Australian eJournal of Theology 6 (February 2006)
Indoctrination: Still Alive and Well
Edmund A. Parker
Abstract: This paper examines the question of indoctrination, and suggests it may be
unhelpful to think of indoctrination as being limited to concepts of religion,
fundamentalism, conservatism and unscholarly methods. A window is opened to describe
the ways in which issues of indoctrination have tended to become part of the
establishment, particularly in the dominance of the scientific approach to understanding
and research. In turn, this approach has determined the manner in which much of
modern education is conducted. The essay concludes with a portrayal of what is deemed
to be the more desirable attributes of openness and choice in education.
Key Words: indoctrination; education; conformity; rationality; irrationality; motives
for belief; academic integrity
ndoctrination generally conjures up concepts of religion, fundamentalism,
conservatism and unscholarly behaviour. However, it seems that even the most
prestigious systems can slip into indoctrinatory modes of presentation. Feyerabend made
the following insightful comment:
Scientific “facts” are taught at a very early age and in the very same manner in which
religious “facts” were taught only a century ago. There is no attempt to waken the
critical abilities of the pupil so that he may be able to see things in perspective.1
A quarter of a century on Jan Masschelein states:
There is a widespread call for the limitation of the ever increasing intrusion of science
and technology into all domains of human life.2
He challenges the direction of a modern education seemly directed by a technological and
scientific global thrust: “In my view this implicitly technical characterisation of the
edifying function of education is related at a very profound level to the development of
science and technology. I would like to call this structure into question.”3 One aspect of the
argument adduced by Masschelein is that the so-called Enlightenment, upon which
modern education would see itself based, anticipated that science would bring both
political and moral progress. However, the very opposite is often what currently
transpires.4 There is an implicit and explicit call by him for education to have a
philosophic foundation on which to base itself and to maintain its direction. Following
Levinas, the approach of Masschelein suggests that education would then not become
From Paul Feyerabend, “How to Defend Society against Science,” Radical Philosophy 2 (1975): 4-8. Reprinted
in Daniel Kolak and Raymond Martin (eds.), Self, Cosmos, God (Harcourt Brace: Jovanovich College Publishers,
1993), 535-543. Quote from 535-536.
1
2
Jan Masschelein, “Can Education Still be Critical,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 34.4 (2000): 603.
3
Ibid, 604.
4
Ibid, 605.
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subjugated to “social, economic, cultural, political or religious imperatives and
developments,” and as such, would not become “simply a victim of ideology.”5
“It seems that scientific rationality itself has become the problem.”6 His
argument is that the modern sciences with their methodological ideals are locked
into a “procedural rationality” that undermines the claims of “universal world
views.”7 In his terms, science has become “the expression of limited and particular
interests: especially the interest in control over nature, both human and physical.”8
The issues highlighted by Masschelein deal with the reductionism of science and its
methods of control that move away from the human-side of personal existence and
experience. With reductionistic-scientific approaches there is a tendency to
dehumanization. Objects are more amenable to empirical experimentation and control
than humans, and hence science tends more and more to deal with the objects of existence
rather than the being of existence. Masschelein suggests that not only is there more
control when dealing with the inanimate objects of scientific research, but the more
commodification takes place, the more predictability is available for those who see
themselves as having the right or the need to control.
The article investigates how two different conceptions of the edifying potential of
education attempt to take into account the normative dimension of scientific
knowledge. In the first conception it is the demand for truth that is edifying, whereas in
the second concept it is a distinctly ethical demand. It is argued that the first concept in
the end implies the subjection of education to the 'brutality of facticity', under which it
risks losing its critical point. The second conception, drawing on Levinas and Arendt,
tries to safeguard this critical point. It conceives education as a process through which
scientific knowledge is made subject to reflection, and is thus confronted with the
ethical challenges and demands of society.9
Another author, David Rozema, presents a disturbing view in “The Polemics of
Education.”10 He perceives a challenge coming between what he calls the education
of commodity as opposed to the education of community. He maintains that this
commodification of education is destructive.11
One of the issues arising from Rozema’s point of view is that when education is
commodified, prescriptivism follows. Issues of power and control are part of the education
of commodity, whereas, it could be argued that the education of community is much more
in the direction of my proposed inclusivist model.12 Education as community seeks to
place an emphasis on the individual and allows that same individual choice and space to
function. C. S. Lewis proposed his own difference between community and commodity.
That is, community has education as propagation while commodity has education as
propaganda. He spoke of these two contrasts thus,
Where the old initiated, the new merely 'conditions'. The old dealt with its pupils as
grown birds deal with young birds when they teach them to fly: the new deals with
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid, 606.
7
Ibid.
Ibid. (The ecology and the green movements with all of their shades and hues are part of this voice that is
calling for some deeper sense of care.)
8
9
Ibid, 603.
10
David Rozema, “The Polemics of Education,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 35.2 (2001): 237-254.
11
Ibid, 238.
See my forthcoming article in Colloquium: “ Reading, 'Riting and 'Rithmetic: Subjectivity in the Process of
Interpretation.”
12
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them more as the poultry-keeper deals with young birds - making them thus or thus for
purposes of which the birds know nothing. In a word, the old was a kind of
propagation… the new is merely propaganda.13
If Feyerabend, Masschelein and Rozema are correct in what they have claimed, it may well
be that ideological-indoctrination is in fact very much alive and well today.
THE QUESTION OF INDOCTRINATION14
Indoctrination is an issue that needs to be examined in the context of critical
theory and epistemological pathways.15 Within what might be regarded as the
orthodox philosophical approach to indoctrination, there are three standard
frames of reference encompassing:
1) “a certain method of teaching;
2) a certain content of teaching; and
3) a certain aim in teaching.”16
Each of these will be considered in turn.
(1) The Issue of Method
This is the use of a teaching technique in which the student is not allowed to become
aware of any discrepant argument at a deeper and more significant level. There may be
minor discrepant views that give the appearance of openness. However, these often may
be categorized as a straw-man that is only put up to be knocked down in order to maintain
an appearance of integrity and academic excellence. Therefore, this methodological
approach allows for the delivery of deliberately biased views.
The method approach of indoctrination occurs when it is impossible for the
recipient of information to ascertain the validity or non-validity of that same information,
primarily because the means of doing so have not been given during the teaching process.
John Wilson describes some obvious model cases, including “brainwashing people to
believe in Communism, teaching Christianity by the threat of torture or damnation, forcing
people by early training to accept social roles as in Huxley's Brave New World.”17 The
method approach is also present if a lecturer deliberately selects a bibliography that
Quoted in Rozema, “Polemics,” 251. [From the reprint, C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York:
Touchstone, 1996).]
13
An unpublished PhD thesis submitted in 2002 at the National University of Singapore deals with the issue of
the paradox of indoctrination: Tan Hwee Phio Charlene, “An Educational Analysis of the Paradox of
Indoctrination.” See also Brian L. Hebblethwaite, The Problems of Theology Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992). A considerable accumulation of literature concerning the issue of indoctrination has been made.
See for example B. F. Pettenger, Indoctrination for American Society (New York: Macmillan, 1941); I. Scheffler
The Language of Education (Springfield, IL: Charles C.Thomas, 1960); R. S. Peters, Authority, Responsibility and
Education (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963); T. H. B. Hollins (ed.), Aims in Education: The Philosophic Approach
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964); R. D. Archambault, Philosophical Analysis and Education
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965); and I. A. Snook (ed.), Concepts of Indoctrination (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972).
15 See R.S. Laura, “To Educate or to Indoctrinate: That is Still the Question,” Educational Philosophy and Theory
15.1 (1983): 43-55. Laura builds on the debate that had taken place in the previous forty odd years. (See
previous footnote).
14
16
Ibid, 44.
John Wilson, “Education and Indoctrination,” in T.H.B. Hollins (ed.), Aims in Education: The Philosophic
Approach (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), 24-46. [Quotation from p. 26.]
17
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simply confirms their own bias and ignores all other discrepant viewpoints. This method
of teaching encourages intellectual myopia and parochialism.
Laura suggests that method questions come to the fore when propositional beliefs
are presented by one person to another in such a way that the other endorses the belief
without understanding “the grounds requisite for its endorsement.”18 If such a method is
used, it is clearly indoctrination. Whenever force, be it physical, emotional or economic is
used, the boundary of indoctrination has been crossed. In the abuse of method, the
method is contrived and is educationally distorted. This allows for manipulation of
student minds and intellectual exploitation. It is a way of teaching that biases the
outcome(s).
(2) The Issue of Content
Content issues fit closest to debates, largely of the past, concerning the positivist
distinctions. It has been suggested that the issue of content comes into focus when a
propositional belief is presented by one individual to another in such a manner that the
other endorses it without being able to “comprehend the grounds for endorsement.”19
This is because the belief is of such a kind that it is not possible in principle to adduce
grounds for or against it – an issue that is generally true of doctrinal beliefs. Doctrine is
defined as beliefs or a set of beliefs “which if not false, were not known to be true.”20 The
doctrine issue becomes clearer when Wilson's question is considered in the context of
arbitrary decisions relative to the question of content. This is highlighted in his
hypothetical comparison between teaching under hypnosis21 such things as mathematics,
Latin grammar, swimming, driving a car, and A level physics, and hypnotizing a boy to
believe in either Communism, political, religious or moral beliefs.22 The arbitrariness of
the decision is highlighted, if for example, one decided that the former range of subjects
was not indoctrinative, while the latter was. There are questions of ethics that press even
harder here, such as the legitimacy of placing information in the head of a person without
them having ample opportunity of making a choice.
A further issue concerns rationality as against non-rationality. This issue plays a
significant part at all times, but becomes particularly pertinent when the teaching of
beliefs or doctrines takes place. In these cases, indoctrination can very easily happen.
There needs to be the backing of evidence,23 and it is clear that in the question of
rationality that there are very few matters that come within the “100 per cent” range.24
Always, there is a need to remember that “problems arise because we are living in an
irrational society, as all societies are.”25
Content covers much more than curriculum. It is the philosophic definition of
content that is being focused here, with the positivist debates of the twentieth century in
the background. The minimal conditions necessary for a belief to be a candidate for
18
Laura, “To Educate,” 44.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
It seems that the term hypnosis could make one miss the point that Wilson is making. He is using hypnosis
as an analogy for teaching young children before they have attained the ability to reason. See Wilson,
“Education and Indoctrination,” 34.
21
22
Ibid, 26-27.
23
Ibid, 28-29.
24
Ibid, 29.
25
Ibid, 37.
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educational and moral instruction is that it must meet the following criteria. Firstly, it
must be a tolerably coherent description of a possible state of affairs. For example, to state
that there is a round square in the vice-chancellor's office is itself a logical contradiction if
round and square are to retain their conventional definitions. A round square is therefore
a necessary falsehood. However, to say that all unicorns are black meets the first condition
of being a tolerably coherent description of a possible state of affairs. It makes no claim as
to the existence of a black unicorn, but it does state something that can, at least, be
pictured in the mind's eye. This then leads to the second of the criteria.
Therefore, secondly, if a tolerably coherent description of a possible state of affairs
exists then, to be of educational or moral value, the belief(s) enunciated must also meet
the criterion or the question of affirmation. Using a shut-in/shut-out protocol, this point
asserts that the outcomes of such are essentially an affirmation or a non-affirmation.
Positively, the affirmation of the proposed belief or idea, that is, one aspect of the shut-in
protocol, must be seen to make some significant difference in the world by the affirmation
of the said belief. Negatively, it must also be seen that the non-affirmation of the belief,
that is, one aspect of the shut-out protocol, must be seen to bring a significant loss by the
non-affirmation of the belief or value.
Content should be coherent, not incoherent, by virtue of what it says. Furthermore,
content should never be of such a nature that it is invulnerable to the principle of
testability, or at least accountability, in the sense of knowing what difference is made to
how the world is when the belief is affirmed rather than denied. Wilson asserts that
because we hold that human personality is valued, forms of indoctrination that tend to
diminish human worth are not wanted.26 Therefore, educational approaches that devalue
the personhood of an individual move in the direction of indoctrination.27
(3) The Issue of Aims and Intentions
This issue functions when an individual deliberately persuades another person to endorse
a propositional belief or set of beliefs (p) “in such a way” that s/he, in spite of otherwise
compelling evidence, is unable to “subsequently endorse” its opposite (i.e., not p).28
“Clearly, the intention account does serve to exhibit something of the extent to which
indoctrination is dehumanizing.29 The intellectual components of individual autonomy are
Ibid, 33. [Human worth is diminished in our opinion when the person is made less capable of dealing with
issues, less able to think for themselves, less able to evaluate logically, less able to be independent, less able to
stand against opposition. Hence human worth is enhanced when a person is not excessively dependant and
vulnerable to those around them, when a person can be their own self and be happy with it, when a person has
the quality of being able to argue their position in an appropriate way, when a person is enhanced in their
relationships to and with others.]
26
See R.M. Hare, “Adolescents into Adults,” in T.H.B. Hollins (ed.), Aims in Education: The Philosophic Approach
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), 47-70. Hare challenges some of the extreme examples that
he claims Wilson has presented, e.g. hypnosis (p. 48), which Wilson uses metaphorically for the way we teach
young children. Nevertheless, he basically agrees with the differences between education and indoctrination
that Wilson presents. Hare makes the claim (pp. 49,50) that if one focuses on content first, they run the risk of
presenting doctrine, which could be expressed as right content (his examples are Roman Catholics,
Communists, Victorians, Spartans, Trobriand Islanders and Anglicans). However, Laura is not arguing for a
doctrinal presentation, he is arguing from the perspective of the proper and appropriate use of language and
for the quality of testability and / or accountability.
27
28
Laura, “To Educate,” p. 45.
Dehumanization takes place when deprivation of that which is human transpires. There are characteristics
which humans have, and to delimit, curtail or distort any of these is to move in the direction of
dehumanization. To inhibit the ability to think, to inhibit the ability to choose, to inhibit the ability to act as an
29
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eroded by narrowing the mind's eye such that only those things are seen which others
want to be seen.”30 The issue of aims and intentions functions on the premise that using
method or content (as defined above) has an orientation towards a success predicate. In
other words, a teacher seeks to achieve a successful outcome that is already loaded with
undue bias.
Cognitive dissonance often occurs in situations such as these where there is very
clear disconfirming evidence, but no change of attitude or belief takes place.31 In his
dissonance studies, Festinger has shown the possibility of being deluded by other
concerns that surround the event or the belief. These concerns include the values of the
community that holds the belief, and also the social structures that surround the
individual, and they may become more important than accuracy or truth, or even
truthfulness. This is not a consciously dishonest reaction, but one that becomes clouded by
other matters such as emotion, personal interest, existence, and survival.
Some Further Considerations
It has been proposed that the content issue should be taken into account before either
method or intention issues are considered.32 Laura maintains that if the content is not of
an acceptable nature, then the issue of indoctrination need proceed no further. Further,
when indoctrination is present, the concept of epistemic primitives is critical.33 Language,
education and knowledge are complex. Hence it is possible that hidden within the
formulation of these ideas are presuppositions and epistemic primitives that can be
indoctrinatory in nature. The matter of hidden epistemic primitives in some ways parallels
the issue of presuppositions. This problem was highlighted in an ongoing discussion that
ensued between the author and members of a theology faculty.34 Several members of the
faculty stated that in the work of exegesis (reading out of a text what it says, as opposed to
eisegesis - reading into a text what it does not say), a skilled exegete could arrive at the
truth or truths of what the text taught. This author's contention was that presuppositions
determined how one was going to read and interpret the text. Accordingly, when working
in a logical pattern, if an individual adopted presupposition 1 they would come to answer
1. However, if that person began with presupposition 2, 3, 4, and so on, then they would
arrive at answers 2, 3 or 4, depending on the presupposition(s) they chose. In these
individual are all dehumanizing. Furthermore, to break the will, to conform the ideas and the personality, to
control and rescue rather than facilitate persons is to dehumanize.
30
Laura, “To Educate,” 45.
Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957). See also
Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken and Stanley Schachter, When Prophecy Fails (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1956).
31
The information in this paragraph comes from many discussions with Prof. Laura at the University of
Newcastle, Australia (1997 - 2003).
32
33
Ronald S. Laura and Matthew C. Cotton, Empathetic Education (London: Falmer Press, 1999), 77-101 passim.
An illustration will clarify what is meant by epistemic primitives. For example, suppose that in the conception
of the human body it is always understood as a single, unitary body, we would never accept any evidence that
tended to suggest a multiplicity of human bodies within the body. Our unitary hidden epistemic primitive
would cause us either to reject the evidence or to modify it to fit with our epistemic primitive. Our unitary
conceptualization acting as a hidden epistemic primitive would determine the outcome. One should not read
the above illustration as a scientific fact, what we are drawing attention to is the issue of hidden primitives we are speaking in the realm of connotation, not denotation. What we are beginning to become aware of is the
underlying subjectivity of all human activity and reflection. It is also important to note that hidden epistemic
primitives are believed to be present in all thought processes.
These discussions took place at various times during the four years that the author was a lecturer in a
tertiary theology faculty, teaching Old Testament and Hebrew language.
34
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situations, exegesis builds a neat bridge between the presupposition and the conclusion
arrived at.
Exegesis is not a tool to define truth. Instead, it is a tool to keep a semblance of
logical flow in the narrative that lies between presupposition, text, interpreter, and
meaning. Often these presuppositions, and also epistemic primitives, are not perceived or
known by either the presenter or the receiver of propositions. For example, the
assumption that, for the sake of science, the future resembles the past is an epistemic
primitive. It has no way of being verified.35 Laura and Cotton suggest, “there comes a point
in our chain of reasoning at which one finds propositions for which no further grounds can
be supplied beyond the data which they are supposed to monitor.”36 Hence, it is necessary
that the reader should remain aware of the problem of hidden presuppositions and
epistemic primitives, and the accompanying potential for invalid conclusions to be drawn.
Presuppositions and epistemic primitives are a precondition for suppositionality. No
person ever comes to an issue or problem without previous experience that in some way
colours the outcome(s). It is very easy to forget, or not even be consciously aware of,
previous history that includes both nature and nurture. For example, behind the context in
which this essay is being written - contemporary Western culture - lies a long history.
Events such as the Renaissance; the Reformation; the Industrial Revolution with its
economic, agrarian and mechanical changes; the American and French Revolutions; the
Enlightenment, and many other happenings have each influenced the way present-day
individuals live, act, think, and feel. Each person, therefore, comes to their own
understandings guided by many hidden principles that have not been brought to the full
clarity of awareness. One has only to go and live for a prolonged period of time with
another culture to see just how different these ways of thinking are. The author lived for
almost twelve years in Papua New Guinea.
Often, he was surprised by the way presuppositions and hidden epistemic
primitives, for both the New Guineans and for himself, evoked a wide and diverse range of
differences in perceptions and perspectives on life.37
Today’s world is scientifically focused, and often individuals are unwittingly trapped
by the hidden presuppositions and epistemic primitives that tend to drive outcomes. The
hypothesis testing approaches of empiricism and tendencies towards reductionism are
unconsciously imbibed, without even a thought as to validity, essence or purpose. Anthony
O'Hear maintains that it is probably an impossible task to clearly define all personal
R.S. Laura and M. Leahy, in the “The Fourth Dimension of Space: A Meeting Place for Science and Religion,”
Journal of Christian Education 91 (April 1988): 5-17 argue that science does not even conform to its own
standards of acceptability. In support of the charge they ask us to consider the following examples: “(1) that
the world exists; (2) that nature behaves in a sufficiently uniform way to make possible an account of its
behaviour; (3) that our senses provide us with a reliable picture of the world.” (Quote from p. 10.) Example
one should be either a tautology or question-begging. It is neither. Question two is an assumption that allows
science to function, but is not capable of proof. Question three reveals that any test to validate the question
would require our senses to test it. Science is not as value free as sometimes we in the modern West have been
led to believe!
35
36
Laura and Cotton, Empathetic Education, 87.
For example, non-Westernized New Guineans tended to look back to the ancestors while Westerners tended
to look forwards to the future and accompanying progress. New Guineans sought to work as a community that
was consensus based, while Westerners were much more individualistic. New Guineans were event oriented,
and did things when it seemed to be auspicious, while Westerners were much more time driven clock
watchers. New Guineans operated in an honour/shame/shameless continuum, while Westerners seemed
much more guilt laden. New Guineans tended to care for their environment much more than did the
Westerners that drove bulldozers through the forest. These differences made for totally different
understandings of life, death, valor and existence.
37
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presuppositions: “In any case, we cannot highlight and invite criticism of all our
presuppositions in any area, because, as with the constancy of length before Einstein, until
they come under fire we may not realize just what our presuppositions are and in what it
is our pupils have to be warned may be untrue.”38
O’Hear also suggests that the real danger of indoctrination does not necessarily
happen when there is a wide range of concepts and ideas held such as in the realm of
religion and morality. “The dangers of indoctrination are perhaps rather more insidious
and subtle in areas where there is a general consensus as to the leading theory or
viewpoint at any time, but where the theory or viewpoint is not likely to be regarded as
satisfactory for ever.”39 He argues for the presentation of ideas, and then the questioning
or substantiation of them at a later time. To illustrate, very young children may not
possess the knowledge nor have the ability to reason in adult ways, but as they grow
older, ideas presented when they are young may resurface and undergo critical
examination.40 In reality, the propositions of Laura and Cotton support and extend
O'Hear’s arguments that there are many hidden aspects of which individuals may or may
not be aware. Dogmatism and indoctrination are much easier to recognize with the value
of hindsight, but that these aspects may be hidden does not invalidate claims for
transparency with regard to presuppositions. Often, in the realm of the present, a person
stands too close to see the forces that actually drive and control what transpires, and
hence the need for ongoing reflection.
SUBSEQUENT COROLLARIES
It is of note that the structures and processes of much of contemporary education
advantage students from the socio-economic middle-class. O'Hear comments, “Middleclass children, being far more used to rigid divisions and categories and abstract concepts,
thus have a hidden subsidy before schooling starts; while those whose lives are dominated
by the fluid and common-sense attitudes of folk knowledge are at a definite
disadvantage.”41 This is particularly evident in the differences that exist between children
raised in individualistic societies and those children raised in communal environments.42
When children from both groups are offered educational situations of equal opportunity,
the methodological approaches used do not always have universal appeal or functionality.
It could be argued that these approaches are not indoctrination, but in a sense represent
the luck of the draw. However, methods that are slanted towards only one direction of the
cultural and class continuum tend to indoctrinate anyone who does not naturally fit the
window of presentation chosen, and further, these same methods also reinforce the
indoctrination of those who have already been so orientated by their early family and
cultural experiences.
In educatory processes, it is impossible for any single presentation to cover in-depth
the whole range of knowledge within that particular curriculum domain. The content of
each presentation always remains subjective and dependent on the choice of the educator.
This situation would appear to be acceptable as long as the intent and purpose of that
Anthony O'Hear, Education, Society and Human Nature: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 91.
38
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid, 124.
41
Ibid, 21.
42
Ibid.
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choice is not to unduly influence or bias the outcome of the educational process.
Furthermore, if a clear intention is declared in the presentation ‘up front’, the student now
is given the right of choice and the situation is potentially removed from the realm of
indoctrination. However, this state of affairs needs to be balanced by the view that the
choice should remain within the boundaries of appropriate educational parameters.
Richard H. Gatchel presents the point of view that:
In present discussions of indoctrination in the context of enculturation, however, the
term appears as a controversial educational method which, depending upon the
definition of the word and the educational philosophy of the educators, is either
desirable or not. Contemporary discussions of indoctrination in terms of desirability or
undesirability seem to fall short of the central issue, which, to the mind of the present
writer, concerns the rightful place - let alone particular orientations - of indoctrination
as part of the enculturative process in a pluralistic society.43
Yet if the intent of the individual teacher or the institution is to bring about certain
methods and certain content by authoritarian control, then whatever is taught falls within
the realm of indoctrination.
On further reflection, the intention issue does point out some of the dehumanising
aspects of indoctrination,44 and it has also been argued that despite an apparent openness
of attitude, it is still possible to be trapped by aspects of the scientific rationalism of
present times. Laura maintains:
It is one thing to fashion theories on the value of an open mind; it is quite another to
become aware that what we are calling an open mind is itself conditioned by a form of
scientific rationalism that has by its very nature closed our minds on open issues. The
educator who believes that indoctrination is avoided simply by ensuring that children
can question everything they have been taught makes the mistake of assuming that the
tools of enquiry are themselves free of ideological bias and insularity.45
The approach described above makes a case for an epistemological context of critical
theory “in which the presuppositional dimension of conceptual analysis can be made
transparent.”46 It is impossible for any point of view, idea, concept or piece of information
to be totally value-free. The collection of data, the use of data, the rejection or acceptance
of data, is at least to some extent predetermined by a wide range of factors including
presuppositions as well as models of thought and logic. Although the Enlightenment
established pathways for the creative flow of thought, Laura asserts “that [because] we
tend to think indoctrination is a dead issue is itself a measure of the extent to which we
have been blinded by the light - little wonder if in our search for illumination we continue
to persist in shining the torch in our own eyes.”47
The theoretical concept of indoctrination has been well-described in a book edited
by I.A. Snook.48 In this book, W. H. Kilpatrick asserts, “Indoctrination, however, is
fundamentally and essentially undemocratic. It intends to anticipate choice. It inherently
uses the individual as a means to an end, and this danger is present wherever any type of
authoritarianism prevails.”49 In this context, Kilpatrick, Dewey and Bode drew a useful
Richard H. Gatchel in I.A. Snook, Concepts of Indoctrination: Philosophical Essays (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1972), 15.
44 For description of dehumanisation, refer to footnote 29 of the present chapter.
43
45
Laura, “To Educate,” 54.
46
Ibid, 55.
47
Ibid.
48
Snook, Concepts of Indoctrination.
49
Quoting Richard H. Gatchel, “The Evolution of the Concept,” in Snook, Concepts of Indoctrination, 13.
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distinction between “planned” and “planning” societies. Planned societies uncritically
impose ideas, methods, and concepts, whilst planning societies remain open for discussion
and negotiation.50
John Wilson sought to distinguish between three concepts, those of conditioning,
force, and indoctrination. Conditioning fits within the psychological realm, and has an
important part to play in the way humans function, learn and behave. With force, the will
is over-ridden. This concept is different from indoctrination because, if a person is made to
do something against their will, they have not necessarily been indoctrinated, only
coerced. However, indoctrination is always an intentional activity.51 It is also clear that
there should be a distinction between instruction and indoctrination. According to T.F.
Green, “it takes no great powers of insight to see that in proportion as the conversation of
instruction is less and less characterized by argument, reasons, objections, explanations,
and so forth, in proportion as it is less and less directed toward an apprehension of truth,
it more and more closely resembles what we call indoctrination.”52
Further Problems of Indoctrination
Wilson suggests that in order to avoid indoctrination, the educator must also take into
consideration the following factors:
1) “He must realize his own lack of freedom as an educator. He must appreciate
the extent to which education is dominated by factors which have little to do
with rationality.”53 Issues such as parental pressures, national demands,
popular opinions and local prejudices are therefore part of the educational
establishment.54
2) “He must appreciate the general ways in which his society is irrational and
hence repressive.”55 The power-seeking and status-seeking sociological
aspects of modern Western society mean that it is often impossible to arrive
at a clear statement or position. Hence, there is a degree to which society
and the educational establishment is “incapable of honesty.”56
3) “He must be realistic about the methods of changing society.”57 Even if a
person presents a viewpoint that is perceived as ideal, and that person in
themselves is somehow regarded as outside of the generally acceptable,
often he/she is rejected, no matter how good the idea(s).
Clearly then, within the context of education, the problem of indoctrination is not simply
one of just making a decision, be that decision of an educational, or philosophical, or
principled, or value-laden, nature. Neither is the problem one of only dealing with
methods, contents, or aims and intentions. The primary issue is to move towards a
position of openness and non-indoctrination within societal and educational
environments. However, this shift should be undertaken with a certain degree of prudence
and caution. The best intentions in the world will not work, if the outcome of that intent
50
Gatchel, “Evolution,” p. 14.
51
52
John Wilson, “Indoctrination and Rationality,” in Snook, Concepts of Indoctrination, 17-18.
T.F. Green, “Indoctrination and Beliefs,” in Snook, Concepts of Indoctrination, 25.
53
Wilson, “Education and Indoctrination,” 39-40.
54
Ibid, 40.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
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comes into conflict with the generally accepted way of doing things. At times, educators
may find themselves trapped between an obligation to serve the requirements of ‘the
establishment’, and presenting what they know to be true.58
Two Major Challenges
When investigating the question of indoctrination and its contexts, two key issues arise.
These can be described under the rubrics of critical evaluation and of creative aesthetics.
Critical evaluation is concerned with the excellence of the education being given.
The challenge it represents is to enhance in both the educator and in the student the
acumen to observe critically what is taking place, to find information and data in a wide
range of sources, and to soundly evaluate and to appropriately use that information. The
implication from this concept is that the investigator has not been deceived or duped by
any of the tools of indoctrination, including issues of method, content, and intent. Further,
at all times the investigator takes care to guard against any undue bias, and any perceived
influence, of indoctrinatory practices.
The challenge of creative aesthetics is to acknowledge the ability of educators and
students to take the information and data gained via the pathways of critical evaluation,
and then to use the information so gained to enable the development of creative and
aesthetic conclusions to be drawn. If no such developments take place, or can take place,
then the seeker after knowledge is trapped into repeating failures from the past – a
situation of educational stagnation.
It is only when the challenges of critical evaluation and creative aesthetics have been
met that true freedom and autonomy in education can be achieved. Terence Lovat states:
It is now close to a century since key works like those of Dewey (1902) provided some
of the early clues about the importance of freedom and autonomy as essential artefacts
of effective learning. Similarly, the highest stages of learning designated by the various
schemes of developmental theorists could be summarized as implying freedom and
autonomy. For Piaget (1959), the high point of intellectual maturity was marked by the
capacity for original thought. For Kohlberg (1963), the zenith of moral maturity was
marked by the capacity to make up one's own mind about ethical matters in order to
have the courage to stand by one's convictions. For Fowler (1981), the ultimate in faith
development (indeed, the only reality deserving the title 'faith' ) was similarly, marked
by freedom...59
He further adds:
the most important lesson of 100 years or so of research into education may well be
about the indispensability of learners being free to learn.60
58
Ibid, 44.
Terence Lovat, “The Ideological Challenge of the Public Syllabus in Religious Studies,” (paper, Education
Department Graduates' Seminar, University of Newcastle, 7 September 2000), 3. [This paper has now been
published as chapter one, in Maurice Ryan (ed.), Echo and Silence: Contemporary Issues for Australian Religious
Education (New Dehli: Social Science Press, 2001), 1-13.]
59
J. Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum and the School and Society (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1902) ; J.
Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959); L. Kohlberg “The
Development of Children's Orientation Toward Moral Order, 1: Sequence in the Development of Moral
Thought,” Vita Humana 6 (1963): 11-13; J. Fowler, Stages of Faith (Melbourne: Dove, 1981); L. Stenhouse, An
Introduction to Curriculum Research and Development (London: Heinemann, 1975) ; J. Habermas, Knowledge
and Human Interests (London: Heinemann, 1972); J. Habermas, Theory and Practice (London: Heinemann,
1974); M. Van Manen “Linking Ways of Knowing Ways with Ways of Being Practical,” Curriculum Inquiry 6
(1977): 205-228.
Lovat, “Ideological Challenge,” 3. See Terence Lovat, “A History and Critique of Critical Religious Education in
Catholic Schools,” in H. Raduntz (ed.), Potential and Opportunity: Critical Issues for Australian Catholic
60
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In this article, I have sought to set a platform upon which to rest appropriate and adequate
educational principles. This platform advocates educational rigor in terms of academic
excellence that remains open to new ideas and new challenges. I am aware that in seeking
to move away from the dogmatism of indoctrination, an individual can be caught in the
trap of apathy, or worse, of no clear point of view. It is equally possible that dogmatism is
present within the domains of fundamentalist and more liberal attitudes, because the
underlying defining principle of dogmatism is the reluctance, or inability, to perceive and
thoughtfully evaluate viewpoints different from one’s own.
Author: Dr Edmund Alfred Parker lectured in Biblical Studies, Biblical Languages, and the
Old and New Testament at St John’s Ministry Centre, Morpeth, NSW, in association with
Charles Sturt University during the years 1998-2005. His research interests include
theological education, general education, hermeneutics, and philosophy.
Email: [email protected]
Education into the 21st Century (Adelaide: Auslib Press, 1995), 177-189; and Terence Lovat “The Support Text
and Public Syllabus: A Case for Integrity,” Journal of Religious Education 48(2000): 33-37.
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