1
PASSAGES TO PAKISTAN: A TALE OF TWO SPEECHES1
Ms Madhavi Ligam
Associate to the Hon. Justice Pagone
Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia
[email protected]
As Pakistan undergoes yet another political rebirth, questions about the nature of its
future government loom on the minds of its leaders. While the focus has been on
Pakistan's immediate future, this has not deterred people from looking into its past.
Created after the partition of India on 15 August 1947, the events of partition and
independence continue to rouse the emotions of those who live today. They provide a
source of national pride and myth making. In June 2005, when Lal Krishna Advani
visited the Pakistani city of Karachi and resurrected this bitter, contentious past,
Karachi became the unwitting host of a political debate that divided Indian politics.
Born in Karachi in 1927, Advani migrated to India after partition and
eventually became the leader of the Bharata Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist
party which strives to revive and promote Hindu culture within India. In 1992, in
pursuance of these goals, Advani became embroiled in the Ayodhya temple crisis. He
1
th
This paper was presented to the 17 Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia
in Melbourne 1-3 July 2008. It has been peer reviewed via a double blind referee process and appears
on the Conference Proceedings Website by the permission of the author who retains copyright. This
paper may be downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and
other relevant legislation.
2
was said to have supported the destruction of a mosque which was believed to be built
on a Hindu holy site. The destruction triggered widespread rioting in Mumbai and
resulted in the death of thousands of people, but the BJP and other right-wing Hindu
parties stood by him. To them, Advani was a hero.
Entangled in this controversial past, and immersed in this culture of Hindu
pride, Advani visited his hometown of Karachi in June 2005. On 4 June he made a
seemingly innocent speech to the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, Economic
Affairs and Law. In this speech, he praised Mohammad Ali Jinnah, now known as the
father of Pakistan. As the leader of the All India Muslim League during the 1930s and
1940s, Jinnah fought to create a separate homeland for India's Muslims and became
Pakistan's first governor-general in August 1947. In his speech, Advani referred to a
speech given by Jinnah on 11 August 1947. He quoted Jinnah's speech and said:
What has been stated in this speech – namely, equality of all citizens in the eyes of the
State and freedom of faith for all citizens – is what we in India call a Secular or a NonTheocratic State. There is no place for bigotry, hatred, intolerance and discrimination
in the name of religion in such a State. And there can certainly be no place, much less
State protection, for religious extremism and terrorism in such a State.2
Advani also said that these ideas should guide those who now have control over the
modern, fragmented sub-continent.
A furore erupted across India. People protested on the streets, shouting
"Advani desh drohi hai" (Advani is anti-national).3 The Hindustan Times described
his speech as "unthinkable".4 Right-wing politicians demanded that Advani apologise
or resign as BJP leader. Why? According to the Hindu right, Jinnah is responsible for
the partition of India. Jinnah used the communal card to create a Muslim homeland,
and it is illogical to think that this homeland was supposed to be secular.
Advani eventually bowed to pressure and resigned as the BJP President in
December 2005. It is mystifying to think that his one speech in Pakistan – which
2
L.K. Advani, Speech At a Function Organised by the Karachi Council on Foreign Relation, Economic
Affairs and Law, at http://www.bjp.org/Press/june_0505.htm, accessed 25/07/06.
3
“Sangh Parivar Furious over Advani’s praise of Jinnah,” HindustanTimes.com, 5 June 2005, at
http://global.factiva.com.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/aa/default.aspx?, accessed 25/07/06.
4
“Advani Says Jinnah was a Secularist,” HindustanTimes.com, 4 June 2005, at
http://global.factiva.com.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/aa/default.aspx?, accessed 25/07/06.
3
ruined nothing and cost no lives – ended his career and made him the outcast of
Indian politics. One then has to wonder if Jinnah's speech received a similar response
in August 1947.
Like Advani, Jinnah was born in Karachi on 25 December 1886, and left the
city to pursue a political career. Unlike Advani, Jinnah began his career as the
ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity for he was simultaneously a member of the Indian
National Congress (INC) and the All India Muslim League (the League). The former
was a forum for upper and middle class people which later became a platform for the
Indian independence movement, while the latter was an organisation established to
safeguard Muslim interests. Jinnah grew disillusioned with Congress and took up
leadership of the League in 1936. At the Lahore Resolution of 1940, Jinnah insisted
that Hindus and Muslims belonged to two different civilizations and proposed that
India be partitioned to create a separate Muslim homeland called Pakistan. By 1947,
the British and Congress caved into the Pakistan demand, and 15 August 1947 was set
as the date for the transfer of power and the partition of India into India and Pakistan.
In preparation for the transfer of power, Jinnah returned to Karachi, his
hometown. Jinnah was to become Pakistan's first governor-general and so he
delivered a speech in the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. He spoke about
building a strong nation, law and order and on the issue of minorities, Jinnah said:
You are free, you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your
mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may
belong to any religion or caste or creed; that has nothing to do with the business of
the State… and you will find that in course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus
and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is
the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the
State.5
Here was Jinnah – the man who for almost a decade had pleaded that Hindus and
Muslims belonged to two different states – claiming that Hindus and Muslims could
in fact live peacefully co-exist. It was this very section of Jinnah's speech that Advani
5
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Address to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly,” 11 August 1947, in M.A.
Jinnah, Speeches As Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948, Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1963, p.
8.
4
quoted in his 2005 speech. But, unlike the reaction to Advani's speech, the reaction to
Jinnah's speech is barely audible.
The major newspapers of the time only recorded that Jinnah delivered the
speech and journalists found nothing curious about it.6 Jinnah's contemporaries also
paid no attention to the speech. In his numerous prayer meetings, Mahatma Gandhi
made no reference to the speech, which is surprising given his concern for minorities.7
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime-Minister and long time leader of the Congress
party, also left no opinion of Jinnah's speech.8 Viceroy Louis Mountbatten visited
Karachi just two days after Jinnah delivered his speech. In his personal report, he
made no mention of the speech.9 The speech cannot even be found in the Transfer of
Power documents.10
This is indeed a curious tale. Here we have two men who returned to their
home town of Karachi and delivered speeches which were very uncharacteristic of
them. The reactions to these speeches were also unexpected. In this paper, I firstly
hope to uncover why Jinnah's speech received a nonchalant response in 1947 and why
Advani's speech received quite the opposite response in 2005. Secondly, by analysing
Jinnah's August 1947 speech, together with his other speeches, can we determine if
Jinnah wished to create a secular or theocratic state?
Academic discussion of these issues is sparse. Various theories have been
advanced as to the meaning of Jinnah’s speech. One theory, as advanced by Akbar
Ahmed, is that the 11 August speech was simply an assurance to protect the
minorities and that ultimately, Jinnah did not want a secular Pakistan.11 The opposing
6
See for example, Times of India, 12-30 August 1947 and The Statesman, 12 -30 August 1947.
See for example, Mahatma Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vols. 89-90, Delhi:
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1983.
8
See for example, S. Gopal (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, vols. 3-4, New
Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1986; G. Parthasarathi (ed.), Letters to Chief Ministers 194764, vol. 1, Oxford: Distributed by Oxford University Press, 1985.
9
Louis Mountbatten, “Viceroy’s Personal Report No 17,” 16 August 1947, in Nicholas Mansergh (ed.
– in – chief), Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: the Transfer of Power, 1942-47, vol.
12, London: H.M.S.O, 1973, pp. 757-775.
10
Mansergh, The Transfer of Power, vol. 12.
7
11
Akbar S. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan, Islamic Identity: the Search for Saladin, London: Routledge,
1997, p. 177.
5
theory, as argued by Sailesh Bandopadhaya, is that the speech was a clear articulation
of Jinnah’s intention to create a secular Pakistan.12
These varying meanings or interpretations, though, are highly politicised. On
the Pakistani side are those who dismiss a secular interpretation of the speech because
they contend that Pakistan was created as an Islamic state. Even the Pakistani
government, at various times, adopted the enlightening policy of deleting sections of
the speech. On the Indian side are those who view Jinnah as an undevout Muslim who
used the communal card in his quest to attain power, and they are more likely to view
the speech in a secular light.13
Given Advani's re-interpretation of Jinnah's speech, there are plenty of reasons
to analyse this question from a new angle. Of the few writers who pay some attention
to the speech, none have examined the reactions of Jinnah's contemporaries to the
speech. This paper should provide a fresh analysis of Jinnah's understandings of
secularism and how Jinnah's vision continues to be reinvented to validate current
political structures.
Past and present presumptions
Today, people view the past through the lens of the present; they presume that
Pakistan's current ‘Islamisation’ is something that was always intended. This
presumption is often based on a highly politicized and teleological reading of history.
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that in Pakistan, Islamic traditions were
enshrined in state practices and institutions. Through his speech, Advani attempted to
rewrite this history. He softened Jinnah’s character and suggested that Jinnah’s
original vision should be remembered today. It is therefore understandable why such
controversy surrounds Advani’s speech: Advani had distorted the Hindu right’s firmly
held myths and creation stories. And, even more importantly, he supported the tainted
political ideology of secularism, an ideology which the BJP has sought to replace with
12
Sailesh Bandopadhaya, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan, New
Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1991, p. 335.
13
Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, London: Routledge,
2000, p. 13.
6
its Hindutva movement. Interestingly, the Hindu right backed Advani during the 1992
Ayodhya temple crisis because he was clearly pushing the Hindu revivalist agenda,
whereas in 2005, he was challenging fundamental historical presumptions held by his
followers.
But perhaps we have been too presumptuous. We have presumed that Pakistan
was always supposed to be an Islamic state to be governed by Islamic law. We have
presumed that the demand for a separate Muslim homeland was tantamount to a
demand for an Islamic state. But what if Jinnah simply wanted to create a secular,
democratic state with a Muslim majority? Perhaps Jinnah's contemporaries were
unfazed by his speech because they too envisaged a secular Pakistan. They did not
know that Pakistan would slowly succumb to the controlling influence of religion, and
the knowledge of the present cannot be ascribed to those who lived in the past.
Speaking in the Constituent Assembly Debates on 27 August 1947, Mahabir
Tyagi quoted Jinnah's 11 August speech and said:
It is very well known that his [Jinnah's] state is a Muhammadan State and they are
proud of its being Muhammadan and they proudly call it "Pakistan"; even in that
State he says religion will not be taken notice of by the State. Every individual will
be an individual and Hindus will lose their Hinduship as far as their political rights
and privileges are concerned.14
Tyagi was unsurprised and unmoved by Jinnah’s speech because it confirmed his
expectation that Pakistan would be a secular state. He held this belief even though
Pakistan was specifically created for Muslims, and ultimately believed that religious
preferences would not be taken notice of in the political sphere.
It is a common misconception that such notions of secularism were not
practiced or espoused in colonial India. Under Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1
November 1858, the crown pledged not to impose Christianity upon its subjects. This
proclamation also transformed the East India Company’s common practice of
religious neutrality into a binding undertaking that no-one would be favoured or
discriminated against on religious grounds.15 This tradition of religious neutrality
14
“Report on Minority Rights,” 27 August 1947, in Constituent Assembly India, Constituent Assembly
Debates: Official Report, vol. 5, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966, p. 219.
15
Donald Smith, India As a Secular State, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 72.
7
provided an antecedent to the non-communal aspirations of Congress.16 In 1931,
Congress, in a resolution on the rights of minorities, said "the state shall observe
neutrality in regard to all religions."17
Prominent members of Congress, though, had differing views on the role that
religion should have in the state. Thomas Pantham shows that Gandhi believed that
while religion and state should remain separate in some respects, there should not be
an absolute, "insurmountable wall of separation," between the two.18 As a socialist,
Nehru distrusted superstition and mysticism, and T.N. Madan even labels him an
agnostic.19 According to Nehru, religion and state were to remain separate as an
amalgamation of the two would be dangerous.20 Gandhi believed all religions to be
true, and thus the state had to accommodate all religions.21 Nehru believed most
religions to be untrue, but nevertheless wanted to provide for their freedom to
function peacefully.22 In this respect, at least, both men's notion of secularism
converges.
It is important to understand how Gandhi and Nehru delineated secularism
because while the historical record does not reveal their interpretations of Jinnah's
speech, it does provide an insight into the type of Pakistan they thought Jinnah
intended to create.
In a speech that Gandhi delivered on 29 August 1947, Gandhi said that in
India, religion was to remain purely a private matter and that people would be judged
on their merits, rather than their religious background.23 This was Gandhi’s vision of
the future India, and he “expected that what was true of the [Indian] Union was
equally true of Pakistan.”24 In November 1947, Gandhi said, “has not the Quaid-i16
Ibid, p. 88.
Ibid., p. 93.
18
Thomas Pantham, “Indian Secularism and Its Critics: Some Reflections,” The Review of Politics,
59(1997), pp. 523-540, p. 526.
19
T. N. Madan, “Secularism in Its Place,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 46(1987), pp. 747-759, p. 239.
20
Jawaharlal Nehru, “Dangerous Alliance of Religion and Politics,” April 3 1948, in Jawaharlal Nehru,
Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches 1946-1949, New York: John Day, 1950, p. 47.
21
Smith, India As, p. 154.
22
Ibid.
23
Mahatma Gandhi, “Speech at Prayer Meeting,” 29 August 1947, in Gandhi, The Collected Works,
vol. 89, p. 112.
24
Ibid.
17
8
Azam [Jinnah] proclaimed that Pakistan is not a theocratic State and religion would
not be imposed by law?”25 Gandhi made a clear distinction between secularism and
theocracy, and stressed that Pakistan would not resemble the latter type of
government. This presumption was based on Jinnah’s prior assurances.
Nehru also conveyed a belief that Pakistan would be a secular state. During a
speech made on 19 August 1947, Nehru insisted that India would not be a communal
state, but a democracy where everyone would enjoy equal rights.26 He went on to state
that “I have been assured by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan [prime-minister of Pakistan] that
this is also the policy of the Pakistan Government.”27 Thus, like Gandhi, Nehru also
believed that the Pakistani government would provide equal rights to its people. As
shown above, the idea of ensuring equal rights to citizens, regardless of their religious
background, was a fundamental element of Nehruvian secularism. His belief that such
rights would be ensured to Pakistanis suggests that he envisioned Pakistan to be a
secular state.
But, in September 1947, Gandhi lamented whether Jinnah and Liaquat Ali
Khan assured equal rights to minorities simply “to please world opinion.”28 In
November, Gandhi believed that Jinnah’s assurances were “not always put into
practice.”29 Finally, in December, Gandhi felt deeply betrayed that people had
dishonoured their promises that anyone could live in Pakistan.30 He felt that “what is
said is often not implemented.”31 Nehru was far more critical of Jinnah’s ability to
abide by his promises. In February 1948, Nehru felt that Jinnah was unable to fight
the “forces of reaction … and has been talking more and more of an Islamic State
based on the laws of the Shariat.”32
25
Mahatma Gandhi, “Speech at Prayer Meeting,” 4 November 1947,in Gandhi, The Collected Works,
vol. 89, p. 474.
26
Jawaharlal Nehru, “The Unhappy Land of the Five Rivers,” 19 August 1947, in Nehru, Independence
and After, p. 45.
27
Ibid.
28
Mahatma Gandhi, “Speech at Prayer Meeting,” 10 September 1947, in Gandhi, The Collected Works,
vol. 89, p. 168.
29
Mahatma Gandhi, “Speech at Prayer Meeting,” 4 November 1947, in Gandhi, The Collected Works,
vol. 90, p. 474.
30
Mahatma Gandhi, “Speech at Prayer Meeting,” 17 December 1947, in Gandhi, The Collected Works,
vol. 90, pp. 250-1.
31
Ibid.
32
Jawaharlal Nehru, Letter to Chief Ministers, 20 February 1948, in Parthasarathi, Letters to Chief, vol.
1, pp. 66-7.
9
Thus, the historical record reveals the fragments of a forgotten trend that did
not progress. In August 1947, when Jinnah delivered his speech, Gandhi and Nehru
thought that Pakistan would be a secular state, but by 1948, they doubted whether this
was achievable. Perhaps that is why they did not respond to Jinnah's speech; the
speech was simply a confirmation that Pakistan would be a secular state. This popular
trend of the times is often overlooked today. Conservatives in Pakistan and India
continue to presume that Pakistan was created as an Islamic state.
Jinnah’s grand plan
Were Jinnah's contemporaries correct in presuming that Jinnah intended to
create a secular state? Exactly what type of state did Jinnah intend to create?
Jinnah's 11 August 1947 speech provides a good starting point for answering
these questions. In his speech, Jinnah certainly gave no indication of wanting to create
an Islamic state or a theocratic state, but conversely, Jinnah did not use the word
'secular' in describing his vision of Pakistan. Despite this, I believe that the contents of
the speech conform with contemporary understandings of secularism.
Donald Smith identifies three fundamental elements of a secular state: it
guarantees freedom of religion; ensures citizenship rights regardless of religious
background and maintains a separation between state and religion.33 In his speech,
Jinnah guaranteed freedom of worship as he convincingly said Pakistanis are free to
go to temples and mosques. By proclaiming that "Hindus will cease to be Hindus and
Muslims will cease to be Muslims in the political sense as citizens of the state,"
Jinnah guaranteed equality of citizenship irrespective of religious background. Lastly,
in promising that religious matters would not be the business of the state, Jinnah was
doing more than simply ensuring freedom of religion. He was stressing that the state
would not interfere with religious matters, and conversely, that religious matters
would not intrude upon business of the state.
33
Smith, India As a, pp. 4-6.
10
Although I have these instinctive reactions to Jinnah's speech, I feel a little
uneasy arguing that Jinnah intended to create a secular Pakistan. I do not wish to
superimpose my westernised, twenty-first century definition of secularism into the
South Asian post-colonial period. Such a teleological reading of history is inconsistent
with the purpose or aim of this paper which is to uncover the type of state that Jinnah
intended to create. As difficult as it may be, I wish to examine this at the subjective
level, rather than at the objective level. That is, rather than asking does this appear to
be a secular speech or an Islamic speech – according to today's standards – I wish to
examine how Jinnah, in 1947, delineated secularism.
Two speeches which Jinnah delivered in February 1948 provide an insight into
what Jinnah deemed to be a theocracy. In his first speech, Jinnah said that East and
West Pakistan were united by their faith in God, and that:
We are members of the brotherhood of Islam in which all are equal in right, dignity
and self- respect. Consequently, we have a special and a very deep sense of unity.
But make no mistake: Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands
from us the tolerance of other creeds.34
In his second speech, Jinnah said:
Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State – to be ruled by priests with a divine
mission. We have many non-Muslims – Hindus, Christians, and Parses – but they are
all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens.35
Thus, Jinnah imagined a theocratic state as a state where the business of governing
was carried out by a particular religious group which was guided by an esoteric will.
Jinnah strongly opposed the imposition of such a theocratic state in Pakistan. He
feared that if this happened, people would be treated unequally and denied citizenship
rights.
In spite of the fears that he had of theocracies, Jinnah nevertheless admired the
former glory and benevolence of Islamic rule in India as it was "replete with those
34
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Pakistan and Her People - I,” 19 February 1948, in S. M. Burke (ed.),
Jinnah Speeches and Statements 1947-48, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 118.
35
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Pakistan and Her People – II,” February 1948, in Burke, Jinnah Speeches, p.
125.
11
humane and great principles which should be followed and practiced."36 This
benevolent period could be recreated in Pakistan through some sort of religious
renaissance. Pakistan would be different from India and any other country. According
to Jinnah's utopian vision, Pakistan would be "a bulwark of Islam"37 and one of the
greatest nations in Muslim history. If people put aside their differences and worked
together, then Pakistan would add "another chapter of glory"38 to this history.
Jinnah believed that Islamic rule was so successful because Islam "taught
democracy, equality, justice and fairplay," and it did not distinguish between races,
religions or sexes.39 Both Islam and democracy advocated the equality of mankind
and for this reason Jinnah believed that "Islamic principles today are as applicable to
life as they were 1,300 years ago."40 Jinnah urged Pakistanis to develop and maintain
Islamic democracy, Islamic social justice and equality.41 Ultimately, Jinnah wanted to
"lay the foundation of [Pakistani] democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and
principles.”42
This melding of religion and democracy does not fit into current metanarratives of secularism. Today, such an overt religious rhetoric is not a feature of a
secular state. This type of rhetoric is more characteristic of a non-secular state as it
voices the sentiments of a majority religious group. Also, when viewed from today's
objective lens, there appears to be a very weak separation between state and religion
because Jinnah wanted to use Islamic teachings to create his state. In today's mind,
there is much apprehension towards drawing on religious ethics to create law or a
system of government. It is perceived that this may entrench that particular religion
into the political system and thus threaten the rights and privileges of people
belonging to minority religious groups.
36
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Inauguration of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan,” 14 August 1947, in
Burke, Jinnah Speeches, p. 34.
37
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “The Tasks Ahead,” 30 October 1947, in Burke, Jinnah Speeches, p. 71.
38
Ibid.
39
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Islam Teaches Equality, Justice and Fairplay,” 25 January 1948, in Burke,
Jinnah Speeches, p. 97.
40
Ibid.
41
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Selfless Devotion to Duty,” 21 February 1948, in Burke, Jinnah Speeches,
p. 121.
42
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “New Era of Progress for Baluchistan,” 14 February 1947, in Burke, Jinnah
Speeches, p. 111.
12
But, examining the issue from Jinnah's point of view provides quite a different
answer. At an institutional level, Jinnah wished to maintain a strict separation between
state and religion. Equality, justice and fairplay were the guiding principles that he
wished to instil into the Pakistani government. These principles embodied the
principles of western style democracy, yet they also embodied the principles of a
1,300 year old religious tradition. And maybe this is how Jinnah envisioned a secular
Pakistan: a modern nation-state free from divine rule, but infused with universally
applicable Islamic ethics and values.
This notion of secularism makes more sense if we contextualise it within
twentieth-century Indian history. The devolution of British power within India posed
a threat to the minority Muslim population because judicial and political power would
be placed in Hindu hands. With Hindus comprising the majority of the Indian
population, it was perceived that the government would be overrun by self-interested
Hindus, and this in turn could adversely affect Muslim rights and culture. Although
the higher echelons of government were dominated by reasoned, rational men such as
Gandhi and Nehru, the streets were often ruled by Hindu fundamentalists. In the
words of R.J. Moore, through the Pakistan demand "Jinnah articulated not the Koran's
promise of political power nor memories of the Mughals but the Muslim's sense of
persecution at the sudden threat to all that he had achieved in the twentieth-century."43
Thus, Pakistan was needed to protect Muslim rights and interests. It would be a
Muslim homeland modelled on secular, Western style democracies.
Conclusion
The hushed reaction which followed Jinnah’s speech in 1947 can be
contrasted with the shock and anger that was incited by Advani's speech in 2005.
Sections of Indian and Pakistani society were outraged by Advani’s interpretation of
Jinnah’s speech because they presumed that Pakistan was created as a Muslim
homeland to be governed by Islamic law. But, the silence which met Jinnah’s speech
in August 1947 speaks volumes. His contemporaries were not surprised or puzzled by
43
R. J. Moore, “Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand,” in Modern Asian Studies, 17(1983), pp. 529-561, p.
559.
13
the speech because they presumed Jinnah would create a secular Pakistan, and his
speech was simply a confirmation of that.
Jinnah’s contemporaries were not wrong in holding such a presumption.
Jinnah certainly did not wish to create a theocratic Pakistan, but his idea of a secular
Pakistan may not accord with today’s definition of secular. Jinnah wished to create a
Muslim homeland based on universally applicable Islamic values which were very
similar, if not the same as, some democratic principles.
Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan has not come to fruition. In 1973, the Pakistani
Constitution was amended so that Pakistan was referred to as the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan. The Ahmadis (a religious group in Pakistan) were declared
non-Muslims, and in 1980, the Federal Shariat Court that was vested with the power
to examine any law and bring it into accordance with Shariat law. This religious
movement is not a phenomenon which is isolated to Pakistan. Indeed, some would
regard the BJP’s push to revive Hinduism in India as threatening India’s secular
beginnings.
Past and present understandings of secularism within India and Pakistan have
not remained static. Secularism continues to reshape itself and it continues to be met
with varying responses. Fundamentalists in both Pakistan and India repudiate it as a
political objective. For both groups, secularism presents a threat to their dreams of
building a Hindu or Islamic state; a state where their needs, rights and culture are
protected.
Sixty years after the partition of India, the past continues to bind both India
and Pakistan. The events of the past century will be used to validate and reject this
century's political institutions, national identities and national myths. Ultimately then,
this is a tale of Pakistan's passage from the secular to the religious.
14
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