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Informal Institutions and Democracy
Hans-Joachim Lautha
a
Assistant Professor at the Institut Fur Politikwissenschaft, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz
To cite this Article Lauth, Hans-Joachim(2000) 'Informal Institutions and Democracy', Democratization, 7: 4, 21 — 50
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Informal Institutions and Democracy
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HANS-JOACHIM LAUTH
Informal institutions have grown in relevance for the analysis of new 'third wave'
democracies. The research strategy receives its impetus from the debate on neoinstitutionalism theory, which offers a productive perspective for structuring the field
of analysis. This article explains the distinguishing factors between formal and
informal institutions. It addresses five basic types of informal institutions, examines
the ways in which they function and discusses their relevance in terms of democracy
theory. Each type is characterized by the way in which it enacts its respective means
of political influence. The study distinguishes between forms of specific relationship
(clientelism), of material exchange (corruption), of violent exertion of influence
(putsch threat), of civil resistance (civil disobedience) and of legal practice (custom
law), and discusses their relevance to democracy. The central argument maintains that
a differentiated study of informal institutions is crucial to addressing this question. The
necessary typological differentiation allows us to make an appropriate assessment one that does not manifest itself in a simple clear-cut choice of affirmative or negative
answers.
Introduction
'Do informal institutions matter?' In political science, this question is
becoming of increasing importance. At least since the comments made by
O'Donnell on 'informal rules', this theme has experienced growing interest
within democracy and political transformation research.1 If it had not been
for the turning point in institution theory, which within the framework of
neo-institutionalism widely influenced political science, this new research
direction could hardly be understood today. It is the understanding of
institutions involved in this turning point which makes a systematic
inclusion of informal patterns possible, and which goes beyond a purely
phenomenological approach to the subject. The main focus beyond the
perspective of democratic transformation and consolidation research is
directed at the relevance of informal institutions. Is their existence coherent
with democratic principles or do they collide with these, as O'Donnell
claims?2 The central argument as developed below argues that a
differentiated study of informal institutions is vital in order to answer this
Dr Hans-Joachim Lauth is Assistant Professor at the Institut Fur Politikwissenschaft, Johannes
Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz. He specializes in comparative politics.
Democratization, Vol.7, No.4, Winter 2000, pp.21-50
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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DEMOCRATIZATION
question. The necessary typological differentiation allows us to give an
appropriate answer, which (as will be shown) does not manifest itself
simply in terms of affirmative or negative answers.
The relevance of informal institutions becomes especially clear within
an inter-cultural comparison of democracies. The initial assumption,
namely that official political institutions function according to their own
formal rules and thus describe accurately the relevant forms of political
behaviour, is shown to be of insufficient scope. Already, as early as 1960,
Gabriel Almond, in his behaviourist-motivated system theory approach,
drew attention to the fact that it is vital to observe real-life processes.
However, in rejecting the traditional understanding of institutions, various
authors lost sight of the necessity of developing their own alternative
institutional model with which to classify findings. As a consequence, many
research efforts concentrated upon the analysis of formal institutions.3
However, this research direction is based on the plausible assumption of a
wide concurrence between actual individual behaviour and the behaviour
(role) expectations inherent within institutions (such as the most recent
extensive discussion of parliamentarism and presidentialism).4
Nevertheless, a problem arises when institutions are unable to guarantee the
order for which they were created, that is, when a discrepancy arises
between the behavioural norms of formal institutions and the actual
behaviour of individuals. Interest in this discrepancy grows especially when
empirically observed behaviour proceeds in an ordered fashion as opposed
to an anomic one. From this, the task arises of identifying these 'new' or
'different' order patterns, which hereinafter should be understood as
informal institutions.
This article focuses its attention upon three central questions: (1) what
are informal institutions? (2) To what extent can we identify them within the
political system and how do they function? (3) What effects do they have
upon the way in which democracy functions? To answer these questions, the
second section explains the basic understanding as presented here of
informal institutions within the framework of more recent institution theory
and discusses the relationships between them and formal institutions. The
third section deals with core types of informal institution seen as being
especially relevant to the democratic process and asks about their impact
upon democracy. The conceptualization of informal institutions as
suggested by this study is an attempt to narrow the institutional gap in the
comparative literature on the subject and thereby outlines a research
strategy for inter-cultural comparisons of democracy, a strategy which
systematically integrates formal as well as informal institutions.
The arguments presented employ the following underlying procedural
definition of democracy,5 which is used to evaluate the relevance of
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY
23
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informal institutions in terms of democracy theory: democracy is a form of
domination based on the rule of law, which makes possible, for all of the
citizens, self-determination in accordance with the notion of the sovereignty
of the people. This is achieved by securing the decisive participation of all
citizens in occupying the centres of political decision-making through free
(and thus competitive) and fair procedures (for example elections), as well
as securing the opportunities to continually exert influence upon the
political process and by generally guaranteeing control over political rulers.
In this way, democracy comprises three dimensions - political freedom,
political equality, and control.
Informal Institutions
We hardly need emphasize the central status of institutions within political
science analysis. However, attention should be drawn to differing
understandings of institutions, themselves based on two different traditions.
In classical political science analysis,6 institutions are widely understood as
controlling, organized organs of state, often extended by the inclusion of
intermediary organizations and of fundamental, formal norms and
principles of political processes (constitution). In contrast, neoinstitutionalist thinking orients itself towards research traditions which
understand institutions as norm patterns which shape behaviour, and which
in turn structure societal action and enhance the security with which citizens
can expect reciprocal behaviour from fellow citizens.7 In this way, Douglass
North defines institutions as 'game rules of a society or ... the limitations of
human interaction as conceived by people'. 8 Analogous to the
understanding of game rules and players, he strictly distinguishes
institutions from organizations. The understanding of institutions as held by
Guillermo O'Donnell takes up this viewpoint: 'By an institution I mean a
regularised pattern of interaction that is known, practised, and accepted (if
not necessarily approved) by actors who expect to continue interacting
under the rules sanctioned and backed by that pattern.'9
It is possible to distinguish between three various schools of neoinstitutionalist thought, the outlines of which have been accurately worked
out by Hall and Taylor.10 Although these schools, namely those of historical
institutionalism, of rational choice institutionalism and of sociological or
cultural institutionalism, developed for the most part separately, and
notwithstanding their different emphases in their mainstream variants, they
possess a common base which should not be underestimated. Thus 'they
share a great deal of common analytical ground on which the insights of one
approach might be used to supplement or strengthen those of another'." The
following arguments operate around this common foundation and are open
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DEMOCRATIZATION
to each one of the three schools. To follow the argument of Hall and Taylor,
however, the most extensive synergetic effects are to be expected in the
combination of rational choice approaches and sociologically as well as
culturally oriented institutionalism.
The understanding of institutions as represented here is closely linked
with the considerations of more recent institution theory; however, it takes
on the institution concept of older political science tradition and with it the
idea of a norm which is to be striven for. In this way, such rules or norms
can be understood as institutions, although in reality they are of little effect
and, in neo-institutional terms, remain to be institutionalized. In order to be
able to observe all formal rules as institutions, this extension makes sense.
Formal institutions are openly codified. Thus, regulations are included
which have the status of constitutional clauses and laws, but also standing
orders and norms actionable at law. Whilst formal institutions are
guaranteed by state agencies and their disapproval is sanctioned by that
state, informal institutions are based solely on the fact of their existence and
of their effectiveness. The power of sanction involved with them is linked
largely to social mechanisms of exclusion, or is based quite simply on the
condition that its non-utilization minimizes the chances of gaining access to
goods and services. Informal institutions are equally known and
recognizable publicly; however, they are not laid down in writing.
The authority of these institutions is based on various sources. First of
all, and according to institution and context, they receive a diverging degree
of social acceptance which lends them a basic measure of legitimacy. One
fundamental element of this acceptance (which simultaneously is an
essential motive for entry into social patterns shaped by institutions) results
from the purposes they envisage, which can be defined either narrowly or
widely. The way in which institutions function continues to make
interaction between individuals and groups easier, by creating known and
accepted behavioural structures which furthermore cannot be changed by
any individual. Even if an actor does not wish to accept them, he or she
obeys by them, as in accordance with rational calculation; the costs
involved in rejecting them can only be offset when real behavioural
alternatives are available. Change within .such traditionally driven
institutions turns out, however, to be an extremely lengthy process, as they
are internalized by the participating actors and reproduce themselves by
shaping future behavioural expectations.12
In contrast to formal institutions which receive their legitimacy through
the state (and in the case of a democracy through the sovereignty of the
people), informal institutions are based on auto-licensing (that is, selfenactment and subsequent self-assertion). Whilst the nature of formal
institutions can be shaped and changed by actors with rule-making
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13
authority, this is not the case with informal institutions, as these develop,
so to speak, indigenously. They do not possess a centre which directs and
co-ordinates their actions. If their actual recognition lapses, so does their
existence with it, whereas ineffectual formal institutions continue to be in
demand and, in form at least, to exist. Despite their unofficial nature,
informal institutions can be precisely understood and described at the
analytical level, as they manifest their own functioning logics and rules of
identity, which distinguishes them from others.14 Zintl offers a
complementary viewpoint: 'We are dealing with systems which have a clear
difference between the internal and external perception of actors as well as
in terms of the type and density of interactions, not simply with statistical
aggregates.'15
These systems derive their status as political institutions from their
reference to binding decisions, themselves guaranteed by the legally
constituted state monopoly on power. Informal institutions either compete
with the state's claim to binding decisions, by striving to establish parallel
areas of competence, or (and this is by far the more usual case) by
influencing the way in which the state reaches its decisions. Political
participation (according to Kaase's definition)16 serves as an essential
defining characteristic of political status. With informal institutions of
political participation (IIPP), well-established behavioural structures and
patterns are conceptualized, by means of which the attempt is made to
influence the political decision-making process - without them officially
being destined for this purpose. In doing so, influence can take its effect in
various phases of the decision path, even including the implementation
phase, during which the attempt is made to hinder or at least modify the
administrative 'enactment' of the decision (an example is seeking reduced
payment of taxes by exerting influence upon the appropriate authority).
Thus the addressees of informal participation are political decision-makers
and those state agencies entrusted with their implementation, in other words
the executive in the broader sense of the term. Modes and logic of informal
influence differ according to the individual institutional type of
participation.
In democracies, formal and informal institutions can have different
relationships to each other. It is possible to distinguish between three types
of relationship: the complementary type, in which they co-exist side by side
and mutually reinforce and support each other; secondly, the substitutive
type, in which either formal or informal institutions are effective in the
sense of being functionally equivalent to each other; finally, the conflicting
type, when the two systems of rules are incompatible. In cases of conflict,
formal and informal institutions can displace each other or, in terms of their
way of working, they can be interconnected to the extent that the
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DEMOCRATIZATION
functioning logic of formal institutions becomes interfered with. Whilst
displacement can be achieved through different strategies and has the
elimination or occupation of formal institutions as its aim, interconnection
demands a precarious coexistence on the part of both. The reason for this is
that informal institutions are dependent upon the existence of formal
institutions. They live, as it were, at the expense of the former, by exploiting
them for their own purposes, by either partially occupying or penetrating
them. In this sense they are parasitic institutions which, for example, find
their expression in corruption. Such institutions, which should be
understood, so to speak, as 'penetrating' environments,17 evade to a
considerable degree any quantitatively oriented empirical analysis. This is
because they do not change the form of formal institutions and 'shy away
from publicity' themselves. At the same time, however, their relevance is
not to be underestimated, as they are capable of exerting quite considerable
pressure upon the way in which formal institutions function.
Informal institutions can influence formal possibilities of participating
in two ways. For one, they influence formal political participation by
shaping modes of behaviour and attitudes at a stage prior to political
participation as well as defining the risks and opportunities of action
options. Thus in the shaping of the corridor of action, they function, so to
speak, as a constraining force and as a resource. Beyond this, through the
character of individual preferences and behavioural dispositions, they
influence which paths within the corridor of action are taken, or in other
words, they have a direct impact upon political participation. For another,
they make available additional channels of influence for political
participation beyond formal institutions. This does not automatically mean
an extension of democratic participation. The specific forms of
participation, as shaped by informal institutions, can also lead to the
limitation and relativization of existing democratic participation.
From here on the inquiry addresses five forms of IIPP, examines the
ways in which they function and discusses their relevance in terms of
democracy theory. The underlying choice for this typology is indeed
selective. Nevertheless, it demands, first of all, an appropriate selection of
the different variants of informal institution and, secondly, the inclusion of
central forms of informal institution, which figure in many case studies on
transformation processes of the 'third wave' of democratization; although
up to now they have received hardly any conceptual consideration.18 Such
forms of informal institution have always been the subject of greater
scrutiny in sociological and social anthropological studies, which of course
only address the political science perspective in a limited way. As basic
types of IIPP, each of which are characterized conclusively by the way in
which each enacts its respective means of influence, the following will
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY
27
distinguish between forms of specific relationship (clientelism), of material
exchange (corruption), of violent exertion of influence (putsch threat), of
civil resistance (civil disobedience) and of legal practice (custom law), and
will discuss their relevance to democracy.
Types of Informal Institutions of Political Participation
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Clientelism
Clientelistic structures characterize numerous states of the third
transformation wave. The concept of clientelism unites such forms of
interaction which result from a specific, personally stratified relationship,
and which are bound to fixed roles and dominance structures. Manfred G.
Schmidt understands clientelism as a 'specialist term for forms of protective
relationship of mutual benefit between a person or persons occupying a
higher place in the social hierarchy (patron) and a following concerned with
protection and the acquisition of certain advantages (clients)'.19 Clientelistic
structures are based upon a relationship of exchange, which justifies our
understanding of them as forms of participation, even when the personal
connections are asymmetrically structured. On the one side, there is the
patron, who controls the relationship, and on the other there are the clients
who accept the authority of the former.
On the one hand, and owing to their composition of individual actors,
clientelistic relationships are of only limited duration. On the other, they are
extremely stable in terms of their institutional form, because, as a rule, they
are the expression of traditionally acquired norm orientations which are
integrated within comprehensive culture horizons. At the same time, they
represent for those concerned an appropriate and rational form of reaction to
existing uncertainties. They are based on a relationship of trust, which,
however, is particularist and not universal in structure. The mutual loyalty
refers to the hierarchically unequal patron-client group relationship and does
not extend to those relationships (also existing within the overall network)
between individual clients. Entry into a clientelistic structure is only in a
limited way voluntary. Partially, it is determined by birth and, partially, it is
based on the necessity to gain access to essential goods. The voluntary nature
of a withdrawal from the relationship is also limited and often entails certain
costs.
Clientelism cannot be understood adequately if sufficient attention is not
paid to its differing variants, which in particular receive special attention as
central themes in social anthropological and sociological literature. One can
differentiate between four clientelistic forms using two criteria which result
from the observation of political participation. On the one hand, these forms
differ when it comes to determining the centre of a particular patron-client
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relationship. Client systems, in which the patron or its centre of dominance
is located within the social domain are to be separated from those whose
centres of dominance are located within the political system. On the other
hand, political participation takes place directly or indirectly.
With the help of these two criteria, four sub-types can be identified (see
matrix below), which can be briefly termed as follows: (I) kinship (II) mafia
(III) autocratic cliques and client parties and (IV) nepotism. Each of these
forms possesses its own recognizable and specific functioning logic, which
in each case is combined with clearly defined role expectations.
TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION MATRIX: FORMS OF CLIENTELISM
Centre of dominance/
Influence upon political system
Social system
State system
Indirect
Type I
Kinship
Type IV
Nepotism / Patronage
Direct
Type II
Mafia
(I)
Type III
(a) autocratic cliques
(b) clientelistic parties
The 'kinship' category contains all clientelistically influenced
structures of interaction and communication as found in the social
domain. These are based upon relational relationships as well as upon
ethnic communities. They have common survival and welfare
interests, which are embedded in the context of the preservation of
clearly defined status relationships. These clientelistic characteristics
separate them from other groups or sub-societies.20 The network of
interactions with state actors is only weakly developed and political
participation is only affected indirectly. Kinship structures are
common in less developed countries. They reflect the traditional
patterns of societal organization as well as the limited performance of
the state in protecting individual rights.
(II) The 'mafia' category includes those structures of interaction which
seek to exert direct influence upon political decisions and whose
centre of dominance is also located within the social domain. These
strive to manipulate not only the way in which decisions are reached,
but also their implementation, with the aim of satisfying particularist
interests. Even when relationships do not necessarily have to be based
on kinship, they are usually binding. As it is with those structures
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which are based upon kinship, opting out of these functionally
sophisticated networks becomes extremely difficult. In contrast to
kinship, such networks do not openly make themselves recognizable.
The existence of mafia-type structures is due in part to poor social
conditions regarding the recruitment of clients, but is mainly a result
of the possibility to receive very high profits.
(III) Within the domain of state-dominated participation, we must
differentiate between two further patterns: 'autocratic cliques' and
'clientelistic parties'. In the former, the participation function is
strictly limited. In order to maintain political support, it is applied
mainly through the steering function of the hierarchy, with which the
leadership of the clique aims to safeguard its particularist interests. An
example is the 'old school tie' networks which are held over from
Communist Party rule and pervade the new prevailing structures. By
comparison, the openness of the second variant, that of clientelistic
parties, towards participation (which is to be found, for example, in
African countries), is greater.21 This is not least due to the fact that
various clientelistic systems compete against each other and that the
client-patron relationships remain relatively variable. Nevertheless,
most patrons come from the political 'establishment'.
(IV) 'Nepotism' or 'patronage' characterizes an indirect mechanism, which
equally has its origins in the state domain. In this case, it is not so
much a matter of influencing the political decision-making process,
but rather one of a special 'use' of formal institutions in the area of
implementation. These are networks which extend from the sphere of
bureaucracy into societal domains and which then mutually 'look
after' their material interests. They are limited in terms of their range
and intensity, benefiting from political majorities which remain the
same over many years. Analogous to type III, their anchoring within
the state domain does not imply that the structures of communication
are not also open to participative interests stemming from the societal
domain. In every case, asymmetrical, vertically structured
communication remains a central characteristic of clientelistic
relationships, which guarantees the participating actors different
opportunities to exert their influence.
In the narrower sense, only types II and III qualify as informal institutions
of political participation, whilst types I and IV only affect political
participation and the functioning of democracy indirectly. Due to the
different ways of functioning, it is not surprising that the relevance of each
type to democracy diverges from the other. At this point it is necessary to
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DEMOCRATIZATION
differentiate between the ways in which direct and indirect influence have
their effect. In the case of indirect influence (especially with kinship), the
intent is not to change the political decision-making process. This does not
mean, however, that as a consequence of types I and IV no modifications to
the style of political participation can result.
In this way, clientelistic structures can promote particularist attitudes
and perceptions, which are then reflected in formal participative behaviour.
In the same way, it should not be ruled put that patterns of authority and of
paternalist orientations (which are practised daily in kinship-based clans)
translate into political behaviour. Thus values and attitudes in the domain of
political culture are supported, which can come into conflict with
universally constituted fundamental values of democracy, such as freedom
and equality. At the same time, however, the possibility exists of the
particularist-aligned patterns of trust (which in the case of kinship are based
upon practised solidarity and a sense of responsibility towards the common
good within the context of one's own peer group) being able to be extended
to abstract, universal references. This can occur either whilst they manifest
themselves as being a subsidiary ferment or when they transform into these.
A transformation of particularist orientations into abstract ones would make
accessible an important precondition for political trust in institutions (with
regard to formal rules), which is essential in a democracy.22 However, such
a transfer would have to proceed with a loss of importance for clientelistic
structures, as otherwise two competing value orientations, both claiming
dominance, would be present. This constellation cannot be excluded,
however, because the stability of particularist institutions should not be
underestimated. If, however, they are in a subsidiary relationship to abstract
orientations, or if their relevance in relation to universal claims for
recognition diminishes, then particularist orientations by contrast are
understood as being compatible with democracy. The civic culture concept
demonstrates this.
More problematic than the damage which would be caused by the valuebased tension illustrated, would be the establishment of clientelistic
institutions at the societal level, which compete against state institutions.
This is the case when kinship structures take on tasks and powers analogous
to those of the state (for example, in the administration of justice and in
criminal prosecution).23 Such a configuration corresponds to a weak state
with strong regional and local powers, the two latter tiers benefiting from
the competition for state authority. The situation eases when the underlying
norm orientations are mutually compatible and the supreme power of the
state and its authority as last instance are accepted, or if the tasks have been
divided up in mutual agreement. It is not eased, however, if a significant
loss of state authority is entailed and thereby a vital element of democracy
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INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY
31
undermined. Preliminary empirical findings seem to indicate that such
developments tend to be the exception and that, on the contrary, clientelistic
structures are frequently situated below the level of state structures, and
which thus have hardly to compete with these. If these findings are
confirmed, then political participation and the functioning of democracy are
affected slightly by indirect influence as understood in type I; however, the
negative effects of this are limited.
Indirect, unintended effect mechanisms, however, are also linked to
nepotism and patronage (type IV), which express themselves, among other
things, in the aforementioned split loyalties and particularist value
orientations. Seen from the life-world perspective, however, the latter of
these do not occupy such a central role as they do with kinship, and for this
reason, are able to correspond to universally confirmed standpoints. Whilst
not appearing as problematic in this respect from the democracy theory
perspective, in terms of sub-type I they do have a disadvantage in another
respect. Those values which are held to be important for the formation of
social capital, such as solidarity, trust and a sense of community (which in
the case of kinship are at the very least developed along group-specific
lines), play a minor role in the case of nepotism and patronage. By
comparison, potential democracy-detrimental effects are far less
pronounced than they are in the case of autocratic cliques, as the formal
institutions are not exploited in terms of decision control (itself highly
sensitive in terms of democracy theory), but simply the bureaucratic
execution of the officially made decisions - which are not questioned
themselves - is manipulated. If the size of those patterns are not too large,
this entails limited additional costs for effective, democratic selfdetermination, whilst either unsuitable persons are entrusted with certain
tasks or favourable bids tendered are not made use of. Once such a network
is established, however, manipulations of decisions cannot be ruled out
completely. In such a case, however, a development in the direction of
autocratic cliques is set in motion.
The direct influence of mafia (type II), develops into something much
more burdening for democracy. The existence of a 'powerful' mafia has
considerable influence within the democratic process. This does not
automatically or necessarily mean the manipulation of the polling process
itself, but rather that it simply has its roots in the partial occupation or direct
undermining of state authorities. Decision-making personnel are affected,
as well as holders of administrative office charged with the task of
implementation. The formal decision-making process (namely the course of
events according to procedural rules laid down in laws and standing orders
of legislative and executive organs of state) becomes disrupted when the
transfer of preferences, as effected through the elections, is illegally
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DEMOCRATIZATION
distorted and hindered, and thereby the element of equality, as well as that
of liberty, of an otherwise effective act of self-determination becomes
violated. The mafia-type relationship can be upheld through the use of
incentives (see corruption) or violence, or often both. The process of formal
decision-making becomes undermined from within, as the decision is made
in the interests of those interests penetrating the process informally. Even
when only a few areas of policy are affected by such penetration,
democracy, none the less, is severely weakened. In extreme cases,
democratic legitimacy is lost altogether if the central organs of state are
occupied in favour of particularist interests and the formal institutions
continue to exist merely as a facade. The groups mostly favoured by mafiatype structures are collaborators inside the state apparatus as well as
(mainly) the mafia organization itself, first the patron ('godfather'), but also
the clients. Occasionally, it is possible to observe some social benefit for the
poor, as in Colombia, where drug barons are known to sponsor social
activities in order to improve their public image.
The way in which autocratic cliques (type Ilia) work is similar to that of
type II (mafia). Here, also, the logic of democratic decision-making is
severely impaired. However, in this case, the undermining originates from
within the state apparatus itself, the institutions of state becoming
'occupied' from the inside. As a means of manipulation, the clique has at its
disposal the powers of public office which it itself has control over. Even
when, from a phenomenological point of view, types II and Ilia resemble
each other in most respects, one central difference should not be
overlooked. Whilst in mafia-type participation we can speak of a
privatization of the state, in the autocratic rule of cliques the tendencies are
similar to the development of an authoritarian regime. As in every
autocratic system, the power of the state is used for particularist interests to
control areas of society. Provided that the possibilities of societal client
groups of participating are limited, developments which are authoritarian in
character become evident, favoured by the internally strict, hierarchically
organized 'autocratic cliques'. At this point, a further democracy-hindering
element requires mention, one which also characterizes mafia-type
participation structures. In order to protect the secretive nature of the
respective networks, the participating actors attempt to disguise the true
political process (such as by manipulation of the media), in order to hinder
the possibilities of control which are constitutive of a democracy.
The ways in which clientelistic parties (type Illb) function and work can
be said to deviate from this pattern.24 They are neither equally rigid nor do
they work in secret. Provided that they compete with each other, they take
on a certain pluralistic character. In principle, a change of patron is possible
for the client party (as long as the networks are not ordered along strictly
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33
and exclusively ethnic or religious lines). The voluntary nature of
patron-client relationships is considerable in such contexts and serves to
enhance the democratic quality of participation. However, one problem
remains which by no means should be underestimated. The loyalties
involved remain linked to persons and are not transferred to formal
institutions. The level of trust in institutions remains low, as these are seen
as a mere form of the political process, which is determined by the
clientelistically structured logic of decision-making. Moreover, clientelistic
parties are embedded in the environment of kinship structures. The
combination of these two forms favours the development of nepotism and
the loyalties of the patrons are oriented towards certain groups or regions,
which expect special treatment ('Bringing Home the Pork', in Barkan's
words).25 In cases of conflict, the formal procedures subordinate themselves
to clientelistic logic.26 As long as this form of participation is in a conflictual
relationship with a universal value orientation, such conflict is to be
expected. However, the democratic quality would then be decisively
impaired only if there was a clientelistically influenced one-party system.
Even when internal party competition cannot be excluded, such a system
conforms more to that of an authoritarian form of rule.
A conclusion of clientelism shows itself to be ambivalent. The stability
of all types can be high, but it seems to be higher in the cases of kinship and
(to a lesser degree) of clientelist parties, both public known types which are
based on traditional societal patterns and which benefit from the social
status of the patrons. In contrast, autocratic cliques and mafia, although
hierarchically structured, are more an expression of new clandestine
organizations favouring persons or groups in terms of their functional
position. In advance, we can say that the intensity of clientelistic
participation diverges according to sub-type. Independent of this, however,
negative evaluations (as found with types II and Ilia) contrast with
assessments showing a certain level of democratic potential (as in types I
and Illb), both types also existing in combination. Expressed another way,
clientelistic forms of political participation in the form of kinship and client
parties offer more opportunities to participate than authoritarian controlled
channels of communication, especially when they arise in a pluralistic
context without too rigid a relationship.
The consequences of informal participation under conditions of strongly
institutionalized mafia-type organizations or autocratic cliques appear
serious indeed. Both hinder not only the way in which democracy functions,
by undermining formal channels of participation and by impairing the
implementation of resolutions reached formally, but, at the same time, they
also gradually erode the legitimacy of the democratic regime. If democratic
attitudes are not yet deeply rooted within consciousness structures and if the
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evaluation of political process, regime performance and fundamental
democratic values and principles are not yet separated from each other, then
an alienation of the populace from the notion of democracy itself is to be
expected. The observable exploitation of democratic structures is
interpreted as true democratic practice, which is not perceived as being
worth defending. Thus a 'belief in institutions' is unable to gain any
foothold. Especially in fledgling democracies, this can severely disrupt the
process of democratic consolidation and, in the worst scenario, may even
prevent it.27 In the light of democracy theory and of the arguments discussed
above, a comparison of the various forms produces the following
Autocratic cliques
> Mafia
> Clientelist parties
> kinship
>nepotism/patronage
Corruption
Current academic research assesses corruption as the prominent mechanism
of informal influence.29 Garzon Valdes defines this influence structure of
informal participation as follows: 'Corruption is the violation of an
obligation by a decision-maker, in order to obtain an extra-positional private
benefit from the agent who bribes or is being extorted, in exchange for
benefits granted to the briber or the extorted whose value exceeds the cost
of the bribe or the extorted amount or service.'30 When corruption takes
place within the political domain (political corruption), then the
involvement of a holder of public office within the political system is a
precondition.31 Garzon Valdes agrees with Morris on the necessity of
separating two basic forms of corruption from each other, by considering
the different directions which their respective influences take.32 On the one
hand, he examines the influence of societal actors upon political decisions
by means of material contributions (bribe). On the other, he looks at those
financial demands made by state employees upon citizens, without which
the former would not be prepared to fulfil their obligatory duties (extortion).
From the participation perspective, the bribery variant is more relevant
to the purposes of the present study, as it refers to the influence as taken by
societal actors, whereas in the case of extortion, the central focus is upon the
citizen. At the empirical level, both variants often appear to be interwoven.
Further, it is possible to differentiate between two types of bribery. In the
more usual case, employees in public administration are the target, who are
then expected to manipulate or ignore decisions reached through the
political process. In the other case, it is political legislators who are
involved, and who are then expected to either make a specific decision or to
make a ruling which favours those exerting their influence. Above all, it is
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35
the latter variant which creates wide-reaching changes, as it not only makes
possible one single occurrence of the phenomenon, but also creates a
corridor of action in which it can repeat itself.
The discussion in democracy theory about the consequences of
corruption could well end up as a short one, for much of this discussion
follows on from the discussions of clientelistic participation (types II, Ilia
and IV). Their effects, however, are more serious in various respects.33
Decisions are manipulated in such a way as to satisfy particularist interests
with the help of the use of public resources. The more extensive and longerterm damage is done through the undermining of the rule of law, by
breaking the logic of formal rules in various places. Not only are political
and administrative processes affected by this, but also the justice system.
When the putting into practice of decisions is undermined, the scope of
effective government is reduced. If after rational calculation an individual
actor reaches the conclusion that the 'channels of corruption' are the most
effective or even the only effective possibility of exerting political
influence, then all those wishing to participate become forced to take on the
corresponding role expectations. The consequence of this would be the rise
of a 'corruption culture', capable of developing its own self-perpetuating
dynamic.
One of the consequences of such a development is an increasing lack of
transparency of the political process and of public communication. Even
when the existence of corruption is known publicly, participants still seek to
cover up their involvement. The privileged access to the power of political
decision-making, gained through bribery, requires secrecy, especially in
order to preserve its distinctiveness from other channels of influence. This
is a constituent part of 'the game'. The ones who suffer are not only those
affected by the manipulation, but equally those who are interested in
shedding light upon it. The consequences are that press freedom is
interfered with and that journalists are hindered in their work by personal
threats made with the complicity of state security agencies.34 The control of
political rule is just as much impaired by this lack of transparency as it is by
the aforementioned breaking of the principles of the rule of law. The proof
of bribery is made more difficult by the attempt to cover it up.35
The way in which democracy functions continues to be hindered by the
distortion of the procedural logic of formal political participation. Not only
does the implementation of political decisions become affected by bribery,
but also the decision-making process itself, and thereby the transfer of the
preference of the electorate becomes distorted. The freedom of democratic
self-determination as well as the equality of individual participation is
affected, as corruption entails an imbalance of preferences (in that it ignores
underprivileged groups) and thus a violation of the principle of equality and
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DEMOCRATIZATION
fairness in the consideration of all interests; the importance of which, for
democracy, has been emphatically underlined by Robert Dahl.36 This
mechanism represents a fundamental disregard for democratic procedures:
'The payment of a bribe ... is one that unfairly distorts official decisionmaking.'37 This corruption-based form of participation functions as an
additional, privileged opportunity to exert influence and fundamentally
undermines the principles of the rule of law and of democracy, by either
disregarding formal rules or by exploiting these for its own uses.38 The
possible perversion of democratic norms can be so far advanced, that even
government anti-corruption campaigns do not aim at putting an end to these
violations of democratic rules, but aim instead at the preserving and
extending of the government's own position of power through the
elimination of rivals accused of corruption.39 In this way, corruption can
even favour the stability of a political system, not in the sense of a
consolidation of democracy, however, but through the establishment of a
'defective democracy'40 in instances of limited rule violations, or in cases of
a significant and continuous damaging of democratic principles, it can lead
to a renewed autocratization of rule.41
The Threat of a Putsch (the Use of Force)
The forms of specific relationship (clientelism) and material exchange
(corruption) discussed above are not the only possibilities of informal
participation. A further variant lies in the exerting of influence by violent
participation. 'Violence' used by informal institutions as a characteristic
means of political participation does not necessarily mean the use of
physical force in order to exert influence. This type of participation is
characterized much more by its use of violence simply as a means of
making threats, itself part of exerting influence upon political decisions. As
an institution, such a type of influence founded on force does not manifest
itself through the use of force alone, whichever way this may be
communicated. What is required is the development of an identifiable form
of interaction, as in the case of the types first mentioned, which involves
fixed roles and its own functioning logic. The precondition for the way in
which it functions is that, as soon as only one element of this structure is
used, the entire structure must become evident to all involved.
Also in the case of this particular participation type, differing variants
can be identified, which diverge in terms of their respective aims,
functioning logics and effects. What is decisive for all of these is that they
are based on the threat or partial use of force. Despite their obvious
distinguishing character, namely that of the violation of norms related to
democracy and to the rule of law, each hinders the functioning of democracy
in different ways. The following can be termed 'identifiable forms of
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37
violence-based participation': the threat of a putsch, guerilla warfare, riots
and organized crime. Due to its structure, which in comparison with the
other variants is accentuated, the following will discuss by way of example
the classic case of the threat of a putsch, the functioning, as well as the
effects, of which are brilliantly described by Valenzuela as part of the
discussion of 'perverse institutions'.42
According to this thesis, this mechanism takes effect whenever elections
are not seen as the sole, legitimate way to a changeover of power, but rather
when military alternatives are seriously considered. The actors who weigh
up such considerations can, but do not need to have, the necessary resources
at their disposal. They simply have to make credible the belief that they
could significantly influence the use of these. The coded message is
understood, without the threat having to be carried out. Thus the real aim is
not a change of regime by means of a putsch, but rather the effective
protecting of particularist interests (namely the safeguarding and creation of
privileges) within democratic structures by the threat of a putsch. If these
aims cannot be secured, however, the putsch option is then taken up anew.
The defining of aims for such strategies of action is not limited to the
influencing of changeovers of power, it can affect all central governmental
and parliamentary decisions. These then stand perpetually under the 'sword
of Damocles', as one must always bear in mind whether the risk of a putsch
is increased by the resolutions arrived at. Once such a climate of potentially
permanent intervention is established, everyday routine decisions also
become influenced by it, the self-censorship of democratic behaviour
spreads and takes root. In this way, Valenzuela argues, a 'vicious circle of
perverse institutionalization' is initiated, which in every piece of planning
and every action includes the interests of those veto-groups which have the
overall say (as they can threaten with violent action).43 In order to hinder a
putsch and thereby avoid an authoritarian regime, far-reaching concessions,
rule of law violations and the relinquishment of democratic decisionmaking powers become accepted. Through this strategy, however, the
quality of the existing democracy becomes ever further reduced, so much so
that the danger arises that one ends up defending a mere fagade, which has
long since been robbed of all its substantial, democratic characteristics.
Provided that it is institutionalized, the 'putsch threat' participation type
has extensive repercussions for the functioning of democracy. The formal
institutions of political participation are affected in two different ways. On
the one hand, their logic becomes distorted by the heavy limitations being
placed upon the capacity of the actors involved to make decisions freely.
This can affect voters just as much as it can the representatives elected by
them, the latter being subject to (self-imposed) restrictions in their
preference formation already prior to a decision being reached. On the other
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hand, the damage to democratic institutions takes place in that their
authority ceases to be of relevance, the real structures of decision-making
having already been formed beyond and parallel to the formal structures and
channels of communication (such as military networks) and which escape
democratic control. Elementary principles of the separation of powers and
of the rule of law are violated by the institutionalization of the putsch threat.
Despite its explosive potential for the democratic process, this type of
informal institution is also difficult to observe empirically. The observation
of a public putsch threat is not sufficient, the corresponding reaction by the
decision-makers must follow. Only then is the institution constituted fully in
terms of a unit capable of action. Neither does it help to count putsch
attempts, for as Huntington rightly points out: 'A coup attempt against a
new democratic regime is a sign that democratization is working.'44 Beyond
this, the assumption can be made that following the establishment of the
institution, already the smallest signals are sufficient to keep active the selfcensorship within the decision-making process. It is exactly this hardly
tangible existence, that is, the apparent absence of putsch threats, which
conceal its efficacious functioning.45
Civil Disobedience
The fourth type of informal participation is located, as are several of the
institutions analysed above, in the illegal sphere; however, this particular
type is distinguishable from these in dimensions which are quite conclusive.
The participation form of civil resistance refers to forms of action such as
'wildcat strikes/political strikes', 'blockades', 'occupations of the land' or
other expressions of 'civil disobedience'. The behaviour patterns involved
in these, whi ch are carried by actors from civil society, are based neither on
(physical) violence (against persons), nor on the threat thereof. In this sense,
they are non-violent. Apart from this, their aim is not an occupation of
power, rather the assertion of certain material or ideational facts within the
democratic order.46 The demands thus made move as a rule within the
framework of the given basic rights or are understood as such or are derived
from these. Economic and social basic rights could be included (as does
environmental protection).
Such informal institutionalization of civil resistance occurs whenever
formal participation channels fail to offer sufficient opportunity to articulate
interests or whenever the urgency of problems, in the eyes of protesters,
demands swift reaction, which in this form is not possible or provided for
within formal channels. This perception of the situation can be found, for
example, in the action matrix underlying the protest by certain
environmental groups. As they seek to hinder and block formal democratic
decisions by infringing the law, these actions of resistance are not only not
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39
provided for, they are also illegal per se. Thus legal forms of protest such as
petitions are not part of the informal institution discussed here. As a
consequence, one can only speak of resistance 'when those persons resisting
accept the risk of disadvantage or punishment, and justify their refusal to
follow orders, instructions or laws through reasons of conscience or by
reference to a higher authority'." Actions of civil disobedience strive to
achieve the revision of political decisions or partisanship on the part of the
state for certain interests (for example, an occupation of land). The pressure
brought to bear through the resistance actions on decision-makers is in
principle, and in contrast to other forms of informal participation, conveyed
through publicity. Here, the strength of the influence exerted is based less
on the size of the protest action, but more on the persuasive power of the
arguments and the moral integrity of those violating the rules. Should
decision-makers not be directly impressed by this, then the possibility
arises, through protest, of influencing public opinion in such a way that with
regard to the matter in question, a new political majority forms.
Forms of civil resistance or of civil disobedience have historically
developed in times of confrontation with authoritarian rule and have found
their justification within this context. But what justifies their use within a
democratic context? Reference has already been made to the aspect of
urgency, which suggests the abandoning of legal channels of
communication. However, the more fundamental reason lies in the claim of
a discrepancy between the formal legal correctness of a decision and its
legitimacy status. Civil disobedience thereby comes into conflict with the
majority rule. In order to be able to substantiate the legitimacy of protest,
the unlimited competence of this decision-making rule must be contested
and a limit to its competence asserted. Even when differing material
arguments are cited,48 this limit can only finally be founded on a democracyinherent base. Democracy finds its appropriate expression not in an
unlimited majority rule, but rather in the fact that its has its own
preconditions for existence to observe, which disclose themselves in the
principles of the rule of law.49 The democratic principle is that of the
sovereignty of the people in the form of majority decisions which are
bound, or in the words of Barry Weingast, 'Democracy is a form of limited
government.'50 Similarly Bockenforde stresses, 'In the same way that
freedom and equality serve as the basis for the principle of majority
decision, they also limit it; democracy consists neither of a majority
absolutism, nor simply of rule by the majority.'5' For this reason, the reason
for the legitimacy of civil disobedience must lie in the equal, universally
conceived and normative tradition of the rule of law and democracy. Those
violating the rules have the task of proving that their protest represents these
basic values more conclusively than the political decision reached. In
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addition to this, various criteria are discussed which merit consideration.
Amongst these are the extent of the perceived injustice and the
reasonableness of the means and the non-endangering of the functioning of
the rule of law.52
This normatively stratified reason permits positive reference of forms of
resistance to democracy. In contrast to the other three informal types of
political participation, as cited above, their aim is generally not to
undermine the formal focus of political participation, although such an
effect cannot exclusively be ruled out. At the same time, resistance can also
contribute to the promotion of democracy, if thereby, for example, reference
is made to democratic deficits (see informal institutions I—III), if staid
features of democratic systems are broken up or when new channels of
participation are opened up. These can enrich democracy in terms of its
three dimensions of freedom, equality and control. Additional opportunities
to articulate demands can be made accessible to groups which are
disadvantaged in formal participation channels, as one can observe in the
case of the occupation of farmland in Brazil. Apart from this, room for
individual action and the potential for effective control can be extended. In
this sense, civil disobedience constitutes an innovative and productive
element of democratic development.53 At the same time, however,
remaining tensions should not be overlooked, as these can, after all, affect
the way in which democracy functions, namely in instances in which formal
procedures are no longer sufficiently respected and in which conflicts
increasingly take place in the form of informal resistance. Which of these
effects finally occurs depends not least upon the normative foundation and
the character of civil society ('ambivalent' as opposed to 'reflexive').54
Despite these risks to and dangers for democracy, the potentially positive
effects predominate. These effects distinguish conclusively this fourth type
of informal participation from the other types discussed above, namely
clientelism, corruption and the putsch threat.
Custom Law
Custom law constitutes a further informal institution, which on its own does
determine some effect, but which can only unfold its full effect through
confirmation on the part of state agencies.55 Despite the fact that we are
dealing with a borderline example of informal institution (as the criteria of
state sanction correspond to that of a formal institution), due to its other
features it has to be categorized with informal institutions. The power of this
informal institution to wield influence, and at the same time that which
distinguishes it, is evident in the fact that custom law constitutes a legal
source of formal law, thus permitting a conversion of informal rules into
formal ones. However, examples of custom law are conceivable which
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41
cannot be formalized in a state under the rule of law, as they run contrary to
its fundamental principles. In the same way, custom law can prove to be not
only compatible with democratic procedures, but also combined with them.56
The difficulty encountered when attempting to define statements on
custom law lies more precisely in its 'open' boundaries, themselves
articulated in the controversies surrounding international law.57 If in a wider
understanding it is identical with informal rules, that is with informal^
institutions, and if thereby all other types were sub-types of custom law as
well, then in a narrower formulation it is 'merely' identical with the legal form
or legal tradition, itself coming before or even analogous to the formal
jurisdiction of the rule of law. If we apply custom law as it is structured within
international law to a particular country, the subjective conviction on the part
of participant actors that they are legally bound must be present in conjunction
with the behavioural element. For this reason, the following arguments will
address custom law in its narrower sense, as characterized by elementary prestate features of the law (matter of dispute, plaintiff, trial, judge, ruling) and
which is linked to a right to recourse, whatever the nature of this may be.
Custom law can also be addressed by the state; however, in principle it is not
binding on the state. Therefore it is not identical to, nor can it be equated with,
the Anglo-Saxon tradition of case law or of common law, as that is authorized
by the state, codified (in varying forms) and is actionable legally. Despite the
different paths of logic which have combined to create it, and the way in
which it is dispensed, this understanding of law is easily compatible with the
continental European legal tradition (as Martinez-Torron showed in his 1998
study of Anglo-American law and canon law).58
In contrast to this, custom law includes all non-codified rules and modes
of behaviour, which are actionable before state or private tribunals. An
important area has developed in the field of business relations, especially at
international level, where conflict arbitration is carried out by private
instances following business law which they themselves have created. Folk
traditions continue to belong to custom law, the adherence to which can
even be enforced in non-state or even partially state-controlled tribunals, as
can be observed in various West African countries.59 The archaic custom of
the blood feud can only in a limited way be included under custom law, as
the roles of plaintiff and judge are normally embodied in one person. What
can be included more easily, however, are 'kangaroo courts' or 'mafia
courts', whose basic concern is the violation of an unwritten 'code of
honour'. Such institutions are to be understood as political ones, not
because they can be classified as part of the political system, but rather
because through their violation of state monopoly power, they combat the
central feature of the political system, thus forming at least partial
opposition to the state.
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When applying custom law to the narrower field of political institutions,
we can distinguish between two levels of informal rule-making. The first
(quite unique) case concerns institutions which are located at constitutional
level. These are unwritten but, none the less, binding constitutional
clauses.60 The second case concerns legal, informal arrangements within
democracies, such as coalition agreements, shadow cabinets and so on.
These represent a very specific variant of informal institution, as they stem
from a quite deliberate decision and thus are similar to formal institutions.
However, they exist without state sanction and are not legally actionable.
Due to the way in which they come about, their life span is not as long or
binding as those which have come about 'autonomously'. The power of
social sanction involved with them is often modest. Thus the question arises
whether such arrangements achieve the status of an institution in all cases.
Often, their only binding feature is the fact of their formation and less the
adherence of actors to them.
Finally, there is a form of arrangement which can be understood neither
as an expression of custom law nor directly as a political institution, namely
self-help networks such as neighbourhood associations, saver and migrant
clubs, or burial societies. These kinds of network can be found in many third
world countries.61 They merit attention as they draw up or develop informal
legal rulings which are credited with the status of custom law. The method
employed for this purpose is the reference to already existing values such as
solidarity and trust. They are political in that they take on state tasks in the
area of social security, and also in that they act as a starting point and
medium for political participation as well as serving as a mobilization
reservoir of state agencies and parties. Self-help networks constitute
informal institutions which, in terms of their understanding of the law,
correspond to that of arrangements made under the rule of law (or which
imitate this understanding). From the democracy theory point of view, they
are capable of making positive inputs, as they make possible the practice as
well as the practising of democratic modes of behaviour, as well as
simultaneously defusing problem situations in the social sphere. However,
their contribution to democracy can be lessened or set in relative terms to
the extent that they are shaped by strong clientelistic and authoritarian
patterns.
These cursory arguments show that custom law can be understood
legally as well as illegally. As part of the process of wide-reaching
formalization and codification of law, in modern constitutional states, it is
to be assumed that a growing discrepancy and tension between custom law
and the rule of law will take place, as the former of these is based on a premodern tradition representing particularist interests.62 Seen from this
perspective, the slow development of custom law norms and the sluggish
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43
nature of their change show themselves to be increasingly inadequate in
modern societies. Nevertheless, the development of custom law can also be
understood as a contribution to the development of law within the overall
rule of law context. Either it serves to establish a more binding structuring
of relationship patterns in the sense of the development of 'soft' law (as in
the case of coalition agreements), or it contributes to the development of
law in areas which up until now have seen little regulation, whereby it can,
in particular, take account of the needs of circles of individuals (as in the
case of self-help networks) who generally do not take any part in the
legislative process. From this latter perspective, the development of custom
law norms is a reference to the democratic context in which law develops,
namely through the demand for the inclusion of all groups. As the creation
of private business law illustrates, in the same way this development of
norms is oriented towards existing state rules, the interpretation and further
development of which is influenced by private legal custom which develops
autonomously.63
Consequently, custom law (and its variant forms) affect the political
system in two ways. First, competition between different legal contents
takes place, which shows itself to be complementary to, substitutive of, or
undermining of the rule of law. Whilst complementary forms can work in
favour of democracy, the two other forms of interaction are evaluated as
either harmful or even lethal to democracy. Productive tensions, as seen in
the case of civil disobedience, are not present here. Second, custom law
represents a source for the creation of formal law. In this case, custom law
can also be understood in terms of political participation, whereby rules are
transferred into the political system, as opposed to specific material
concerns. What effect takes place depends upon the character of custom law
in each particular case, which accordingly can be judged as being beneficial
as well as harmful to democracy. From this perspective, the study of custom
law proves to be a meaningful extension of the spectrum of formal
institutions which influence the ways in which democracy and the rule of
law work.
Conclusion
The discussion of various types of informal institutions of political
participation has shown that the individual types and equally their variant or
sub-types differ recognizably in terms of how they function. The rather
more comprehensive discussion of clientelistic structures here owes much
to this observation. The analysis of clientelistic sub-types not only reveals
specific forms of political participation, in the same way informal
institutions become evident that structure political behaviour in a general
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way and can indirectly affect democracy. In this way, the functioning of
democracy is influenced on the one hand by competing institutions of
informal participation and by societal institutions on the other. Both
structure and restrain the corridor of action for political participation so to
speak as a sort of filter. However, in the latter case, of societal institutions,
the interrelation of effects is not as strict and is difficult to observe
empirically. In the explanation of the development of the different structures
of informal institutions the sociological-cultural as well as the rational
choice variant of neo-institutionalism provide good arguments, which have
to be proved in each special case. Space permits the addition of only one
argument that is relevant in the process of regime transformation. In most
cases of transition, there is a phase in which the old formal institutions die
but the new ones have not yet appeared. In this environment of insecurity,
there is a need for certainty, which can satisfied by informal institutions.
These then tend to survive over into the institutional world of the new
regime.
The relevance of the five types in terms of democracy theory varies
considerably and is not strictly linked to the respective legality of each type.
Civil disobedience can accompany an improvement in a democracy's
capability to function and can be understood as a functional equivalent (of
distorted) formal participation channels. The assessment of custom law
differs significantly according to its respective character. For the other
types, however, consequences have been presented that are harmful to
democracy and can occur in different degrees. Only in a limited way do the
ambivalent findings in respect of clientelistic structures (types I and Illb) set
this assessment in relative terms. The presence of corruption and of the
putsch threat have proved to be equally burdensome for democracy. The
analysis has assumed in each case the presence of a fully established
institution, the power of which being able to influence behaviour across the
entire political system. If an institution is weaker, the negative effects are
estimated to be accordingly less. In cases in which informal institutions of
the types I, II and III are present simultaneously, the situation has to be
judged as being highly problematic, as due to their compatible particularist
orientation, they are capable of mutually reinforcing each other. Although it
is possible to separate these different types of informal institutions on an
analytical level, in reality, various forms of combination very often exist.
Strong links are evident between the variants of clientelism and corruption.64
However, such constellations are not uncontested in the area of informal
institutions. Especially, forms of civil disobedience evolve to counter such
patterns, which are very problematic to democracy, in that they penetrate
formal rules. Also certain aspects of custom law can be understood as a
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INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY
45
corresponding reaction. Thus the battlefield is not only to be found between
informal and formal institutions (which can partly reinforce as well), but
also inside the informal arena itself.
Once, however, such informal institutions (of type I—III) are established
and support each other mutually, their logic is difficult to break; indeed, it
would require an enormous amount of effort and public commitment to do
so. Seen from a three-level perspective, the consequences for a democracy
can be serious in this particular case. First of all, they undermine the
sovereignty of the state, by breaking its monopoly on power and by
curtailing the possibility of effective government. Second, they undermine
the notion of the rule of law, by disregarding its formal rules and by partially
doing away with the separation of powers. Third, they hinder the democratic
process as a whole, by manipulating the preference transfer of formal
democratic processes and by occupying democratic institutions. It is
obvious that even already long-established democracies can be badly
damaged as a result. In fledgling democracies the disadvantages can be
greater still. Through the systematic exploitation of the rule of law and
democracy to the advantage of particularist interests, it becomes difficult to
develop any trust in these norms or indeed to develop a workable civic
culture. Instead, a cynical attitude towards the state agencies and
government establishes itself.65 It is to be expected that, under such
conditions, young democracies often develop into defective or into 'badly
functioning democracies',66 or that they have tendencies towards hybrid or
autocratic forms of regime.
As, however, the discussion of civil disobedience and partially that of
custom law have shown, not all informal institutions of political
participation must have effects which are harmful to democracy, as the
assertion that a mutual relationship of tension exists between formal and
informal institutions implies. This argument is, however, appropriate in
respect of the other types. On the contrary, such forms of participation can
be the expression of a positive defensive reaction, designed to hinder the
exploitation and occupation of formal democratic institutions. For this
reason, the consolidation process within democracies does not
automatically mean closing the gap between formal institutions and
behaviour completely (as O'Donnell argues).67 This gap is justifiable in as
much as informal institutions which shape factual behaviour prove to be
compatible with democratic principles. Due to differing ways in which
informal political institutions function and work, in view of the examination
of the types discussed above, it remains to emphasize that without the
inclusion of informal institutions, the analysis of the functioning of a
democracy remains incomplete.
46
DEMOCRATIZATION
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NOTES
1. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Illusions about Consolidation', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2
(1996), pp.32-51.
2. Ibid., p.33.
3. See Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Vol.2
(Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
4. In numerous studies on western governmental systems, this assumptions works as an
unspoken premise. This does not mean, however, that a potential discrepancy between
constitution, the law and constitutional reality would be negated, as numerous case studies
show. Instances of negation are frequently seen as isolated incidents and not as the
expression of a collective behavioural logic or of competing systems of rules.
5. For an explanation, see Hans-Joachim Lauth, 'Drei Dimensionen der Demokratie und das
Konzept einer defekten Demokratie', in Gert Pickel, Susanne Pickel and Jörg Jacobs (eds.),
Demokratie — Entwicklungsformen und Erscheinungsbilder im interkulturellen Vergleich
(Frankfurt an der Oder: Scripvaz, 1997), pp.33-54.
6. Carl J. Friedrich, Der Verfassungsstaat der Neuzeit (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 1953).
7. Wolfgang Balzer, Soziale Institutionen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993).
8. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.3.
9. O'Donnell, op. cit., p.34.
10. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms', Political Studies, Vol.44, No.5 (1996), pp.936-57.
11. Hall and Taylor, op. cit., p.955. Paul J. DiMaggio, 'The New Institutionalisms: Avenues of
Collaboration', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol.154, No.4 (1998),
pp.696-705, also emphasizes common patterns of the various approaches to 'New
Institutionalisms' by discussing ways in they might cooperate.
12. Niklas Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie 1 (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1972), p.71.
13. Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf, 'Der Ansatz des akteurszentrierten Institutionalismus',
in Mayntz and Scharpf (eds.), Gesellschaftliche Selbstregelung und politische Steuerung
(Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 1995), pp.39-72.
14. The definition of 'functioning logic' or 'rule of identity' is based on the idea that the
following criteria are present in a specific form and inner connection: definition of internal
and external aims, function with regard to the political system (external effect), internal rules.
With this are linked clearly identifiable and classifiable action patterns.
15. Reinhard Zintl, 'Clubs, Clans und Cliquen', in Bernd-Thomas Ramb and Manfred Tietzel
(eds.), Ökonomische Verhaltenstheorie (München: Vahlen, 1993), p.89.
16. Max Kaase, 'Politische Beteiligung', in Manfred G. Schmidt (ed.), Die westlichen Lander
(Lexikon der Politik, Vol.3) (München: Beck, 1992), pp.339-46.
17. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational
Analysis. Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p.13.
18. For the different areas of transformation studies, cf. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter
and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transition from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore, MD and
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour M.
Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner,
1989); Wolfgang Merkel, Eberhard Sandschneider and Dieter Segert (eds.), Systemwechsel 2.
Die Institutionalisierung der Demokratie (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1995); Juan J. Linz and
Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996). These phenomena are also seldom addressed systematically
within research on industrialized countries. One exception is a comparative study of democratic
consolidation processes in the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Spain, in which 'party
patronage', 'clientelism', also 'corruption', 'corporatism' and 'lobbyism' are all conceived as
parliamentary networks of organized interests and are compared empirically on the basis of its
own collected data. See Ulrike Liebert, Modelle demokratischer Konsolidierung. Parlamente
und organisierte Interessen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Italien und Spanien
(1948-1990) (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1995), pp.276-8.
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INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY
47
19. Schmidt, op. cit., p.476. For basic reading on the phenomenon of clientelism, see Samuel N.
Eisenstadt and René Lemarchand (eds.), Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981); Samuel N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, Patrons, Clients and
Friends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Gioia Weber Pazmiño,
Klientelismus. Annäherungen an das Konzept (Zürich: Diss, 1991); Luis Roniger and Ayse
Günes-Ayata (eds.), Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society (Boulder, CO and London:
Lynne Rienner, 1994).
20. The drawing up of a boundary is emphasized by Zintl, op. cit., p. 107, in his discussion of the
clan: 'The formation of clans aims at creating a specially composed society within a society.'
Zintl's concept of the clan is applicable in this case; however, it cannot be applied to the
mafia and nepotism or patronage categories, which are to be observed analogously to the
sub-type IIIa (as explained below) as a clique, and which aim at discriminating against
outsiders (ibid., p.95).
21. See Stefanie Hanke, 'Klientelismus als System: Die Reproduktion klientelistischer
Netzwerke im Demokratisierungsprozeß in Mali', in Hans-Joachim Lauth and Ulrike
Liebert, Im Schatten demokratischer Legitimiät (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999),
pp.277-93; Dieter Neubert, 'Demokratisierung ohne Zivilgesellschaft? Zur Rolle von
Patron-Klient-Beziehungen in den neuen afrikanischen Mehrparteiensystemen', in Lauth and
Liebert, op. cit., pp.258-76.
22. In this way, Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), supports the argument of the importance
of a solid presence of social capital, itself based upon abstract trust, for a working democracy.
23. In various West African countries, the presence of a clientelistic multiplicity of institutions
has been proved. See Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, 'Les arenes
locales face à la décentralisation et la démocratisation. Analyses comparatives en milieu rural
béninois', in T. Bierschenk and J. de Sardan, Les pouvoirs au village, he Bénin rural entre
décentralisation et démocratisation (Paris, 1999), pp.11-56; Hanke, op. cit.
24. See Neubert, op. cit.
25. Joel D. Barkan, 'Bringing Home the Pork: Legislator Behavior, Rural Development and
Political Change in East Africa', in L. Musolf and J. Smith (eds.), Legislatures and
Development (Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), pp.265-88.
26. This mechanism is described by della Porta and Vannucci in their analysis of clientelist
structures: 'In fact ... clientelist practices impede that dissociation between a role and its
occupier which is the principle characteristic of institutional authority. Being based on the
principle of "considering the person" it undermines confidence in the "rules of the game" and
the institutions which should enforce them.' See Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci,
'The Perverse Effects of Political Corruption', in Paul Heywood, Political Corruption
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.100-22.
27. In the case of Italy, see Liebert 1995, op. cit., pp.412-13.
28. The relationship a>b is to be understood as 'a' being at least as much a threat to democracy as 'b'.
29. See the research overview by Anne Deysine, 'Political Corruption. A Review of the
Literature', European Journal of Political Research, Vol.8 (1980), pp.447-62. The collection
of essays by Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption (New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 1970), offers a very good overview of the cognitive development
concerning corruption and its effects. This analysis also gives a representative selection of
the debate which ran during the 1950s and 1960s on this theme. A more recent analysis on
this theme is Paul Heywood, op. cit., and also (although somewhat dated) Arnold J.
Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston and Victor T. LeVine (eds.), Political Corruption. A
Handbook (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989).
30. Ernesto Garzón Valdés, 'The Concept of Corruption', Associations, Vol.1, No.1. (1997),
pp.103-25.
31. In this extended version of political corruption, the definition includes the first of three basic
and pioneering categories of corruption definition, as suggested by Heidenheimer, Political
Corruption, pp.4-6. By its reference to individual cost-benefit considerations, it
simultaneously integrates the second category, that of market-oriented definitions, but not the
third offered by Heidenheimer, which orients itself towards the common good.
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48
DEMOCRATIZATION
32. Stephen Morris, Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico (Tuscaloosa, AL:
University of Alabama Press, 1991).
33. Although they are also important, the various economic impacts will not be examined here
as they have been broadly discussed elsewhere, for example, by Samuel P. Huntington,
'Modenrnization and Corruption', in Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine, op. cit., pp.377-88,
and Gunnar Myrdal, 'Corruption as a Hindrance to Modernization in South Asia', in
Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine, op. cit., pp.405-21.
34. The fate of many reporters who were investigating the interconnections within the illegal drugs
trade, in which holders of public office were involved, provides graphic examples of this. See
Press Freedom Survey 1999; see also http://freedomhouse.org/pfs99/ (status 12.05.99).
35. Besides case studies which will continue to be vital, a quite noteworthy attempt to determine
the overall extent of corruption is the initiative by Transparency International (TI) to compile
an international Corruption Ranking. See Peter Eigen, 'Combatting Corruption around the
World', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.1 (1996), pp.158-68. All in all, an inter-cultural
comparison of corruption encounters considerable difficulties, the limited availability of data
being simply one of these. A further problem lies in the choice of measurement criteria. The
orientation towards the legal framework of analysis encounters limitations. As Werner Raith,
Die Republik der Schein-Heiligen oder wieviel Korruption braucht die Demokratie?
(München: Knesebeck, 1996), pp.33-4 emphasizes, individual countries have developed
very different standards with regard to corruption, although as a rule the 'more serious cases'
are recorded. Further, reference should be made to the varied, culture-specific spectrum of
acceptance, which from country to country influences the public debate, the registration and
the condemnation of political corruption differently. See Heidenheimer, Political
Corruption., pp.20-21.
36. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT and London:
Yale University Press, 1971), pp.2-3.
37. James Lindgren, 'The Elusive Distinction between Bribery and Extortion: from the Common
Law to the Hobbs Act', UCLA Law Review, Vol.35, No.5 (1988), p.824.
38. Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannuci judge this accordingly: 'In fact ... while
corruption is in no way limited to democracies, it is in such systems that its effects are most
disruptive. By attacking two of the fundamental principles on which democracy is based, the
equality of citizens before institutions and the open nature of decision making, corruption
contributes to the delegitimadon of the political and institutional systems in which it takes
root,' della Porta and Vannucci, op. cit., p. 121.
39. Virgine Coulloudon illustrates this practice using Russian examples, which can also be
observed in. other countries. Virginie Coulloudon, 'The Criminalization of Russia's Political
Elite', East European Constitutional Review, Vol.6, No.4. (1997), pp.73-8. For Mexico, see
Hans-Joachim Lauth, Mexiko zwischen traditioneller Herrschaft und Modernisierung. Die
Gewerkschaften im Wandel von Polilik und Wirtschaft (1964-1988) (Münster: Lit, 1991),
pp.497, 719.
40. See Lauth, 'Drei Dimensionen'; Wolfgang Merkel, 'Defekte Demokratien', in Wolfgang
Merkel and Andreas Busch (eds.), Demokratie in Ost und West (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1999), pp.361-81.
41. Independent of whether a maximalist or minimalist version of democratic consolidation is
represented, what is meant in most concepts is the stabilization of a democracy capable of
functioning. For a research overview see Ben Ross Schneider, 'Democratic Consolidations.
Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping Arguments', Latin American Research Review,
Vol.30, No.2 (1995), pp.215-34. If in a minimalist conception this point of reference should
not logically be necessary, it is inherent in maximalist conceptions, which include
institutional, attitudinal and behavioural dimensions — see the reference by Peter Burnell and
Peter Calvert, 'The Resilience of Democracy: An Introduction', Democratization, Vol.6,
No.l (1999), pp.1-32, to the legitimacy of liberal democracies as put forward by W. Merkel,
'The Consolidation of Post-autocratic Democracies: A Multi-level Model', Democratization,
Vol.5, No.3 (1998), pp.33-67. Apart from this however, it makes little sense to understand
consolidation as being synonymous with stabilization, as by doing this, one would
unnecessarily be eliminating a specific meaning of consolidation. In accordance with this
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY
42.
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43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
49
consideration, a defective democracy cannot consolidate itself, only 'simply' establish and
possibly stabilize itself.
J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings. Notion,
Process, and Facilitating Factors', in Scott Mainwaring and Guillermo O'Donnell, Issues in
Democratic Consolidation (Notre Dame, ILL: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992),
pp.57-104.
J.S. Valenzuela understands institutions in the sociological sense as action-oriented, actionstructuring and action-restraining norms, that can be constituted formally as well as
informally. By 'perverse institutions', Valenzuela understands institutional deficits which
undermine democracies and which mean, in his view, a perverse institutionalization. Besides
the 'putsch threat', he differentiates between three further basic types of 'perverse
institutions', which are to be found predominantly in the formal domain. These are (1)
tutelary powers, (2) existence of reserved domains and (3) serious instances of
discrimination in election processes.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p.235
In this context, the reader is reminded of the land reforms in Central America which were
delayed for decades. Even governments willing to introduce reforms were forced to take into
account the latent and ever-present putsch threat stemming from the rural oligarchy. See
Richard L. Millett, 'An End to Militarism? Democracy and the Armed Forces in Central
America', Current History (Feb. 1995), pp.71-5.
'In contrast to the resistance fighter' the violator of rules 'recognizes the democratic
legitimacy of the existing order', Jürgen Habermas, 'Ziviler Ungehorsam - Testfall fur den
demokratischen Rechtsstaat. Wider den autoritären Legalismus in der Bundesrepublik', in
Peter Glotz (ed.), Ziviler Ungehorsam im Rechtsstaat (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983),
pp.29-53, p.39.
Herfried Münkler, 'Widerstandslehren', in Dieter Nohlen and Rainer-Olaf Schultze (eds.),
Lexikon der Politik. Vol.1, Politische Theorien (Munchen: Beck, 1995), pp.691-6.
See Bernd Guggenberger and Claus Offe (eds.), An den Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984).
This consideration follows in principle the same logical argumentation structure which the
seventeenth century English philosopher John Locke used in his concept of the termination
of a contract. The contract loses its validity when its underlying precondition, that is the
protection of natural rights, is no longer fulfilled. Should a government violate these
fundamentals (natural rights), then in Locke's view the right to resist is allowed.
Barry R. Weingast, 'The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law',
American Political Science Review, Vol.91, No.2 (1997), p.245.
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie.
Studien
zur
Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), p.340.
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Ralf
Dreier, 'Widerstand und ziviler Ungehorsam im Rechtsstaat', in Glotz, op. cit., pp.54-75.
Habermas, op. cit., pp.40-41.
See Wolfgang Merkel and Hans-Joachim Lauth, 'Systemwechsel und Zivilgesellschaft:
Welche Zivilgesellschaft braucht die Demokratie?', ApuZ B 6-7 (1998), pp.3-12; HansJoachim Lauth, 'Strategische, reflexive und ambivalente Zivilgesellschaften: Ein Vorschlag
zur Typologie von Zivilgesellschaften im Systemwechsel', in Heidrun Zinecker (ed.),
Unvollendete Demokratisierung in Nichtmarktökonomien (Amsterdam: Fakultas 1999),
pp.95-120.
Hermann Avenarius, Die Rechtsordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Neuwied u.a.:
Luchterhand, 1995), pp.3-4.
In this way, custom law can lead to the privileging of social status, gender or age, which is
irreconcilable with the equality postulate of democracy.
See Jörg Manfred Mössner, Einführung in das Völkerrecht (Munchen: Beck, 1977). Within
international law, custom law signifies an ongoing practice of modes of behaviour in which
states are convinced that they are legally bound to such behaviour. According to this, the
custom law norm is composed of an objective element (one of practice) and a subjective one
50
58.
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59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
DEMOCRATIZATION
(one of recognition). In the absence of the latter, one speaks of a custom or habit. However,
the question of to what extent this norm represents its own source of law, or instead is simply
the expression of an unspoken contractual agreement, remains controversial.
Javier Martínez-Torrón, Anglo-American Law and Cannon Law. Canonical Roots of the
Common Law Tradition (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998). For the successful, mixed
character of the Scottish legal system, see Helmut Weber, 'Recht und Gerichtsbarkeit', in
Hans Kastendiek, Karl Rohe and Angelika Voile, Länderbericht Groβbritannien (Bonn:
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1998), pp.178-93.
See Bierschenk and De Sardan, op. cit.
Such binding, yet non-codified traditions can be observed in the case of the United Kingdom
(for example, human rights catalogue). However, this should not mislead the reader to
assume that no formal institutions exist. Many central elements of the British system of
government are set down in writing, albeit not in one single document. In dealing with noncodified traditions, itself often controversial, an inherent problem of custom law becomes all
too evident, namely how such rules are to be recognised and how they are to be amended.
See Weber, op. cit., p.179.
For an Egyptian example see Diane Singerman, The Politics of Informality in Egypt.
Networks, Family, the Economy and Islamists, University of Minnesota, McArthur
Consortium Working Paper, 1997, and in regards of Chile, see Philip Oxhorn, 'The Popular
Sector Response to an Authoritarian Regime: Shantytown Organisations Since the Military
Coup', Latin American Perspectives, Vol.18, No1 (1991), pp.66-92.
A difference exists in comparison to the international level, where the formalization of
international law is not yet advanced to the same extent, although here also a considerable
increase in the codification of law has been observed over previous decades, being reflected
not least in the development of international regimes.
See Marc Galanter, 'Justice in many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law',
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, Vol.19 (1981), pp.1-17; see also Daniel
Kiwit and Stefan Voigt, 'Überlegungen zum institutionellen Wandel unter Berücksichtigung
des Verhältnisses interner und externer Institutionen', ORDO, Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vol.46. (1995), pp.117-47.
The strong negative impact of co-operation between various forms of clientelism and
corruption upon democracy have been elucidated by O'Donnell in the 'brown areas'
theorem. See Guillermo O'Donnell, 'On the State, Democratization and some Conceptual
Problems. A Latin American View with Glances at some Post-communist Countries', World
Development, Vol.21. No.8 (1993), pp. 1355-70. The mafia is another example of combining
different types of informal institutions (types 1, 2 and 5).
By use of an example, O'Donnell illustrates the problematic consequences of corruption for
democracy. As instances of corruption within governments are not investigated by the legal
authorities, the media functions as a type of replacement tribunal. However, it does not have
the capacity to act as a functional equivalent. The consequence of this is that 'los culpables
suelen quedar impunes, los inocentes estigmatizados'. (the guilty go unpunished, and the
innocent become stigmatised). The consequence of this is a further loss of faith in government
action. See Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Accountability Horizontal', Agora, Vol.4, No.8 (1998),
pp.5-34. Delia Porta and Vannucci, op. cit., pp.114-21, draw a corresponding conclusion in
their analysis of the effects of corruption in the first Italian Republic. In cases like in Latin
America where the abuse of democratic institutions is founded upon deeply-rooted historical
experiences and which is nurtured repeatedly by new experiences ('defective democracies'),
the enormous difficulty of leaving such a path of 'perverse' institutionalization becomes all
too evident. See Manfred Mols, Demokratie in Lateinamerika (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1985).
Peter Burnell, 'Arrivals and Departures: A Preliminary Classification of Democratic Failures
and their Explanation', Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.36, No.3 (1998),
pp. 1-29.
See Guillermo O'Donnell, Another Institutionalization: Latin America and Elsewhere.
Revised version of a paper presented to the Conference 'Consolidating Third Wave
Democracies: Trends and Challenges', organised by the National Policy Research Institute
and the International Forum for Democratic Studies, Taipei, 26-30 Aug. 1995 (mimeo).