THE DOOLITTLE RAID
Michele Hawes
May 8, 2016
2
Introduction
According to Carl von Clausewitz in his book On War, there are four basic components
to war: “danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance.”1 In WWII, the Doolittle Raid embodied all
of these components and more. In early 1942, American military actions in the Pacific were not
particularly successful and a new plan of attack was devised. Sixteen B-25 bombers were loaded
onto the U.S.S. Hornet aircraft carrier with the intention of carrying out a daring long-range
bombing raid on Japan. On April 18, 1942, Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle and his
seventy-nine volunteers left the carrier to bomb strategic sites located in five cities of Japan Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, Nagoya, and Yokosuka.2 While the raid was not expected to
substantially physically alter the war making capabilities of Japan, it was hoped that the bombing
would have other far reaching consequences. This paper will focus on the analysis of the
historiography of the Doolittle Raid during WWII which has not been sufficiently explored to
fully appreciate its immediate strategic and tactical value and its eventual impact not only on the
outcome of the war, but also on the morale of both the American and Japanese people and their
allies.
By examining the historiography of Doolittle’s Raid, a deeper awareness of how the
actual impact of the raid influenced the outcome of the war can be garnered. In addition to
examining the record as presented by American historians, this paper will also explore what
military historians had to say about this dramatic bombing mission. By exploring different
perspectives on Doolittle’s Raid, an understanding of the utility of such tactics with limited
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 100.
2. David G. Styles, “The Doolittle Raid: Towards a Place in History,” Air Power History (2003): 36.
3
immediate military value can be gained. While hardly a turning point in the war, the importance
of Doolittle’s Raid cannot be overestimated and deserves further study.
As the historiographical interpretations of the Doolittle Raid are analyzed, I will use both
a military and a social historical lens. The use of a military lens will allow a more detailed
exploration of how historians have interpreted the immediate, intermediate, and long-range
impact the raid had on both American and Japanese military operations in the Pacific Theater
during the war. Using a social lens will provide the opportunity to examine how historians over
time have analyzed the Doolittle Raid’s influence on both the American and Japanese people’s
morale, as well as some of their allies.
Historiographical Interpretations
Although they share a similar topic, historians’ perspectives on the Doolittle Raid vary
considerably. Some historians’ interpretation of the event tended to highlight the immediate
emotional and psychological importance of the raid. It was a demonstration of American might
and resolve that first and foremost avenged the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, and consequently
raised the morale of America and her allies. Other historians focused on the broader tactical and
strategic implications of the bombing of Japan. The raid had a ripple effect on the deployment of
forces in the Pacific that shifted the balance of power in the region permanently away from the
Japanese. Finally, other historians took an additional step back and examined the political and
moral aspects of the raid. The Japanese were expected to retaliate brutally, but the victims of
that retaliation were considered expendable, even Doolittle and his team, because of the expected
benefits to be garnered from a bombing of the Japanese homeland. These diverse perspectives
will be explored more fully in the pages that follow.
4
David G. Styles, in his article, “The Doolittle Raid: Towards a Place in History,”
compared the raid directly to the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. Styles stated that “The
Doolittle Raid was, in its own way, every bit as audacious as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
which provoked it less than four months earlier.”3 Both attacks were long shots. Neither had a
high probability of complete success or even of inflicting significant tactical damage to the
enemy. But both proved that no nation was immune to attack in the modern age of air warfare.
Styles also explored the emotional impact both attacks had on their respective victims to
show a direct correlation towards changes in military strategy and tactics fueled by emotional
responses. One interesting aspect of the raid that Styles discussed was the significant impact it
had for the British. He wrote, “Of particular significance to this event is the effect it had on
British military morale and the fact that, for the British as well as for the Americans, victory
really did start here.”4 According to Styles, Doolittle’s Raid helped to boost British morale after
a long string of territorial losses that were as damaging psychologically to the British as they
were militarily.
The day after Pearl Harbor, British held Hong Kong was taken by the Japanese, a fact
that Styles believed has not been sufficiently recognized in military history. The losses in the
Far East compounded for the British those that they were already coping with in Europe, on the
Atlantic, in the Adriatic, and in the Middle East. Styles observed that the Doolittle Raid was an
incredible morale boost for the British and that it proved “…that the Japanese had awoken a
sleeping giant, and this raid on Tokyo and neighboring cities was a demonstration of the first
stirrings from that giant’s slumber.”5 According to Styles, the Doolittle Raid was a turning point
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
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in the war in the Pacific Theater, which boosted the morale of the Allies, and that would
ultimately lead to a Japanese surrender.
James M. Scott, in his book, Target Tokyo: Jimmy Doolittle and the Raid that Avenged
Pearl Harbor, went well beyond simply discussing the details of the raid itself. Scott dedicated
considerable time to the personal history of Doolittle as well as the extensive planning and
preparations that were required before the first B-25 lifted off from the USS Hornet. Scott also
analyzed in detail the Japanese retaliatory response and changes in tactics that turned the tide of
the war in the Pacific. In particular, he highlighted the punitive response of the Japanese against
the Chinese people and American and Allied P.O.W.’s.
Scott is quick to point out that while the actual raid took up relatively few pages in the
book, it was not his intention to belittle the contributions of the brave airmen that executed the
raid. However, Scott contended that the story of the raid on Tokyo is much more nuanced and
important than history has reported. The importance of a positive propaganda angle on the raid
was so great that the American public was misled about some of the details. Japanese civilian
casualties as well as the loss and capture of American airmen were kept secret. Additionally, the
planners responsible for the raid had anticipated a severe Japanese retaliatory response, but felt
that the goals of the raid were worth the risk.6
Unfortunately, the extent of the Japanese wrath was beyond anything the planners could
have imagined. The Japanese retaliation against the Chinese ultimately resulted in an estimated
quarter of a million casualties as villages were burned, entire families were drowned, and
biological warfare was rained down upon those that had helped the Americans humiliate Japan.
5. Ibid., 40.
6. James M. Scott, Target Tokyo: Jimmy Doolittle and the Raid that Avenged Pearl Harbor (New York: W.
W. Norton and Company, 2015), Kindle Edition, xii-xiv.
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However, Scott does not lose sight of the harrowing exploits of the flyers that made it to China.
His detailed accounts of what they experienced after they dropped their bombs makes this record
of this historical event a human story as well as one of military tactics, maneuvers, and casualty
figures.7
Scott detailed Roosevelt’s determination to demonstrate to the American people that the
dastardly attack on Pearl Harbor would be avenged and that the Japanese homeland was far from
invulnerable. Roosevelt believed that even though there were small successful attacks against
the Japanese, many coming from the American forces stationed in China, a grander
demonstration of American capability was called for as a “…means of carrying home to Japan
proper, in the form of a bombing raid, the real meaning of war.”8 Scott explained that the
president believed it was essential that the Japanese experience the horrors of war on their home
soil.
Scott’s incredibly detailed account of the Doolittle Raid is a combination of military
history, political history, and the personal histories of those directly involved. His approach is
unique in that it examined the topic from the perspectives of Americans, Japanese, and Chinese,
both civilian and military. In this way, he put a human face on a legendary event in the annals of
World War II, and illuminated some less known, but incredibly important aspects of Doolittle’s
Raid.
Robert B. Kane, in his article, “The Doolittle Raid: A 65-Year Retrospective,” discussed
the details of the Doolittle Raid, but took it one step further by examining the raid’s impact on
American morale. Kane concluded that although the raid on Japan had minimal physical
7. Ibid., 388-390.
8. Ibid., 28.
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damage, its psychological impact on both the Japanese and American people was phenomenal.
According to Kane, after suffering many losses in the Pacific Theater early in 1942, the success
of Doolittle’s bombers boosted American morale by not only providing a much needed victory
but also by avenging the attack on Pearl Harbor. On the other side, the raid forced Japanese
military leaders to change their strategy and re-allocate their forces for the possibility of further
attacks on their homeland.9
The overall interpretations by Kane focused through a military lens, but also focused on
some of the psychological effects of the raid. Kane discussed how fears of future attacks from
the mainland prompted the destruction of numerous Chinese cities. Additionally, in retaliation
for assisting the American flyers of the Doolittle Raid, thousands of civilians were slaughtered.
Kane pointed out that these actions only served to further convince Americans that the Japanese
were barbarians and that they had to be defeated.
Desperate to protect the Japanese homeland from another attack, the Japanese military
attempted to regain the upper hand in the Pacific by extending their defensive perimeter. Kane
observed that rather than ensure the safety of Japan, the risky offensives carried out by the
Japanese navy ultimately made the country more vulnerable. In an attempt to destroy the carriers
that had escaped the Pearl Harbor attack, Japanese Admiral Yamamoto launched an unsuccessful
attack on Midway Island. According to Kane, the ultimate result of Doolittle’s Raid was that it
“…portended the massive strategic bombing that virtually destroyed Japan’s war making
capabilities by August 1945.”10 The raid forced a shift in Japanese tactics in the Pacific that was
to be their undoing.
9. Robert B. Kane, “The Doolittle Raid: A 65-Year Retrospective,” Air and Space Power Journal (1987):
7.
10. Ibid.
8
In the book, The Doolittle Raid: The History and Legacy of the First American Attack on
Tokyo During WWII, the Charles River Editors discussed in detail the two primary purposes of
the raid; to demonstrate to the Japanese that they were not invincible and to convince the
American public that the war in the Pacific could be won. It had an unintended consequence of
convincing military planners in the Pacific that airpower could play an important role in the
fight. According to the authors, the Doolittle Raid although “…a small military operation…had
an important psychological effect on the war effort.”11
Their interpretation of the psychological effect on Japan was one of humiliation and
surprise. The Japanese had been firm in their conviction that their homeland was safe from
attack. But after the raid, they became unsure of themselves and began to second guess their
military strategy in the Pacific. Japanese military leaders decided it was more important to
guarantee the safety and security of their homeland, and pulled resources out of more strategic
locations to fortify home defenses. By doing this, the Japanese made themselves vulnerable in
ways that provided the American navy offensive opportunities.12
On the other side of the Pacific, Doolittle’s Raid boosted American morale and helped to
promote the idea that “…Japan was a beatable enemy.” The authors also noted that American
military leaders shared the same fear as many of the Japanese, more attacks on their homeland.
American military leaders changed their strategy and moved military assets from the European
Theater to protect American interests in the Pacific. According to the authors, this had a
significant impact on Roosevelt’s “Europe-first policy.”13 While winning the war in Europe first
11. Charles River Editors, The Doolittle Raid: The History and Legacy of the First American Attack on
Tokyo during WWII (Cambridge: Charles River Editors, LLC, 2015), Kindle edition, 46.
12. Ibid., 45-47.
13. Ibid., 46.
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was a priority, the Japanese could not be given free run in the Pacific, and this two-front war
made accomplishing either goal extremely challenging. Doolittle’s raid made it slightly less
daunting for the American forces in the Pacific.
Clayton K.S. Chun, in his book, The Doolittle Raid 1942: America’s First Strike Back at
Japan, discussed Doolittle’s Raid from the unique aspect of planning a joint military operation.
Chun included copious details from de-classified Air Force records and analyzed the raid from a
military planning perspective. He discussed in detail the military situation in the Pacific Theater
and how the raid had an immediate effect on the war. According to Chun, “The Japanese
government, military, and people were pushed out of their security blanket of imagined
invincibility…to the cold reality of fighting a determined foe.”14 The Japanese were now
vulnerable to attack and were forced to make significant offensive and defensive changes to their
military strategy.
Chun stated that the kernel of the idea of the raid began with Roosevelt when he tasked
the military, shortly after Pearl Harbor, with conducting “…a bombing raid on Japan as soon as
humanly possible to bolster morale of America and her allies.”15 Chun analyzed the intricate
details that were required to successfully execute Roosevelts order. It was determined that the
only way for the operation to be successful was that it had to be carrier-based, using land-based
bombers. This had never been tried before and the feasibility of such an operation was
questionable.
According to Chun, there were three operational attack plans formulated for the raid.
Each differing in what time of day the bombers would take off from the carrier, pre-dawn, dawn,
14. Clayton K.S. Chun, The Doolittle Raid 1942: America’s First Strike Back at Japan (Oxford: Osprey
Publishing Company, 2006), Kindle Edition, location 1467.
15. Ibid., location 543.
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and pre-dusk. Each brought with it different problems concerning visibility at take-off or upon
landing and also target identification. In the end, a combination of weather conditions and
enemy sightings forced Doolittle and his bombers to take off at an unexpected time.16 Chun also
discussed the fact that Doolittle and his crews had been given specific targets to bomb. The
bombers were broken up into groups of three or four and given targets in specific geographic
locations. According to Chun, the targets included “Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, Nagoya, and
Osaka…primary targets included the Nippon Electric Company, Tokyo Gas and Electric
Company, and an army arsenal.” According to Chun, the targets were selected carefully with the
greatest importance given to minimizing civilian casualties.17
Ultimately Chun believed that the raid, although it did not cause serious physical damage
to the Japanese, boosted morale and helped to feed “…the mood for revenge prevalent at the
time.”18 It showed Americans and their allies that Japan was vulnerable and that victory was
attainable. Chun also felt that this small victory forced the Japanese to re-think their military
strategy, creating a sense of uncertainty as to when or where they might be attacked again. Chun
wrote that Admiral Halsey said that Doolittle’s Raid was “…one of the most courageous deeds in
all military history.”19 Chun’s detailed military perspective on the raid highlighted the far
reaching impact it had on military planning on both sides of the conflict in the Pacific.
Paolo E. Coletta, in his article, “Launching the Doolittle Raid on Japan, April 18, 1942,”
covered in great detail all aspects of the Doolittle Raid in 1942. Coletta discussed not only the
actual preparations taken by Doolittle and his bomber crews, but also the strategic and tactical
16. Ibid., location 587-602.
17. Ibid., location 882-890.
18. Ibid., location 1489.
19. Ibid., location 1514.
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planning that the U.S. Navy undertook to accomplish this nearly insurmountable task. He
identified many of the obstacles that had to be overcome to successfully complete this mission.
Coletta also discussed both the military and psychological impact the raid had on the Japanese.
Coletta’s perspective was definitely slanted towards the Navy, stating “…that naval
officers determined the feasibility of using aircraft carriers to launch army bombers, briefed their
crews on carrier operations, taught them and helped them to take off from their extremely limited
deck space, and brought them within range of their target-and that the U.S. Navy was willing to
risk half of its carrier fleet in the Pacific to accomplish the mission.”20 In other words, according
to Coletta, Doolittle’s Raid would not have taken place if it was not for the navy. To back this
claim up, Coletta went into great detail explaining all of the coordination and planning the navy
underwent to prepare for ferrying and launching Doolittle’s bombers.
According to Coletta, one of the greatest obstacles that had to be overcome was keeping
the mission secret. Nothing could be thrown overboard that could identify which ship it came
from and Admiral Mitscher (Captain of the USS Hornet) took a “…meandering route” to
rendezvous with Admiral Halsey.21 The massive fleet steamed deeper into Japanese territory
than any U.S. Navy vessel, with the exception of a few scouting submarines, had since Pearl
Harbor. Any hint of detection required the task force to change course and ultimately the
bombers had to be launched further from Japan than planned. The ships represented too great a
part of America’s total force in the Pacific to risk and once the bombers were launched, they
executed the navy maneuver designated “…get the hell out” at 25 knots.22
20. Paolo E. Coletta, “Launching the Doolittle Raid on Japan, April 18, 1942,” Pacific Historical Review
62, no. 1 (1993): 73.
21. Ibid., 79.
22. Ibid., 83.
12
Although a joint operation, Coletta focused heavily on the challenges the Navy had to
overcome to deliver the Army bombers in an attempt to redress what he perceived as a historical
slight. Coletta pointed out that history’s minimizing of the Navy’s role in the success of
Doolittle’s mission extended to the president, noting that FDR did not mention the Navy at all
when he announced the news of the raid to the American people.23 The author went on to defend
Halsey’s decision to launch the bombers early, stating that the admiral’s assessment of the
immediate and long term situation in the Pacific required it. Although the psychological impact
of an American strike on mainland Japan was worth the risk of losing the 16 B-25’s and their
crews, the carriers could not be lost. Halsey’s awareness of the carriers importance to the long
struggle still ahead in the Pacific made sacrificing Doolittle and his men the right, if difficult,
decision. Although his naval bias was obvious, Coletta expertly documented the significant and
often overlooked contributions that the Navy made to ensure the success of the Doolittle Raid.
Perhaps the most detailed account of the Doolittle Raid came from James Doolittle
himself. In his book I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, Doolittle recounted the history of the
mission that bears his name with a high degree of detail and humility. As he recalled, his
involvement began when General Hap Arnold asked him, “…Jim, what aircraft do we have that
can take off in 500 feet, carry a 2,000 pound bomb load, and fly 2,000 miles with a full crew?”24
A few days later, Arnold called Doolittle back to his office and started him planning the most
audacious mission of his already illustrious career.
Historian Doolittle put his mission in perspective by detailing the state of the conflict in
Europe and in the Pacific. The Japanese were racking up victory after victory with alarming
23. Ibid., 86.
24. General James H. Doolittle, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again (New York: Bantam, 1991). Kindle
Edition, location 3786.
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speed and the situation in Europe, while not quite as grim, was hardly cause for celebration. The
Allies needed a morale boost and President Roosevelt had determined that the bombing of the
Japanese homeland would be just the tonic needed. However, the planning and execution of
such a mission would have to be carried out in utter secrecy. If the Japanese caught wind of the
operation their dominance of the Pacific theater would turn the raid into a disaster not only for
the airmen involved but also for the precious aircraft carriers that would deliver them to within
striking range. Security was so tight that during a briefing when the president asked about the
bombing of Japan, General Hap Arnold was purposefully vague about the specifics.25
Throughout his description of the planning, execution, and the aftermath of the bombing
of Japan, Doolittle provided not only unique first-person information, but also details only
available to an insider in military circles. Renowned as a dare-devil, a brawler, and an aviation
innovator, Doolittle acquitted himself well as a historian. Rather than take the opportunity for
self-aggrandizement, Doolittle remained focused on the facts as he knew them and reserved the
praise for his superiors and the men that served under him. After the mission at the White
House where he was awarded the Medal of Honor by the President, Doolittle said to his mentor,
General Hap Arnold, “…while I was grateful, I would spend the rest of my life trying to earn
it…”26 It was his humility and candor that added an extra element of credibility to the historical
record Doolittle penned, making it both a fascinating military and personal story.
These historians did share a common theme in that they all recognized the psychological
importance of Doolittle’s Raid. Some focused more on the morale boost it provided to America
or the Allies while others explored the profound effect it had on Japanese confidence in their
25. Ibid., location 3937.
26. Ibid., 4747.
14
own invulnerability. As the vast majority of players in the event were military, it is no surprise
that these historians each employed a military lens to examine it and its aftermath. One
important aspect of their analysis that was lacking was the political lens. While war is often
considered a strictly military function, World War II involved every nation on the planet to some
degree. Cooperation, conflict, and compromise in the political arena were as important to the
planning and execution of the war as deploying troops. Some passing mention was made
regarding building tension between Japan and America in the Pacific, but the overall complexity
of a multi-nation war from a governmental point of view was conspicuously lacking.
Personal bias in the evaluating and reporting of the historical events surrounding
Doolittle’s Raid were not prevalent among these historians. The only significant exception was
Paolo E. Coletta, who clearly had a bias in favor of the importance of the Navy’s contributions to
Doolittle’s success. However, he stated at the outset that it was his intention to shed light on
naval involvement since much of the historical record centers itself on the exploits of the B-25’s
and not enough on the complex and dangerous task of getting them within striking distance.
However, Coletta did manage to highlight the Navy’s accomplishments without diminishing the
accomplishments of Doolittle and his men.
Doolittle’s Raid was a seminal event of World War II. Although the bombing did not
inflict serious physical damage to Japan or impact their overall ability to continue to manufacture
military supplies, it did have a profound psychological effect on them. Understanding how and
why a handful of lightly armed bombers reaching the Japanese homeland initiated a domino
effect on events that ultimately led to the Japanese defeat is vital to an analysis of the war in the
Pacific. Before Doolittle’s Raid, Japan seemed invincible in the Pacific and the complexity of
how things changed after the raid needs to be more thoroughly studied. The future research in to
15
Doolittle’s Raid needs to focus less on the military aspects of the event and more on the political
ramifications in America, among her Allies, and among the Axis Powers as well.
As the title of the book Thirty Seconds over Tokyo implies, Doolittle’s forces were
engaged with the enemy for only a microscopic fraction of the time World War II was fought. In
that tiny sliver of time however, the bombers reminded the Japanese that war was not without its
consequences. Author and historian Michael Lind compared war to surgery that is required to
keep the body politic healthy.27 The Japanese thought that America was reluctant to fight
because they believed that the loss of American lives would be an immoral act. The Japanese
had engaged in a campaign of conquest thinking that they could continue to expand their empire
like a cancer indefinitely. When they attacked Pearl Harbor they forced America to act to
surgically remove them as a threat to the health of the Pacific body of nations. Doolittle’s Raid
was the first cut in that operation, and is still heralded as one of the most significant military
operations of World War II.
27. Michael Lind, Vietnam: The Necessary War (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1999), 220.
16
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Review 62, no. 1 (1993): 73-86.
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