Italian Reconstruction and "Depressed Areas":
The Marshall Plan in the "Mezzogiorno"
by Pier Paolo 0' Attorre
University of Bologna
Working Paper Series #11
Pier Paolo 0'Attorre was a visiting scholar at the Center for European Studies in 1987.
;(
PIER PAOLO D'ATTORRE
Italian Reconstruction and "Depressed Areas": The Marshall Plan in the "Mezzo­
giorno"
"Per capita output in the Mezzogiorno in 1951 was equal to 54-55% of that in the
centre and north; in 1985, it was 60-61%.
years of special programs have reduced tie gap by 10%. At this rate,
Thirty five
it
will take 280 years to eliminate the disequilibrium between North c(gJ\South".
With
those
economy,
words,
P.Saraceno,
emphasizes
Italian
postwar
Italian
"miracle",
the
fact
the most
important
authority on the Southern
that economic dualism is a structural element in
history. The economic history of reconstruction and the ensuing
or
"boom",
cannot
be written or understood if this aspect
is forgotten. (1)
This essay proposes to highlight only one aspect of this big problem:partecipation
by
the
South in the European Recovery Program, the Marshall Plan. The question
that keeps arising in the less-than-abundant literature on the subject is simple,
in
light
of
Saraceno's
words
quoted
above:
Did
the
ERP
represent a lost
opportunity for the South?
The
prevailing
view in contemporary pUblic opinion, from Rome to Palermo at any
rate, certainly was one of culpable negligence, of almost complete exclusion from
the
benefits
opinion
much
as
directly
first,
is
with
the
economic
international
aid.
This
is
not
in line with the facts. My
that the Southern economy benefited from the ERP, even though not as
the
industrial
or
indirectly,
agrarian
Agency for
propping
of
the
up
laws,
North,
of
course.
Thanks to that flow of resources,
major changes took shape in the Italian Mezzogiorno:
quite
Development
emphatically called "Reform"; second, the Public
of the South, "Cassa per il Mezzogiorno"; third, a
in Naples and Sicily of a portion of the industry that had grown up
War.
That said,
proposals
put
it
forward
seems to me indisputable that the most original
in
those years by the SVIMEZ, an institution
halfway between
planning
staff
a self organization of the "meridionalist" intellectuals and a
inside
technicians
and
stimulating
debate
public
students,
on
industry,
who
the
had
were
been the
'depressed
set
aside
or
distorted.
The
outstanding figures in the most
areas" that the country has ever known,
qui-ckly found themselves isolated. (2)
The failure of this pressure group reminds one of the other failures of southern
"enlightenment"
even before
the
20th Century.
Those who looked for planned
administration of the ERP fund, for coordinated action between public and private
actors, or at least for the singling out of development areas with differentiated
roles
or
flexible, decentralized legislative instrumets had, instead, to put up
with quite different choices made by the central government with decisive support
from traditional Southern elites.
Of course, history is not linear, but we can
disting~ish
two phases. A brief (and
disastrous)
season of enthusiastic free-trade liberism was followed by a longer
season
bureaucratic
of
emigration,
the
growth
conflict
social
political
point
met
an
with
parties,
interventionism,
and,
of
unemployment
lastly,
view,
adequate
and that
of
incapable of
containing
wholesale
and territorial disequilibria, sharp
the related phenomena of organized crime. From a
we can maintain that progressive meridional ism never
response
from
the trade
union movement and left wing
this was the most important reason for its defeat. There are
a number of social reasons for this situation. In the 140s and '50s trade unions
and
left
wing
World War
parties,socialists and communists.were stronger than in the post
I period,
but
these forces chiefly represented agricultural daily
workers and (a few) industrial workers, that is, a small part of southern society.
The former pressed heavily for collectivization of large landed estates (and not
only
that),
industry.
while
When
the
latter focused on safeguarding the jobs created by war
such policies
were succeeded in the mid-50s by less defensive,
corporative and traditional strategies, many basic choices had already heen made:
migration
abroad and to
"agrarian
reform"
the
had divided
North had
resumed
intensively;
the so-called
the agrarian support to the Left; the Cassa was
bringing
in
significant funds and job opportunities that were not small, unless
compared to
government
and
the
what
was
helped
to
despite the
for
North.
In a word, social control by
Labor support for structural change. In this context
whether
demand,
back by emigres.
win
the
expectations of many reformers - the South became linked to
"growth-train",
support
happening in
as
an inexhaustible reserve of labor, an indirect
or a help to the balance of payments, thanks to money sent
These events, and others as well, took place not only in the
years of ERP ... Such was the result of the Marshall Plan for the South. (3)
Postwar depression of the South: analysis and purposes of the SVIMEZ.
In 1938 over-population appears as the greatest problem of southern areas, even
in
a comparative perspective. There was no great improvement from 1861 to 1938,
in
spite
75
were
between
7000
of
North and
in
agriculture,
of
were
were
3.8 million
individuals. In fact, in 1861
the
South is even more pronounced. Per capita income in 1936 was
North,
4700 in the South, where 60% of production came from
as compared to
several
40% in the northern areas. We can investigate and
other indicators of relative backwardness. One is housing: 35.6
the Italian population
located there.
"overcrowded",
The
totalling
unemployed for every hundred who had work; in 1938, 166. Disequilibrium
lire
discuss
emigration
lived in the South, but only 28,5% of available rooms
More
than
even before
half
of
all
houses are
here classified as
bombings which took place during World War II.
the
war, in fact, made things worse. In the NOrth 12.4% of the industrial plants
damaged,
in the South 35%. Reconstruction in 1946-1947 was slower here: by
1947 8.7% of
national capital was invested in the South in comparison to 13.9%
of
30 years
discussion
of
before.
the
In this
general situation, it is easy to understand why
"questione meridionale" became more pressing, especially on
the economic ways to solve it. (4)
Reading
the
by the
clear
South was
various
ideas
analyses
of
dating from 1945-1948, the observer is impressed
the SVIMEZ. The Association ofr the Development of the
a particular form of brain trust or "eggheads club", gathered in 1946
by
a common interest in enlightening and advising those in the political power.
It
is interesting to note that many prominent people in the SVIMEZ were involved
in
the
and
experience of the '30s, in the pUblic sector, such as Molinari
planning
Saraceno, or private enterprises, such as Cenzato and Guidotti, for example.
Many of them were in the '50s Christian Democrats, some were Socialists, but they
all
looked at
econom)
with
the
international
watchful
market priorities
in
particularly tough:
(5)
Italian
on "depressed areas" and development
Their position on state intervention or free
reconstruction
was
clear. Molinari in 1948 was
"Private enterprise is absolutely insufficient to work in
southern environment - he wrote -. We need a massive, planned, coherent and
the
continuous
Italy".
intervention
And
Cenzato,
everyone of the
by
eyes.
debate
itself".
state
(6)
of the state to modify the economic disequilibrium in
one of the directors of the S/'IIE, said: "The war disabused
notion, if any still believed it, that the South can recover
But in what direction should this intervention take place? The
needed to promote emigration, but it was not realistic in forecasting 300­
400 thousand emigrants a year. Europe needed qualified workers, but the southern
unemployed
were unskilled
everywhere.
and
they
threatened
to
swamp the
labour market
So they criticized the government's propagandistic approach to this
problem.
relieve
Emigration could
rational
cultivation,
southern
Molinari
agriculture,
wrote
this
but even allowing
for more
approach did not resolve the
dating from the years before the first world war, and
problem of
backwardness
this
not resolve the structural depression of the '50s. The SVIMEZ ideas
could
on agrarian reforms are the same as those of Man1io Rossi Doria, another meridio­
nalista able
of
the
to
reconsider
the great research work of the 1305 - the inquires
INEA - in order to plan for the future. "Agrarian reform" means overall
modernization:
not only the redistribution of "latifondo " estates, but also the
amalgamation of small properties.
Hower,
Government
should not overvalue the prospects for intervention in the
primary
sector:
"Even the most
thorough
projects
of agrarian modernization
cannot absorb more than 10.000 workers a year. Not very much can be expected from
agriculture".
It1s
a chilling conclusion for the hopes and electoral promises
of both majority and
opposi~ion
(7)
the leader of the SVIMEZ. public works are more useful. They
For Saraceno.
parties. And it was formulated in March 1948 .....
can offer a take-off thrust. a big push; they can increase incomes and. therefore.
demand
for
manfactured products. In his view. public works can employ thousands
of unskilled workers. "State intervention". he wrote in his Elementi per un piano
economico 1949-1952.
(land
reclamation.
which
to
realize
"must
start with the great. national public works sectors
roads. ports. railroads. etc.). Those are the key sectors in
a satisfactory mass of investments and to produce a revenue
increase without precedent in the South".
The
infrastructural needs of the South were dramatic. For example. in the Mezzo­
giorno there were 10 Kills of roads, against 50 Kills in the North,every 100 Kms square.
In Calabria.
to
wells; ninety
percent
this
background
create
quote
a regional example. 70% of the towns had no sewers and
of
the province of Cosenza had no school building. Given
Saraceno added
- other public investments are necessary to
new environments. to localize new firms. to create mixed - pUblic-private
companies. and so on. In the view of
industry
are
the SVIMEZ. public work projects without
completely useless. Molinari underlined that: "This big push must
not be led by electoral priorities or broken into small. incoherent local works".
All
the SVIMEZ students agreed that the South needs studies before intervention.
a "zoning"
capital,
works.
approach, able to select regional vocations. guarantees for invested
and an agency for coordinating and quickly implementing projects and
it
••
independent of the government and of organized and informal lobbies. They
advocated
a shift
permanent
base for a new economic structure. "Industrialization linked to a plan
of
public
works
of emergency approacheds to the South in order to build up a
might become the sheet anchor for the South"
~~olinari
wrote.
Other intervention (i.e. into the agricultural sector or to modernize traditional
handcrafts)
are complementary. not substitutive, for industrialization. And this
tndustrial
priority must
be reaffirmed
in
speaking about the future of war
industries in the South, iron and steel plants, or new sectors as oil refineries.
But
no
hypothesis
the
natural
of
result
industrial "monoculture" can be accepted, even if it is
of
a
"forced" development of more competitive industrial
sectors such as buildings and cement. (8)
The
industrialization of
'depressed
areas'
into
industrial
take-off
the
South is
'prosperous
the
only
areas'.
key to
transforming the
According to the SVIMEZ, if the
were to be set back, the present difficult situation would
continue for ten or twenty years into the future. The general and indirect costs
of
private enterprise must
equalizing
down
by public action as much as by
northern and southern enterpreneurs competing in the market. But the
is
problem
be brought
how to finance this public intervention? The answers of the SVIMEZ
are three: first, to utilize in the South all the savings of the Mezzogiorno.
In this regard the paradox is that for every hundred lire deposited in southern
banks,
55
only
preferred
not
to
bonds
public
are
and
invested,
against
73
in
the North. The southern banks
risk on industrial activities. The South was the kingdom of
postal
savings,
and
the
lotto,
was
the typical "risk"
investment. Therefore, the credit system needed reform.
The
second way
to finance
attract
northern
In this
regard,
was
the take-off was to employ fiscal incentives to
capitals
also
towards
the role of a new financial agency for industrial loans
seen to be decisive. (9)
international
people
credits
agreed
on
more
realistic
size
of
machinery.
Counterpart
and
The third and most interesting here was to direct
the counterpart fund of the ERP to the South. Many
this last approach, as we shall see. But the SVIMEZ was much
about the
southern
industrial investments in southern areas.
Marshall Plan than any other institution. The small
enterprises
"They can never
mad
it difficult to utilize loans and American
know what the USA is offering" said Saraceno. The
funds, underlined Molinari also before the starting of the program,
will
become
a bookeeping trick: aid will only replace ordinary expenses. The
ERP
has to
realize it goals as soon as possible. Therefore the Administration
will
prefer
investments.
existing
The
not
and
virtual partners, short-term and not long-term
Plan is not a plan for the development of depressed
Marshall
areas. (10)
When ·point IV' was advanced by Truman, SVIMEZ judged the resources available for
Italy insufficient to solve the problems of the southern economy; the conclusion
was
pessimistic,
and
opinion
problem
Applying
modern
the
not
resigned. An alliance between an enlightened public
an efficient state - the dream of every reformist approach to the
Southern
by
but
-
realize much more than a mere reliance on US loans.
could
planning
survey
techniques
for example "zoning" purposed in 1942
Regional Resource Development,
edited by the American Planning
Association
and the laws to promote industrial areas introduced in the '30s,
SVIMEZ
presented in 1948 a practical example of its purposes for Campania.
the
(11) It
remained a good
Association
Marshall
known
for the Industrialization of the
the
origins
of
by counterpart
financed
w
~
South~rnothope
remained,during the
the idea of public intervention in the Mezzogiorno. Well
Plan days,
are
theoretical exercise, as many other projects of the
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. From 1950 the Cassa,
funds
and IBRD
loans,
became
an
agency able to
administer international credits for backward areas.
It's
a great
mistake,
however,
to
consider this
experience
as
just the
realization of the projects of Saraceno and Molinari. The 'Cassa" was the result
of a compromise between the modernizing approach of the SVIMEZ and the influence
of
forces:
other
conservative
administrators,
public
resistance
of southern traditional elites and
wishes of northern industries fearful of any project of
new competing firms in the South, ambiguous pressures coming from the ECA. Last
but
not
least,
conflicts
and
the
so-called
In this
decision-makers.
implemented
works
(as
in
in
reestablishment
the
'50s,
political
context,
of
public
order - threatened by social
subversion - became an important focus for
Italian
legislation
on depressed areas,
was more concerned with land reclamation and public
the pre World War I period) than with industrialization. Only in
the 1960s did this trend change significantly, and some ideas of the SVIMEZ came
to
be realized.
Before this,
however,
the
SVIMEZ
aroused
suspicion
and
misgivings for its technocratic autonomy and superpartisanship, among the right,
the center, and also the left of the Italian political system. (12)
Saraceno,
Rossi
Doria,
influential
voices
during
years
on
the
of
and Molinari
Southern
public
were
never the
unique,
nor the most
opinion. Other leaders were prominent
of Marshall Plan. The relative absence of historical studies
them is surprising in this context: see, for example, the book of P.Barucci,
Ricostruzione, pianificazione, Mezzogiorno.
Inside the
Christian
neapolitan
Corbino,
the
party men
building enterpreneurs,
a liberal
speaker
a planning
without
Democratic
of
the
the leader of the
the founder of the Popular Party,
landed elites, were more influential. All of them opposed
some such as Sturzo and Corbino wanted industrialization
intervention,
the so-called "meridionalismo liberista"; others
wished
for
It
not surprising, therefore, that the representatives of northern industry
is
should
more
Porzio,
professor in the University of Napoli, Carmine de Martino,
approach:
state
Sturzo,
like
support
Conference on
Of
course
students
state expenditure, but only for purposes of land reclamation.
them
the
those
of
and criticize Molinari and Saraceno, for example at the
Marshall Plan organized by the Confindustria in March 1948.
opposed
the
to
the
SVIMEZ
"boys" could make use of important
southern problem, who were critics of the too rigid Keynesian
approach utilized by Saraceno himself. Vera Lutz surely produced very interesting
reflections
on the
"depressed",
approach.
SVIMEZ,
backward
The more
theoretical
based on
but
basis
the
the
lack
of attention paid to an economy which was not simply
(if
not underdeveloped) in a Keynesian demand-side
traditional and orthodox studies of F. Voechting offered a
for the opposition, and they influenced the final compromise
priority of
pre-industrialization
investments. (13) Among the
academic critics, and the traditional conservatism of the southern
landed elites,
the
leaders of the Christian Democratic Party tried in fact to
come to a very difficult compromise, able to strengthen their role of "brokers"
not only among different social interests but also between center and periphery.
Men
such as Aldisio and Scelba, prominents of the Sicilian DC, Silvio Gava, in
Ntf'~n.
and others,
knew
how
important
credit was for landowners guaranteed by land
reclamation state programs but, at the same time, could not forget the interests
of
other
sectors
of
Southern society, i.e. the middle classes in the cities.
At the end, they were in favour of state support for existing industries without
breaking
the
free enterprise and private initiative in the South.
primacy of
ERP aids must become the economic key of their direct administration of economic
resources
against
in order to keep a new clientele and electorate. Therefore, they were
planning
attitude
bill,
criteria
and
overpartisan
agencies.
An
example of their
was the implementation of the so-called "legge Togni". The goal of the
approved in 1947 immediately before ERP, was the industrialization of the
South.
Putting
it
into effect meant some incentives for Southern industries.
The
prominent members
the
limits
Therefore
short-term
of CD party achieved their political purpose, extending
of the law not only to new plants but also to exsisting industries.
the
bill
did
credits:
not grant few long-term loans, but rather many small,
political
consent
was
more
important
than
economic
efficiency.
Another example of
the differenftbetween Christian Democratic leaders and the
SVIMEZ "boys" was the evaluation of the linea Einaudi, the def1ationist monetary
policy
started
in
opposition,
because
industries,
the
class
savings
the
this
summer
1947. While the
monetary policy
had
SVIMEZ
never concealed its
negative effects on Southern
leaders of the party looked at the defense of middle and upper
as
Treasury Minister,
a social
duty.
Giuseppe Pella,
Silvio
Gava
was a strict collaborator of
in the years of the Marshall Plan, and he
policy,
which drew upon Einaudi·s ideas. In this context, however,
the most important
role was played by Donato Meniche11a, as new research was
shared
his
clarified. (14)
The discussion on the Marshall Plan in the South.
The
administration
among
ERP
all
was
of the
Marshall aid became the most important battlefield
the political groups after the elections of April 1948. Before this,
only one item of electoral propaganda in Southern Italy. May 1948 is
overwhelmed by a wave of resolutions, votes, and appeals, all aimed at reserving
some
amount
situation,
of Marshall resources for every town in the South. In this chaotic
local
busy showing
government
should
the
wounds
prefects, political and economic institutions were
of
secular
poverty,
in order to touch the central
and to influence the American Administrators of the ECA. Southerners
for
vote
attitude
notables,
De
of many
now formed
Gasperi
and
wait
for
consideration~
this was also the
Italo-American trade unionists involved in the campaign who
a pressure group in the States, for "South in the ERP". "Give the
Mezzogiorno absolute priority in the Marshall Plan" was the slogan of De Gasperi
J.
himself.
It
After
so many words, we need action: that was the opinion also of the
most important American technical mission in Southern Italy. (15)
In May
1948, McCall
Authority,
studied
a month.
The
was
backward
areas.
today,
reclamation
the
Tomlinson, two experts
from the Tennessee Valley
Southern economy by travelling around the country for
report of this mission - the Italian supervisor was Manlio Rossi
Doria
areas
and
not
p~sitive
for the meridionalisti favoring industrialization of
"Agriculture is the most important resource in all the studied
and
it must be in
can relieve demographic
the
future",
wrote the
Americans. Land
pressure and unemployment much more than
a completely hipothetical industrialization. The South needs hybrid corn rather
than
for
up
mechanical
equipment;
new industrial
in
firms.
modern
agricultural machines, rather than credits
The social problem of agrarian reform is swallowed
generalizations. The report concludes, in fact, that backward areas need
laws to promote the settlement of farmers in newly reclamed lands and financial
aid
to
help
economic activities there. The solution is simple: "To import the
American experience
into
Italy".
Then
they announced
the idea of an Italo­ American agency to develop Southern areas. (16)
Nevertheless,
McCall
and Tomlinson thought of a link between the Marshall Plan
and the development of backward areas.
Not
many
should
the
people
concern
in
the
ECA,
depressed
prevalent
however, were convinced that the Marshall Plan
areas. As the SVIMEZ experts understood immediately,
approach was
different, and long-term commitments clashed with
the letter of the ECA law of April 1948. Zellerbach, the American representative
in
Italy, spoke frankly to Southern political elites in September 1948: "Don 't
look at
the
ERP as a magic amulet. Instead of working out many plans, we need
a few projects
It
was
able
not easy
interesting
to
to guarantee the best results as soon as possible". (17)
to
guell
review the
Democratic Party:
the
all the public expectations. In this regard it is
activity of
a Committee
inside
the
Christian
Comitato permanente per il Mezzogiorno. This was a type
of interest group which became more and more influential. Its chairman was Luigi
Sturzo.
Initally it supported all local and regional requests because 3 billion
~",ecl
dollars (!) of aid to Italyrhad been designated in 1948-49. When those estimates
appeared
the
unreal,
"Southern
every
government decisions belied earlier policy statements on
priority in the ERP", the Committee changed its tune. It refused
pressure
generic
and
reserve
for
planning available resources, but demanded for the South a
of
2/3rds of the counterpart funds utilized in every economic
sector.
This
to
seemed
accept
grants
and
a strong
the
claim, but it was not. In fact it induced the Committee
general criteria to utilize ERP resources: private channels for
loans,
and
refusal
to fi nance i ndustri a1 "dup 1i cates" through
counterpart funds. (18)
Even
Carlo
underlining
Sforza,
on
industrialization
Minister
the
before
of
Corriere
Foreign
the
transforming
an international instruction on it. (19)
Affairs,
necessity
not
entered
to
in
this debate,
improvise
Southern
the civil environment, as if there were
This argument of "environment" gradually became an alibi to channel capital only
towards
as
a substitute
Luigi
the
reclamation and public works and overall to use counterpart funds
land
Sturzo
ERP:
for
ordinary expenses. (20) After the first 6 months of ERP,
launched a press campaign against the "erpivori", the hoarders of
Northern
industrialists,
inefficient
public enterprises, protected
sectors such as iron and steel, bureaucratic administration. The "erpivori" must
be fought
planning
added
of
ERP
counterpart
Committee
resources,
funds
can understand,
the
for
this
as
land
was
in the winter of 1948 - not by the central
SVIMEZ
said,
but by a law affecting all the
reclamation and public works in the South. As one
much
less
than what they had requested six months
previously. (21)
On
the
other side, the Committee was unable to coordinate requests coming from
areas. Owing to its regional autonomy, Sicily for example - the region
Southern
of
its
established direct relations with the United States and asked for
Sturzo
participation in the ERP as a nation, like Trieste. The alternative to this
participation
allocation
could
of
be
loans
as Alessi
for
specified to an amazed De Gasperi - the
41 billion lire and counterpart funds for 82 billion
lire, for the first year of the ERP,at least! (22)
In the
same months the long-term program presented by Italy to OEEC considered
the problem of depressed areas in a really generic way. The only concrete aspect
of
the
government policy was support for emigration, and this aspect in itself
did not produce great successes. (23)
In
spite
of
continuous mumbling,
conservative
groups in the South adjusted
themselves to those trends.
The
evolving
situation in Sicily itself can help us understand this process of
local adaptation to central policy.
In Sicily the
industrialist,
reformistic
the
State
SVIMEZ
and
ideas
E. La
were strongly supported by G.Frasca Po1ara, an
Loggia,
an old
representative
of the prefascist
group of F. S. Nitti. Industrialization of the South is a duty for
noted La Loggia - since it would remedy secular exploitation. ERP
resources
had
to be utilized by Sicilians themselves: this is the key of real,
and not just formal, regional self government.
But
in
about
in
1948, many members of the regional government were much more cautious
industrialization. The son of E. La Loggia, Giuseppe, an emerging notable
the
CD
available
party,
for
reclamation
preferred
a more traditional use of the Counterpart funds
the South. He signed that they should finance public works, land
and the rationalization of agriculture. But above all the money had
to be managed by the regional government and the consortia of landowners without
recourse
to
against
the
agrarian
every
a new agency or the adoptation of central planning. They all were
Labour movement
reform,
its
request for "real planning based on the
which is the fundamental problem and the necessary premise to
industrial
agrarian
in
investment".
policy of
"We must
not
go
along the old roads of the
the fascist regime" said the Communist P. Colaianni in the
regional assembly in 1948.
Those
on
three different
the
Marshall
favorable
the
to
spring
Plan
spending
of
They
Has
utilization
policies
tne
in
the South. But here the groups prevailed were which
the
ERP funds in public works and land reclamation. In
defeated by the local leaders of the CD party, such as F.
were ready
industrialization
local
were also evident in the meeting of Catania
1949, the strong autonomismo of the regional government led by
Giuseppe Alessi
Restivo.
approaches
and
of
to
renounce every request for central support for
economic
self-government,
the funds.
(24)
in
exchange for controls on
Such adaptation to central government
involved Gava, Scelba, Aldisio and other notables of DC. They also led
Committee for the South to abandon the Sturzo campaign against the Erpivori
and, at the end, to end the role of the Committee itself.
Counterpart funds and public expense.
In Spring
1949 the
effects
of
the
so-called "linea Pella" oecarse clear to
everyvbody.
flinGS
the
of
of parliamentary approval, the Treasury used counterpart
In spite
for
not
i nfrast ructura 1 investments, 0Ut to aid the public budget. "In
first tvo years of ERP, the South wi -11 receive lu6 oi l l i on 1i re o-f aid, 1/3
total
the
anc not
amount,
Frasca Polara, this approval
1S
2/3. But, noted experts such as Cecoparno ana
not sure. For example, 20 billion lire allocated
for Southern railways have been recently devolved to relieve the budget deficit".
Therefore
of
1949
the
moment was not right, for dissolving the Comitato. In the spring
strikes of
the
agr)cultural
workers began
in
the South and many
conflicts became violent. (25)
The
ECA mission in Italy perceived the danger of this double trend. The famous
"Country Study" of
1949, which harshly criticized government economic policy,
can be seen as the result of that worried perception in Washington.
The American press described the social situation of the South in the same terms
as did Italian Communists, and it criticized the Truman Administration also for
the
where
waste of
American
carabinieri
"Communists
are
shot
aid in Italy. After the events of Melissa and Crotone,
at strikers, the American Vice Consul in Palermo said:
capitalizing
of
the
on
the disappointment of the workers". (26) The
first
answer
Mission was a massive, propaganda campaign. Exhibitions,
radio
programs, booklets, even the pupi and the cantastorie, the famous puppets
and ballad singers of Sicilia, were utilized in favour of the MP and of "western
civilization".
example of
The
this
"story of
a poor girl saved by a generous friend" is an
propaganda: let us read the last (and badly written) verse of
the song:
"Vegliava dal Ciel 1a Provvidenza
e giunser di 10ntano a1fin gli aiuti.
Ecco grano e carbon, pane e semenza,
aratri, ferro e viveri ottenuti
senza pretender nulla in cambio e senza
esser torturati 0 spremuti.
Tutto offri generoso il donatore,
tutto dette con puro ed onesto cuore". (27)
But all this was not sufficient to show that aid was producing prosperity.
In fact
also
welfare
the
and a consumer goods boom were unknown in the South. This was
conclusion of Fortune,
events of Crotone to the American taxpayer, Fortune presented an interview
the
an agricultural
with
was
"a communi st
many
billions
which
He
was
not
anti -Ameri can:
"Wi thout thei r
of dollars to the landowners. Funds cannot reach uS,not the land
The owners
Landed
by fertilizers,
estates
seeds,
waste the money
in spite of
investi~g
it in
should be redistributed, and we have to be helped
irrigation
and so on. Then, you'll see an increase in
agricultural production". In this way Fortune underlined the necessity
Southern
much
poverty".
the war, we all could now be dead. But they make a present of
needs them.
agriculture.
daily worker of Calabria. Marcovicchio, as many others,
for
after
generosity
of
American magazine. In attempting to explain
an agrarian
reform to contain communism, a subject on which Zellerbach was
more cautious. In fact the tycoon of San Francisco often spoke against the
projects
of
landlords.
technical
Antonio Segni and indirectly helped the opposition of the Southern
The
ECA mission
in
even when
approach,
Italy,
after two years of study, preferred a
De Gasperi oriented himself towards a new more
courageous line, really not politically painless for his majority. (28)
De
Gasperi
successes
understood
of
the
Democratic Party.
that
left,
but
Minister
something must be done to contain not only the
also
the difficulties inside the same Christian
Porzio
resigned in the summer of '49, judging the
government deaf to the needs of the South.
During 1949, a period of
communist
production
new pressures
stagnation,
the
permanent committee started
again
growth,
of
the
American
Southern
mumblings about
public
opinion (the
its activity) and, last but not least, the
critics coming from the Northern industrial regions (their slogan was "meno mac­
cheroni
piu macchinari") created a dangerous mixture. Christian Democrats were
influenced
in
the
and La
by those
winter
t>'la lfa
of
pressures and seemed to be able to implement a new policy
'49-'50.
The seventh De Gasperi Government, where Campilli
- 1eaders of the "moderni zer" group - had a role as promi nent as
Pella,
passed
also
important laws for the South, utilizing counterpart funds.
Those most investigated by historical
studies
are the so-called "Sila" and
"stra1cio" laws. These were neither an organic agrarian reform, not a "battering
ram"
against
traditional
interpretation.
economic
of
class
Nevertheless
situation.
relationships,
in
~any
areas,
as described by an apologetic
those
laws deeply changed the
A new small holder class emerged. Also since it grew out
a rather ephemeral class, the peasant front against landowners was divided.
In some areas there was a real improvement of agricultural productivity. (29)
The
i nstituti on of
with
the
became
not
Marshall
counterpart
a planning
credits
agency,
from international
Administration.
Cassa never
of
"Cassa per 11 Mezzogi orno" became much more 1inked up
funds.
The project of an agency for the South
a leading idea of the SVIMEZ. But the Cassa was implemented by the govt
as
was
the
became
limited,
the
Judicja1
but simply as an institutional instrument to draw
banks and
concerns
the
th£
"Point
IV Program" of the Truman
were stronger than planning priorities. The
Tennessee Valley Authority of the South: JuriSdiction
the administration was not committed to a brain trust independent
of Southern
pressures
notables.
On
the
contrary,
every minister
(agriculture, public works, interior, and so on) could interfer in the projects,
speeding up or restricting state intervention. (30)
At
the
same
time,
as
Francesco
Compagna noted,
the Cassa was outside the
democratic control of the parliament and local government. It was not the school
for
awakening
Domenico
bill,
in
countries
Romano,
underlined
our
economic
the
that
extolled by the books of M.F. Neufeld and M. Carlile.
majority
the
system,
speaker in the parliamentary discussion of the
Cassa refused "every criterion of planning because
based on free market and free enterprise, it meant
stiffness
and waste". Thus the intervention of the first decade (1950-1960) of
activity
produced no surprise, although 1000 billion lire were expended. It is
interesting
for
the
to note that the Americans did not screen the public works projects
South,
investments,
as
so as
happened
not
in
to
'48
give
and
the
Italians the occasion for delaying
'49. They discovered that there was an
incredible
lag
even 7 years - between allocation and assignments of funds
which
caused
by complex procedures: 25 Italian offices, for example, had
to
was
screen
and approve a land reclamation program before work could start. (31)
There were
two
great
failures
unsuccesful
mobilization
construction,
in
fact,
of
of
meant
the first decade of the Cassa. First, the
Southern
enterpreneurship.
Infrastructure
contracts, first for Northern firms. Second, no
long-term credit companies helped the Southern industrialists, except in Sicily,
in the decisive years 1950-1955, despite the suggestions of Cenzato and Guidotti
in 1948 and many others after them.
Economic aspects of the ERP in the South.
If the Northern
e~onomy
but
as
over
financed
il
all
loans,
the
South~ew
the ERP much more as Lire Fund, which
agriculture and public works (also through agrarian laws and Cassa per
Mezzogiorno)
First
utilized Marshall aid in grants and counterpart funds,
of
than
all,
as direct aid. There were two main consequences of this.
residents in South completely identified the Marshall Plan with
traditional centralized public works and land reclamation projects.
Secondly,
many
less
l~s
did
not
mean
the absence of American industrial
investments. On the contrary, in much of the South, we may see that the Marshall
Plan
helped support the "open door" policy of American companies in Italy. This
trend,
not
while
not so unilinear as "revisionists" such as Kolko once thought and
so important as the propaganda of the Left often claimed, was nevertheless
significant.
policy
of
but
loans
equipment.
could
The year 1950 was a turning point not 9nly for Italian Government
also
for
for
small
Until
participate
American initiative in the South. Under the ECA programs
size firms,
then,
in
finally
some enterprise could buy American
in fact, only the SME, a Southern electricity company,
the
loans program. But this fact is not as important as
was a change in the nature of US commitment.
From the time of the Korean war, there was a new interest by ECA-MSA in Italian
mining resources,
minerals
were the
state
both
especially mercury,
and
object
sulphur and oil. These three strategic
of much bargaining among Italians and Americans, in
private enterprizes.
Two years after the SVIMEZ debate, the
Americans again focused on the problem of industrial take-off in depressed areas
such as Sicily.
the
American
southern
This take-off, noted Andrew Kamarck, an influential expert in
Embassy,
mines.
was
within
reach
Sulphur mines and
if foreign investment could exploit
refing
plants
were the most important
beneficiaries of ERP loans to small size firms in the South. (32) The situation
was more complex in relation to oil dri11ings. In Sicily, oil was struck by AGIP,
the
state company
bilateral
of
in
agreements
tat '30s.
Since
strengthened
1947, Gulf Oil had been drilling. ERP
Ita10-American cooperation, that is freedom
initiative in this field. The agreement, however, did not cancel the Italian
mining law (1927),
striking
oil
and
according
the
to
which
there
is
no automatic link between
exploitation of oil fields. The Italian state company,
reorganized by Enrico Mattei and sponsored by influential ministers such as Ezio
Vanoni,
American
strongly opposed
pressure to exploit new Italian oil fields
in the Po Valley and Sicily.
In 1950, after
monopoly,
hard
bargaining
the Americans
and
and
press
campaigns
for and against state
the Italian Committee for Reconstruction came to
a compromise. In continental Italy, drilling and exploitation were reserved for
AGIP, but in Sicily this was liberalized by a regional mining law. The royalties
here were the same as in Iran after Mossadeq.
In a few years
helped
by
ERP
del1 'Isola",
time, Gulf, Anglo-Iranian and other Ita1o-American companies,
guarantees
the
for
Company of
foreign investments such as RASIOM or "Petroli
the prince Nicco16 Pignatelli d'Aragona, drilled
60% of the Sicilian Oil fields. (33)
Except near
Italian
Catania, Sicilian oil remained a dream: the island never became an
"emirate".
industrialization,
the
presence
Nevertheless,
new
here
the
Marshall
Plan
did
mean
jobs and prosperity. The building of oil refineries and
of American
experts
helped bring the emergence of Americanized
behavior
the
as
happened
in Naples in the postwar period. Priolo, for example, in
Italian magazines was still mentioned in 1960 as a "little Detroit". (34)
Also the
military
ERP,
an important
had
rearmament, financed by the American aid programs under the
effect on the industrialization of some Southern areas
(Naples, etc.). But we cannot forget, for example, that the Off-Shore Procurement
program, which
rather
than
amounted
Southern
to
383.5 million
dollars, mostly favoured Northern
industries. The South in fact drew only 14% of the total
amount of the program. (35)
Without considering
concerning
the
these
Marshall
events,
Plan in
it
the
is
not
South.
easy
It
to
reach
is difficult
a conclusion
in
fact to
distinguish between ERP and other aid, or between American and Italian resources
in
the
programs
difficulties.
which
immediately must
addition,
first,
funds
is
end of our period, Fall 1951. In this regard we
compared to
the
and public
Northern ones
distribution
works.
(121
million dollars). In
of counterpart funds in sectors such as
We
have to pay attention to two aspects:
a fundamental difference between allocation and assignment of
those
construction,
residual
is
the
the scarce incidence of loans made to Southern industry
dollars)
there
in
at
note
there
agriculture
by the Fondo-Lire; and there are other
We can start nevertheless with the geographic allocation of aid
proposed by the· MSA
(30 million
were financed
two
but
sectors.
were
liabilites.
Many
binions
of lire were allocated for house
not expended in a given fiscal year, and these became
The "residui passivi" system was utilized by the Treasury
to countain the budget deficit. (36)
Second:
assignment
of
fund for Southern housing and public works were larger
than for the North only in the first year of the ERP. In 1949-'50, 70% of public
works
funds
was
devoleved
to Northern areas. In this way the Lire Fund never
counterbalanced
the
to
historical disequilibrium between the two parts of the country,
change the
and it may
agriculture
financial flow to the Northern economy. The ERP did little
be that dualism between modernizing Northern industry and archaic
in
the
South,
became more
pronounced.
It
is not excessive to
conclude that the
was
the fact
integration
most
important
result of the Marshall Plan for the South,
that it opened markets and brought the first attepts at European
(OEEC),
and
this
was particularly true for Southern agricultural
exports. (37)
The
in
depressed areas were not forgotten, as many Southern opinion makers charged
the
26.6
'50s.
billion
very much,
A regional
example can clarify this statement. Sicily obtained
lire from the Lire Fund; 4% of the national total. This was not
if compared with the 10% of the population living there. This was,
in fact, the parameter of every 'cahier de doleance'. But only Campania obtained
much more
among
the
other regions. In the South the rejected planning of the
ERP
had its winners and loosers. The per capita revenue of a Sicilian, in 1951,
was
100 thousand
that
the
lire: half of the national standard, and it was only in 1955
standard of living here reached the low level of 1938. The prosperity
promised by the American exhibits, which toured the South, was absent in the
lands
described
however
the
by the parlamentary enquiry on poverty, in 1953. In the South
someone took advantage from the aid: main institutions benefitted from
distribution
Federconsorzi,
thanks
gravity
to
in
the
of
for
grants.
the
first
For example, the agricultural union federation,
time
spread over the Southern countryside also
ERP. It became, as many others administrations, a new center of
the local political system, after the decline of the landed elites,
brought about by the agrarian reforms of De Gasperi. (38)
Quota parte rlcg/i S! t1 II;: io;nr II Ii ENP (rJol3 aprilc 19·18 al jO gillJ;110 1951) per i quell e1I0ia fa distriinuione rcglonale .
.
.
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F 0 0 T NOTE S
1) P.SARACUW, Quel mezzogiorno oggi __non C'e p i u, "la Repubblica" 26.9.1936. For
a general approach to the "questione mer i d t one l e ", see R.VILLARI, 11 Sud nella
storia d'I_'t~alia, Bari 1%3; A. DFL t/iONE, A.GIANiWLA. 11 t\lezzogiorno nel1'ec-O:
nomia italian", Bo1o<;na 1978; La questione meridionale, special issue of "I
probl emi di UTi sse", september '--983.
2) SV IHEZ, Associ azi one per los vi l oppo de H' i ndustri a ne 1 t~ezzo9i orno, 11 ~1ezzo­
giorno ne11e ricerche della SVIM~~ 1947-1967, Roma 1968: P.BARUCCI, Ricostru­
zione, pianificazione, Hezzogiorno. La po1itica economica in Ita1ia da1 1943
al 1955, Bologna 1978; ?~ARACENO, Ricostruziune e pianificazio'12 (1943-1948),
Bari 1969; t d . 11 meridiona1ismo dopo 1a r i cos truz i one (1948-1957), i·1i1ano
1974.
3) On the Left in the South, see, S.TARRC~·l, Partito ccmunista e contadini nel
Mezzogiorno_, Torino 1972; two important sources are E.SF.RENI, 11 to1ezzogiorno
all 'opposizione, Torino 1948; G. AMENDOLA, La democraz~a nel Mezzogiorno, Roma
1957.
4) A.MOLINARI, 11 mezzogiorno dIt el t e , "Moneta e credito" 4.1948. Of c our se ,
unemp10ymlnt was the greatest problem of the area. In 1948 P. Saraceno valued
18,7% of ~cti~e population, unem~loyed ~n the South, against 10,6% in the North.
See Centro studi e piani tecnico economi c i , E1ementi per un pi3.no eccnomi co
1949-1952, Roma 1948; A.MOLINAR~, La distribuzione territoria1e della disoccu­
paz i one , in Atti del cO:1Vegno di stud; statistici sulla disoccupazione, Roma
T9SZ:­
5} See G.CENZATO, S.GUIDOTTI. 11 problema industriale del Mezzogiorno, Roma 1946;
more in general, P.BARUCCI, op.cit .. For "backward areas" theory, see
K.MANDELBAUM. The industriC\lization of Backward Areils, Oxford 1945; G.CERIANI
SEBREGONDI, Lateori.a delle aree depresse (1950) now, in Sullo svilurpo de~la
societa ita1iana, Tori~o 1965.
6} Quotations by A.MOLINARI, 11 Mezzogiorno d'Ita1ia and C. CENZATO, Su1 problema
industria1e del t~ezzogiorno, Roma -1948. This "dirigistic" approash--wa5pointed
out by Molinari and' Saraceno in the se~ond Conference of economic and
industrial policy studies, promoted by the Italian enterpreneur organization,
in r'larch 1948. F01' the harsh rc;actions of the Northern t nt.er-es t qrcups see
the Proceedings of the Conference in "Ri vi st a di politica economica" 6, 1948.
7)
A.r'1OLII';/~RI, 11
r·1ezzoqiorno d'lta1ia p.490. For t·1.ROSSI DORIA analysis of
Sout-hern aqr i cu l tur e see, Centro permanent e per i problerr.i del mezzogiorno,
Atti del c~.veqno _d_~ stud~syi pr obl em'i del t'lezzogiorno, Bari 1946, in wh i ch
one can find t'1.ROSSI DORIA, La Terra: il 1atifGIldo e ;1 f r az i onemcnto . See
also N.R.OSSI DORIf\, r~-jforma aqr ari a e az i one merid-ionulista, Bologna 1356.
.--.,
9
__
':L-
"
_
8) For industr'ia1ization as a priority of the SVlt~EZ, see also the first document
of the Association, R.t·l0RMDI, ~~ Ricostruziune italiana e 10 svi~uppo de l l t e­
conomia indllstriale del Mezzogiorno, in 11 r'1ezzogiorno nplle ricerche cit.,
and, of course, G.CEtEATU, S.GUIDOTTI, 11 problema cit. For the SVU",EZ there
was no big power shortage in the Sout n, cfr. C.BUONO~ORE, Sul l a disponibi1".ta
presente e futura di energia elettrica nell'Ita1ia meriGionale, t~ilan() 1'.)48;
G.DELL'ANGELO, t~.BATTISTELLl, Prospettive e a£petti de l l t tndvstr i al t zzaz t one ,
Roma 19~9, is
9)
P.SARACENO, L'Cispetto finanziario del problema industriale del ~lezzogiorno,
Roma 1949. The SVH1EZ showed a continuous interest in the credit f l ow; to
industrialization, see i.e. Aspetti economici, tecnici e giuridici dell'indu­
stria1izzazione del Mezzogiorno, Roma 1949, and Cont'Cibuti a110 studio del
plobl~ma industriale del MezzogiornJ, Roma 1949.
10) P.FRASCA P~LARA, ~iano.-!:!arshall e l'ec?nomia del r'1ezzogiorno, Palermo 1948.
This Sicilian industrialist, was one . of the most important expert in the
Southern periphery, acting according to the SVIMEZ ideas. See his Lineamenti
di uno sviluppo industriale in Sicilia, Palermo 1948, edited by the Ministery
of Industry, Sottocommissione Industria per 1a Sicilia.
v
11) A.MOLINARI, 11 Mezzogiorno cit. p.498. From an institutional point of view,
this approach is exactly the contrary of Every centralization of state
Interventivn. SVlt1EZ o f ten underlined the important role the "regioni" could
play in th~ economic development of the So~th. See, i.e. La regione come punto
di riferimento di un programma di sviluppo economico del ~·1ezzogiorno, in Atti
del IV Congresso nazior.ale di Urbanistica (Venezia 1952), Milano 1953.
12)
On the or i qrns of the Cassa, see a reconstruction coming out of the SVnlEZ,
as S.CAFIERO, La nascita della Cassa, in AA.VV. Scritti in Onore di Pasquale
Saraceno, Milano 1975, pp.177-192. See also G.DI NARDI, La Cassa nella prospet­
tivastcJrica, "Economi a e Stor i c" 2, 1956. The f~ey man in-this context I\Ol,oJ
seems--O. r,lenic;'}el1a, director of the Gank of l t el y from may 1948, and member
of the Bo ard of the S\JII~EZ from 1947, ·cfr. Donato I';enichella. Tes t tmoni anz e
e studi r ac co l t i d 1 a BancLi d'Italia, Bari 1986. For the Left c r i t i c s and
------------the suspicious about the SVIMEZ, see G.NAPOLITANO, 11 dibattito meridionalista
dopo 1aLi berazi one , "Soci eta" 1.1952.
13)
On V.Lutz, see now, r~oneta, dua l i smo e pi an i f i c e.z i one nel pensiero di Vera
Lutz, Bo l oqna 1984, vlith a complete bibliogrdplW of the Euq'l i s h ecoromist.
By Voechtirfg, see Die It~~~enische SUdfrage. Entstehung und Problematik ei ne s
Wirtschaftlichen Notstandsgebietes, Berlin 1951~and Sulla questicne merid~ona­
Te:rnd'ustrializzazione 0 pre-industriaiizzazior.e? "Moneca e cr-ed i t o " 17,1952.
On those approaches to t ne "questione meridionale" really insufficient is not
only Barucci, but also G.ALIBERTI, reti produttivi e questipne agraria:lin~a­
ment i di un prngro.mma 1i ber; sta ne1 t·jezzogi orno del secor-do dopoguerra, 1945­
1946, "Storia contemporanea" 3.1980; idem, Lo svi1uppo difficile. Lc. pOlitica
economica dell 'eta degasperiana e ;1 Nezzogiorno, in U.CORSINI,K.REPGEN (erl.)
KonrJd Adenauer e Alcide De Gasperi: due eyperienze di rifondazione della demo­
crazia, Bolcgna 1986.
14) On the bill, see the documents in Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Prosidenza
del Consiglio dei t~inistri (ACS, PCH), Verbal'i del Consiglio de; mt ni s t r l ,
14.2,1948. For an interpretat~on) see M.ANNESI, Profilo storico della legisl~­
zione pr 10 svi1uppo del ~lezzogi:)rno 1361-1957, Roma 1957. On the so cal1e-d
"linea Einaudi", see U.RUFFOLO, t.a linea Et nauo i , 'Storia cont.empcr ane a ", 5­
6.1974. For the effects of the deflatio~n Southern economy, se2 the reports
of the prefects, in ACS, peM, 1948-1950,9.6.14576.
15) For the propagandistic mobilization of april 1948, see now J.MILLER, The United
States and Italy, 1940-1950, Chapell Hill 1986.
On the Southern vub1ic opinion, great effects had th~ letters mailed by italo­
americans, see, i.e., "11 Popolo" 31.3.1948. For the trade unionists and t.he
italo-american Com;nittee, see National Archives, Washington, (NAW) Record Group
59, OF. 1945-1949, 86550/ 32348, ~1emo of a meeting between V. Montana and C.
Bohlen. See also "L'Ilman i t a" 8.4.43 and "Informazioni SVI~lEZ" 17,1948.
16) On the orlglns of the Mission, see Archivio storico del Ministero deg1i Affari
Esteri (A91AE), Rappresentanza diplomatica a Parigi, 1949 f.412.2, Re1azione
ambo Quaroni, 12.5.1948. See also "11 Popolo" 14.5.1948; for the text of the
report, "Informazior.i Svimez" 21-22, 1948. Ap Ita1o-american agency for the
deve l opment of. the South was proposed by the Mission, and a project Vias
sL,~gested by the State Department to [CA qener al administrator, Paul Hoffrnan
in july 1948. It seem to be discussed in Pads, see Nf\vJ, RG.286, ECA.O:)R, Paris,
Countr-y Subject Files, 1948-1952, l t al y-Pr-oqr arns . Letter by B.H.Thibodeaux
to A. Harr unan, 17.7.1948.
17) See the speeches of Zellerbach at the conferences on Marshall Plan anj Sout~ern
econorny, of Cat an i a - august, ~948 - and Bari - September 1948 - respectively
in "ERP, Bo l l et.t i no del CIR-ERP", 5.1948 and "Hondo economico ' 25.9.1948.
18) For the expectations of pUblic opinion, see ACS, PCM, 1951-195~, f.19.17.13659.
39.9., but also articles of the "Popolo", the CD newspaper, Southern edition,
i.e. "Occhio alla Calabria", 25.6.1948. For the Committee see the same source,
18.::;.1948, and "Informazioni SVniEZ" 30-31, 194t5. The' Bullettin of the
Association quotes many resolutions of the technical permanent commission
in the yea)' 1948··1949 years. The Committee haci among his membcr s , Ferrari
Agaradi, general secretary of the CIR, Pal1astre11i, another prominent ~ember
of the 1ar.ded elites, Guidotti, the SVrr<1EZ industrialist,"yY~L;ng and emerqent
leader of the party, as E. Colombo.
19) For tile influential position of C. Sforza, see "Corriere della Sera" 26.5.1948.
ag?inst tndus t r i al "dopp i on i " was al so R. Tremelloni, acting presider.t of the
CIR-ERP, whose attitude in f avour of planning was comp1et1y t neor-et i cs.l . See
his interviews in "G10bo", 20.6.1948 and , before, "Ita1ia Soc i al t s t a" 15.1.1948
All these pos i t i ons can be under stood in the light of t ndus tr i al t s t c arnpa i qn
against state planning cfr. "L'Organizzazione industria1e" 6.3.1948 and
29.4.1948.
20) The uti1 izatiorl of ERP counterpart funds to finance land reclamation projects,
was He goal of landed e l t tes representatives inside the CD party and the
Committee. See C.DE MARTINO, Problem; del Mezzogiorno, "ll Pcpolc'' 8.5.19",8,
and many "techni cal" comments expressed ; n the national conference on "Mars hall
Plan and italian agriculture" in Naples (June 1948), whose proceedings are
in Archivio 1stituto Gramsci s i c i l t ano , fonda Li Causi, cart. 24.1., and "In­
formazioni Svimez" Z5-27, 1948.
The utilization of the Lire fund to relieve the budget was, et pour cause,
the fear of S. Gava, see "11 Domani d'Ita1ia" 4.5.1948. More sincere was
attitude of P. FRASCA POLARA, 11 Piano Marshall, quoted.
21) L. STURZO, Po1itica di questi anni, 1948-1949, Bologna 1955. On the sicilian
leader of the DC, see F.~lALGERI, La vita po1itica ed economica ita1iana del
secondo riopoguerra ne1 giudizio di Luigi Sturzo, in LUigi Sturzo nella storia
~_~tol__~,
Rorna 1973. The c amp ai gtl agai nst t he "Er p i vori" was supported by
several newspaper-s of the South: "Sicilia del pcpo l o", "Giornale di Sicilia",
etc.
22)
problem, see nAH, RG.59, OF.1945-1949, 86550/41948, m~'eting be twee n
C~strogiov(liini
and ~!i:llmsley; 84050/113048, report of the American Consul in
Palermo to 1\!-,~sriCi',n Enl~assy in Italy; 84050/5349, mae t i nq between ECA mission
and Italian COIJUlI:TI2nt on Sicilian r eque s t s , ~1ore t n particular, see my Il
piano r·1arsha11 in Sicilia, "Lt al i a cont emporane e " 164,1936.
On this
23) OECE, Rappor-t interinaire sur le Programme de Relevement Europeen, Paris 1948
vol.II, pp.54tOn it, see The tntervent i on of S. ADbadessa i n "Giornale d i
Sic i 1; a" 4. 11 . 1948.
On ita 1i an emi grati on pol icy see CEEC, Manpov:er Conference, ROlne, Jan-Feb.
l~48, Reports_, London 1948, and the subsequent wor k of the. Han~O\'ier Commi ttee
of the OEEC.
24) For the debate on the ERP in Sicily, see P.FRASCA POLARA,
L'applitazion~ del­
l' ERP e l' i ndus t r ' a1 i zzazi one dell a S1 cil i a; E. LA LOGGIA, Le cOlldi zi oni econo­
mico-sociali quali base determinanti della quota regionale del fondo 1ireEP:P,
papers presented to the Catania conference on the Marshall Plan.Th2 Proceedings
of tile Conference in Istituto Gramsci s i c i l t ano , Archivio Li Caus t , c. 7.~,
f.c. H2re, documents on the communist position: see i.e. R1so1uz;one del comi­ tate regionale PCI su1 piano Marshall, 19.8.1948.
For the prevailing approaches see, the interventions of S.MILAZZO, L'agricoltu­ ra sici1iana a11a vigilia delle grandi opere; E.ZANINI, C6~1aborazione fra pro­ duttori; F.RESTlVO, unt t.a naz;ona1e e auton0mia dell'isola, in "Piano i~arsilali~
22.5.1949.
25) s.Cr.c.OPARDO, Che cos a si rea1izza col Fondo lire? "Piano Marshall" 22.5.1949;
for Frasca Polara critics to this trend of events, see his intervention in
"Giorna1e di Sicil ia" 7.12.1948. To understand the adaptation of the Southern
elites, it is important- to appreciate the strenght of Northern pressures
against every kind of Southern priority. See, i.e., C.M6RZAGORA, 11 piano in­
c1inato, "11 Corriere della Ser a" 25.12.1948, an harsh reply to G.TOGN1, ~­
dustria1izzazione del Mezzogiorno e un problema di portata naziona1~, "11 Popo­
10" 25.11.1948. For tne Wave of strikes in 1949, see S.TARROW, op. cpt , 8.
26)
NAW, RG.5£, DF.1945-1949, 84050/12.749, R.J.Harris to Dunn, 7.12.1949. For
a different evaluation of the situation, see Lo svi1uppo democratico del Mezzo­
giorno da1 1944 a1 1954, "Cronache meridiona1i" 11-12, 1954. Also the
t ecurn c i ans
expressed
Svimez" 91-92, 1949.
27)
criticism
agclinst
t he
qovcrnment ,
see
"Lnforrnaz i on i
NN!, RG.22>6, Ecr\. Office cf Infonnation, Office of tile Director, General
Subject Files, 19if9-1952, Italy. Other mont hl y and weekly reports on this
effort, i n NP\~J, RG. 59, DF.1945-1949, 84050/Recovery. For t he ita 1i an side of
the c ampe i gn, see "P'i ano ti1ar s ha11", the maqaz i ne of the Comi tato per 1a d i vuI­
gazione del Piano r'1arshall.
28) The h. stor-y of r~arcovicchio in "Fortune" 20.10.1949. On the same subject, sec
"New York'Times', 18.11.1949. In Hay 1949 there was an interview in wh i ch
L. ell e r btlC hex pres sed his do ubt son the SOC all ed "agI' aria n ref u 11~t'.\ The t ext
of the interview and others documents on this ~ttitude of the mission, in NAW,
RG.286, OS[(, Central Secretariat, Country Subject File, Italy, box 6; NA\~,
RG.286, ECA, European Program Division, ~1editerranean Branch, Country Sub jcc t
File, Italy, box 21. See also B.r"1c Gurn, ERP against Arbitrary Land Reform
in Italy "New York Herald Tribune" 21.1.1949~ and De Gasperi scr i vc , e i . by
~.R. De Gasperi, Brescia 1964, pp.248-9.
29)
For the implementation of the agrarian reform, see the annual report 0:= the
Aqr i cul ture division of the ECA. Mission to Italy, Jtalian Agriculture and
ERP. For an historical interpretation of the reform, see La r i f orma f ond i ari a
trent~nlli d?,DO, Milano 1979. For the difficult implementation of the u.grcr-ian
l ews , see A.BLOK, Land Reform in a ~!est Sicilian Latifondo Village.: The
Persistence of a feud03.1 structurE:, "AnthropOlogical Quarterly" 3~, 1966.
30) On the Cassa, see S.CAFIERO, La nasclt~ della Cassa, Cassa per il Mezzogiorno,
12 anni, 1950-1962, Bari 1962. To understand the attitude of the ECA officers,
see NAW, RG.286. ECA. Office of the D~puty Administrator, CSF. 1950-51, Italy,
box 2, Counterpart release to Cass~ per il M~zzogiorno, Letter of D.K.::opkinson
to R. Sissel, 28.10.1950.
31) ECA, Special ~lis3ion to Italy, Annual Report on ital,ian Agriculture,
Rome 1~51 p. 37-38. For the quotation, see Senato della Repubb l i ca , Disegni
di legge e relazioni 1948-1950, Tav. 1183 A. A Critic evaluation. is: F. COMPA­
GNA. Il Mezzogiorno ha bisogno di un brain trust di tecnici, "Mondo economico"
5, 1951. For apologetical approaches see also M.CARLYLE, The Awaking of Southern
Italy, London \QS-9 ; M.F. NEUFELD. Italy: School for awakoning Countries, New
York 1961.
32) A.KAMARCK, Condizioni per l i ndus tr-i al i az az tone della Sicilia, "Rivista italia­
na di economt a , demografia e statistica" 4.1950. For this new interest. see
NAW. RG.286, OSR, Program Division. Country Desk Section, CSF. 1950-1951, box
12, Italy, LCC Southern Industry. On the sicilian sulphur industry. see V.GIURA,
t
L'inc\ustriil zol f i f er a , in St.or i a della Sicilia, edited by S. La Rosa vol , IX.
We-T1JV; ta·t:·~:::e:l:be,-,:~ neIjITt~lei-;-ss:-t-ha-t--the' korean boom, vias able to push
sulphur production to prew~r levels.
33) Regione siriliana, Petrolia in Sicilia, Palermo 1954; E.SCALFAKI, (ed.), Petro­
~~.?~1_~_~~_ Ri.lr(l~-isT;--I:f:CESArdf:jT-sTOf{lA,QE..~~L~nc; petrol i 0, Fi renze 1956;
?t~.£~_J_o_ con~cgno internuzionale ci studi ~Jl p trolio di Sj c i l t a , Gela
1958.
Fer the LIS-Italy bOX9i1ining see, i.e., NAvJ, RG.286, OSR, Central Secretariat,
CFS 1948-1952, box G, Italy, Plltical Affairs, m~mo of a meeting among G. PellJ
L. Dayton, D. Bolton, 10.3.1948; NAW, RG.59, DF. 1945-1949, 71165.81049, Report
by J.P.Wilson and W.B.Sale on ital~an OilpJlicy, 10.8.1949; NAW, RG.286, OSR,
Central Secret ari at , CSF, 1948-1952, box 6, Italy, Petroleum, Report by \'/alden
to Harr iman , 21.4.950. By N.Pignatelli Aragona, see Proposte per ricerche e
produzioni di alii mi r-e r al t in lt al i a , Roma 19/i8, and Problemi e pr ospet t i ve .
ctefieri·cerche petrofffere In Sicifi~aierr:1o 1958.
34) E.Elv1AI'1UEI.LI, Rinascita in Sicilia, "La Stampa" 6.3.1960; G.K:~1ANELLI, Ragusa
uno, Ragusa due, "Prospe t.tl ve meridionali" 8, 1958. Ragusa is t he most
impartunt .example of new industrialization Juring the '50s: see A.ANFOSSI,
F.TALAMO, F.INDDVINA,· Ragusa, comunlta in tr~nsizio~e, Torino 1959.
35).ARAR Direzione generale, Le commesse americane (OSP) all 'Italia ed aitri paesi.
Rclazione generale e prospetti illustrativi al 31 dicembrp 195~" Rama 1953.
36)
Tu undprst~nd the importance 0f the disti~~tien b2t~een allocation and
assignement an example related to land r-e c Iarnat i on is sufficient. In February
1951, the land rec l amat io.i pr-oqram was 43,3 billions 1 ire; projects fur 38,5
billions were authorized by EO., but only projects fer 27,5 billions were
authorized by He Ministery, and only projects far ~4,4 billions had been
finish~c. ~ut, last not least, only 7 billio1 had been p0idl
For the statistical sources, see, ECA MIssion t c Italy, Tre allni di ERP in
Italia, Roma 1951; CIR, Lo s vi luppo dell'economia t t el t ana , Roma 1952. For
For tr. e dif f i cult i esin eval uat i n9 '-t he- 0 ff i cia 1 dat a , see Tr e C' nni diE RP ne,
Mezzogiorno, "InTormazioni Svimez" 48, 19~1. Pn account of He tn-ius tr t al loans
in Cooperazione econom;ca Italia-Stati Uniti. 1944-l9S4, Roma 1954.
37) On this problem, sec G.U.PAPI, L1 a g r 1 c o l t u r a italia:1a di fronte alla ripresa
degli scambi internazionali, "Rivista di politica economica" 8, 1947;t~.BANDINI,
Prosp8ttive della produzione agral~ia italiana in relaz;one ai prob"lemi del
commercio internazionale, "Economia internazionale" 3, 1949; P.ALBERTARIO,
L'agricoltura italiana nella nuova tariffa doganale, "Moneta e Credito" 9,1950.
3 8 )
For t.ne p
y enquires of the
see «liii(-:ra
i
i , !\tti
conm i s s i one p arl ament ar o d i ncrn e s t a su l I a nri scr i a in l t e l i a e sui rnezzi per
C o:"ilbat tel' 10., ""RC);;1il -195~I~-:-Ccmlni s s i olle"-pi:lr 1 Z;~;;)t 0t'e d'i nc hies t a S u 11 a cl i soc-"
cLlp'ozione;- l.a Di soccu:Ja.~..9ne ~l.!.~:i ilL Rome 1953. Hey'e is no re se ar ch on
the politlcal processes linked to the administration of ERP loans and
counter-par-t f unds , but se,~, G.GRIBAUDI, t'lediatc~2.- __ Tor-i no 1980, and for the
par t i cu l ar aspect qrot ed , I.CP,RSf,DORO, La Federconsor z i nella politica agr~T~~
i t el t ana , Roma 1901.
a r
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a r
' 5 0 s ,
d e
D e p u t
a t
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l
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a
t
PIER PA0LJ D' AT TO rZ RE (1 951) i s are seat' ch2 r i nth e U11 i ver s it y
mento
Discipline
storiche.
As
Integration, coord i.iet ed by A.S.
he is completing a uookon
Mars~al
a
member
t~ilward,
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the
Research
0
f B0 log na, Dipart i ­
Group
on
European
European University l nst i tut , Florence,
Plan in Italy.
The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies
The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies is an interdisciplinary
program organized within the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences and
designed to promote the study of Europe. The Center's governing
committees represent the major social science departments at Harvard and
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Since its establishment in 1969, the Center has tried to orient students
towards questions that have been neglected both about past developments in
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European societies and about the present.
The Center's approach is comparative and interdisciplinary, with a strong
emphasis on the historical and cultural sources which shape a country's
political and economic policies and social structures. Major interests of
Center members include elements common to industrial societies: the role
of the state in the political economy of each country, political behavior,
social movements, parties and elections, trade unions, intellectuals, labor
markets and the crisis of industrialization, science policy, and the
interconnections between a country's culture and politics.
For a complete list of Center publications (Working Paper Series, Program on Central
and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series, German Politics and Society, a journal
appearing three times annually, and French Politics and Society, a quarterly journal)
please contact the Publications Department, 27 Kirkland St, Cambridge MA 02138.
Additional copies can be purchased for $4. A monthly calendar of events at the Center is
also available at no cost