Back issues of BCAS publications published on this site are intended for non-commercial use only. Photographs and other graphics that appear in articles are expressly not to be reproduced other than for personal use. All rights reserved. CONTENTS Vol. 17, No. 3: July–September 1985 • Maurice J. Meisner - The Chinese Rediscovery of Karl Marx: Some Reflections on Post-Maoist Chinese Marxism • Tamae K. Prindle - Shimizu Ikko’s Silver Sanctuary (Gin no seiiki): A Japanese Business Novel / A Translation • Tinna K. Wu - A Translation of Hou De-jian’s Poem Heirs of the Dragon • Suniti Kumar Ghosh - On the Transfer of Power in India • Jon Halliday - Women in North Korea: An Interview With the Korean Democratic Women’s Union • Corrina-Barbara Francis - Interview with Kang Ning-hsiang • Bruce Cruikshank - Villains, Victims, and Villeins: Studies of the Philippine Economy / A Review Essay • Eddie J. Girdner - Storm over the Sutlej: The Akali Politics by A.S. Narang / A Review BCAS/Critical Asian Studies www.bcasnet.org CCAS Statement of Purpose Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979, but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose should be published in our journal at least once a year. We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to ensuring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We realize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them. CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a community for the development of anti-imperialist research. Passed, 28–30 March 1969 Boston, Massachusetts Vol. 17, No.3/July·Sept., 1985 Contents MauriceJ. Meisner 2 Tamae K. Prindle 17 Shimizu Ikko's Silver Sanctuary (Gin no seiiki): A Japanese Business NovellA Translation TinnaK. Wu 28 A Translation ofHou De Jian 's Poem "Heirs of the Dragon" Sunili Kumar Ghosh 30 46 On the Transfer of Power in India Corinna-Barbara Francis 57 Interview with Kang Ning-hsiang Bruce Cruikshank 65 Villains, Victims, and Villeins: Studies of the Philippine Economy/review essay Eddie 1. Girdner 70 Storm Over the Sutlej: The Akali Politics, by A. S. Narang/review 72 List of Books to Review Jon Halliday i The Chinese Rediscovery of Karl Marx: Some Reflections on Post-Maoist Chinese Marxism Women in North Korea: An Interview with the Korean Democratic Women's Union I , Contributors Bruce Cruikshank: Unaffiliated Historian, Ann Arbor, Michigan Corinna-Barbara Francis: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York, New York Suniti Kumar Ghosh: Calcutta, India Jon Halliday: Writer on Japan and Korea, London, England Maurice J. Meisner: Department of History, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin Tamae K. Prindle: Department of Modem Foreign Languages, Colby College, Waterville, Maine Tinna K. Wu: Chinese Language Program, Hamline University, St. Paul, Minnesota The poster by Zhao Ningmin and Chen Guo/i on the front cover appeared in the People's Daily (Beijing) of Nov. 26. /984. The slogan on the poster says "Work makes you rich and helps the nation." The photograph on the back cover is of Japanese employees eating in a company cafeteria. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org The Chinese Rediscovery of Karl Marx: Some Reflections on Post-Maoist Chinese Marxism by Maurice J. Meisner Preface One of the more striking features of Chinese Marxist thought in the years since the death of Mao Tse-tung has been the revival of many original Marxist concepts and orthodox Marxist-Leninist perspectives. This, of course, does not accord with the conventional view of the post-Maoist era which has it that Mao's successors have all but abandoned Marxism in favor of "pragmatism." Those who seek Chinese Communist abandonments of Marxism might be better advised to look to the Thought of Mao Tse-tung in Maoist times. However that may be, in this essay I am concerned not with the Maoist past but with the post-Maoist present. But before beginning the inquiry into certain aspects of recent Chinese Marxism, perhaps a word or two should be said to explain (if not necessarily to justify) the title under which my comments appear, 'The Chinese Rediscovery of Karl Marx."* Karl Marx was of course discovered by Chinese intellectuals during the first decade of the century, largely as a by-product of their interest in Western anarchist and other socialist doctrines derived mostly from Japanese and French sources. Marxist theory did arouse intellectual curiosity among a few early revolutionary intellectuals, most notably Chu Chih-hsin, but for the most part it struck few responsive intellectual or political chords at the time. The reasons for the lack of appeal are rather obvious. Marxism, in its orthodox and pre-Leninist form, taught that socialism presupposed capitalism and the material and social products of a highly developed capitalist economy, namely, large-scale industry and a large and mature urban proletariat. Consequently, it was a * This essay is based on a paper presented at the Modern China Seminar, East Asian Institute, Columbia University on April 19. 19X4. Portions of the essay are drawn from chapter 8 of my book Marxism, Maoism, alld Utopianism (University of Wisconsin Press, 1982). doctrine that addressed itself to the workers and intellectuals of the advanced industrialized countries of the West. It offered no political message to nationalist intellectuals in a largely pre-capitalist and mostly agrarian land. Or more precisely, the political message orthodox Marxism conveyed was the disheartening one that there was little to do but wait until the forces of modem capitalist production had completed their historical work. Few Chinese were attracted to this wisdom, dispensed in the writings of such orthodox Marxists as Kautsky and Plekhanov. It was not until the triple impact of the May Fourth Movement, the Bolshevik Revolution . and the arrival of the Leninist (and Trotskyist) version of Marxism that significant numbers of Chinese intellectuals embraced the theory. In many respects, the embrace was a rather superficial one-and remained so for many decades. The reasons are more political than intellectual. Unlike Marxists in Russia and the Western countries, who generally spent many years immersed in reading the classic Marxist texts before committing themselves to a course of political action, youthful Chinese converts to Marxism lived in a land which lacked a Marxian Social-Democratic intellectual tradition and one where they were immediately caught up in what undoubtedly was the most massive, intensive and desperate revolutionary struggle of the twentieth century. Those who survived (and most did not) the prolonged revolutionary trial of more than a quarter of a century were afforded little time, and even less leisure, to study and assimilate the inherited body of Marxist theory. It is thus hardly surprising that the Marxist writings of Chinese Communists during the revolutionary era, in striking contrast to their political deeds, do not excite the observer's imagination. The demands of political struggle no doubt account for the anomaly that the Marxist works of Chinese Comn~unists often appear less learned and less theoretically sophisticated than the writings of such Kuomintang Marxists as Hu Han-min. (In © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org rejecting the theory of class struggle, at least insofar as China was concerned, the Marxist credentials of Hu Han-min and other non-Communist Marxists are of course a bit suspect although it was precisely that rejection which afforded Hu the leisure to acquire his relative theoretical sophistication. The history of Marxism in China, as elsewhere, is not without its ironies.} The theoretical level of Chinese Marxist writings did not rise markedly in the years after 1949, even though the volume increased enormously. If there was now more time and many more theoreticians to study the doctrine under whose banner the revolution had been carried out, study and investigation of the inherited Marxist intellectual tradition was inhibited by the canonization of Mao Tse-tung Thought as the official Marxist state orthodoxy (actually canonized, with the generous assistance of Liu Shao-ch'i, at the Seventh CCP Congress in 1945). The official orthodoxy demanded conformity to interpretations laid down in Peking on a relatively narrow range of topics and questions, and confined study of the tradition to a rather small number of Marxist-Leninist texts (or portions of texts) officially approved by ideological czars in the capital. If Marxist intellectuals and scholars read more of Marx and other Marxists than was formally sanctioned, they wrote little on the basis of those readings, and virtually nothing found its way to publication. If Mao was free to make innovations in "Mao Tse-tung Thought" (and he freely made some rather interesting ones after 1957), this was not the case for others. On the whole, the post-1949 period was not an era when creative Marxist thought flourished in the People's Republic. The impoverish ment of official Chinese Marxism in the late Maoist era is perhaps most strikingly revealed by the fact that the polemical pamphlets of Yao Wen-yuan (even thin as polemics) were celebrated as creative innovations-and even taken as serious theoretical contributions by some serious Western observers of the People's Republic. (It would be unkind to cite names and examples at this late date.) Post-revolutionary eras, Marxist or otherwise, have not been terribly conducive to intellectual creativity as a general rule. One exception that comes to mind is the 1920s in the Soviet Union-a decade of quite extraordinary intellectual and cultural creativity and utopian experimentation, until stifled by the imposition of newly-invented Stalinist orthodoxies around the time of "the great turn." There is no comparable period in the history of the People's Republic, in any event. In the post-Mao years much has been heard about a "crisis of faith" in Marxism in China, not only from many Western observers who long for an "end of ideology" (and often have prematurely proclaimed it) but also from official quarters which have complained about the general inadequacy of Marxist knowledge while deploring the revival of interest, particularly among youth, in Social Darwinism, religion, and the ideologies of the capitalist West. I This latter portrait, fulsomely reproduced in the Western press over the past few years, is a rather partial one and partly misleading. To be sure, the widespread political disillusionment and cynicism resulting from the Cultural Revolution (or more precisely, its failures) and from the Byzantine degeneration of political life during 1. For example, Lou Jingbo, "What Should Young People Believe In?", Xin Shiqi (New Era), November, 1981, pp. 4-7. JPRS 80272, pp. 10-14. the last years of the Maoist regime continues to find expression in rejections of, or indifference to, Marxism. But the "crisis of faith" has been accompanied by a less noticed, but perhaps more politically and intellectually significant, revival of faith, a renewal of interest in the entire Western Marxist tradition and particularly in the original texts of Marx and Engels, so long neglected during the Maoist era for the most part. The result has been something of a Marxian renaissance in China, an era of intellectual and scholarly creativity among the Chinese Marxist intelligentsia unprecedented in the history of the People's Republic. While the emphasis has been on the original writings of the founding fathers of Marxism, there has been a growing interest in the entire Western Marxist tradition, not excluding a good many theoreticians (such as Kautsky, Lukacs, Gramsci, and the writers of the Frankfort School) hitherto banished from the official Marxist-Leninist pantheon. Over recent years, Chinese scholars have pursued inquiries into such previously forbidden or neglected areas as the writings of the young Marx, Marxist humanism, Western Marxist aesthetics, the concept of alienation, the theory of the Asiatic mode of production, and a vast variety of topics in modem world history as well as the full range of Chinese history and philosophy - to mention but a few of the many avenues that have been opened for inquiry. It should hardly be any cause for surprise that politically disillusioned Chinese intellectuals today turn to Marx to seek solutions for the problems that beset their land-just as politically disillusioned Confucians in imperial times often sought answers in an uncorrupted version of the teachings of Confucius. In contrast to the Mao period, when there was much Marxian ideological fervor but little study of Marx, we are presently witnessing what is undoubtedly the most intensive and serious era of Marxist scholarship in the history of China. One example of this Marxian renaissance, although hardly the most intellectually intriguing one, was the "First National Academic Forum on Das Kapital" held in Wuxi in December 1981. Presided over by Yu Guangyuan and Xu Dixin, the forum was attended by 232 delegates representing 120 research and educational institutions who (among other things) founded "the Das Kapital Research Association of China" to coordinate the activities of the thousands of scholars said to be engaged in the study of what was described as "the most important work in Marxist literature.'" Quantitatively, at least, it was a most 2. Yu Guangyuan, "Several Questions on the Research ofDas Kapital," Jingji Yanjiu (Economic Research), 20 February 1982, p. 10. (JPRS 80478, pp. t-7 for a translation of Yu's article). A summary of the forum appears in Jingji Yanjiu, 20 February 1982, pp. 3-7. 3 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org impressive affair. It should hardly be any cause for surprise that politically disillusioned Chinese intellectuals today turn to Marx to seek solutions for the problems that beset their land-just as politically disillusioned Confucians in imperial times often sought answers in an uncorrupted version of the teachings of Confucius. Marxism, after all, is the sole politically acceptable mode of intellectual and political discourse in the People's Republic, and, more importantly, Marxist theory informs the dominant worldview of the great majority of the contemporary Chinese intelligentsia. At least among social scientists and humanists, as distinct from the numerically larger technological intelligentsia, basic Marxist assumptions and concepts are generally (if not necessarily universally) accepted, even though they may be differently understood and variously interpreted. However that may be, they share the view that during much of the Mao era the inherited Marxist tradition was both neglected and distorted. If Marx has been rediscovered by Chinese Marxists in the post-Mao period, they have searched for-and found-rather different ideas in the classic texts. Whereas official ideologists have seized upon the more economically deterministic strands in the Marxist tradition, many individual Marxist intellectuals have been drawn to the writings of the "young Marx," to the long tradition of Marxist "humanism," and especially to the concept of alienation. In part they have been searching less for ideological rationalizations for the policies of the current regime than for a moral basis for socialism and ethical philosophy of life. Thus there is a distinction to be drawn in post-Maoist Chinese Marxism between the official Marxist ideology of the Party and the Marxism of the intelligentsia, although there is much intellectual overlapping and the ideological lines are indistinct. Certainly a good many members of the intelligentsia, consciously or not, have provided copious ideological, theoretical and historiographical support for the Deng regime. On the other hand, some official ideologists have lapsed into ideological heresies, most notably Marx's concept of alienation. It is both ironic and heartening to observe Chou Yang, so long a guardian of official ideological orthodoxies and veteran witchhunter, drawn in his later years to the writings of the young Marx. And it is heartening if not necessarily ironic to read the Marxian humanist and democratic writings of an official theoretician of the stature of Wang Roshui. Both Chou and Wang, of course, along with others, have paid political penalties for their ideological heresies; Chou Yang has publicly confessed his ideological sins and Wang Roshui was dismissed from his post as deputy managing editor of the People's Daily. The Marxist theory of alienation, with its universally radical social and political implications, is of course threatening to anyone in power and, as recent events have confirmed, is no more likely to be tolerated by the present regime than it was by its predecessors-or for that matter, than by its counterparts elsewhere. The theory of alienation not only raises embarrassing questions about the alienation of workers from the products of their labor; it also teaches that the state is an expression of alienated social power. This is not a message that holders of state power typically find congenial. The relationship between the official Marxist ideology of the party under its current leadership and the Marxism of the intellectuals, insofar as a meaningful distinction might be drawn between the two, is a matter filled with complexities and ambiguities which I fear I am ill-prepared to attempt to discuss here. Perhaps it might suffice for the moment to note that while the former (official Party ideology) certainly places political and ideological limitations on the latter, the limits thus far have been sufficiently broad (albeit narrowing in the last year or two) to permit a remarkable degree of intellectual creativity and theoretical innovation on the part of the intelligentsia. Indeed, the recent flourishing of Marxist thought in China bears certain affinities to the reanimation of Marxism in the Eastern European countries during the post-Stalin "thaw" in the 1950s and 1960s, movements of intellectual and political renewal variously labelled "revisionism" and/or "democratic socialism." Whether the Chinese movement will prove abortive, as did its East European counterparts, remains to be seen. China, of course, is not subject to the same kinds of external Soviet pressures as are the East European countries, but the internal workings of the Leninist party-state apparatus may well result in the imposition of a new ideological straitjacket, albeit one differing in form and content from the discarded Maoist one. Yet apart from the ultimate political and ideological implications of current Chinese Marxist thought, it is certainly now clear that the history of Marxism in China did not come to an end with the canonization of "Maoism" but rather has resumed processes of change which have proceeded in new and unanticipated directions. Those processes of change call for, among other things, a reconsideration of Benjamin Schwartz's influential thesis that Marxism has undergone progressive phases of "disintegration" or "decomposition" in its journey eastward-to Russia and China-from its Western European homeland. 3 Whatever the utility of the thesis for studying the history of Chinese Marxism in its Maoist phase, it has little relevance for understanding Chinese Marxist thought in its current phase. Post-Maoist Chinese Marxist writings, far from showing signs of "decomposition," are above all characterized by the revival of (and return to) many original and orthodox Marxist conceptions. Indeed, contemporary Chinese Marxism, both as an official ideology and as an ideology of the intelligentsia, is a doctrine whose authors seek to establish firm (albeit often politically selective) links to the Western Marxist theoretical and intellectual tradition. The pages which follow are concerned primarily with the official Marxist ideology of the Party in the post-Maoist era and largely ignore the Marxist writings of the intelligentsia. (The latter is far more intellectually interesting but the former may prove more politically significant.) Moreover, the essay makes no attempt to treat, much less evaluate, the whole of official theory, which now has grown into a voluminous and complex body of economic, political and historical literature. Rather, the focus is on what appears to me to be one of the less positive tendencies in the post-Maoist version of Chinese Marxism, namely, the profoundly anti-utopian character of the doctrine. Whether the purge of the "utopian" elements from the body of official theory still celebrated as "Marxism Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought" is viewed as desirable or not depends, of course, on one's point of view. From an orthodox Marxist point of view, the elimination of the utopian 3. The thesis was of course set forth more than three decades ago in Schwartz's pioneering study Chinese Communism and the Rise ofMao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), and subsequently has been repeated, with variations, by Schwartz and a variety of other scholars. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 4 aspects of Maoism should be regarded as a desirable and progressive development, removing from the scene ideological conceptions and visions (and actions inspired by them) which exceed the limits of "objective historical possibilities" -and thus removing one source of destructive or regressive tendencies. Such a view would be shared by orthodox modernization theorists, who regard utopian social strivings, and indeed socialist goals in general, as at best "dysfunctional" elements in an inevitable and universal "modernization process." My own point of view is rather different, and might briefly be summarized at the outset. The discussion which follows rests on the premise that without a utopian reading of Marx, and the voluntaristic and politically activist impulses such a reading sanctions, Marxism would have been politically impotent and historically irrelevant in the essentially pre industrial environment of modern China. And I would further suggest that had it not been for the survival of a vital utopian vision of the socialist future in post-1949 China, Marxism in the People's Republic would have become-and is probably now becoming - little more than an ideology of modernization. Such has been the fate of Marxism in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, and it offers abundant historical evidence for Adam Ulam's gloomy prediction that "socialism, once it assumes power, has as its mission the fullest development of the productive resources of society," that the socialist state "will in no wise proceed differently from the capitalist," and that "socialism continues and intensifies all the main characteristics of capitalism."4 For Marxism to retain its vitality as a force for social revolutionary change, an activistic utopianism remains essen tial, both in pre- and post-revolutionary societies. With the waning of that utopian spirit, Marxism in the advanced industrialized countries becomes an ideology that adapts itself to the social reformism of the capitalist "welfare state." And in "socialist" societies it degenerates into vacuous revolutionary rhetoric only thinly disguising the banal nationalist and modernizing aims of the rulers of autonomous bureaucracies. 5 1. The Post-Revolutionary Era "The socialists might conquer, but not socialism, which would perish in the moment of its adherents' triumph," Robert Michels wrote at the turn of the century. 6 The histories of twentieth-century socialist revolutions offer little evidence, and even less comfort, for those who might be inclined to dispute Michels' cynical prediction. However one may choose to judge the social and economic accomplishments of revolutions which have proceeded under Marxi!it political auspi<;;es-and judg ments of course differ-few would judge that socialist revolutions have produced socialist societies. The Marxist promise of "a truly human life" remains unfulfilled, and there is nothing on the contemporary historical horizon to sustain a 4. Adam Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 45. 5. For a discussion of the relationship between Marxism and utopianism, see Maurice Meisner, Marxism. Maoism and Utopianism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), chapter I. 6. Roben Michels, Political Parties (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949), p. 391. faith that the promise will be realized under any of the current Communist regimes which rule over what all too easily are labelled socialist societies. The failure of revolutions to achieve the goals proclaimed by their leaders and ideologists is of course not a peculiarity of contemporary socialist revolutions. It has been the general historical case that great social revolutions have been inspired by great utopian visions of a future perfect social order-and it has been no less generally the case that such grand visions have perished in the post-revolutionary era. It is not simply a matter of revolutionaries in power betraying their ideals and their hopes for a radically new and better society (although that is a common enough phenomenon), but rather that the political and economic conditions of post-revolutionary situa tions seem to impel revolutionaries-turned-rulers to com promise with existing realities and with the traditions of the past. The process of the postponement and ritualization of utopian social goals, and the manipulation of utopian symbols to ideologically rationalize new forms of social inequality and political oppression, is of course an all too familiar pattern in the history of revolutions, and there are familiar formulae which describe the process. Perhaps the most familiar is Crane Brinton's thesis of the "universality of the Thermidorian reaction," which Brinton defines as that point in the revolutionary process when there is a "convalescence from the fever of revolution," the decline of revolutionary utopianism, and a return to "normalcy. "7 A recent variant of Brinton's thesis is Robert Tucker's intriguing argument on the "deradicaliza tion" of Marxist movements-the presumably inevitable willingness, sooner or later, of Marxist revolutionaries to come to terms with the existing order of things. 8 It is no argument against revolution in general to acknowledge that the directions societies take in the wake of successful revolutionary upheavals are usually far different than those originally envisioned, and that the utopian visions essential to revolutionary endeavors are hopes which fade and die in post-revolutionary eras. Barrington Moore was perhaps too optimistic in drawing from his study of modern revolutions the generalization that "the utopian radical conceptions of one phase become the accepted institutions and philosophical platitudes of the next,"9 If utopian visions of the future survive successful revolutions, they do so only in distorted and disfigured form. They serve less as the foundations for new institutions than as ritualized ideological slogans manipulated to justify the institutionalization of social orders which bear but faint resemblances to the original conceptions. Indeed, the tragedy of revolution resides precisely in the fact that utopian hopes do become transformed into philosophical platitudes rather than surviving as living sources of inspiration for social action. That such terms as "Thermidor," "Bonapartism," and "deradicalization" have become commonplace in descriptions of the life cycles of revolutions is itself testimony to the unhappy fate of utopian hopes and revolutionary ideals. They 7. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage, 1%5), pp. 205-36. 8. Robert C, Tucker, 'The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," in Robert C. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 172-214. 9, Barrington Moore, Social Origins ofDictaJorship and Democracy (Boston, Beacon Press, 1966), p, 505. 5 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org suggest not the simple failure of revolution but rather a process of degeneration which seems inherent in its very success. There is perhaps some measure of historical validity in the view that "the truth of all revolutions is not that they tum into counterrevolutions but that they become boring."'o The incongruity between utopian revolutionary ideals and post-revolutionary realities might best be understood less in terms of personal limitations of revolutionaries than in light of the historical limitations imposed by the conditions of their times. For the utopian visions which inspire revolutions, and the even higher utopian hopes which periods of revolutionary upheaval arouse, always far outrun objective historical possibilities. The communitarian and egalitarian dreams of the Levellers and the Diggers in the English Civil War clashed with, and eventually were submerged by, the interests of the propertied classes in establishing an order favorable to the growth of modem capitalist commerce and industry. The social results of the French Revolution bore little resemblance to the great ideals of liberte, egalite. Jraternite-and the radical intellectuals who proclaimed them and the radicalized plebeians who fought for them were soon swept off the historical stage once the destruction of the ancien regime was accomplished. As Isaac Deutscher observed: "The irrationality of the Puritan and Jacobin revolutions arose largely out of the clash between the high hopes of the insurgent masses and the bourgeois limitations of those revolutions. "II The clash between revolutionary utopian hopes and objective historical limitations has been especially acute in the case of twentieth-century socialist revolutions. Karl Marx insisted that socialism presupposed a highly developed industrial economy and a large and politically mature proletariat, the products of modem capitalism. But it has been the great irony of the history of Marxism in the modem world that Marxist-led revolutions have succeeded not in the advanced industrialized countries which, Marxist theory taught, were prepared for a socialist reorganization of society, but rather in economically backward nations lacking the Marxian-defined material and social prerequisites for socialism. The post revolutionary results of this incongruity are well known. Having achieved power in countries laboring under the burdens of agrarian backwardness, Marxist revolutionaries have been forced to tum their energies to industrializing the backward lands over which they have come to rule; in effect, they have been confronted with the task of building the preconditions for socialism rather than socialism itself. As Marxist rulers undertake the work of modem economic development which earlier and abortive capitalist regimes failed to accomplish, and create massive bureaucratic state structures to preside over the modernization process, socialist goals are postponed. Indus trialization, originally conceived as the means to attain socialist ends, soon acquires a dynamic of its own and, indeed. tends to become an end in itself. And while the means and values of modern economic development are lasting, the goals of socialism are relegated to an increasingly vague and indefinite future, and eventually degenerate into ritualized ideological slogans invoked to spur production and to provide a spurious political legitimacy. In the end, the subjective aims of the revolutionaries seem vanquished by the objective limitations of history and the socialist regime appears little more than "capitalism without capitalists," to borrow Adam Ulam' s suggestive phrase. 12 The Maoist era of the People's Republic seemed to promise a radical departure from these familiar processes of the post-revolutionary institutionalization of an industrializing order and the ritualization of utopian goals. Rather than declining after the political triumph of 1949 the utopian impulse in Maoism grew stronger and the commitment to ultimate Marxian aims took on increasingly chiliastic overtones in the 1950s and 1960s, portending new and ever more radical revolutionary dramas which attempted to enact the prologue to a communist future-although the Maoist dramas, as we now know, took an enormous human and economic toll. Economic backwardness, rather than serving as a reason to postpone the socialist reorganization of society, was converted into a socialist advantage in Maoist ideology. The proclaimed socialist virtues of being "poor and blank," though a startling inversion of Marxist and Leninist orthodoxies, by no means implied that Mao envisioned a communist society residing in perpetual conditions of material impoverishment. The moderni zation of China was no less highly placed on Mao's political agenda than it is on that of his successors. But modernization, during the Maoist era, was accompanied by a unique willingness (however flawed in practice) to confront the dilemma of the means and ends of socialism in an economically backward land, by a demand to reconcile the means of industrialization with the goals and values of socialism and communism. Through a process of "permanent revolution" which demanded increasingly radical social and ideological transformations, the ultimate goals prophesied in Marxist theory were to be striven for (and realized in at least embryonic form) in the here and now, in the very process of constructing their Marxian-defined economic prerequisites. During the first quarter-century of the history of post-revolutionary China, at least during times when Mao and Maoists held sway, there were few signs of the presumably inevitable process of "deradicalization ... Yet Maoist utopianism, for better or worse, has not survived the passing of Mao Tse-tung from the historical scene. It doubtless is hazardous to predict the future of Chinese society on the basis of current Chinese political and ideological proclivities, much less on the basis of the historical experience of other post-revolutionary societies. The Chinese Revolution has taken a good many unanticipated radical turns over the decades, and it may yet produce new revolutionary dramas by actors who now wait in the wings. But from the vantage of the present it would appear that the Chinese Revolution, albeit more belatedly than most revolutions, has not eluded "the universality of the Thermidorian reaction." The depoliticization of socioeconomic life and the deradicalization of political life in the years since the death of Mao Tse-tung--or what most foreign observers celebrate as the "pragmatism" of the policies of the post-Mao leadership- has been accompanied by the 10. Kenneth Allsop. The Spectator (March 1959). as quoted in James H. Meisel. Counter-Revolution (New York: Atherton. 1966). p. xii. II. Isaac Deutscher. The Unfinished Rel'Olution: Russia 1917-1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 27. 12. Adam Ulam. The Unfinished Rn'ollllioll (New York: Random Hou,e. 1960). p. 45. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org emergence of a new version of Chinese Marxist theory which both reflects and promotes an accommodation to the existing social order. The doctrine that is still officially termed "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought" now bears little resemblance to what it was during the Maoist era. It is above all a doctrine from which all utopian elements and impulses have been purged, and one in which new authors have rewritten or abandoned most of what was distinctively "Maoist" in the Chinese version of Marxism in favor of more orthodox Marxist-Leninist perspectives.13 Several of the more salient features of this recent process of ideological transformation might be briefly examined for what they reveal about the nature of the contemporary Marxist mentality-and about the intellectual processes involved in the deradicalization of a once revolutionary movement. 2. Economic Determinism and the Objective Laws of Development One of the more striking and pervasive characteristics of Chinese Marxism in the post-Mao era is a newly found faith in the existence of objective laws of historical and economic development. Whereas Maoism (during the Maoist era) was characterized by a highly voluntaristic faith in the ability of people armed with the proper will and consciousness to conquer all material barriers and mold social reality in accordance with their ideas and ideals, Chinese Marxist theoreticians now view history in more orthodox Marxist fashion, as a more or less natural process governed by immutable laws which operate independently of human wishes and desires. As typically stated: "The laws of development of social history are objective laws which cannot be changed at will. They should be treated the same as the laws of the process of natural history. "14 It is a faith similar to that held by Plekhanov who insisted that the Marxist must swim with "the streams of History ," proclaiming that the forces of history "have nothing to do with human will and consciousness." 15 Objective social and historical laws, post-Maoist ideologists believe, can be determined with a scientific accuracy approximating the precision of research in the natural sciences. There is indeed now an enormous and growing emphasis on the scientific character of Marxism, which, it is proclaimed, can reveal the laws of both nature and history. The tendency to equate the laws of nature with the laws of history gives an almost positivistic cast to the contemporary Chinese Marxist mentality. "The development of society," it 13. This, of course, does not preclude copious quotations from the works of Mao. Indeed, since late 1981, there has been a growing celebration of Mao Tse-tung's theoretical contributions to Marxism, particularly prior to 1958 and, needless to say, in politically selective fashion. 14. Discussion at Institute of Philosophic Research. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Peking, 25 June 1980. The comment was made to a group of seven Western scholars, including this writer, who held talks with leading Chinese Marxist theoreticians and scholars in the People's Republic from IS June to IS July 1980. Further references to statements made during the course of these conversations will be entitled "Discussions" and will indicate the place, time and institution but not the individual speaker. The trip to China was made possible through the assistance of a research grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. IS. G. Plekhanov, lzbrannyefilosofskie proizvedeniya (Moscow, 1956), Vol. 4, p. 86. Quoted in A. Walicki, The Controversy over Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 159. is repeatedly declared, "is just like the development of the material world and is determined by objective rules."16 Just as there are general objective laws of history whose dictates must be obeyed, so, it is believed, there are specific (but no less objective) economic laws which govern the development of a socialist society. Progress is therefore dependent on discovering what are termed "the objective laws of socialist economic development" and pursuing policies in accordance with them. To do otherwise invites disaster, for "objective economic laws are inviolable and {those] who violate them will be punished." The most flagrant violators of such laws were of course Lin Piao and the "Gang of Four" (and, by implication, Mao Tse-tung)-and the Chinese nation which was subjected to their ill-advised and nonscientific policies was duly "punished by the law of objectivity."17 Although the existence of objective laws governing "socialist economic development" is taken for granted, the nature and content of such laws remains less than entirely clear. Save for invoking "objective economic laws" to ideologically rationalize whatever policies the regime happens to be pursuing at any given moment, the theoreticians have thus far confined themselves to repeating, at very considerable length, some of the more deterministic formulations of Marx, Engels, and Stalin. From Marx there is derived the familiar proposition that the economic "base" determines the sociopolitical "superstruc ture"; it was the inversion of the proper relationship between base and superstructure, it is charged, that was responsible for many of the most grievous errors of the past. (A much favored source of textual authority is Marx's well-known summary of the materialist conception of history in the preface to the Critique of Political Economy, a statement which easily lends itself to an economically deterministic interpretation, as well as a variety of deterministic formulations in the later writings of Engels.) Stalin, while sometimes criticized, is more often praised for his correct exposition of "the economic laws of socialism," especially the law that the social relations of production must conform to the level of productive forces, the law that the national economy must be developed according to a plan, and the continued operation of commodity production and the law of value in a socialist economy. 18 The belief in objective historical and economic laws appears in the context of a new Chinese Marxist mentality characterized by an increasingly economically deterministic interpretation of the doctrine in general. This is especially apparent in prevailing views on the question of the material preconditions for socialism. Whereas Mao Tse-tung believed that a "continuous" process of the transformation of social relationships and popular consciousness must accompany (and indeed precede) the process of modem economic development in order to bring about a socialist historical outcome, his political and ideological successors emphasize the orthodox 16. Che-hsueh yen-chiu (Philosophic Research) (Feb. 1979), JPRS 73710: 13. 17. Xue Muqiao, "Study and Apply the Objective Laws of Socialist Economic Development," Jingji Yanjiu (Economic Research), 1979, No.6 (JPRS 84029). Hu Chiao-mu began his celebrated July 1978 speech with the proposition, presumably derived from Marx, that "economic laws are like natural laws." "Observe Economic Laws, Speed Up the Four Modernizations," Peking Review, November 10, 1978, p.7. 18. For example, Xue Muqiao, "Study and Apply the Objective Laws of Socialist Economic Development," pp. 7ff. 7 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org I I I I I I I I I Marxist view that the prior development of productive forces to a very high level is the first and essential prerequisite for a socialist society. Marxism, it is stressed, teaches that "socialism can only be built on a foundation of highly developed socialized large-scale production."19 And, it is further stressed, the process of constructing such necessary economic preconditions will span a lengthy historical era. As one leading theoretician recently speculated: "Perhaps by the year 2050 we shall accomplish our high degree of moderniza tion, the developed stage of socialism."20 Other writers have observed that modern capitalism developed over a period of four centuries, suggesting that the development of socialism will span an equally lengthy historical era. And it is said that the transition from socialism to communism will require "a level of productive forces much higher than what is already attained in developed capitalist countries. "21 The emphasis on objective laws of history, at least as presented in post-Maoist Chinese Marxist literature, serves less to convey an optimistic faith in the historical inevitability of a socialist future (although the inevitability of communism is of course ritualistically proclaimed) than it does as a warning that objective reality imposes stringent limits on the possibilities for human action and social change. For, it is repeatedly emphasized, the laws which presumably determine the course of historical development "cannot be altered by the will of man," nor, for that matter, even by "the subjective will of the Party."22 Men thus must recognize the restraints imposed by objective laws and obey their dictates. Indeed it is assumed that the economic failures and political turbulence of the Maoist era resulted from an exaggerated stress on the factors of human will and consciousness-and from premature changes in the social relations of production. The notion that the "super structure" might play a decisive role in historical development is now condemned as a "reactionary theory" propagated by Lin Piao and the Gang of Four, or, at best, as a species of historical idealism. 23 Moreover, the literature is filled with quotations from Marx and Engels warning of the dangers of economic stagnation and historical regression resulting from attempts to eliminate class distinctions before the productive forces have developed to a sufficiently high level. 24 By invoking objective historical and economic laws, and by making the socialist utopia dependent on their workings, post-Maoist Chinese Marxist theory postpones socialism and communism to an indefinite time in the future and counsels 19. Li Yinha and Lin Chun, ''Tentative Discussion on the Struggle Against Vestiges of Feudalism in China During the Period of Building Socialism," Lishi Yanjiu (Historical Research), 1979, No.9, JPRS 74829, p. 32. 20. "Discussions," Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought Institute, Peking, 17 June 1980. 21 Xue Muqiao, China's Socialist Economy (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981), p. 307. 22. Xue, "Study and Apply the Objective Laws of Socialist Economic Development," p. 7. 23. For an interesting (and controversial) article interpreting late Maoism as an abandonment of historical materialism in favor of idealism, see Ying Xueli and Sun Hui, "Some Theoretical Questions Regarding the Later Period of Socialist Transformation in Our Country," Nanjing Daxue Xuebao (11 November 1980), pp. 98-104. (JPRS 79073), pp. 21-30. 24. For example, Xu He, "We must Achieve an Overall Understanding of the Theory of Marx and Engels on Public Ownership," Jiefang Ribao, II March 1982, p. 5. (JPRS 81134, pp. 33-36). that people can do little to hasten the arrival of the good society. For objective social laws, particularly when they are conceived as analogous to the laws of nature, work slowly and yield their presumably socialist results only gradually, and thus it would be "utopian" and "unscientific" to anticipate the hoped-for society in the foreseeable future. And since objective laws cannot be altered by human will and consciousness-and indeed since recent historical experience allegedly teaches that such intrusions are not only historically fruitless but politically pernicious-the socialist future is made ultimately dependent on the impersonal workings of such presumably objective historical and economic laws. Moreover, both the lengthy and impersonal nature of the process is underlined by the repeated insistence that the very highest level of the development of productive forces is the first and essential prerequisite for the emergence of a genuine socialist society. And as China is an impoverished and backward land, the road to be traveled is a long and arduous one, and the destination lies far in the distance. In the meantime, human energies are to be devoted almost exclusively to productive work, not to the building of socialism but rather to the task of constructing its necessary economic foundations. What is therefore envisioned in the contemporary Chinese Marxist mentality is an essentially evolutionary rather than revolutionary process of historical development governed by the operation of objective laws rather than by human desires and visionary hopes. The radical aspects of the Maoist tradition which are incongruous with this evolutionary perspective are naturally eliminated from the reinterpreted body of orthodox doctrine which is still presented under the label of "Marxism Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought." Mao's theory of "perma nent revolution," for example, is now denounced as non Marxist,ls or sometimes simply reinterpreted as meaning no more than a "technological revolution, identical in meaning with modernization."26 And Mao's doctrine of the continuance of class struggle under socialism has been replaced by a doctrine which announces the withering away of class struggle. Just as Stalin announced the cessation of class struggle in the Soviet Union in 1936, so Chinese Communist leaders now proclaim that "class struggle has ceased to be the principal contradiction in our society,'>27 sometimes dismissed as no more than "a legacy from the past."28 The notion that class conflict has all but ceased, the further implications of which will be discussed shortly, reinforces the image (if not necessarily the reality) of a harmonious and stable society developing in a smooth and evolutionary fashion. For the purpose of the present discussion, it will perhaps suffice to note than an evolutionary conception of social development largely excludes human purpose from the historical scheme of things and is certainly incongruous with any sort of visionary utopianism. "Were sqme /l~opian social order to emerge from process of evolution,"it has been observed, "it would be a long time coming, and essentially 25. Jen-minjih-pao (People's Daily), 19 June 1980. 26. "Discussions," Institute of Philosophic Research, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Peking, 25 June 1980. 27. "Fundamental Change in China's Class Situation," Beijing Review, 23 November 1979, p. 17. 28. "Discussions," Marxism-Leninism-Mau Tse-Iung Tbought Institute. 17 June 1980. 8 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org accidental. "29 3. The Burdens of History The postponement of radical social change, and the message that the socialist and communist utopia lies far in the distant historical future, are further conveyed by a new historical analysis which places an enormous emphasis on the persistence of China's "feudal" past. 30 Although it is maintained that China is a socialist society, it is a country that still suffers from the weight of its long history, a past which manifests itself in the present both in the form of a heritage of economic backwardness and in the persistence of a deeply ingrained "feudal consciousness." The economic and ideological burdens of the past, it is suggested, make the development of socialism a far more difficult and lengthy process than hitherto anticipated. This pessimistic assessment of the effects of China's lingering "feudal backwardness" stands in striking contrast to the Maoist perception of the relationship between China's past, present and future. Mao, inspired by a utopian impulse to escape history, converted China's heritage of backwardness into socialist advantages. Whereas the bourgeoisie had dominated the advanced industrialized countries of the West for nearly three centuries, thus making "the poisons of the bourgeoisie very powerful" and permeating "every nook and cranny" of Western societies, China, he argued, was fortunate to suffer only three generations of bourgeois class dominance. Whereas the capitalist regime in the West was firmly consolidated and thus resistant to radical social and ideological transformation, China, relatively unencumbered by capitalist influences, was amenable to continuous processes of revolution ary transformation. And whereas the moral corruptions inherent in the overly mature and ossified capitalist countries had sapped the revolutionary spirit of their working classes, the Chinese people were characterized by the virtues of being "poor and blank" -and, as Mao so often proclaimed, poor people want change and revolution while blank sheets of paper offer the opportunity to write the newest revolutionary words. From these beliefs in the advantages of backwardness, Mao drew a strikingly optimistic conclusion: "Lenin said: 'The more backward the country, the more difficult its transition from capitalism to socialism. ' Now it seems that this way of speaking is incorrect. As a matter of fact, the more backward the economy, the easier, not the more difficult, the transition from capitalism to socialism."3) Backwardness, to be sure, was to be overcome, but it was the special moral and revolutionary potentialities inherent in that very condition which held the promise of China's future socialist greatness. Just as in the Biblical prophecy that the last shall be first, Mao believed that the backward were destined to soon overtake the advanced. It was a faith similar to the nineteenth-century Russian Populist belief that backward Russia, yet uncorrupted by capitalism, was closer to the realization of socialism than the industrialized countries of the West which, precisely because of the effects of capitalist industrialization, no longer possessed the moral energies to achieve their own socialist ideals. 32 There is indeed now an enormous and growing emphasis on the scientific character of Marxism, which, it is proclaimed, can reveal the laws ofboth nature and history. The tendency to equate the laws of nature with the laws of history gives an almost positivistic cast to the contemporary Chinese Marxist mentality. "The development of society," it is repeatedly declared, "is just like the development of the material world and is determined by objective rules." These eminently Maoist notions are now condemned in orthodox Marxist-Leninist fashions as "utopian" and "reaction ary ," although the heresies are not always attributed directly to Mao who authored them, but rather to the author's evil associates. In post-Maoist Chinese Marxist ideology, there are no advantages, socialist or otherwise, to be found in China's economic, social, and cultural backwardness. Indeed, the absence of a full and genuine capitalist phase of development in modem Chinese history is regarded as a great historical tragedy, for it is now taken as an article of Marxist faith that "capitalism is a necessary element in the victory over feudal relationships"; and, it is stressed, "Marxism holds that socialism is the outcome of basic production relationships when capitalism is at a high stage of development, and that socialism can only be built on a foundation of highly developed socialized large-scale production. "33 But China was precluded from reaping 32. The argument was first set forth in the early 1850s by Alexander Herzen, especially in "The Russian People and Socialism." See A. Herzen, From the Other Shore (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956), pp. 165-208. 33. The post· Maoist critiques of Mao on this issue are usually implicit, and invariably cite the authority of the classic Marxist texts. For example: "After the seizure of political power by the proletariat, the speed by which socialism is built in a country depends on the developmental level of industry and all productive forces at the time. History has repeatedly proved that this concept of Marx and Engels is entirely correct. But during the past, we somehow held that, although China is economically backward and because it has been subject to less bourgeois influence, it should have been easier to build socialism (in China) than in countries like England and America." Xu He, "We Must Achieve an Overall Understanding of the Theory of Marx and Engels on Public Ownership," liefang Ribao, II March 1982, p.5 (JPRS 81134, p. 34). 29. Wilbert E. Moore. "The Utility of Utopias," American Sociological I f the abortive ness of capitalism and the consequent condition of economic Rel'ie... 31 (1966): 767. backwardness makes the building of socialism a more difficult task, as is now 30. For example, Li and Lin. "Tentative Discussion on the Struggle Against held to be the case, there remains the question of why socialist revolutions Vestiges of Feudalism." pp. 29-42. have taken place in the backward lands and not in the industrially developed 31. Mao Tse-tung. "Reading Notes on the Soviet Union's 'Political ones. a problem about which much has been written in recent years. The Economy ...· Mao Tse·tung .Hu·hsiang \l'all sui (Long Live the Thought of proclivity is to invoke the "weak link" notion in Lenin's theory of imperialism, Mao T,e·tun~) (Taipei. n.p .. 1969). pp ..H3-34. which some writers have universalized into a general historical law. For © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org the material and social benefits of capitalism due to the combination of foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism, a "mutual collusion" which inhibited the emergence of a genuine national bourgeoisie and instead gave rise to a "bureaucratic compradore bourgeoisie and its political domination." Under this regime, "the old feudal system never sustained total destruction. "34 If China avoided many of the evils of capitalism, it suffered all the more because the abortiveness of capitalism facilitated the persistence of its pernicious feudal heritage. And that heritage survived into the post-revolutionary era, distorting the political and economic life of the new society: "In a country as backward as China, even following the seizure of power by the proletariat, a restoration of feudalism continued to be the most important danger faced by the revolution. History is not severed by a single stroke of the knife. . . ."35 The persistence of "feudalism," and the continued danger of a "feudal restoration," are attributed not only to the objective conditions of the modem Chinese historical situation but also the political and ideological failings of the Chinese Communist Party. If modem capitalism proved abortive in China, and if the indigenous bourgeoisie was too weak a social class to fulfill its historic mission, then the task of carrying out the bourgeois-democratic phase of the revolution fell to the Chinese Communist Party. But the Party's "new democratic" revolution, it is acknowledged, was less than completely successful, 36 partly because the Party gravely underestimated the vestiges of feudalism, and partly because of the Party's "metaphysical denial ... of all positive results of the growth of capitalism. "37 Thus a "feudal consciousness," deeply-rooted in a two thousand-year-old tradition of an unchanging "small-scale peasant economy," persisted into the post-revolutionary era, there sustained by a relatively slow rate of modem economic growth and there finding its natural social base among a peasantry still mired in feudalistic habits, traditions, and ways of thought. Thus China remained not with the Maoist virtues of being "poor and blank" but in a deplorable "state of poverty and blankness."38 And it was this state of affairs, it is argued, that was in large measure responsible for the political and economic errors which marred the last years of the Maoist era. This argument, pursued with many variations, is note- example: ". . . in the history of Western Europe the replacement of countries under the slave system by countries under the feudal system and the replacement in tum of feudal countries by capitalist countries likewise did not first occur in countries with a mature develoment of an old or existing system but rather in countries with weak links to an old or existing system." Economically strong countries, it is further pointed out, are more resistant to the assaults of newly-emerging classes. Wu Shuqing, "Theoretical Explanations on the Advantages of the Socialist System." Jingji Yanjiu (Economic Research), 20 December 1981, pp. 72-75. (JPRS 79980, pp. 45-52). It is thus that Chinese Marxists confront the paradox that economically backward lands lend themselves to socialist political revolutions but not to the construction of socialist societies. 34. Li and Lin, "Tentative Discussion on the Struggle Against Vestiges of Feudalism," pp. 30-33. 35. Ibid., p. 33. 36. "On the Ideology of Feudalism," Wen-hui pao, 16 September 1979; JPRS 74526:11. 37. Li and Lin, "Tentative Discussion on the Struggle Against Vestiges of Feudalism," pp. 34 and 38. 38. "On the Ideology of Feudalism," p. 13. worthy on several counts, not least among them the reappearance of orthodox Marxist views on the historically progressive character of capitalism and the revival of orthodox Marxist judgments about the peasantry. A fully-developed and mature modem capitalist economy and culture, it is emphasized in recent writings, is the natural historical remedy for the lingering influences of feudalism. While few advocate abandoning the existing "socialist" system in favor of establishing a full-fledged capitalist regime, at least not in official print, there is much emphasis on the necessity and desirability of inheriting both the material and cultural legacies of world capitalism. 39 There is the further implication, often made rather explicit, that "Chinese socialism" will incorporate many of the features, forms and practices histori<:ally associated with capitalism for many decades to come. 40 Even more striking is the reappearance in official ideology-on a scale not present in Chinese Marxist writings since the early I920s-of orthodox Marxist analyses of the political and ideological limitations of peasants, frequently accompanied by conventionally pejorative Marxist imagery on "the idiocy of rural life ." For Mao the sources of revolutionary creativity and social progress resided in the countryside, and the peasantry was the true revolutionary class. In post-Maoist Chinese Marxist theory, by contrast, peasants are portrayed as narrow in their thinking and conservative in their habits, and the countryside in general is seen as the repository of stagnation and backwardness. A much-quoted source of textual authority is Marx's unflattering description of peasants in the Eighteenth Brumaire-and even Red Flag approvingly notes that Marx depicted the peasantry as "a sack of potatoes. "'41 These views have been eagerly adopted by Marxist historians who, in accordance with the new emphasis on the decisive role of productive forces, no longer champion the historical pro gressiveness of peasant wars. The Taiping Rebellion, hitherto celebrated as part of the modem revolutionary tradition, is now presented as "a record of the failure of absolute egalitarianism. "42 In the new historiography, the Taipings are criticized for having alienated landlords and intellectuals, for destroying traditional culture, and for inhibiting economic development-and their defeat is attributed to their "radical policies," which, it is said, were "rooted in none other than the peasants' narrow-mindedness, conservatism and backwardness. "43 Such defects as allegedly 39. For example, Sun Yuesheng, "On 'Exalting the Proletal;at and Eliminating the Bourgeoisie,'" Dushu (Reading), 1981, No. I, pp. 6-17. (JPRS 77495, pp. 28-32.) A more candid theoretician argues that Ih,~ CCP established "feudalistic government-run enterprises" because "we did not understand that socialism has highly-developed capitalist production as its prerequisite." Ying and Sun, op. cit., p. 26. 40. As observed by Carl Riskin in his exceptionally perceptive analysis of recent economic thought and policies. Carl Riskin, "Market, Maoism and Economic Reform in China," in M. Selden and V. Lippit (eds.), The Transition to Socialism in China (M.E. Sharpe, 1982), pp. 300-301. 41. Fang Wen and Li Zhenxia, "Thoroughly Eradicate the Influence of Personality Cults," Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), 16 December 1980. (JPRS 77436, p.48). 42. Rong Sheng, "How Are We to Regard the Egalitarianism of the Taiping Regime," Lishi Yanjiu (Historical Research), June 1981. 'JPRS 79194, p. 13). 43. Van Xiu, "Carrying Out Radical Policies was an Important Reason for the Failure of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace," Fudan Xuebao, January 1981. (JPRS 78321, pp. 47-55). 10 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org I characterized the peasantry in the mid-19th century linger into the present. Indeed, in much of the recent litrature the peasantry is viewed as the social carrier of "feudalistic" ideas arid "petty-bourgeois ideology," which, it is alleged, lie at the root of the pernicious "ultra-leftist" current which manifested itself during the Great Leap Forward campaign and found its political expression in the "feudal-fascist" rule of Lin Piao and the Gang of Four. regarded as the major barrier to modernization and thus to the development of socialism-is essentially an ideological problem, the agreed-upon solution is essentially economic. To be sure, educational efforts to "emancipate the mind" are necessary, but the ultimate remedy, it is stressed, is "the growth of productive forces'.' and the consequent rise in the cultural level of the populace.'s "The ghost of feudal consciousness," it is proclaimed, "will in the end be disposed of by the thundering guns of modernization."46 But modernization is of course a lengthy process. And thus the arrival of the good society must await its consummation. Industrialization, originally conceived as the means to attain socialist ends, soon acquires a dynamic of its own and, indeed, tends to become an end in itself. And while the means and values of modern economic development are lasting, the goals of socialism are relegated to an increasingly vague and indefinite future, and eventually degenerate into ritualized ideological slogans invoked to spur production and to provide a spurious political legitimacy. 4. The Stages of Socialism China, contemporary Chinese Marxist theory claims, is a socialist society, and not merely a society in the process of "the transition to socialism." The claim rests on what is taken to be the defining features of socialism: first, a system of public ownership of the means of production, said to have been essentially accomplished by 1956; and secondly, the principle of "distribution according to work." (There is no need to pause here to discuss the adequacy of this definition of socialism or its meaning in social practice.) Yet while China is socialist, it is acknowledged that it is a socialism of what is termed a "low" or "undeveloped" character. "Although we have established socialist public ownership," it is typically said, "we still have a long way to go to establish a socialist society as described by Marx .... we remain in a stage of socialism not yet well developed. . . . "47 Socialism, it is emphasized, is not single stage in historical development but rather a process which proceeds through many stages, each of which is tied to, and essentially determined by, the level of economic development. Moreover, the procession through the various stages of socialism is of indeterminate historical length, and the time of the consummation of the process cannot be predicted in advance: "As to how long this period will last, we are not fortune tellers so we cannot guess. But owing to the backwardness of production in our country, it will undoubtedly be a very, very long period divided into numerous stages."'8 There is of course nothing particularly novel about the view that socialism passes through various stages of develop ment. The notion is present in original Marxist theory and, indeed, in the thought of Mao Tse-tung, who also spoke of the "stages" of development in postrevolutionary society. What is noteworthy about the post-Maoist view of "the stages of socialism" is that the process is conceived in essentially a characterized the peasantry is viewed as the social carrier of "feudalistic" ideas and "petty-bourgeois ideology," which, it is alleged, lie at the root of the pernicious "ultra-leftist" current which manifested itself during the Great Leap Forward campaign and found its political expression in the "feudal fascist" rule of Lin Piao and the Gang of Four. It is thus that the responsibility for the evils of the recent past and the problems of the present are shifted from the eminently urban-oriented leaders in Peking to the lingering "feudal remnants" of China's historic past, with the peasantry implicitly bearing the blame as the social source of backward ideas and ideologies. As a leading Marxist theoretician remarked: "Our country is dominated by small producers who are accustomed to obey imperial paternalism and who cherish the dream of absolute equality. It will take a long time to change them....... If the peasants, or many of them, have benefited from the economic policies of the post-Mao regime, they have not fared nearly so well in the regime's ideology. The stress on the survival of the evils of the past, and the emphasis on the need to overcome the burdens of the traditional heritage, is a way to deny that the problems which beset Chinese society may be contradictions inherent in the new society itself rather than remnants inherited from the millennia. It is perhaps instructive to recall that the enormous emphasis in Soviet ideology on the need to overcome the old Tsarist historical heritage long served as a means to ignore the contradictions of the new social order produced by the revolution. If the persistence of "feudal consciousness" -which is ~~. "Di"u"ion,:'ln,titutc or Polili,al E,onomy. Chinc,.: Acadcmy or Social Science'. Shanghai. I~ .llIl~ IYXO. 45. Li and Lin, "Tentative Discussion on the Struggle Against Vestiges of Feudalism:' p. 30. The enormous weight given to "feudal consciousness" stands in striking contrast to the strongly economically deterministic character of post-Maoist Chinese Marxist theory in general. This tension, or perhaps contradiction, will not easily be alleviated. 46. "On the Ideology of Feudalism," p. 16. 47. Su Shaozhi, "On the Principal Contradiction Facing Our Society Today," Xueshu Yuekllll (Academic Monthly). June 1979. (JPRS 74813, p. 14.) As put by another leading theoretician: "In the underdeveloped socialist stage, agricultural productivity remains low. ownership forms remain varied, and commodity production remains a fact. The system of distribution according to work does not function in the same way Marx prophesized because productivity ... is still underdeveloped." "Discussions:' Institute of Economics, Nankai University. Tianjin, 28 June 1980. ~g. Sun Shuping. "Tentaive Discussion or Basic Contradictions in a Socialist Society:' XUl'S/111 Yul'kall (Academic Monthly). July 1977. (JPRS 74450. p. 7.) II © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org evolutionary terms, as a gradual and peaceful social progression from lower to higher stages, with each stage reflecting the growth of the productive forces. 49 For Mao Tse-tung, by contrast, the whole process of development-from the transition to socialism to and through the realization of a communist utopia-was characterized by a continuous series of radical revolutionary ruptures with the past, by qualitative breaks with existing reality, and by changes in social relations and popular consciousness proceeding as rapidly as possible with, as Mao put it, "one revolution following another . . . without interruption. "SO Whereas for Mao the socialist transformation of social relationships, forms of political organization, and especially the consciousness of the masses was more the precondition for modem economic development than its product, Mao's ideological successors believe that the development of material productive forces is the essential prerequisite for social and intellectual change. Whereas Mao viewed "the stages of socialism" as a continuous process of revolutionary transforma tion, in which social contradictions and struggles would constitute the motive force of historical change, his successors look to a long-term and gradual process of evolutionary change, characterized by a relatively peaceful and socially harmonious course of economic and social development. These differences between the Maoist and post-Maoist versions of Chinese Marxism are particularly apparent in the treatment of the question of class struggle, an issue of enormous practical as well as theoretical significance. In striking contrast to the Maoist emphasis on social contradictions and class struggles as the necessary motive force of sociohistorical development, the evolutionary conception of the "stages of socialism" presented in post-Maoist ideology implies social harmony. It is thus hardly surprising that the Maoist doctrine of the continuance of class struggle in a socialist society has been condemned as erroneous in theory and harmful in practice. 51 It is acknowledged, to be sure, that certain social class differences remain and that a form of class struggle must still be waged-for it would otherwise be theoretically impossible to justify the continued existence of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" - but class struggle is now directed against what are termed "the remnants" of the old exploiting classes, their ideological residues, and "a handful of counterrevolutionaries." The exploiting classes themselves have been abolished, it is maintained, and under a "socialist system of public ownership of the means of production" it is impossible either for the old exploiting classes to reconstitute themselves or for new exploiting classes to emerge. 52 "Facts tell us," it is argued, "that the development of socialism has already passed through one stage and is currently in a second stage-the stage of two different kinds of public ownership of the means of production in which class and class struggle no longer persists. "53 Thus the principal contradiction in Chinese society is no longer between antagonistic social classes but rather between the productive forces, which are relatively backward, and the relations of production, which are presumably socialist in character and therefore relatively advanced. And thus the obvious solution for the contradiction is to direct all energies to the building of a modem industrial economy. As the matter is typically formulated: Inasmuch as a fundamental transformation occurs in the class relationships of a socialist society, the principal contradiction in a socialist society is no longer between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie but rather the contradiction that socialist production is far from capable of satisfying the needs of society. If this contradiction is to be resolved, the priority must be to accelerate socialist construction and rapidly bring about the Four Moderniza tions. A look back at the previous period shows that because of confusion in demarcating the period of the transition [to socialism] and socialism itself, class struggle was seen as the paramount contradiction and the major efforts were devoted to political movements, which obstructed the shift to the emphasis on production and resulted in lost opportunities for socialist construc tion. We are determined not to follow this same old disastrous road again. 54 All other social contradictions are of a secondary and nonantagonistic character, and can be resolved, it. is confidently assumed, peacefully and gradually in accordance with the development of the productive forces. It is of some interest to observe that post-Maoist theoreti cians have devoted considerable energies to distinguishing between a "socialist" society and a society "in transition to socialism," affirming (at rather great length) that the former is the correct characterization of the People's Republic. The dis tinction may appear a bit scholastic, but it is in fact of considerable political and ideological import. For the notion of "the transition to socialism" is identified with the Maoist theories of "permanent revolution" and the continuation of class struggle. Thus, as emphasized in a major article in Red Flag: "It must be noted that the theory that it is still necessary to carry on 'uninterrupted revolution' after our country has entered the socialist (stage) ... is in fact a theory which negates the socialist nature of our present-day society. "55 Or, to put the 49. The envisioned process of post-revolutionary development is sometimes labeled "revolutionary reformism," in contrast to Maoist notions of "continuous revolution" and class struggle. With the establishment of a socialist system, it is argued, "it is no longer necesary ... to basically remold the superstructure and economic base, as fallaciously advocated in the 'continuous revolution' theory .... We can only gradually improve and progress, and reach our goal at a relatively slow speed over a long period of time." The concept of "revolutionary reformism," it is claimed, is derived from Lenin and especially Stalin, who favored gradualism and opposed "eruptions." (See Xue Hanwei and Fan Guohua, "On Revolutionary Reformism," Xueuxi yu Tansuo (Study and Exploration), 1981, No.6, pp. 4-9. (JPRS 80792, pp. 93-101.) 50. Mao Tse-tung, "Speech to the Supreme State Conference," 28 January 1958, Chinese Law and Government. 1.4:10-14. 51. Wang Ruisun, Song Yangyan and Qin Yanshi, "A Chat About the Nature and Characteristics of a Socialist Society," Jingji Yanjiu (Economic Research), 10 (1979). (JPRS 84866:2.) 52. Jin Wen, "On Current Classes and Class Struggle." Jiejllllg Ribao (Liberation Daily). :!3 July 11J71J (JPRS 7~33~:~-5.) 53. Sun, "Tentative Discussion of Basic Contradictions." p. 9. 54. Wang. et aI., "A Chat About the Nature and Characteristics of a Socialist Society," p.ll. 55. Duan Ruofei. "The Scientific Theory of Socialism and the Reality of Socialism in China," Red Flag (16 March 1982). pp. 21-~,1. (JPRS 80980. pp. 36-53.) 12 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org matter more precisely, the new orthodoxy (which has generated an enormous body of literature) that China is firmly and forever socialist serves to negate the notion of uninterrupted revolution and the necessity of class struggle. The post-Maoist deemphasis on class struggle (while politically salutary in some respects) does more than simply lend support to an evolutionary conception of "the stages of socialism" which gradually unfold over a long historical era. It also serves as a way to mask the social contradictions of the present. One such contradiction-and one which loomed large in Maoist ideology-is the gap between town and countryside, and the resulting conflict of interests between workers and peasants. But that quite real social contradiction is largely ignored in a post-Maoist Chinese Marxist ideology which confines class struggle to a skirmish against "remnants" of the old exploiting classes and which propounds the new orthodoxy that there is "no basic conflict of interests among the people. "~6 The abolition of the distinction between town and countryside is, of course, still proclaimed as an ultimate goal, but its realization is postponed to a time when the growth of the productive forces has sufficiently ripened. And since social change can only follow in the wake of economic development, as is repeatedly emphasized, the goal of abolishing the distinctions between the urban and rural areas is severed from the social practice of the present, relegated to an unspecified time in the future, and safely ritualized. A second, and perhaps more fundamental, socioeconomic contradiction which the present deemphasis on class struggle serves to mask is the conflict between rulers and ruled. In a society where private property and private ownership of the means of production largely have been abolished, and where the state has become the de facto economic manager of society, the principal social contradiction clearly is no longer primarily economic in nature but rather political, between those who hold political power in the state apparatus and those who do not; it is, in essence, the distinction between the rulers and the ruled. Mao early recognized this elemental fact, emphasizing in 1957 the contradiction between the "leadership and the led. "~7 And from there he was driven inexorably to the conclusion that China's political and economic bureaucrats were becoming a new exploiting class, "bourgeois elements sucking the blood of the workers," he charged in 1965.'8 In effect, they were a functional (albeit propertyless) bourgeoisie able to exploit society and appropriate much of the fruits of social labor by virtue of the political power they wielded. There are many ambiguities in the Maoist treatment of class,'9 but it is reasonably clear-and it is certainly clear enough to post-Maoist ideologists and politicians-that when Mao and Maoists spoke of class struggle between "the bourgeoisie and the proletariat," at least in the late Maoist era, the term "bourgeoisie" referred not to lingering remnants of an old and expropriated capitalist 56. Wu Jiang, "Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People is a General Subject," Hung·ch' i (Red Flag), 2 (February 1979). (JPRS 73304:4.) 57. Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1957), p. 49. 58. Mao Tse-tung,"Comment on Comrade Ch'en Cheng-jen's Stay in a Primary Unit" (29 January 1965). (JPRS 49826:23.) 59. As perceptively analyzed by Richard Kraus in Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). class but rather to those who occupied positions of privilege and authority in the post-revolutionary political and economic bureaucracies, and particularly in the higher echelons of the Chinese Communist Party. The proposition that bureaucrats can constitute themselves as a new ruling class, a notion remarkably similar to Milovan DjiJas' theory of "the new class," received abundant Maoist theoretical elaboration during the Cultural Revolution era. 60 The Maoist theory of a bureaucratic ruling class has of course now vanished from Chinese Marxist writings, for it is obviously a notion profoundly unsettling to those in power and not one conducive to an ideology which insists on a diminishing role for class struggle in the development of a presumably socialist society. The official position was laid down by Teng Hsiao-p'ing in December 1980. "There is absolutely not, nor could there ever be a 'class of bureaucrats.' Our propaganda work should guard against creating various images among the masses that do not square with reality,"61 Teng decreed as he was suppressing the last of the Democracy Movement activists, some of whom had revived the theory of a privileged bureau cratic ruling class. Teng's decree subsequently was elaborated at great length by official theoreticians. It is acknowledged, to be sure, that bureaucracy and bureaucratism remain problems in Chinese society, problems which are variously attributed to economic and cultural backwardness, the vestiges offeudalism, and the persistence of a "small producers' mentality." But the theory of a new bureaucratic class, with interests fundamentally opposed to the interests of the masses, is a matter now beyond the pale of acceptable political discussion. In its place has come the orthodox dogma that it is impossible for a new exploiting class to emerge in a society which has established a system of "public ownership" of the means of production. It is thus that the radical deemphasis on class struggle serves to obscure the social contradictions generated by the post-revolutionary order itself and instead directs attention to the problems inherited from the past, particularly the heritage of economic backward ness. An evolutionary conception of "the stages of socialism," combined with the doctrine of the increasing diminution of class struggle, is an ideology which serves to support and rationalize the social status quo. Since it is assumed that social development must follow and reflect economic development and since China is economically impoverished-it is an ideology that conveys the message that little or no social change can be anticipated in the foreseeable future. It is also an ideology which serves to dampen utopian hopes since it counsels that what people are able to achieve is bound to (and limited by) the stage of social development in which they find themselves, a stage which is determined, in turn, by the level of development of the productive forces. Thus the striving for socialist and communist goals is largely removed from the realm of human desires and volition and entrusted to the impersonal forces and "objective laws" of economic develop ment. 60. One of the more extensive theoretical discussions of the thesis appeared shortly before Mao's death in a treatise published under the acronym "Ma Yen-wen." See "The Bureaucratic Class and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Pei-ching ta-hsueh hsueh-pao (Peking University Journal) 4 (1976). 61. FBIS Daily Report, 4 May 1981, p. W8. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 5. Socialism and Modernization The overwhelming emphasis on building the economic foundations for socialism in post-Maoist Chinese Marxist theory provides-and is of course intended to provide ideological support for the policy of "the Four Modernizations" pursued by Mao Tse-tung's successors. In contrast to Maoism, contemporary Chinese Marxism gives primacy to productive forces over productive relations, and assumes that economic development rather than class struggle is the motor of historical change. By thereby subordinating the transformation of social relationships to the development of the forces of production, post-Maoist theory serves to postpone the arrival of the communist utopia prophesied in Marxist theory to an unspecified time in the future, to a time when the level of economic development is sufficiently high to support further social change. The guiding theoretical notion which justifies the postponement is essentially the old Soviet assumption (which the Chinese embraced in the early 1950s and which Mao Tse-tung abandoned in the late 1950s) that "public owner ship" of the means of production combined with the rapid development of modern productive forces will more or less automatically produce a communist utopia. While the economic results of the pursuit of the Four Modernizations remain to be seen, the social results are quite predictable-and it safely can be predicted that they will move China further away from, rather than closer to, the socialist goals which modernization presumably is intended to serve. It is above all a policy which will tend to increase and institutionalize socioeconomic inequalities in a society which already suffers from enormous and glaring inequality. Socialism, by Marxist definition, does of course presup pose inequality. If the social product is to be distributed in accordance with the principle of "to each according to one's work," inequality necessarily will result for the simple reason that people are unequally endowed and their labor contributions will thus be uneven. But it is assumed in Marxist theory that the process of building socialism demands progressive reductions in social and economic inequalities. Yet even the most cursory review of post-Maoist economic policies and ideological tendencies reveals an almost wholesale repudiation of egalitarian Maoist practices in favor of policies which mayor may not produce a more rapid rate of economic growth but which will clearly produce greater social inequities. Growing wage differentials accompanied by a renewed stress on material incentives, piece-rate wages, and bonus payments obviously will increase economic differences among the urban working class. Strengthening the authority of factory managers and technological personnel, the borrowing of managerial methods from capitalist countries, and stringent demands for "labor discipline" can only widen the gap between managers and workers in factories. Higher wages and status for the technological intelligentsia, ideologically rationalized by the revival of the formula that "intellectuals are part of the working class," may yield short-term economic benefits but will cer tainly have the long-term result of promoting the stratification of bureaucratic and intellectual elites increasingly separated from the masses of workers and peasants. The adoption of profit-making criteria for the operation of economic enterprises is likely to increase already enormous regional economic differences. Agricultural policies which deemphasize collective work in favor of individual family farming and market relations will surely result in greater socioeconomic inequality in the countryside. Finally, the abandonment of Maoist educational reforms in favor of the system which existed in the 1950s will promote and reinforce social differentiations in general. The educational system is of course a powerful force for fostering equality-or inequality-in any society, but particularly so in one where private ownership of the means of production has been abolished and where social status is based on income and function rather than property. The reintroduction of standard ized examinations for admission to secondary schools and universities, the revival of traditional teaching methods and performance criteria, and the reopening of special schools for unusually talented youth are measures which obviously favor the children of bureaucrats and intellectuals over children from working class families, and favor urban over rural inhabitants. These policies, which proceed under the slogans of "the Four Modernizations," and "socialist modernization," are logically accompanied by increasingly strident condemnations of what is called "the fallacy of egalitarianism," an ideological drive reminiscent of Stalin's infamous campaigns against egalitarian strivings, which the old Soviet dictator once denounced as worthy only of "a primitive sect of ascetic monks." And the policies and ideology of Mao's successors are likely to yield social results similar to those brought about by their Soviet counterparts. If the degree of socioeconomic equality is one standard to measure whether a society is socialist, or one moving in a socialist direction, then it would seem that there is little socialist in the much-heralded program of "socialist modernization." "If a socialist society does not promote socially collectiv istic aims, then what of socialism still remains?" Mao Tse-tung once asked. 62 It is not a question that his political and ideological successors seem inclined to ponder. An economically deterministic interpretation of Marxism which subordinates all to the over-riding task of developing productive forces in the most rapid possible fashion is not a version of Marxism conducive to confronting the dilemma of the means and ends of socialism. Whereas Maoism, in the Maoist era, was distinguished by its concern with reconciling the means of modern economic development with the ends of socialism, this concern is glaringly absent in the post-Maoist version of "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought." The revised doctrine rests on a faith that modern technology is a universal panacea for all the ills and contradictions which afflict society. In the process, the means of economic development tend increasingly to be converted into final ends. Indeed, one of the more curious features of the current Chinese Marxist mentality is a proclivity to define socialism almost exclusively in terms of economic productivity. "The aim of the socialist revolution is to emancipate the productive forces," the Party theoretical journal Red Flag announced at the time of the inauguration of the policy of "the Four Modernizations."" "The ultimate goal of all our revolutionary struggle is to liberate and develop socialist economic construction to raise the material standards of all the people," it is typically stated in the most prominent Marxist periodicals.64 And high Party officials 62. Mao, "Reading Notes on the Soviet Union's 'Political Economy,'" p.197. 63. Hung·ch'i (Red Hag) I (January 1977). 14 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org I repeatedly declare that "the aim of our Party in leading the whole nation in making revolution and taking over political power is, in the final analysis, to develop the economy."6.5 The writings and speeches where such statements appear are remarkably unconcerned with the presumably Marxian socialist and communist goals of the revolution, save in the most ritualistic and passing fashion. "Socialism" is virtually equated with modernization and the rapid development of the productive forces. Indeed, it is often suggested that a socialist society is to be evaluated by its productive achievements. As China's leading economic journal rhetorically queries: "If the development of the socialist economy is permanently slower than that of the capitalist economy, where is the manifestation of the superiority of socialism?"66 It might also be asked that if the aim of socialism is to "develop the productive forces," then wherein lies the difference between socialism and capitalism? China's present political and ideological leaders believe that they are pursuing a path to an inevitable socialist and communist future, and there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the belief. But one well might ask whether the means they are employing are consistent with the ends they proclaim to seek. An economistic doctrine which subordinates social and ideological considerations to the task of building modern productive forces-and assumes that the desired social results will naturally flow from a developed economy-is a doctrine that not only ignores the dilemma of reconciling the means of modem industrialism with the goals of socialism, but also one which neglects the question of the nature of the human beings who presumably will construct the envisioned new society. It is most unlikely that a people schooled in the ideology and practice of "the Four Modernizations" will emerge from the process with socialist values and ideals-and the latter are no less necessary preconditions for socialism than its assumed material prerequisites. But the post-Maoist version of Chinese Marxist theory propogates the idea that one need only rely on the "vigorous development of productive forces and the gradual elevation of material life" to bring about a "gradual elevation of the socialist consciousness of the people. "61 It is a faith similar to, if not borrowed from, the longstanding Soviet ideological orthodoxy that raising the material standard of life will itself produce a popular socialist consciousness. And there 64. ''The Great Transition and the Important Themes of Historical Mate rialism," Che-hsueh yen-chiu (Philosophic Research) 2 (February 1979). (JPRS 73710:14.) 65. Half Guang, "On the Development of Modem Industry," Beijing Review, 23 March 1979, p. 9. 66. Xue, "Study and Apply the Objective Laws of Socialist Economic Development," p. 7. Recent writings emphasize that the superiority of socialism is demonstrated not by the level of economic development but rather by the rate of increase as compared to capitalist economies. See, for example, Wu Shuqing in Jingji Yanjiu (20 December 1981). It is interesting to note that the recent literature, in contrast to that of the years 1978-80, tends to celebrate the economic accomplishments of the Maoist era (including, in some cases, the Cultural Revolution decade)-in part, to demonstrate the superiority of socialism and, in part, to counter arguments that China's level of economic development is too low to support a socialist society. 67. Sun, "Tentative Discussion of Basic Contradictions in a Socialist Society," p. 10 is little reason to believe that the assumption, and the policies it rationalizes, will yield more salutary social results in China than it has in Russia. By a deterministic reading of Marx's proposition that "being determines consciousness," with "being" often narrowly interpreted as the level of economic development, contempo rary Chinese Marxists present a mechanistic version of Marxist theory which distorts the writings of Marx as well as abandons the teachings of Mao. Marx, for one, did not assume that socialism was simply the product of modern economic develop ment, or even, for that matter, the transformation of social relationships. No less important was the socialist transformation of human beings through what Marx called "revolutionizing practice," whereby people would change themselves in the course of changing their social world. "The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that therefore changed men are the product of other cir cumstances and changed upbringing," Marx wrote, "forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated .... The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice."68 For Marx the new society presupposed, among other preconditions, the emergence of "new men." Mao Tse-tung was very much in accord with this strand in the Marxist tradition (however much he may have departed from Marxism in other areas) in his repeated insistence. on the importance of "remolding people."69 And Mao shared with Martin Buber the "utopian" belief that the achievement of socialism "depends not on the technological state of things" but rather "on people and their spirit. "10 In the post-Maoist version of Chinese Marxism, however, it is precisely "the technological state of things" that is taken as decisive. And while the appropriate technological state is being built, the socialist and communist goals which modern technology pre sumably is to serve are postponed to an ever more remote future, and tend to become empty rituals increasingly divorced from social reality and political practice. "History," Karl Marx wrote, "is nothing but the activity of men in pursuit of their ends. "1) What ends do Chinese Communists pursue in the post-Maoist era of the People's Republic? They claim to seek the communist utopia prophesied in Marxist theory, but they propagate a version of Marxism which relegates that utopia to an historical time so far in the future that it no longer bears any imaginable relationship to the present. Official post-Maoist Chinese Marxism is an ideol ogy which sets forth a gradual and evolutionary scheme of social development governed by impersonal and objective economic and historical laws, and thus one which provides little place for human will, wishes, and consciousness in the 68. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Collected Works (New York: International Publishers. 1976). vol. 5. p. 7. 69. In Soviet ideology. Mao observed. "the emphasis is on the role played by machines in socialist transformation. However. if we do not raise the consciousness of the peasants and remold the ideology of man. how is it possible to rely on machines alone?" "Reading Notes on the Soviet Union's 'Political Economy ...• p. 336. 70. Martin Buber. Paths in Utopia (Boston: Beacon Press. 1958). pp. 46-47. 71. Karl Marx. Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, T. B. Bottomore and Maxmilian Rubel. eds. (London: Watts, 1956), p. 63. 15 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org making of history. It is an ideology whose authors are preoccu pied more with the burdens of the past than with visions of the future, who dwell more on the limitations imposed by historical reality than on the potentialities history offers. To be sure, it is an ideology which assumes that "modernization" eventually will produce communism, but also one which counsels that people can do little in the here and now to bring about the good society of the future, save to construct its economic foundations. Post-Maoist Chinese Marxism, in essence, is primarily an ideology of modem economic development which promises, at least for the foreseeable future, no more than a slowly improving material standard of life. If Chinese Marxist theoreticians have purged Maoism of its utopian elements, Chinese Communist political leaders have shorn socialism of its socialist meaning. "The purpose of socialism," Teng Hsiao-p'ing says, "is to make the country rich and strong."72 That, of course, has been the purpose of Chinese modernizers and nationalists of all political and ideological persuasions for the past century-and indeed is the aim of nationalist leaders of all modem nations. While the goal of making the country "rich and strong" may satisfy Chinese nationalist impulses, it is not likely to inspire socially utopian aspirations. Nor are many likely to be moved to strive for Marxian ends when Chinese Communist leaders repeatedly insist that the basic principle of the doctrine is the vapid truism that "practice is the sole criterion of truth." The official press complains that China suffers from "a crisis of faith in Marxism. "13 And a foreign journalist observes that "the idealism, the drive, the almost religious fervor that marked Communism's early years and lasted until the Cultural Revolution have largely vanished."" And well might there be a "crisis of faith" and a vanishing of idealism when Marxism is reduced to an ideology of modernization, when the essence of the doctrine is redefined by the banal injunction "to seek truth from facts," when Marxist goals are ritualized by being put off to a remote future, and when socialism itself is virtually equated with modem economic development. Revolutions die not from failures to achieve utopian dreams, but when the goals, if not entirely forgotten, are lodged in a future so distant that they are severed from what is foreseeably possible and removed from the realm of what can be striven for in the here and now. It is precisely that function which is performed by the profoundly antiutopian and economically deterministic character of official Chinese Marxism in the post-Maoist era. In pondering the fate of the Chinese Revolution in a conversation with an American writer in the mid-1960s, Mao Tse-tung wondered: "Is Communism only the piling of brick on brick? Is there no work to be done with man?"15 Mao's successors are busily at work piling bricks, and no doubt they will eventually construct a huge edifice. But it seems doubtful 72. In remarks made to a visiting Rumanian delegation in November 1980. New York Times, 30 December 1980, p. 2. 73. Guo Luoji, "Commenting on the So-called 'Confidence Crisis,'" Shanghai Wen Hui Bao. 13 January 1980. (FBIS, 30 January 1980, pp. 9-11.) 74. Fox Butterfield, "Apathy Replaces Idealism among Chinese," New York Times. 30 December 1980, p. 1. 75. Anna Louise Strong, transcript of "Talk with Mao," 17 January 1964. Anna Louise Strong papers, Peking Municipal Library. that there will be anything socialist or communist about the structure and its inhabitants. If the official Marxist doctrine of the post-Maoist regime holds little socialist potential, then what of the Marxism of the intelligentsia? Here one finds much that is positive and hopeful for the development of critical and radical socialist perspectives -especially the search for democratic socialist strains in the Marxist tradition, the interest in "the young Marx," and the revival (albeit largely abortive) of Marx's theory of alienation. In these respects, some recent Chinese Marxist writings bear striking similarities with the flourishing of democratic socialist thought among East European Marxist intellectuals in the post-Stalin period. Yet in comparing contemporary Chinese Marxism with Eastern European Marxian revitalization move ments, one striking difference is immediately apparent-and it suggests that the Marxism of the Chinese intelligentsia may prove of limited political significance. Eastern European Marxist intellectuals who sought to revive the democratic and humanist strains in the Marxist tradition were centrally con cerned with the relevance of Marxism for political action, and with the political role of the proletariat. These concerns found expression in the various alliances between workers and intellectuals that characterized the most important upheavals against Stalinist and neo-Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe. Such worker-intellectual alliances were crucial in the Hungarian revolt of 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in the Polish up rising of 1970, and more recently in the Solidarity movement. (In the case of the latter, most Western press accounts have gravely underestimated, if not entirely ignored, the role of Marxist intellectuals organized in KOR, in favor ofemphasizing the role of the Catholic Church. While the Polish Church, with the blessings of the Papacy, has arrived at an accommodation with the State in time-honored fashion, many of the Marxist intellectuals of KOR languish in Polish jails.) In the recent writings of Chinese Marxist intellectuals, in contrast to their Eastern European counterparts, neither political action nor the proletariat emerge as prominent con cerns. The possibilities of a Chinese worker-intellectual alliance appear rather dim-not only because of objective political circumstances but also because of the subjective political and intellectual limitations of China's intellectuals. The Democracy Movement of 1978-80 was led mostly by youthful and self-educated former Red Guards, and drew such social support as it acquired from a small minority of younger workers. Intellectuals, or at least members of the established intelligentsia, were conspicuous by their absence-and their silence. While contemporary Marxist intellectuals are intellec tually radical in some cases, they are politically passive in virtually all cases. The leaders of the Chinese state have been far quicker to recognize (and act against) the potentially radical political implications of intellectual interest in "the young Marx," and especially the theory of alienation, than intellectuals have been to act upon those potentialities. In view of their bitter experiences from the Hundred Flowers campaign through the Cultural Revolution, it is of course understandable that intellectuals should look upon political involvement as futile and with a sense of foreboding. But this does not bode well for prospects of any future process of democratic evolution and socialist revitalization in the People's Republic. 16 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org * Shimizu Ikko's "Silver Sanctuary" (Gin no seiiki): A Japanese Business Novel translated and with an introduction by Tamae K. Prindle Introduction "I want to describe lots of people who are directly involved in business," says Shimizu Ikko.' Shimizu Ikko (1931)is the pioneer of Japanese "business novels" (kigyo shOsetsu) and one of the most prolific and popular novelists today. Born in Tokyo, Shimizu attended Waseda University and was active as a freelance writer contributing articles to weekly magazines until he was recognized as a novelist. His An Artery Archipelago (Domyaku retto) was awarded the 28th Japanese Detective Story Writers Association Prize in 1975. As Shimizu notes, the business novel is "young"; they have only been in the Japanese market since the mid-1960s. The mainstay of these novels is their "immediacy to the business world." Because the novelist's artistry in fictionalizing socio-economic data makes it appealing and approachable, novels are informative and expressive at the same time, qualities which even professional economists find quite creditable. And the immense popularity of business novels also speaks for their socio-cultural significance. Shimizu's short story "Silver Sanctuary" (Gin no seiiki) first appeared in the monthly magazine All Reading (Oru yomimono) in January 1969. The story begins with the discovery of an infraction of confidentiality in the administra tion of three "confidential long-term savings accounts," a type of account unfamiliar to most Westerners. This is a system whereby a client opens a long-term savings account under a pseudonym. His real name and address are known by a very limited number of bank employees. Later transactions on this account will be carried out by means of a registered stamp (inkanY bearing the client's pseudonym. It is a technical aberration Shimizu takes special interest in. The story outlines, among other things, the process of training a bank's staff, and brings to light the bank's difficult interpersonal relationships as well as its competition with other banks. We learn of the existence of two career paths: vertical and relatively horizontal. Only executives-in-training have the privilege of rising in rank. Hence, personnel rotation brings about psychological tension among employees, who, in a sense, are like machinery operated by the institution. They are requested to work under the basic principle that "A banker must be trustworthy, almost impartially serious, and at the same time, must not have any personality." Women, in particular, are underdogs. The tragic heroine's name Yoko (meaning a person who "serves," who is "constant" and even "stupid") symbolizes women's status. And in fact, Yoko becomes persona non grata and even a criminal, after offering everything a woman can to Tagawa, Saeki and a number of other men. Feudalism, sexism-many such objections may be raised after a reading of "Silver Sanctuary." Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that business novels project socio-economic reality in Japan and present it in an easily graspable format. I. My interview with Mr. Ikko Shimizu in January 1985. This translation was made of "Gin no seiiki" as it appeared in Churenpoton [Nine Consecutive Jewel Towers) (Tokyo: Kodansha bunko. 1984), pp. 5-46. I am grateful to Mr. Shimizu, Dr. Brett de Bary. Mr. Chris Stevens and Dr. Peter Prindle for their assistance. 2. lnkan is a stick usually made of wood, bamboo, ivory or crystal. A name is carved on one end. By pressing onto a pad of thick ink (which is usually red), the stamp may be used any number of times. Japanese use stamps in place of the Western signature, trusting that virtually no two stamps have an identical carving on them. 17 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org I I I I 1 "Silver Sanctuary" (Gin no seiiki) 1. Exactly three months ago, Tagawa Junji was appointed to be the Manager of the Nitto Bank N Branch Office. He was the first to be nominated from his age group. The incident in question took place just when his management of the bank was beginning to run smoothly. "Something is bothering me . . ." Assistant Manager Nishiyama Kenji looked hesitantly at Tagawa, coming out of a conference. "You must know Ikuno-shP of five-chome: an engineer specializing in the installation of greenhouse heating systems. He telephoned and asked me why the salesman from Daido Bank across the street came to visit him." "You mean ... , why he visited?" Tagawa repeated the question like a parrot. Tagawa had paid a courtesy visit to Ikuno's house once since becoming Manager. It was with Nishiyama. If he remembered correctly, this client lived in an old-fashioned pre-fabricated rusting steel frame house which had been expanded by annexing a brick walled shed. Seem ingly,the owner of this ramshackle house without even a business sign-board has been carefully saving every penny. In the N Branch Office alone, he had a confidential long-term savings account of 25 million yen. 5 Tagawa found it difficult to put the person and the amount of his savings together. "In other words, he is having a difficult time convincing himself that there was no purpose to the salesman's visit. He says that nobody other than our bank should know about his 25 million yen account . . . You remember his shanty, don't you? The reason why he lives in that run-down house, he says, is to get around unnecessary taxation. How did Daido Bank find out about his savings? He is panic-stricken. He is afraid that the tax bureau may trace back his actual income, now that the Daido Bank has learned about it." Tagawa smiled critically. He did not disapprove of the penny-pincher mentality, but it made no sense to directly connect the salesman's visit with the problem of taxation, and to be frightened by the idea. "It's not that Daido demanded a transfer of his 25 million yen in our bank into theirs, is it?" "Heaven forbid!" "Then, there's nothing to worry about." "The only thing is-although this may only be a coincidence-Norisaka-san on K Street, where I dropped in yesterday, had also been solicited by Daido Bank." Norisaka on K Street owns a small grocery store. Although the store is small, he used to be the largest landlord in the area and has been a regular customer at the Nitto Bank N Branch Office. His long-term savings account holds nearly 30 million yen. "I wonder what they are doing at Daido Bank, a memorial savings raising campaign, or something of that sort?" 3. "-shi" is a title suffix, used at more formal situations than when "-san" may be used. Its English equivalent would be "Mr." 4. ChOme is an area designation slightly different from a street name. 5. The historical context of this short story is not clear, but judging by the housing condition and the geographical setting in the story, the period is likely to be sometime before the international exchange rate of$l = Y 360 was altered. Shimizu Ikkii Through the thin lace curtains, Tagawa peered into the two-storied white Daid6 Bank N Branch Office kitty-comer across the narrow intersection in front of N Station. Next-door to it was a Mutual Bank. 6 In all, there were six branches of financial institutions in the neighborhood. "Nothing that I know of." "Well then, did they decide to steal our regular customers?" If only one customer had been solicited, one could say that it was just a coincidence. It would not have bothered Tagawa. But with two private account clients having been approached one after the other by the Daido Bank salesman, a certain amount of caution was necessary. N Station was located on a private railway network. It was only thirty minutes away from Ikebukuro Station on the National Railway Yamate Line. The daily number of passengers on this private line was approximately twenty thousand. The district had been attracting growing interest as a newly developed residential area. New banks had mush roomed at a speed comparable to that of the regional develop ment itself. Now that the area was completely built up, as many as six branch offices of banks flanked their eaves. They competed bitterly against one another, trying to pick up more clients. Not simply for the sake of competition, but also because no office could expect substantial savings from new home owners. Salesmen who attempted to conscript opulent savers had no choice but to take over long-committed clients from other banks. 6. Traditionally, a Japanese Mutual Bank used the system of mutual financing, wherein the members of the "bank" would pool in fund" and some of them as selected by drawing. tin example. would have the privilege of borrowing from it. Nowadays, Mutual Banks are more like short-term financiers. 18 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org The bank entrusted to Tagawa Junji was located in one of the most competitive zones in Tokyo. Tagawa was con sidered a future spearhead of the bank. He was singled out to be its Manager at the age of thirty-seven. Regardless of when or where, the bank management, by nature, demanded a steady climb in the amount of customers' deposits. Inasmuch as the survival of branch offices depended on this, the offices could not help but become sensitive to the activities of large deposit holders. "I hope that nothing serious is going on. For now, I'II go talk with the two clients." "That may help." First a self-defence, next a counterattack! But the strategy for the counterattack would develop only out of a knowledge as to what the opponents knows, and what they are after. Ikuno and Norisaka, the two clients Tagawa visited that day, reprimanded Tagawa, claiming that the financial secret of an individual should not be used as a means to promote a bank's coming out on top in the overheated competition. They demanded his assurance of the confidentiality of their accounts. "Something is strange. The confidential deposits'list must have been leaked from within Nitto Bank." Frowning nervously, Ikuno kept after Tagawa. His expression looked unbecoming to a man of his chubby physique. "I swear, Sir, that there was no mistake." "But, I still can't put faith in ..." "It is the duty of a bank to keep the secrets of its clients." Tagawa tightened his handsome face and spoke crisply. "May I ask what the name ofthe salesman from Daido Bank was?" "I think it was Saeki, or something like that." Tagawa had seen a calling card at Norisaka's home where he had visited before coming to see Ikuno. The name on it read Saeki Kikuo. In Norisaka's description, he was a "smooth and pale faced fellow." Tagawa decided to check up on Saeki Kikuo as soon as possible. But upon his return to the N Branch Office, he ran into an emergency causing him to react much faster than he had planned. Another large deposit holder, Aoki Tatsuo, was waiting for his return in the Manager's office. "What the hell is going on, Manager? This man came to see me. What does this mean?" Baldheaded Aoki tossed a calling card on a side table. As Tagawa stooped over to peer at it, he saw again Saeki's name printed on it. Tagawa was tempted to say, "Oh, he went to your house, too," but swallowed his words at the last minute. "I see, it's Daido Bank. Is this something new?" Tagawa sat on the sofa, facing Aoki and questioned him calmly. "He asked me to deposit some money." Aoki' s voice mirrored his disappointment that his bravado had failed to impress Tagawa. But he regained his feistiness right away; his voice grew inflated. "I tried to get rid of him. I told him that I had no money to save. Then, what do you think? The guy with ridiculous-look ing glasses had the nerve to say, 'You have some money, don't you, Sir?' He had a big grin on his face!" "My God, he is forward!" "He knew what he was doing, though. Listen. The man said, 'You have 50 million yen in the confidential account at Nitto Bank alone. Since it matures next month, won't you kindly take advantage of our services and deposit just half of it with us?' Can you imagine? Can you think of anything more absurd than this?" Tagawa caught his breath at Aoki's piercing words. Aoki gained confidence to see Tagawa's reaction. He became coarse. In a sarcastic, caustic tone, he attacked Tagawa, "I don't see how my account with Nitto is known by people at Daido." "I assure you that there's nothing like that." "But in fact things are getting out of hand." Tagawa feared that this mix-up might tum into a fatal blow to his career. There couldn't be a leakage of the informa tion about confidential long-term savings accounts unless there was inside sabotage. "Say what you may, I can't trust you with my money. I am withdrawing all my accounts here. This bank can not be trusted," Aoki roared, banging on the armrest of the sofa, and the arteries of his boar-like neck bulged grotesquely. To the N Office, the 50 million yen was a significant amount. If the total of this sum was recalled, the achievement record of the office would suddenly go down. "As you may know, the competition among banks is vicious. It's exactly like the saying, 'a hundred devils marching at night.' It is difficult to tell what kind of trap Daido has set up against us. But it is, at least, unlikely that the information has leaked from within. In any event, I shall investigate the situation right away. Please kindly give us time to find out what is really going on." Tagawa could not afford to take the case lightly. He edged forward on the sofa and tried his best to calm Aoki down. Just then, he began feeling a strange anxiety. Rather than anxiety, it may have been a gut feeling or a brainstorm that struck him. An image momentarily loomed in the back of his brain, like a shadow floating between dark waves. It disappeared and came to the surface again, and again and again. "Please give me a week. One week will do. I can rectify the situation as soon as the cause is pinned down." "What would you do, if you can't pin down the cause?" "I will see to it that you will not be inconvenienced." Tagawa bowed low. "When the Manager is young, the management is bound to fall apart." Aoki spoke spitefully, and added emphatically, "I won't wait more than a week!" After Aoki left, Tagawa pondered over the anxiety he had just felt and thought about the shadow which had wafted through the back of his brain. It was really a crazy idea, but judging from her post, it was not totally improbable. If, moreover, her personal resentment against Tagawa still lingered, there could be a smell of revenge behind what was happening. Tagawa lifted the inter-com receiver and asked two telephone switchboard operators, "Does the name Saeki Kikuo ring a bell to you?" "From where, Sir?" "What I mean is, do either of you remember anybody from our bank calling a person named Saeki, or Saeki calling somebody here?" The two operators whispered to each other. Holding the receiver, Tagawa had the distasteful premonition that the girls would name the person whose image had just passed his brain. "It seems that Takigami Yoko-san used to call him. She stopped calling him about two months ago." Tagawa winced at these words. He was right ... , exactly as the premonition had foretold. A heavy sigh escaped his mouth. 19 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 2. It was an ironic encounter as Tagawa recalled. He couldn't help making it out as ironic to find Takigami Y6ko in the N Branch Office at which he had been assigned Manager. Tagawa had graduated from the Department of Economics of University A. After entering Nitt6 Bank, he worked for five years as executive-in-training. His desk was in the first section of the General Affairs Office in the main building. Sub sequently, he was sent to the Ikebukuro Branch Office, which was an auxiliary branch of the bank in the 16hoku District. This time, he was an executive-in-training in branch office management. There, for the first time, he was introduced to his co-worker Takigami- Y6ko. She was a clerk at the front window, in charge of the day-to-day transactions. Y6ko had graduated from high school and had worked in the office for three years already. She was twenty-one years old and was more experienced than Tagawa both as a clerk and also in terms of the ins-and-outs of life at the regional office. With the sophistication of a city woman, she covered Tagawa's blunders. Tagawa was perturbed by the monotony and uneventful ness of life in a regional office, mostly because he knew nothing outside the colorful life of the main office. Indeed, the dissatisfaction and chagrin felt by the bottom rank workers in peripheral branch offices had no outlet. Tagawa's immediate supervisor, Konno lun'ichi, in charge of the day-to-day transactions, for instance, had graduated from a provincial university and had been sent to a branch office from the beginning. His career had always been off the high-level executive track Tagawa was on. Konno would never be given a chance to work in the main office. It was evident that Tagawa and other future executives would pass him by soon enough. Konno would be placed under their supervision. All the more because of these circumstances, Konno would at times bicker with the inexperienced Tagawa as a mother-in-law would, but again would instantly soften up and take Tagawa to a bar. Under the influence of alcohol, he would cajole Tagawa with the words, "Please help me out in the future." While being harassed by frustration and the need to persevere, this underling class gradually came to squeeze themselves into the "banker type" mold, a severely confining one. The first end-of-the-year party at the Ikebukuro Office was held shortly after Tagawa was transferred there. This party fell into an unbelievable nightmare. "Too bad Manager is going to be absent from the party this year again," Y6ko remarked, giving her hands a little rest from bookkeeping. The bank's customer service was over by now. "But he seems to be donating funds for the party. We may have a better time without him." "Only if nothing happens ..." At the time, Tagawa did not catch the delicate nuances of Y6ko's remark. The party was held in a neighboring restaurant and went on merrily. Suddenly, just as the fun and games started to get out of control, the lights went off. Concurrently with the female clerks' theatrical screams, Tagawa saw a number of shadows swooping toward the Deputy Manager, who was sitting kitty-corner to him. He took this movement to be a part of the entertainment and had no suspicions. But against the noise of small tables being thrown around and dishes and bowls being broken, the Deputy's pathetic cry, "Cut it out!" pierced through the darkness. Shadows swayed and muffled the shrieks. Startled by the heavy and bizarre atmosphere condensed in the darkness, Tagawa started to get up. Instantly, somebody grabbed his hand and pulled him back in his seat. He could not make head from tails in the darkness. He could not even tell who it was that had pulled his hand. There was a thud of something falling down the stairs. "Don't move. Don't look at anything. Just sit still!" It was Y6ko who was ordering him in whispers. The lights came back on and the party members hurrahed. But the Deputy's seat was a gaping hole. Only at the distraught screams of the restaurant workers did Tagawa realize that Yamazaki, the forty-five or forty-six-year-old Deputy Manager, had been thrown down the stairs by somebody and was groaning. The victim took nearly a week offfrom work for treatment. It was an atrocious, incredible incident. It was a sinister rebellion by the bottom rank workers against the institution's forceful casting of them into a uniformity of personality. One must not stand out, must not be praised or berated. One must not become a topic of conversation. One must strive in every way possible not to commit either virtue or vice. Overnight, the bank was back to the smiling, sophisticated work-place, just as it had always been. No one mentioned Deputy Yamazaki's injury. Those who had struck out at him in the darkness, as an outlet for their pent-up resentment, received clients with the usual smiles. They threw themselves diligently into their assigned work like a congregation of saints. "Did you know what was going to happen'?" Tagawa asked Y6ko a couple of days later when they ran into each other on their way home. But Y6ko shook her head with a heavy-hearted smile. "That has nothing to do with Tagawa-san, because you don't belong here. You will return to the main office and be promoted to be a section head or an executive. It's best if you forget about it quickly and finish up your service at the branch office. Just stay away from this mess." Tagawa momentarily felt that Y6ko's age and his were reversed. Exactly a week after the party something else happened: the spotting of a forged check. Y6ko, who was waiting on clients as usual, nonchalantly attached a small note to a check and sent it to Tagawa. Tagawa stretched his neck and looked at the note. "Forged." He re-read it in surprise. He was not mistaken. "Please have a seat and wait." Just when Tagawa cast his glance at her Y6ko was addressing with her usual calmness a pale-faced man in his forties who looked like a small factory owner. Tagawa's head throbbed with pulsating blood. He lost his composure, but Y6ko, as though to divert the man's attention, took on another client. Tagawa inserted the check along with Yoko's note in some other documents and brought them to Chief Clerk Konno. His knees trembled as he stood in front of the Chief Clerk. He was afraid he might collapse. It was a forgery alright, but a very amateurish one. The number "6" had simply been changed to "9" with a pen. 7 7. 1\ (6). fL (9). 20 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org Sixty-one thousand yen had been changed to ninety-one thousand yen. It was the kind of forgery to be detected sooner or later, even if the window clerk had failed to notice. Seen from another angle, it showed how hard up the forger was. The man was arrested in no time. Assuming that the ideal image of a banker is not to be praised, not to be criticized, nor even to be talked about, Takigawa Yoko's difficulties, it may be said, started at this point. Mostly because it happened to be the end of the year, when a crime-prevention campaign was at its peak, the incident attracted the newspapers' attention. They praised the exemplary way in which Yoko had handled the situation. The articles were entitled "An Ingenious Banker," "Skillfully Detecting a Forger," and the like. Because Tagawa was her co-worker, he was included in a picture in the papers. Tagawa learned from the newspaper articles that the criminal's name was Hirayama IchirO. He managed a small manufacturing business. A machine which made plastic bags was installed in the entrance of his tiny house. Both the man and his wife did everything, from delivering the products to the wholesalers, to operating the machine. They worked assiduously, even cutting down on their sleep at night, but they could not make ends meet at the end of the year. After much anguish, Hirayama made up his mind to resort to crime. The incident precipitated an intimacy between Tagawa and Yoko. Yoko forced Tagawa to join a company skiing trip in the JCietsu Highlands during the three day New Year's vacation. They spent the entire vacation as lovers. Yoko was in high spirits and was active as though her youth had swept her away. Her laughter and nimble movements permeated Tagawa's mind. It was in mid-January that Yoko asked in a formal manner, "Would you like to have tea with me on our way home?" Tagawa met her by the West Exit of the station, which was on the other side of the station from his bank building. They walked passed the insolently lined up drinking stalls in front of the station and came to a Western style delicatessen-coffee shop near North Ikebukuro. 'There's something I would like to talk over with you, Tagawa-san," Yoko began after ordering something to drink. She told Tagawa that her father was a guard at the Nippori Branch Office of the Nitto Bank. It was he who had arranged her employment at the Ikebukuro Office. "The Deputy Manager asked me yesterday if I would be interested in moving to the General Affairs Department in the main office," Yoko announced with hardly a sign of elation. "Sounds great!" "I imagine that the incident has something to do with this transfer." "Whatever the reason, it's an exceptional break for you. No matter how you look at it, the main office is the best. It makes you feel you are really working for a bank." Apparently, the main office had been obliged to make a gesture of appreciation towards Yoko so long as the incident of the forged check had gotten so much pUblicity. "But ... ,.. Yoko cast a glance downward as though she was thinking about something. Then quickly she looked up straight into Tagawa's handsome face. "When can Tagawa-san go back to the main office?" Yoko asked urgently without even blinking. "I wish I knew. It's been only four months since I came to Ikebukuro. It's unlikely that I get to go back for another two or three years." Tagawa equivocated, flinching at Yoko's strangely intense stare. "What does your father say? That's more important." "He advises me to take the post, because it's a great honor." "Definitely. Also, the main office has a lot of good-looking men. They won't leave you alone for long. You will be proposed to." Tagawa talked jokingly, making himself at home. Their relationship after the forged check incident, the New Year's ski trip, and a couple of dates, one coming right after another, was close enough to permit this kind of dialogue. But the way Tagawa teased her made Yoko's eyes cloud over. Her head suddenly dropped down. "That's why I don't want to go. If Tagawa-san talks like that, I will tum down the offer ," she said in a trembling voice. "What's wrong?" he asked in bewilderment. This change in her was something he had not expected. He did not think he had said anything wrong. The main office was better than a branch office-that was simply common knowledge. But Yoko shook her bowed head. She shook it once again after a short while, as though to shake off Tagawa's way of talking. "Did I say something wrong?" "You said that the handsome men there won't leave me alone." "No kidding, though. It may really happen." "Please. Don't talk like that. I feel rotten," Yoko interrupted Tagawa, revealing her virginal innocence. She could not tolerate the idea of a stranger proposing to her to get married. "I have a better time at this Ikebukuro Office." "Oh? But you won't come across another chance to go to the main office," Tagawa admonished her, and suspected at the same time that Yoko would be transferred for certain to another office at the bank's next personnel rotation, if she lets go of this offer. Now that she had caught the forged check, had been written up in the papers, and had made herself a topic of conversation, Yoko had ceased to be the invisible clerk which all the rest were. A bank should be a place where nothing exciting happens, a place to which clients peacefully entrust their money. Even though nothing was wrong, the sheer fact that something had happened at the front window would slow down the canvassing activities. Yoko's presence at the front window of the Ikebukuro Office would only remind customers, over and over again, of the unpleasant incident. Her presence, therefore, was undesirable. A bank usually makes an effort to wipe off the trace of such a troublesome impression quickly. Here was the merit of the personnel rotation. Tagawa meant to explain that it would be far better for her to be sent to the main office than to another nasty place, but Yoko raised her eyes as though to cut off his words. "... it's because, if I go to the main office, I won't be able to work with Tagawa-san." "Work with me?" asked Tagawa, thrusting his face forward. Yoko gave a big nod. Tagawa looked back at her in surprise. Yoko's eyes, ardently looking into Tagawa's face, were filled with burning desire. Tagawa sensed a desperate affection in the sparks of her eyes which were ready to ignite. It was her suicidal proposal. "Shall we go outside?" ~I © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org "Please stay a little while longer." Yoko shook her head violently. And she pleaded in a still more precipitous tone, "I would like to work with you. But if it bothers you, I would like you to let me know clearly." Her gasp echoed loud in Tagawa's heart. "How can I be bothered? You taught me everything about the branch office life and work." "No, that's not what I'm talking about. Please tell me . . ." The tone of her voice was violent and petulant. Without giving him a chance to hedge, Yoko demanded that he evaluate her feelings towards him. "If you don't mind." Tagawa spoke looking slightly downward. "I don't." Yoko spoke as though she clung onto Tagawa's words with her entire body. When Tagawa raised his smiling face, rapturous jubilation spread over her blushing cheeks. Tagawa was impressed by Yoko's youthful glamor. At that instant, he wished to arrive at a deeper and more violent conviction which might satisfy his flaring passion. "Let's have a drink." Tagawa offered the initiative, being careful in the meantime not to let her know that he wanted to express his man's urgent desire and decide the issue at once. Smiling hesitantly, Yoko nodded gently. Outside the coffee shop, a whirling, chilly wind enveloped the two people. Yoko leaned heavily on the arm Tagawa casually thrust out. That night Tagawa got engaged to Y6ko whose white flesh was stained by fresh blood. 3. It did not take long for talk of their relationship to spread among the Ikebukuro Office employees. Yako was in a constant rapture over the idea of marriage with Tagawa. When her colleagues teased her, she blushed happily, even appreciatively. Such scenes made Tagawa feel that he should conclude the marriage before long. "Let's first talk to your father." No matter how quickly he wanted to proceed, there were preparations to make. They had to be taken care of in a certain order. The happiness of having Yoko's help bolstered him through these otherwise onerous procedures. Takigarni Yiikichi, Yoko's father, who worked as a guard at the Nippori Office, met Tagawa cordially in his Takinogawa apartment. "My daughter has been telling me about you. Please don't worry about me. I will manage by myself after she gets married. I only have this apartment of a six tatami mat" room to look after." Yiikichi was courteous and calm. He showed a sensitive concern, trying to free Tagawa from any anxiety about disntpting the father-daughter bond. "I would like to have the wedding this spring. If I wait till fall, I will be twenty-nine." Bowing his gray-haired head low, Yiikichi cordially thanked Tagawa for suggesting that they make simple prepara 8. The size of a tatami mat in the Tokyo area nowadays is 5.8 by 2.0 feet (1. 76 by 0.88 meters) according to Kodansha Encyclopedia ofJapan (Tokyo, 1983), p. 348. tions to suit Yiikichi's financial condition. Tagawa decided to introduce Yoko to his parents in Yamanashi Prefecture early in February. Very early that February, Hirayama Ichiro, the culprit who had forged the check committed family suicide. Chief Clerk Konno, who had opened the evening paper shortly before the five o'clock closing hour, called Tagawa in a disturbed voice, "Oh, God! That son of a gun has committed suicide!" Tagawa twisted his body to look back at Konno. "That son of a gun?" "Yeah, that forged check criminal." "What! Hirayama . . ." Tagawa kicked away his chair and rushed to Konno's desk. "Small Businessman Commits Family Suicide." The large headline jumped out at Tagawa's eyes. Tagawa bent over the caption which started with a quotation from Hirayama's will, "Once convicted of forgery, it's impossible to make a living ..." "It's a suicide of a family of five," Konno reported to the other clerks. All turned to look at him. "A family suicide!" Somebody shouted. Two or three people rushed to look at the newspaper on Konno's desk. One of them groaned, "With gas." "I never got to see the criminal closely, but I would have never guessed that he had three such cute children. What a nightmare." Konno shook his head afflicted. The paper reported that it appeared that Hirayama Ichir6 and his wife waited till their children had fallen asleep, took sleeping pills, and turned on the gas. The so-called check forgery was only a matter of changing the figure "sixty thousand" to "ninety thousand." It was a crime of thirty thousand yen. On the grounds that the bank incurred no real loss, it decided not to prosecute. Hirayama Ichiro had been released from jail quite awhile before. Having read the article, and turning his face away from the picture of the family of five, Tagawa looked at Y6ko. "It was only thirty thousand yen. I don't see why he had to die," Yoko heard one of the bank clerks remark after reading the paper. She got on her feet with her pale face bent downward. Covering her mouth with her hand, she scurried out to the locker room. Tagawa hurried after her. Yoko was standing alone motionless by the end of a row of lockers. She lost control of herself at the sight of Tagawa and covered her face with both hands. "Let's not worry about it." Tagawa held Yoko's shoulders and pulled her toward him. "It wasn't our fault, was it?" "But, it was because I found the forgery. Yes, I drove them to family suicide." Yoko lifted her tear-filled eyes and looked up at Tagawa pleadingly. "You are worrying too much." "But I can't forget that man's exhausted face." Unable to control her emotions, Yoko pressed her face onto Tagawa's chest. "It was my fault. Yes, absolutely. I get to marry Junji-san because of that incident. Meanwhile, someone else was driven to commit suicide ... how dreadful!" "You are wrong. Pull yourself together." There was no need to picture what kind of life the Hirayama family had led since it had been written up in the papers. But was it necessary for Yoko and Tagawa to bear the blame for it? "Oh, I hate it. I can't stand it! He may have died cursing 22 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org us. Don't you think so?" "More serious than cursing would be the question of how Y6ko and I struck him. As merciless prosecutors? As stuck-up money guards ... ?" wondered Tagawa. Y6ko was not the only one to feel wretched. "What else could we do then? You see, once a forgery is noticed, a banker is not allowed to overlook it. Even supposing that a family suicide was to follow as a consequence, we shouldn't be blamed for it, to say the least. Money. Money is the evil force." Tagawa held Y6ko tightly against his tall body, as if to chase away his delusion. "I would like you to wait awhile before you take me to your parents," asked Y6ko the next day. It was understandable. Tagawa decided to wait till Y6ko had recovered from the trauma of the Hirayama family's sui cide. But as it turned out, the family suicide of the man convicted of check forgery was only an omen that the bond between Tagawa and Y6ko would be disrupted. Exactly a week later, when Y6ko was just pulling out of her shock and regaining mental eqUilibrium, Takigawa Yiikichi was em broiled in a scandal. That morning, Tagawa was awakened by his apartment manager's call, "Telephone!" "My father is in trouble." The call was from Y6ko, sobbing helplessly. Rubbing his sleepy eyes and gathering the collar of his night robe together, Tagawa asked clumsily, "What's going on?" "I was right. The man who committed suicide was cursing us." Y6ko's words made little sense. Only sometime later, she brought herself together to explain in a choking voice, "My father is in critical condition." Putting her choppy phrases together, Tagawa figured out that there had been a carbon monoxide poisoning caused by the imperfect combustion of a gas burner at her father's Nippori Office. Two young bankers who happened to be staying overnight in the Night Duty Room had passed away. Yiikichi alone barely survived, but had been taken to the hospital in critical condition. ''I'm calling from the hospital. My father is in the emergency room, and ..." Upset and distraught, Y6ko lost track of what she was saying. "Where is the hospital? Do you hear me? Which hospital are you in?" "Right by Nippori Station, M Hospital." "I'll be right over. Your father is safe, isn't he?" "They are giving him oxygen." "There's no such thing as Hirayama Ichir6's curse, so calm down. Understand? Pull yourself together." Rushing back to his room, Tagawa changed his clothes and ran out. It was difficult to find a taxi. The one he finally caught moved cautiously and slowly. He could almost hear Y6ko's desperate voice calling from the other shore of the river Styx. "Why did that gentle Takigami Yfikichi have to ... ?" Tagawa brooded over the nature of the accident. Finally in the hospital, he found Y6ko doubled up on a chair in a corridor. A chilly breeze blew through. "How did it go?" he asked, running up to her. Y6ko raised her face vacantly. She directed her empty gaze at the emergency room. She looked like a figure drained out of the energy to cry or tears to drop. "Does it seem as if he's going to make it?" "I have no idea." "I wonder if it's really bad." "... he may not have a chance." "Don't be foolish." Tagawa squeezed Y6ko 's hand firmly. Presently, the Deputy Manager of the Nippori Office ran over. Also, the police who had inspected the site came to check on Yfikichi's condition. The Deputy Manager explained what might have happened. His story was that Yiikichi was on duty the night before. He must have allowed the two bank clerks to stay overnight. The two had gotten drunk in the Nippori area and had missed the last train. Judging from the appearance of the room, furthermore, it was likely that the two men started drinking what they brought. Yiikichi joined them. In drunkenness, he fell asleep on the floor without shutting off the gas burner. This was what caused the incomplete combustion. "Please wait. Takigami-san can't drink." "There's always such a thing as being obliged to drink." The Nippori Deputy Manager insisted that it was improb able for Tagawa to fall asleep on the floor unless he had been drinking. Tagawa asked how it could be possible that the two young men had died and the elderly man, Y6ko's father, had survived, if they had all been drinking. But the Deputy would not discuss this point. Tagawa foresaw that the finger of blame would be pointed at Yiikichi sooner or later. Y6ko's father, who pulled through by the skin of his teeth, was moved to his Takinogawa apartment after nearly ten days' hospitalization. The aftereffect of the muscular and brain paralysis, however, had turned him into a semi-vegetable. To make matters worse, the Nippori branch office dismissed Takigami Yiikichi from his post on the grounds that his fingerprints were found on a teacup. 4. The personnel rotation at Nitt6 Bank usually takes place in May and November. Because Tagawa was judged to have been indirectly involved in the incident as well as the accident, his name was included in the list of the people to be transferred as part of the May rotation. He was sent back to the main building eralier than originally planned. He and Y6ko stood out too conspicuously in the Ikebukuro Office. "We could be married by now, if nothing had happened," Tagawa spoke to Y6ko pensively after reporting his transfer. This was when Y6ko at the Ikebukuro Office needed him more than ever, but nothing personal could countermand the periodical rotation. "Maybe by fall my father will be better. Also, Junji-san will still be in Tokyo even after you move to the main office." We can see each other anytime we want to-. Y6ko must have wanted to say this, but there was no time left for her now that she had to attend her father. Her father could no longer take care of his bowel movements. Three months passed without a date, to say nothing of physical relations between them. The financial burden on Y6ko was tre mendous. She had to scrape together, out of a twenty-one-year old woman's salary, her father's medical expenses as well as their living costs. Yiikichi had absolutely no income. Tagawa knew the magnitude of the burden. He offered to help, but Y6ko would not accept. The last shred of hope left for Y6ko to restore the hopeless invalid was mercilessly snatched away that autumn, the very autumn she had once looked forward to. Yiikichi's condition 2.' © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org I I went from bad to worse. Yoko had to take off many days from work in order to look after him. Upon hearing from a clerk in the Ikebukuro Office that Yoko had missed work for over ten days, Tagawa stopped at her Takinogawa apartment. This was his first visit in months. Yoko was sitting forlornly by Yfikichi's pillow. A sad smile appeared on her lifeless pale face when she saw Tagawa. '''The doctor came about an hour ago, and gave him a shot." Yfikichi was asleep, his mouth agape like a child. Out of the blue, Yoko suggested taking a walk. "Once he has fallen asleep, he is alright till morning." The red and round early October moon was almost re morselessly bright for the couple who found themselves walking side by side for the first time in some months. In silence, each craved for a place where they could embrace each other firmly. In a narrow alley leading to Asukayama Park, Tagawa saw the shabby sign-board of an inn. As he turned back, Yoko nodded pressing her body against his. The walls and the ceiling of the somber room were filthy. The quilt, not even enclosed in a white coverlet, looked ruefully cold. "I've done something wrong to Tagawa-san." Yoko spoke in a formal manner, facing Tagawa, but without using her usual appellation "Junji-san." "It's not your fault," said Tagawa comfortingly. Tagawa pulled Yoko's thin, limp hand and embraced her. Yoko lay back on the quilting and sought Tagawa's lips, trembling. It was not just her body, but the very marrow of her soul that had been craving after gentle affection. At Tagawa's first embrace in many months, her entire body instantly flared up. She kept repeating as if in a delirium, "I've done something awful to Tagawa-san." That night, for the first time, Yoko reached climax. Tagawa also, engulfed by her frenzied and violent reaction, was bathed in a soaring intoxication. It was right after this that Yoko broached the proposal to call off the wedding engagement. She insisted that they could not marry as long as she was taking care of her invalid father, and that there was little hope for his recovery. She pleaded desperately with Tagawa that he not let her get in his way. "I am no longer worthy of Tagawa-san's love. I can't even offer my body when you need it." Yoko dissolved into tears, remonstrating with Tagawa-and finally even shouting at him-to forget her, because there was no hope for their future. Never after that day did Yoko telephone Tagawa. On days when he visited the Takinogawa apartment, using Yiikichi's illness as an excuse, she would receive Tagawa only with empty formality, as if he were a stranger. A new marriage offer came Tagawa's way in early November. On a holiday, Business Department Manager Koyanagi Yiizo invited Tagawa to his Shiba-Takanawa home, and advised, "You are asking for misunderstanding by staying a bachelor for such a long time." The name of the woman Koyanagi brought to Tagawa's attention was Oribe Misako. She was the second daughter of Nitto Bank's leading customer, a graduate from the Department of French Literature of Uni versity A, 25 years old. "She's by no means young, but she's good looking as you can see from this photograph. She has the perfect background for a banker's wife." Koyanagi hammered away, "You already know what kind of place a bank is. It's different from ordinary companies. One cannot marry just anyone." "I appreciate your concern." Tagawa was on the verge of telling Koyanagi that he was already engaged to be married to another woman when Koya nagi continued knowingly, "For example, one must not marry the daughter of a guard who, out of carelessness, got drunk and fell asleep, and as a result, took the lives of two young and promising men." "But that accident was . . ." "I know. I have talked with the Manager of the Ikebukuro Office. You probably want to add that the woman is the one who spotted the forged check. But even that is a problem to us now." "Don't you see? Suppose you marry her, everytime you are reviewed for promotion, there is bound to be someone who will say that Tagawa-kun9 is outstanding but his wife is problematic. That won't help. Think twice about what I'm saying. I mean her father's incident and the forged check case included. All of this will affect your future adversely, making you seem as problematic. You will be branded a non-desirable type of banker. This is why I transferred you out from the Ikebukuro Office. Once you are tainted it's too late. Nothing can remove the stain. A person in charge of personnel-who ever it may be-would take the less tainted one, if he had to choose between you and someone else." ''Tainted . . ." A strange word. While it has virtually no meaning in and of itself, its connotations are endless. In the extremely limited context of bank parlance, moreover, the word has the power to take over people's personalities. Koyanagi added, "I want you to think hard about the meaning of the phrase we hear all the time, 'the image of a typical banker. '" That is, a banker must be trustworthy and almost impartially serious, and at the same time, must not have any personality. Koyanagi was asking Tagawa to fit himself into the assigned mold. One could not re main at the highly selective level of executive without coming to terms with this framework. Tagawa refrained from making a clear-cut response. He asked Koyanagi to give him some time to make up his mind. Koyanagi patiently kept after him through the end of the year, going so far as. to admonish, "This is your last chance to wipe out the stain you almost got at the Ikebukuro Office." In January of the following year, Yoko was transferred to the Sugamo Office, as a part of an irregular rotation. The superficial reason given by the bank was that it would be easier for her to look after her father if she worked closer to her home. But in practice, the Sugamo Office was farther way from her apartment than the Ikebukuro Office. There was no telling where she might be sent next. Tagawa finally made up his mind and told Yoko in a letter that he probably would be married in the near future. His marriage to Oribe Misako took place just as he was offered a promotion to Chief Clerk of the Business Department, First Section. The announcement of promotion was dated May 9. "-kun" is a title suffix like "-san" and "-shi." but the addressee or the ~eferen.t is usual!y a man of lower status or of younger age. unless the speaker IS a chIld speakmg to another male child. 24 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org first. Ironically, it was when Tagawa returned from his honey moon that he heard about YUkichi's death. Yoko's father had just died after a year and several months' illness; by the time he breathed his last, he was as frightened of death as a child, because of the brain damage. Tagawa's first son was born, and his second, two years later. In the fourth year after his marriage to Misako, Tagawa was singled out to be the Deputy Section Chief of the Business Department. At last, he had a clear sense of his future. He was definitely on the high level executive track. This turn of events could be seen as a reward for marrying someone recommended by Koyanagi, the Business Department Manager. About a year before he was appointed as Manager of N office-that is, in the seventh year after he moved from the Ikebukuro Office back to the Main Office-Tagawa heard about Yoko, the woman he had nearly forgotten. It so happened that Aizawa Koichi had transferred from the Sugamo Branch Office and joined Tagawa's section. Tagawa sponsored a small welcome party for him. "Sir, have you heard of a woman named Takigami Yoko?" asked Aizawa as an afterthought, when the conversation drifted to the topic of personnel. "Takigami Yoko!" repeated Tagawa, taken aback. It was a name he had long forgotten. "They say she has worked with you before, in the Ikebukuro Office," Aizawa went on with a smile, probably because he was uninformed about the details. "We used to sit next to each other at the customer window. But that's when I was twenty-eight years old. Seven years ago, wouldn't it be? How do you know her?" "Because she is in the Sugamo Office." "In Sugamo? Is she still single?" "Of course. Didn't you know?" -Oh, she hasn't married yet. Tagawa recalled his affectionate relationship with Yoko which never came to bear fruit. "And how is she doing these days?" "I hear she will be transferred to another office. It's because there's a problem." "A problem?" "Nothing serious, but we call her Miss Nymphomania in the Sugamo Office." At Tagawa's question, "Miss Nymphomania?" Aizawa nodded with an eloquent smile. "To make a long story short, I think she wants to get married." "That's understandable. She must be getting on in years. But what exactly do you mean by Miss Nymphomania?" The expression was new to Tagawa. Two or three young clerks looked at each other and giggled. "Haven't you heard, Sir? It's a type you often see among old maids. She'll be the first one to have a date with a new comer to the office. That kind, you know. Nobody who's been in the office for awhile pays attention to her. From what I hear, women like this will even date men who approach them at the teller's window or call, sight unseen, over the phone. At least so they say." -Yoko! Every year around April or May, Tagawa would notice couples made up of what appeared to be experienced office women and newly employed men , in such popular dating places as Chidorigafuchi or Yoyogi Olympic Parle. The thought that Yoko-now twenty-eight years old-had become expert in this role, worrying one minute whether her face powder was wearing off, yet acting quite sophisticated the next, was unbearable. It actually was not a matter of bearability. It was a scene of moral depravity. "I wonder why she can't get married. She is a smart, polished woman." ''I'm not sure. When you talk with her, she strikes you as a nice person. She is kind and thoroughly considerate to men. It's just that she occasionally acts licentious. Maybe people are turned off by something dingy about her." "Dingy?" "Betrayed and tramped on by many men; that kind of impression . . ." Tagawa found the word distasteful. It perfectly charac terized the history of Yoko's relationship with men for the entire period following her separation from him. He felt guilty. Of all places, it was in the N Office to which he moved with so much ambition that Tagawa now found Yoko. It was to the N Office that she had been transferred from Sugamo. "How are your children?" Yoko would ask casually when they passed each other in hallways. But that was all. Tagawa invited her out once, but she smiled lightly and turned away. 5. It was Takigami Yoko who had disclosed the confidential information which could determine the fate of the bank . . .! Tagawa fought back the idea. But Yoko had been in charge of the long-term savings accounts and was familiar with the confidential large-account holders. Once it had been proven that she had contact with Saeki Kikuo from the Daido Bank, there was no room for further doubt. First Tagawa thought of calling Yoko to the Branch Office Manager's office, but at the last minute he could not bring himself to make the interrogation quite so official. He told Yoko over the telephone, "I have something to ask you about Saeki Kikuo. I think you know him." It was difficult to ascertain Yoko' s reaction over the telephone, but after a moment's hesitation, Yoko returned a short reply, "I see." Tagawa told her that he wanted to meet her in front of the department store, by the west exit of Ikebukuro Station. At 7 p.m., the appointed time, Yoko was standing, with bright lipstick on, in front of the iron grille of the closed department store. "Shall we take a walk?" Yoko nodded at Tagawa's proposal. Since heaven knows when, her face which used to be round and chubby had become angular and her cheek bones were protruding. Her skin looked unusually rough in the neon light at dusk. "It's been eight years since we walked like this the last time." Tagawa spoke warmly, turning back toward her. "Tagawa-san. Won't you be in trouble, if someone sees you walking with a woman like me?" Yoko cast her glance slightly downward. "Don't talk to me that way. How about some food?" " ... I'd rather drink." "You drink?" Tagawa could only throw back the question. That evening eight years ago, when she so passionately © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 25 Then, she took out from her red leather wallet about ten one thousand yen notes to show Tagawa. "Since young men spend a lot, their salaries don't tide them over till the next payday. I can at least help out with a little. But, I never loan more than two thousand to one person. Because they'll never talk to me again, if the debt becomes more than they can pay back." It was a strange scene: she would put down her cigarette, pick up the glass, put the cigarette back in her mouth, and ransack her pocketbook. "Say, shall I tell you something else? You know Kaneko-san, who is getting married this fall? I introduced his fiancee to him. I used to go out with him till quite recently. Can you guess why I did that?" "You've told me enough. Don't torture yourself any more." "I'm used to it. It doesn't bother me. It was like this when I worked in Sugamo also. While I'm going out with young men in the office, I'm always worrying about when they refuse to have another date with me, or say, 'Let's not meet tonight. ' Tagawa-san won't know what I mean. I'm lonely. So, just before anything like that turns up, I introduce them to young girls who are good matches for them. That way, I'm never totally rejected. I can avoid the pain of being abandoned. This way, they may even go on seeing me once in a while." Yoko's words were strangely dry. After awhile, she carefully put back the thread, the needles, the handkerchieves, and the wallet which had been lying on the table. "Laugh at me if you want to. But so much has happened. And I'm already twenty-nine years old. Nothing can change that. Saeki-san has been really nice to me. But, you see, there's nothing I can do for him. I was just wnodering what I could do for him when he asked me for the list of confidential clients. " Tagawa felt a turbulent anger churning upward in his chest, a feeling diametrically opposed to the nonchalance with which Yoko told her tale. Did she have to go that far? Just because Saeki was nice to her, did she have to ruin herself by being taken advantage of, like a toy or a tool, by a middle-aged married man? Bastard! Our enemy has taken advantage of Yoko, a woman coveting men, craving for a chance to get married, full of weaknesses and defenseless as a naked person. Tagawa could not tolerate even the idea that Saeki resembled him. "Are you going to keep on seeing Saeki?" asked Tagawa, barely suppressing his boiling anger. The thought that he would march into the Daido Bank as early as tomorrow had been churning in his head. He would uncover Saeki Kikuo's cowardice, and bring back the list given by yoko. As soon as it was made public that he had used a woman, Saeki would have to suffer the consequences-as a banker-even if it had been done for the benefit of his bank. Banks try to stay out of trouble. This case can even become a scandal. Without answering Tagawa's question, Yoko called a waiter nearby, and ordered another drink. In coincidental togetherness, the two people let out a sigh in despair. "... I suppose it won't work," said Yoko in a low voice. "A man's career ends when people start to talk about him. It's the same in any bank, isn't it? No matter how hard I try to keep him, Saeki-san, in his tum, will start running away from proposed to him, Yoko had turned crimson after a glass of gin. "Yes, that's the only way to ..." A short petulant response was thrown back. Bars had been cleared away from the area in front of the west exit of the station, and there sprawled a wide street. Tagawa went to the bar district near North Ikebukuro and walked down one flight to a basement Suntory Bar. Yoko ordered whiskey on the rocks. Watching her movements, Tagawa knew that he would have to maintain his detachment. Avoiding Tagawa's eyes, Yoko impatiently reached for one of the glasses that had just been brought to the table. "Do you hate me?" Tagawa started slowly. This, in fact, was the problem tormenting him the most. Suppose it was proven that Yoko had leaked the confidential information out of her personal resentment towards him, and if she had attempted to deprive him of his professional title, there was no way he could report it to the Main Office. "If you are disgusted with me, I won't talk any more." As Tagawa repeated the same sentence, Yoko burst into wild laughter. "What's the matter?" "Don't worry. I neither hate nor have a grudge against Tagawa-san. It was I who asked you to break off the engagement." "Then, am I right in saying that this is not revenge against me?" asked Tagawa cautiously. Yoko took a king-size cigarette out of her pocketbook, held it in the comer of her mouth, and lit it with a lighter. Tagawa's life had changed greatly in many respects after he married Misako and got on the executive track. But he suspected that Yoko had changed even more, and possibly more than he could imagine, after he parted from her and since her father had passed away. "Saeki-san ... ," Yoko began to talk" but smiled, and shrugged her shoulders slightly, "looks like Tagawa-san." "Me?" "Especially his physique. He is tall and thin and slightly hunch-backed." "Are you going to marry him?" "Why?" "Aren't you?" "He has a wife. I can't marry him." Yoko blew a puff of cigarette at the blue lights overhead, as she spoke. -Why does she wear such heavy makeup? Tagawa's eyes were fastened on Yoko. But Yoko lifted her eyes, with an impulse strong enough to repel Tagawa's sympathetic gaze. "You'll never understand why a woman goes out with a married man. But please don't look as if you feel sorry for me." Whatever may have come to her mind, Yoko abruptly placed her pocketbook on the table. "I'll show you what I always carry with me." She opened the metal clasp with a dull click. "Four handkerchieves. Do you know what I do with them? Men often forget to bring their handkerchieves, so I let them borrow mine. I tell them just to bring them back when they are through with them. Here are needles and thread. See? Not just black and white; I have navy blue, brown; I have every kind from cotton thread to nylon thread. Three kinds of spare buttons. I mend all their lost buttons and tom clothes. I even keep an iron in my desk drawer at the office." Poking around in her pocketbook, as a child searches in her toy box, Yoko started lining up all sorts of paraphernalia. me." -My situation was different; I didn't run away from her. Tagawa controlled his desire to speak. He realized that a man 26 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org who had chosen to project the image of a model banker had no right to defend himself in front of a woman like Yoko. He lacked even the confidence to assist Yoko who had no prospects for the future. One could even say that Saeki Kikuo, who had taken advantage of Yoko, was far more humane than Tagawa himself. "I'll get the list back. Please don't make an issue of it. I'm sure Saeki-san will understand that a scandal would be disadvantageous to him." Yoko talked with her head gradually dropping down. Yoko was absent from work for two days. On the third day, a special delivery envelope from her arrived in Tagawa's office. The contents were a letter of resignation and the list of the confidential long-term savings account clients. In one comer, a single line had been scribbled, "Saeki-san went along with my request." "What shall we do, Sir? Shall we mail Takigami-kun 1o her retirement fund?" Deputy Manager Nishiyama came to ask for Tagawa's advice. Yoko was probably still living in the Takinogawa apartment. "Yes, please do." "The electric iron in her drawer; we will send that back, , too. " "An iron?" "Yes, she used to press young men's shirts and things like that." "We better not. That would be too heartless." "Oh?" "I'll keep it." At Nishiyama's direction, one of the office girls brought Tagawa a rusty iron. Tagawa's hands responded to the feel of the cold iron and the peculiar weight of the lead inside. He carefully buried it deep in his bottom desk drawer. * WORLD DEVELOPMENT The Monthly Multi-Disciplinary Journal Devoted to the Study and Promotion of World Development Chairman of the Editorial Board: P P STREETEN, Economic Dtwe/opm""t Institute, The World &nk. 1818 H Street ~~ W1~igS~~~/~a~~~BEK. A""".,.,. Suit:t1 I, 17 I 7 MassflChusfJtts NW Wa.hington DC 20036. USA World Dflvelopment provides 8 forum for international dialogue across national, disciplinary and professional barriers in order to stimulate new and imaginative insights for tackling the chief evils of the developing world: malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, slums and unemployment. Original research and review papers critically exami ne such topics as: the application of appropriate science and technology; relations between rich and poor countries; the impact of world inflation; the transfer of 'Western' institutions to the different societies or countries attempting to develop, and implications for the Third World of Western concern for environmental quality. 10. Sometimes. a woman is called by a man of a higher status with the male suffix "-kun." 14 ............. _ _ Structurel _rminanta of government budget deficits in developing countries, T K MORRISON. Approaches to a Nawlntametional Economic Order. P STREETEN. I. there a poverty trap for developing countries? Pola".atlon: rulity or myth? H W SINGER. R A MAHMOOD. Structurel edjullment policies in developing economies. B BALASSA. Ha. political risk scared mlnerel investment away from the depolita in developing countries? MRADETZKI. The 'luxury unemployment' hypOthesis: I review of recent evidence, A r UDAlL. SSINCLAIR. Research on rur.l-to-urban migration in LOCs: the confusion frontier and why we should pause to rethink afresh, 0 STARK. The ten commandments of renewable energy, D FRENCH. Growth constraints on smlU--IC81e :'~:'c'!l~;:~ ~n:H~f~ng countries: a ~- Published monthly (Volume 13' Annual sublcrlption (1985) Two-Vea, rate (19851881 Developments in social accounting methods as applied to the analyai. of IIaZIO.OO ustI84.00 :~~:~t\fA~i~ ...as? ~8'8~~ent ~vent~TM~~'i:'S""'~:HfLtom. A systeml model of rural development, T R LAKSHMANAN. I Copies of articles from this publication are now available from the UMI Article Clearinghouse. Mail to: University Microfilms International 300 North Z••b Road. Box 91 Ann Arbor. MI 48106 I I I I 1 I ! ~ © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 27 Heirs of the Dragon by HOD De Jian Translation and Introduction by Tinna K. Wu This is a translation of a song written in late 1978 by Hou De Jian, a literature student at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. This song was written at the height of the protest of the Chinese people in Taiwan against the U.S. government's decision to sever diplomatic ties with the Republic of China. "Heirs of the Dragon" powerfully aroused the sense of ethnic pride of the Chinese people in Taiwan and contributed greatly to the maintenance of dignity at that historic moment when they felt they had been betrayed by an old friend. Instantly the song became a hit and catapulted Hou to national fame. It also became very popular among the overseas Chinese. Because of its patriotic theme, the song found its way very quickly to mainland China and became an immediate success among young people there. Hou De Jian's song expressed the cultural longing of this Taiwan-born songwriter, and through him, the longing also of the overseas Chinese for their native land. It was, in the true sense of the words, music to the ears of the PRC government United Front in its ongoing efforts for the reunification of China. So even though it was from Taiwan and to the consternation of many in Taiwan, the song was appropriated and used to promote the one-people, one-China idea. Even more unexpected was the fact that Hou, already regarded as a popular hero in Taiwan because of his song, would become the center of a major political controversy in June of 1983 upon leaving his wife and baby son in Taiwan to live in mainland China. The reason he gave reporters for going to China was to seek inspiration for new songs. He was warmly welcomed and given guided tours in China by the Beijing government. His going to China certainly gave the PRC government considerable propaganda mileage, but it left many people in Taiwan in great puzzlement. Hou's celebrated 'return' to the mainland is probably of little importance to the whole problem of the reunification of China, but it must be having quite a powerful impact on Hou himself. Now that he has fulfilled his dreams of seeing the Yangtze River and hearing the rolling waves of the Huang Ho, will another song as poignant and inspiring as the "Heirs of the Dragon" be forthcoming? It will be interesting to know. Hou De Jian was born in Taiwan in 1956. His parents are natives of Sichuan province. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org There is a river in the faraway East; It is called by the name Yangtze. There is a great "Ho" in the faraway East; It is called by the name Huang Ho. Although I have never seen the beauty of the Yangtze, I have often floated down its stream in my dreams. Although I have never heard the majestic torrents of Huang Ho, Its crushing waves rumble in my dreams. There is a dragon in the ancient East; It is called by the name Zhongguo. There is a group of people in the ancient East Who are the heirs of that dragon. I grew up in the shadow of its feet; I'll be the dragon's heir when I come of age one day. Dark eye, black hair, and yellow skin; I'll be the dragon's heir always. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org On the Transfer of Power in India by Suniti Kumar Ghosh 1 The transfer of power in India in 1947 brought a sense of "fulfillment" to the three parties to the settlement-the British raj, the Congress and the Muslim League. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee declared that it was "not the abdication but the fulfillment of Britain's mission in India, a sign of strength, and the vitality of the British Commonwealth."1 Speaking on the Indian Independence Bill in the House of Lords, Lord Samuel, a Liberal leader, said, "This was not an hour of defeat but of fulfillment."2 The same idea had been expressed a few days earlier in words shorn of rhetoric by Field Marshal Smuts, then Prime Minister of South Africa: "This does not look like quitting . . ."3 The Indian Independence Act, passed by the British Parliament in the middle of July 1947 without a division, pleased its authors-Attlee, Bevin and their Labour Party colleagues-as well as the Tory leaders including Churchill, whom President Roosevelt had called "an unreconstructed Tory," "the last of the Victorians."4 After the Mountbatten plan, proposing partition of India on religious lines and transfer of power on the basis of dominion status, had been agreed to by Congress and Muslim League, Alec Joyce of the India Office wired on 3 June 1947 to Mountbatten's press attache, Alan Campbell-Johnson: A packed House of Commons listened with intense interest to I. Cited in Michael Edwards, The Last Years ofBritish India, (London, 1963) p.181. 2. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, (London, 1951) p. 134. 3. N. Mansergh (Editor-in-Chief), Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-7 (Hereafter cited as T.O.P.), in 12 volumes (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971-1983), X, p. 988. 4. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (hereafter Roosevelt and Churchill). ed. by F.L. Loewenheim, H.D. Langley and M. Jonas, (London, 1975) p. II. Prime Minister's announcement this afternoon. Proposals and first reaction from India undoubtedly created profound gratification among all Parties. Sense of unity and recognition of tremendous issues and possibilities involved were comparable only with most historic moments during war . . . . This has been a great day for us all. ~ Campbell-Johnson recorded that "the American reaction has been especially enthusiastic.'''' On their part the Indian leaders of both Congress and the Muslim League exuded happiness and gratitude. Rajendra Prasad, President of the Indian Constituent Assembly, described the transfer of power as "the consummation and ful fillment of the historic tradition and democratic ideals of the British race."7 Later, on 16 May 1949, moving his resolution in the Indian Constituent Assembly for the ratification of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' decision to accept the "sovereign, independent republic" of India as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations of which the British King or Queen was the head, Jawaharlal Nehru, the lover of roses and rose-tinted phrases, said that from the "prickly thorn of frustration and despair, we have been able to pick the rose of fulfillment. "" How was it that all the three parties supposed to be engaged in a grim struggle with one another retired from it as winners, victors! 2 The protagonists in the drama of the transfer of power are 5. Campbell-Johnson, op cit, p. 110. 6. Ibid, p. 114. 7. Ibid, p. 159; V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, (Bombay. 1957) p. 415. 8. Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After, (Delhi, 1949) p. 275. 30 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org supposed to have been two: British imperialism (and its domestic feudal allies) and the Indian people including the entire bourgeoisie. The following are held almost as axiomatic truths: first, the contradictions of British imperialism with the entire Indian bourgeoisie were of an antagonistic nature; second, the Congress, "an all-class movement" led by the bourgeoisie, spearheaded the struggle for freedom to establish a bourgeois nation state; and third, the transfer of power meant genuine political independence. In fact, the combination and clash of forces that led to the transfer of power and partition of the Indian subcontinent on religious lines were far more complex than are generally supposed. My contentions are: First, though the chief protagonists were two (British imperialism and the Indian people) and though their relative strength and weakness were the main factors in bringing about the transfer of power and in determining its character, there were also other forces-especially U.S. imperialism and the forces of Socialism and national liberation struggle, as then represented by the Soviet Union and the revolutions sweeping China, Vietnam, and Indonesia-which influenced the British raj's decision to liquidate its direct rule in India. Second, the dominant section of the Congress leadership represented the Indian big bourgeoisie, which was comprador in character. 9 It could place itself at the head of mass 9. Whether the Indian bourgeoisie comprised (and comprises) two sections national bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie-is a thorny question. It was the subject of my article 'The Indian Bourgeoisie and Imperialism" (BCAS, Vol. 15, No.3), though no exhaustive treatment was possible. Here we shall refer briefly to a few facts. Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works, set up in 1892 by P.C. Ray, a scientist, manufactured various products including many vital drugs from basic stages, mainly with indigenous raw materials and without any foreign help. It pursued the policy of learning and innovating while doing. It not only developed basic drugs and new processes but designed most of the machinery for the purpose. Its objective was not merely to make profits but to harness science and technology for productive purposes and to attain self-reliance. (See Sudip Chaudhuri, Bengal Chemical: 1892-1977 [mimeo graphed], Indian Institute of Management, [Calcutta, n.d.]) It was not the only firm of this kind, but its character was altogether different from that of the Petits, Tatas, Goenkas, and Birlas to whom reference has been made in my article. The former may be called an enterprise of the national bourgeoisie and the latter compradors. There were conflicts, both economic and political, between the two sections. Economically, in the thirties and forties, the national bourgeoisie represented by men like Manu Subedar (a small industrialist), K. T. Shah (Secretary of the National Planning Committee) and their friends (who threw out tycoons like Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Sir Homi Mody and Sir Phiroze Sethna from the leadership of the Indian Merchants' Chamber, Bombay, in the early thirties)-was hostile to foreign capital, demanded immediate scrapping of the managing-agency system (then the bastion of expatriate foreign capital and Indian big capital), and condemned collaboration agreements between them as "illegitimate marriage." See Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee 1931, Vol. I, Part II-Minority Report (of Manu Subedar), (Calcutta, 1931); L. Natarajan, American Shadow Over India, (Bombay, 1952) pp. 52, 266 (note I); N. N. Mitra, ed., Indian Annual Register, Calcutta, I, 1945, p. 62, Modern Review (Calcutta), Sept. 1945, pp. 128-29; and K. T.Shah, "Introduction" to Industrial Finance (a National Planning Committee publication, ed. by K.T. Shah), (Bombay, 1948). On the other hand, the comprador bourgeoisie allied itself with foreign capital and found merit in the managing agency system. Politically, the national bourgeoisie sought to achieve complete independence through armed struggle while the compradors wanted greater power and privileges but within the framework of basic dependence on the imperialists. Its "non-cooperation was only a step towards cooperation." See G. D. Birla, Bapu: A Unique Association, III (Bombay, 1977) p. 76; B. Pattabhi movements because the working class and its leadership were ideologically and politically weak. By making a fetish of "non violence" and the "change of heart" of the imperialists, the Congress leaders saw to it that a genuine anti-imperialist movement did not develop. Further, from 1945 when World War II was drawing to an end, the Congress leaders system atically helped the raj to suppress the anti-imperialist struggles of the people. For British imperialism it was both a retreat and an advance. It was a retreat because Britain had to terminate its direct rule. In another sense it was an advance, for freed of the immediate worries of direct confrontation with the Indian people, it would carry on and even intensify its exploitation of India. Third, faced with contradictions at home and abroad, British imperialism found it prudent to stage a withdrawal through the front door and hand over the direct reins of administration to its Indian compradors. The purpose was to ensure preservation of its economic, political and strategic interests. The end of the direct rule meant the end of Britain's monopoly possession of India; but the formal empire changed Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress, I, (Bombay, 1946) reprint, p. 358. The method of the national bourgeoisie was non-violence in thought and deed. Gandhi, who played the "dual role of saint for the masses and champion of big business" (to quote Edgar Snow cited in Birla, p. 269), told Guy Wint, a British journalist, in 1939: "We cannot become an utterly independent nation .... And so if we could become partners on equal terms I want the Indo-British partnership to be permanent." Gandhi also wrote that "if dominion status was offered, I would take it ... " (Harijan, 16 December 1939). The Congress included within it national bourgeois elements which forced the dominant section of the leadership (Gandhi, Sardar Patel and Gandhi's other lieutenants) to formally accept complete independence as the Congress goal in 1929 and sometimes to make radical pronouncements. In early 1939, national bourgeois elements and communists rallied around Subhas Bose, challenged and defeated the Gandhian leadership, then grew panicky and surrendered. Outside the Congress, the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie had initiated revolutionary struggles long before mass movements were launched by the Congress. The revolutionary struggles in Bengal after 1905, the Ghadar movement, the activities of the Hindustan Republic Association, the Chittagong uprising, the R.I.N. revolt of February 1946, to mention only a few, reflected the aspirations of the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie to liberate India through armed struggle. Men like G.D. Birla, who were very close to the Gandhian leadership, appealed again and again to the alien rulers to combine with it and crush the "left wing." (Birla, II, pp. 12-14, 44-45, 85). The Indian national bourgeoisie was economically weak and politically flabby and vacillating. Here it is worth quoting Mao Tsetung's words: "Why did forty years of revolution under Sun Vat-sen end in failure? Because in the epoch of imperialism the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie cannot lead any genuine revolution to victory." (Mao Tsehlng, Selected Works, II, [Peking, 1969] p. 422). 31 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 3 The British raj emerged victoriolls out of World War II but far weaker economically, politically and militarily than the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Its economic decline which had started after World War I was hastened by World War II. Much of its industry was shattered and its capital investments in Canada and the U.S.A. had been taken over by the latter. For its postwar reconstruction it was dependent on American loan-capital. Instead of being a creditor country as in the past, it had become a debtor. World War II was the "best of wars" for U.S. monopoly capital. When the war started, it began to cherish dreams of building a world-wide informal empire and of fulfilling its "Manifest Destiny." As James Burnham put it in a 1947 Life article, what was wanted was "an American Empire which will be, if not literally world-wide in formal boundaries, capable of exercising decisive world control." During the war years there was significant increase in the U .S. share in India's foreign trade. The imports from the U.S.A., apart from lend-lease aid, surpassed those from Britain. But what was more significant is that Indian big capital had begun to forge close ties with American monopoly capital. Tatas and Wa1chands had led the way and Birlas, Kasturbhais and others were looking forward to that happy consummation, without, of course, neglecting the British connection. Throughout the war the U.S_ rulers put unrelenting pres sure on the British raj to loosen its hold on the empire, especially India. To bring about the end of India's colonial status, they did whatever was possible for them to do without breaking the Anglo-American alliance which they deemed es sential to winning the war. The objective of the U.S. ruling classes was to liquidate the old imperialist powers' monopoly possession of the colonies, remove all barriers, such as the "imperial preference" and "empire dollar pool" that impeded the free movement of U.S. capital and trade, and bring the colonies into their own informal empire. No wonder that the British raj very much resented all U. S. attempts at intervention and found it "intolerable."lo Under the Anglo-U.S. Financial Agreement of December 1945 the U.S.A. extended a loan to Britain to assist in her postwar reconstruction on condition that Britain would end by mid-1947 the empire dollar pool and eventually the system of imperial preferences. II During the postwar years the American demand for liquidation of Britain's direct rule in India was insistent. At the same time, the U. S. A. urged Britian "not to abandon essential strategic positions in India" and wanted "to participate in the use and upkeep of some of these positions. "12 The specter of Communism was haunting the raj. The emergence of the Soviet Union with its power and political influence greatly enhanced, the collapse of different reactionary regimes in Eastern Europe, the advance of the People's Liberation Army and the expansion of Red bases in China, and Thefront page ofthe British-owned Evening News oflndia ofFeb. 21. 1985 into an informal empire shared with other imperialist powers like the U.S.A. Fourth, the Indian subcontinent, the home of several nations and nationalities, was partitioned on religious lines into two states because the Indian comprador bourgeoisie was split into two hostile sections-one predominantly Hindu (with which Parsi big capital was allied) and the other Muslim. There was unequal development among them, and the Muslim compradors were much weaker than their Hindu counterparts. Out of the fear of being swept away by much more powerful Marwari and Gujarati compradors in an India where the political representatives of the latter would be in direct control of the state machinery, Muslim compradors backed by Muslim feudal elements sought to carve out of India a state of their own-Pakistan. Lastly, while the roses of fulfillment were plucked by the imperialists and their compradors, the people felt the thorns. While the transfer of power and the birth of the two new states marked the victory of imperialism as well as of the two sections of the comprador big bourgeoisie, it meant defeat of the Indian people and was a setback to revolutionary struggles in 'South Asia and elsewhere. The people lost because, in the absence of a revolutionary leadership, they rallied behind sections of the bourgeoisie which were in the camp of imperialism and to which World War II had opened up new vistas of rapid expan sion as underlings of foreign imperialist capital. 10. T.O.P., I, pp. 7-8; II, pp. 969-70; III, pp. 30, 554-56, 690, 699, 792; Roosevelt and Churchill, p. 74, n. I. 11. Gary R. Hess, America Encounters India, 1941-1947, (Baltimore and London, 1974), pp. 160, 165, 166, 174. 12. T.O.P., VI, p. 644; VII, p. 931. 32 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org the anned national liberation struggles in Indo-China and Indonesia were contributing to the revolutionary ferment in India and accelerating the change in its political climate. The national liberation wars in Indo-China and Indonesia, where the raj rushed troops, including Indian soldiers, to halt the march of national liberation forces, and the prospect of such wars in Burma and Malay threatened the foundations of the British empire. There was great resentment among the Indian people against the use of Indian troops in Indonesia and a powerful demand for their withdrawal. Another contradiction that beset the raj was with its own people. By the end of the war British youth had become sick of fighting and felt no inclination to serve in distant lands and to shed their blood for the sake of the profits of their bourgeoisie. That is why the British ruling classes were often heard to bewail the shortage of manpower to preserve the empire. Even those who joined the anned forces during the war demanded speedy demobilization and mutinied in some places to realize their demand. 13 But of all the contradictions with which British imperialism was faced in the immediate postwar years, the contradiction with the Indian people was, no doubt, the principal one. While the years of the war were the best of times for the bourgeoisie, they were the worst of times for the people. Already impov erished, they became victims of indescribable want and misery as a result of the policies of the government and the profiteering of traders and industrialists. The popular anger found its expression almost immediately after the war. There was an unprecedented upsurge of anti imperialist struggles, in which workers, peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, even sections of the Indian navy, anny and air force, police and lower rungs of the bureaucracy took part, and anned confrontations were frequent. Describing the mood of the people in Calcutta in November 1945, Governor Casey wrote: "Both in North and South Calcutta a feature of the disturbances comparatively new to Bengal was that the crowds when fired on largely stood their ground or at most only receded a little, to return again to the attack. "14 Waves of anti-imperialist struggle rose one after another in different parts of the subcontinent. The most spectacular and most significant among them was the uprising in Bombay. The ratings of the Royal Indian Navy (R.I.N.) rose in revolt first in Bombay and then in Karachi, Calcutta and Madras. By 22 February 1946 the rebel sailors, were in control of about 22 vessels in Bombay harbor, including the flagship of the British Vice-Admiral. A total of 78 ships, 20 shore establishments and 20,000 ratings were involved in the struggle. Over a thousand men in the Royal Indian Air Force camps in Bombay came out in a sympathy strike. When ordered, Indian soldiers refused to fire on the R.I.N. ratings. Bombay's workers and youth, irrespective of the community to which they belonged, stood by the navy men, carried food to them, erected barricades and fought with armed policemen and with several British battalions equipped with tanks and armored cars. On 22 February. Bombay observed a general strike in the teeth of the bitter opposition from the top Congress and Muslim League leaders like Sardar Patel. Jinnah. Chundrigar and S.K. Patil, who made common cause with the raj and placed "volunteers" at its service, The entire working class came out at the call of the Communist Party, and for two days there were pitched battles on Bombay's streets, in which, accprding to official estimates, there were about 1500 casualties, including more than two hundred dead. The men of the navy refused to be cowed-even by the threat of Admiral Godfrey (who had flown in bombers) to sink the navy. The glorious struggle ended in defeat when the "non-violent" might of Congress and League leaders was added to the anned might of the British imperialists to crush it.15 What is significant is that the wall that had been sedulously erected by the raj to separate the anned services from the people crumbled down. Significant also was the role the Congress leaders played. More of that later. While the transfer of power and the birth of the two new states marked the victory of imperialism as weU as ofthe two sections ofthe comprador big bourgeoisie, it meant defeat of the Indian people and was a setback to revolutionary struggles in South Asia and elsewhere. The people lost because, in the absence of a revolutionary leadership, they rallied behind sections of the bourgeoisie which were in the camp of imperialism and to which World War II had opened up new vistas of rapid expansion as underlings of foreign imperialist capital. Workers rose up everywhere despite the opposition of Congress and League leaders, factory workers, railwaymen, posts and telegraph workers, bank employees, even policemen in various places. In his diary under the date 19 February 1946, Wavell noted: A day of alarms but not excursions. I saw ~orter [Secretary. Government of India, Home Department], all for capitulation to the I.N.A.; Bewoor [Secretary, Posts and Air Dept.] about a postal strike; Carr [A.O.C.-in-C.] about R.I.A.F. mutiny; Griffin [Chief Commissioner of Railways] and Conran-Smith [Secretary, War Transport Department] about a railway strike; and finally the C-in-C., most gloomy of all, about the R.I.N. mutiny at Bombay and the I.N.A. trials. What a cheerful day-prospect or reality of three mutinies and two strikes!l. The anti-imperialist struggle was not confined to cities and 15. Ibid. pp. 1048. \055-56. 1076. 1080-84. According to a leading participant in the struggle. the total number of ratings involved in the struggle in different places was about 50,000 and the entire navy was affected. See also B. C. Dutt. The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay, 1971). 13. T.O.P., VI, p. \055. fn. 14. Ibid, p. 725. 16. Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal. ed. by Penderel Moon. (Delhi. 1977) p. 215. :n © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org towns; it spread to remote rural areas. In Telangana in the Hyderabad State a peasant struggle started in 1946 which turned into a liberation struggle and out of which emerged a peasant anny and liberated areas. (Its fight against Nehru's anny after the transfer of power and its withdrawal in 1951 is a story into which we shall not enter here.) All these struggles showed that, so far as the oppressed people were concerned, Congress and Muslim League were on the same side of the barricade as the raj. When the Cabinet Mission came in March 1946 and met the Viceroy's Executive Council, Sir Edward Benthall, a member of the Council, said that "the Council was unanimous that a change of Government at the Centre was imperative . . . . It [the Council's lack of confidence] is due to the uncertainty of Indian troops and police to whom they must look for defence and support in the future. ",7 Replying to Wavell, Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, wrote on 25 November 1946: anything in the nature of reconquest and retention of India by force [would not be] practicable from a political, military or economic point of view. Politically our party would not support such a policy nor do we believe that it would be practicable from an international point of view. From a military point of view we have not the forces sufficient to embark upon the holding down of India as a whole ... Nor from an economic point of view can we contemplate the great expenditure that would be entailed ... "'8 The postwar situation in India was, indeed, revolutionary. The rulers could not rule in the old way and the mass of the people understood "the impossibility of living in the old way." But no revolutionary leadership, ideologically and politically mature, had emerged. In the absence of such a leadership the domestic class forces hostile to the people were far from isolated. On the contrary, the people cherished illusions about the goals of the political representatives of those very classes-the Congress and League leaders-who were out to strike a bargain with imperialism. In his letter to King George VI, dated 22 March 1946, Wavell, referring to the happenings in India, wrote: "It is a sorry tale of misfortune and of folly. Perhaps the best way to look at it is that India is in the birth-pangs of a new order. ..."'9 But the new order did not emerge. What emerged was a mockery of it. 4 The British imperialists regarded India as "the essential linchpin in the structure of the Commonwealth." Their main aim was to transfer power to "friendly hands" -that is, to the classes that had a symbiotic relationship with British capital and could be trusted to preserve and further its economic, political and strategic interests-and to enmesh the new state or states in a net of Commonwealth ties,>o in short, to convert the colony into a neo-colony or semi-colony. The British Chiefs of Staff and the G.H.Q. (India) held that "from the military point of view, it was as nearly vital as anything can be to ensure that India remains within the Commonwealth." The Chiefs of Staff Committee repeatedly emphasized this point. From the military point of view, and on the grounds of our future strategy and the security of the British Commonwealth, our aim must be to retain India constitutionally within the British Commonwealth of Nations, and to direct all our endeavour towards persuading her to this end. If in th,!se endeavours we were successful, a formal Treaty would probably be unnecessary, and our strategic requirements could be met by Staff conversations and liaison arrangements similar to those in force with the other Dominions. 21 The Dominion statesmen agreed that India's continuance in the Commonwealth was extremely important to the interests of Britain and the dominions. 22 The British imperialists also hoped that in the event of India deciding to remain in the Commonwealth, its example would influence other colonies to do so when they were "eligible for independence."23 To forge a new kind of relationship with India under which their economic, political and strategic interests would remain secure, the raj followed a strategy which was twofold: first, to keep the Indian leaders engaged in negotiations about the future and sow illusions among the people, while defusing the revo lutionary situation and crushing all future struggles; and second, to divert the anti-imperialist struggles along the channels of communalism. As early as September 1943, Viceroy-designate Wave II and most of the members of the India-Burma Committee of the War cabinet, including Deputy Prime Minister Attlee, realized the efficacy of negotiations and of a negotiated settlement with the Indian leaders, for "our main aim must be to keep India within the Commonw~~alth."24 The move fell through because of Churchill's opposition. Anticipating unrest among the Indian people in postwar days and stressing the need for opening negotiations with Indian leaders to forestall mass struggles, Wavell wrote to Churchill on 24 October 1944: "If we can secure India as a friendly partner in the British Commonwealth our predominant influence in these countries [such as Burma and Malaya] will, I think, be assured; with a lost and hostile India, we are likely to be reduced in the East to the position of commercial bag-men."25 With the end of the war in Europe, negotiations opened at Simla in June-July 1945 with the object of reconstituting the Viceroy's Executive Council as a step "towards a settlement." Earlier, in November 1944, the proposal made by Bulabhai Desai (leader of the Congress Party in the Central Legislative Assembly) to the Viceroy with the approval of Liaquat Ali Khan (Jinnah's deputy and General Secretary, All India Muslim League) for the reconstitution of the Viceroy's Executive Council had suggested parity between Congress and Muslim League. The raj changed this to parity between Caste Hindus and Muslims, a cunning maneuver which brought the communal question to the center of the political stage. The 17. T.O.P., VII, p. 7. 18. Ibid, IX, p. 174. The tenos of this reply were agreed at a meeting between Prime Minister Attlee, Pethick-Lawrence, Stafford Cripps and officials of the India Office. See also ibid, p. 68 for Attlee's Notes. 19. Ibid, VI. p. 1233. 20. Ibid, VI, pp. 561,659-60,666; VII, p. 591; VIII, p. 224; IX, pp. 307, 940, 972; X, pp. 329, 965, 974-5. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. Ibid, Ibid, Ibid. Ibid, Ibid, VIII, pp. 53-7, 348-50, 547, 646,659; IX, p. 975. X, pp. 829,949,988,989,997. p. 974; also p. 965. IV, pp. 333-38, 340-44,365-69. V, p. 127. 34 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org I I '" Cl "" .;: ~ =::: <::I Anti-imperialist demonstration of Feb. II. 1946 in Calcutta. The next day a general strike began , I I I i I Simla conference subsequently foundered on the rock of the Muslim League's claim to nominate all the Muslim members of the Council; and E. Jenkins, then Private Secretary to the Viceroy, strongly suspected "that there has been official support for Jinnah' s obstinacy. "26 From the standpoint of the British imperialists, the Simla Conference was far from a failure. As we shall see, it successfully pulled the top Congress leaders into an infonnal alliance with the raj to extinguish the flames of anti-imperialist struggle. Second, it gave fresh ammunition to the Hindu and Muslim communalists who, wittingly or not, helped the raj by diverting anti-imperialist hatred into the communal channel. Summing up the views of the Governors expressed at their conference held on 1 and 2 August 1945, Wavell said, "We should endeavour to retain the initiative and divert political energy into legitimate channels. "27 Soon after the victory of the Labour Party in the British general elections, which was hailed enthusiastically by the Congress and described by Hindustan Times as "the downfall of India's oppressors,"28 elections were announced in New Delhi for the central and provincial legislative assemblies on the basis of the old franchise (less than one percent of the population for the fonner and about ten percent for the latter). There followed a veritable deluge of "interesting negotia- 26. Ibid, XII, p. 797; see also V.P. Menon, op cit, p. 214. 27. T.O.P., VI, p. 19. 28. Ibid, pp. 1-2. tions about the future." A British parliamentary delegation toured India in January 1946. Close on its heels came the Cabinet Mission which had hectic rounds of negotiations for more than three months. On 16 May it produced a plan which proposed the creation of three semi-independent sub-federa tions-one comprising predominantly Hindu provinces and the other two comprising Muslim-majority provinces in the northwest and northeast of India-within a loose all-India federation with a weak center. Interestingly, Assam with Muslims fonning about 33 or 34 percent of the population was tagged to Muslim-majority Bengal. If it was intended by the Mission to stoke the communal fire, the purpose was well served. It was the fight over the interpretation of a sub-clause in the plan concerning the grouping of provinces that led to the Muslim League's call for "direct action"-and virtual communal war-to force the Congress to concede the Pakistan demand. "Amidst these 'summit talks,' " wrote Michael Brecher, "the poison of communalism penetrated deeper into the body politic of India. "29 It was the systematic policy of imperialism to drive a wedge between Congress and League (both its own "creations," as Gandhi said in a letter to Stafford CrippS)lO and to stir up and exploit communal tension. Wavell stated on 30 May 1946: "We must at all costs 29. Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, (London, 1959) pp. 318-19. 30. Sudhir Ghosh, Gandhi's Emissary, (London, 1967) p. 159. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 35 II avoid becoming embroiled with both Hindu and Muslim at once. "3\ The Secretary of State for India was of the same view: "We cannot allow ourselves to get into position in which Muslim League and Congress are both in opposition. "32 In the conditions created by World War II the prospect of dominating the Indian Ocean region economically and politically, under the umbrella ofimperUdist powers like the U.K. and the U.S.A., became quite alluring to the Indian big bourgeoisie. It is the vision of becoming a zonal power as underlings of the imperialists that impelled the Congress leaders to reject an undivided India with a weak center. And they must share the responsibility for the tragedy. On 24 January 1947 the Director of the Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, noted: The game so far has been well played, in that (a) both Congress and the League have been brought into the Central Government; (b) the Indian problem has been thereby thrust into its appropriate plane of communalism. . . . Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reproduce anti-lfritish agitation. The latter may produce an inordinately dangerous situation and leads us nowhere. The former is a natural. if ghastly process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem." The "ghastly process" was hardly a natural one. It was, on the contrary, as the earlier portion of the note gleefully claims, part of the imperialist "game" which the raj and its collaborators "played." And far from solving any problem, it plagues the people of the subcontinent even today. The fact is, there was a revolutionary unity among the people in 1945 and 1946, even in 1947 after communal holocausts had been engineered. On 27 November 1945, Wavell informed Pethick-Lawrence: "Casey [Bengal Governor] was impressed by the very strong anti-British feeling behind the whole demonstration [in Calcutta and Howrah in November 1945] and considers the whole situation still very explosive and dangerous."34 The revolutionary unity of the people displayed in Bombay in February 1946 alarmed the imperialists and the Hindu and Muslim compradors. Gandhi denounced it as "unholy combina tion" between Hindus and Muslims and preferred to die rather 31. T.O.P., VII, p. 735. 32. Ibid, VIII, p. 162; also p. 177. 33. Ibid, IX, pp. 542-3. Copies of this note were sent to the private secretaries of Attlee, Lord Alexander and Stafford Cripps. 34. Ibid, VI, p. 553. than see India delivered over to "the rabble."3s Within less than a year a qualitative change in the situation was brought about by the skillful moves of the raj and its collaborators. Speaking at the Subjects Committee meeting of the Meerut Session of the Congress, held in November 1946, Ashok Mehta said: "A year ago, an Englishman could not show his face in Bombay or Calcutta; today he alone moves freely and even Indians move in English dress."36 Alan Campbell-Johnson wrote on 1 June 1947 in a mood of exultation: "It should be noted that the fury is internal and fratricidal and that the British are probably more popular with both Hindus and Moslems than at any time in living memory."37 On 20 February 1947 Attlee announced in Parliament their "definite intention" to transfer "power to responsible Indian hands" by June 1948. The imperialists were afraid that the communal Frankenstein they had raised might cause irreparable damage to their long-term plans for a "friendly and stable India." But they were also afraid of Communism. When Attlee asked Mountbatten to become the Viceroy of India, he told him that if power was not transferred quickly, they might find themselves "handing India over not simply to civil war, but to political movements of a definitely totalitarian character."'· Wavell was replaced by Mountbatten, for the former, as Attlee told the king, lacked "the finesse to negotiate the next step when we must keep the two Indian parties friendly to us all the time. "39 In about a month and a half afller assuming office as Viceroy on 23 March 1947, Mountbatten devised a plan the outline of which had been prepared by Reforms Commissioner V.P. Menon and Congress boss Patel in late December 1946 or early January 1947.4() The plan proposed transfer of power to Indian hands on the basis of dominion status and partition of India on communal lines. It was formally accepted by Congress and League on 3 June, when Mountbatten fixed 15 August as the date of the transfer of power. In less than two months and a half this vast subcontinent was partitioned, boundaries demarcated, assets divided and two new dominions brought into existence! Mountbatten himself had told the Governors' Conference held in April that the "partition of India would be a most serious potential source of war."41 J.D. Tyson, the Secretary to the Bengal Governor, wrote to people in England on 5 July 1947: "Mountbatten is a hustler; ever since he came out he has pursued shock tactics .... I believe, now, we shall withdraw in fairly peaceful conditions-whatever may happen after we have gone.... I think there will be very unsettled conditions in India for some time to come ... but the trouble will be primarily between Hindus and Muslims·-not anti-European. "42 And Penderal Moon, a high British official then serving in India, wrote: "So with a quick unprecedented unanimity all 35. The Collected Works oJMahatma Gandhi, Vol. 83, (Delhi, 1981)p. 304. 36. T.O.P., IX, p. 133. 37. Alan Campbell-Johnson, op cit, p. 98. 38. Ibid, p. 17. 39. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, King George VI, pp. 709-10; cited in B.B. Misra, The Indian Political Parties, (Delhi, 1976) p. 625. 40. V.P. Menon, op cit, pp. 358-59. 41. T.O.P., X, p. 251. 42. Ibid, XI, p. 940. 36 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org [the raj, Congress and League-the three parties to the settlement] set forth together on a path leading straight to mass slaughter [and mass migration]."43 At the same time a parallel process was going on. Speaking on 4 July 1947 on the Indian Independence Bill, the Secretary of State for India told journalists that there would be a new partnership between the East and the West which would bring healthy results for the whole world. 44 Indeed, the old political relationship between imperialism and the Indian comprador bourgeoisie was yielding place to a new kind of political relationship that would be beneficial to the imperialist system as a whole. 5 The imperialist game could be so well played because Congress and Muslim League were willing participants in it. Though there was a savage "war of succession" between them, their policies vis-a.-vis the raj were complementary to the British strategy. Even before the end of the war, G.D. Birla, the "mentor of the Indian capitalist class" (to quote Bipan Chandra) as well as of many top Congress leaders, was anxious to open political negotiations and was assuring the raj of their co-operation.4~ In his interviews with a correspondent of the News Chronicle and subsequent press statements after his release from detention in the Aga Khan Palace, Gandhi declared that his object was "to help and not hinder the Allied war effort." He abjured any "intention of offering Civil Disobedience," condemned sabo tage and underground activities and instructed underground political workers to give themselves up to the raj's police.~ The Congress's appraisal of the postwar situation was similar to that of the British. Bhulabhai Desai, leader of the Congress party in the Central Legislative Assembly, pleaded with Wavell early in January 1945 that "the continuation of the present situation was more likely than not to lead to an upheaval. ".7 Together with the raj, Congress leaders wanted to build beforehand a dam against the tide of postwar mass upheaval they anticipated. So, in mid-November 1944, with Gandhi's blessings and Liaquat Ali Khan's approval, Bhulabhai made his proposal (known as Desai-Liaquat pact) for the reconstitution of the Viceroy's Executive Council "under the existing constitution from members of the existing legislature" to be ultimately selected by the Viceroy. 48 On 30 January 1945 Wavell informed the Secretary of State for India that "Desai's proposals fit in with those I submitted months ago ..... "49 During these negotiations, G.D. Birla saw the Viceroy's Private Secretary and, as Wavell wired to Amery, Birla "was probably sent by Gandhi" and "Birla obviously thought 43. Penderal Moon, Divide and Quit, (London, 1961) p. 70. 44. V.P. Menon, op cit, p. 391. 45. T.O.P., IV, p. 779; V, pp. 236,476; Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal, p. 132. 46. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, Vol. II, (Bombay, 1947) pp. 617, 620-22; T.O.P., IV, pp. 1032, 1086, 1102, 1136,1209. 47. Ibid, V, p. 424. 48. Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal, p. 101; T.O.P., V, pp. 230-31,400-1, 424,476-77,787, 1126. 49. Ibid. p. 481. Coalition Government at centre under present constitution by no means impossible. He said he was satisfied that Dominion status should be the aim and not repeat not complete independence. He thought Gandhi was now of the same opinion. "50 When Wavell convened the Simla Conference after the war in Europe had ended, the Congress, as V. P. Menon wrote, came in for cooperation without any conditions.~1 They accepted the Viceroy's right to select members of the reconstituted Executive Council and his right to overrule any decision of the Council. Before agreeing to cooperate, Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee did not even demand the release of Congress prisoners or removal of the ban on the Congress and allied organizations. On the other hand, they were prepared to join the Viceroy's Executive Council "on the basis that they would whole-heartedly co-operate in supporting and carrying through the war against Japan to its victorious conclusion." (That would not militate against the creed of non-violence devoutly cherished by Gandhi and the Congress.) Though the Simla Conference failed, "the contacts established between the Congress and the Government," wrote Congress President Azad to Wavell, "had largely allayed past bitterness, and marked the beginning of a new chapter of confidence and goodwill."~2 After the Simla Conference was over, Wavell "assured them [Gandhi and Azad] that even if a final constitutional settlement failed to materialize, he would see to it that an interim Government is formed at the centre out of the elements prepared to cooperate." He wanted that the Congress leaders "should see to it that a peaceful atmosphere is preserved in the country . "~3 To refurbish the image of the Congress, which had been somewhat tarnished by Gandhi's repudiation of all responsibil ity for the "Quit India" movement, his condemnation of sabotage and underground activities associated with it, and his instruction to underground workers to surrender,~ Nehru, Patel and a few others, especially Nehru, did some saber-rattling during the election campaign towards the end of 1945. This perturbed Wavell and some high British officials though the Secretary of State for India considered it as part of electioneering." G.D. Birla, who served as a valuable contact between the raj and top Congress leaders like Gandhi and Patel, hastened to assure the Secretary of State for India and Stafford Cripps that there "is no political leader including Jawaharlal who wants to see any crisis or violence" and that "everyone is anxious for settlement." He explained that "even leaders are often led."56 Immediately after the upheaval in Calcutta in November 1945, Gandhi and other Congress leaders visited the city. Gandhi had a series of eight interviews with Bengal Governor Casey, who gave interviews also to Nehru and Patel. And the 50. Ibid, p. 236. 51. Ibid, XII, pp. 790-91. 52. Ibid, VI, p. 455. 53. Argus, "A Delhi Diary," Eastern Economist lEE], 10 May 1946, p. 786; Indian Annual Register (ed. by N.N. Mitra), 1945, II, p. 147. 54. B. B. Misra, op cit, pp. 501-2. 55. T.O.P., VI, p. 482. 56. T.O.P .• VI, 615. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 37 popular support. If Congress will take responsibility they will realize that firm control of unruly elements is necessary and they may put down Communists and try to curb their own left wing."64 The Congress leaders were anxious to play their part. In August, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution condemning the growing lack of discipline and disregard of obligations on the part of workers.· s On 5 August Wave II reported to Pethick-Lawrence that, according to an unimpeach able source, "Patel. ... was convinced that the Congress must enter the Government to prevent chaos spreading in the country as the result of labour unrest. "66 Next day Wavell again wired to Pethick-Lawrence: "I think it is quite likely that Congress [if it joins the government at the center] would decide to take steps fairly soon against the communists as otherwise the labour situation will get even worse. "61 So. Congress leaders were taken into the Viceroy's Executive Council (termed the Interim Government) to serve as imperialism's shield and to protect its interests from the popular anger. The expectations of the raj were fulfilled. On 2 I January 1947 Wavell informed Pethick-Lawrence that searches, still then incomplete, had been conducted and that the Congress governments of Madras and Bombay were taking strong action against the Communists." On 27 February 1947 the Bombay Governor reported to Wavell that Bombay's Congress ministry "are determined to handle the communist and other extreme Left Wing elements firmly, and are bringing forward this session a new Public Safety Measures Bill which re-enacts all our Ordinances in full . . . . "69 The Bombay Governor also wrote on 2 April 1947 to Viceroy Mountbatten that the Congress ministers of Bombay felt that "their real opponents are the Congress Socialists and the Communists" -not the British imperialists. At its twenty-second session held in Calcutta in February 1947, the All-India Trade Union Congress expressed its concern at the "indiscriminate firing by the police on workers" in Coimbators. Golden Rock, Kolar Gold Fields, Ratlam, Amalner and Kanpur (all of which were located in Congress ruled provinces), "resulting in the death of more than 50 persons including women and children and injury to more than 400." After referring to "the suppression of civil liberties," ban on labor meetings, arrests and internment of trade union workers. and destruction of union properties, the resolution added: "In Madras alone, hundreds of labour workers are in jail, and in some places, Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been applied demanding security of good behaviour from labour leaders. "11 The AITUC also protested against "the recent amendments to the Bombay District Police Act and the enactment of Congress Working Committee met in Calcutta and proclaimed once again its faith in non-violence. On 27 December 1945 Wavell noted that "Indian business magnates . . . are anxious for a solution without conflict and disorder. "51 In many of his speeches Nehru pointed out to the rulers the need for an early, peaceful settlement. 58 While assuring the raj that "every attempt will be made to arrive at some suitable compromise," Nehru decried the "sporadic violence" of the people and told them that "British rule in India is a thing of the past. "59 According to Nehru, any delay on the part of British imperialism to arrive at a compromise with the Congress would be disastrous, both for imperialism and for the class Nehru represented. After the R.I.N. revolt, Nehru and Patel condemned at a mass meeting held in Bombay on 26 February 1946 "the mass violence in Bombay during the past four days." Next day, at an interview to the press, Nehru thundered, "The R.I.N. Central Strike Committee had no business to issue such an appeal [to the city of Bombay to observe a sympathy strike]. I will not tolerate this kind of thing."60 Birla's Eastern Economist stated: In fact, whenever they [Congress leadersJ spoke, it was to denounce rebellion, mutiny, indiscipline. It was Sardar Patel's intervention that brought R.I.N. mutiny to an end. Ghandhiji's statement on the same brought out for the first time in recent history a chorus of unstinted praise from every section of the British Press. Maulana Azad denounced unequivocally the recurring disturbances at Calcutta.... In fact the fear was and is that if the Government failed to accomplish a negotiated transfer of power, even the Congress would not be able to check the deluge that would follow. India would cease to be a politically stable area and this would knock out the international foundations of the British Empire."·' The Birla organ's tender concern for the international foundations of the British empire is worth noting. Despite the shootings and other repressive measures, despite the communal tension that was steadily being built up and the other efforts of the Congress and League, new struggles, especially police and military revolts and workers' strikes which often turned political, continued to break out in different parts of India. Towards the end of March 1946, Turnbull, Secretary to the Cabinet Mission to India, wrote to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India: "The only hope is that the big boys of Congress and the League are said to be much alarmed lest their followers break loose and of Russia."62 At the end of July 1946 the India and Burma Committee of the British Cabinet concluded that if "some positive action" was not taken "without delay," the initiative might pass from His Majesty's Government. The postal strike and the threatened railway strike were symptoms of a serious situation which might rapidly deteriorate."6) Wave II agreed and wired to Pethick-Lawrence: "The most urgent need is for a Central Government with ,,7[) 64. Ibid, p. 155. 65. Note on Labor by J. B. Kripalani, A.LC.C. 02611946; cited in Sumit 57. Ibid, p. 687; see also p. 2. Sarkar, Modern India /885-1947, (Delhi, 1983) p. 429. 58. lawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works (hereafter SW). XIV, [New Delhi, 66. T.O.P., VIII, pp. 190-91. 1981]) pp. 141,265,459. 67. Ibid, p. 194. 59. Ibid, XIV, pp. 135, 254,493,496,497; T.O.P., VI, ll18. 68. Ibid, IX, pp. 524-25; see also p. 575. 60. Nehru, SW, XV, pp. 4, 13; T.O.P., VI, p. 1083. 69. Ibid, p. 822. 61. Argus, "A Delhi Diary," EE, 10 May 1946, p. 786. 70. Ibid, X, p. 87. 62. T.O.P., VD, p. 72. 71. All-India Trade Union Congress, Report: Twenty-Second Session, 63. Ibid, VIn, p. 150. (Calcutta, 1947) p. 77. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 38 ordinance in the provinces of Punjab, Madras, Bengal, United Provinces and Central Provinces under which persons can be arrested, externed or detained without trial." It also condemned the Congress governments of Madras, Bombay and the Central Provinces for detaining trade unionists in jail without trial and for interning some of them. 72 As part of their onslaught, the Congress launched a vicious political campaign against the Communists in order to isolate them politically. When the Congress leaders were themselves playing the imperialist game, they accused the Communists of having co-operated with the government during the war after the Nazi attack upon the Soviet Union!,3 The tragic fact is that when India stood at the crossroads of history, the Communist Party would give only hesitant and feeble leadership to the people. It failed miserably to fulfill the task that history had given it. Instead of clarifying the minds of workers and peasants about the true character of the Congress and League leaders, it only befogged them; instead of freeing the masses from the influence of the comprador bourgeoisie, it only strengthened it. 6 The aims of Congress and Muslim League, despite the fierce fight between themselves, fit in perfectly with the aim of British imperialism. They, too, were keen on retaining close ties with it in the form of dominion status or membership of the Commonwealth,'4 which Nehru himself had described in the thirties as "an Indianised edition (with British control behind the scenes) of the present order. "1S On 8 May 1947 Mountbatten communicated to the British cabinet that Patel and Nehru had indicated "a desire for a form of early Dominion Status (but under a more suitable name)" and added: "This is the greatest opportunity ever offered to the Empire. . . . "'6 At a meeting with the Viceroy and his staff on 10 May, Nehru said that he "himself was most anxious, apart from sentimental reasons, to have the closest possible relations with the British Commonwealth . . . . He did not intend to talk about 'Dominion Status' openly because of the many suspicions. He wanted to prepare the ground."" In the record of his interview with Krishna Menon (Nehru's emissary) on 23 May, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India and Burma, Henderson, noted: "I gained the impression that those for whom he speaks are desperately anxious to maintain the closest possible nexus with the United Kingdom. He rather plaintively stated that they would be hard pressed by their own followers as having sold out to the British. . . ."'8 72. Ibid, p. 78. 73. B. B. Misra. or cit. p. 537. 74. T.O.P., p. 236; Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal, p. 219 (G.D. Birla and Devdas Gandhi, especially Birla, often acted as Gandhi's unofficial emissary); V.P. Menon, op cit, pp. 358·59; T.O.P., IX, p. 890; X, pp. 13,312,320. 75. lawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, (New Delhi, 1982) (first published in 1936), p. 137. 76. T.O.P., X, p. 699. 77. Ibid, p. 735; see also pp. 829, 897·98. 78. Ibid, p. 962. The Muslim league was no match for the Congress in the art of double talk-saying one thing in private and the opposite thing in public. Because of the weakness of the class it represented, it wanted the raj to stay 10nger.79 When transfer of power in the immediate future became a certainty. Jinnah appealed to Wavell that the British should "give them their own bit of country, let it be as small as we [the British] liked. but it must be their own, and they would live on one meal a day, etc."80 The tragic fact is that when India stood at the crossroads of history, the Communist Party would give only hesitant and feeble leadership to the people. It failed miserably to fulfiU the task that history had given it. Instead ofclarifying the minds of workers and peasants about the true character of the Congress and League leaders, it only befogged them; instead offreeing the masses from the influence of the comprador bourgeoisie it only strengthened it. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan proposed again and again that after its establishment Pakistan should be allowed to join the British Commonwealth. 8 ! On 26 April 1947 Jinnah told Mountbatten that it was not a question of asking to be admitted, it was a question of not being kicked out. He referred to Churchill's assurance to him and said that "it was quite clear to him that the raj could not kick them out. "82 On 23 May Attlee wired to the Dominion Prime Ministers: They [the Congress leaders] said that though, in order to secure assent of their party, they would have publicly to stress fact that it is inherent in Dominion status that Dominion can secede from Commonwealth whenever it wishes, in their view Hindustan would not ultimately leave the Commonwealth, once Dominion status had been accepted. This most unexpected development opens up new possibility of whole of India, although divided into two or possibly three independent states, remaining in the Commonwealth after the effective transfer of power has taken place .... Example set by India would be likely to influence Burma, and probably later other parts of the Empire to remain in the Commonwealth. I must emphasize the need for extreme secrecy on this matter because if it became known that Congress leaders had privately encouraged this idea, the possibility of their being able to bring their party round to it would be serious[ly] jeopardized. 83 79. Ibid, 80. Ibid, 81. Ibid, 82. Ibid, 83. Ibid, VI, p. 862; VII, pp. 285, 684; IX, 54, 95. IX, p. 109; see also X, pp. 102, 300. VI, pp. 798·99; IX, pp. 261, 797; X, pp. 201, 300, 357. X, 453. X, 974·75; see also p. 965. 39 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org Churchill, "the unreconstructed Tory," was quite happy. He promised Mountbatten that if he "could achieve Dominion status for both Hindustan and Pakistan, the whole country would be behind" them and "the Conservative Party would help to rush the legislation through."B4 Gandhi, too, was happy. He told Mountbatten that "even during the war he had expressed himself as not being against it [dominion status]" and sent him a cutting from Harijan as a proof. 85 The Congress and League leaders had reasons to be "desperately anxious to maintain the closest possible nexus with the United Kingdom," for without the assistance of the imperialists the Indian comprador bourgeoisie could neither thrive nor even survive. Quite rightly did Nehru say in May 1949 on his return after attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London that "We join the Common wealth, obviously because we think it is beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that we wish to advance. "86 7 A political settlement would have been easier and quicker if there were two parties to it. Instead of two, there were three-the raj, Congress and Muslim League. Encouraged by the raj and reacting against the communalism of the Hindu elite, the Muslim elite had earlier demanded and obtained separate electorates, reservation of seats in legislatures, and so forth. It should be noted that both Hindu and Muslim communalism and casteism thrived and stilI thrive in conditions of semi-feudalism prevailing in India. Egged on by the British imperialists and exasperated by the dictatorial powers of Gandhi, Patel and their closest confidants in the Congress especially of Gandhi - the League raised the demand for partition of India on communal lines in March 1940, when the end of the direct British rule was in sight. And the demand snowballed, at first with the help of the raj. 81 The demand for Pakistan was neither raised by the Muslim masses nor was it a demand for their emancipation, as suggested by some people who usually lump together Muslims belonging to different classes and nations of India. The fate of the Muslim "hewers of wood and drawers of water" was no different from that of their Hindu counterparts, who could derive little comfort from the fact that there were more Hindu landlords, usurers and merchants to fleece them than their Muslim counterparts. The raj, which at first encouraged the idea of Pakistan, could hardly be accused either of having any desire to liberate the Muslim masses. Pakistan was the demand of the big Muslim compradors (Ispahani, Habib, Sir Rafiuddin Adamji, Sir Abdulla Haroon) who wanted a separate state where they could thrive by using 84. Ibid, X, p. 945. 85. Ibid, XI, p. 132. 86. Nehru, Independence and After, p. 275. 87. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, (Lahore, 1961) pp. 204-11; also pp. 233, 257, 266-70; Uma Kaura (Muslims and Indian Nationalism, (New Delhi, 1977) pp. 147-49, 170. The British Cabinet's offer of March-April 1942 contained, according to Secretary of State for India Amery, "the Pakistan cuckoo's egg." T.O.P., I, p. 396; see also pp. 468, 474,477; M.A.H. Ispahani, "Factors leading to the Partition of British India" in C. H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright, eds, The Partition of India, (London, 1970) p. 345 (for Cripps' assurance to Jinnah). the state machinery, untrammelled by competition with the more powerful Gujarati and Marwari compradors. 88 Seeking their own "emancipation," they invented the "two nation theory" and raised the slogan of "Islam in danger" to rally Muslims behind their demand. In semi-feudal conditions and in the absence of revolutionary mass organizations, they could sway the Muslims as Hindu and Sikh chauvinists did the Hindus and Sikhs. After the emergence of Pakistan the Muslim masses have continued to be in poverty and misery, while the Pakistan state machinery has minted big Muslim industrialists, whom Gustav Papanek calls "robber barons," out of those who were mainly traders in undivided India. 89 The result has been, in the words of M.A.H. Ispahani, that: "Today one finds an array of industrialists-big and small-in our country. The perform ance of some of the big Pakistani industrialists compares favourably with that of the well-known giants of India such as Tata, Birla, Dalmia and Mafatlal."90 Gandhi and the Congress wanted an undivided India if they could possibly have it through negotiations with the raj, and they resorted till the end to maneuvers to fulfill that object. But almost from the time the Muslim League raised the demand for partition on religious lines, Gandhi and the Congress accepted it in principle and went on declaring that they would not coerce any unwilling part (meaning a Muslim-majority area) to remain within India. 91 Interestingly enough, it was G. O. Birla (who was very close to Gandhi, Patel, and Rajendra Prasad) who proposed partition of India on religious lines at least as early as 11 January 1938, more than two years before the League raised the demand. He wrote to Gandhi's secretary: "The chief difficulty [preventing an agreement with the raj] still seems to be the Hindu-Muslim question .... I wonder why it should not be possible to have two federations, one of Muslims and another of Hindus.... I fear if anything is going to check our progress, it is the Hindu-Muslim question-not the English man, but our own internal quarrels. 92 Clearly, neither the Hindu nor the Muslim big bourgeois considered the raj as an impediment to his progress. The Congress-League "war of succession" was not over the question of Pakistan or the principle of partition on communal lines but over the content of the proposed Pakistan. In his reply, dated 16 July 1942, to G. D. Birla's letter advocating such partition, Gandhi's secretary Mahadev Desai wrote: "Bapu [Gandhi] has given it [Birla's letter of 14 July] careful attention. . . . The question is not of Pakistan or 88. M.A.H. Ispahani, ibid, pp. 356-69; T.O.P., VI, pp. 392,732; VIII, 199; X,479. 89. Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development, (Cambridge, Mass.) 1967, pp. 32-68. 90. M.A.H. Ispahani, op cit, p. 359. 91. Gandhi, "A Baffling Situation," April 1940; cited in D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma (in 8 vols.), Vol. V, (Bombay, 1952) pp. 333-34; J. Nehru, The Discovery of India, (London, 1956 ed.) pp. 468-69; SW, XIII, p. 324; XIV, pp. 50-51, 65, 142, 162,418; Pattabhi Sitaramayya, op cit, II, pp. 631-34; B. B. Misra, op cit, pp. 506-11; Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, (Bombay, 1959) p. 62 (for Congress Working Committee Resolution of II April 1942); V.P. Menon, op cit, p. 222 and Indian Review, September 1945, p. 555 (for Congress Working Committee Resolution of 12 Sept. 1945). See also V.P. Menon, op cit, pp. 162-63; T.O.P., VI, pp. 796, 1022. 92. G.D. Birla, 8apu: A Unique Association, Ill. p. 144. 40 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org separation as such, but of the real content of these conception [sic]. "93 Wavell put it correctly when he wired to Pethick-Lawrence on 11 March 1946 that "The real issue between Congress and the League is not repeat not that of self-detennination for Muslim majority provinces but whether, and if so how, Bengal and Punjab should in the last resort be partitioned.''94 To obtain the maximum they could through tripartite negotiations, Gandhi and the Congress on the one hand and the League on the other resorted to strategems which cost the people dearly. Watching Jinnah during the Cabinet Mission's interview with him, Lord Alexander, a member of the mission, noted that Jinnah avoided "as far as possible direct answers" and was "playing this game, which is one of life and death for millions of people. "95 "'This game" was being played by all the three parties; the stakes were the lives of millions of people and the welfare of unborn generations-quite cheap and expendable! The Cabinet Mission's plan of 16 May 1946 offered the prospect of a united India as a loose federation with a weak center. The plan which was at first accepted by Congress and League was later torpedoed by the Congress. Michael Brecher, a great admirer of Nehru, writes that the consensus among the people whom he saw, including Nehru, was that "a united India was within the realm of possibility as late as 1946." He adds that "one must assume that it [the partition of India on religious lines] was a voluntary choice by Nehru, Patel and their colleagues."96 They sought even to suppress the demand of the different Indian nationalities to fonn homogeneous units within India until popular upheavals coerced them to accept it in the main. As B. B. Misra observed, the Congress "would not have anything short of a strong central government, with even residuary powers vested in it."99 It should be noted that to oppose the Muslim League's obscurantist demand for the right of self-detennination of the many different nations of India, such as the Telegus, Tamils, Bengalis, Punjabis, and Gujaratis, each of which has a common territory, history, language, and economic life. On 14 July 1947, while presenting a report of the Order of Business Committee at the fourth session of the Indian Constituent Assembly, K.M. Munshi, one of the main architects of the Indian Constitution, said that they were free to have a federation of their own choice, with as strong a center as they could make it and that there would now be no Provinces with residuary powers. '00 The Marwari, Gujarati and Parsi big capitalists wanted a strong center, for only that could enable them to realize their ambitions. First, they wanted to prevent by using the state machinery the emergence of competitors from different national regions. Second, they aspired to become a zonal power in the Indian Ocean region. At that time Japan lay prostrate, the old colonial powers like France and the Netherlands were maimed, and China was in civil war. Southeast Asia as well as West Asia beckoned our big capitalists. While detained in the Ahmednagar Fort Prison, Nehru dreamt that it was India's "manifest destiny" to become the center of a super-national state stretching from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and to exercise "an important influence" in the Pacific region. He was categorical that the small national state "can have no independent existence."IO' The burden of many of his speeches and writings in 1945 and after was that "India is likely to dominate politically and economically the Indian Ocean region.",o2 On 27 October 1948 he wrote to Patel from Paris: "Definitely India is considered as a potential great Power and specially a dominant Power in Asia. . .. In Asia, everyone knows that China cannot play an effective part for a long time. The only other country in Asia is India capable of playing this part."'03 When he visited the U.S.A. in 1949, he spoke at many places in the same vein. '04 Patel, too, sang the same tune: "Let India be strong and be able to assume the leadership of Asia, which is its right. . . . "105 How could India "dominate politically and economically the Indian Ocean region" when it was one of the poorest countries, woefully lacking in economic and military strength? It was because of this disparity between aspiration and ability that the Indian big bourgeoisie was at the same time, enamored of the virtues of the British Commonwealth and yet longed to 8 Why was such voluntary choice made? While the Congress leaders tried to have an undivided India, they were prepared to settle for an India minus certain parts in the northwest and east. But they would not compromise on one issue, a strong center, whatever the cost to be paid by the people of India. They preferred a divided India with a strong center to an undivided India with a weak center. They opted for partition on religious lines when they found that their dream could not be realized through negotiations. Moving his resolution at the All India Congress Committee meeting held on 14 June 1947 for acceptance of the 3 June plan, G.B. Pant argued that it would assure an Indian Union with a strong center which could ensure progress. He contended that this plan was better than the Cabinet Mission plan with its groupings and sections and its weak center. 97 The Congress leaders wanted nothing more passionately than a strong center. It is true that the Congress declared more than once that the future constitution of India "should be a federal one, with the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units, and with the residuary powers vesting in these units. "98 But when the Indian Constitution was framed, the Congress leaders divested the units of all autonomy and residuary powers and reduced them to glorified municipalities. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. B.B. Misra, op cit, p. 431. 100. E. W. R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India 1945-7, (London, 1954)p.179. IOI. J. Nehru, The Discovery of India, pp. 545, 549, 550. \02. J. Nehru, SW, XIV, p. 325; Independence and After, pp. 219, 360. 103. Durga Das (ed), Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50, Vol. VII, (Ahmedabad, 1973) p. 668. 104. J. Nehru, Inside America (a collection of his speeches in the U.S.A. in 1949), (New Delhi, n.d.) pp. 54, 63, 83. \05. P.O. Saggi (Editor-in-Chiet), Life and Work of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, (Bombay, n.d.) p. 86. Ibid, IV, p. 319. T.O.P., VI, pp. 1134-45. Alexander Papers, Diary. p. 17; cited in B. B. Misra. op cit. p. 564. Michael Brecher, op cit, pp. 374-75. V.P. Menon, op cit, pp. 384-85. See B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, op cit, I, p. 481; Azad, op cit, p. 240. 41 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org TilE sT.\TlSMAN TIIURIDAY. nIIIIUAny U 1'1' \'01. CXIJ. No. 22850 am. CALCU1TA, THURSDAY. FEBRl'ARl" II. 1911. N.. CIH MOB VIOI..ENCE CONTIN~ TO HOLD :~ SWAY IN CALCUTTA .... Ii H CHURCH & posT OFFICE SET ON .lu.enOI.1 nElel FIRE: TRAINS HELD UP I .IUTAI~ ••••ET '_IIL111':~If - PA"~ r"b II -TIw r,...... !IIaliOftaI OP•.,.. ('w....... . . . . . t I., till' Ift.hlan' h..... l 'rIft.... GOV1:'D~P~ ".DAl~-..:.l~& '''''uno . , .............. ft ........" ...,.. .. i '"' J •. d';':' ~:~:'':I~t..OC:.::::; 'GI. n. fta.... . ~'I AI ~'UOO_UOII ::::'II;.:'''::.IO'':",oo:a.•r::: t· . . . . . . .. BAN PROCmslONS • AND A.SSEMBLI~ 1I .... I .''"''h_.......... :J •• '1'" ....... - ,.............. ........ I.,....,, . ••_ , ........ III ..., _ _ _......... ___ _____ _ _ _ _ _ 1, ...... rra"" ............... , .r.1i.... ......., ......... - . . - . . ~.., . . . . ...., ..... 1 ....... 10 Dead Yesterday: Police and ~~~_. 1loops Open Fire 20 Times ""'"'' .. ' ........................ ,.........,'. del...... r--- ! t·.s .(~. II No ... ____ .. ca.............. ,.................., ............................ allMlL _ , .... r.:-~nl''''' Front page of the British-owned Statesman of Feb. 14. 1946 hitch its wagon to America's more resplendent star, as Nehru told Colonel Louis Johnson, President Roosevelt's Personal Representative, in April 1942!06 It hoped to play an intermediate role between the imperialist metropolises and the countries less developed than India, that is, assume the role of a sub-exploiter. K.M. Panikkar, then Prime Minister of the native state of Bikaner and later India's ambassador to China and other countries, pleaded for the formation of what he called ':a maritime State System" with the great land area of India organized to a high pitch of industrial efficiency at one end, and Great Britain at the head of a Western bloc at another. He said that in the organization of this maritime State system "India will be one of the pivotal areas. It will be in the interests of all her associates that she is strong, well-organized, industrially advanced-in fact, a nation in a position to play her role in the world."107 The following extract from the evidence ofthe Engineering Association of India (on which big business was represented) before the Fiscal Commission 1949-50 is also illuminating: Communism in this part of the globe. "l()8 This role of a sub-exploiter in an imperialist system of exploitation was not a new one for our bourgeoisie. During the era of direct colonial rule they went to Ceylon, Malaya, Burma, Uganda and Tanganyika as the British opened up those colonies. As S.B.D. de Silva has put it, "Like the remora which travels long distances by attaching itself through its dorsal slicker to the body of the shark, Indian capital went along with Britain's overseas expansion. "109 For instance, in Burma, Indian businessmen controlled about two-fifths of the value of Burma's imports and about three-fifths of the value of exports. 11O Besides other Indian capitalists, the Nattukottai Cheittiyar groups alone, bas~d. in Tamil Nadu, invested about Rs.75 crore (1 crore = 10 mIllIon rupees, but to have an idea of the amount of this investme~t at today's prices one has to multiply it by more than fifty) In usury and trade in Burma. III In the conditions created by World War II the prospect . . . industrially-advanced countries like USA and UK should undertake the obligation of making India industrially great. The exigencies of the situation in South-East Asia require. it and comparative inability of the Western powers to be of effective he~p in South-East Asia demands that India should be made strong In order that she may act as a bulwark against the rising tide of 108. Government of India, Report of the Fiscal Commission 1949-50, Vol. Ill, Written Evidence, (Delhi, 1950) p. 80. 109. S.B.D. de Silva, The Political Economy ofUnderdevelopment, (London, Boston and Henley, 1982) p. 153. 110. Ibid, p. 153. Ill. The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee 1981, Vol. I, Part I -Majority Report, Calcutta, 1931, p. 95; Shoji Ito, "A Note on the 'Business Combine' in India-with Special Reference to the Nattukottai Chettiars" The Developing Economies (Tokyo), Sept. 1966, p. J70; see also Raman Mahadevan, "Pattern of Enterprise of Immigrant Entrepreneurs: A Study of Chettiars in Malaya, 1880-1930," Economic and Political Weekly, Jan. 28-Feb.4, 1978, pp. 146-152. 106. T.O.P., I, p. 665; 1. Nehru, SW, XII, pp. 194-95. 107. K.M. Panikkat, The Basis of an Indo-British Treaty, "Introduction"; cited in Modern Review (Calcutta), Dec. 1946, p. 489. 42 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org of .d.ominating the Indian Ocean region economically and politically, under the umbrella of imperialist powers like the U.K. and the U.S.A., became quite alluring to the Indian big bourgeoisie. It is the vision of becoming a zonal power as underlings of the imperialists that impelled the Congress leaders to reject an undivided India with a weak center. And they must share the responsibility for the tragedy. 9 II I I I The transfer of power was the political counterpart of the new economic and financial relationship that was developing between imperialist capital and Indian big capital. During the later phases of the war, British monopolists were planning to set up manufacturing units in India in partnership with Indian companies and to expand the market in India for their capital goods and sophisticated consumer goods. 112 Both Secretary of ~tate f~r In~ia Amery. and Viceroy Wavell were eager to help m makmg co-operative arrangements" between British and Indian firms "for joint co-operative development of Indian industries."!!3 On 25 January 1945 Amery informed Wavell that U.K. business interests "were anxious to assist India's industrial expansion which they believe will, if properly organized, carry the hope of considerable profits to themselves as well as to Indians by expanding the market in India for United Kingdom goods."!14 A confidential memorandum, prepared jointly by the board of Trade and Amery's Office, and enclosed with Amery's message, stated that "Our future prospects lie in meeting, and indeed promoting (1) the steady growth in the demand for machinery, equipment, stores, accessories and semi-manufac tured materials needed by an expanding and diversified Indian industrial system, and (2) the rapidly developing sophistication of a growing section of Indian consumers .... " The memorandum strongly hoped that through co-opera tion with Indian capitalists and by setting up manufacturing units in India, British monopolies would be capable of "guiding domestic production" and "strengthening our position in the Indian market." II 5 During the inter-war years, the traditional British indus tries, such as cotton textiles, coal and ship-building declined. On the other hand, technologically new and mass production industries like engineering, electrical goods, chemicals and automobiles grew rapidly. As a result of increasing concentra tion in the private sector giant corporations like Imperial Chemical Industries, Unilever, and Guest Keen and Nettlefold emerged. Consequently, the character of British investments in foreign countries began to change after World War II. During the inter-war years and even earlier, some large international companies like Royal Dutch Shell, ICI, Guest Keen, and Unilever had set up subsidiaries in India, but the typical foreign investment was smaller, directed by expatriates th~ough managing agency firms whch were unable to dispense With the patronage of the colonial state. But gradually "the sun of the old-fashioned rentier," as Hobsbawm puts it, "was 112. T.O.P., III, p. 752; IV, 935. 113. Ibid, IV, p. 676, 741, 812, 851-2. J II 114. Ihid, V, p. 466. 115. Ibid, V, pp. 469-70. setting," and the sun of the giant international corporation was rising."6 Besides setting up branches and subsidiaries, the multinationals began towards the end of the war to make "cooperative arrangements" with big Indian capitalists to start joint ventures. They would provide the technology, capital goods, components, and spare parts, and design, set up and run, at least for some time, the plants, while local capitalist groups would raise finances for making payments to them and for other construction work and working capital. There was a merger of interests of foreign and Indian capital. As technology and capital goods (in which technology is embodied) are the key to power, and as they are in the hands of the multinational it generally controls a joint venture, whatever may be its equity holding. Indian big capital was eager to participate. Flush with war profits, it began to have visions of rapid expansion in postwar days by relying on two props, foreign imperialist capital and state capitalism. In 1944 appeared A Brief Memorandum Outlining a Plan ofEconomic Developmentfor India, popularly known as the Bombay Plan, the authors of which were the foremost representatives of Indian commerce and industry -Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Sir J.R.D. Tata, G.D. Birla, and others. For finances, it depended partly on fresh influx of foreign loan-capital, and for capital goods and technology it relied on imperialist capital. It declared that India in the initial years of planning would "be dependent almost entirely on foreign countries for the machinery and technical skill necessary for the establishment of both basic and other industries."117 Then in the spring and summer of 1945, a delegation of some of India's top business magnates (including Sir J.R.D. Tata, G. D. Birla, Sir Padampat Singhania, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, M.A.H. Ispahani) went to the U.K. and the U.S.A. in search of capital and collaboration. Tie-ups between ICI and Tata and between Nuffield and Birla for starting joint ventures in India, which Manu Subedar denounced in the Central Legislative Assembly as illegitimate marriages, were formed in 1945 and more negotiations for such tie-ups were in progress. The Indian big bourgeoisie's plan of depending on imperialist capital for fulfilling its dream of expansion fitted perfectly into British and U.S. capital's st~ategies of ~sing India chiefly as an outlet for export of capital. Direct c.olo~lal rul~ was not deemed essential for the purposes of multmatlOnals like the ICI. It could obtain much of what it sought by using the levers of capital goods, technology and loans. Unde~ the new kind of arrangement, the Indian economy would remam, as before, dovetailed with the economy of the metropolis, despite formal political independence. And when the economic basis of the relationship would be of a satellitic character, political and other relations could be shaped accordingly. For British imperialism it was both a retreat and an advance. It was a retreat because Britain had to terminate its direct rule. In another sense it was an advance, for freed of the immediate worries of direct confrontation with the Indian 116.. E. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1976 repnnt) p. 259. 117. P. Thakurdas et aI, A Brief Memorandum Outlining a Plan of Economic Development for India (in 2 Parts), (Bombay, 1944) Part I, p. 44. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 43 people, it would carry on and even intensify its exploitation of India. 10 It was not conflict with the raj but the bitter struggle between Congress and League that delayed the political settlemen~. The Congress stand vis-a-vis British imperialism was no dIfferent from the League stand vis-a-vis the raj: and amounted to "sweet reasonableness" and servility. The task of carving up the provinces of the Punjab and Bengal and the district of Sylhet in less than five weeks, regardless of the interests of the 100 million people living there, and attaching the parts to the two new states was given to a British lawyer, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a stranger to the country. The casual manner in which the government and top Congress and League leaders handled the problem and the callous indifference with which Mountbatten published the Radcliffe award contributed greatly to the horrors of the communal conflagration. Campbell-Johnson wrote of the 3 June 1947 plan: "The third main feature was Dominion Status. This was a masterstroke on many grounds, but in particular because it made possible the administrative and constitutional continuity, on the basis of the great India Act of 1935.""8 It was this Act that Nehru had described in 1936 as "a charter of slavery." Interestingly, before Mountbatten left London to assume the office of Viceroy, Attlee and members of the Cabinet Mission had told him that he "was, in fact, to regard himself less as the last British Viceroy than as the first head of the new Indian State. ""9 (One marvels at the remarkable confidence of the British imperialists in their compradors). The last British Viceroy actually became at the invitation of the Congress the first head of the new Indian state. Nehru and Patel "wanted him to stay on [in that capacity] as long as he would .... "'20 At the invitation of the Congress two British governors and two other governors of the period of direct colonial rule remained governors of four out of nine provinces of the Indian Union, the former two as governors of the largest two p~ovinces. In .~akistan the governors of all the provinces except Smd were BntIsh after the transfer of power. The bureaucratic "steel frame" continued as before, but many British civilians chose to leave after accepting compensation. British military officers became heads of the three defence services of India as well as of Pakistan. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Sir Claude Auchin leek, became for some time Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the two new States. An appeal was issued to all the British officers and other British personnel in the Indian armed forces to continue, and forty-nine percent of the officers and ninety-four percent of the other ranks decided to stay on.'21 But the naval ratings who had been victimized for their role in the R.I.N. revolt of 1946 and other such men were denied jobs. Mountbatten appreciated Nehru's attitude and noted that "it was evidence of Nehru's fairness of mind that he said that he would look for someone other than his previous nominee to be Trade Agent in Malaya, since Lord Wavell had objected to him on the ground that he took part in an anti-British movement during the- war."'22 Both Nehru and Jinnah "wholeheartedly welcomed" the British Government's proposal to negotiate "overall Common wealth defence arrangements." It was decided that, on behalf of India and Pakistan, the Joint Defence Council would conduct negotiations with the high-powered British delegation. It is worth noting that the Joint Defence Council was composed of Mountbatten as Chairman, Claude Auchinleck (Supreme Commander), Liaquat Ali Khan (representing Pakistan) and Baldev Singh (representing India) as members. In his Personal Report to members of the British cabinet and the king, dated 8 August 1947, Mountbatten wrote: "As I shall continue to be Chairman of the Joint Defence Council after 15th August, I shall hope to be able to regulate these discussions [between the Council and the British delegation] and trust that the desired objects will be achieved."123 Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, descended on Delhi and had talks with Nehru on 23 and 24 June 1947 "concerning the grant of facilities for the employment of Gurkha troops in the British Army." The only Indian present at the talks was Nehru. The note on this interview prepared by Nehru himself stated that Montgomery "pointed out the grave man-power difficulty of the United Kingdom leading to the necessity of their retaining Gurkha troops in South-East Asia for emergencies, notably war." On behalf of India Nehru agreed in principle to grant the facilities the British Government was seeking. Montgomery hoped that the subsequent discussions for working out details would be "carried out quietly without much fuss .... Therefore, it is better to do it as soon as possible in a quiet way without any fuSS."124 Replying to Montgomery's letter of appreciation, Nehru wrote: "As I told you, we have approached this question with every desire to meet the wishes of the British Government. "125 Several Gurkha regiments and battalions "which now form part of the Indian Army" and "their Regional Centres" were "allotted for service under His Majesty's Government,"126 obviously, to deal with the rebellious people of Southeast Asia. Mountbatten designed flags for the new states with the Union Jack in the upper canton. Gandhi, Patel and others, as Nehru told Mountbatten, were willing to accept it, but they late~ found it prudent not to do so as there was a "general feelIng among Congress extremists . . . that Indian leaders were pandering far too much to the British." They agreed to fly the Union Jack on certain days of the year; the flags of the Governor-General and governors and of the Navy and the Air Force were suitably designed, and it was decided not to publicize these matters. 127 In India, freedom was ushered in with the playing of "God Save the King" followed by "Jana Gana Mana" (the Indian national anthem), with Nehru toasting the health of the British 122. Ibid. IX, p. 13. 123. Ibid, p. 599. 118. Campbell-Johnson, op cit. p. 355. 124. Ibid. XI. pp. 724-25. 119. T.O.P .• X, p. 243. 125. Ibid. pp. 609-10. 120. Ibid, XII, p. 36. 126. Ibid. XII. p. 569. 121. Ibid. p. 765. 127. Ibid. pp. 164.230-31.596. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org King and Mountbatten toasting the Dominion Government, 128 and with the Union Jack flying proudly and looking on while the Indian national flag was unfurled. On 15 August 1947 the "programme had originally included a ceremonial lowering of the Union Jack" but it was changed and the Union Jack was not hauled down, because it might offend "British suscepti bilities. "129 To crown all, on 15 August, Rajendra Prasad, President of the Indian Constituent Assembly, requested Mountbatten, the head of the new State, to convey "a message of loyal greetings from this House" to the British King. It said: "That message [the King's message to the new Dominion] will serve as an inspiration in the great work on which we launch today. . . . I hope and trust that the interest and sympathy and the kindness which have always inspired His Majesty will continue in favour of India and we shaH be worthy of them. "'30 * 128. Campbell-Johnson, op cit, pp. 158, 161. 129. T.O.P., XII, p. 772. 130. Ibid, p. 777. Indian Council of Social Science Research Journals ICSSR Research Abstracts Quarterly Subscription: Single copy: Rs. 3, £ 0.50, $0.75. 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The Director, Social Science Documentation Centre.J.C.S.S.R .. 35, Ferozeshah Road. New Delhi 110001 (INDIA) The author. Suniti Kumar Ghosh, has retained the copyright on this article. What time I - Inside l\SI~ IS I t e e ? e T'S A GOOD TIME to subscribe to Inside Asia. After the months it takes to get a new magazine started, we have three issues out and all the signs are that we're on our way. At first we had to go out and persuade people to write for us-in this issue, some of our best stories came to us, unsolicited. At the last count we have subscribers in 19 countries, we're on sale in four continents and we have most of the financial backing we need for the critical first two years. So jump on the bandwagon. We'll be calling at some of the lesser-known flash points in Asia en route, Our development and environment stories are written from a popular perspective. Our sections on labour affairs and women in Asia have a campaigning edge. Our 'Britain and Asia' section knocks even the newest stereotypes. You'll be surprised, We promise you: if you don't join us now, you'll miss out. I wish to subscribe to INSIDE ASIA for I year (6 issues) Individual Europe (incl. Britain) £10 0 USA. Canada. £150 Australia. Japan & New Zealand Asia (except Japan) & the rest of the world Institution £18 0 £200 Founding £25 0 £18 0 £250 £25 0 Please make cheques and money orders payable to INSIDE ASIA and send to: 242-244 Pentonville Road, London NI 9UP. Name: Address: £\0 0 I/we enclose the following sum in payment: Signed: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Date: © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org Women in North Korea: An Interview with the Korean Democratic Women's Union by Jon Halliday* Historical Background From 1910 (formally, de facto earlier) until 1945 Korea was under extremely harsh occupation by Japan. During this period, when every component of Korean culture was cruelly suppressed, Korean women suffered specific oppression. Very large numbers of Korean women were forcibly driven into prostitution, both in Korea itself and throughout the Japanese empire. Many were forced into prostitution for Japanese troops in appalling conditions, often in the front lines, and many were killed in the trenches. I Within general Japanese sexism, there was a specificity to the attempt to degrade and exploit Korean women. Certain aspects of contemporary Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) official culture must be understood as attempts to combat the legacy of this colonial past. The emphasis on "purity" -for women-which is articulated by both men and women in the DPRK is justified officially by reference to both the Japanese colonial past and the contempor ary degradation of women in South Korea, which is usually attributed mainly to US and Japanese influences, such as sex tourism. 2 However, the official DPRK position conceals several evasions. First, Korean society had its own autonomous forms 'My thanks to Bruce Cumings and Brett Nee for very helpful critical comments. Any errors are solely mine. I have done short bibliographies on North Korea in Vol. II, no. 4 (1979) and Vol. 16, no. 4 (1984) of the Bulletin. I. Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War: World War /I and the Japanese, 1931-1945 (New York, Pantheon, 1978), p. 159; cf. p. 184. See also the appalling account by Yoshida Kiyoharu, a former Japanese official involved in shanghaiing Korean women, in People's Korea (Tokyo), Aug. 21 & 28, 1982. of sexism which pre-dated both Japanese colonialism and the advent of US imperialism. A particularly emblematic-and problematic-instance is that in the period before the formal imposition of Japanese rule in 1910 the Korean state, which was male dominated, executed by decapitation Korean women who "consorted" with Japanese men.' So far as I know, similar punishment was not visited on Korean men who "consorted" with Japanese women (or with Japanese men). Clearly here, a potentially salutary response to Japanese male sexism was transmuted into sexist retribution against Korean women. This evasion may well be linked to a second one: the conspicuous failure of the DPRK to come to terms with its 2. This male-imposed concept of "purity" also involves the suppression of an important part of Korea's cultural past. Gavan McCormack reports being told (falsely) by a DPRK historian in 1980 that Korea's tradition "was of a degree of purity superior to other East Asian countries" because it lacked any equivalent to Japanese erotic paintings or Chinese erotic novels (Gavan McCormack, "North Korea: Kimilsungism-Path to Socialism?" Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars [henceforth: BCASj, Vol. 13, no. 4 [Oct.-Dec. 1981], p. 57). Contemporary male-imposed puritanism also seems to deny the possibility of an autonomous female eroticism and of women's right to this. The Cuban writer Carlos Franqui notes that Korean puritanism exceeds even that of other post-revolutionary states, including not only the USSR and China, but also Cuba, which had an extremely harsh experience of US sexism within recent decades (Franqui, Family Portrait with Fidel [London, Cape, 1983], p. 211). 3. Mikiso Hane, Peasants. Rebels, and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan (London, Scholar Press; New York, Pantheon, 1982), p. 219, citing Morisaki Kazue, Karayuki-san (Tokyo, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1976), p. 120-123, 127ff. (The word "consorted" is Hane's). 46 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org own Confucian past. 4 Whereas both China and Vietnam have waged major campaigns of varying effectiveness against their Confucian pasts, the DPRK stands out among the East Asian post-revolutionary regimes by its silence on this score. Confucianism struck particularly deep roots in Korea, and it is not fanciful to suggest that there may be powerful links between this Confucian past and the manifestly patriarchal present under the "Great Leader" Kim II Sung and the "Dear Leader" Kim long II (his son). Third, male sexism and violence against women have not been a monopoly of the representatives of capitalism in the modem era. The Soviet Red Army committed a large number of rapes and other acts of violence against women in Northern Korea when it first arrived. These are neither included in the official account nor explicitly adduced as a cause of current policies and attitudes. 5 Lastly, while the DPRK has adopted the standard rhetoric of Marxism common to all post-revolutionary societies, it, like the others, has not come to terms with the incomplete legacy of this tradition. 6 On the contrary, the DPRK and its leader Kim II Sung have grafted this incomplete ideology onto their own Confucian traditions without much questioning of the inadequacies of the two strands, particularly as regards the autonomy of women. The position of women in the DPRK is also directly affected by material factors. Among these is the ratio of Northern to Southern popUlation. When Korea was divided in 1945-48 the Northern part had only about one-third the South's population. It now has about 20 million people, compared with some 42 million in the South. This demographic disadvantage was exacerbated by the effects of the Korean War of 1950-53 in two major ways. First, the North was subjected to intensive bombing which virtually destroyed the entire DPRK. Within six months of the start of the war the US grounded its bombers because, according to the head of Bomber Command in the Far East, there were no more targets left to hit (something which never happened in Vietnam).7 By the end of the war, the DPRK had been saturated with high explosives and napalm. 4. On Korean Confucianism, see: Key P. Yang and Gregory Henderson, "An Outline History of Korean Confucianism," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 18, no. I (Nov. 1958) and no. 2 (Feb. 1959); cf. Munsang Seoh, "The Ultimate Concern of Yi Korean Confucians: An Analysis of the i·ki Debates," Occasional Papers on Korea (Seattle), No.5 (March 1977); Michael C. Kalton, "Chong Tasan's Philosophy of Man: A Radical Critique of the Neo-Confucian World View," Journal of Korean Studies (Seattle), Vol. 3 (1981). Lew Myong-gol, "A Critique of North Korean View of the Practical Learning," Vantage Point (Seoul) [henceforth: VP], Vol. 6, no. 5 (May 1983) has reference to DPRK criticisms of Confucianism-in the past. 5. Edvard Kardelj records that when he raised the same issue with Stalin about Yugoslavia: "Stalin said that Soviet soldiers did not do such things, but that if there had been an odd case here and there-which was only natural-well, they had not done any real harm." (Edvard Kardelj, Reminiscences: The Struggle for Recognition and Independence: The New Yugoslavia, 1944-1957 [London, Blond & Briggs, 1982], p. 63). 6. The fundamental source on this whole area is Maxine Molyneux, "Socialist Societies Old and New: Progress Towards Women's Emancipation," Feminist Review (London), no. 8 (Summer 1981); also in World Development, Vol. 9, no. 9/10 (Sept.-Oct. 1981). 7. Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., to U.S. Congressional Hearings on the dismissal of Douglas MacArthur, June 25, 1951, p. 3075. It should be specified that at the period to which O'Donnell is referring the US was occupying most of North Korea. Secondly, between October and December 1950 some 90 percent of the territory and population of the DPRK were occupied by the US and its allies. This is, inter alia, the only time in history (apart from the marginal case of Grenada) when the US has actually occupied a Communist country. It seems probable that the DPRK lost 12-15 percent of its population during the war-a much higher percentage than the Soviet Union lost in the Second World War. lust over half the Korean dead were men. 8 These two factors condition official DPRK attitudes to population growth. The historical conditions are further aggravated by the high level of military preparedness on the Korean peninsula. Both North and South Korea have very large armed forces. In 1983 the South reportedly had 622,000 people under arms (all men). The North's armed forces (mainly, but not exclusively, male) are probably less than this, but the proportion of the North's population under arms is much higher than in the South. 9 This high level of militarization also reinforces male domination in the DPRK. When I asked about women who might not want to have children I was told: "All women in our country want children. Any woman who did not would be considered abnormal." I checked the word "abnormal" and was assured that that was indeed what had been said. When I asked if there was therefore any social stigma attached to women who did not have children, I was told: "All women have children." The position of women is determined by three major linked pressures, which partly conflict with each other: for higher production of material goods and services; for a larger population; and for a long-serving, but largely celibate army. To achieve these goals the regime has pushed almost all adult 8. A Soviet source states that between 1949 and 1953 the male popUlation of the DPRK fell from 4,782,000 to 3,982,000, while the female population fell from 4,840,000 to 4,509,000 (V. V. Martynov, Koreya [Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Mysl," 19701, p. 59, cited in Robert Ante, "The Transfurmation of the Economic Geography of the DPRK," Korea Focus, Vol. I, no. 3 [19721, p. 55). I have discussed some of the far-reaching effects of the US-UN occupation of North Korea in "The Korean War: Some Notes on Evidence and Solidarity," BCAS, Vol. II, no. 3 (1979). Two important further sources are: We Accuse! Report of the Commission of the Women's International Democratic Federation in Korea, May 16 to 27, 1951 (Berlin, WIDF, 1952); and Commission of International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Reports on Investigations in Korea and China, March-April 1952 (Brussels, IADL, 1952). 9. The Western estimate most widely reproduced is 784,500 in the services (1983); but no hard evidence has ever been publicly produced for this figure; among the problems in accepting it is that the official Western estimate for 1978 was 512,000; an increase of over a quarter of a million in the armed forces over five years in a country the size of the DPRK would involve a huge strain on the economy which would be bound to show up in other economic .t7 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org f I I I! t ! ! t I I, i <' women into production outside the home, set up a very extensive network of kindergartens and other services, and encouraged a high birth rate (partly by making contraception and abortion difficult to obtain), but with very late marriage. Men carry more of the burden on the military front, but women carry a disproportionate amount of the total burden in terms of overall work and sacrifice. Gains, Limits-and Uncertainties No foreign visitor on a short trip to North Korea can honestly claim to be sure how anything really works. Even less so can a male visitor, who does not speak Korean, like myself, give a comprehensive picture of the position of women-or of male oppression-after a visit of only 10 days. 10 The regime provides only very fragmentary information; it blatantly evades on many very important issues and adopts an extremely cavalier attitude to facts and statistics. And not only are certain barriers between men and women strong, but there are also the barriers between Koreans and foreigners and a strong division between the public and the private. On the one hand, with the above qualifications, it is manifest that, compared with the past, the position of women has greatly improved in terms of standard of living, access to education, health and the basic human dignities, life expectancy and access to a wide range of jobs. The most extreme form of exploitation of women, prostitution, has apparently (and I believe probably in fact) been eradicated; the same goes for conCUbinage. This marks a major advance over both the past and South Korea. Similarly, it seems most unlikely that the crudest forms of violence against women, such as male goon squads pouring human excrement over women workers, which do occur in the South, could possibly occur in the North. On the other hand, does the equality which the regime loudly proclaims reaIly exist? It seems most unlikely. First, it is clear that women still have to do far more work overall; almost all adult women work outside the home more or less fuIl-time, but the bulk of housework and looking after children at home is (as everywhere) done by women. Second, although the regime claims to have "enforced" equality for women for four decades, including in pay, it is also clear that male and female wages and incomes (see below) are not equal. Some of this is due to different occupational structures (more women in light industry and agriculture), but it is by no means certain that the principle of equal pay for equal work is being enacted either. Evidence confirming that it was would surely be forthcoming if this were the case. Third, in the key area of political power women are enormously under-represented, even though what has been done undoubtedly represents a major advance over the past. Thus a very recent text on women (March 1985) explicitly starts out by stating: "Participation of indices; yet no such evidence has been forthcoming. In 1980 Gavan McCormack was told by an official in the DPRK that the armed forces were "about 350,000-400,000" (information kindly made available by Gavan McCormack to the author). My own visual observation (in 1977) was that about 10% of the armed forces were women. 10. I visited the DPRK for ten days in summer 1977. as a guest of the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. together with the late Malcolm Caldwell. whose account of this interview is in his "North Korea-Aspects of a New Society." Contemporary Review (London). vol. 233. no. 1355 (Dec. 1978). women in political affairs is a barometer of women's position and roles."11 It goes straight on to give figures for women in the relatively powerless assemblies, but it does not have a single figure for women's participation in the political organisation which actually runs the country, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP). The regime's consistent failure to provide any information about women in the KWP bodes ill for women having a major role not only in the present but also in the foreseable future. This manifest under-representation in the KWP and in its ruling bodies is aggravated by the equally manifest high military component in the party. Doubt about the degree of real equality is reinforced by the stridently patriarchal style (and substance) of the regime, most evident in the cult of Kim II Sung, along with the promotion of his son, Kim long II, as heir apparent and the attendant mini-cult of Kim long II. 12 Along with this goes a whole gamut of authoritarian and patriarchal attitudes and language on the part ofthe ruling group. AIl of this is reinforced by blatantly patriarchal and phaIlocratic products. In addition, some of Kim II Sung's speeches, while rhetorically calling for equality, in fact seem to blame women for errors and forms of backwardness which are actually the responsibility of men. 13 The question of male responsibility and women's freedom also has to be confronted in the area of sexuality and repression. It is hard to believe that the regime's steely attitude towards late marriage, with enforced sexual abstinence before marriage, does not conceal immense sexual misery. This suffering may hit both sexes, but it is male-imposed. There is no sign that women have been allowed an equal say with men in reversing and reforming traditional attitudes in what is, after all, supposed to be a new society. Any visitor on a formal guided tour in a post-revolutionary society is inevitably subjected to considerable ritual. 14 It would be an illusion to think one is seeing "the real society." In all the "social" situations in which we were involved, and in everything involving "entertainment," women were always both serving men and not partaking of the goods offered, except in the headquarters of the Women's Union. Towards the end of our stay we visited a cooperative farm at Ryongrim, near Anju (about half way between Pyongyang II. Pak II Bun, "Women at Work," People's Korea, no. 1,234 (March 23, 1985). 12. I have a few preliminary observations on the specificity of Kim's cult in my "The North Korean Enigma," New Left Review (London), no. 127 (1981). Excellent analysis and evocative quotations in Bruce Cumings. "Corporatism in North Korea," Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 4 (1982-3). Interesting observations in Horst Kumitzky, "North Korea as I Saw It" (Seoul, Public Relations Association of Korea, n.d. [translation, with altered title, of article originally in Kursbuch, no. 30 (1972)]); see especially section V ("Sexuality and Political Power"). 13. See the curious passage about what Kim calls "the disaster" during the US-UN occupation of the DPRK in 1950 in Kim, "On Some Tasks Confronting the Women's Union Organization," speech to the 3d KDWU Congress. Sept. 2, 1965, in Kim, On the Work of the Women's Union (Pyongyang, FLPH. 1971), pp. 45-6; and the passage from Kim's speech to the 4th KDWU Congress, "On the Revolutionization and Working-Classization of Women," (FLPH, 1974), pp. 4-5 (speech delivered October 7, 1971). In addition, one can hardly avoid stating the obvious: most of the texts on "the woman question" are by a·man. Kim II Sung; most of the rest are by his wife, Kim Song Ae. 14. Brilliant material on this in Hans Magnus Enzensberger. "Tourists of the Revolution," in Enzensberger. Raids and Reconstructions: Essays on Politics, Crime and Culture (London, Pluto, 1976). 48 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org , I l and the Chinese border). It was a Sunday. We had specifically asked to visit a fann and to meet fanners, but we naively did not spell out our desire actually to see a field. So we saw the fann and met some fanners-but never got into a field. We were entertained at dinner in a house which had been visited by Kim n Sung. Women did all the cooking and serving, while the men ate a great deal and spent a lot of effort trying to force food on us. When we asked about the division of labor in the house and the absence of women from activities other than cooking and serving, the woman who seemed to live in the house (it was not clear if she really did, as it was a very artificial set-up) was brought into the room where we were eating and sat down, but ate nothing, looked uneasy (maybe bored, too), and soon returned to the kitchen. On the occasions when alcohol was served, no woman ever drank alcohol in our presence. On several occasions women disappeared when men started drinking beer. One woman said that women did sometimes drink alcohol, but not as much as men, and would rarely drink in the company of men. The same person also spontaneously expressed a strong dislike of male drunks-so they apparently did then still exist in the "socialist paradise." Obviously, drinking beer with men is neither a goal of socialism nor a higher form of human existence. All the same, is there equality? Doubts on this score are somewhat strengthened by the charge made by a Venezuelan Communist poet and writer, Ali Lameda, who lived in the DPRK and was imprisoned there, that a woman was sent to prison for smoking (about 1970).'5 Again, while men smoked a lot in public, women did not. Apart from the regime's systematic concealment of infor mation it does not want outsiders to know, and its manifest willingness to lie when it wants to, there are two particular problems in its mode of dealing with "the women question." The first is that the official position now is that "the women question" has been "solved" (or even "brilliantly solved ... by the Great Leader"). When the regime makes a claim of this kind, it is no longer open to question. Even though inequality between men and women remains manifest, the regime deprives both women and men of the grounds on which to wage a campaign for genuine equality. Indeed, I would think it would be most unwise for anyone in the DPRK to suggest that such a campaign was still needed-and there was certainly no sign that it was underway, much less being vigorously waged, in 1977. The second problem is that the regime seems to be quite haphazard in its programmatic approach to the question of inequality and the position of women. In 1971 Kim II Sung could tell the KDWU that there were very few women in positions of power, especially in the KWP, (something which they presumably were well aware of).'6 But at the next KWP Congress, the 6th, in 1980, Kim II Sung, in devoting exactly 14 lines of a 5-hour speech to the subject, described the position of women as solely part of the "technical" revolution, and made no mention at all of the massive under-representation of women in the Party (manifest in pictures of the Congress)'7 nor any reference to whether or not the apparently important deficiencies which he had mentioned in 1971 bad been corrected. The possibility must therefore be confronted that the im provement in the formal position of women manifest after 1945 may have come to a halt, or slowed down, well short of even formal equality. In fact, there is little evidence, other than official rhetoric, that genuine equality is even a real goal of the regime. Not nearly enough is known about life in the DPRK to come to definitive conclusions (which does not mean, as some apologists for the DPRK claim, that one can not be sure about anything). Two small examples at each end of the scale are the socialization of youth and retirement. At the Ryongrim fann we visited a middle school (on a Sunday). The boys and girls (about 12 years old) were in separate groups in the same classroom. We asked if this was sexual segregation and were told that it ws not-it was simply because, it being Sunday, the children were in their work groups (sort of organized hobbies) and that in regular classes they were not segregated. We were unable to verify if this was the case or not. In any case, the implication was that boys and girls were engaged in different hobbies, which is itself important. As for old age, women retire at age 55, men at 60. Life expectancy has risen markedly since Liberation. The regime claims that life expectancy for women has now reached about 77 (71 for men). If so (these figures are disputed in the West), this means that women have on average over 20 years of life after retirement, while men have only one decade. II What happens to women over this long period? One recent text says that "many women . . . remain on their jobs and are active after retirement age."'9 This may be a very good thing, but it may also mean that "retirement" does not mean what the regime usually claims. The very rapid urbanization of the society some two-thirds of the population probably now live in urban areas-must have put tremendous strain on the old extended family. Has the regime found a way to obviate, or lessen the loneliness which most societies inflict on their old people? Anyone who has tried to decode and evaluate DPRK propaganda knows that the regime speaks with two voices. It is quite capable of stating as a fact something which is only a goal. It is also capable of presenting sharply conflicting information, without attempting to resolve the contradictions. From the regime's published material, it is clear that women have not yet achieved economic equality, in spite of official claims; and, above all, they have not remotely approached political equality in the body which matters, the ruling Party. Culturally, the society is still very patriarchal. Socially, women have undoubtedly made enormous advances over the past, but 17. An observer at the last (6th) Party Congress in 1980 told me that less than 10 percent of the delegates, and probably closer to 5 percent were women. 18. Life expectancy figures are difficult to decipher. Most DPRK sources claim that average expectancy reached 74 years (female: 77; male: 71) around 1980. People's Korea, March 9, 1985, p. 3, appears to claim that the figure reached 77 in 1979 (it claims 79 for men and 75 for women in that year [presumably the other way round?]-but this claim is different from the figure 15. Ali Lameda, A Personal Account of the Experience of a Prisoner of of 74 years (average) for 1984 published on the facing page (2) of the same Conscience in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (London, Amnesty issue as the official figure at the end of the Seven-Year Plan. The DPRK is International, 1979), p. 19. I was told that women made up 5-10 percent of not often given the benefit of the doubt, but it has only itself to blame if it the prison population in 1977 (interview, Pyongyang, July 1977). publishes such radically conflicting data. 16. See quotation in note 27 below. 19. Pale II Bun, 'Women at Work,' op. cit. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 49 I ! I I! ! I! ! ! I. whether they have achieved equality is another matter. The Interview The text below is an almost complete version of an inter view with representatives of the Korean Democratic Women's Union, the KDWU. This organization apparently groups together all adult women in the DPRK. 20 I have reproduced an almost verbatim text for two reasons. First, it is one of the few on-the-record interviews in which DPRK officials have discussed issues such as contraception, abortion and remarriage; information about women in the DPRK is conspicuous by its absence in most studies on women in post-revolutionary societies. Second, I hope the full text carries some of the flavor and nuances inherent in an interview conducted by two Western male intellectuals on a short visit, questioning official female representatives of a regime which prides itself on being "monolithic" and carefully controls information. "As for wages, there is no difference. There is equal pay for equal work. Women [in fact] have more benefits than men. Women with three children aged thirteen or less get eight hours' pay for six hours' work. There are women's san atoria, rest homes, maternity hospitals and children's hospitals. Asfor birth control, there is no such policy." During our stay in Korea we were accompanied throughout by two (male) officials on behalf of the Society which invited us. We made our requests in advance for meetings and inter views via the Society. If a particular interview appeared to be a probability (or a certainty), the officials would ask us to give them the questions in advance, both in writing and verbally. It was not always possible to prepare written questions in advance and submit them in time. Further, we made it clear that we preferred to have a freewheeling discussion whenever possible. However, after a brief period in the country, it became clear to us that we got more information, especially of a factual kind, if we stated in advance what we wanted to ask. We therefore communicated in advance the areas and issues we wanted to discuss, while explicitly reserving the "right" to pursue questions in the discussion. In the case of the interview with the KDWU we did not submit written questions in advance, but went very fully over the ground several days ahead with our guides. The only question to which an objection was raised was the one about contraception. We were told that this would be "embarrassing." We replied that people in the West, both men and women, would like to know about this question and that we had been requested to ask it by both women and men-and that we would like to hear any refusal from the women themselves and not from a man claiming to interpret women's reactions. We suggested that if the question was not appropriate for this interview we would like to interview a woman doctor. During the preliminary discussion with our guides, a number of observations emerged which deserve to be reported. When I asked about women who might not want to have children I was told: "All women in our country want children. Any woman who did not would be considered abnormal." I checked the word "abnormal" and was assured that that was indeed what had been said. When I asked if there was therefore any social stigma attached to women who did not have children, I was told: "All women have children."21 On the question of divorce, I was led to understand that it was basically a private matter between the two parties, but that they did have to go to some form of court to get the divorce ratified formally. One official said, "the courts only come in in a case of venereal disease." One (male) official also stated that contraceptive devices were freely available to all women, but that they needed a doctor's prescription. According to him, anyone could ask. But the criteria for approval were not clear, at least to me. We failed to ask about the availability of male contraceptives. We saw no signs of contraceptives on sale or any other indication that information about them was communicated in a public way.22 The interview below took place at the heaquarters of the KDWU in Pyongyang, the capital ofthe DPRK. Our three inter locutors were: Yi Suk Yon,23 Chairperson of the Auditing Committee and member of the Central Committee of the KDWU; Yang Gi Su and Ro Song Hi, officeholders attached to the Central Committee of the KDWU. Two of the women wore traditional Korean dress; the youngest one wore Western style dress (and understood English as well). The interview was conducted through a (male) interpreter. across a rather wide room. All participants sat in large armchairs set in rows down each side of the room. Lemonade and beer were served. The room was air-conditioned. A portrait of DPRK President Kim II Sung hung at one end of the room. After initial formalities, we started out by stating briefly 21. We frequently encountered such "total" slogans and answers. Ritual use of them, of course, undermines all DPRK evidence. The possibility that there might be a childless married woman in the DPRK is evident in the tale of the woman worker at the famous Vinalon factory at Hamhung who was discovered by Kim II Sung to be childless after several years of marriage. The Great Leader immediately endowed her with a gift of his personal supply of ginseng root, whereupon she reportedly produced four children in the next four years. "All women" may include those with children by adoption. 22. In other conversations with officials we asked about sex education. Specifically, we asked if it was usually given in the family or at school. We were told that it was not given by either, and that the state did not have an explicit policy on it. When we suggested that it might be considered a lacuna 20. In 1971, Kim Il Sung said: "Every woman in our country now belongs in state practice to fail to have a policy in such an important field, we were to her organization" (Kim, "On the Revolutionization and Wooong-Classiza told that sex education material was available at schools, but that each child tion of Women," speech given Oct. 7, 1971 to the KDWU [Pyongyang, FLPH, had to seek it out as best she or he could on their own. We were told flatly 1974], p. 6). Some sources suggest that the KDWU is mainly for women who that sex before marriage "does not exist in our country." are not members of the ruling Korean Workers' [Communist] Party. We failed to get clarification on this. 23. Korean names are given surname first. © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 50 why we had asked for the interview. We said that many women in the West had asked us to discuss these questions, and that many people, both male and female, in the West would like to know about the position of women in the DPRK and about attempts to end male domination. We gave a brief outline of the women's movement in the West and its political import ance, emphasizing its radical and progressive nature. (This appeared to be news to our interlocutors, but their reaction may have been a form of politeness, which I could not "read" correctly). The KDWU officials indicated that they would be interested in receiving material produced by the women's movement in the West. In order to try to avoid misunderstanding we said that some of the questions we wanted to ask might be considered delicate and asked the KDWU officials to say in advance if there were any areas or subjects they did not want to discuss. They said there were none. The text below has been reproduced from notes I made at the time. It has not been checked by the KDWU. I have added explanatory notes and some additional information. The procedure adopted was that we read out a list of questions at the beginning after our introductory explanation. Some supplementary questions came up during and after the KDWU replies. * * * * * Questions We would first of all like to get some idea of the place of women in the economy of the DPRK. What is the ratio of women to men in the labor force as a whole? The last figure we have for the ratios in the population as a whole is 51.3:48.7-but this isfor 1963. 24 Is this still the same or not? And can you give us precise information about the age distribu tion of the population by sex? Second, what percentage ofwomen are actively employed? And what is the distribution by sector-as a percentage of the industrial work force, and in the tertiary sector? The latest figures we have date from 1971, which show women accounting for 45.5 percent of the industrial work force, and possibly 48 percent of the work force as a whole. 25 Is this still the same, or not? It has been suggested that more men are being moved 24. Chong-Sik Lee, "Social Changes in North Korea: A Preliminary Assessment,"' Journal of Korean Affairs, Vol. 6, no. I (1976), p. 20. US government sources indicate that the population imbalance resulting from the Korean War had been righted by 1968 at the latest (see Rinn-sup Shinn et ai, Area Handbookfor North Korea [Washington, D.C., US GPO, October 1969], p.65). 25. Kim II Sung, in "On the Revolutionization and Working-Classization of Women," op. cit., p. 13, said that women were 45.5% of the work force in industry; Lee (see p. 20 of reference in n. 1) cites an interview by Kim with the Asahi Shimbun (Sept. 25, 1971) in which Kim is reported to have said that 48 percent of the industrial work force were women. Additional conjectures in Lee Won-jun, "North Korean Labor Policy and its New Labor Plan," Vantage Point (Seou\) [henceforth: VP), Vol. I, no. 5 (Sept. 1978), pp. 15-16. The figures of 45.5 and 48 percent are given as current in a very recent text, Pak II Bun, "Women at Work," People's Korea, no. 1,234 (March 23,1985), p. 3. This text also states: "Especially, in light industry, women hold a majority. It is not too much to say that women are producing almost all products of light industry, including daily necessities, which are closely related to living." And: "It is the power of women which has supported the country's agriculture.. . . " into industry, leaving women as the majority offarm workers: is this correct? And what are average wages for women and men throughout the economy? Third, what is the current birth rate, and what is the growth rate of the population as a whole? Is it correct that the latter fell from the early 1960s to reach a figure of about 2 percent per annum in the period 1970-197426 Fourth, what percentage of the total membership of the [Korean Workers' J Party is made up of women? And in its leading organs-e.g., the Central Committee; and in other leading bodies, such as the Central People's Committee? And in the cabinet? In his address to the 4th Congress ofthe KDWU in 1971 President Kim Il Sung pointed out that while women make up half the popUlation of the country, they account for much less than halfthe leading cadres throughout the society.27 What concrete steps are being taken to rectify the situation? And what is the KDWU's policy for correcting the imbalance? Are you vigorously combating male supremacy in the Party and the state? Fifth, what is the average age ofmarriage,for both women and men? What is the minimum legal age of marriage? And are women in the armed forces allowed to marry? We would also be very interested to hear about the marriage ceremony here: is it a big occasion? Roughly how many people, and what sort of people, would attend? Sixth, we would like to ask about divorce. What is the procedure for obtaining a divorce? Can it just be by mutual consent? And what grounds are necessary for obtaining it? In what circumstances do the courts intervene? What is the divorce rate? And what is the situation as regards child custody? In addition, we would like to know about remarriage for women whose husbands are still alive . We have been led to understand that this is very rare or non-existent: is this so? Seventh, are birth control methods freely available? What is the procedure for obtaining contraceptive devices? Is a doctor's certificate necessary? Is there any difference depend ing on whether a woman is married or not? Eighth, is abortion legal? And what are considered legiti mate grounds? Ninth, we would be very interested to know whether the distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy has been officially abolished. Are there any single mothers in the DPRK, and, if so, what is their social position? Is there any discrimination against an unmarried mother? Tenth, we would like to know about how work in and around the house is divided up. For example, who would I !: ! 26. Lee, op. cit., p. 19; confirmed by M. Glebova and V. Mikheyev, "Some Aspects of Economic Development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow) [henceforth: FEA], no. I, 1983, pp. 89-90. The World Bank's World Development Report 1984 (Table 20, p. 257) gives the crude birth rate as 30 per thousand (I982); the Asia 1984 Yearbook gives the birth rate as 32 per thousand (year not given) (p. 6). The World Factbook 1984 (U.S. CIA, Washington, D.C., April 1984) gives average annual growth rate as 2.3 percent (p. 125). 27. "We have a very small number of women cadres today in view of the large number of women on the job ... [a]t present the overwhelming majority of [cadres] are men at both national and local levels . . . And even this small number of women cadres are working mostly in the fields of secondary importance." (1971 Report cited in note 20, pp. 9-10). © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 51 I ! I normally do the cooking? the shopping? and looking after the children? Is it normal for a man to share in these tasks or not? In his speech on the 30th anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party [October 9, 1975J, President Kim Il Sung said that the food industry and kitchen utensils must be improved so as "to free women completely from the heavy burdens of household chores." The implication of this is that women, not men, are doing all or most ofthe work in the house. Is this so, and what changes would you like to see in relations between men and women as far as this is concerned? Eleventh, we would like to hear your opinion on the family. We are rather surprised at the emphasis you place here, in a society which claims to be socialist, on the family. 28 As you know, both Marx and Engels, especially the latter, were highly critical of the family as an institution and did not regard it as assisting socialism in any way. Yet here you put tremendous stress on it: why? Twelfth, we would be very interested to know why women, but not men, continue to wear traditional Korean dress. Lastly, we would be interested to know if you have any information on, or have published any material on Korean revolutionary heroines. Answers We don't know if we can satisfy all your questions. We will try to answer the questions as they correlate to each other, giving priority to the most important ideas. We would like to stress that women take a very important role in economic life, in politics, and in the realm of ideas, so you may get answers to your questions about the participation of women in the economy. First of all, what is the woman question? It is to free women from oppression and inequality, and provide women with all the necessities of life. In our country women participate actively in the institutions of power. Women account for 33 percent of all deputies-ranging from the Supreme People's Assembly to local government organs. 29 Women account for a very high number of cadres in the national economy-especially in agriculture, light industry, public health and education. In agriCUlture women account for the majority of the leading personnel in, for example, management committees and other organs [of power]. 30 In 28. Article 63 of the 1972 Constitution reads: "Marriage and the family are protected by the State. The State pays great attention to consolidating the family, the cell of society." The family is also used to define the goal of a socialist society: "Our ideal is ... a society where all people live united in harmony as one big family" (Kim II Sung, "The Duty of Mothers in the Education of Children," speech at the National Meeting of Mothers, Nov. 16, 1961, in Kim II Sung, On the Work o/the Women's Union [Pyongyang, FLPH, 1971), p. 4); c.f. Kim II Sung, "On the Duties of Educational Workers in the Up bringing of the Children and Youth," speech at a National Conference of Active Educational Workers, April 25, 1961 [Pyongyang, FLPH, 1970), p. 6). But cf. Lee, op. cit., p. 28, for condemnations of "family-ism"; Shinn et aI, Area Handbook, op. cit., chapter on the family. 29. The Supreme People's Assembly is roughly the equivalent of Congress or Parliament-i.e., the highest large assembly elected by universal suffrage. As in all Communist countries, this body is relatively powerless. According to Pak II Bun, op. cit., women made up the lower figure of 30 percent of all deputies at local levels resulting from the elections in 1979. Cf. note 53 below re the SPA. 30. If so, this would seem to mark a big change from the situation described education, women account for 80 percent of all teachers. 31 Women make up 48 percent of the work force in the economy as a whole. In culture and the arts, especially the latter, women playa major role, and account for a very high percentage of Merited Actors and Actresses, and of People's Actors and Actresses. 32 The relationship between the Korean Workers' Party and women [is that] the women's movement is a very important component of the social revolution. The Korean Democratic Women's Union is the transmission belt of the Party,33 and President Kim II Sung has said that the situation is like the pear which has seed and flesh: the seed is the Party and the flesh is the [Women's] Union. The main aim of the [Women's] Union is to defend the policies advanced by the Party and to implement them thoroughly. The inequality of women was abolished since President Kim II Sung provided women with the Law on the Equality of the Sexes on July 30,1946. 34 That is why women are provided with the practical conditions so that there is no inequality in social status between women and men. Tomorrow is the 31st anniversary of the proclamation of the Law and so I regard this meeting as [especially] timely. Well, as you referred to the report made by President Kim II Sung on the 30th anniversary [of the founding of the KWP], that is precisely the main aim-of freeing women, especially from the burdens of the family. As you said correctly, the problem of sexual inequality was already abolished. 35 We have traversed the democratic revolution, the socialist revolution and socialist construction. 36 Women's status has been tremen by Kim II Sung in 1971, when he said: "Especially in the countryside most of those who hold the post of some sort of 'chiefs' or go about with brief cases under their arms are men" ("On the Revolutionization ... of Women," op. cit., p. 10). The infonnation given us also seems to be contradicted by data in Pak, "Women at Work," op. cit. which states that 30 percent of the chairpersons of farm management boards are women. What does "leading personnel" really mean: just chairpersons, or all members of the boards, or something in between? 31. Pak, "Women at Work," says women "account for 70-80 percent of the doctors and teachers"-a typically vague statistic. Cf. note 55 below re doctors. 32. Different grades. 33. This is a standard (and depressing) formulation; see, e.g., Kim, "On the Revolutionization ... ", op. cit., p. 29: "I finnly believe that the Women's Union, our Party's transmission belt, will faithfully implement its revolutionary tasks so as to meet the Party's expectations with credit." 34. Full text of the law in Appendix below. Formulations of the kind "the Great Leader provided us with ... " are now obligatory. They mask the real history of mass struggle by Korean women, on which, unfortunately, detailed information is very scarce. It is interesting that an interview two Soviet writers had with the then head of the KDWU, Pak Chong Ae [given as Pak Den Ae], by all accounts a most remarkable person, in the late 1940s does not contain a single mention of Kim II Sung's name (Aleksandr Gitovich and Boris Bursov, Mi Videli Koreyu [We Saw Korea) [Leningrad, "Mo1odaya Gvardiya," 1948]. pp. 36-38). Pak Chong Ae played a prominent role in the 1951 investigation by the delegation of the WIDF (see note 8 above). The only Western correspondent to visit the DPRK between 1945 and the start of the Korean War was a woman, Anna Louise Strong, but her report' contain only fragmentary information about the position of women. See Strong. Inside North Korea: An Eye-Witness Report (Montrose, California. n.d. [1951 ?). This is a revised edition of the 1949 edition of the same title; cf. the articles by Strong in Soviet Russia Today (New York). October and November, 1947; February and December. 1948). 35. We did not say this. 36. Standard phrases for the successive stages since 1945. 'i2 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org dously strengthened, and we have come through the final stage of freeing women. So we regard this measure as one of the important measures finally to conclude the freedom of women. The food industry is only one aspect. We have to improve the bringing up of children and other measures so that women can in practice be freed from all burdens. During the anti-Japanese revolutionary armed struggle President Kim II Sung worked out the plan for bringing up children and shortly after Liberation [1945] he instructed that kindergartens and nurseries be built. Now this problem has been tremendously solved. As you said, Marx and Engels paid attention to the question of the family. Our policy is to bring up children in kindergartens and nurseries and this is a Communist policy. We have a thirty-year history of bringing up children in this way. There are 3,500,000 children being brought up in kindergartens and nurseries, of which there are 60,000 throughout the country. President Kim II Sung has called children "the kings of the country. "37 [We have enacted] many policies on children: for example, the 6th Session of the Supreme People's Assembly carried a decree on bringing up children; and at the 5th Congress of the KWP [1970] it was said that in order finally to solve the women question, we should press forward with the program to bring up children [sic].'" We have a principle of setting up kindergartens and nurseries, and near the shops where the mothers work. There is a nationwide network like a fishing net. This means that there is no such problem as the one you have raised about the division of labor in the family between husband and wife. There is cooperation between them. If the husband comes home first, he should do something. We hope that this question when explained will be clear. Children are brought up at state expense. If there is pressing and ironing [to be done] it goes to the laundries. The foodstuffs industry has been developed, so food can be bought at any time. J9 So what is there left to do in the family? Perhaps clean the family? Or pack [away] things used during the night?"') Or cooking rice. These things can be done in a cooperative way between men and women. As regards cooking, this is a job women 37. We failed to ask what the significance of this monarcho-sexist formula might be (neither of us understood Korean). Nor did we ask if girls were called "queens of the country." 38. Kim II Sung is on the record (not subsequently modified, so far as I know) to the effect that bringing up children is primarily a woman's task; e.g., "By nature, it is up to the women to bring upchildren." ("The Communist Education and Upbringing of Children is an Honourable Revolutionary Duty of Nursery School and Kindergarten Teachers," Address to the National Congress of Nursery School and Kindergarten Teachers, Oct. 20, 1966, in Kim, On the Work of the Women's Union, op. cit., p. 52). Cf. Kim in 1961: "Mother has to bear the major responsibility for home education. Her responsibility is greater than father's." ("The Duty of Mothers in the Education of Children" [Nov. 16. 1961], ibid., p. 16). 39. In 1977 shops. including food shops, were open late on weekdays and open on Sundays in the capital Pyongyang. On random visits to shops in the city center, it seemed to me that women were doing about two-thirds of the shopping for food (in early evening). There is reportedly an extensive system of food ordering from home and delivery to homes; there were some "take-aways" (in American English "take-out"). But I do not have enough evidence to be able to evaluate how widespread or effective these services really are. 40. So far as we could see and find out, most (perhaps all) Korean families sleep on a thin mattress on the floor; all the "bed" gear is taken up each morn in!! and stored until it is put down again for the night. have traditionally done, and as their natural duty. Q. Did you say "natural"? A. Yes. Well, we see the family as the cell of the society, and as such the family should be healthy and the people in our country-both husbands and wives-have enjoyed the great care taken by President Kim II Sung and they know how important the family is. Husbands go to their work where they are constantly kept educated. Women the same. So they know how important the family is. Family work is done on a voluntary basis. Such problems as you have raised do not arise. There is nobody in the family who refuses to do something that should be done. The most extreme form of exploitation of women, prostitution, has apparently (and I believe prob ably in fact) been eradicated; the same goes for concubinage. This marks a major advance over both the past and South Korea. Similarly, it seems most unlikely that the crudest forms of violence against women, such as male goon squads pouring human excrement over women workers, which do occur in the South, could possibly occur in the North. Now, as to single women. There are categories of such women: a) who have no children; b) who have lost a husband who dedicated his all to the country; c) who have lost sons and daughters who died by dedicating their service to the country; d) and some others. These women have the benefit of compre hensive social services; they are cared for by the shop where they work. Also the neighborhood units take care of them. Thus, they are respected by the state and socially-therefore, they have virtually no worries at all. If they are disabled, they naturally get state support. When they are old, they go to an Old People's Single Home. As for wages, there is no difference. There is equal pay for equal work. Women [in fact] have more benefits than men. Women with three children aged thirteen or less get eight hours' pay for six hours' work.4l There are women's sanatoria, rest homes, maternity hospitals and children's hospitals. As for birth control, there is no such policy. 41. The law also provides for 77 days paid pregnancy leave for women-35 days before giving birth and 42 days after (V. Andreyev and N. Beryozkin, "How the DPRK Deals with Social Questions," FEA, no. I, 1981, p. 64). The phrase about 8 hours' pay for 6 hours work reportedly means that women who have 3 or more children only have to do 6 hours work, but get a full day's pay anyway. Women with three or more children under the age of 12 also only have to work a 5-day week (all others work 6-day weeks) (Pak, "Women at Work"). As for wages: it is very hard to know exactly what proportion of total income they represent; I have guesstimated a figure of roughly half (see my "The North Korean Enigma," New Left Review, no. 127 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 53 Q. What does that mean? The state does not have a policy of actively promoting it? Or is there no such thing? A. The former-because there is no necessity for it in view of the labor force and the scale of the economy [sic] and the speed of the development of the economy; the state needs a bigger reserve work force. But there are some cases where women are not well and in such cases that is another thing.42 And if the woman suffers any hindrance to her social activities because she already has two or three children, if she wishes, then an abortion may be carried out.43 There is no abortion for unmarried women because women are educated in our country in Communist morality, and they know how to live in our society. There is no such condition that unmarried women can have an abortion. Q. What about if pregnancy was the result of rape? A. We have no such instances so far [women laugh], though there are many in South Korea. Q. Does this mean there is no rape at all in the DPRK? People in the West may find it very hard to believe this, and can you put a date on the statement? Can you say that there has not been a single case of rape in the DPRK since the end of the Korean War (1953]? A. So far as I know, there is no such instance, and I am forty years old. 44 As for the age of marriage: the average age [sc. until recently] ranged from 27 to 28 because women and men graduate from colleges and universities between the ages of 23 and 24. After graduation they work for two or three years, so naturally they get married about the age of 27 to 28. But these days we find it is even later-in the case of women the average age is 29; that is, they work more after graduation. And for men it is 30. 45 According to the law, citizens are entitled to get married at the age of "full 17" [17 years and 9 months]. Before Liberation the average age [of marriage] was 20 to 25, but it has changed as the years have gone by. About women in the Army. For women, like men, military service is not obligatory.46 Women are engaged in hospitals as doctors and nurses, and in communications; and women in the Army can get married, but not so many do. Q. Is there an age limit-high and low-for women in the Army? And what is the highest rank currently held by a woman in the armed forces? A. Women generally do two or three years service. I don't know what woman currently holds the highest rank in the armed forces. But some women hold the position of head of a hospital with the rank of colonel. There are many such women. About the wedding ceremony. Both men and women have the right to select their counterpart of their own will, but in that case they may have the agreement of their parents. Q. What does that mean? Would it be unusual not to ask? A. It is normal [to ask]. But men and women have the right [not to ask].47 The ceremony is generally attended by about twenty persons from the family and the work place, congratulating them on their marriage. It is a very simple ceremony. In the past there were, apparently, cases where parents had the right to decide, instead of the children; they were influenced by Confucian ideas. These disappeared soon after Liberation. 48 Q. Do parents have any civil rights over their children after the age of ''full 17"? A. According to the law, anyone can get married at the age of full 17, but in practice they get married between 29 and 30. The children who get married have an independent position, so I don't think such a question as you have raised about parents exercising civil rights over their children arises; but parents [1981], and "The North Korean Model," World Development, Vol. 9, no. 9/10 [1981]): i.e., a differential of 20 percent in male: female wages would translate into a differential of only 10 percent in total income. Even the well-informed Soviet scholars Andreyev and Beryozkin imply some difficulty over this problem (see note 26 to their article. op. cit. above, p. 60). Cf. note 56 below. 45. The North Korean fisherman cited in note 44 said that a marriage could 42. In 1980 an American Friends Service Committee delegation was told that not be registered if the bride's age was below 26 and the bridegroom's below no contraceptives were available (AFSC, Korea Report, no. 9, Feb. 1981, p. 30 (p. 21). Edith Lederer was told that people did not "usually" marry until 3). On the other hand, in 1979 a correspondent for AP, Edith Lederer, reported they were 24-25 years old (op. cit., p. 69). In 1971 Kim II Sung told the that she was told by a member of the Central Committee of the KDWU, Kang KDWU: "Women on their part must strive to learn more and work more for Chun-kum, that intrauterine devices were available. Birth-control pills, she the Party and the revolution even if their marriage is delayed a bit ... "("On was told, were discouraged "because of possible long-term side-effects," i.e., the Revolutionization ... , " op. cit., p. 10). it was not clear if they were sometimes available (Edith Lederer, "Love and Marriage," AP report dated May 6, 1979, in: Korea Herald, "Pvongyallg 46. This is the official position. It is impossible to be sure. Western sources Pingpong Diplomacy" -What Achieved and Not Achieved (Seoul, Korea insist that military service is compUlsory. My own feeling after being in the Herald, 1979), p. 69). Like most visitors to the DPRK, I got the impression DPRK is that it may be, but it is also possible that social pressures are so (as suggested by our KDWU interlocutors) that there was a labor shortage. intense that it does not have to be: no one would dream of not volunteering. But a recent (and well-informed) Soviet source states flatly that "the country Western and South Korean sources suggest that men are not allowed to marry has a reserve of labour" (G1ebova and Mikheyev, FEA, op. cit., p. 89). Some during military service, though full-time professional servicemen (and reports have suggested that women are given special awards for having six or presumably servicewomen) can. more children. 47. Edith Lederer was given a slightly different angle: she was told that young 43. Edith Lederer was told by the director of the Pyongyang university hospital people do (by implication always) ask their parents for permission (Lederer, that abortions "are sometimes performed" but was not told under what op. cit., p. 68). The North Korean fisherman cited in note 44 says the state circumstances they were permitted (Lederer, op. cit., p. 69). allocates some food and alcohol for a wedding celebration, but limits "attendants" (meaning not c1ear-J.H.) to five (p. 21). 44. We failed to ask the necessary follow-up questions: l) Would our interlocutor know if such a thing had happened? 2) If there had been a rape, 48. This version of events, apart from being inherently rather hard to believe, and she knew about it, would she be allowed to tell us, if official policy lays also clashes with Kim II Sung's repeated stress on the long-tenn nature of the it down "that there is no such thing in the DPRK." Although there might be struggle to eradicate old ideas. For example: "The material conditions of sociey determine the consciousness of man, and the latter changes slower than the no way of evaluating with certainty the answer to these questions, especially the second one, I think we should still have asked them. The Seoul magazine former." ("On the Duties of Educational Workers in the Upbringing of the Vantage Point carried a text of an interview with a North Korean fisherman Children and Youth," 1961, p. 2). Cf. his remarks to the KDWU in 1971 on who stayed in the South in 1978, Oh Ri-sop, who said he had heard of two the survival of old ideas: "There are some delinquent children nowadays ... cases of rape while he was in Nampo City and that the culprits had been [T]hey are mostly the children of unrevolutionized mothers." (sic) ("On the executed in public (VP, Vol. I, no. 5, p. 21). Revolutionization ... , " p. 4). © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 54 still feel obliged to help children with wedding ceremonies and suchlike. Let me add something about property status. We underwent the war, which destroyed everything. Here there are no rich people or poor people; there are no people with more, or less, property. Everyone is more or less the same. As for divorce, there are very few cases. It is allowed only under the following circumstances: (a) health conditions-that the family cannot exist on health conditions. Q. What does that mean? A. That they cannot have a sexual life. The other case (b) would be referred to a court and the court may approve. 49 As for remarriage: women who have lost husbands through illness can get remarried and the court [sc. the law?-J.H.] allows them to do so. But old women, since all conditions are provided by the state, they have no worries. Such cases do not arise very frequently. If a woman wants to, she would be allowed. She has no inconvenience [sc. no obstacle is placed in her way?-J.H.]. She does not feel so [sic]. There are no cases of women who have divorces from their husbands and want to get married again. so Q. It will be difficult for people in the West to believe that. Can you put a time schedule on this? A. There were very few divorces in the past. Since all conditions are provided, and society is developing, [there are no cases of this]. An under-age woman who wants to get married cannot. There are no instances of this here. And about women's traditional dress. This is four or five thousand years old, and it suits women very well, because it is convenient to work in,S! and it suits the natural characteristics as far as women are concerned and there is a very strong love for the dress by women. This is why women wear traditional national dress. But this does not mean that this is the only kind. So the dresses are chosen by women according to the conditions, the necessity of life. And women like to wear it, especially when they receive such distinguished visitors as today-and I believe that you find it very beautiful. Men have a traditional national dress, but this we feel is not suitable for labor and is inconvenient to the activities that men do. So men have different clothes. 49. There was no follow-up Oft this. The criterion of venereal disease mentioned by another official was not mentioned here. 50. The same sort of bland reply was given to Edith Lederer about divorce in general: "We can hardly find divorced couples because young couples marry according to their own choice so there can be no quarrel between them." (Lederer, p. 70). According to this argument, there should hardly be any divorces in the USA or Britain. What may/must be different is the degree of social pressure exerted against divorce-and, perhaps, the lessening of expectation via the diminished chance of divorce and, especially for women, the virtual impossibility of starting a new life, including a new sexual relationship, after divorce. In an earlier discussion with a male official, we indicated that the only way we could understand that divorces requested by women were so low or non-existent was due to the enormous social pressures against women; in the end the official said, in effect, that no male in the DPRK would marry a divorced woman whose husband was still alive. In 1961 Kim II Sung reported that some men wanted to divorce wives who had not produced sons. Kim called this "immoral." (Kim, "The Duty of Mothers ... , " op. cit., p. 14). 51. This is very dubious; it seemed to me most unsuited to work in. Reports on whether it is even comfortable for non-work vary depending on whom one is talking with. Well, the women's movement has a history of fifty years. Women played a great role in the Anti-Japanese Women's Association during the anti-Japanese armed struggle and participated in armed struggle like men. S2 There are many cases of women playing distinguished merited roles. I hope my answers could satisfy. Supplementary Questions Q. You have given us the figure of 33 percent of all deputies at all levels, but could you break this down between upper and lower echelons? For example, what percentage ofthe members of the Supreme People's Assembly are women? A. The SPA has 541 members, of whom 112 are women. S3 Q. You gave us the figure of 80 percent of all teachers being women, but again, can you break this down? What are the percentages for universities, on the one hand, and schools, on the other? A. The figures are not available, I am sorry. S4 But in Pyongyang, for example, at the Institute of Light Industry, the Rector is a woman, and at the Institute for Foreign Languages both the Rector and the Vice-Rector are women. At Pyongyang 52. At this point our interlocutor launched into a ritualistic recital of current mythology about the alleged role of Kim n Sung's mother, Kang Ban Sok, setting up the first radical women's organization in 1926. There is no independent evidence that anything of the sort occurred. The role of Kim II Sung's mother has tended to be inflated (and invented) roughly in tandem with the mythologization of the past of Kim himself. Kang Ban Sok is called "Mother of Korea" while Kim II Sung's first wife (and the mother of heir-designate Kim long 11), Kim long Suk, is called "Mother of Revolution." So far as can be ascertained, Kim Jong Suk did indeed play an active role in the anti-Japanese struggle. When I asked about her in front of a picture of her in the Museum of the Revolution in Pyongyang I was first told: "She gave her all for the Great Leader." When I asked what that meant, I was told (after discussion between officials): "She even dried the Great Leader's wet clothes in her bosom." 53. Pak II Bun states that the percentage of women in the SPA resulting from the 1978 election was 20.8 ("Women at Work"). Combining this figure with the one given for women in the local assemblies (cf. note 29 above), there was a slight decline in the percentage of women in all assemblies in the late 1970s. The Australian Myra Roper, who visited the DPRK in the early 1970s, states .that 25% of the SPA were women then. If so, then the 1977 figures indicate a decline in women's representation. However the reliability of Roper's data is severely undermined by the fact that she can write in the same paragraph that "Kim, like Mao, is a feminist. . ." (Myra Roper, "DPRK-The Phoenix Country," Eastern Horizon [Hong Kong], Vol. 13, no. 5 (1974), p. 60). So far as I can make out, there is currently one woman in the DPRK cabinet, Minister of Finance Yun Gi long. There is (or was until very recently) one woman Secretary of the Central Committee of the KWP. The most important woman in the country is probably Kim Song Ae, the head of the KDWU-and the wife of Kim II Sung. The fact that the DPRK refuses to release any information on women's participation in the KWP and in its leading bodies bodes ill for women having a leading role in them. An examination of the Central Committee in 1980 made it appear that about 4 percent of that body was made up of women. 54. The figures for teachers probably include kindergarten workers, almost all of whom are women. In a discussion later the same day at Kim II Sung University, Pyongyang, the country's top university, we were told that \0 percent of the teachers there were women and 25-30 percent of the students, varying according to faculty. The group which hosted us there, made up of eight staff and students (in rigidly hierarchical relationships to each other), was exclusively male-but then so was our group of two. The AFSC delegation reported that in 1980 20 percent of those with higher education were women (Korean Report, op. cit. p. 4): a major advance over the situation in 1961 when Kim II Sung said that no woman had yet received a doctorate (Kim, "The Duty of Mothers ... "op. cit., p. 31). 55 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org Normal College, the Kim Hyung Jik [Kim II Sung's father-J.H.] Normal College, the Rector is a woman. In colleges, polytechnics and universities, there are many women rectors and many chairs and faculties are filled by women. Q. You have given us the figure for women as a percentage of the total work force, and some indication of where they make up the majority of the labor force, 55 and you have also stated that there is equal pay for equal work. But it would be interesting to know what is the average ratio of women's pay compared to men's pay throughout the economy as a whole. A. There is no difference. Q. But from what you have said, it is obvious there are more women in agriculture and more men, for example, in heavy industry. It is also clear that wages are not the same in all sectors of the economy and for all jobs. Therefore, it is clear that not all women are earning the same wages as all men. What are the averages for the whole economy? A. I am sorry, I do not know in detail. I agree with you that there are differences between different occupations, and some fields have more men and therefore there must be a difference [in the average wage].56 * Appendix THE LAW ON EQUALITY OF THE SEXES IN NORTH KOREA (July 30, 1946) For 36 years Korean women had been subject to incessant insult and cruel exploitation by Japanese imperialism. They had neither political nor economic right, and were denied to participate in cultural, social or political life. Medieval, feudalistic family relationship accentuated the political and economic oppression of women. Maltreatment, insult and illiteracy were the lot the masses of the Korean working women had to suffer. The Red Army emancipated north Korea from the Japanese colonial yoke, and this brought about a change in the social position of women. Various democratic reforma 55. Roper states that 75 percent of doctors were women in the early 1970s (Roper, op. cit., p. 60). This may be true, but two qualifications are in order: I} the DPRK definition of "doctor" is not clear; 2} in most Communist countries the increased access of women to such jobs can be-and often is-accompanied by a downgrading of the job in both pay and status. In 1978 Kim lamented the absence of women in finance and banking in rather strong terms: "At present women make up nearly half the labour force in [the] economy. But their number in the financial and banking establishments is not large. This shows that our functionaries are not yeat clear of the tendency to despise women. There is no reason why women are unfit to work in the financial and banking institutions. Rather, they can work better [sic] than men. From now on these institutions should take on a large number of women." ("Let Us Step Up Socialist Construction by Effective Financial Management," speech at the National Meeting of Financial and Bank Workers, Dec. 23, 1978, Pyongyang Times, Dec. 30, 1978). The tone of Kim's remarks is both unmistakably dirigiste and somehwat magical. 56. The fact that there is not yet equal pay is clearly, if obliquely, stated by Pale II Bun, who writes: "There is a growing tendency for equal pay for men and women for the sake of real equality of the sexed [sc. sexes]" ("Women at Work," op. cit.). This remark can sit right alongside the statement that "Korean women have been under the equal wage system for 40 years." In brief, they have been under an "equal wage system" (i.e., a system whose proclaimed target is equal wages) under which wages are not yet equal. tions carried out in the country have provided conditions for freeing women from inequality of political, economic, cultural and family life, which they had suffered. With a view to liquidating the remnants of Japanese colonial rule, reforming the old feudalistic relationship between man and woman and enabling women to take part in all fields of cultural, social and political life, the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea decides: Article I. Women shall have equal rights with men in all realms of state, economic, cultural, social and political life. Article 2. Women shall be on a par with men in the right to elect or to be elected in the local state organs or in the highest state organ. Article 3. Women shall have equal right with men in work and the rights to equal pay, social insurance and education. Article 4. Women shall have the right to free marriage like men. Unfree, forced marriage without consent of the contracting parties is prohibited. Article 5. When conjugal relations get into trouble and cannot be continued any longer, women, too, are entitled to free divorce on an equal footing with men. A mother shall be allowed to sue her divorced husband for the cost of bringing up children. The suits for divorce and children's nursing expenses shall be dealt with by the People's Court. Article 6. The age of marriage shall be full 17 or above for woman and full 18 or above for man. Article 7. Polygamy, a hereditary custom based on medieval, feudalistic relations, and the evil practices of infringing upon the rights of women, such as selling and buying girls as wives or concubines, shall be hereafter prohibited. Both licensed and unlicensed prostitution, and kisaeng-girl keeping system (kisaeng call-office and kisaeng school) shall be prohibited. Those who violate this shall be punished by law. Article 8. Women shall have the right of succession to the property including land like men and, when divorced, the right to distribution of property including land. Article 9. With the proclamation of this law, the laws and rules of Japanese imperialism with regard to the Korean women's right are annulled. This law shall become effective as from the day of its promulgation. Source: On the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Pyongyang, FLPH, 1975), pp. 312-313. The Bulletin is indexed in The Alternative Press Index, The Left Index, International Development Index, International Development Abstracts, Sage Abstracts. Social Science Cita tion Index, Bibliography of Asian Studies. IBZ (Internationale Bibliographie der ZeitschriJten Literatur). IBR (International Bibliography of Book Reviews). and Political Science Abstracts. Microforms of past issues are available from University Microfilms International (300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor. MI 48106. USA). 56 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org Interview with Kang Ning-hsiang by Corinna-Barbara Francis* Introduction For almost two decades Kang Ning-hsiang has been an active political figure on Taiwan and a key member of the tang-wai, the unofficial opposition to the ruling Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, hereinafter KMT). Many in Taiwan and many Taiwanese abroad consider him a leading figure in the opposition movement. A native Taiwanese, Kang was born and raised in Taipei, and his political career has been closely linked to that city. His first introduction to politics was in his parents' home where an informal 'open house' was held during which people from all walks of life would discuss the issues of the day. After working for some years, including a job at a gas station, Kang decided to try his luck at politics. In 1969 he ran and was elected to the Taipei City Council as a tang-wai member. He held that position for three years. During that time he became known for his radical criticism of the KMT and his outspoken support of the tang-wai. In 1972 Kang ran for and was elected to the Legislative Assembly. He was in the Assembly for three successive terms until 1983 when he was defeated in his re-election bid. From 1984 to 1985 Kang spent eight months in the U.S. in "academic retreat." He is now back in Taiwan and active in politics. For many years Kang has sponsored a number of the leading tang-wai magazines including The Eighties, The Asian, and The Current. The tang-wai, meaning literally 'outside the Party', is a set of diverse groups which have in common their opposition to the KMT or the nature of KMT rule on Taiwan. Although the tang-wai is not recognized by the KMT as a legal political party (and there are a number of legal opposition parties), it undoubtedly constitutes the real political opposition on the island. The tang-wai regularly fields candidates in local and national elections, receiving around 25-30% of the popular vote. Through dozens of political and literary journals, it has had a role in shaping public opinion. In this interview, Kang Ning-hsiang discusses a wide range of issues regarding Taiwan's domestic and international politics. In the first section, which focuses on domestic questions, he begins with a general consideration of Taiwan's political and economic growth. He then goes into a more detailed discussion of the tang-wai: its origins and recent developments; its political goals and strategy; its internal conflicts and ideological debates; its role in the democratization of Taiwan's political system, and more. In this section Kang also discusses the role of ethnicity in politics on Taiwan and the relationship between the tang-wai and the Taiwanese Independence Movement. The second section deals with international issues. Here Kang discusses his view of the various models for Taiwan's international status and sets out his position on what the nature of ties between Taipei and Peking should be. He also discusses his view of the role of the U.S. and the current developments on the mainland. While critical of the KMT's resistance to democratic reforms on Taiwan, Kang rejects the views of more radical elements within the tang-wai, those advocating a strategy of mobilizing a mass movement for national independence. Since the Kaohsiung incident' Kang has strongly opposed continua- * This interview was conducted by the author in Chinese in January 1985 and translated by the author. I. On Dec. 10. 1979 a parade was organized by various opposition groups to commemorate International Human Rights Day. In the course of the day 57 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org f [ I I I tion of the radical line of the Formosa period. 2 In his view, radical efforts to change Taiwan's domestic or international status quo have only, and can only, result in disaster. He believes that both the domestic and international interests of Taiwan lie in the mutual efforts of the people and the government to peacefully establish a democratic political system on the island. The Interview CBF: What is the "tang-wai," or the "non-partisan" move ment? Efforts to expand political pluralism and democr~tic rights have a long history in Taiwan. Should the tang-wal be considered synonymous with this movement? If not, what. are the differences? What are the major goals of the tang-wa!? KNH: Essentially the democratic movement in Taiwan is a movement in which the local people seek power for themselves-power to make their own decisions. This has been a quest for some form of self-government-that we should be able to govern ourselves. There are a number of reasons why the situation appears so complex at present. First, for the last one hundred years Taiwan has been through two distinct periods: one period of fifty years of Japanese rule and now almost forty years of KMT rule. The strategies and ways of thinking of the movement for self-government have taken different forms in each of these periods. Secondly, in the different stages which Taiwan has been through different issues have become critical. Finally the pluralization of Taiwanese society has made its political movements more comple~. In the earliest phase of the tang-wai movement III the I 950s an attempt was made by both mainlanders and Taiwanese together to organize a political party. This was an extremel.y good approach. Unfortunately it did not succeed. After thiS initial period the democratic movement took on a more local character. During this period Taiwanese politicians concerned themselves with local issues and did not raise issues of national concern. Concerning the relationship between the tang-wai a~d the democratic movement we can say that at different stages III the political development of Taiwan the democratic movement has had different political opponents and has concentrated on distinct political issues. The tang-wai should be considered one stage in the hundred-year history of the democratic movement of Taiwan in which the people have demanded power for themselves. CBF: Taiwan's spectacular economic growth is well-known. What do you think has been the impact of this growth on Taiwan's political system? Do you think it has changed th~ relationship between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the tang-wa! Ill,,,t of the key opposition leader, were arrested. and eight of them were subsequently tried and sentenced to long prison terms. The events of that day arc now referred to as the Kaohsiung incident. and it marked tbe end of the more radical period of the opposition movement. 2. The period from 1975 until 1979 when F(!rmosa Maga:ill(, and the group associated with it were in the ascendant is known as the Formo,a penod. The period came 10 an abrupt end with the arrest of key opp",iti"n leaders during the Kaohsiung incielent and if so, how? KNH: The question of the impact of the growth of the economy on politics must be considered in the larger context of changes in Taiwan's international position. The economy has been one area in which the KMT has done quite well. It was only after the combined effect of the major setbacks-the withdrawal of Taiwan from the U.N. in 1972 and the U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1978-that the KMT's legitimacy was seriously challenged. Before 1972, the year Taiwan withdrew from the U.N., the power structure on Taiwan had at its core the KMT, big industries run by mainland Chinese, and the national industries. But after 1972, as the economy developed, private industry was allowed to develop even further. This has given greater power to the class of private smalI- and medium-level businessmen, most of whom are Taiwanese. Technocrats and certain sectors of the bureaucracy have also been able to increase their power because of their influence over economic policy. At the same time we can see the gradual decline of the influence of mainland Chinese over big business and national industries. Another result of Taiwan's economic growth has been rapid urbanization. A great many farmers have left the countryside for the cities. This has created large pockets of unskilled labor in the cities. Many urban problems developed which left the majority of the people dissatisfied. These dissatisfied elements have swelled the ranks of the tang-wai. Another result of economic growth has been the movement of large numbers of people abroad for business and education. These people have become messengers bringing news back to Taiwan about the world situation. This has helped break down the KMT's monopoly on news and information, and this new information has benefited the tang-wai by creating new ideas which have in tum created new demands. People have begun to see the need for a second political force to challenge the KMT, to pressure it to carry out reform. The tang-wai has become this secondary political force. CBF: What impact has economic development had on the political base of the tang-wai? How has the latter changed? KNH: In the early stage of the tang-wai its main supporters were extreme Taiwanese nationalists, dissidents, and lower income groups. With the rapid growth of the economy the tang-wai's political base has expanded to include small- and medium-level entrepreneurs and businessmen and parts of the middle class. Because big business has been favored by the government's economic policies, many of the small- and middle-level Taiwanese businessmen are dissatisfied with the KMT and have given political support to the tang-wai. In addition, many intellectuals, who advocate the establishment of a democratic political system and believe that for this it is necessary to have at least two political pa~ies: have also supported the tang-wai in greater numbers. ThiS gives an Idea of the changing political base of the tang-wai. CBF: How would you describe the major changes in the tang-wai movement since the mid- to late 1970.1: KNH: First, there have been important changes as far as the members of the movement are concerned. The supporters of the tang-wai in the late 1970s were from the post -WWII generation. This group was educated under the. KMT. It IS very different in character from the supporters of the democracy movement in earlier periods. Secondly. the issues that have been raised since the late 1970s are no longer strictly of a local © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org \ i character but are issues of national concern such as martial law, Taiwan's international status, self-rule, and human rights. Third, the movement has regained its island-wide character. The movement moved from the local level to the national level. Since 1972, when the KMT opened up the decision-making process at the national level by allowing local Taiwanese politicians to enter the Legislative Assembly, it has been possible for local representative bodies to influence the higher levels. These four points represent important trends within the tang-wai movement since the mid- to late 1970s. CBF: What do you see as the major dynamics in the tang-wai movement since the Kaohsiung incident in 1979? KNH: In the situation immediately following the Kaohsiung incident there was a general feeling of hopelessness within the tang-wai, although within a short period it did regain its strength and experience new victories. Beginning in 1979, the year of the Kaohsiung incident, there suddenly emerged numerous factions within the movement. To begin with there had already been the group of elected officials consisting of the Taipei City Councilmen, city mayors and magistrates, the Provincial Assemblymen, the Legislative Assemblymen, etc. This group would qualify as one faction of the tang-wai. Secondly, the families of the prisoners of the Formosa period emerged as a more cohesive group. In the past the KMT jailed a lot of people. When the men were imprisoned the women would not have dared to protest openly. No one was expecting that when the men were jailed after the Kaohsiung incident, their wives would come out and run for office. So the wives of these prisoners constitute a separate faction. Third, the Presbyterians can be considered a faction of their own after their deepened involvement in politics during the Formosa period. Fourth, during the 35 years of KMT rule on Taiwan a lot of people have been imprisoned. These people have gradually been released and have also formed a separate faction within the tang-wai. Fifth, the young generation of university graduates, especially those studying literature and the arts who have trouble finding jobs after graduation, have joined in large numbers and now constitute a distinct faction. Sixth, there is the China Tide group which is supportive of reunification with the mainland. Finally, some doctors, lawyers, and professors have increasingly concerned themselves with politics and have taken positions critical of the KMT and supportive of a two-party system. They have begun to participate in the tang-wai and could now be said to constitute their own faction. Before 1979 these various groups were not all linked with the tang-wai. The tang-wai was associated primarily with the group of elected officials. But even among this latter group, which of them belonged to the tang-wai and which did not has never been very clear. In the past the tang-wai had been limited to internal competition. The movement spent much of its time and energy struggling against itself. But in 1980, before the 1981 province-wide elections, we organized a nomination procedure which indicated clearly to the electorate who was a favored tang-wai candidate and who was not. In the past it had never been very clear what the tang-wai was and who belonged to it. But with this new procedure everyone wanted to come out and prove they were the real tang-wai. This was an extremely interesting development. On the one hand it created a split among the elected officials between those who had been nominated and those who had not. On the other hand it enabled the tang-wai to move away from competing against itself to competing against the KMT. Now this new situation of competition between the KMT and the tang-wai raised many questions and problems. These were compounded by the multiplication of factions and ideological perspectives within the movement. What kind of relationship should exist between the KMT and the tang-wai? What attitude should the tang-wai take toward the KMT? On this issue each faction had a different view. For the group of elected officials this was not a major problem-these people had had constant contact with the KMT in Assembly meetings, etc., so they had already an established relationship. But what type of relationships were the political prisoners supposed to establish with the ruling party? And what about the China Tide group? Being primarily interested in reunification their strategy has been simply to weaken the KMT as much as possible. So why should they even establish any ties with the KMT? Another major development in the tang-wai occurred in 1982 when a group of tang-wai representatives visited the U.S. By helping to establish links between the tang-wai and the U. S. government this visit raised the political profile of the movement, giving it an international identity. In the past the U.S. had dealt only with the KMT and the tang-wai had been completely out of the picture. The KMT has always claimed to be the only spokesman on Taiwan. So when the KMT would say the U.S. takes such and such position the tang-wai would have no way of knowing whether it was true or not. So after this visit which I participated in the KMT no longer had a monopoly on international ties. The tang-wai's profile was raised to a new level. We had established an international channel linking the tang-wai and the U.S. This new situation also created a new set of questions and tensions within the movement. What should the nature of our ties with the U.S. be? How should the issue of U.S. weapons supply to Taiwan be used by the tang-wai? Should it be a political tool to pressure the KMT to reform itself and change its politics? These problems emerged at this time. So during this period the tang-wai was able to move from coynpetition within its own ranks to overall competition with th~ KMT as well as to elevate its political identity from the strictly domestic one that it had been to an international level. While this transformation signaled an important new stage in the development of the tang-wai, it also created a whole new set of very difficult problems. CBF: What are the goals of the tang-wai at present, and what are the major obstacles to the realization of these goals? KNH: To reflect on the entire situation of the tang-wai we need to keep the following in mind; that of all the problems Taiwan now faces-international problems, economic prob lems, domestic problems, and the problem of democracy in Taiwan-there is only one which the tang-wai is able to address, that is, the problem of democracy. The tang-wai concerns itself with the issues of martial law, of political organization, of human rights, of freedom of the press, all of which have to do with the state of democracy in Taiwan. But the tang-wai has not yet addressed itself to the international challenges which face Taiwan; they do not have concrete ideas about Taiwan's economic problems; and their ideas about the domestic problems are not well-developed. They are therefore not prepared to take positions on these problems. They maintain the attitude that Taiwan's problem is the KMT, and that it is Taiwan's only problem. They do not believe that the KMT is only one of Taiwan's problems. If they coltld change this outlook they would be in a much better position 59 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org to tackle Taiwan's diverse problems. But up to the present the tang-wai has been unable to do this. So how are they going to get the support of the people of Taiwan? How are they going to inspire confidence? This is a big problem, and I believe the goal of the tang-wai at present should be to address the diversity of problems facing Taiwan and in particular the four I mentioned earlier. Only by doing this can they gain the confidence and support of the Taiwanese people. At present the tang-wai faces two major problems. The first is that tang-wai members of the Legislative Assembly and other tang-wai elected officials spend too much time in meetings and taking care of their constituencies. They have insufficient time to investigate issues in public policy in both international and domestic affairs. They lack experience in policymaking at the national level and lack understanding of the entire political system. Secondly, the younger members of the tang-wai believe that the reason the movement is having difficulty in expanding is because of internal ideological differences, that the divergences in political and ideological views is preventing tang-wai activists from working together. They claim that without pursuing a mass movement the tang-wai will be unable to carry out its goals. But in fact the young generation of the tang-wai has many deficiencies of its own. They do not adequately understand Taiwanese society, and they lack the ability to find correct political positions. So they are not even clear themselves about what issues they should raise in carrying out a mass movement. At present the tang-wai is stuck in a position of not being able to expand its influence and contacts in society. Those individuals who have political responsibility do not have the time to think about the issues, and those who do not have political responsibility have very limited contact with society. So the problem now is first how to revive the situation that existed three years ago in which the tang-wai had strong ties with local political forces throughout the island, and in which there was a linkage through organized contacts within the tang-wai. If this situation could be revived then the tang-wai would have increased power to mobilize support and move ahead. Secondly, the vertical links within the movement which existed three years ago-between the local level and the center, between the Provincial Assembly and the Legislative Assem bly-must be re-established. This would allow the people to express their demands through the vertical channels from the lower levels to the higher ones; it would also enable the government to be more aware of what the people want. If the tang-wai does not re-establish both the horizontal and vertical links which constitute its organizational structure, then it will fall into a rut of disorganization and chaos, and the people will not know what it is doing. In such a situation how do you expect to mobilize people? This is a big problem. CBF: Within the tang-wai movement the sharpest conflict seems to be between the moderate group of elected officials and the more radical group referred to as the 'young generation.' You yourself have been the target of their criticism. What is your view of this 'young generation' and their position in the tang-wai? KNH: The young generation says that there is too great an ideological division between themselves and the group of elected officials making up the moderate group, therefore they are not going to work with us and are going to find support from groups that are closer to their own views; i.e., that support a mass movement and an independence movement. But there are great dangers in carrying out a mass movement or an independent movement in Taiwan. Once you bring up the question of independence or Taiwanese nationalism then many people will be unwilling to participate. When they say they are going to carry out a mass movement, what kind of mass movement do they really intend? They have not made this clear. Of all the problems Taiwan now faces, there is only one which the tang-wai is able to address, that is, the problem of democracy. The tang-wai concerns itself with the issues of martial law, of political organization, ofhuman rights, offreedom of the press, all of which have to do with the state of democracy in Taiwan. Another problem is that the younger generation lacks ties with the society. So they have great difficulty in mobilizing the local Taiwanese politicians who have contacts with all groups in the society and have the means and interests to help the various interest groups such as the workers and business men. So even this issue they have not handled well. What is necessary is the ability to raise issues and questions in such a way as to gain the support of the various groups in society. If you want to mobilize the workers then you have to understand what the workers want and need most. You have to begin by researching the basic labor laws. What kind of protection can you give them? The main objective for the tang-wai should be to increase its capacity for raising issues on the entire spectrum of problems facing Taiwan, and to raise them in a manner sensitive to the needs of the different social classes: the farmers, the intellectuals, the workers, the small businessmen, the middle classes, etc. This is the only way to mobilize the society. If you do not have the capability to even confront these issues, let alone proposing solutions, then the people will not have faith in you. Furthermore, if the tang-wai can't even order its own internal relations, how on earth can it expect to carry out a mass movement? How can they expect to mobilize the people? The young generation wants to go fast, but do they have the strength? CBF: The emergence of so many factions is a relatively recent phenomenon. Will these factions continue to be so numerous and divided and do you have any ideas on how these factions could be drawn into a coalition in the future? KNH: In principle the emergence of so many groups is good, because in the past participation in the tang-wai was much more limited and did not take the form of well-defined political groups. In the past the Presbyterian church could never have come out publicly to take a political role. Now they. and many others, have entered politics. This is good. But if the Presbyterians want to get involved in politics they have to think seriously about the basis on which they compete with the KMT. As for the political prisoners and dissidents who want to 60 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org overthrow the KMT they have to remember that the KMT could easily wipe them out. With so many groups the problem of how to organize them into a coalition becomes more acute. A way has to be found for these different factions to share the political power of the tang-wai, and for each of them to be given the place they deserve. The task of the tang-wai at present is to draw those people with potential from all of these factions and from them to create a new mainstream for the tang-wai. From the position of this new mainstream we will be able to analyze how to develop the strength we should have, and to work together. Because the tang-wai has a major problem now which is that it is good at playing with the outside, but that it is bad when it comes to its own internal dynamics. These are problems which the tang-wai faces now and will have to resolve in the future. Right now we do not have sufficient power to organize a political party, but we can proceed in establishing the horizontal and vertical ties I spoke of earlier. This could resolve many of our problems. Especially since 1982, after the failure of the recent election, the tang-wai has lacked leadership and direction. It has no power to mobilize and everybody is just complaining. Is the way things have been done these last two years right? I don't believe so. CBF: In the last election you failed in your bid for reelection to the Legislative Assembly. How do you explain this? KNH: My failure in the last election relates to the state of disorganization within the tang-wai since 1982, and to its loss of direction since that time. Given the weakness of the tang-wafs political organization, when it was confronted with the incredible diversity of views and factions which had erupted within the movement, the situation inevitably became chaotic. The approaching elections complicated matters even further. The candidates who participated in the election were numerous, diverse, and disorganized. In any particular district one could easily find three or four tang-wai candidates competing for one or two seats. This of course splintered the tang-wai votes and gave the advantage to the KMT. The KMT of course took advantage of the internal problems of the tang-wai to sow discord and distrust between the different groups and divide them even further. Under these conditions the tang-wai had enormous difficulty organizing a coalition. The situation created a lot of trouble for me. Personally, I had enormous difficulty in both thinking of a way to organize a cohesive coalition and at the same time to look after my own campaign. I did not have the strength and resources to do so. In fact I had trouble even getting sufficient support for my own campaign. My way of doing things did not draw the support of a lot of people. While I wanted to allow the formation of a tang-wai coalition I also wanted to get re-elected. So I believe this election was an important lesson for me. I realized that at this critical stage in the course of the democratic movement, faced with such a diverging set of opinions, I was incapable of organizing the tang-wai into an effective coalition. It has been an important experience for me, and it was a big challenge. CBF: Local politics in Taiwan could be said to be quite democratic: local elections are quite open and competitive, there is a high level ofpopular participation and a fairly high level of representation of local interests. At the national level 011 the other hand. the KMT has managed to preserve a virtual monopoly on representation and decision-making. Do you believe that democracy at the local level will gradually filter up to the national level, or do you think the national level can continue indefinitely to be autonomous from the pressures from below? KNH: In 1972, when the KMT opened the doors of the Legislative Assembly, there was for the first time the chance for local-level and national-level tang-wai politicians to be linked. The center has had a monopoly on decision-making, but after the national level was opened up, the local level has gradually gained more influence at the center. The two levels will probably become closer. I think an important task for the tang-wai in the next 7 to 8 years is to pull the two levels into a closer relationship. This I will do on the basis of personal ties and contacts. Every 3 to 4 years I help a tang-wai candidate's campaign by raising funds, gathering political support, etc. Why? Because this helps to bring the entire tang-wai into closer ties. Since the end of the last election there has been a return to past practices. Now the local-level politicians won't have anything to do with this young generation. When the young generation attended a meeting at the local level the local politicians didn't pay attention to them. The KMT's claim to be the legitimate government of China is increasingly being recognized in Taiwan as highly unrealistic. It is time to resolve these contradictions, and the U.S. could help the government of Taiwan on these matters. This would be extremely practical, and would not be out of line at all. If Taiwan's domestic political situation was improved this would also benefit the U.S. CBF: You have had wide-ranging experience in Taiwan and broad contact with the people. Could you give your view of how the relationship between the Taiwanese and the mainland ers has evolved? How do you view the process ofTaiwanization taking place in Taiwan? KNH: While the KMT has remained firmly in control for the last 35 years it has nevertheless needed to recruit a great number of Taiwanese into the party, government and army. We can see this even at the top levels which have been monopolized by mainland Chinese. This is one aspect of the Taiwanization of the political system. At the social level there has been an increasing fusion between the Taiwanese and mainlanders through common socialization, education, intermarriage, etc. Due to these factors the relations between Taiwanese and mainlanders is much better than before. But one should not mistake these changes to mean that political power is not still in the hands of the mainlanders. I can point 0ut at least three meanings to the Taiwanization process. First, in politics, the unified strength ofthe Taiwanese has presented a challenge to the KMT, and has served to pressure the KMT to carry out more reforms. Secondly, 61 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org Taiwanese culture has developed and enriched the cultural sphere which has been dominated by mainland Chinese culture. Third, in the international arena, Taiwan is no longer recognized by the majority of nations to be the legitimate government of China. If you say you are China no one will believe you. But if you say the wishes of the Taiwanese people must be considered everyone will agree with that. CBF: What is your view of the Taiwanization of the KMT? What does this process meanfor the transformation ofTaiwan ,s political system? If this process is successfully carried out could it take the place ofthe democratization ofthe political system? In other words, does Taiwanization necessarily mean democra tization? KNH: No, it would not necessarily mean democratization, but without it democratization is certainly impossible. I just spoke about how a great many Taiwanese have entered the Party, government, and the army, but the real power is still in the hands of a small group of mainland Chinese. There are three aspects to look at in analyzing the role of the nationality question in the process of democratization. First, how to use the energy generated by the nationality issue to pressure the KMT into carrying out reforms in the political sphere. Second, to put greater stress on Taiwanese culture to balance the overemphasis on mainland Chinese culture. Third, in the international sphere, to respect the Taiwanese people in discussions about Taiwan. In considering whether Taiwan can go the way of democracy, one has to keep in mind the nationality question. To persist in making the mainland Chinese the center of the system will not succeed. But neither can the Taiwanese take over power. We have to study the approach of the 1950s when mainlanders and Taiwanese cooperated together to solve Taiwan's problems. This is the only way Taiwan will be able to follow the path of democracy. If this approach does not guide our efforts now and in the future then we will run into enormous problems. We do have a chance for democracy in Taiwan. This comes in the first place from the fact that in Taiwan we do not have a system of absolute power such as existed under Stalin, Mao, and Franco. And secondly we can derive great hope from the third generation of power-holders within the KMT. CBF: Could you give an idea of what you think the real popularity of the Taiwanese Independence Movement is in Taiwan? What is the relationship between the tang-wai and the Taiwanese Independence Movement (hereinafter TIM)? KNH: Looking at the history of the Taiwanese people we can see that the question of independence has received a lot of sympathy. But the majority of the Taiwanese still do not fully understand what the Taiwanese Independence Movement is. While they are quite sympathetic they do not understand it very well. So it is very difficult to analyze and to measure the extent of their support. There are important differences between the tang-wai and the Taiwanese Independence Movement. Taiwan's tang-wai is, to begin with, opposed to any kind of violence. They do not support revolutionary methods or violent methods to overthrow the KMT, but the TIM does. Secondly, the tang-wai on Taiwan has not said it wants independence. They have not said it. It is true that the tang-wai and the TIM are concerned with many of the same issues which have to do with the state of democracy in Taiwan: martial law, establishing a political party, human rights, etc. But it cannot be said that because we talk about similar issues that we are advocates of the TIM. It is also possible that certain individuals have ties to both the tang-wai and the TIM. Or that certain individuals in the tang-wai have personal ties with people in the TIM. This is difficult to ascertain. CBF: Do you think reunification between Taiwan and the mainland is possible in the near future? KNH: That the relations between Taiwan and the mainland must be very good and intimate in the future is unquestionable. The critical question is when this can be achieved. I do not believe it can be right now. There are at least two problems we have to discuss here. First, for the last 35 years Taiwan and the mainland have been developing in completely different directions and have been set in postures of mutual confrontation and hate. This is not a natural situation but one which was created by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang. In these 35 years the CCP and the KMT have used their political power and their countries' national resources to create a long-standing and systematic confrontation between the two societies. If you have carried on this way for such a long time you can't just suddenly tum around and say, O.K. now let's be good friends, can you? The peoples of these countries have been educated not to trust each other; now you suddenly tell them the KMT is good, the CCP is good. That is impossible. In considering whether Taiwan can go the way of democracy, one has to keep in mind the nationality question. To persist in making the mainland Chinese the center of the system will not succeed. But neither can the Taiwanese take over power. We have to study the approach of the 1950s when mainlanders and Taiwanese cooperated together to solve Taiwan's problems. This is the only way Taiwan will be able to follow the path of democracy. The first task now is to get rid of this emotional burden. After such a long period this attitude of confrontation has become some sort of a social institution which cannot be toppled in a few days. This problem has to be resolved before we can seriously start trying to improve relations. The second problem is that we are faced with two completely different political, economic, and social systems. These differences have to be resolved in some way. Given these problems, how could the two societies embrace each other today? CBF: If you do not believe reunification is possible in the near future, what do you think the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland should be? What is your view of the Hong Kong agreement? Do you think the 'Hong Kong model' could be used for Taiwan? KNH: Let's look a moment at what the Hong Kong model is. In fact this model is very similar to the traditional model which existed in the past between China and its vassal countries. In this arrangement these countries had completely different © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 62 \ ! political, economic and social systems, but they recognized China as 'big brother.' Is that in fact what China now wants with the Hong Kong model? If it is then we can find a way to accommodate them. There are a number of problems that have to be looked at. First, are the terms which the mainland offered Hong Kong better than what Taiwan already has? I think not. Take the economic freedoms the mainland has granted Hong Kong for instance. These already exist in Taiwan. Hong Kong is also being granted elections, but Taiwan has been running elections for several decades. These types of concessions are therefore not of interest to Taiwan. We already have all these things. According to the reaction from Taiwan in the press, from the people, etc., the general view is that such concessions would not benefit Taiwan. Therefore we would have to bargain. Secondly, for the last 100 years the position of the major powers has been critical to the fate o( Taiwan and continues to be so today. At different stages they have taken various positions regarding Taiwan's status. At one point when it suited their interests the CCP even said Taiwan should be independent. In the case of Hong Kong all that was needed was for England and the PRC to agree, but this could not be the case for Taiwan. Because in addition to Taiwan and the mainland, the CCP and the KMT, the interests of the major powers (the U.S. and Japan) have to be taken into consideration as well. A final problem with the Hong Kong model is that it does not consider the views of the Hong Kong people. Taiwan could not be treated in the same way. For 100 years the people of Hong Kong have never made political demands. But since 1911, the people of Taiwan have taken both the Japanese and the KMT as opponents and have raised numerous political demands. These demands would have to be considered in any resolution of Taiwan's fate. CBF: When you say Taiwan should recognize the mainland as "big brother," does this imply Taipei should recognize Peking's sovereignty? KNH: Not necessarily. You should understand it rather as China being recognized as playing the role of "big brother" in Asia. CBF: A number of other models concerning Taiwan's future are being discussed. One of these is the Olympic Model, another is the Asia Development Bank model. What position does the government on Taiwan take regarding these other models and what is your view? KNH: In 1981 the KMT came up with the Olympic Model and very enthusiastically coined the new slogan "China Taipei." Everything was fine until the Hong Kong agreement came out with the term "China-Hong Kong." Under the terms of the agreement, if Hong Kong participates in any international event or organization it must use this title. The parallel between the two terms terrified the KMT and they retreated from the Olympic model. The Asia Development Bank model is interesting. It takes Taiwanese society as a unit based on its population and economic strength and takes into consideration the role it should have in Asia. It seeks to give Taiwan the position it deserves in the international arena. CBF: Taiwan in effect is already a functioning unit, isn't it? So what kind ()lullit do you have in mind? When you speak of the position it deserves should this include national sovereignty? KNH: It is true that Taiwan is a functioning unit but its position is not sufficiently clear. Neither the U.S. nor Japan is willing to openly address this problem. Now if it suits their interests for Taiwan and the mainland to improve their relations then it can be done. But for a long time the U.S. and Japan used Taiwan to achieve their own goals in Asia. It is irresponsible for them simply to pressure Taiwan into negotiations without themselves playing a positive role. CBF: What is your opinion about cu"ent U.S. policy towards China and Taiwan? Do you think the U.S. is pursuing an approach which represents American interests to the greatest possible extent? KNH: In principle the normalization of Sino-American relations benefited the U.S. This readjustment of U.S.-China relations-I say readjustment, not establishment, of ties since it involved the shift of recognition from the KMT to the CCP-was a very long time in the making. The U.S. had to wait a long time and wait for the proper occasion and opportunity to make this shift. I can identify four types of interests which are satisfied by this move. First, the U.S. was able to push the U.S.-Soviet strategic line in Asia back to the Sino-Soviet border from its previous position along the Pacific belt including Taiwan. This has been of enormous advantage to the U.S. Second, the U.S. no longer has to fight the PRC for the sake of little countries like Taiwan. Now with the readjustment of its ties to the PRC this will no longer be necessary. Third, readjustment of U. S. -PRC relations created a considerable shift in the balance of U.S.-Soviet relations in favor of the U.S. Fourth, because the PRC can act as a leverage with regard to the USSR in Asia, this has served to relieve the strategic pressure on American allies in Europe and thereby has affected the world balance of power. These represent some of the benefits the U.S. has derived. CBF: What kind ofsupport do you reasonably expect the U.S. can provide Taiwan at present? If you were in a position to advise the American government, what concrete suggestions would you give? KNH: Now with regard to U.S. policy towards Taiwan, when the U.S. recognized the Communists as the legitimate rulers of China, it still had the responsibility to allow Taiwan to survive and develop. Do you want to destroy that opportunity for Taiwan? You have done away with the right of the KMT to legitimately represent China. Does this mean you must also do away with the ability of Taiwan to survive and grow as a society? We are extremely thankful for the Taiwan Relations Act. It shows that while the legitimacy of the KMT to represent China has been removed there is still concern for the ability of Taiwanese society to flourish. On this point there is a crisis in that the U.S. is gradually renouncing this sense of responsibility. It suddenly came out with the restrictions on quantity and quality of weapons supply to Taiwan. In the Taiwan Relations Act it was very clear that the U.S. would continue to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons. Why do they need to go and place restrictions on this now? The U.S. could play much more of a role in helping Taiwan resolve its domestic political problems. The KMT says it wants to establish a democratic system, but it continues to close down newspapers, prohibit the establishment of new political parties and in other ways violate the civil and political rights of the people on Taiwan. The KMT's claim to be the legitimate government of China is increasingly being recog nized in Taiwan as highly unrealistic. It is time to resolve these contradictions, and the U.S. could help the government of 63 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org Taiwan on these matters. This would be extremely practical, and would not be out of line at all. If Taiwan's domestic political situation was improved this would also benefit the U.S. If the situation does not improve then Taiwan could become a burden for the U .S. These are some of the suggestions I would give the U.S. government. Japan's democratization was also Japan's busi ness, so what was the U.S. doing in drafting a constitution for them? Does the conduct ofMarcos in the Philippines, the fact that Aquino was killed, have nothing to do with you? Don't you care about it? Obviously such problems cannot simply be taken as having nothing to do with the U.S. These matters cannot be separatedfrom U.S. interests in Asia. CBF: You seem to regard it as legitimate for the U.S. to intervene in Taiwan's internal affairs to encourage the process of democratization. Shouldn't this process be the outcome of the efforts of the people of Taiwan and not be imposed from the outside? KNH: Japan's democratization was also Japan's business, so what was the U.S. doing in drafting a constitution for them? Does the conduct of Marcos in the Philippines, the fact that Aquino was killed, have nothing to do with you? Don't you care about it? Obviously such problems cannot simply be taken as having nothing to do with the U.S. These matters cannot be separated from U.S. interests in Asia. Any position the U.S. takes has an impact on Taiwan. When the U.S. and China established diplomatic relations wasn't Taiwan dragged into it? Didn't it have a big impact on Taiwan's domestic affairs? So why shouldn't the U.S. take a constructive position in favor of democracy? The U.S. has interests and has a tremendous impact on Taiwan's fate, so shouldn't it take a constructive and responsible position? It's a lot of nonsense to say that Taiwan's democratization is its own business. It relates to the U.S. and to the political order in Asia. CBF: What is your view of the current developments on the mainland? Do you have confidence that the current reform efforts will succeed? KNH: Well, I am interested in these developments, and I hope they will succeed, because if they do this will allow the people on the mainland to live even better. and this will bring more stability to Asia. I worry about things going wrong. If the reforms don't work out, then relations with the U.S. and Japan will once again break down and this will have a major impact on the region. CBF: KMT rule on Taiwan rests in large part on its claim to be the represelltative of China. While they hm'e gradllally become less stalillch about this claim m'er time hOl\'far do rOll think they ('(III del'iate from it without upsettillg the basis (d' their legitimacy? KNH: Today the KMT continues to grab onto this claim. Their justification to rule still rests significantly on this claim of being the legitimate representative of China. This claim is the legal foundation of their rule. On the basis of this claim they refuse to hold elections for national representatives. The real problem is that they are unwilling to give up their political power. Yet we do not want to kick them out of office. We are willing to let them continue in their place. But they must progress in the goals that they themselves have proclaimed. They say they are going to democratize. Good, we are waiting. I am not at all like the Taiwanese Independence Movement that wants to overthrow the government. But the KMT had better democrat ize. Their claim to represent all of China is an obstacle to the progress of real democratization. As long as they claim to represent China then Taiwan will have no power. Now if they really want to continue making this claim then they can go ahead and do it, but they must democratize. Give the Taiwanese people a chance to participate. As for the mainland, it cannot simultaneously support the Hong Kong model and oppose the democratization of Taiwan's political system. * De.or AmericdnS, O<.Cltdl, N.c.C1ros~~ When I .......as Li we didn'T hove. dn'f 5<:.1'\00\S or dOCTors or land To grow -f'ood. ThdT'S wh'l "''I fdmi 1'1 fO\lghT aGainst ~~ dict~tor SOf\'\OZ.d. But rv;:,w 'f0~'" governmenT ,s +1"'11r'\3 TO destroya\l we Qre buildirs. Eller'l0ne Sd"iS +he Amet-ic.dl"t peOPle ore <30Od. Th~'t S""'Y if '(ou. knew whd't was hctppc:ning 'Iou wou\d s+op -the wdt-. P'eos~ S't6p \~iS Wd\" and G',,,~ M~ dl'\d I"'\'f C~Ntt)' Q C.hdnce.. +0 G~o,",. Y~t- -fr"iend, Dcinie\ Give Nicaragua a Chance. D YES! I'd like 10 help Please rush me delalls 011 whal I cae do [J Enclosed IS my lax-deductible contnbutlOn 01 $ _ to help With your work NAME _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ AOORESS _ _ CllY ... _ __ _ STATE _ _ _ ZIP _ _ _ _ _ _. Mall to Institute lor Food and Development Policy 1885 Mlss.or Street Sar FrarCISCO CA 94103 3584 c1985 Institute lor Food and Oevelopmerl Polq Sar Fraf"l(lsco CA © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org .~. PROSPERITY WITHOUT PROGRESS: MAN ILA HEMP AND MATERIAL LIFE IN THE COLONIAL PHILIPPINES, by Norman G. Owen. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 311 pp. Review Essay Villains, Victims, and Villeins POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PHILIPPINE COMMODITIES, by Third World Studies Program. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines, 1983. 310 pp. THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY AND THE UNITED STATES: STUDIES IN PAST AND PRESENT INTERACTIONS, by Norman G. Owen, ed. Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies (Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, no. 22), the University of Michigan, 1983). 208 pp. by Bruce Cruikshank These three books, by ten authors and with eleven essays and one book-length manuscript, give us in Philippine studies some fine, recent research on the course of the Philippine political economy from the late eighteenth century almost to the present. Of the three titles, the book on Bicol or Kabikolan by Norman G. Owen is not only the longest but undoubtedly the most important in research depth, scope, and length of time covered. The volume edited by the Third World Studies Program is less extensive in scope and time, but its essays are generally well-researched and tightly argued. The book edited by Owen has some good essays, but overall is less strong than the Political Economy of Philippine Commodities. In his book Norman Owen is trying to combine a full study of the region of Kabikolan in the nineteenth century with a case study of the nature and effects of its partial incorporation into the capitalist world system from about 1818 to about 1918. It is a particularly valuable case study, he argues, because the partial incorporation through the major export industry of abaca ("Manila hemp") seems to contradict usual perceptions of the cost of such contact with world capitalism by regions in Wallerstein's "periphery." In Kabikolan generally and the export sector particularly there was none of the "usual" forced labor or slavery; there were no plantations of note; the indigenous elite often wet'e the major innovators in the local and export economy; a1lkIl the results for Kabikolan and all of its people was improved material welfare. However, thanks to Owen's talent we can see that ultimately "this temporary prosperity failed to lead WI' real progress, as if it contained within itself its own limits- and thus its own demise" (xv). He contines (xvi): This boot. is. a study of how the rise and eventual decline of abaca in Kabikolan affected. the' development of that region. The tint half of the- book, ex.plores· the rise of the export industry, sbawing how a. strong. marKet: sector evolved from a traditional subsistence economy without either governmental coercion or substantial investment of foreign capital in plantations. In the second half of the book the rest of the regional economy is explored in an effort to analyze the failure of Kabikolan to capitalize on the rise of abaca or to transcend its decline. Through examination of the persistence of a strong subsistence sector, the vicissitudes of other commercial enterprises, and the uneven growth of the tertiary sector, we may begin to understand one often-ignored aspect of Third World history-the paradox of truncated development. His exploration of this "paradox" (especially in pp. 222-253) moves along a spectrum of analyses from internal causes to external factors, roughly from the "lazy native" and development theorists to imperialism and dependency theory. He breaks no new ground with any of these explanations, but throughout he demonstrates a mastery of major works in the literature. Indeed, throughout the book he shows a good knowledge of and gives comparative examples from: archival sources in the Philippines, Spain, the USA, and Great Britain; Spanish published sources; Southeast Asian history; develop ment theorists; Marxist scholarship; dependency theory; demography; statistics; world capitalist history, including specific crops and industries; patron-client theory; Spanish and American imperialism; and studies of women and social change. This listing, a veritable Boy Scout's tally of a good social historian's virtues, should not mislead the reader. The book, based on a significantly revised University of Michigan Ph.D. dissertation (1976), is fundamentally a regional history. His research findings are always paramount. Theory is important in the book but always subjected to strong reasoning, good questions, comparative analysis, and of course the results of his extensive research. That is, it is a case study of a region's histm-y, with theory capably incorporated but subordinated to his responsibility as a historian. 65 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org The reader gains a sense of this emphasis in one of his concluding paragraphs (p. 252): Whether colonialism and capitalism together were responsi ble, or whether they also combined with some indigenous disinclination to modernize, the opportunity for Kabikolan to tum temporary prosperity into more lasting progress had passed before the end of the colonial period. The market for abaca and coconuts had faUen, and though it would recover somewhat in the postwar period, it would never again offer Kabikolan the kind of profits the region had once enjoyed. The most fertile lands had been opened and farmed; the most accessible timber and gold had been extracted; the frontier was disappearing; population pressure had become a permanent factor in the developmental equation. If the Bikolanos were ever to achieve real progresss, it would have to be under less favorable circumstances. The century of abundant resources and expanding markets was over. This "paradox of truncated development" was a costly one for coming generations. Owen quotes (p. 221) from a 1979 Philippine Government report-I.8 million people on 706,000 hectares of land (only half of which arable); 80 percent of these people at or below the national poverty level in 1971 (65 percent so categorized in 1975) and suffering serious health problems, poor housing, inconstant employment, and a marginal share of the region's total income (10 percent of all households controlled at least 43 percent of that income). If Owen is chary of sweeping generalizations and indictments, the reader initially expects otherwise from the Political Economy of Philippine Commodities. After all, this book of four essays begins with a Foreword by the Director of the Third World Studies Program characterized by misleadingly strong rhetoric (v): The colonial powers that plundered the Third World also created monocultural economies in the territories they brought under their control. They forcibly drafted entire sections of existing societies or brought in coolies from abroad to work in the back-breaking routine of mono-crop plantations, while the rest of the indigenous population were [sic] marginalized and left to fashion their own existence in mutually isolated subsistence communities . . . But whether we are dealing with bananas, or sugar, or tobacco or coconut, the images conjured by the dependence on primary commodity exports remain the same: a history of colonial subjugation, a dependent economy dutifully fulfilling an obligation in the global capitalist division of labor ... , an authoritarian State presiding over the unholy alliance of the military, the technocracy, imperialist capital and subservient comprador and rentier local capital, and a subjugated culture sufficiently transformed, distorted, homogenized and attuned to the logic of transnational market. The reader should not be misled by these phrasings. Three of the four essays that follow are as good as any I have read, with solid documentation, relatively jargon-free style, and a concern for description over theory or bombastic posturings. The first essay, by Randolf S. David, Temerio C. Rivera, Patricio N. Albinales, and Oliver G. Teves, "Transnational Corporations and the Philippine Banana Export Industry" (pp. 1-133), is a straightforward and cogent study of banana exports after 1958. The essay documents the acquisition of private and public lands through various means from sweet talk to coercion (often with government support). It shows the infusion of capital and technology by United Brands, Standard Fruit, and Japanese and Filipino-owned companies. The result is domination economically, politically, and contractually by transnational corporations. The authors indicate some policy options and recommendations (pp. 98-106), but they are not optimistic concerning possible changes and reacquisition of freedom and dignity by the indigent Filipino farmers at the bottom. The second essay, by Alfred W. McCoy, " 'In Extreme Unction': the Philippine SugarIndustry" (pp. 135-179), shows briefly the crisis suffered by that industry in the 1970s when it lost the protected USA market and was forced to compete on the world market while hobbled by higher and disadvantageous costs of production. McCoy shows the effects of government bungling of the newly nationalized sugar export trade, low world market sugar prices in the mid-1970s, and Martial Law politics. As a consequence, planters increasingly sought mechanization as a means to cut costs, increase production, and compete more effectively on the world market. He includes (pp. 139-144) a brief summary of the Philippine sugar industry from the 1850s to the 1970s and concludes (pp. 162-172) with a case study of labor dislocation and the resulting murder of a plantation manager. The third essay is the strongest and most successfully detailed of the four essays in this book. Rigoberto Tiglao shows in his 'The Political Economy of the Philippine Coconut Industry" (pp. 181-271), "the forms of class and national exploitation engendered by that industry" (p. 183). Although Tiglao is much more sophisticated in his analysis, the gist is a basic division in the industry between small farms operated by peasant farmers and large farms or plantations operated through wage labor. Ninety percent of all farms are small, but large farms and plantations control 42 percent of the hectarage of all copra farms. Peasant farmers are "semi-proletarianized" through subjection to the world capitalist system, its prices, marketing contracts, and need for cash to purchase marketed items. But income from their farms permits only subsistence and perpetuation of the system. He mentions in passing that 8 hectares is the minimum needed to break even (p. 199), but his Table One (p. 256) shows that almost 73 percent of all farms are less than 5 hectares. Wage labor is pervasive but especially common on large farms and plantations. Wages for such toil are low and based usually on piece-work rates. Profits then are low to zero for small farms, but low wages and economies of scale allow profits to increase directly with size of the farm. These profits go for purchase of more land, since productivity per tree is not expansible or into other spheres, benefitting government corporations and bureaucrats as well as transnational corporations. He concludes a well-documented and detailed argument with a flourish (p. 238). While generating substantial income for the industrial consumers in the capitalist world centers, as well as for the landed elite and comprador-industrial capitalist classes in the country. the coconut industry, together with similar industries producing primary commodities for export, constitute the basic cause of underdevelopment of the Philippine economy. The last essay in this fine book of essays is by a Mexican anthropologist, Patricia Torres Mejia. Entitled "Philippine Virginia Tobacco: 30 Years of Increasing Dependency." her essay sketches out the history of tobacco from about 1952 to the 1970s. Torres Mejia tells of a US entrepreneur, government support, and a tobacco boom in the 1950s. This was followed by grower indebtedness, government bungling, and a government monopoly in 1960, with 1961 reforms blocked by local and USA interests. Then came more government © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 66 bungling. near bankruptcy of the government corporation, and a perpetuation of grower indebtedness. In the 1970s involved local politics and violence became prominent, along with a restructured government monopoly. However. even with the aid of cotton as an alternative crop. local and national corruption and mismanagement continues today, as does the indebtedness of the farmers. In terms of documentation and organization. this essay is the weakest of the four. but its story is believable and fits in well with the other essays in the Political Economy of Philippine Commodities. The last book of essays, The Philippine Economy and the United States: Studies in Past and Present Interactions. is less cohesive. Its seven essays by six authors reflect not only different themes and degrees of documentation, but also, surprisingly. "contradictions, of debate. even of fundamentally irreconcilable views" (xi) among themselves. Not all the essays are controversial. The first three contributions are straightforward essays. though on strikingly different topics. Frank H. Golay in his" 'Manila Americans' and Philippine Policy: The Voice of American Business" (pp. 1-35) shows in convincing fashion that from around 1900 to 1946 the American business community in the Philippines was remarkably ineffective in attempts to shape US imperial policy made in Washington. D.C. Grant K. Goodman in his "America's 'Permissive' Colonialism: Japanese Business in the Philippines. 1899-1941" (pp. 37-62), while speaking in passing of the USA as "a reluctant colonial mentor" and the American colonial elite being "psychologically burdened with gUilt about colonial control of the Philippines." only demonstrates that the Japanese before World War II had made significant economic and political contacts in the islands. Harold C. Livesay offers us an interesting essay (pp. 63-76) on "The Philippines As an Example of the Ford Motor Company's Multinational Strategy." Unfortunately Livesay resolutely demarcated his subject in such a way that many of the interesting policy, economic, and political questions involved are ignored or shrugged off with deceptive ease. Somewhat the same problem, but to the point of outright error. is found in Victor M. Ordonez's essay "An Analysis of Reactions of Investors to the Recent Investment Climate in the Philippines." This fifth essay (pp. 109-130) is a weakly documented public relations talk with an attempt (pp. 119-127) to delimit four stages of socioeconomic development in. apparently, the twentieth century; this section has so many errors one wonders why it was included in the book. The three remaining essays are provocative. well documented and well-developed arguments of strikingly different positions. Robert T. Snow writes an essay, "Export-Oriented Industrialization, the International Division of Labor. and the Rise of the Subcontract Bourgeoisie in the Philippines" (pp. 77-108), that could very well have graced the pages of Political Economy ofPhilippine Commodities. He argues convincingly that after the import-substitution indus trialization programs of the Philippine government in the 1950s and 1960s came (in the late 1960s) a shift to a policy of export-oriented industrialization (EOI). He then documents for this latter program patterns of capital investment, markets and trade, and class (especially the "bourgeoisie" and "subcontract bourgeoisie"), concluding with implications for the future of the Philippine economy. This is a strong essay whose underlying argument is (p. 78): EOI has continued the external dependence of the Philippine economy upon the American market. It has also fostered the growth of a new domestic class of Filipino subcontractors whose interests are as closely tied to the United States as were those of the export-crop plantation owners of the past. In short, EOI may have changed the form of the bonds of dependence, but it has not broken them. Snow is convincing-and then questions arise when one encounters the fine essay (his second in the book) by Frank H. Golay. "Taming the American Multinationals" (pp. 131-176). Golay agrees on the shift from import-substitution to export-oriented industrialization, but he argues that since then (and in some cases before) the American percentage in and presumed control over the Philippine economy has declined and is now marginal. Apparently there was marked US disinvestment in the late 1960s and early 1970s with an overall decline in the rate of growth of direct investment in the Philippine economy from 1950 to 1977. By 1977, he calculates (p. 157). US direct investment "was equal to 2.6 percent of the capital stock of the Philippines," or only "equivalent to 8.1 percent of the assets of the one thousand largest Philippine corporations." One often hears that US firms dominate the credit structure and available capital resources of Third World countries. but Golay argues that from 1960 to 1974 only 7.2 percent of all credits extended went to United Citizens and their enterprises (p.159), and might have been less. By the end of 1977 it was down to 4.3 percent. Land ownership by US citizens has never been significant in the Philippines. but one hears worrisome comments about leased land controlled by American firms. Golay tries to downplay the situation (p. 161). The II. 724 hectares of land leased to American direct-investment enterprises was equal to slightly more than one-third of one percent of the area harvested to Philippine commercial crops in 1976. Land owned or leased by Americans and their enterprises in the 1970s totaled some 29.000 hectares. or one-third of one percent of all Philippine agricultural lands in private hands. I imagine he would agree that in the areas of the lease, meddling by a US firm could dominate the local economic and political scene; but certainly the fear of US domination of the whole Philippine economy seems to be dispelled by these figures. Equally impressive are his statistics for remittance of direct-investment income from the Philippines: up from 45 million in 1960-62 to 74 million in 1974--76 but dropping from 8.3 percent of export earnings in 1960-62 to 3.0 percent in 1974--76. Business is good in the Philippines, but foreign business interests do not dominate the Philippine economy seems to be his thesis. Substantial numbers of educated and sophisticated Filipinos of various persuasions choose to believe that their economy is dominated by American-owned enterprises and that they live in thralldom to American direct-investment enterprises-the so called multinational corporations. To do so. these Filipinos reject a broad spectrum of objective evidence to the contrary, major elements of which are summarized above (p. 163). The picture does seem more complex than one might have originally thought. Of course not just "these Filipinos" talk about Philippine economic dependence on the United States, and one of the reasons is that in a world capitalist economy the Philippines would seem to need overseas markets more than they (the US and Japan especially) need the Philippines. Golay surprised me with the figures demonstrating the smallness of US percentages of control in the Philippine 67 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org economy, but Norman G. Owen in the concluding essay, "Philippine-American Economic Interactions: A Matter of Magnitude" (pp. 177-208), takes yet another approach. He argues from the seemingly commonplace observations that the United States has a trade forty times greater than the Philippines and has a gross domestic product eighty times greater. This sort of disparity, he demonstrates, stands behind the history of U.S.-Philippine imperialism and post-independence relations. Whether you view these relations as beneficient in intent or consequence, still this "fundamental disproportion of scale is a major reason that the Philippines has always, from the beginning, been peripheral to the United States" (p. 184). Conversely, and again from the 19OOs, the United States has always "mattered too much" to Filipino leaders (p. 185). The question of who needs whom more-and of course the dependence revealed in the answer is cultural and political as well as economic-he also extends in passing to multinational corporations. Owen concludes (pp. 1'96--198): The other great constant of Philippine economic history over the past century is the persistent poverty of the great majority of Filipinos . . . . It would be hard to prove that the material welfare of the average Filipino is significantly higher today than it was in the nineteenth century .... Any study of the Philippine economy which fails to take this into account is disingenuous at best. It is possible, of course, that this poverty is simply coincidental, explicable in terms of inadequate resources, short-sighted leadership, or just plain bad luck. Yet seen over the span of a century in which the poverty and the Philippine-American relationship are constants, it is difficult not to assume that they are somehow connected. Whatever its motives, whatever the specific policies it included, the "special relationship" has not proved healthy for the Filipinos . . . . Ultimately, of course, the relationship has always been asymmetrical, despite occasional efforts to create a nominal reciprocity. Perhaps this must always be the case; when two "partners" are so unequal, is real partnership possible? . . . Focusing on the disproportion of magnitude does not prove that the relationship was inherently unhealthy, but it creates a strong, and sad, presumption. These three books offer us a spectrum of approaches to the Philippine past. Such a spectrum might have at one end the exploiters and at the other the exploited, or villains and victims. Perhaps among the victims one might place the bulk of the Philippine population, laborers and peasants. And among the peasants and others would be found many bound by forms of patronage or tenancy-and which for reasons (only) of alliteration and to suggest socio-economic dependency I have included in the title of this essay as villeins. With exceptions, such as the essays by Goodman, Livesay, Ordonez, and Golay, the dominant motif that occurs to me in this disparate collection of scholarship is such a spectrum. For instance, while crude references to villains are omitted, there are clear attitudes concerning the capitalist world system in general and the United States in particular. More significantly, there are some exciting suggestions for future analysis. Who is/was the Filipino socio-economic elite, how was it recruited, what will its role be in the future of Philippine politics, and where are there divisions among this elite which might be significant in that future? Snow, for instance, talks about the "bourgeoisie" and the "subcontract bourgeoisie" who Rave benefited from the program of export-oriented industrialism, who are in direct competition with the elite that prospered under import-substitu tion, and who "do not appear to be part of the politically influential circle around President Marcos" (p. 97). Com plementary patterns of ties between Filipino businessmen, politicians, and foreign economic interests are hinted at in the essays in Political Economy ofPhilippine Commodities and in the essays by Golay, Goodman, and Ordonez, though some of these would not place the domestic elite in the part of the spectrum I have labeled villains. The category of socio-economic and political 'internal dependency called for convenience villeinage here but more correctly designated as patronage systems is a dimension merely touched in passing in Owen's book and almost completely ignored in the two books of essays. Regardless of the results of the current debate concerning its importance or function in general and in the Philippines specifically, it is surprising to me that this major dimension of Philippine politics and society in general is almost totally ignored in these works. Many but not all of the victims function at the lower end of such patronage systems. Patronage analysis suggests that the weaker party is frequently unfree but still a fully functioning member of a hierarchical society, a society increasingly subject to major socio-economic change. Many writers have traced how these changes increasingly subject the weaker parties to pressures that erode the margins of maneuverability and move villeins closer to being classical victims of industrialization, farm mechanization, commercial crop growing, and so forth. The number and categories of victims seem to be growing in the Philippines. The people at the socio-economic bottom, and in some cases those in the middle sectors, appear to be increasingly victimized by the division of profits and power in the Philippines today. Only some of the writers explicitly discuss the impact on the "victims" and fewer still give any sort of personal dimension to this group. Coping mechanisms are mentioned in the essay by David, et al. on bananas (pp. 71-76); the implications of the coconut smallholder's lot are easily drawn in the essay by Tiglao, though it is left to the reader to do so; and politics and local violence in I1ocos are mentioned by Torres Mejia (pp. 288-290). Snow at least mentions "the growth of a new, largely female proletariat" with EOI policies (p. 79), but for most of the writers in The Philippine Economy and the United States volume victims and those at the bottom fall outside the purview of their essays. Al McCoy in his essay on the Philippine sugar industry and Norman Owen in his book on Kabikolan expressly try to incorporate this dimension. McCoy uses an ultimately ambiguous case study following his study of mechanization on a plantation manager (pp. 162-172). He ends his essay with an interview fragment with the murderer: I do not regret that I killed Mr. Pereche. Our life was miserable then, and two of my younger siblings had been forced to quit school because we couldn't borrow money. Today I have three siblings in school because father can borrow from the new administrator. And the wookers' wages have gone up as well. From what I ,hear, things are better on the hacienda now . . .. More ;people Wsited me in prison than visited Pereche in the funeral parlor. And a lot of people from the hacienda send me money. If Pereche were still there, ,pe~ple 'Would be miserable. So until now I have no regrets. None.at ,all. McCoy has succeeded in adding the dimension of victim or people at the bottom, but it 'is a dimension as shown through this interviewfr.agment Which is rather puzzling if not 68 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org depressing. Mechanization continued, labor dislocation continued, the terms of trade and financing into the world capitalist economy continued, and here is a simple laborer who by drastic action has temporarily alleviated the burden on his family and neighbors. Through simple but vicious reactions an individual has managed to release some of the pressures; and the individualism that led him to take such steps also leads him to bask contentedly in jail with the knowledge of what little he has in fact achieved. Owen in his book on Kabikolan is also concerned with the people at the bottom, who would not be called victims probably until after the collapse of the abaca trade around 1918, if then. Throughout the book he tries to achieve a picture of the Bicolanos in general and the non-elite specifically, but the results are fragmentary. His strategy is to present sketchy collective portraits of people devoted to multiple economies and handicrafts along with abaca cultivation for the export trade, especially in Chapter Four and here and there in Chapters Five through Seven. He succeeds remarkably well, given the refractory sources we struggle with. He does concede that a fully dimensional history of Bicol, beyond "its bare socioeconomic bones" (xvii), is yet to be written, but his book is nontheless a fine piece of work. Indeed, all three books contain a wealth of well-researched material on Philippine local, regional, national, and international economies. I recommend all three and hope that the work therein will stimulate further studies that will attend as well to some of the dimensions and problems raised in this review essay. 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URPE '" a nonprofit. tax exempt orgamzatlon Your donations are tax deductible Namc _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Addrc~ Cil) .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Slale ZIP _ _ __ Send to URPE. 155 West 23rd St.. 12tn Floor. New York. New Vod 10011 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org Review STORM OVER THE SUTLEJ: THE AKALI POLITICS, by A. S. Narang. New Delhi: Gatan jali Publishing House, 1983, 261 pp. Distributed by South Asia Books, P.O. Box 502, Columbia, Missouri 65205. by Eddie J. Girdner Contemporary North Indian society presents a complex mosaic in which religion, language, caste and class interact. In this context, religious revivalistic movements beginning in the nineteenth century have produced a volatile political culture in which emotions and passions, associated with the fear of religious communities of being absorbed into the larger community, have resulted in periodic outbreaks of violence. In this book, A. S. Narang sets out to account for the rise of Sikh nationalist consciousness from its origins in the nineteenth century to the present concept of a Sikh nation. Professor Narang attempts to analyze recent political develop ments and the growing demands for more political autonomy in the Sikh community by adopting the revisionist theoretical framework recently developed by Paul Wallace.' Following Cynthia Enloe,2 this perspective views the traditional simplistic view of modernization and politicization in terms of dichotom ous sets of pattern variables as inadequate. It is argued that so-called "traditional" and "parochial" values may contribute to "nation building." Religious and communal cultural loyalties may facilitate rather than inhibit the process of political mobilization. Narang points out that the Western social mobilization model of political development cannot account for continued allegiances to religion, caste and community in North India. Further, class interests and class consciousness only rarely emerge to weaken such communal allegiances. The most crucial factor in Punjab politics, in recent years, according to Narang, is that economic and class interests have largely coincided with communal interests. Consequently crosscutting cleavages which might have served to diminish communal politics have not evolved. The roots of the communal cleavages in Punjab are traced to the religious revivalism of the nineteenth century whereby language became associated with "group dominance, religious reform and political aspirations." Language played a peculiar role in Punjab, it is argued, in that while it is ordinarily a uniting force, in Punjab it became a divisive force because of its association with religion. Regardless of their spoken language, people opted for the language associated with their religion. Sikhs came to claim Punjabi and the Gurmukhi script as their language while Hindus claimed Hindi and the Devanagiri script, as these were the languages of their scriptures. But underlying the language issue was economic struggle which undermined complete communal solidarity. In the Sikh community, caste divides members into roughly three groups, agriculturalists (Jats) , shopkeepers and businessmen (Khatris and Aroras) and laborers (Scheduled castes). In the villages, the interests of the landowing Jats are sharply opposed to those of the landless laborer Harijans. Professor Narang notes that while the Green Revolution has resulted in swiftly changing agrarian relations in recent years, whereby tenants and laborers suffered the loss of traditional economic benefits when they were forced to work for cash payments, there has been little actual class struggle in Punjab. Historically, the establishment of the Khalsa or religious community of Sikhs marked the establishment of a "militant church" which was a response to Islam. Narang argues that "modernization and Westernization" under the British led to competition among communities. "The differential response to social mobilization created mutual antagonisms among different communities." (p. 38) Sikh Nationalism began with the "Kuka Movement" around 1850 which included a boycott of British goods, or Swadeshi. Its emergence proceeded through the establishment of the Singh Sabha movement in 1873 and the Chief Khalsa Diwan, which served as the political wing of the Singh Sabha associations, in 1887. After 1914, the Sikhs, desiring a more militant organization, founded the Central Sikh League. The emergence of the Shiromani Akali Dal in 1920, as the militant wing of the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandhak Committee I. Paul Wallace, "Religious And Secular Politics In Punjab: The Sikh Dilemma In Competing Political Systems," in Political Dynamics Of Punjab, Paul Wallace and Surendra Chopra, eds. (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1981). The tenn "revisionist," as used here, refers to the revision of the thesis that modernity and tradition are polar opposites and that consequently modernization necessarily leads to secularization. 2. Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little. Brown and Co .. 1973). © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org 70 (SGPC) for the management of Sikh shrines, was a major landmark in the politicization of the Sikhs. With their political base in the Jat Sikh community, these organizations supported the Indian Nationalist Movement. But as a "religio-political organization," the Akali Dal exploited religious sentiment to gain political influence. Opposing the Indian National Congress policy of refusing to cooperate with the British during WWII, the Akali Dal used the position of the Sikhs in the British-Indian Army to further their political goals. After Independence, the demand for a Punjabi-speaking state led to the demand for a Sikh state. The Akali Dal, concerned with maintaining the cultural identity of the Sikhs, argued that the secular democratic framework of the Indian Constitution was detrimental to the interests of religious minorities. They wanted a state which would "protect Sikh interests." The Punjabi Hindus also moved toward com munalism, claiming Hindi as their language in greater numbers. At the Center, political leaders viewed Akali demands for a Punjabi speaking state (Punjabi Suba) as communal. Narang's analysis shows that politicization of the Sikhs was closely related to socio-economic developments in Punjab. Just after Independence, the Akali Dal, whose political base was in the depressed rural castes, claimed that political freedom had left the Sikhs worse off. The Party exploited cultural symbols and religion to stir emotions, dramatizing the alleged discrimination against back ward castes (p. I 13). Furthermore, the Akalis demanded "all decision making powers to the Khalsa," as the Sikhs in the Party's view constituted a distinct political community. Rejecting the concept of secularism, in theory, the Party claimed identity with the Sikh religion and the absolute right to sovereign rule. But while the Akali Dal used religion as a unifying force in the Sikh community, economic and class interests under mined these efforts. The urban commercial Sikh castes, particularly in lullundur, opposed the division of Punjab and the creation of a Hindi-speaking state, prior to the 1960s. During the 1960s, the Green Revolution increased the wealth and influence of the rural elites. According to Narang, increasing class polarization led both Sikh Harijans in rural Punjab and the Hindu Scheduled castes of present Haryana to oppose the demand for the creation of a Punjabi-speaking state because they would be subjected to the political rule of the new class of rural elites. In this instance, class consciousness was a stronger force than religious or communal consciousness. A rural-urban dichotomy also arose within the Sikh community with the rural-based Akali Dal exploiting religious sentiment while the urban Sikhs drifted toward a more secular mode of political participation within the constitutional framework. With the granting of Punjabi Suba in 1966 by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the political influence of the newly affluent lat Sikh elite grew vis-a-vis other sectors of society in Punjab. The political base of the dominant factions ofthe SGPC and the Akali Dal Party had shifted to this elite, which benefited disproportionately from the increased agricultural production brought about by the Green Revolution. Simultaneously, the quasi-federalist national political structure became more and more centralized culminating in Emergency Rule (1975-1977). After new elections were held in 1977, the Akali Dal joined with the Hindu-based lana Sangh to form the new state ministry. Punjabi Suba had created a Sikh majority state, but the Akalis found themselves unable to rule without forming a coalition with other parties, as Sikh communal solidarity continued to be diluted by diverse class and economic interests within the community. The Party simultaneously exploited communal religious rhetoric to increase support among the less educated rural Sikhs while attempting to broaden its political base from a communal to a regional basis. Narang shows that the political rule of the Akali Dal in Punjab resulted in increased repression of agricultural laborers as the Akalis aggressively opposed implementation of land reforms. Defending the interests of the landed lat Sikhs, the basis of their political support, the Akalis demanded increased inputs from the Center for agricultural development, a greater share of river waters for irrigation and the freedom to keep agricultural eamings in the state to capitalize new industries. Symbolic demands, which included the declaration of Amritsar as a Holy City, were also made upon the Central Government. From 1967 until 1980, the grip of religious leaders upon the Party was weakened, but efforts to establish the Party on a regional basis failed. Narang argues that communal appeals were necessary in order for the Party "to keep its grip upon the masses." In 1978, the founding of the Dal Khalsa by Sikh youths marked the beginning of the rising influence of radical right-wing groups who demanded a Sikh nation or "Khalistan." Its support base was largely among the rustic elements, the rural Nihangs, Sikh Sants and lathedars. The Akali Dal did not support the demand for Khalistan, but the growing popularity of the radical right forced the Party to the right as the Central Government sought to repress the rebels. Since Narang's book was published, the confrontation between the Sikh radicals and the Central Government has escalated with thousands of political arrests, the Central Government's assault on the Golden Temple in Amritsar, resulting in the death of Sant lamial Singh Bhindranwala and several hundred followers, and widely scattered communal clashes between Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab and Haryana. The recent assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh guards in New Delhi and the violent aftermath has precipitated perhaps the greatest political crisis facing India since Independence. The book provides a great deal of useful background information on the present political conflict in Punjab, but the author's attempt to fit recent developments into a theoretical framework fails. Following the revisionist analysis of Wallace, he takes issue with the social mobilization modeP in which economic development (industrialization) was seen to be the driving force for social change whereby traditional elements (parochialism and communalism) were weakened and "mod em" individuals with secular concerns emerged. He argues that on the contrary, the growth of sectarian politics can be traced to "the process of modernization in a particular social system" (p. 223). Economic development, then, becomes the driving force behind "sentiments of parochialism, communalism, and racialism" which are a part of "the process of foundation of the sovereign civil state" (p. 233). 3. See, for example, Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), and Alex lnkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1974). 71 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org There are several problems with this explanation. Such a detenninistic view is one dimensional as it sees the individual as a passive object of social mobilization rather than a subjective agent of social change. It lacks explanatory value since it can be used to explain both secularization and de-secularization. Further, this explanation is at odds with the author's own analysis in which he stressed the role of charismatic religious leaders in exciting communal passions in rural areas. Thus it neglects the important psychological and emotional element in Indian politics as well as the importance of non-secular charismatic leadership. The explanation also neglects the role of religious ideology. As the author points out, the Akalis demanded "all decision making powers to the KhaLsa" (p. 119) on the basis that the Sikh community constitutes a distinct political community. This concept provides a theoretical justification for complete political autonomy for the "Sikh Nation" under the rule of communal leaders. While economic development and class tensions are clearly related to the communal conflict, the role of leadership and religious ideology should not be neglected. Moreover, Narang's conclusion is confused further by his uncertainty as to whether communal attachments are becoming stronger in Punjab or whether society is becoming more secular. Despite his argument that economic development reinforces communal ties in the particular political culture of Punjab, he points out that the focus of Punjab politics shifted from "socio-religious" ("charismatic and agitational leadership") to "socio-economic issues" after 1966. He also states that "Sikh cultural nationalism became more moderate and accomodating" with the granting of Punjabi Suba (p. 336). While this may be true until recently, it is inconsistent with his theoretical model. Finally, Narang argues that "the urge for autonomy is not a divisive force ..." (p. 236). His vision for future Indian society is a pluralistic one in which cultural nationalities in a truly federalist system are guaranteed a maximum degree of political autonomy. But it must be recognized that radical Sikh nationalism which grounds the claim to absolute political sovereignty upon religious ideology presents a serious obstacle to the emergence of such a culturally pluralistic society. While the Akali Dal was willing to participate in a quasi-secular manner until recently, more radical elements have now sown seeds of division, which, given the historical precedents for political fragmentation in the Indian subcontinent, cannot ellsiIy be ignored. Howard N. Higginbotham, Third World Challenge to Psychiatry: Culture Accommodation and Mental Health Care (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984). Robert F. Scholz and Phyllis Andors (eds.), Work: An Anthology of Readings (Fourth Edition) (Lexington: Ginn Custom Publishing, 1985). Bruno Zorallo, Dalla Corea divisa alia Cina libera (Rome: Edizioni II Sellimo Sigillo, 1984) (In Italian). Southeast Asia Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Burden ofProof: The Vargas-Laurel Collaboration Case (Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 1984). Craig Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War: Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon (Thetford: The Thetford Press Ltd., 1984). Philip M. Hauser, Daniel B. Suits, and Naohiro Ogawa (eds.), Urbanization and Migration in Asean Development (Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement, 1985). Nancy Howell-Koehler, Vietnam: The Battle Comes Home: A Photographic Record of Post-Traumatic Stress With Selected Essays (Dobbs Ferry: Morgan Press, 1984). Giff Johnson, Collision Course at Kwajalein: Marshall Islanders in the Shadow of the Bomb (Honolulu: Pacific Concerns Resource Center, 1984). E. San Juan, Toward a People's Literature: Essays in the Dialectics ofPraxis and Contradiction in Philippine Writing (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1984). Kimmo Kiljunen (ed.), Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide; Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission (Bath: The Pitman Press, 1984). Hong Lysa, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century: Evolution of the Economy and Society (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984). Ross Prizzia, Thailand in Transition: The Role of Oppositional Forces (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). Muhammad Ikmal Said, The Evolution of Large Paddy Farms in the Muda Area, Kedah: A Study ofthe Development ofCapitalist Farms in Peninsular Malaysia (Pulau Pinang: Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1985). William Shawcross, The Quality ofMercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). Ann Laura Stoler, Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt, 1870-1979 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1985). Nancy Viviani, The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia (Carlton: Griffin Press Limited for Melbourne University Press, 1984). South Asia Maarten Bavnick, Small Fry: The Economy of Petty Fishermen in Northern Sri Lanka (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij Free University Press, 1984). Yvonne Fries and Thomas Bibin, The Undesirables: The expatriation of the Tamil people "of recent Indian origin" from the plantations in Sri Lanka to India (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Company, 1984). Mohammed Mohabbat Khan and John P. Thorp (eds.), Bangladesh: Society, Politics & Bureaucracy (Dhaka: The City Press, 1984). Jaganath Pathy, Tribal Peasantry: Dynamics of Development (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1984). Baren Ray, India: Nature of Society and Present Crisis (Delhi: I.M.H. Press Ltd., 1983). Ashim Kumar Roy and N. N. Gidwani, A Dictionary of Indology, Vol. 2, D to K (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, Inc., 1984). Ralph Singh, Barbara Joshi and Surjit Singh (eds.), The Turning Point: India's Future Direction? (Syracuse: Committee on Human Rights, 1985). Michel De Vroey and N. Shanmugaratnam, Peasant Resettlement in Sri Lanka (Louvain-Ia-Neuve: TricontinentaI Centre, 1984). * Books to Review The following review copies have arrived at the office of the Bulletin. If you are interested in reading and reviewing one or more of them, write to Bill Doub, BeAS, P.O. Box R, Berthoud, CO 80513. This is not, of course, an exhaustive list of the available books in print-only a list of books received. We welcome reviews ofother worthy volumes not listed here. Northeast Asia John Crump, The Origins of Socialist Thought in Japan (London & Canberra: Croom Helm Ltd.; New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1983). Bill Ford, Millicent Easther and Ann Brewer, Japanese Employment and Employee Relations: An Annotated Bibliography (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1984). Penelope Francks, Technology and Agricultural Development in Pre-War Japan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984). David T. Hill, Who's Left? Indonesian Literature in the Early 1980' s (Clayton: Monash University Press, 1984). Janet E. Hunter, Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History (Berkeley Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1984). Claude A. Buss (ed.), National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985). Irene L. Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). Bhabani Sen Gupta (ed.), Soviet Perspectives ofContemporary Asia (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, Inc., 1984). 72 © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org © BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org
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