experiences
due to domestic incentives start to dominate the bilateral relationship. Thus, the theoretical
argument outlined in my thesis would be the more informative explanation in this case.
Finally, a third potential explanation for the dynamics surrounding territorial disputes
and interstate rivalry in the China-Japan case, is an argument focusing on nationalism. This
argument would state that territorial conflicts are more likely to lead to the emergence of
interstate rivalry if state leaders have fostered a strong sense of nationalism among the
30
population. When state leaders fuel strong nationalist feelings among the general public,
especially in relation to territory, territorial issues are likely to become focal points in
domestic political discussions. Everyone, from the populace to state leaders, becomes
permeated with a sense that territorial issues are crucial points on which the state has to act.
Thus, uncompromising stances over territorial issues would be a logical policy stance. This
dynamic is exemplified by the reaction of Japanese citizens towards the Sino-Japanese War:
they rallied around the state and the army during the war by celebrating battle victories (Hearn
1907, 74). Similarly, it is also exemplified by the reaction of the Chinese thinking class over
ceding territory to Japan after the War: they strongly protested the ratification of the post-war
Treaty of Shimonoseki with the government and demanded it continue fighting (Hsü 1995,
342). These dynamics could lead to the argument that nationalist feelings in all layers of
society pushed state leaders towards an uncompromising position in territorial conflict,
leading to interstate rivalry.
Again, the theoretical argument on domestic incentives put forth in my thesis offers a
more comprehensive explanation than the alternative one. Whereas the nationalist argument
would merely argue that the government fuelled nationalism among its citizens, my domestic
incentives framework explains why a government might need to fuel such nationalism: for
state-building purposes. It thus incorporates the nationalist argument while providing a wider
explanation of the phenomenon. Additionally, the domestic incentives explanation also adds
other motivations that make territorial conflicts a prime variable in explaining the emergence
of interstate rivalry. Escalation over territory might well take place due to state-building
motivations, while also being due to the government's necessity to divert popular attention
and listen to pressure groups at the same time. Thus, my thesis encompasses a greater amount
of motivations for escalating territorial conflicts than the alternative explanations I have kept
in mind during my research. It is now crucial to outline a few illustrative case studies, so as to
show that my theory is also applicable to other cases.
Illustrative Cases
The China-Russia rivalry is a first case study that can illustrate the applicability of my
theoretical argument to other cases. From the 1850s to the 1880s, Russia's political leaders
had ceded a large amount of territory from the Qing dynasty at the Chinese borders. With the
Treaty of Peking in 1860 and the Treaty of Tarbagatai in 1864, the Russians had taken areas
surrounding the modern-day province of Xinjiang (Paine 2003, 71). The tough policy stances
31
of both Chinese and Russian political leaders over these territorial issues would eventually
lead to the emergence of the Sino-Russian rivalry. Both the Russian and Chinese government
faced domestic incentives to act to aggressively over their border disputes. The first incentive,
focusing on domestic pressure groups, were especially present for Russia. At the start of the
1850s, there was a faction of 'Easterners' at the Russian court, which by advocating the
importance of the East on the world political scene, pressured the Russian Tsar to turn his eye
to China (Lin 1934, 7-8). On the Chinese side, once government officials realized that Russia
was encroaching upon Chinese territory, China's Foreign Office and the Chinese thinking
class pushed the Qing court to take a firm foreign policy stance over the territorial disputes
with Russia (Hsü 1995, 322-323). Domestic pressure groups thus forced both governments to
escalate their shared territorial disputes.
For the second incentive, as outlined in the China-Japan case study, the Chinese were
facing many divisive domestic problems. Problems such as land scarcity and government
corruption undermined popular and elite support for the Qing dynasty (Wakeman 1975, 106).
Anti-foreign sentiment, including against Russia, was a way to divert popular attention from
these problems. In the Russian case, during the 1860s its state leaders were facing divisive
issues at home, such as a the abolishment of serfdom (Paine 2003, 72). An aggressive stance
towards China on territorial issues could divert popular attention from the domestic turmoil.
The third incentive, nation-building, was most crucial for both Russia and China. The
authority of Russia's political leaders was eroding due to a loss of international status after the
Crimean War of 1853-1856, and they used a strategy of imperialist expansion to legitimize
the power of their dynasty (Paine 2003, 66-67). Similarly, the Qing Dynasty was facing the
anti-Qing Taiping Rebellion at home. It could not allow Russian encroachment on its territory,
because tolerating such actions would mean an even further loss of legitimacy (Paine 2003,
120). Thus, from 1858 on, the Qing court took a more active policy stance over its border
region (Lin 1935, 22).
This discussion shows that both the diversionary and nation-building incentive
motivated Russia and China's political leaders into hawkish foreign policy stances. Drawing
on these events and dynamics, both China and Russia developed enemy images that resulted
in the emergence of their interstate rivalry. Once Chinese officials figured out that they had
ceded border territory to Russia in the 1860s treaties, they were extremely angry with the
Russians for weaselling this territory away from China. They considered it a national
humiliation (Paine 2003, 71). As a result, Russia over the years became China's main security
threat next to Japan. The Russian government, on the other hand, became increasingly
32
frustrated with China's obstruction of Russia's territorial expansion and Chinese bellicose
rhetoric by the 1870s (Hsü 1995, 323). The two countries thus ended up in a negative spiral in
their bilateral relationship, which eventually lead to the emergence of interstate rivalry..
Another illustrative case study of the domestic incentive argument is the interstate
rivalry between North Korea and South Korea. Next to the obvious international influences,
both North Korean and South Korean state leaders faced domestic incentives which pushed
them to escalate their territorial conflict over the partition of the Korean peninsula. For the
first incentive, key political players in both North Korea and South Korea were extremely
committed to unifying the Korean peninsula under their preferred economic system (Seth
2011, 321). Additionally, especially in South Korea political leaders faced popular rallies for
the unification of Korea (Seth 2011, 317). This forced both governments to advocate the goal
of unification. Secondly, both the North Korean and South Korean regime faced difficult
domestic problems from which the territorial issue of unification could divert attention. South
Korea particularly was set back with divisive problems: a harsh economic situation, famines,
and political chaos (Seth 2011, 317-318). This led South Korean state leaders to divert
attention to the issue of unification and North Korea.
Finally, state leaders of both countries faced political challenges domestically, which
required them to consolidate their power and legitimacy. In South Korea, there was political
chaos due to the actions of left-wing insurgents and due to the rebellions taking place after
unification (Seth 2011, 315; Seth 2011, 320). North Korea, on the other hand, was reforming
government institutions rapidly and thus in need of power consolidation (Seth 2011, 320).
The territorial disputes over Korean unification would allow the mobilization of the state and
of popular support. Hence, both leaders took tough stances over the unification issue, which
eventually led to the Korean War in the 1950s. After the Korean war, however, a bitter rivalry
between the countries had emerged (Seth 2011, 333). South Korea and North Korea thus
became another case in the long list of interstate rivalries, on which the theoretical argument
on domestic incentives can shed light.
Conclusion
As the discussion of the China-Japan rivalry and the illustrative cases have shown, the
theory developed in my thesis convincingly explains why territorial disputes so often lead to
the emergence of interstate rivalry. As outlined in the previous pages, domestic incentives
play a crucial role in explaining this link. First, I have argued that state leaders face an
33
incentive to act tough in territorial disputes due to the pressure of domestic interest groups.
These groups push the state leaders to take an aggressive position according to their own
interests and beliefs. The second incentive put forth in the theoretical argument states that
state leaders also have an incentive to take an uncompromising or aggressive policy stance in
territorial disputes when they face domestic turmoil. In such cases, they can use territorial
disputes to divert attention from divisive domestic issues, so as to gain more domestic support.
Finally, I have argued that state leaders face an incentive to act hawkish in territorial disputes
so as to bolster up their own state power in the face of domestic challenges and/or institutional
weakness. When a government faces domestic uprisings, or weak institutional control and
legitimacy, it can exploit territorial issues to strengthen the state. These three domestic
incentives can thus together force states into a negative spiral in their bilateral relationship, in
which enemy images start to dominate their exchanges. If this is not properly managed,
interstate rivalry may emerge.
I have built this theoretical argument with the use of the theory-building case study.
By studying the Sino-Japanese rivalry, I was able to develop the dynamics outlined above.
The illustrative case studies that have followed my original case have shown that at face value,
these dynamics can be transferred to other rivalry settings. This would mean that the theory
put forth in this thesis is likely generalizable. The theory on domestic incentives could
therefore be an important contribution to the literature on interstate rivalry as well as on
territorial conflict, because as I have shown, the link between the two was previously
underspecified. However, this can only be concluded with further testing of the theory. A
theory-building case study cannot build a theoretical argument and at the same time serve as
evidence for that theoretical argument. The illustrative case studies discussed in the previous
section provide some idea of whether the argument applies to cases beyond the Sino-Japanese
rivalry. Nevertheless, this is not enough. A crucial direction for further research on the link
between territorial disputes and rivalry emergence therefore would be the large-scale
quantitative testing of the theory on domestic incentives. This would give it extra external
validity.
This research faced two other weaknesses which can be addressed in further research.
A first weakness is that I have only used one case study to build up the theoretical framework,
one in which I discerned all three domestic incentives of the theoretical framework. I
therefore have to conclude that all three incentives have to be present for territorial disputes to
lead to the emergence of rivalry. It seems logical at face value, however, that this does not
have to be the case. Consequently, an important direction for future research would be to
34
check if the three incentives above need to be present together in a rivalry, or if the presence
of one of these incentives can act independently to bring about interstate rivalry. A second
weakness of my research is that the causal sequence remains vague. It remains slightly
confusing whether territorial disputes lead to interest group pressure, the diversionary tactic,
and nation-building tactics, which in turn lead to the emergence of rivalry; whether these
domestic incentives and territorial disputes appear at the same time; or whether the domestic
incentives precede the emergence of territorial disputes. In the case of the China-Japan rivalry,
the sovereignty of the Ryūkyū Islands as well as the status of Korea was already a longsimmering issue between China and Japan before the domestic incentives appeared. These
incentives then led Japan to become an aggressor, and China reacted uncompromisingly in
turn due to its own incentives. Although future research could attempt to clarify this sequence
better, it seems to me that the emergence of interstate rivalry is a messy process in which the
exact sequence of events remains difficult to determine entirely.
Finally, if the theory on domestic incentives proves more convincing after quantitative
testing, it will have crucial policy implications. Most importantly, it may prove useful for
policymakers who deal with interstate conflict. This is because the rivalry literature has found
that 75% of all interstate conflicts take place between interstate rivals, and that most interstate
rivalry has to do with territorial conflict. Thus, understanding the dynamics that underlie the
connection between territorial disputes and rivalry emergence may help mediators and
policymakers in taking correct actions in a conflict situation. For example, by being aware of
the domestic caveats that come into play over territorial conflicts, mediators can work more
effectively in managing a conflict. They could expect that domestic incentives act as a serious
constraint on state leaders to tone down their behaviour in territorial disputes, and try to
mediate these issues accordingly. In this way, my research could contribute to managing the
recent conflict between China and Japan as described in the opening paragraphs, as well as
other conflict in a rivalry context. Bringing this stability might prove a crucial advantage.
35
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