Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy
Author(s): Gideon Rose
Reviewed work(s):
The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security by Michael E.
Brown
Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict,
1947-1958 by Thomas J. Christensen
Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest by Randall L. ...
Source: World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Oct., 1998), pp. 144-172
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Review Article
REALISM AND
NEOCLASSICAL
OF FOREIGN POLICY
THEORIES
By GIDEON ROSE*
Michael
et al., eds. The Perils of
Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and
MIT Press, 1995, 519 pp.
Security. Cambridge:
J. Christensen.
Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobiliza
E. Brown
International
Thomas
Princeton: Princeton Univer
tion, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958.
319
1996,
Press,
pp.
sity
Randall L. Schweller. Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitlers
Strategy of
World Conquest. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998,267
pp.
William
Curti Wohlforth.
The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during
the Cold War. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993, 317 pp.
Fareed Zakaria. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins ofAmericas World
Role. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998,199
pp.
two decades international relations theory has been dominated
FOR by the debate
of the skirmishing
international
comes
multipolar
such
between
has occurred
and
and their various
neorealists
over
its effect
system
as war and peace. Thus
more
generates
system
critics.1 Much
about the nature of the
questions
on
out
of international
patterns
a
scholars have disputed whether
*
For
conflict
than
a
bipolar
one,
or
am
to
and suggestions
support, criticisms,
grateful
regarding earlier versions of this essay I
Berts, Michael Desch, Michael Doyle, Aaron Friedberg, Philip Gordon, Ethan Kapstein, Jeff
Andrew Moravcsik,
Kenneth Pollack, Robert Powell, and especially Sheri
Legro, Sean Lynn-Jones,
at discussions
Berman. I am also grateful for the comments of participants
sponsored by the Research
at Princeton University,
the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic
in International
Security
Program
Political Science Asso
of the American
Studies at Harvard University,
and the 1997 annual meeting
ciation.
xThe seminal neorealist text is Kenneth N. Waltz,
Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.:
over neorealism can be found in Robert O. Keohane,
ed., Neorealism
1979). Debates
Addison-Wesley,
and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986); Barry Buzan et al., The Logic ofAnarchy:
to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University
Neorealism
Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin,
andNeoliberalism:
The Contemporary Debate
(New York: Columbia University
Press,
ed., Neorealism
Relations
1993). For the current state of the debate, see Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International
48 (Spring 1994); and Brown
Debate," International Organization
Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal
et al., an invaluable collection of important recent articles on realism from the journal International
Richard
Security.
WorldPolitics 51 (October 1998), 144-72
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
whether
international
national
cooperation.
interactions,
can
institutions
increase
145
the
neorealism
it is a theory of
about the motivations
assumptions
of state
some
of inter
incidence
tries to explain the outcomes
it includes
international
politics;
Because
general
to
but does not purport
explain their behavior
cases. As Kenneth Waltz
has written:
of
states
individual
in great
or in all
detail
[A] theory of international politics ... can describe the range of likely outcomes
of the actions
range
of
and
interactions
expectations
varies
of
as
states within
systems
change.
a
and
system
given
It can tell us what
show
how
pressures
the
are
exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure, but it
cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to
those
pressures
and
possibilities.
. . .To the
extent
that
dynamics
of
a
system
limit the freedom of its units, their behavior and the outcomes of their behavior
become predictable . . . [but in general] a theory of international politics bears
on the foreign policies of nations while claiming to explain only certain aspects
of them.2
From
such a perspective,
much
of the daily
stuff of international
re
lations is left to be accounted for by theories of foreign policy. These
take as their dependent
variable not the pattern
but rather the behavior
of individual
interactions,
theories
of outcomes
state
states. Theories
of
to
states try to achieve
in the exter
policy seek
explain what
to
at this
it.
and when
achieve
they try
Theory
development
little attention.
has received comparatively
level, however,
of foreign
nal realm
Some, likeWaltz
himself, simply rule the subject out of bounds due
to its
he argues, must deal with the coherent
Theories,
logic
is driven by both inter
realms." Because
foreign policy
nal and external
it does not constitute
such an autonomous
factors,
we
a
not
and
strive
for
therefore
should
realm,
truly theoretical
explana
complexity.
of "autonomous
or "ac
rest content with mere
it. Instead, we must
"analyses"
include whatever
factors appear relevant to a particular
counts," which
case.3 Others
such diffidence,
and their recent efforts to
have rejected
construct a
general theory of foreign policy fall into several broad schools.
tion of
2
and Jack Sny
Waltz
(fn. 1), 71-72. See also the discussion of this point inThomas J. Christensen
International Or
der, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns inMultipolarity,"
44 (Spring 1990), 38 fn. 3; Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic
Politics," in Brown et
ganization
it is even useful or
al.; and Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 7-11. Robert Powell has questioned whether
must neces
to
possible
speak of theories of international politics in isolation, since systemic theories
see Powell
to
include
nontrivial
about
states'
and
behavior
with;
sarily
assumptions
preferences
begin
(fn.l).
3
"Much is included in an analysis," he writes; "little is included in a
"International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 6 (Autumn
to the suggestion
that scholars should devise and test theories
sponding
see Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why
from his neorealist framework;
Foreign Policy?" Security Studies 6 (Autumn 1996).
theory." Kenneth N. Waltz,
1996), 54-55. Waltz was re
of foreign policy emerging
of
Not Neorealist Theories
WORLD POLITICS
146
The first and most common school is composed o? Innenpolitik the
ories, which
The others
stress
the
influence
are all variants
international
of domestic
factors
of realism
and highlight
on state behavior.
"Offensive
on
foreign
the influence
policy.
of the
realism"
(sometimes
ar
reverses
realism")
essentially
logic and
"aggressive
Innenpolitik
are
that
factors
dominant.
"Defensive
realism"
gues
systemic
always
in
that systemic factors drive some
takes a softer line, arguing
practice
but not others.4
kinds of state behavior
set out a fourth
The works
under review here collectively
school,
ex
I term "neoclassical
both
which
realism." It explicitly
incorporates
in
certain
ternal and internal variables,
and systematizing
updating
system
called
sights
drawn
scope
and ambition
from
classical
realist
of a country's
thought.
foreign
Its adherents
policy
is driven
argue that the
first and fore
most by its place in the international system and specifically by its rel
ative material
argue
further,
are realist.
is
This
they
They
why
capabilities.
on
of
such
that
the
however,
power capabilities
impact
must
is indirect and complex, because
systemic pressures
power
foreign policy
be translated
through
are neoclassical.
they
intervening
variables
at the unit
level. This
iswhy
the
argue that relative material
power establishes
a
of
basic parameters
country's foreign policy; they note, inThucydides'
can and the weak
suffer what
that "the strong do what
formula,
they
or
out that there is no immediate
Yet
must."5
perfect
they point
they
Neoclassical
realists
4
and defensive realism are not only theories of foreign policy, but both schools commonly
Offensive
address foreign policy behavior and it is this aspect of them that will be treated here. The distinction
and defensive realism was first made by Jack Snyder inMyths
between offensive/aggressive
ofEmpire:
Domestic Politics and International Ambition
Press, 1991), 11-12, and
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
and Steven
in Brown et al.: Sean M. Lynn-Jones
has been widely adopted since then. See the following
"The False
"Realism and Domestic
E. Miller,
Politics"; and John Mearsheimer,
"Preface"; Zakaria,
Re
Promise of International
Institutions."
See also Benjamin Frankel, "The Reading List: Debating
alism," Security Studies 5 (Autumn 1995), esp. 185-87; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, Randall
Status Quo Bias: What
L. Schweller,
"Neorealism's
Security Dilemma?"
Security Studies 5 (Spring
about the Third World,"
C. Desch,
1996), esp. 114-15; Michael
Security Stud
"Why Realists Disagree
of
Realism and the Expansion
ies 5 (Spring 1996), esp. 365; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive
"International Relations: One
Aims," Security Studies 6 (Summer 1997); and Stephen M. Walt,
World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy 110 (Spring 1998), 37. Other authors make the same distinc
substitutes "pessimistic structural"
tion but use idiosyncratic
terminology. Thus Robert G. Kaufman
for "offensive" and "optimistic structural" for "defensive"; Stephen G. Brooks substitutes "neorealist"
"
in
for "offensive" and "postclassical" for "defensive"; and Charles Glaser calls his variant "contingent
Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal De
"A Two-Level
stead of "defensive" realism. See Kaufman,
War
and U.S. Grand
1994), 683ff; Brooks,
"Dueling
mocracy,
Strategy," Security Studies 3 (Summer
51 (Summer 1997); and Glaser, "Realists as Optimists:
Realisms," International Organization
Cooper
in an overview of recent realist theorizing,
in Brown et al. Finally,
ation as Self-Help,"
Joseph M.
and the
"Realist International Theory
into the defensive camp; see Grieco,
Grieco puts all neorealists
and G. John Ikenberry, eds., New Thinking in Interna
Politics," inMichael W. Doyle
Study ofWorld
tional Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1997), esp. 166-67.
5
Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides:A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War
(New York: Free Press, 1996), 5.89.
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
147
transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behav
ior. Foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and
so it is their
perceptions
relative quantities
of physical
and
elites,
simply
means
that over
the
short
of relative
resources
to medium
term
not
that matter,
power
or forces in
This
being.
countries'
foreign policies
trends closely or
power
necessarily
objective
those leaders and elites do not always have
Furthermore,
continuously.
resources as
to extract and direct national
freedom
complete
they might
must
wish.
Power
examine
therefore
also
the strength
and
analysis
structure
to their societies,
of states relative
because
these affect the
resources
can be allocated
to
of
national
that
proportion
foreign policy.
may
not
This
means
ferent
track
that countries
state structures
material
with
but dif
gross capabilities
comparable
to act
likely
differently. And finally, systemic
the
broad contours
and general di
may shape
are
and incentives
pressures
rection of foreign policy without
termine
the specific details
of
or
to de
precise enough
means
This
that the
a dis
influence
of systemic
factors may often be more
from
apparent
tance than from up close?for
in significantly
the
limiting
example,
a state s leaders at a par
menu
of foreign
choices
considered
by
policy
item
ticular time, rather than in forcing
the selection
of one particular
on that menu
For
being strong
state behavior.
over another.
all these
reasons,
the neoclassical
realists
believe, understanding
examination
of the
close
power and policy
requires
are formulated
contexts
within
which
and
foreign
policies
imple
out the schools
mented.6
After
theoretical
briefly sketching
competi
its major works
of this essay will
discuss
and
tors, the remainder
the
links between
distinctive
characteristics
and assess
Four Theories
its contribution
of Foreign
and political
historians,
Statesmen,
causes states to
what
adopt certain
to the field.7
Policy
have long pondered
philosophers
kinds of foreign policies. Yet most
6
In their stress on intervening variables, constrained choice, and historical context, as in other ways,
in comparative politics, who
realists have much in common with historical institutionalists
struc
that mediate
the effects of macro-level
socioeconomic
institutions
study "intermediate-level
... are
or
tures." Neoclassical
realists would agree that "this focus on how macrostructures
magnified
us to
struc
allows
the
of
such
intermediate-level
institutions
effects
by
explore
overarching
mitigated
. ..
tures on political outcomes, but avoid the structural determinism
that often characterizes
[purely
Kathleen
and
Institutionalism
in Compara
Sven
"Historical
Thelen
Steinmo,
systemic] approaches."
in Comparative
tive Politics," in Sven Steinmo et al., eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism
neoclassical
Press, 1992), 11.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Analysis
7
re
For reasons of space and coherence this essay will focus on the general features of neoclassical
alism as a theory of foreign policy rather than on the empirical contributions
the various neoclassical
realist authors have made to the literatures on their particular historical subjects.
148
WORLD
have
answers
sought
considering
theories
of
in intricate
policy
foreign
combinations
that one
to think
it hubris
POLITICS
that would
of
factors,
case-specific
construct
parsimonious
have much
power.
explanatory
could
interested in theory building, meanwhile, have tended to fol
Analysts
low one of three distinct
paths.
to assume that
approach has been
foreign policy
sources
in domestic
has its
theories
These
argue
politics.
Innenpolitik
and economic
that internal factors such as political
national
ideology,
character,
countries
monadic
tion
common
most
The
partisan
behave
version
that
politics,
toward
or socioeconomic
the world
of such
the behavior
theorizing
of democracies
structure
their
determine
borders.
beyond
in a liberal vein would
is different
from
how
A
pure,
be the no
that of non
A modified,
be the notion
of the
dyadic version would
is
which
holds
that the behavior
of democracies
"democratic
peace,"
are many variants
different when
deal
with
each
other.
of
There
they
democracies.
the Innenpolitik approach, each favoring a different specific domestic
variable, but they all share a common
assumption?that
a
as the
is
understood
of
best
internal
country's
foreign policy
product
a
a
in
is
To
understand
par
country
why
behaving
dynamics.
particular
ticular way, therefore, one should peer inside the black box and examine
independent
the
preferences
and configurations
of key domestic
actors.8
The chief problem with Innenpolitik theories is that pure unit-level
states with
for why
similar do
have difficulty
accounting
explanations
act
in the foreign policy
mestic
often
systems
differently
sphere and
act alike. Some scholars
states in similar situations
often
dissimilar
why
grounded in the neorealist model of international politics have sought
to avoid this problem by applying thatmodel to individual state behav
ior as well
as to international
outcomes.
They
have
generated
two the
8
For a brief history of Innenpolitik theorizing about foreign policy, see Zakaria, in Brown et al.; for
restatement
in modern
social science terms, see Andrew
of the Innenpolitik
tradition
powerful
of International Politics," International
Moravcsik,
"Taking Preferences
Seriously: A Liberal Theory
E. Brown et al.,
51 (Autumn 1997). On the concept of the democratic peace, seeMichael
Organization
theDemocratic Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996). Other notable recent examinations
eds., Debating
in Robert I. Rotberg and
of Innenpolitik
variables include Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics andWar,"
K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention
Theodore
ofMajor Wars (New York: Cambridge University
and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy
Press, 1988); Richard Rosecrance
and Valerie M. Hudson,
Skidmore
eds., The
Press, 1993); David
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Limits of State Autonomy:
Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
"Domestic Political Systems andWar Proneness," Mershon International Studies
1993); Joe D. Hagan,
in the Analysis
of
Review 38, supplement 2 (October 1994); idem, "Domestic Political Explanations
et al., eds.,
Its Second
Foreign Policy," in Laura Neack
Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in
"Domestic Struc
Generation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995); and Matthew
Evangelista,
a
tures and International
Change,"
inDoyle
and Ikenberry
(fn. 4).
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
149
ories of
and defensive
both start
realism, which
foreign policy, offensive
from the
of uni
that the international
system is composed
assumption
a
states
theories
rational
motivated
desire
for
The
dif
tary,
security.
by
assume
fer over what
incentives
offers
the
international
system
they
are
as well as over the
to
they
likely
respond,
degree
inherent in anarchy can be modulated
the tension
such as the state of military
technology.
such states and how
assume
to which
they
by other factors
Offensive
realism
assumes
is generally
that international
anarchy
or nuclear deter
situations
from
of
apart
bipolarity
it by maximizing
their
rence, security is scarce and states try to achieve
In the offensive
relative advantage.9
realist world
rational states pursu
Hobbesian?that
are prone to take actions that can lead to conflict with oth
ing security
a defensive
ers?and
but are
do: "States begin with
motive,
usually
structure
act
because
of
the
forced to think and sometimes
offensively
countries
of the international
Domestic
differences
between
system."10
are considered
international
to be
relatively unimportant,
are assumed
to be
system
to make
enough
similarly
their internal characteristics.
from the
pressures
and
strong
straightforward
states behave
of
situated
alike, regardless
ac
to this view,
foreign policy
According
because
tivity is the record of nervous states jockeying for position within
framework
a state
should
because
of a given
the
understand
To
why
systemic power configuration.
one
is behaving
in a
realists
offensive
way,
suggest,
particular
examine
its relative
and its external
environment,
capabilities
into foreign
those factors will be translated
relatively
smoothly
to advance
state chooses
its interests.
policy and shape how the
assumes
in
Defensive
that
international
contrast,
realism,
anarchy is
is
rather
than
often
that
often more benign?that
is,
security
plentiful
or
over
can
states
time
this
learn it
that normal
understand
scarce?and
rational states pursuing
realist world
to re
to be relaxed,
themselves
bestirring
only
are rare. Even then, such states gener
to external threats, which
spond
manner
to these threats in a
against
timely
by "balancing"
ally respond
obviates
the need for actual
the
threatener
and
which
deters
them,
to this rule is when
situations
certain
chief exception
conflict. The
from
experience.11
can often
security
In the defensive
afford
9
"Back to the Future: Instability
of offensive realist analysis include John Mearsheimer,
Examples
in Europe after the Cold War," in Brown et al.; idem (fn. 4); and Labs (fn. 4).
10
Mearsheimer
(fn. 4), 337 fn. 24.
11
Prominent
defensive
realist authors include Stephen Van Evera, Stephen M. Walt, Jack Snyder,
to works in the defensive
realist camp, see Zakaria
Barry Posen, and Charles L. Glaser; for citations
realists view systemic incentives as less
(fn. 2), 476 fn. 34. For some of the reasons why defensive
Hobbesian
than offensive
realists do, see Brooks
(fn. 4).
150
WORLD POLITICS
states to fear each other, such as when
security-seeking
prevailing
in this
of warfare
favor the offensive.12
activity,
Foreign
policy
states
to
is
of
the
record
rational
clear
view,
systemic
reacting properly
into
in
those
circumstances
when
the
conflict
incentives,
coming
only
lead
modes
security dilemma is heightened to fever pitch. But this dance is repeat
to defensive
edly interrupted,
according
or
true
misread
ignore the
security-related
environment.
realists, by rogue states that
incentives
offered by their
Innenpolitik theories of foreign policy privilege domestic indepen
while
variables,
both
schools
though
dent
offensive
realism
privileges
are clear, bold, and
predictive,
and inaccurate.
(Pure
oversimplified
both
are often
face
the reverse
ones. Al
systemic
the predictions
of
theories
systemic
states in
their
counterparts:
anomaly
Innenpolitik
of
adherents
do not always act alike.) The
similar structural positions
in
but
realism also view it as a systemic
defensive
theory,
they
practice
on both
to account
variables
and domestic
systemic
independent
rely
from
for different kinds of foreign policy behavior. Defensive
the international
which
conduct,
ogy or certain
system
includes
other
a resort
factors
the remainder
consider
as the cause
to
provide
of aggressive
count
for it by auxiliary
realism
Neoclassical
hypotheses
of what
"natural"
if military
technol
might
only
aggression
clear incentives
realists view
be called
behavior
to strike first.
They
to be "unnatural" and ac
involving
domestic
variables.
of all three of
important
challenges
the neoclassical
theories are misguided,
these perspectives.
Innenpolitik
if there is any single, dominant
factor shaping the
realists say, because
over time, it is their relative
broad pattern of nations'
foreign policies
so
rest
of the international
the
material
power vis-?-vis
system?and
elements
this iswhere analysis of foreign policy should begin. Defensive
ismisguided
because
its
on countries'
to threats
sponses
partly
realism
re
reason,
emphasis
are
one
s
of threat
overlooks
the fact that
perceptions
is further
The
material
one's
relative
power.
theory
by
for a similar
shaped
12
Modern
s
of the security dilemma;
offense-defense
theory is rooted in Robert Jervis presentation
see Jervis,
World Politics 30 (January 1978). Recent de
under the Security Dilemma,"
"Cooperation
variables are Glaser (fn. 4); Ted Hopf,
fensive realist works stressing the importance of offense-defense
85 (June 1991);
Balance, andWar," American Political Science Review
"Polarity, the Offense-Defense
and Its Critics," Security Studies 4 (Summer 1995);
"Offense-Defense
Sean M. Lynn-Jones,
Theory
and the Causes ofWar," International
Security 22 (Spring
Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense,
"What Is the Offense-Defense
Balance and Can
1998); and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann,
see also Jack S.
It?" International
We Measure
Levy, "The Offensive/De
Security 22 (Spring 1998);
and Historical Analysis," International Studies
A Theoretical
fensive Balance of Military Technology:
to military technology,
balance is sometimes held
the offense-defense
addition
28
In
(1984).
Quarterly
resources are cumulative and therefore offer a tempt
to
incorporate judgments about whether power
see Peter Liberman, Does
an
Conquest
analysis of this question,
ing target for potential aggressors; for
Press, 1996).
Pay? (Princeton: Princeton University
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
flawed
because
much
actual
bulk
of their
its first-order
thus
behavior,
explanatory
on an ad hoc basis.13
The
neoclassical
argument
its adherents
systemic
forcing
to domestic-level
work
realists
believe
151
does
not
account
to contract
variables
out
for
the
introduced
that
inde
preferred
Innenpolitikers9
to
be relegated
second place analytically
because
pendent variables
over the
run a state's
cannot
transcend
the
limits
long
foreign policy
and opportunities
environment.
thrown up by the international
"A
must
good theory of foreign policy," one of them writes,
what
effect
the most
relations
because
always
the
"should first ask
has on national
because
behavior,
system
a state in international
of
characteristic
powerful
generalizable
is its relative
in the international
system."14 Moreover,
position
the influence of structural factors such as relative power
is not
obvious
international
even
to
actors
political
themselves,
neoclassical
realists
caution that analysts who do not begin by looking carefully for such in
to other factors
causal significance
in reality are only
epiphenomenal.
the neo
relative power their chief independent
variable,
By making
are
to
classical realists
forced
choose
sides in the perennial
debate about
fluence
may mistakenly
that are more visible but
attribute
just how that concept should be defined and operationalized. They
generally
serving
confront
the term
out their reasons for re
issue directly,
setting
. . .
or resources
to refer to "the
"power"
capabilities
this
with which states can influence each other" (Wohlforth, 4).15They dis
tinguish
between
these
power
resources
and a country's
foreign
policy
13
source of
Stephen Van Evera (fn. 12), for example, has recently argued that "a chief
insecurity in
times has been [the] false belief that security was scarce." In general, he claims,
Europe since medieval
"States are seldom as insecure as they think they are ... [the] exaggeration of insecurity, and the belli
cose conduct it fosters, are
causes of national insecurity and war"
real
prime
(pp. 42-43). Neoclassical
an elaborate systemic
ists question the point of constructing
that states
theory around the assumption
a
are driven
on
states suffer from
by quest for security only then to argue that
security-related
questions
realist critique of defensive realism along
false consciousness most of the time. The original neoclassical
these lines is Zakaria (fn. 2); see also Schweller
(fn. 4).
14
Zakaria (fn. 2), 482.
15
Neoclassical
realists acknowledge
that in contrast to this "material" definition,
the "relational" def
inition of power?in
Robert Dahl s formulation,
"As ability to get B to do something
itwould not oth
erwise do"?has
certain strengths, but they find it so fraught with theoretical and empirical difficulties
as to be
a re
to stressing the
practically unusable. In addition
problems of empirically operationalizing
lational definition,
such an approach makes
it difficult to say much about
they argue that employing
the causal role of power factors relative to other potential
writes:
independent variables. As Wohlforth
"If one defines power as control [over other actors, outcomes, or the international
system as awhole],
one must infer the
the balance of power from out
relationship of power from outcomes_Inferring
comes and then
a dubious
using the balance of power to explain those outcomes appears to be
analyt
1-17. For arguments against the use
ical exercise." For a clear discussion of these issues, seeWohlforth,
of Power," Behavioral Science 2
definitions of power, see Robert Dahl, "The Concept
1989). See also
(July 1957); and David A. Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power (New York Basil Blackwell,
and the Study ofWorld
Waltz
Poli
(fn. 1), 191-92; and Robert O. Keohane,
"Realism, Neorealism
(fn. 1), 11.
tics," in Keohane
of broad material
152
WORLD POLITICS
"interests,"
country's
Instead
by which
they
external behavior.
mean
the goals
or
preferences
that guide
the
of assuming
that states seek security, neoclassical
realists as
states
to
that
the uncertainties
of international
respond
anarchy
to control and
environment.
their
external
by seeking
shape
Regardless
of the myriad ways that states may define their interests, this school ar
gues, they are likely to want more rather than less external influence, and
sume
pursue
central
such
influence
to the extent
that
of neoclassical
empirical prediction
term the relative amount
of material
are able to do so.16 The
they
realism is thus that over the
resources
countries
power
as it
the magnitude
and ambition?the
possess will
envelope,
shape
as their relative power rises states will
were?of
their foreign policies:
as it falls their actions and ambitions
seek more
influence
and
abroad,
long
will be scaled back accordingly.
Yet a theory of foreign policy limited to systemic factors alone is
bound
to be inaccurate
which
is why
way states
one must
offensive
much
of the time, the neoclassical
realists argue,
is also misguided.
To understand
the
realism
and respond
to their external
environment,
they say,
are
translated
systemic pressures
through unit
analyze
and do
level intervening
variables
such as decision-makers'
perceptions
state
structure.
mestic
In the neoclassical
realist world
leaders can be
interpret
how
and domestic
politics.
by both international
nor
is
neither
Hobbesian
benign but
anarchy, moreover,
constrained
and difficult to read. States existing within
International
rather murky
it have a hard time seeing
or scarce and must grope their way
security is plentiful
clearly whether
ac
in
evidence
forward
interpreting
partial and problematic
twilight,
to
of
thumb.
rules
cording
subjective
In this respect, therefore, neoclassical
realists occupy amiddle
ground
im
The
former
and constructivists.
theorists
between
pure structural
a clear and direct link between
constraints
and
systemic
plicitly accept
con
unit-level
the latter deny that any objective
behavior;
systemic
straints exist at all, arguing
instead that international
reality is socially
constructed
and that "anarchy
iswhat
states make
of it."17Neoclassical
16
One member
of the school writes that "classical realists have written carelessly about power-max
resources or as a consequence
states
of mate
imization/
leaving unclear whether
expand for material
the latter assumption;
increased resources give rise to
rial resources.
realism] makes
[Neoclassical
but influence-maximizers"
States are not resource-maximizers
(Zakaria, 19).
greater ambitions.
a broader range of po
too limiting and advocates incorporating
Schweller considers this assumption
see
realist theorizing;
into neoclassical
tential state preferences
Deadly Imbalances, 18-26, 217 fn. 37;
and idem (fn. 4).
17
See Alexander Wendt,
"Anarchy IsWhat
International
1992); and idem, "Constructing
States Make of It," International Organization 46 (Spring
Politics," International Security 20 (Summer 1995).
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
realists
assume
of relative
that there
is indeed
power, which will,
of state interactions.
outcomes
something
for example, have
153
like an objective
dramatic
effects
reality
on the
do not assume,
that
however,
They
on a
that
basis.
necessarily
reality accurately
apprehend
day-to-day
one could peer
Hans Morgenthau
that
with
his
famously
argued
theory
over the statesman's
realists believe
the same but
shoulder; neoclassical
states
feel
in
that
doing
so one
sees
through
a
glass,
darkly. The
states
world
end up inhabiting, therefore, is indeed partly of their own making.
It might
described
be asked why, given
as "classical"
simply
their outlook,
these
authors
we must
are not best
add yet another
reason is that un
realists?why
lexicon. The
already burgeoning
no
there is
classical realism. Rather,
fortunately
simple, straightforward
the term covers a host of authors who differ greatly from one another
in
to an
bit of jargon
and methodologies,
and thus is not helpful for
objectives,
assumptions,
as a
current
sets
What
the authors under discussion
apart
purposes.18
nature of
distinct
school worthy
is both the common
of recognition
an
their quest?to
and
of
develop
explicit
generalizable
theory
foreign
the common
threads of their argumentation.
Their
central
policy?and
concern
is to build
on and advance
the work of previous
students of rel
vari
the
role
of
domestic-level
by elaborating
intervening
it
the
and
ables, systematizing
testing
against contemporary
approach,
the
four
differences
theories are sum
The
among
general
competitors.
ative power
marized inTable 1.
Because
neoclassical
pendent
and
ological
preference?for
realism
variables,
intervening
supplemented
by explicit
different
factors combine
stresses
the role played by both inde
it carries with
it a distinct method
theoretically
counterfactual
to
yield
informed
particular
analysis,
foreign
classical realist archetype isThucydides' History
narratives,
that trace
policies.
ideally
the ways
The neo
of thePeloponnesian
its narrative
in the theoretical
War, which
grounds
proposition
"real cause" of the war was "the growth of the power of Athens,
that the
and the
alarmwhich this inspired in Sparta," and then describes how systemic
18
three separate theoretical strands within
Michael
the classical
Doyle has recently distinguished
realist tradition: Machiavelli's
the importance of individual am
"fundamentalism," which emphasizes
s "structuralism," which
the importance of the international
bition; Hobbes
system; and
emphasizes
Rousseau's
the importance of unit-level
factors such as the na
which emphasizes
"constitutionalism,"
ture and
relations. All three strands, he argues, have their fons et origo in
strength of state-society
seeMichael
Thucydides'
incorporates variables from each level of analysis;
"complex" realism, which
W. Doyle, Ways ofWar and Peace (New York: W. W. Norton,
1997). For analysis of previous modern
to
"classical" realists, see Michael
(Baton Rouge:
Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber
Kissinger
Louisiana
State University
Press,
1986).
154
WORLD POLITICS
Four Theories
View of
International System
Theory
Innenpolitik
theories
unimportant
Defensive
occasionally
realism
important;
Policy
View ofUnits
Causal
Logic
internal factors ?? foreign
highly
differentiated
highly
differentiated
anarchy's
implications
TABLE 1
of Foreign
or
systemic
incentives
internal ?? foreign policy
factors
(two sets of independent variables
practice, driving "natural" and
variable
"unnatural" behavior
Neoclassical
differentiated
important;
ismurky
realism
systemic
incentives
anarchy
?>
undifferentiated
very important;
anarchy isHobbesian
realism
were
incentives
translated
of the various
policies
In keeping
through
unit-level
systemic
in
respectively)
internal ?> foreign policy
factors
(intervening
variables)
(independent
variable)
Offensive
policy
incentives
variables
?>
foreign policy
into the foreign
Greek
city-states.19
to
realist works
this tradition,
the major neoclassical
or case studies of how great powers have re
date have been narratives
on the
to relative material
rise or decline:
Fareed Zakaria
sponded
with
United States;William CurtiWohlforth on the Soviet Union; Thomas
J. Christensen on the United States and China; Randall L. Schweller
on
same authors have also
ofWorld War
II. These
the belligerents
to the role of do
issues ranging from the formation
of alliances
tackled
mestic
politics
American
most
in war
policymakers.
and
substantial
initiation
Their
to the
challenges
collective
sophisticated
facing
contemporary
some of the
output represents
on
work
policy
foreign
currently
available.20
19
as an international
relations the
Strassler (fn. 5), 1.23. For an excellent discussion of Thucydides
orist, see Doyle
(fn. 18), 49-92; other interesting recent treatments include Mark V. Kauppi, "Thucyd
ides: Character
and Capabilities,"
1995); and Ashley
J. Tellis, "Political
Security Studies 5 (Winter
to Scientific Theory," Security Studies 5 (Winter 1995), 12-25.
Realism: The Long March
20
a
on
Recent statecentric writings,
comparably rig
foreign economic policy, represent
particularly
see G.John
et al., eds., The State
orous and
a
Ikenberry
impressive literature; for
sampling of this work,
Iken
and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); and G.John
1996). Another
berry, ed., American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, 2d ed. (New York: HarperCollins,
or
as comparative foreign
foreign policy analysis, has generally produced little
policy
approach, known
or
recent offerings can be sampled in Charles F. Hermann
its
cumulation of knowledge
lasting impact;
et al., eds., New Directions
in the Study ofForeign Policy (Winchester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman,
1987); and
Neacketal.(fn.8).
realism
neoclassical
The Rise and Fall
of the Great
155
Powers
The primary subject of all the major neoclassical realist works is the
on
them the
makes
impact of relative power
foreign
policy?which
third wave of books on this hardy realist theme in the last two decades.
The firstwave came in the 1980s, as Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy, and
Michael Mandelbaum all used relative power as the ordering principle
for
and wide-ranging
impressive
several centuries.
They
argued
events
lay substantial
regularities.
studies
of
international
that beneath
the
politics
chaos
apparent
over
of
se
put it, "Similar
across
the international
and
As Mandelbaum
recur
history
throughout
policies
in states that, whatever
their differences,
similar posi
occupy
system
. . .The
tions in the system.
of
very strong states are
security policies
curity
different from those of very weak ones, and both differ from those of
that are neither
states
states moved
from one
eventually followed
individual
very strong nor very weak."21 When
rank to the next, moreover,
their foreign policies
suit: "The historical record suggests," Kennedy
run between
an
in the
"that there is a very clear connection
wrote,
long
rise and fall and its growth
and de
individual Great Power's economic
reason
world
cline as an important military
The
(or
power
empire)."22
was
this pattern, Gilpin
that states were
continually
explained,
to try to increase [their] control over the environment....
A
"tempted
more
more
state ... will select a
and
bundle
of
wealthy
larger
powerful
a
less wealthy
and less powerful
state."23
security and welfare
goals than
for
second wave consisted of works by Aaron L. Friedberg and
P.
Leffler that traced precisely how a shift in relative power led
Melvyn
The
to a shift
in the foreign policy of a particular
country.24 Friedberg
began
economic
his analysis with
the relative decline
of Britain's
and military
turn of the twentieth
century; his goal was to un
strength around the
external
and how this decline
started to affect Britain's
derstand when
behavior.
As
from which
place
at which
he noted:
to
begin
to end
"Structural
analysis
it. Even
of
considerations
a useful
point
rather than a
politics
that structures exist
acknowledges
provide
international
if one
21
and
Michael Mandelbaum,
The Fates ofNations: The Searchfor National
Security in theNineteenth
Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), 4,2.
22
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House,
1987), xxii, em
in original.
phasis
23
Robert Gilpin, War and Change inWorld Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981),
94-95,22-23.
24
Aaron
L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905
P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: Na
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988); and Melvyn
and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
tional Security, the Truman Administration,
Press,
1992).
156
WORLD
POLITICS
and are important,
there is still the question
their contours
from the inside, so to
speak,"
about them.25
of how
statesmen
grasp
they will do
and of what
Friedberg found that in practice British officials reacted to decline
that "simply ignored or papered over se
pursuing
haphazardly,
policies
rious underlying
in Britain's
weaknesses
or, in solving certain
position
created new and perhaps more dangerous
is not
ones." This
problems,
one would
a
actor
the response
ratio
expect from
unitary
responding
to incentives
to
from
the
that
international
and
he
system,
nally
argued
one had to consider
not
it
in
relative
merely
explain
properly
changes
but also organizational,
and domestic
intellectual,
capabilities
political
factors. Assessments
of relative power by policy-making
elites, Fried
"are related to but not directly determined
berg concluded,
by reality"
and are, "in turn, related to but not fully determinative
of policy."26
Leffler's study of American foreign policy during the early cold war
case in which
the opposite
situation?a
relative power was
rather than decreasing.
Instead of following
the lead of most
examined
increasing
traditional or revisionist historians in highlighting the objective nature
of either
a
Soviet
postwar
he
dominance,
on the
dynamic
and their relative
global
cused
goals,
or an American
threat
quest for
ideological
the postrevisionists
and fo
interaction
between
the two countries,
their
Most
he
demonstrated
strength.
importantly,
took his
stand with
how changing capabilities helped to drive policymakers' perceptions of
external
Union
Worries
about the Soviet
interests, and opportunities.
ar
Leffler
the
of
the
Truman
administration,
underlay
policies
but those worries were themselves
the
of
increased
partly
product
threats,
gued,
American
were
not about
concerned
strength: American
policymakers
an immediate
or
threat but rather about some poten
primarily military
to America's
the great
tial future challenge
broader environment.
Only
one
est of powers,
their
point out, have the luxury of viewing
might
interests so
the United
States did not do
national
certainly
expansively;
were
so earlier in its
its
institutions
the same
ideals
and
when
history,
but its geopolitical position was different.
The
neoclassical
and demonstrate
realists
left off
these earlier waves
up where
of this line of analysis to awide vari
pick
the applicability
ety of times and places. Thus,
in the late nineteenth
policy
karia asks: "Why, as states
25
(fn. 24), 8.
Friedberg
26
Ibid., 295,290-91.
in his compelling study of U.S. foreign
century, From Wealth
grow
increasingly
to Power,
wealthy,
do
Fareed
Za
they build
157
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
large armies,
themselves
entangle
in politics
their borders,
beyond
the basic answer of the
seek international influence?" (p. 3). Echoing
stems from
first wave,
he argues that this behavior
states to use the tools at their
to
gain control
disposal
ronment.William
and
the
over
of
tendency
their envi
CurtiWohlforth, meanwhile, grounds his analysis of
the cold war in the notion
that "state be
foreign policy during
to
constraints
external
conditioned
[is an] adaptation
by changes
in relative
in
And
Thomas
Adversaries,
Christensen,
J.
power."27
Useful
war
and Chinese
argues that U.S.
foreign policies during the early cold
Soviet
havior
were driven in the first place by shifting distributions of power in the
international
system.
influence of relative
is not obliterated
power on national policies
at least so Randall
world-historical
L. Schweller
leaders?or
by
in
contends
his
neoclassical
realist
Imbalances,
study of foreign
Deadly
The
even
II. Conventional wis
policy dynamics before and duringWorld War
that explains
the onset and course ofthat war largely by reference
ar
to the character and views of
ismisguided,
Hitler
Schweller
Adolph
dom
the structure of the international
is, the dis
gues, because
system?that
across
a critical
tribution of material
the
units?had
power capabilities
on alliance
the
1930s
and
and
patterns
foreign policies
impact
during
a
1940s. He documents
the existence
of
international
comprehensive
pecking order dominated by three poles (theUnited States, the Soviet
and Germany)
Union,
ers of various different
ventional
neorealist
and traces
its influences
sizes. His
on the behavior
makes
it clear
of pow
that the con
analysis
is
between
systems
bipolar and multipolar
a much
at
look
the
dis
and
that
closer
purposes
division
for many
inadequate
in order to uncover
the foreign
tribution
of power may be necessary
structure should be
to
expected
produce.
policy effects that system
and Misperception
Perception
International
Politics
in
In stressing
the primacy
realists part
of relative power, the neoclassical
from many
the
themselves
with
company
separate
They
Innenpolitikers.
a further contention
that
other structural
however,
theorists,
through
the impact of such power on policy is indirect and problematic. The
first
tions,
intervening
through
variable
which
they
systemic
introduce
pressures
is decision-makers'
must
percep
be filtered.
27
in Brown et al., 8. This arti
"Realism and the End of the Cold War,"
William
Curti Wohlforth,
book The Elusive Balance and should be read as its
cle follows through on the argument ofWohlforth's
final chapter.
158
WORLD
POLITICS
a
of foreign policy presume
explanations
reasonably
officials
of
the
distribution
of
and a
power
apprehension
by
direct
translation
such
of
into
national
reasonably
apprehensions
pol
most
structural
realist formulations,"
"assess
noted,
icy. "In
Friedberg
ment
a
[of relative power]
through rational calculation
plays the part of
systemic
Purely
accurate
reliable but invisible transmission belt connecting objective [material]
to
has made
the same
adaptive behavior."28 Robert O. Keohane
most
that
for
theorists
"the
link
between
point, arguing
sys
systemic
tem structure and actor behavior
is forged by the
assump
rationality
to
to
enables the theorist
that leaders will respond
tion, which
predict
change
the
incentives
and constraints
imposed by their environments.
Taking
one to attribute variations
in state be
permits
of the international
characteristics
system."29
as a constant
rationality
havior to various
Neoclassical
in contrast, argue that the notion of a
smoothly
transmission
belt is inaccurate
and misleading.
realists,
mechanical
functioning
The
international
distribution
of power
can drive
countries'
behavior
only by influencing the decisions of flesh and blood officials, they point
no alternative but
out, and would-be
analysts of foreign policy thus have
to
in
how
detail
each
explore
country's policymakers
actually understand
means
their situation.30 What
in
this
is that the translation
of
practice
into national behavior
capabilities
term.
short and medium
Friedberg
found
that
in
is often
rough
turn-of-the-century
and capricious
Britain
"official
over the
assess
ments did not adjust steadily, but neither did they shift dramatically
. . .
as the result of external
went
and decisively
shocks.
for
[C]hange
as the result of
diffuse
intellectual
that
gradual,
developments
were consolidated
and accelerated
crises."31
The process of
by periodic
was
bureaucratic
and func
moreover,
assessment,
fragmented
along
over
tional lines within
the British
with
debates
relative
government,
on
indicators
of capability which
power
centering
simple numerical
or
often held sway because
of their familiarity
cognitive
appeal rather
a result, the actual British
than their substantive
As
appropriateness.
to relative decline was
more
incon
policy response
significantly
halting,
than a simple structural model would
sistent, and "nonstrategic"
predict.
ward
neoclassical
Every
ceptions
at the heart
realist makes
of their work.
a similar
some
put per
point, and
In The Elusive Balance, for
example,
28
Friedberg
29
Keohane,
(fn. 24), 13.
Politics," in Keohane
(fn. 1), 167.
"Theory ofWorld
in International Politics (Princeton:
30Following Robert Jervis's Perception andMisperception
ton Princeton
first dwelt on the implications of this point
Press, 1976), Wohlforth
University
of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance," World Politics 39 (April 1987).
Perception
31Friedberg (fn. 24), 288.
Prince
in "The
NEOCLASSICAL
Wohlforth
the general
supports
REALISM
thrust
159
of Leffler's
argument
while
looking at cold war dynamics from the Soviet side.World War IImay
have eliminated the Axis, he points out, but it did little to establish a
clear hierarchy
endless disputes
current
the victorious
allies and thus set the stage for
among
in the decades
afterward. At base, he contends,
the re
tension from the 1940s to the 1980s were
of superpower
cycles
similar, and all were
quite
and policymakers'
rooted
in the ambiguities
of relative
of
tension] was
[cycle
power
of it: "Each
perceptions
shaped
a
two
differently
by the
by
change in the power relationship
interpreted
own
to
In the wake of each shift, each side tried
maximize
its
sides....
position.
reached
to go to war to test the power distribution,
they
after crises, posturing
and signaling until a new per
Unwilling
stalemates
ceived shift led to another round" (pp. 301-2).
not as a sta
For Wohlforth,
therefore, the cold war is best understood
in which
acted as sensible du
ble bipolar arrangement
the superpowers
as an
and USSR
the U.S.
ongoing
dispute between
opolists but rather
over who had how much
over
the interna
influence
power and what
tional
system
were
they
argues, constantly
influence abroad,
thus entitled
to
struggled
control over
United
and more
with
Soviet Union,
he
spoils?
institutions,
prestige
gain
international
and deference?commensurate
The
to exercise. The
a share of the international
its perceived
general
power
capabilities.
to be greater
its own power
capabilities
to
such a global role.
diversified,
struggled
deny the Soviets
a
the episodes displaying
these tensions came to a boil, with
States,
perceiving
Periodically
familiar pattern:
shift in power, publicly
"a perceived
acknowledged
by
new
a
Soviet drive for increased prestige; positive
both sides;
early feed
revealed the contra
back on the new policy; sharp crises that eventually
of the political
dictions
between
sides'
the two
interpretations
an
of tensions
eventual
relaxation
and
of
the
power shift";
implications
a
on
of
Wohlforth
stalemate
based
mutual
argues
acceptance
(p. 182).
down and
the last cold war cycle began to wind
that during
1983-85
status
would probably have ended with a new mini-d?tente
ratifying the
reforms altered the
quo circa, say, 1970. In 1985, however, Gorbachev's
picture irrevocably, leading (albeit unintentionally) to the shedding of
the Soviet empire and then the dissolution of theUSSR itself.
Together
the two
Leffler
foreign
superpowers'
to its end, with
changing
at each
key point.
perceptions
is more
and policy, however,
Wohlforth
says, "rapid shifts
war
a
view of
comprehensive
provide
of the cold
from the beginning
policies
threat
relative power ultimately
driving
between
the
connections
power
Tracing
as
difficult
than it might
seem?because,
in behavior may be related to perceived
and Wohlforth
WORLD POLITICS
160
shifts in the distribution of power which are not captured by typical
measures
of
the decades U.S.
and Soviet perceptions
capabilities." Over
...
a
was
to
of power "followed
broad pattern
connected
[that]
changes
. . .
a
to
in real
it
would
be
choose
[but]
capabilities
impossible
single
indicator or composite index [of power capabilities] thatwould predict
the precise
perceptual
pattern
without
prior
knowledge"
(pp. 294,
302).32
As
them,
a case
study of how relative material
capabilities,
to
and other factors
combine
shape historical
Wohlforth
perceptions
of
developments,
offers Soviet policy at the end of the cold war. Gorbachev
was
to launch his
of domestic
renewal, he shows, by
spurred
campaign
assessments
external
internal
that
Soviet
had
stalemate,
capabilities
a
and
conviction
that appropriate
reforms could
greatly deteriorated,
over
undo the damage.
It was the combination
of concern
perceived
relative decline
and confidence
that he could reverse it, in other words,
to embark on the
that led Gorbachev
ulti
far-reaching
changes which
brought his entire system crashing down. The full and devastating
of Soviet weaknesses
became clear only as the reforms progressed,
so
the
the Soviet Union's
time
and
external and internal col
however,
by
loomed they were practically
faits accomplis.33
lapses suddenly
mately
extent
are a common
Such vagaries
feature
In their books Zakaria
and Christensen
of neoclassical
both
note
realist
the
analysis.
of
importance
make
decision
events
in which
"shocks,"
suddenly
single
perceptual
aware of the cumulative
makers
effects of gradual
power
long-term
leaders have
Christensen
trends.34 Elsewhere
argues that European
often misread both the distribution of capabilities and the efficacy of
he argues, by a host of other problems: "Power cannot be tested;
32The waters are further muddied,
different elements of power possess different utilities at different times; the relation of perceived power
resources can be
to material
states
of power are surrounded by uncertainty;
capricious; the mechanics
ratios and comparative
possess different conversion
advantages; the perceived prestige hierarchy and
the military distribution may not coincide for prolonged periods; states adopt asymmetrical
strategies
to maximize
their positions and undercut rivals; signals get confused among allies, rivals, and domes
tic audiences" (pp. 306-7).
has teamed
33In addition to his article "Realism and the End of the Cold War"
(fn. 27), Wohlforth
realist take on this subject; see Randall L. Schweller and
up with Schweller for a further neoclassical
to the End of the Cold War," Se
in Response
C. Wohlforth,
"Power Test: Updating Realism
in drawing clear theoretical lessons from these events,
curity Studies (forthcoming). On the difficulties
of International Politics in Re
C. Wohlforth,
however, seeWilliam
"Reality Check Revising Theories
sponse to the End of the Cold War," World Politics 50 (July 1998).
of national power shift[ed] suddenly, rather
"statesmen's perceptions
34Zakaria finds that American
events like wars than by statisti
than incrementally, and [were] shaped more by crises and galvanizing
cal measures"
argues that itwas only the sudden awareness, in 1947, of the extent
(p. 11). Christensen
the true distribution
of
into recognizing
of British decline that shocked the Truman
administration
power and triggered the shift toward active containment
(pp. 32ff).
William
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
offensive
and defensive
trary to what
argues
nally,
and thus acted
military
strategies,
theories
would
systemic
pure
in
Deadly
that
Imbalances
161
con
in ways
fi
predict.35 And Schweller,
a
it was
actually
misperception
of the distribution of power which drove the foreign policy of one of
the poles of the international system at the beginning ofWorld War II.
the true state of affairs, he writes,
Given
itwould have been far better for the Soviets to have balanced against, rather
than bandwagoned with, Germany [in 1939]. In that case Stalin would have
presented
the F?hrers
takenly
Hitler
with
strategy
perceived
the
and
Europe
prospect
perhaps
as a
of
causing
tripolar,
a two-front
war,
its abandonment.
not
a
bipolar,
undermining
seriously
But because
he mis
system
with
France
and
Britain as the third pole, Stalin expected awar of attrition in theWest. The fall
of France abruptly ended Stalins dream of easy conquests in a postwar period
when the rest of Europe would be exhausted, (p. 168)
Bringing
The
the
State Back In
second
especially
variable
realists?
intervening
emphasized
by neoclassical
a
state
Zakaria
and Christensen?is
the strength of
country's
assessments
and its relation to the surrounding
society. Gross
apparatus
of the international
distribution
of power are inadequate,
they contend,
leaders may not have easy access to a
total
country's
resources.
material
Once
that international
raised, the notion
power
must
account
to ex
into
take
the
of
power analysis
governments
ability
tract and direct the resources of their societies seems almost obvious, and
because
national
in fact
it
into international
relations the
simply involves
incorporating
are
routine
variables
that
in
other
subfields
of
science.36
And
ory
political
an
this
in
and
realist
yet
represents
important
powerful
development
35
in Europe, 1865-1940,"
Thomas J. Christensen,
International Organi
"Perceptions and Alliances
zation 51 (Winter 1997).
36
As Zakaria points out, everyone knows Charles Tilly's mantra that "war made the state and the
state made war"; it is just that heretofore
the implications of the first clause have received far more at
on the
tention than those of the second. See Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 39-40;
Tilly, "Reflections
of European
in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation
States inWestern
History
State-Making,"
ofNational
Press, 1975), 42; and Christensen,
Europe (Princeton: Princeton University
Useful Adversaries, 20ff. A
as well,
similar stress on the role of state structure is a characteristic of some recent
Innenpolitik theories
although the two schools differ over the nature and importance of this variable and the interpretation
of many cases; for an overview of this work, see Evangelista
examinations of the
(fn. 8). For pioneering
role of the state in the formation and implementation
of foreign policy, see Peter J. Katzenstein,
ed.,
Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University
ofWisconsin
Press, 1978); Stephen Krasner, Defend
Interest (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1978); Ikenberry et al. (fn. 20); and
ing theNational
et al., "Toward a Realist
Michael Mastanduno
Theory of State Action," International Studies Quarterly
33 (December
1989).
162
WORLD
POLITICS
for it brings analysis
closer to the real world
theorizing,
significantly
core
without
the paradigm's
and assumptions.
concepts
abandoning
note the
observes
that historians
of American
Zakaria
expansion
foreign policy in the years beforeWorld War I and askwhy it occurred.
for a while,
richest country
even after the United
States had become
the
perhaps
to
in the world, most
American
opportunities
expand
even when
influence
abroad were
it did become
active
rejected?and
later on, the U.S.
its European
"For a po
counterparts.
lagged behind
litical scientist,"
the
and
therefore,
"viewing
country's power
expansion
Yet
the more puzzling
iswhy America
comparative
perspective,
question
more
not
did
and sooner" (p. 5).
expand
Zakaria
after testing dozens
of opportunities
for expan
concludes,
sion against propositions
derived
from different
that
Ameri
theories,
in
can
external
national
shape
behavior
depended
makers.
He
thus
decision
intentions
on
the means
affirms
at the
the
of
disposal
that
logic
capabilities
as an
to introduce
state
strength
and
officials'
behav
capabilities
it necessary
between
national
but finds
variable
intervening
ior:
ismade not by the nation as awhole
but by its gov
"Foreign policy
ernment.
matters
not national
is state power,
what
Consequently,
is
State
that
of
the
national
power.
power
power
government
portion
can extract for its purposes
and reflects the ease with which
central de
cisionmakers
can achieve
eign policy
these
years,
during
of the administrative
emergence
The decades after the Civil War
Americas
resources.
material
for
story of American
(p. 9). His
a
includes
discussion
of
the
therefore,
state:
their ends"
saw the beginning of a long period of growth in
But
this
national
power
dormant
lay
a
beneath
weak state, one thatwas decentralized, diffuse, and divided. The presidents and
their
secretaries
influence
tral bureaucracy
state
of
but
abroad,
that
to convert
repeatedly
over a federal
presided
men
or money
not
get
tried
they
could
from society at large_The
ern American
sures
complemented
the
executive
American
ican War
America
Zakaria
against
his
by
structure
from
the
rising power
and a tiny
into
cen
or
state governments
1880s and 1890s mark the beginnings of the mod
state, which
generated
the nations
state
emerged
industrialization.
primarily
.
. . This
to cope with
transformation
the domestic
of
state
pres
structure
the continuing growth of national power, and by the mid-1890s
branch
interests
crystallized
was
abroad.
able
to
Americas
the perception
or coerce
it into
expanding
in the
victory
resounding
Spanish-Amer
. . .
of increasing
American
[and]
power
bypass
Congress
expanded dramatically in the years that followed, (pp. 10-11)
tests
drawn from
propositions
explicitly
cases and finds that such a
security-based
defensive
approach
realism
is only
REALISM
NEOCLASSICAL
163
to defensive
realism,
supported by the evidence. According
sporadically
are
on the international
to exert themselves
he claims, nations
supposed
scene "in times of
nations with
against powerful
insecurity,
aggressive
. . . the United
intentions."
"when
confronted
real
threats
Instead,
by
secu
States usually opted to contract
its interests." Conversely,
"greater
and expansion"
rity bred greater activism
(pp. 11-12).
consensus
notes
the
Christensen,
meanwhile,
among
widespread
is best ex
from 1972 onward
scholars that Sino-American
cooperation
a shared realist desire to balance
against the Soviet Union?
plained by
and
the
equally
consensus
widespread
that
earlier
Sino-American
tensions are best explained by Innenpolitik variables (such as ideological
or leaders'
domestic
He
differences,
pressures,
psychology).
political
not
true and that
sets out to show that the latter
is
proposition
strictly
and Chinese
behavior had its real source in the international
American
system even during the late 1940s and 1950s.
Christensen
in
argues
Adversaries
Useful
these years both the American
pelled
shifts
to mobilize
resources
national
that at critical
in order
points
during
leadership felt com
and the Chinese
to
respond
to
perceived
engage, that is, in what
as "internal
Waltz
describes
stresses,
balancing"
(p. 245).37 Christensen
to execute such
it
is
countries
for
difficult
however,
operations,
just how
in the international
balance
of power?to
are
shifts in national policy.
when
by major
they
accompanied
especially
of "national
the concept
He
introduces
therefore
political
power,"
their nation's
he defines as "the ability of state leaders to mobilize
which
resources behind
initiatives." Like
and material
human
security policy
the
variable between
this acts as "a key intervening
the
nation
and
the strategies
facing
challenges
meet
to
state
those challenges"
(pp. 11, 13). Because
"state power,"
Zakaria's
international
by the
and Chinese
adopted
American
statesmen
lacked
sufficient
"national
political
argues, they had to
they pleased,
power"
arena
use
in a secondary
policies
domestically
popular but unnecessary
but necessary
each other) as a cover for unpopular
(conflict with
poli
the
Soviet
cies in a primary arena (mobilization
Union):
against
to do
exactly
as
Christensen
Viewing basic changes in the international balance of power, Truman in 1947
andMao in 1958 decided to mobilize their nations around long-term strategies
re
designed to respond to those shifts. In both cases, the strategies adopted
so
in
faced
difficulties
in
the
leaders
sacrifice
peacetime,
quired significant public
selling
37Cf.Waltz
those
(fn.l),
strategies
168.
to their
respective
publics.
The
manipulation
or exten
WORLD POLITICS
164
sion of short-term conflict with the other nation, while not desirable on
international or domestic grounds, became useful in gaining
public support for the core grand strategy, (p. 6)38
straightforward
and maintaining
Christensen
tween
are
policies
model
not
does
defensive
realists
take a position
in the theoretical
debate be
active foreign
their critics over whether
and
driven
usually
threat; his
power or increased
both. From his tone and choice
increased
by
to
is general enough
incorporate
one gets a
of cases, however,
elites sensitive to the
picture of far-sighted
to
of
relative
consequences
power, yoked
changing
penny-pinching
to obvious,
who
short-term
threats. The
military
publics
respond only
conces
want
in the end but have to make
elites tend to get what
they
sions
to their
publics
along
the way?with
the result
that foreign
policy
is linked to systemic incentives but not wholly determined by them.
Other
neoclassical
tional
realists
variables
advocate
exploring
the
influence
of addi
on
their
captures
foreign policy. Friedberg
are
he writes
that "neorealists
probably
right that,
are
unsta
systems
equal, multipolar
intrinsically
non
not
is
ble. In the real world,
else
and
however,
everything
equal,
or
can
serve
to
to
structural
factors
either
exacerbate
the
mitigate
intervening
general attitude when
all other things being
tendencies
that are inherent
in a system's
structure."39
Schweller
argues
inDeadly Imbalances that a full theory of foreign policy should include
as the
of states' goals or interests, which
he operationalizes
are status quo or revisionist?satisfied
or dissatis
to which
they
the nature
degree
fied with the existing distribution of international spoils, "the prestige,
resources,
of relative
and principles
of the system" (p. 24) .40By combining
degrees
he conjures up an international
bes
power and revisionism,
tiary and shows how each country played to its predicted type before
and during World War
II: strongly revisionist great powers such as Nazi
such
revisionist
acted
like
"wolves," moderately
great powers
Germany
as the Soviet Union
acted like "foxes," indifferent
such as
great powers
38
such as
In some respects Christensen
of revisionist
historians
follows here in the footsteps
Richard M. Freeland; see Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins ofMcCarthyism: Foreign Pol
revi
(New York: Schocken Books, 1974). Unlike
icy,Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946?48
the role of economic
sionist analyses of Truman's China policy, however, Christensen
downplays
as using domestic anticommunism
motives
inAmerican
behavior and sees the Truman administration
rather than creating it, and being in control of it rather than being controlled by it.
39
for Peace in aMultipolar
Aaron L. Friedberg,
Asia," International
"Ripe For Rivalry: Prospects
11. See also Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive
Security 18 (Winter 1993-94),
realist analy
War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics 44 (January 1992). For a neoclassical
variables can be incorporated
into realist theories, see Jennifer Sterling
sis of how domestic-level
Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level
Studies
Folker, "Realist Environment,
Variables," International
Quarterly 47 (1997).
40
see pp. 19-26;
of revisionism,
For Scwheller's discussion
the Revisionist
State Back In," in Brown et al.
Bringing
and idem, "Bandwagoning
for Profit:
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
the United
States
acted
revisionist
like "ostriches,"
165
such as
lesser powers
Italy and Japan acted like "jackals,"and so forth.
Quite
from
apart
the vividness
its presentation
of
there
is clearly
something to this idea, but unfortunately Schweller slights discussion
of the
sources
or
the concept
integrate
Sometimes
he
argument.
systemic
implies
is a domestic
is, a purely unit-level
pathology?that
of revisionism
and
so fails
to
into his broader
ganically
that revisionism
ply because
can emerge sim
times he implies that revisionism
in the systemic
of
(the distribution
superstructure
at other
variable. Yet
changes
international spoils) do not keep pace with changes in the systemic base
(the distribution of power capabilities). This latter revisionism would
not be a unit-level
true difference
factor
at all and would
not
in state
of a
require the positing
it would
conceived:
interest,
abstractly
of the system, rather than following
from
product of the dynamics
state itself. One of the chief contributions
character of the revisionist
Gilpin,
process
Kennedy,
at work
in fact, was
to illustrate
and Mandelbaum,
time and again and
to show
be a
the
of
a
such
just
how much
history
could be accounted for by the simple story of "differentials in growth
rates and
technological
balances, which
change,
to shifts
leading
in the global
tary balances."41 Contra
ate more
trouble?and
realm
than
revisionism
Schweller,
therefore,
more accommodation?in
require
one.
in the theoretical
Designing
A
distinct
theoretical
economic
in turn gradually impinge upon the political and mili
methodological
argument:
Social
analysts
Inquiry
flows
perspective
from
neoclassical
to understand
wanting
may well cre
the practical
realism's
any particular
case need to do justice to the full complexity of the causal chain linking
relative
material
power
and foreign
policy
outputs.
Realism,
in this
view, is a theoretical hedgehog: it knows one big thing, that systemic
forces
and relative material
power
shape
state behavior.
People
who
ig
nore this basic insight will often waste their time looking at variables
that are actually
epiphenomenal.
Yet
people
who
cannot
move
beyond
the system will have difficulty explaining most of what happens in in
ternational relations.Waltz himself captured this dynamic best when
he wrote: "The third image describes the framework of world politics,
but without
the first
and second
images
there
can be no
knowledge
of
the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe
Kennedy
(fn. 22), xx.
WORLD POLITICS
166
the forces inworld politics, but without the third image it is impossible
to assess
their
Neoclassical
or
importance
predict their results."42
realists therefore
think that neither
spare game-theo
are
to for
"thick description"
good approaches
at the
favor beginning
eign policy analysis. They
intellectually
systemic
level but then taking care to trace precisely how, in actual cases, relative
is translated
into the behavior
and operationalized
of state ac
power
nor pure
retic modeling
tors.43 To
some
that "the de
extent, they agree with Robert O. Keohane
advocates
of parsimony
and proponents
of contextual
of stages, rather than either-or
resolves
itself into a question
subtlety
choices. We
should seek parsimony
first, then add on complexity while
the effects this has on the predictive
power of our theory:
monitoring
on the basis of limited
its ability to make
infor
inferences
significant
bate
between
mation."44
A major dilemma
is their appreciation
they confront, however,
of the degree to which
their central, parsimonious
variable
independent
needs to be studied in conjunction with &variety of messy
contextual
fac
tors in order to say much of interest about their
matter. For neo
subject
to
is
foreign policy
paraphrase Clausewitz,
explaining
even
is
difficult.
but
the
usually very simple,
simplest explanation
in the field have come to favor a formal, universalist
While
many
ap
to
realists
insist
neoclassical
proach
stubbornly
political
phenomena,
area
is critical for an accurate understanding
that significant
expertise
of countries'
"are
foreign policy behavior. The
theory's basic concepts
classical
realism,
across cultures
and political
they
simple and generalizable
systems,"
re
to any
but "the application
of the approach
contend,
given country
a great deal of
in
about
nation
the
(Chris
quires
knowledge
question"
one
for example,
how perceptions
tensen, 248). To investigate
matter,
to
that
has
get inside the heads of key state decision makers,
something
and/or
archival
research.
often requires foreign
language
capabilities
one has
to
state structure as an
And
variable,
intervening
incorporate
to know a decent amount about how different
insti
countries' political
in theory
tutions work,
both
byWohlforth
and Christensen
and
in
practice.
Accordingly,
the volumes
(like those by Friedberg and Leffler) are
42
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man,
the State and War (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1959), 238.
43
On the use of "process tracing," see Alexander
L. George,
"Case Studies and Theory Develop
ment: The Method
in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New
of Structured, Focused Comparison,"
and
and Alexander
L. George
Approaches inHistory, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979);
inAdvances
of Organizational
"Case Studies and Theories
J.McKeown,
Decisionmaking,"
Timothy
in Information Processing in Organizations,
vol. 2 (]M Press, 1985). For an argument that Innenpolitik
seeMoravcsik
rather than systemic variables deserve to be the starting point for such amethod,
(fn. 8),
541ff.
44
Keohane
(fn. 29), 187-88, emphasis in original.
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
based
on extensive
Schweller
and ground-breaking
and Zakaria
archival
work,
amounts
incorporate
nuance
and historical
source material
Some might
question
at all. Hard-line
policy
167
while
significant
into their analyses.
the result is truly a theory
whether
both
of primary
of
foreign
for example, might
generated
by neoclassical
and historians,
positivists
to the lack of
point
precise predictions
so on, and
realism, the stress it places on detailed historical
analysis, and
claim that this
should not really be called social science. (Pos
approach
itivists would
this
of course, while historians would
say
disapprovingly,
both
not be correct. "A
Still, they would
say it approvingly.)
theory," Waltz
some
more
are
reminds us, "indicates
that
factors
than oth
important
ers and
them_A
relations
among
theory arranges phenom
specifies
ena so that
are seen as
it connects
otherwise
they
mutually
dependent;
neces
some
in
of the phenomena
facts; it shows how changes
disparate
in others."45 Whether
sarily entail changes
agree, the neoclassical
realist
theory
things,
linking clearly specified
in a direct causal
dent variables
or not Waltz
of foreign
independent,
chain. "It does
policy
himself
does most
intervening,
not
simply
would
of these
and depen
state that do
matter
in foreign
the conditions
politics
policy, but specifies
under which
matter"
(Christensen,
252).
they
Thus
neoclassical
realism predicts
that an increase in relative mate
mestic
to a
rial power will lead eventually
in the am
expansion
corresponding
and scope of a country's
that a
bition
foreign
activity?and
policy
a
to
contrac
in such power will lead eventually
decrease
corresponding
tion. It also predicts
that the process will not necessarily
be gradual or
on
not
mate
it
because
will
uniform,
however,
objective
solely
depend
rial trends but also on how political
decision makers
per
subjectively
ceive
them. And
it
to translate
predicts
an increase
that
countries
with
weak
states will
in material
into expanded
power
route there.
circuitous
longer
or will take a more
policy activity
It is true nonetheless
that neoclassical
realism
take
foreign
non
has a decidedly
recent theoretical
de
in keeping with
It recognizes,
in
the
social
elsewhere
and
that
sciences,
velopments
physical
can
sometimes
and that foreign
small choices
have big consequences
a
from
distance
and over the
behavior
look
"clocklike"
may
policy
only
mechanistic
long term;
"cloudlike"
feel.
on close
activity
and over the short
inspection
the
norm.46 Furthermore,
may be
to medium
neoclassical
term,
real
45
Waltz
(fn.l), 8-10.
46
see Gabriel A. Almond with
For the cloud/clock
distinction
and its implications,
Stephen Genco,
"Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," inAlmond, A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects inPolit
ical Science (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1990).
WORLD POLITICS
168
that power-related
factors will drive all aspects of a
its broad contours. Crit
state's foreign
policy, only that they will affect
ics might
make
the theory harder
charge that all these qualifications
ism does
not
claim
(though not impossible) to falsify and thus discredit. Adherents would
the point and acknowledge
this as a serious weakness;
that neoclassical
realism has compensat
counter, however,
they might
in
it offers for building
the
ing advantages,
particularly
opportunities
of
aban
satisfying
comprehensive
foreign policy without
explanations
to concede
have
the theory's core assumptions.
in other words,
Its very looseness,
it a useful framework
for carrying out the kind of midrange
the
to achieve.
that so often is the best social science can
hope
doning
makes
orizing
The Road Ahead
Conclusion:
On
of its works
the evidence
much
to offer
to date,
the neoclassical
realist
school
has
it retains signif
of foreign policy. Theoretically,
in its basic form while
and parsimony
clear
providing
in achieving
for those interested
richness
and
fit.
greater
students
icant abstraction
guidelines
Methodologically,
narratives
behavior
it calls for an emphasis on theoretically informed
that trace how
of actual
that this approach
relative material
decision
political
can illuminate
makers.
is translated
into the
power
Its adherents
have shown
the behavior
of countries
in many
re
gions of the world during many historical periods. By this point, how
in
Future work
ever, it should be old news that relative power matters.
to
this vein should therefore
in
focus on continuing
the
ways
specify
can deflect
unit-level
what
variables
from
pure
tervening
foreign policy
structural
theories
might
predict.
the best efforts of neoclassical
realists, the link
despite
between
and policymakers'
power capabilities
objective material
subjec
see the school's
tive assessment
of them remains murky. Critics might
For
example,
on
as a
giant fudge factor, useful for explaining
emphasis
perceptions
instances
realities di
where
and material
away
power
foreign policy
ex
in this area would
be helpful,
theoretical
verge. Precise
development
and cultural factors
ideational,
just how various psychological,
plicating
own
actors
how
their
affect
and
others' capabili
may
political
perceive
are
ties and how such perceptions
into foreign policy.47
translated
47
Two
can
recent
examples of how psychological
insights
successfully be brought into foreign pol
icy analysis are Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam
Decisions of 1985 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1992); and Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and
International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1996); a useful survey of recent work in
this area is James M. Goldgeier,
and
1997).
Security," Security Studies 6 (Summer
"Psychology
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
169
to
further the notion
that
moreover,
explore
on
an
must
to
be
"usable"
have
for
power capabilities
impact
state structures
could analyze how different
eign policy. Future work
or facilitate
constrain
the extraction
and deployment
of national power
It should
be
possible,
national
as power
state leaders. And
other variables
by
serving
"dividers" might
be uncovered,
themselves
by
operating
"multipliers"
or in
conjunc
or
tion with those already described. Stephen Peter Rosen and Kenneth
M.
for example,
have
Indian and Arab
Pollack,
have
argued that cultural variables
recently
in ways detri
institutions,
respectively,
such hybrid theoretical
linkages could
shaped
to
effectiveness;
military
into a neoclassical
be
realist framework
without
easily
incorporated
too far from the model's
basic
straying
argument.48
power-related
The
relative power on other factors could also be
impact of changing
mental
an important field of inquiry.Thus
purely
realists
independent
could explore
or
instead of viewing ideas as either
future neoclassical
variables,
purely dependent
in
with
relative
how,
power,
conjunction
they
could play both roles simultaneously. From the Founding onward, for
have
Americans
example,
generally
that their domestic
agreed
institu
tions should be disseminated to others but have disagreed over the form
this
that
transmission
ideological
the nation
world,
direct
while
should
"crusaders"
with
take.
have
believed
role
have believed
"Exemplars"
an
for the
setting
example
the nation
should take a more
with
in shaping political
American
ideals.49 During
and activist
cordance
should
rest content
abroad
developments
most of the nineteenth
in ac
cen
tury the more modest version generally prevailed, typified by John
Quincy
search
Adams's
that the country should go not abroad "in
to
century the ambitious
destroy." By the twentieth
admonition
of monsters
version had gained the upper hand, asWoodrow Wilson
tion to war
to make
the world
"safe for democracy."50
From
took the na
a neoclassi
cal realist perspective, the first place to look in explaining such a shift
ideas, see Sheri Berman, "Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis" (Paper delivered atWork
on Ideas and Culture
in Political Analysis, Princeton University, May 1998). A recent sampler of
cultural analysis is Peter Katzenstein,
ed., The Culture ofNational
foreign policy-related
Security: Norms
and Identity inWorld Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996).
48
Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Rosen, Societies andMilitary
Press,
Effectiveness"
(Ph.D. diss., MIT,
1996); and Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military
On
shop
1996).
49
See Robert W. Tucker,
no. 5 (Fall 1986).
50
The Adams quotation
"Exemplar
or Crusader?
Reflections
on Americas
Role," National
Interest,
can be found in his "Address of
inWalter LaFeber, ta., John
July 4,1821,"
Adams
and
Continental Empire (Chicago: Times Books, 1965), 45; theWilson
American
quota
Quincy
of a State ofWar," April 2,1917,
tion can be found in his "Address Recommending
the Declaration
B.
Scott
President Wilsons Foreign Policy: Messages, Addresses, Papers, ed. James
(New York: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1918), 287.
170
WORLD
POLITICS
would not be intellectual history or presidential psychology, but the
massive
increase
in relative
Adams
and Wilson.
power
One
the country
still need
had experienced
between
to know
the content
of
might
in order to understand
the spe
political
ideology, however,
in either era.
cific policy choices officials made
Neoclassical
realism should also redirect our attention
toward critical
American
issues
such as what
drives
the waxing
and waning
of material
ca
power
pabilities in the first place. Factors such as differential growth rates, it
can
the roles countries
argues, will end up dictating
play in world poli
tics. For this reason if for no other, asWohlforth
says, "Any realist dis
must
cussion
of international
the domestic
combine
and
change
international
levels of analysis.
A
realist explanation
[purely structural]
account
offer
of precisely why a given state's
comprehensive
in compar
domestic
institutions
decline
social, and economic
political,
ison to those of competing
powers."51
a
cannot
If neoclassical
into
variables
realists
their
continue
basic
to
incorporate
unit-level
argument,
power-oriented
intervening
ironically,
they
might find themselves bumping into chastened Innenpolitikers coming
from
the other
direction.
For asMatthew
has noted,
Evangelista
haps the most promising development
"Per
in the field is the recognition
scholars inclined
toward domestic
for foreign pol
among
explanations
are
scholars
that
these
understand
icy
explanations
inadequate. Many
that they must
factors at the level of the international
sys
incorporate
so
tem into their
must
do
in
that
moreover,
and,
ways
they
explanations
mat
that are more
than the mere assertion
that everything
systematic
ters."'52
Future work,
tinct perspective
that the future
ridden
neoclassical
realism's dis
finally, should also develop
on
issues. Offensive
realists
generally
policy
predict
its conflict
of international
relations will
resemble
past. Defensive
realists
and Innenpolitikers
often
disagree,
argu
ing that great power conflict is likely to emerge if and only ifmilitary
technology
favors preemption
or domestic
pathologies
drive
countries
to
51
Wohlforth
(fn. 27), 19. This does not mean, of course, that easy answers to such questions are
available. Paul Krugman was recently asked, "What are the great puzzles economists are trying to solve
are some countries rich and some
these days?" He replied, "The biggest question of all is still,Why
father of growth theory in economics?said
countries poor?' Long ago, Bob Solow?the
that when
it
comes down to the
some countries do well over the
term and some do
question of why
long
badly, you
a
a little bit past that, but not much." Wired,
always end up in blaze of amateur sociology. We're
May
1998,146.
52
and Thomas Risse-Kappen,
"From the Outside
In
(fn. 4), 202; see also Harald M?ller
Evangelista
and the Inside Out: International
(fn. 8), 29-32.
Hudson
Relations,
Domestic
Politics,
and Foreign
Policy,"
in Skidmore
and
excess.53 Neoclassical
flagrant
171
REALISM
NEOCLASSICAL
realists,
in contrast
to both,
emphasize
the contingency of history and the importance of how foreign policy is
because
conducted,
actually
they
for
"ripe
rivalry."
For example,
they view China's
as normal
around
one would
see certain
recent
situations
attempts
and entirely predictable?just
"a thoroughly
traditional
as
to throw
the
particularly
its weight
sort of behavior
from
expect
great power."54 "Fast
are
"if
almost
rising powers
invariably troublemakers,"
Friedberg writes,
are
to
reluctant
border divisions,
accept institutions,
only because
they
were com
in
when
and hierarchies
of political
put
prestige
they
place
some cases to
powers seek to change, and in
paratively weak. Emerging
new
status
to
the
and
establish
that more
overthrow,
quo
arrangements
reflect their own conception
of their place in the world."55
accurately
because
often
social turmoil, because
Moreover,
rapid growth
produces
onto the
is tricky, and because
is emerging
accommodation
China
scene
in a
most
environment
of the ele
lacking
multipolar
regional
of
East
that can mitigate
the
future
Asian
conflict,
(as opposed
seems
to
international
European)
politics
especially
problematic.
ments
Yet
for neoclassical
realists
these
whether
are tendencies,
not inexorable
laws;
into conflict,
will
they argue,
depend
the region actually erupts
in large part on how the United
and other
States, China,
important
to
The
Asian
their
decide
ambivalent
manage
powers
relationships.
is to rec
starting point for policy advice, the school's adherents believe,
a status quo
that
the
is
United
States
whose
ognize
today
hegemon,
statement
of a frank British
offi
by the
to
cial in 1934: "We
of not wanting
remarkable
position
we have
or
most
of
the
world
with
because
got
already
anybody
quarrel
we have got and pre
to
the best parts of it and we only want
keep what
vent others from
24). In this
taking it away from us" (cited in Schweller,
fortunate
situation
is captured
are in the
over the next sev
view, one of the main tasks of American
policymakers
revisionism
eral years will be to analyze the nature and extent of Chinese
no
at
is
wise.
After
and determine
what point accommodation
longer
53
The
or pessimism
about the future among Innenpolitikers and defensive real
degree of optimism
ists, therefore, depends in part on how likely they think it is that at least one important power will suc
realist views about future
For constrasting
cumb to a domestic
offensive
and defensive
pathology.
(fn. 9); Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," International Se
security, seeMearsheimer,
European
in the New Europe," International
and Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy
curity 15 (Winter 1990-91);
15 (Winter 1990-91).
Security
54
Fareed Zakaria, "Speak Softly, Carry a Veiled Threat," New York Times Magazine,
February 18,
1996, 36.
55
Aaron Friedberg,
"Warring States: Theoretical
18 (Spring 1996), 13.
national Review
Models
of Asia
Pacific
Security," Harvard
Inter
WORLD POLITICS
172
all, Schweller
reminds
us,
the difference
between
a
modestly
and
a
strongly revisionist power is the difference between Weimar and Nazi
Germany, which obviously merited different policy responses (p. 32).
In the end, neoclassical
about its ability to
realism's relative modesty
answers or
should perhaps be seen not
precise predictions
provide
tidy
as it does from a
as a defect but rather as a virtue,
stemming
judicious
appraisal of its object of inquiry.As Aristotle noted, the "actionswhich
science investigates,
admit of much variety and fluctuation_
political
... to indicate
in
We must be content,
then,
speaking of such subjects
... for it is the mark of an educated
the truth roughly and in outline
man
to look for
in each class of things just so far as the na
precision
ture of the
subject admits."56
56
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
Random House,
1941), 936.
1:3, in Richard McKeon,
ed., The Basic Works ofAristotle
(New York: