What’s information got to do with it?
Third-party voting in plurality systems
Party Politics
1–11
ª The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/1354068814551295
ppq.sagepub.com
Christopher D Raymond
Queen’s University Belfast, UK
Mathias Wessel Tromborg
Rice University, USA
Abstract
Although strategic voting theory predicts that the number of parties will not exceed two in single-member district plurality systems, the observed number of parties often does. Previous research suggests that the reason why people vote for
third parties is that they possess inaccurate information about the parties’ relative chances of winning. However, research
has yet to determine whether third-party voting persists under conditions of accurate information. In this article, we
examine whether possessing accurate information prevents individuals from voting for third-placed parties in the 2005
and 2010 British elections. We find that possessing accurate information does not prevent most individuals from voting
for third-placed parties and that many voters possess reasonably accurate information regarding the viability of the parties
in their constituencies. These findings suggest that arguments emphasizing levels of voter information as a major explanation for why multiparty systems often emerge in plurality systems are exaggerated.
Keywords
Duverger’s Law, electoral viability, political perceptions, tactical voting, third parties
A strict (but fair) interpretation of the strategic voting literature holds that the number of parties in single-member district plurality (SMDP) systems will converge on two in
equilibrium. The reason for convergence on two parties is
that voters will desert their most-preferred party if it does
not have a chance of winning, particularly when voting for
that party will result in the election of their least-preferred
party (Cox, 1997; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972;
Palfrey, 1989). Despite the substantial body of formal
and empirical evidence in favor of strategic voting theory,
convergence on two parties is seldom realized at either
the national (Best, 2010) or constituency (Diwakar, 2007;
Gaines, 1999, 2009; Raymond, 2013; Singer, 2013) levels
in countries operating under SMDP systems. One of the
assumptions required for tactical voting is that voters possess enough information about the chances of the parties to
know if their most-preferred party is out of the running
(Cox, 1997). Recent work has emphasized this information
assumption as an important reason why voters do not desert
parties that do not stand a chance of winning (Blais and
Bodet, 2006; Blais and Turgeon, 2004; Davidovitch and
Ben-Haim, 2010; Meffert et al., 2011), and thus why the
number of parties does not converge on two (Clough,
2007; Herrmann, 2012).
But what happens when individuals do possess enough
information to know that their most-preferred party is out
of the running? Would people still vote for third parties if
they knew they had no chance of winning? We examine the
extent to which knowing that a party is out of the running
prevents individuals from voting non-tactically for their
most-preferred – but soon to place third – party. Specifically,
we examine non-tactical voting for third-placed parties at the
constituency level in Great Britain where the SMDP system
should prevent voting for third parties yet parties like the
Liberal Democrats have persisted for several decades.
The findings presented here show that individuals’ voting behavior is only weakly influenced by perceptions of
Paper submitted 18 August 2014; accepted for publication 21 August 2014
Corresponding author:
Christopher D Raymond, Queen’s University Belfast, 25 University
Square, Belfast BT7 1 PB, UK.
Email: [email protected]
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Party Politics
the most-preferred parties’ chances and that possessing
accurate information does not prevent a sizable portion of
voters from voting non-tactically for third parties. This
finding holds after controls for other variables that may
produce non-tactical behavior are accounted for. Perhaps
just as importantly, the average voter supporting thirdplaced parties at the constituency level has accurate knowledge of the party’s relative chances of winning, with
roughly half of all such voters in constituencies where their
most-preferred party placed third knowing that their party
is out of the running. This implies that the focus in the literature on violations of the information assumption as a
major reason why third parties have survived and flourished in SMDP systems may be exaggerated.
Electoral systems and the number of
parties
According to Duverger (1963; see also Riker, 1982), SMDP
systems favor the two-party system whereas simplemajority systems with a second ballot and proportional
representation favor multiparty systems. Duverger’s Law
is the result of two effects produced in SMDP systems.
First, a mechanical effect underrepresents third parties
because votes are translated into seats in a way that (usually) exaggerates the success of large parties relative to
their electoral margin of victory. Second, a psychological
effect occurs as a tactical response to the mechanical
effect, as voters abandon third parties and vote tactically
for parties that stand a better chance of winning in their
constituency than their first preferences in order to avoid
wasting their votes on hopeless candidacies.
Analyzing the nature and extent of this tactical voting
behavior has become an important research agenda because
the incentive to vote tactically is one that faces many voters
and has the potential to shape the nature of party systems in
the aggregate. The general consensus is that tactical voting
is widespread. This has been demonstrated both formally
(Cain, 1978; Cox, 1994, 1997; Fey, 1997; Kselman and
Niou, 2010; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972; Myerson and
Weber, 1993; Palfrey, 1989) and empirically (Alvarez and
Nagler, 2000; Alvarez et al., 2006; Black, 1978; Blais and
Nadeau, 1996; Cain, 1978; Dellis et al., 2011; Fieldhouse
et al., 2007; Johnston and Pattie, 1991; Merolla and Stephenson, 2007; Ordeshook and Zeng, 1997; see also Blais
et al., 2001). Other research has demonstrated the consequences of tactical voting for party systems, leading to
reductions in the number of parties contesting elections
(Benoit, 2002; Blais and Carty, 1991).
While the literature has been successful in formalizing
the conditions under which tactical voting should take
place, and while scholars have shown that many voters
behave tactically, the literature has been less successful
in explaining why third parties continue to exist in many
SMDP systems despite the presence of tactical voting. The
traditional strategic voting literature, in conjunction with the
literature examining the implications of strategic voting – as
it relates to the effects of electoral systems on the number
of parties – predicts that third parties should be eliminated
over time in SMDP systems; even when there are multiple
and deeply rooted cleavages, voters have an incentive to
coordinate around two parties (Clark and Golder, 2006).
However, the number of parties at the national level
increasingly exceeds two-party predictions in SMDP systems and has done so over many years (Best, 2010).
In an attempt to understand this paradox, Cox notes that
the number of parties may exceed two at the national level
while converging on two at the constituency level, with one
of the two major parties nationally failing to place first or
second in certain constituencies (Cox, 1997, 1999).
According to Cox, this convergence on two parties at the
constituency level should occur because the tactical voting
incentives apply more powerfully at the constituency level
than the national level. However, the emerging consensus
is that the number of parties exceeds two in SMDP systems
even at the constituency level (Diwakar, 2007; Gaines,
1999, 2009; Raymond, 2013; Singer, 2013). Thus, thirdparty voting is a phenomenon that requires explanation.
Why voters do not behave tactically:
Recent arguments in the literature
In his seminal treatment of tactical voting, Cox notes four
assumptions that are required to produce convergence on
two parties at the constituency level in SMDP systems and
that the absence of any of those assumptions is sufficient to
produce non-tactical voting (Cox, 1997). The assumptions
are that voters: (1) possess reasonably accurate information
about the relative chances of each candidate, (2) are shortterm instrumentally rational, (3) do not believe a certain
candidate will win with certainty, and (4) do not care so
intensely about their first preferences that they are indifferent towards their second and third preferences, and therefore behave non-tactically.
In examining the factors that explain why third-party
voting persists in spite of the incentives favoring tactical
voting, recent studies have focused increasingly on the
information assumption to account for third-party voting.
This makes sense given the general skepticism of mass
political awareness in the general population that has long
characterized the discipline (Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini
and Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992). Given these concerns,
many scholars question whether the relative electoral
chances of each candidate at the constituency level are
common knowledge. Several scholars have argued explicitly that some voters do not possess adequate information
to engage in tactical voting (Babad and Yacobus, 1993;
Blais and Bodet, 2006; Blais and Turgeon, 2004; Mutz,
1998). Particularly, voters who are generally uninformed
about politics and who identify strongly with a party are
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3
likely to be misinformed about the relative competitiveness
of their party (Blais and Turgeon, 2004; Meffert et al.,
2011). Party identifiers are less likely to meet the information assumption because they overestimate the chances of
the party they identify with, which is often referred to as
wishful thinking or wish-fulfillment (Uhlaner and Grofman, 1986; though see also Meffert et al., 2011).
Several scholars have attempted to model aggregatelevel outcomes in SMDP systems when the information
assumption is relaxed (Clough, 2007; Davidovitch and
Ben-Haim, 2010; Fey, 1997; Myatt, 2007). While these
studies debate how much information in the electorate is
needed to produce two-party outcomes, they agree that
inadequate information levels can lead to the multiparty
systems observed in SMDP systems. This is because convergence on two parties requires a coordination effort
among multiple players. Voters who do not have accurate
information about their most-preferred third-party candidate will have no (perceived) tactical reason to vote for a
second preference. As third-party voting increases, other
voters become less certain about which two parties are
strongest electorally. Additionally, several empirical studies have found that a decrease in information levels results
in more third-party voting (Black, 1978; Blais, 2004; Burden, 2005; Herrmann, 2012; Johnston and Pattie, 2011b;
Meffert et al., 2011), which is supported by studies employing experimental methods (Forsythe et al., 1993; Merolla,
2009; Rietz et al., 1998). In particular, previous election
results, polls, and elite messages can help voters identify
the two leading candidates, leading them to desert their
most-preferred alternative (Fey, 1997; Meffert and
Gschwend, 2011). However, when many third-party supporters are unaware or unconvinced that their candidate is
trailing, coordination on two parties is unlikely.
The information assumption has reached a prominent
position in the literature as an explanation for third-party
voting. However, other studies have found evidence that
violations of the other assumptions required for tactical
voting noted by Cox account for third-party voting as well
(Cox, 1997). First, some voters may not be short-term
instrumentally rational, believing that support for hopeless
candidates in the current election will translate into future
gains (Cox, 1997). Second, Cox (1997; see also Chhibber
and Murali, 2006; Moser and Scheiner, 2009) has shown,
using aggregate-level data, that in situations in which the
candidate likely to win the constituency is well-known (and
thus the race is not close), the incentives for tactical voting
are greatly reduced. Third, some empirical analyses show
that some voters may engage in third-party voting because
they favor their first preferences (for third parties) so intensely that they are indifferent about which of the two dominant parties wins the election (Blais, 2002; Blais and
Nadeau, 1996; Blais et al., 2009). In keeping with these
findings, other studies have shown that those identifying
with third parties – in part reflecting preferences that are
too intensely held to induce tactical voting – are less likely
to vote tactically (Lanoue and Bowler, 1992, 1998; Niemi
et al., 1992).1
While the literature has demonstrated the importance of
accurate information for tactical voting, previous research
has not yet explored whether possessing accurate information about the parties’ relative chances of winning in a constituency will prevent most – if not all – non-tactical voting
behavior. It is entirely possible that even after all controls
have been taken into account, possessing accurate information about the parties’ chances may not prevent very many
individuals from voting non-tactically. In addition to the
instrumental – short-term or long-term – components
behind voters’ choices focused on electing winning candidates, there is also a significant component to voting that is
more expressive. For instance, given that social cleavages
still play a role in structuring modern electorates (Elff,
2007; Raymond, 2011), some voters may be willing to support the party that best represents their cleavage group’s
interests even if these parties do not stand a chance of
winning in their constituency. Finally, with the increase
in postmaterial values in advanced industrialized democracies – and given that self-expression is a significant
underlying component of postmaterial values (Inglehart,
1977, 1990 – more voters today than before may view
the act of voting more as a means of self-expression
than rational calculation. Thus, there is reason to suspect
that the effect of information on tactical voting may be
substantively small relative to the attention this variable
has been given so far in the literature.
Data analysis
To determine the impact of possessing adequate and accurate information for voting behavior, we analyze whether
knowing that a party is out of the running at the constituency level (using the case of Great Britain) is sufficient
to prevent most – if not all – individuals from voting for
parties placing third in their constituency. We focus on
Great Britain because British elections throughout most
of the 20th century – carrying into the 21st – have been
characterized by the presence of at least one sizable third
party that has persisted over decades of successive elections despite Britain’s use of the SMDP electoral system.
Since at least the early 1970s (though arguably dating back
to the 1960s), the major third party in modern British elections has been the Liberal Democrats (formerly the Liberal
Party), who have captured as much as 25.4 percent (1983)
and not less than 13.8 percent (1979) of the vote since 1974.
In the most recent elections, the party captured 22.0 (2005)
and 23.0 (2010) percent of the national vote. Despite these
sizable vote shares, the Liberal Democrats’ seat shares have
not been proportional, being disadvantaged by the SMDP
electoral system. What is more, the fact that the Liberal
Democrats place third in most – but not all – constituencies
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Party Politics
Table 1. The relative accuracy of individuals’ perceptions of the
party placing third in their constituencies.
Correctly perceiving the
party placing third (voters
preferring the party
placing third only)
Party placing third in the
constituency
Labour
Conservative
Liberal Democrat
2005 data
2010 data
36.46% (78) 38.00% (45)
41.42% (22) 35.50% (16)
47.24% (128) 56.79% (56)
Entries are the percentages of voters whose first preferences are the party
placing third in their constituency and who accurately perceive that this
party will place third in their constituency. The number of observations
appears below in parentheses.
(see e.g. Johnston and Pattie, 2011a) despite the incentives
to vote tactically for either Labour or the Conservatives
suggests that either Liberal Democrat voters lack information about their party’s chances in their constituencies or
that significant non-tactical voting has taken place in the
presence of accurate information. Because of the persistence of the Liberal Democrats as a major third party in
British politics drawing sizable vote shares – in addition
to several other third parties – third-party voting in Britain
remains a worthwhile phenomenon to be explained. Recognizing that the Liberal Democrats do not place third (or
lower) in every constituency, often leaving either the Conservatives or Labour in third place in the constituency, voting for third-placed parties more generally also merits
explanation.
To this effort, we use data from the 2005 and 2010 British Election Studies. In order to examine voting behavior in
situations that create incentives for individuals to behave
tactically (in keeping with the advice of Alvarez et al.
[2006]), we only examine the behavior of respondents
whose first preferences are the parties placing third in their
constituencies (Labour, Conservative, or Liberal Democrat).2 In other words, we only focus on voters who are in
a strategic context creating incentives for them to vote tactically for a less-preferred party with better chances of winning. Additionally, and in order to ensure homogeneity in
the choices facing respondents, we also restrict the data set
to those respondents residing in English constituencies in
which the top three parties were the top three parties nationally (the Conservatives, Labour, and Liberal Democrats).3
To measure the impact that respondents’ viability perceptions for their most-preferred parties have for their voting behavior, we create a variable that measures whether
respondents accurately perceived that their most-preferred
party would place third in their constituency. To create this
variable, we use three variables – one for each party – measuring respondents’ estimates of the parties’ relative
chances of winning in their constituency. The values for
each variable range from 0 (‘very unlikely’ that the party
in question will win in the respondents’ constituency)
to 10 (‘very likely’).4 The resulting variable is coded 1 for
respondents accurately perceiving that their most-preferred
party was the party that placed third in the constituency,
and 0 otherwise. To measure respondents’ party preferences, we create a variable coded 1 for those whose first
preferences are the third-placed party in the constituency,
and 0 otherwise. This variable is created using variables
measuring respondents’ favorability scores for each of the
three major parties (Labour, Conservative, and Liberal
Democrats), each of which is measured from 0 (‘strongly
dislike’) to 10 (‘strongly like’).
Table 1 presents the percentage of respondents (correctly) perceiving that their most-preferred party would in
fact place third in their constituencies. This allows us to
determine whether individuals accurately perceive the
party placing third in their constituency. If voters who prefer the third-placed party in their constituency do not accurately perceive that their party is out of the running, then
voters cannot behave tactically, and convergence on two
parties is unlikely to happen.5 Among those preferring the
Liberal Democrats, roughly 50 percent recognized that
the Liberal Democrats were out of the running. Although
the percentages of respondents preferring the Labour and
Conservative parties are somewhat lower – a lack of awareness that possibly reflects ‘wishful thinking’ (Uhlaner and
Grofman, 1986) on the part of these parties’ supporters –
more than a third of respondents preferring third-placed
parties recognized that their first preferences were likely
to place third. That being said, the fact remains that a sizable portion of each party’s supporters recognize that their
party will place third. While the data in Table 1 clearly
demonstrate that many third-party supporters recognize
when their party is out of the running, it is also interesting
that respondents are particularly likely to recognize when
the Liberal Democrats are out of the running. This suggests
that parties placing third or lower nationally, such as the
Liberal Democrats, are likely to survive despite being perceived to have poor national electoral prospects among
their supporters.
Despite the findings in Table 1 showing that many voters accurately perceive when a party is out of the running, it
is possible that respondents voting for the third-placed
party in the constituency are alone in failing to recognize
when their party is out of the running. In order to determine
whether this is the case, Table 2 displays the percentage of
respondents voting sincerely for their most-preferred party.
The table is broken down according to whether respondents
correctly perceived that their most-preferred party would
finish third or not. The data in Table 2 indicate that while
possessing accurate information about the party’s chances
has a sizable effect on the likelihood of voting sincerely,
it does not reduce all – or even most – sincere voting. Specifically, a majority in 2005 and nearly 50 percent of
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Raymond and Tromborg
5
Table 2. Accurate perceptions of viability and sincere voting for
respondents’ most-preferred parties.
Voting for the party placing
third (voters preferring the
third-placed party only)
Perception of the third parties’
viability in the constituency
First or second
Third
2005 data
2010 data
77.49% (119) 57.90% (60)
52.13% (109) 47.93% (57)
Entries are the percentages of voters casting sincere votes for their mostpreferred party in constituencies where their most-preferred party finished third, with the number of observations appearing below in
parentheses.
respondents in 2010 voted sincerely despite recognizing
that their party was out of the running. This provides clear
evidence that, while possessing accurate information
increases the likelihood of voting tactically for a party with
better chances, it does not prevent many individuals from
voting sincerely for the party they most prefer.
To demonstrate this point further, we examine the effect
of possessing accurate information about respondents’
most-preferred party’s chances, controlling for several
variables measuring alternative hypotheses. This allows
us to isolate precisely the effect that perceiving a party’s
chances as hopeless has on voting behavior. To measure
sincere voting behavior – the dependent variable in this
multivariate analysis – we include a variable coded 1 for
respondents who vote sincerely for their most-preferred
party and 0 for respondents voting tactically for their second or third most-preferred party. Viability perceptions are
measured using the same variable (coded 1 for respondents
correctly perceiving that their most-preferred party will
place third in their constituency and 0 otherwise) described
above.
Turning to the control variables, one set of variables
measures differences in respondents’ preference orderings
and the intensities of these preferences. One variable measures the difference in favorability between respondents’
first and second preferences, while a second variable measures the difference in favorability between respondents’
second and third preferences. Favorability for all three parties is measured using variables ranging from 0 (‘strongly
dislike’) to 10 (‘strongly like’). Thus, the first/second preference difference variable ranges from 1 (the minimum
difference, resulting from the fact that we restrict the analysis to respondents with a clear preference order between
first and lower preferences) to 10 (the maximum difference). The second/third preference difference variable
ranges from 0 to 9 (as respondents having second preferences must perceive at least a one-unit difference between
their first and second preferences, this leaves 9 as the maximum possible value for this variable). Both scales allow
us to control for differences in respondents’ preference
orderings that are so extreme (either extremely high in the
context of differences between first and second preferences
or low in the context of differences between second and
third parties) as to prevent tactical voting.
Although each of the variables described above are
expected to have independent effects on sincere voting, it
is possible that preference intensity conditions the effects
of perceived viability. For instance, perceptions of viability
may not be important for those who perceive little difference between their second and third preferences. In such
cases, respondents may not vote tactically, whereas they
may be more likely to vote tactically when there is a consequence to those perceptions (i.e. respondents will vote
tactically when voting for their first preference increases
the probability of victory for their clear third preference).
Additionally, while accurately perceiving that thirdplaced parties are out of the running may increase voters’
chances of voting tactically for those without strong differences between their first and second preferences, such perceptions may have little effect on the behavior of those with
strong preferences for their most-preferred parties relative
to their second preferences. To account for these possibilities, we interact both preference variables with the viability
perception variable.
Another set of variables includes the party identification
of voters.6 We include separate indicators for each of the
three major parties (coded 1 for those identifying with the
party in question, and 0 otherwise). Including these variables controls for the possibility that party identification
affects individuals’ willingness to vote tactically. In this
way, party identification could violate one of the other key
assumptions besides accurate information noted by Cox
(1997) that are required for tactical voting to occur –
namely that voters do not care too intensely about their first
preferences to vote tactically. Additionally, identifying
with a political party may also lead individuals to support
the hopeless party with which they identify in this election
in the hope that this support translates into winning seats in
future elections, thereby violating the assumption of shortterm instrumental rationality (Cox, 1997).
While the information assumption is primarily concerned with voters’ perceptions of the parties’ viability in
their constituencies, we also include two variables measuring the objective competitiveness of the election. One variable measures the impact that knowing the outcome of the
current election with certainty will have on the likelihood
of tactical voting. Cox (1997) notes that in constituencies
where the winning party’s margin of victory is so large that
the outcome of the election is certain, the incentives to vote
tactically are reduced. This is measured using an indicator
variable that is coded 1 for safe constituencies (which we
define as races won by 15 percent or more) and 0 for more
marginal constituencies. A second variable measures the
difference between constituencies in which the first and
second runners-up are competitive, and constituencies in
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Party Politics
Table 3. The effect of correct perceptions of third parties’
chances on sincere voting behavior.
Models
Independent variables
Viability perceptions
1st–2nd preferences
Viability perceptions x 1st–2nd
preferences
2nd–3rd preferences
Viability perceptions x 2nd–3rd
preferences
Labour Party ID
Conservative Party ID
Liberal Democrat Party ID
Safe constituencies
Competitive races between
second and first runners-up
Labour viability (nationally)
Conservative viability (nationally)
Liberal Democrat viability
(nationally)
Attention to politics
Constant
Likelihood ratio chi2
% correctly classified
McFadden’s R2
n
2005 data
–0.67 (0.70)
0.49* (0.16)
–0.01 (0.26)
2010 data
0.39 (0.87)
0.32 (0.17)
–0.24 (0.23)
–0.25 (0.18)
–0.17 (0.31)
–0.20 (0.34)
0.05 (0.40)
–0.22 (0.48)
–0.29 (0.62)
0.87y (0.52)
1.36** (0.39)
–0.47 (0.44)
1.20y (0.71)
2.44* (1.06)
1.29y (0.71)
–0.81 (0.66)
0.30 (0.72)
0.02 (0.11)
–0.01 (0.09)
0.19* (0.08)
0.18 (0.13)
<–0.01 (0.12)
0.07 (0.12)
0.14y (0.08)
–2.37* (1.08)
100.00**
74.67%
0.23
225
0.01 (0.10)
–2.33 (1.42)
14.97
66.38%
0.13
116
y
p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests. Entries are log odds ratios
with robust standard errors (clustered by constituency) in parentheses.
which the runner-up is more certain. Cox (1997) notes that
the incentives to vote tactically are reduced when the margin
between the first and second runner-up shrinks, making it
more difficult to determine which party is likely to place third.
To account for this, we include an indicator variable measuring the competitiveness of the contest between the first and
second runners-up in the constituency. This variable is coded
1 for competitive races (which we define as constituencies in
which the difference between the first and second runners-up
is less than 10 percent of the vote), and 0 otherwise.7
We also measure two other sets of variables related
to individual characteristics that could affect the likelihood of voting non-tactically. To isolate the effects of
constituency-level perceptions on vote choice further,
we control for respondents’ estimates of the three major
parties’ chances of winning the general election. Each
variable ranges from 0 (‘Very unlikely’) to 10 (‘Very
likely’).8 Finally, we include a variable measuring the
amount of attention respondents report paying to politics.
This control is needed because those paying less attention
to politics may be more likely to vote non-tactically. This
variable ranges from 0 (‘Pay no attention at all’) to 10
(‘Pay a great deal of attention’), measured in one-unit
intervals. Both sets of variables are measured during the
pre-election wave of the survey. Descriptive statistics for
each independent variable are presented in the Appendix.
To estimate the effects of information on sincere voting
behavior, we use logistic regression.9 We cluster the standard errors by constituency in order to account for
within-unit correlation resulting from the fact that respondents are grouped in different constituencies.10 The results
of our logistic regression models predicting tactical voting
behavior in 2005 and 2010 are presented in Table 3.
Beginning with the control variables, the results show
that sincere voting behavior is shaped by identification with
one or several of the political parties. Identifying with the
Liberal Democrats increases the likelihood of casting a sincere vote in both 2005 and 2010 (though only at the 0.10
level of significance), while identifying with Labour or the
Conservatives significantly increases the likelihood of voting sincerely in 2010. Consistent with Cox (1997), the results
also show that respondents residing in safe constituencies in
2005 are significantly more likely to vote sincerely, as are
those who pay more attention to politics (though only at the
0.10 level of significance). Additionally, perceiving better
chances for the Liberal Democrats to win the general election increases the likelihood of voting sincerely in 2005.
Contrary to expectations, those paying more attention to politics, ceteris paribus, are more likely to vote sincerely,
though this variable only reaches statistical significance in
2005 (and even then only at the 0.10 level).
Turning to the effects of viability perceptions on sincere
voting, the results indicate that perceived viability depends
only a little on the modifying variables, as indicated by the
fact that the interaction terms are not statistically significant in Table 3. In order to interpret the precise effect that
perceiving a party as placing third will have on sincere voting behavior, however, this variable must be interpreted
jointly with the impact of the moderating variables – the
difference between respondents’ first/second and the difference between respondents’ second/third preferences. To
this end, we generate and present predicted probabilities for
four simulated situations. The first assumes that respondents do not perceive that their most-preferred party will
place third, while the second assumes that respondents correctly perceive that their most-preferred party will place
third. Both models assume the minimum (one-unit) difference between respondents’ first and second preferences, no
difference between their second and third preferences, and
assume that respondents do not identify with any of the parties, all while holding each remaining variable at its median
value. These assumptions allow us to set the effects of all
alternative explanations to zero and thus rule them out as
alternative explanations. A third condition assumes the
same conditions as the second simulation, except that it
assumes that respondents perceive a two-unit difference
between their first and second preferences in order to
demonstrate the conditional impact of preference intensity
for respondents’ most-preferred party. Finally, a fourth
condition assumes the same conditions as the third simulation, except that it assumes respondents perceive a one-unit
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Table 4. The predicted probabilities of casting a sincere vote.
Predicted
probabilities
Perceptions of third-placed
party’s chances
Inaccurate perceptions1
Correct perceptions2
Correct perceptions and differences between
2nd and 3rd preferences and 1st and 2nd
preferences3
Correct perceptions and differences between
2nd and 3rd preferences4
2005
data
0.4475
0.2917
0.3997
2010
data
0.2307
0.2588
0.2747
0.3042
0.2452
Entries are the predicted probabilities of respondents voting sincerely for
the party placing third in their constituency.
1
This assumes that respondents do not perceive that their most-preferred
party finished third in their constituency, a difference of one unit between
their first and second preferences, zero difference between their second
and third preferences, and do not identify with a political party, while
holding all other variables at their median values.
2
Similar to 1, except that this assumes respondents correctly perceive that
their most-preferred party finished third.
3
Similar to 2, except that this assumes a two-unit difference in preferences
between respondents’ first and second preferences.
4
Similar to 3, except that this assumes a one-unit difference in preferences
between respondents’ second and third preferences.
difference between their second and third preferences in order
to demonstrate the conditional effect of preference intensity
between respondents’ second and third preferences. The predicted probabilities can be seen in Table 4.
The results in Table 4 confirm the findings in Table 2
and lend little support to the notion that possessing accurate
perceptions of respondents’ most-preferred parties will
reduce most, if not all, third-party voting. Among those
respondents incorrectly perceiving that their mostpreferred party will place second or third in their constituency, the model using the 2005 BES data predicts that
44.75 percent will vote sincerely for their most-preferred
party. While this percentage is relatively low for respondents who think their most-preferred party is likely to place
first or second in their constituency, this low percentage
makes sense given the context in which respondents operate. In addition to the fact that they reside in constituencies
where their most-preferred party placed third (whether they
perceived this or not), the percentage is low because our
simulated probabilities assume that respondents do not hold
strong preferences for their most-preferred party (preferring their most-preferred party only one unit more than
their second preference, the lowest possible value, makes
these voters susceptible to switching their votes to parties
other than their first preferences), do not identify with a
political party, and do not reside in ‘safe’ constituencies
(which reduces the incentive to vote sincerely). This percentage drops among those accurately perceiving that their
most-preferred party will place third, but remains sizable,
with 29.17 percent voting sincerely. In 2010, the percentage
voting sincerely among those with accurate information
(25.88) is actually higher than those with inaccurate information (23.07). Put in other terms, this means that a sizable
percentage of voters in both 2005 and 2010 would continue
to vote sincerely for their most-preferred party even if they
were presented with accurate information about the party’s
chances. Moreover, the percentage voting sincerely
increases further in both 2005 and 2010 as the difference
between their first and second preferences increases.
Increasing the difference between respondents’ first and second preferences by one unit increases the probability of voting sincerely to 39.97 and 27.47 percent in 2005 and 2010,
respectively. Finally, the last row of predicted probabilities
in Table 4 shows that the percentage voting sincerely
remains sizable even when respondents perceive a difference
between their second and third preferences. Assuming that
respondents perceive a one-unit difference between their
second and third preferences (the median respondent perceives zero difference between their second and third preferences), more than 30 percent of respondents in 2005 would
continue to vote for the third-placed party in their constituency, as would 25 percent of respondents in 2010.
Thus, the results presented in Table 4 show that possessing accurate information about a party’s chances of
winning at the constituency level – when respondents
perceive no hope for their most-preferred party – does
not prevent voters from behaving non-tactically (i.e. voting for one’s most-preferred party in constituencies in
which the party placed third). Even after assuming that
voters accurately perceive that their most-preferred party
will place third in their constituency, a sizable percentage of voters still vote for that party regardless of the
strength of their preference for their second most-preferred
party over their third preference. These findings reinforce the
point made above in Table 2 that many, possibly most, individuals voting non-tactically do so knowing that their mostpreferred party is out of the running. In turn, this underscores
the danger of exaggerating the information assumption as the
explanation of why voters behave non-tactically and why
third parties persist in situations of multiparty competition
at the constituency level. If these findings are to be believed,
third parties are able to persist despite the fact that voters correctly recognize that they are out of the running.
Conclusion
The results in this study imply that the existing literature
puts too much emphasis on the information assumption
inherent in strategic voting theory to explain why the number of parties often exceeds two-party predictions in SMDP
systems. Although strategic voting theory predicts that voters’ perceptions of the parties’ relative standing in their
constituency should increase the likelihood of voting tactically (and not according to their sincere preferences), our
findings show that most people in constituencies where
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8
Party Politics
their most-preferred party finished third will still vote for
that party even if they possess accurate information that the
party was out of the running. Perhaps more importantly, we
find that accurate information has little effect even after
variables for many of the other factors that would lead individuals to vote tactically are controlled for. Moreover, we
find that many voters possess reasonably accurate information: sizable shares of the electorate are able to correctly
identify which party placed third in their constituencies.
Thus, our findings indicate that even in conditions that are
highly favorable for tactical voting to occur (i.e. in this case
by focusing solely on voters in situations where their mostpreferred party places third), a non-negligible number of
voters vote sincerely for their most-preferred party, in contrast to the predictions made by strategic voting theory.
These findings suggest that the emergence and survival
of third parties are fuelled by well-informed, sincere
(non-tactical) voting for these hopeless parties.
Given these findings, future research should explore the
degree to which concerns with self-expression motivate
non-tactical behavior. While some research has begun to
explore the effects of expressive motivations deriving from
protest voting (Kang, 2004; Kselman and Niou, 2011),
more research is needed: because third parties like the Liberal Democrats have survived through multiple successive
elections over several decades, non-tactical support for
third parties in SMDP systems cannot be explained by protest voting alone, as such behavior is supposed to be shortterm in nature. Additionally, given the findings above
showing that variables like party identification – which are
related to the intensity of voters’ preferences – have stronger effects on non-tactical behavior than variables related
to voters’ accuracy of information (in keeping with previous literature: see Blais et al., 2009), future research examining how multiparty systems emerge and persist in SMDP
systems should also concentrate on the other assumptions
noted by Cox (1997) that are required for tactical voting.
Again, though, considering that the effects of these variables have been controlled in our analysis, and yet nontactical behavior still persists (even when we assume that
voters have only modestly strong preferences for their
most-preferred parties relative to their second and third preferences), this suggests that additional theorizing is needed
to explain why the current list of explanations for nontactical behavior is insufficient.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency
in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Notes
1. Additionally, however, party identification may also reflect a
lack of short-term instrumental rationality and wishfulfilment effects. Therefore, any effects of information on
9.
tactical voting must account for party identification in order
to be considered robust.
While some might be concerned that sincere voting for
Labour and the Conservatives in constituencies where these
parties placed third might be fundamentally different from
sincere voting for a true third party like the Liberal Democrats, we have re-examined the data by restricting the data
set to include only Liberal Democrat supporters residing
in constituencies where the party finished third. These analyses, which can be seen in the supplementary material
(available online), yield similar conclusions to those presented here.
This primarily excludes respondents who might have supported the Scottish National Party or Plaid Cymru. While
these are sizable third parties, the fact that these parties only
compete in their home regions – paired with the fact that
Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats compete nationwide – suggests the possibility that incentives
for/against third-party voting for the Scottish National Party
or Plaid Cymru may be different from third-placed voting for
other parties competing nationwide.
The question prompt reads, ‘On a scale that runs from 0 to 10,
where 0 means very unlikely and 10 means very likely, how
likely is it that [PARTY NAME] will win the election in this
constituency?’ (emphasis in the original text).
In addition to examining whether individuals supporting
third-placed parties recognized that their parties were out
of the running, we also examined whether all voters possessed accurate information about the party placing third
in their constituency. The data presented in the supplementary material (available online) confirm the findings presented here.
In order to ensure the exogeneity of this effect (i.e. to ensure
that party identification is not affected by perceptions of the
parties’ chances of winning), we measured party identification during the pre-election phase of the survey. However, the
results using party identification measured during the postelection phase are nearly identical to those presented here.
Despite the theoretical overlap between these objective measures of competitiveness and respondents’ perceptions of viability, the substantive findings presented here hold even when
these variables are excluded from the analysis.
The question prompt reads, ‘And, on the 0 to 10 scale, where
0 means very unlikely and 10 means very likely, how likely
is it that [PARTY NAME] will win the general election?’
(emphasis in the original). Despite some differences in the
estimates, including some over-estimates of one’s respective party, the average voter for each party has the (roughly)
correct ordering: the Conservative and Labour parties are
the only two parties that are viably positioned to win the
general election, while the Liberal Democrats stand little
chance.
Despite concerns with possible multicollinearity, variance
inflation factor tests reveal no significant multicollinearity
problems, with all factor scores lower than 7.
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Raymond and Tromborg
9
10. We also estimated these as multilevel models to allow for
random intercepts. The standard errors using this approach,
however, were less conservative on average than with the
logistic regression models clustering the standard errors by
constituency.
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Appendix: Descriptive statistics
Independent variables
Correctly perceiving their party as placing third
1st–2nd preferences
2nd–3 rd preferences
Labour Party ID
Conservative Party ID
Liberal Democrat Party ID
Safe constituencies
Close second–first ratios
Labour chances (nationally)
Conservative chances (Nationally)
Lib Dem chances (nationally)
Attention to politics
2005 data
2010 data
Mean/median (std. deviation)
0.48/0 (0.50)
3.58/3 (2.46)
0.46/0 (1.43)
0.37/0 (0.48)
0.12/0 (0.32)
0.31/0 (0.46)
0.36/0 (0.48)
0.28/0 (0.45)
7.20/7 (1.95)
4.46/5 (1.98)
2.92/3 (2.13)
5.98/7 (2.42)
Mean/median (std. deviation)
0.49/0 (0.50)
3.61/3 (2.39)
0.71/0 (1.80)
0.47/0 (0.50)
0.13/0 (0.34)
0.21/0 (0.41)
0.43/0 (0.50)
0.24/0 (0.43)
5.02/5 (2.03)
6.55/7 (1.68)
2.07/2 (1.98)
5.89/6 (2.30)
Author biographies
Christopher Raymond is a Lecturer in Politics at Queen’s University Belfast, UK. His research has appeared in Party Politics,
Electoral Studies, Political Studies, the Journal of Legislative
Studies, Government and Opposition, Politics, and the American
Review of Canadian Studies.
Mathias Wessel Tromborg is a PhD student at Rice University,
USA. Other research by Mathias has appeared in the Journal of
European Social Policy.
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