Faculty of Arts and Philosophy
Academic year 2008 - 2009
“Truth is what we find out” – “Jesus says ‘I am Truth’”
A Linguistic Analysis of Interviews Between Richard Dawkins
and Two Religious Principals.
Supervisor:
Prof. Dr. Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen
Dissertation presented to the Faculty of Arts
and Philosophy to obtain the degree of Master
of Linguistics and Literature, Main Subject:
English, by Jorinde Berben
Universiteit Gent
Faculty of Arts and Philosophy
Academic year 2008 – 2009
“Truth is what we find out” – “Jesus says ‘I am truth’”
A Linguistic Analysis of Interviews Between Richard Dawkins
and Two Religious Principals.
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen
Dissertation presented to the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy to
obtain the degree of Master of Linguistics and Literature, Main
Subject: English, by Jorinde Berben.
1
Contents
Contents................................................................................................................................................... 1
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................................... 4
1.
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 5
2.
Background studies.......................................................................................................................... 7
3.
Data.................................................................................................................................................. 8
4.
Analysis .......................................................................................................................................... 10
4.1.
Quantitative results ............................................................................................................... 10
4.1.1.
Questions ....................................................................................................................... 10
4.1.2.
Responses ...................................................................................................................... 10
4.2.
Classifying questions and replies ........................................................................................... 12
4.2.1.
Questions ....................................................................................................................... 12
4.2.1.1.
yes-no questions .................................................................................................... 14
4.2.1.2.
Interrogative- word questions ............................................................................... 15
4.2.1.3.
Question-tag questions.......................................................................................... 15
4.2.1.4.
Moodless questions ............................................................................................... 16
4.2.1.5.
Declarative questions ............................................................................................ 17
4.2.1.6.
Rhetorical questions .............................................................................................. 19
4.2.2.
Responses ...................................................................................................................... 20
4.2.2.1.
Replies .................................................................................................................... 21
4.2.2.2.
Intermediate replies .............................................................................................. 23
4.2.2.3.
Non-replies............................................................................................................. 24
4.3.
Commitment .......................................................................................................................... 36
4.4.
Presupposition ....................................................................................................................... 45
2
5.
6.
Interpreting the results .................................................................................................................. 49
5.1.
Questions ............................................................................................................................... 49
5.2.
Responses .............................................................................................................................. 50
5.3.
Commitment .......................................................................................................................... 55
5.4.
Presupposition ....................................................................................................................... 56
Conclusion and suggestions for future research ........................................................................... 57
References ............................................................................................................................................. 59
3
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisor, professor Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen,
without whom this dissertation would never have materialised. She provided a different perspective
on the data and on the analysis, and her experienced eye noted inconsistencies in the analysis where
I initially missed them. Apart from that, her patience and enthusiasm were a constant comfort and
inspiration.
Secondly, I thank professor Wallace Chafe from the University of California, Santa Barbara, for his
useful and illustrative replies to my questions about his book. He shed a more nuanced light on the
scale of reliability which I have also used in this dissertation.
My gratitude also goes to Chris Bulcaen, librarian of the library of English Linguistics at the University
of Ghent, for helping me track down books and articles when I needed them.
Last but not least, I want to thank my husband for his devotion to (the completion of) this
dissertation, which was almost equal to mine, for letting me bounce ideas around and for his
understanding.
4
1. Introduction
Religious language differs from languages which are spoken in an everyday context because of their
status as being the word of God and their use in rituals (Crystal, 1965; 1966). Linguistic analyses of
religious language have until now focused on the language of religion as it occurs within its own
context (Crystal, 1965; 1966; Samarin, 1976; Omoniyi & Fishman, 2006). When religion is however
confronted with science, this conflict creates a new type of discourse. When believers debate nonbelievers the argumentation of both parties is based on two different modes of knowledge which is
reflected in the language (Chafe, 1986; Aijmer, 1997).
The focus of this dissertation is on two interviews between the atheist Richard Dawkins and two
principals of religious schools: Herschel Gluck and Adrian Hawkes. Dawkins confronts the principals
with their literal interpretation of the Bible and what they teach the children in their schools by
asking a series of questions to which the interviewees respond. Question-answer sequences have
been investigated in a variety of different situations such as political discourse (Bull & Mayer, 1993;
Bull, 2003; Harris, 1991; Fetzer, 2007; Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008) and news interviews on different
topics, including but not limited to politics (Clayman, 2001; Clayman & Heritage, 2002; Léon, 2004).
Both have in common that the interaction is public, either because of the presence of an audience, or
–as is usually the case– through broadcasting or publishing live or at a later time. In these situations,
the interviewer is a neutral (or supposedly neutral) questioner who does not take a side in the
argument. In the debate between scientists and religious believers where one questions the other,
there is of course no neutral interviewer, both speakers defend their own views against those of the
opposition. The interviews that constitute this data are also public, but the opposing ideologies of
the interviewer and interviewee in the data create a situation which is different from political/news
interviews both in topic and in the interviewer-interviewee relationship. Thus, the first and foremost
research question of this paper is how the two principals will respond to the questions of Dawkins.
How will they defend their religious beliefs against scientific arguments and still uphold an image of
rational modern educators? The focus will be on the comparison between these interviews and
political interviews because of the similar adversary nature of the two genres. The hypothesis is that
because of the lack of evidence on which religious belief is based, the interviewees will show a lower
reply rate when confronted with questions that ask specifically for justification of their belief through
evidence.
As mentioned before, interviewer and interviewee base their knowledge on different sources (Chafe,
1986). Since speakers express the degree of certainty of their assertions through commitment
5
(Berlin, 2008; Fetzer, 2008), the degree of commitment to scientific knowledge versus religious belief
will also be investigated in this dissertation. In political discourse, the verbs think and believe can
often be used interchangeably (Fetzer, 2008; Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008; Berlin, 2008; Chafe, 1986),
but since the topic of the data at hand is religious belief, it is suspected that the meaning verb believe
will be distinctly different from other cognitive verbs in these interviews.
A third part of the analysis will focus on the use of presuppositions in the data. It has been shown
that presuppositions are not only prevalent in political discourse but are also difficult to challenge
and thus provide a powerful tool for building arguments (Simon-Vandenbergen, White & Aijmer,
2007; Schmid, 2001). In the debate between science and religion, the amount of presupposed
knowledge that both participants agree on to be true will be less than in a political interview
discussing current events. Where for instance science is based on a world view that sees the world
beginning with the Big Bang, the principals in the interviews accept divine creation as the beginning
of the world. Thus arguments built on either of those viewpoints will not be based on knowledge that
is accepted to be true by both participants, unlike in situations where they talk among scientists or
believers who share their viewpoints on the matter. Whether both interviewer and interviewees will
use linguistic devices to express presupposition and to what degree, will be addressed in as much as
the limited data allows for a detailed study.
We start by taking a look at studies that have already been done on the topics of equivocation,
commitment and presupposition in section 2. In section 3, the data is presented and discussed,
introducing the participants and focusing on the hybrid genre between an interview and a debate.
The transcription conventions used throughout the rest of this dissertation will also be presented in
that section.
Section 4 consists of an analysis of the data on the various topics that are under investigation. It gives
a detailed description of categories and examples from the data to illustrate. The results are
interpreted in section 5 through comparison with the background research. In the conclusion
(section 6), the research questions will be addressed again and discussed in the light of the results of
the analysis and opportunities for future research are suggested.
6
2. Background studies
The research reported on in this dissertation is put in context through a comparison with other
research on equivocation, commitment and presupposition, mostly in political discourse. In this
section the research which served as the basis for this dissertation will be discussed briefly.
In their book Equivocal Communication, Bavelas, White & Aijmer (1990) lay the basis for the study of
equivocation in various types of communication. The book gives an overview of how to qualify,
quantify and interpret equivocation. It describes several experiments that further illustrate the
previous points, one of which also focuses on political discourse.
For the identification of questions and responses, most of the tools came from Bull (Bull & Mayer,
1993; Bull, 2003; 2008). He has written extensively on the analysis of interviews from British politics
and the use of equivocal responses by the politicians. In a recent article, Bull (2008) also focuses on
the role that face management plays in whether or not questions receive a full reply.
Harris (1991) has also written on the evasive nature of political discourse and has a qualification of
answers that is different in terminology but often very similar to Bull (Bull & Mayer, 1993; Bull, 2003)
in the criteria used to distinguish between direct answers and what she refers to as ‘challenges’
(Harris, 1995: 8). Her coding framework is however not as extensive as that of Bull (2003), which is
why it was not extensively built on but only referred to where it was relevant. Fetzer (2007) has
researched the phenomenon of challenging an interlocutors’ questions as well, referring to Bull
(2003) at various points. Another participant in the ongoing research about equivocation in political
discourse is Simon-Vandenbergen (2008). She analysed equivocation in debates and interviews with
extremist right-wing politicians, mostly relying on Bull’s framework. A comparison between the
results of this paper and the results of her research can be found in section 5.
For the analysis of commitment and presuppositions in the data, use was made of a few key articles
and books on the subject. Fetzer (2008) and Berlin (2008) have done very recent research on the
topic of commitment and the use of cognitive verbs to express commitment, or lack thereof. Chafe
(1986) wrote in detail on the various degrees of certainty a speaker will commit to, creating a scale
which I have adopted in this dissertation. For the specific analysis of I think, Simon-Vandenbergen
(2000), Aijmer (1997) and Holmes (1995) have been instrumental. On the topic of presuppositions,
Simon-Vandenbergen, White & Aijmer (2007) and Schmid (2001) were most influential during the
classification of the occurrences and interpretation of the results. On the adverb of course, Holmes
(1995) was consulted as well.
7
Other authors have been referred to regarding more detailed and specific topics. Their views provide
a nuance and have helped to establish a more objective system of classification and interpretation of
the data.
3. Data
The data that was used for this study is a set of interviews that Richard Dawkins conducted for his TV
series ‘The Enemies of Reason’. Richard Dawkins is an evolutionary biologist, widely known for his
books on atheism such as ‘The God Delusion’ (2006) which was in part based on this TV series. He
also holds the position of Charles Simonyi Professor for the Public Understanding of Science at
Oxford University (Dawkins, 2006). The TV series consisted of only two episodes, the first one was
titled ‘The God Delusion’, the second episode carried the title ‘The Virus of Faith’. Each episode was
about 45 minutes long, and they aired for the first time in January 2006 on Channel 4. The program
itself contained only very short fragments of conversations that Dawkins had with people who either
promoted or opposed religion. Some of the full interviews however were brought out on a separate
DVD. Two of these interviews were selected to be discussed and analysed in this paper. These
interviews were part of the second episode where Dawkins focuses on what he calls the
‘indoctrination’ of young children by religion. He sees faith schools as being the main problem of the
segregation of religious groups in conflict, such as the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland,
and the Jews and Muslims in Jerusalem. The interviewees in this case are two principals of faith
schools. In the final edit of the episode, about two minutes and forty seconds of each of the
interviews was shown. During the analysis these parts were not treated separately however, or with
special emphasis, but as a regular part of the conversation.
The first interview is with Adrian Hawkes. He is the principal of an ACE school in London. ‘ACE’ stands
for ‘Accelerated Christian Education’. The school is based on an American system that allows children
to work at their own speed in individual booths. The teachers break up the material into parts that
the children go through one at a time. Apart from that there is also a very strong Christian aspect to
the schools in that they adopt a literal interpretation of certain parts of the Bible. The books that the
children study from are full of religious references. The narrative of the Ark of Noah, for instance, is
mentioned in a science lesson as a historical event. The interview is 38 minutes long and consists of
229 turns.
The second interviewee is Rabbi Herschel Gluck of the community of Hassidic Jews in London. He is
the head of an Orthodox Jewish school where children are brought up in the Jewish tradition. A
8
literal interpretation of the Bible is part of this tradition. Children are taught that Adam and Eve were
the first people and that God created the earth 5765 years ago (at the time of interviewing). The
interview is 48 minutes long and consists of 193 turns.
The conversations are in between the genre of the interview and that of a debate. The Oxford English
Dictionary (2003) (OED) defines a debate as ‘a formal discussion on a particular matter in a public
meeting or legislative assembly, in which opposing arguments are put forward and which usually
ends with a vote.’ In the data there is clearly a case of opposing arguments being put forward and a
TV series could qualify as a public form of discussing. The OED defines interview amongst other
things as ‘a conversation between a journalist or radio or television presenter and a person of public
interest, used as the basis of a broadcast or publication’. The particular nature of the interviews lies
in the double role that Dawkins plays. He is at once both the presenter of the TV series and one side
of the argument between science and religion that is the topic of the series. Dawkins is thus not a
neutral interviewer and does not limit himself to asking questions. He also responds to the answers
that the two principals ask him and puts his own opinion opposite theirs. His questions are not
objective, but very much put forward from his position as a scientist. In that way several parts of the
interviews are more similar to debates where both parties discuss their different opinions.
The following transcription conventions were used for the transcription and appear in the examples:
D = Richard Dawkins
G = Rabbi Herschel Gluck
H = Adrian Hawkes
C = crew member
(I mean i) = simultaneous or overlapping speech
it’s part of- = broken off words, phrases or sentences, interruptions
[laughs] = non-verbal communication
xxx = unintelligible word(s)
miseducation = neologisms
(…) = part of utterance missing (only for the examples)
Further detail was not relevant to the analysis of this paper and spelling was kept standard so that
readability would not be limited.
9
4. Analysis
4.1. Quantitative results
This section will give an overview of the numbers of question and replies, and how they are
distributed over the different categories. As was mentioned in the introduction (section 1), the
numbers are small due to the focus on the quality of an in depth analysis rather than the quantity of
data. What each category entails is further explained in section 4.2. and an interpretation of these
results will follow in section 5.
4.1.1. Questions
As can be seen from the table below, in both the interviews combined there were a total of 86
questions. Roughly two thirds of those took an interrogative syntax. The rates are mostly divided
evenly between the two interviews, but there are some exceptions. In the interview with Hawkes,
Dawkins only used two types of interrogative word questions, namely ‘why’ and ‘what’ questions. In
the interview with Gluck he uses all of the five listed interrogative words to preface questions. It is
also in the interview with Hawkes that Dawkins uses 10 of the 12 declarative questions probing for a
reaction.
Table 1: Question rates
Interrogative syntax
Interrogative word:
what
why
how
which
where
Yes-no + q-tag positive
Yes-no + q-tag negative
Totals
27
13
5
7
1
1
17
12
56
Non-interrogative syntax
Declarative: reaction
Declarative/moodless: clarification
Declarative/moodless: yes-no
Totals
12
4
14
30
4.1.2. Responses
To give an overview of the response rates, the results for the two interviews were combined in Table
2 below. For a more detailed analysis and discussion of the differences between the two
10
interviewees, see section 5.2. There are a total of 87 responses that were analysed. The reason there
is one more response in the analysis is that the following utterance was counted as both an attack on
the question because it is hypothetical (bold) and an intermediate reply implying a disagreement
with Dawkins’ question (italics).
G:
I think after 7/7 that this argument is rather facile excuse me saying so because the
bombings on 7/7 were actually people who went to state schools Muslim kids who
went together with Christian kids together with people from all different
backgrounds and it didn’t seem to prevent the terrible scenes that we saw so I don’t
think the issue is going to a different school
In the preceding question, Dawkins asked the rabbi whether he did not think that through abolishing
sectarian schools in Northern Ireland, the conflict there would be solved in the next generation. If
children went to the same schools, they would no longer be enemies. The rabbi responds that this
argument is no longer relevant after the bombings in London on July 7th 2005, attacking the question
for being hypothetical and no longer realistic. He then goes on to explain why it is no longer relevant,
implying that he disagrees with Dawkins’ viewpoint, which counts as an intermediate reply. A
response can thus classify as two different types of reply, especially when there is an elaboration of
the initial response (Bull, 2008). For a further discussion of the attack on a question for being
hypothetical, see section 4.2.2.3.1. For more information on what constitutes an intermediate reply,
see section 4.2.2.2.
Table 2: Response rates
Replies
Intermediate replies
Non-replies
Attacks question:
false presupposition
objectionable
misquotation
fails to tackle important issue
factually inaccurate
hypothetical
Ignores question
Makes religious point
attacks opposition
present policy
Answers different question
Pleads ignorance
Acknowledges question without answering
Reflects question back to interviewer
11
33
18
36
11
5
2
1
1
1
1
5
5
4
1
5
4
3
3
Overall the numbers show that 38% of the responses were replies where the answer was
immediately clear from the utterance. In 41% of the responses to a question, there was no reply at
all, and in 21% of the responses the answer was implied. The interviewees used various types of nonreplies, of which different forms of attacking or challenging the question in some way were most
common.
4.2. Classifying questions and replies
It should be noted that in analysing the questions and replies, only one direction was analysed. Only
Dawkins’ questions were taken into account and only the responses from the interviewees to those
questions were classified according to the framework of equivocal responses created by Bull (2003).
Because of the mixed genre of the interviews, there are however also instances in which the roles of
interviewer and interviewee become reversed, and the principals ask Dawkins question which he
answers. The following is an example of a question by Hawkes to which Dawkins responds:
H:
you think there’s not okay so if there’s no god or there is no lawgiver … why does it
matter what I do why why why is rape wrong why is paedophilia wrong why why are
any of these things wrong if there is no lawgiver if what you say correct me if I
misunderstood what you’re saying if you’re saying well actually it’s just we’re just a
machine or a mechanic then that that’s the way it works if that is true then all the the
law things if I can get away with it and nobody’s going to stop me why is it-
D:
do you realize what you’ve just said I mean what you’ve essentially just said is that
the only reason you’re a good man is that you’re frightened of god finding out
whereas a moral philosopher would say I don’t rape and I don’t pillage and I don’t
steal because I worked it out that the society in which we would live if we did that
would be a very nasty society in which to live for example the consequences the
consequences of raping would be unpleasant or we have empathy with other people
we feel sympathy for the victim of a crime so-
These questions and responses are not reflected in the numbers and are not included in the
discussion. The only exception is when the question of the interviewee is way to evade a question by
Dawkins, usually because the interviewee reverses the argument. This type of non-reply is discussed
in section 4.2.2.3.6. which deals with reflecting the question back to the interviewer.
4.2.1. Questions
In classifying the questions the categories were adopted from Bull (2003), who based his on Quirk, et
al. (1985) while adding two more categories: the indirect question and the ‘moodless’ question as
defined by Jucker (1986). Since there are no occurrences of the category in the data, ‘alternative or
disjunctive questions’ (Bull, 2003) are not mentioned in this paper.
12
Bull shows concern that the name ‘wh-question’ as it is used in Quirk, et al. might cause confusion
since the list of wh-words also includes ‘how’ but leaves out ‘where’. He therefore opts for the use of
the label ‘interrogative word question’ (2003), a practice which I have adopted in this dissertation. In
the case of this dissertation, as in Bull’s analysis, the category includes questions with ‘how’ and
‘where’.
In the data there were also questions formed by a declarative sentence and a question tag. In
function these questions are very similar to ‘yes-no questions’ as they both demand either a
confirmation or a negation as a reply. However, I have put these in a separate category, named
‘question-tag questions’, because of their suggestive nature which favours the affirmation of the
statement coming before the tag (Heritage, 2002).
Bull’s category of ‘moodless questions’ is special in that it does not have an interrogative structure
(2003). In fact the moodless question is not even a full sentence since it does not have a finite verb.
There are also other types of non-interrogative questions indicated by Bull (2003), these are
‘declarative questions’ and ‘indirect questions’. Bull describes ‘indirect questions’ as questions ‘in
which the force of the question is expressed in a subordinate clause’ (2003: 103). This is for instance
where a journalist quotes someone else’s question. Dawkins does refer to what other participants in
a current discussion on religion would say, for instance in the following example.
D:
well yes but but I mean we we were talking about Noah’s ark and and a modern
theologian would say that there never was a man called Noah who had an ark and
the animals went in two by two those children are being taught I (gather that there
was)
Dawkins however never quotes anyone else’s questions, but always puts himself forward as an
individual or as a representative of the scientific community, so ‘indirect questions’ are nowhere to
be found in the data. Moodless and declarative questions are however frequent and are discussed in
a similar way to the rest of the categories. They will be further divided into different types according
to the expected reply to those questions, as can be seen in sections 4.2.1.4 and 4.2.1.5.
It is useful here to make a distinction between formal and functional categories of question. Formal
types can be distinguished by looking at the structure of the utterance. An interrogative word
question is recognizable by the interrogative word in the beginning of the question. The same goes
for declarative and moodless questions. To further subdivide those two categories it is however
necessary to look at the function of each question. Bull classifies declarative questions according to
13
the different types of questions with an interrogative structure. Most of the declarative questions in
his data expect a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as an answer and are thus compared to yes-no questions, and a
minority can be equated with disjunctive or interrogative word questions (Bull, 2003). For this paper,
only the category of ‘declarative yes-no questions’ was adopted from Bull’s classification. Apart from
this first function, there were two more functions of declarative and moodless questions recognized
in the data. The first function is where the interviewer asks for a further clarification of something. It
can be a way to reiterate a previous question or to point out that no explanation has been given yet
or that it was insufficient. These questions are called moodless/declarative clarification questions. A
second type of question are the instances where Dawkins is clearly probing for a reaction. They are
often obvious from the rising intonation in Dawkins’ voice. One could argue that in a debate all
utterances seek a reaction of some kind, but the category has a more specific meaning in this case.
For a further explanation of this category, see section 4.2.1.5.
A separate category of questions are the rhetorical questions. These utterance are the opposite of
non-interrogative questions in that they do have an interrogative structure but the speaker does not
expect an answer. Rhetorical questions are difficult to identify but important to separate from
regular questions for reasons that will be explained further in section 4.2.1.6.
The criteria and attributes of each category will now be discussed below and illustrated by an
example taken from the research data of this paper. For details on the transcription conventions see
section 3.
4.2.1.1.
yes-no questions
The ‘yes-no question’ or polar question is named after the reply it seeks. It is a question to which a
full reply would mean either a confirmation or negation of the statement. For the purpose of this
dissertation, the questions were further divided up into negative and positive ‘yes-no questions’. This
distinction is based on the way the questions are formulated, either by a negation of the verb or not.
The reason for further categorization is that the way in which a question is formulated can have an
effect not only on the answer but also on the interaction as a whole (Heritage, 2002).
Example of a negative ‘yes-no question’:
D:
I do see that yes but on the face of it since these different traditions believe different
things I mean things that that really matter about the cosmos about the universe
about time about space about morality wouldn’t it somehow seem more sensible if
children as it were looked them all over and then made their choice when they grew
up rather than this automatic assumption that a child shall be brought up in the
tradition of its forefathers
14
Example of a positive ‘yes-no question’:
D:
4.2.1.2.
let me ask about another thing in the booklet which was about aids and HIV I think
somewhere it talks about I mean it’s sort of health education class obviously very
sensible but then it’s something about it’s not the exact words but something about
aids being the wages of sin or something like that I mean is that kind of mixing health
education with moralistic preaching
Interrogative- word questions
As the term indicates, interrogative-word questions start with an interrogative word which usually
indicates a gap in the information which needs to be filled in by the person who responds (Harris,
1991; Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008; Bull, 2003). Interrogative words used in the data include how,
what, which, where and why.
Example of an interrogative word questions with how:
D:
so how how old would a typical Jewish child be when he knows that he’s a he’s a Jew
I mean
Example of an interrogative word question with what:
D:
4.2.1.3.
I suppose we’ve got two rather unusual things going on at once here and we need to
separate them out I mean one is that this is an unusual way of learning the children
are in separate cubicles so they’re taught to a set of individual goals and things like
that and you’ve explained how valuable that is but the other thing is that it’s
Christian I mean it’s it’s ACE the C in that is is is Christian could you tell me a bit about
that I mean what’s what’s that all about?
Question-tag questions
Question-tag questions are statements that have been turned into a question by adding a question
tag at the end. This makes them highly suggestive and difficult to disagree with since the statement
put forward is usually presented as the truth. Heritage assigns more illocutionary force to a negative
yes-no question than to a negative question-tag question, but recognizes a strong conducive quality
in both (2002). Dawkins tends to use this type of question often which is why it was counted as a
separate category in this paper. There is a formal difference between positive and negative questiontag questions but since the utterances focus on the truth value of the statement whether it is a
positive structure or not, the distinction has no importance in this case. Below are two examples of
question-tag questions.
D:
but it doesn’t say that does it (it just says it just says)
D:
that would be true of Islam as well wouldn’t it I think
15
Holmes (1995) recognizes four functions of tag questions, which can take a variety of forms in her
research. One of the functions is as an epistemic modal which mainly expresses the uncertainty of
the speaker. The other three functions are affective in nature: facilitative, softening and challenging.
There were a total of six question-tag questions in the two interviews and all except for one were
challenging in nature. Holmes (1995) describes challenges as “confrontational strategies. They may
pressure a reluctant addressee to reply or aggressively boost the force of a negative speech act” (p.
80) This interpretation is in line with the nature of the debate in which Dawkins wishes to confront
religion with the hard facts of science. The one example of a tag question which is not challenging, is
given below.
H:
(it’s a) very nice way of thinking about (it)
D:
(well) it is isn’t it (and what’s wrong with it)
Dawkins’ question is a device to encourage agreement, it falls under Holmes’ (1995) category of a
facilitative use. This utterance is also further discussed under e) in section 4.2.2.3.1.
4.2.1.4.
Moodless questions
As mentioned before in section 4.2.1., moodless questions are marked by the fact that there is no
finite verb. Usually these questions ask for a confirmation of a word or concept, as in the following
example, where the question is underlined:
H:
when I was taught one of the things they taught me at school I’ve always
remembered was that the moon came from the ocean here on earth and was flung
into space and that’s where it came from
D:
yes what the pacific ocean or
H:
something like that yeah
In this case the expected reply Is either a confirmation or a negation of the ‘question’. One could
rephrase it as a yes-no question in the following way: ‘did they say that the moon came from the
pacific ocean?’ That is the reason why these questions have been labelled as moodless yes-no
questions.
Another type of moodless question is the moodless clarification question. These questions ask for a
broader explanation of a concept mentioned by the interviewee. They ask for further clarification.
The following is an example of the moodless clarification question following another turn by Gluck
that puts the question in context:
16
G:
one discusses it with others and if if people can’t show that it’s wrong so then it- and
it’s accepted so then it becomes part of the Jewish tradition
D:
wrong by what criteria by (by-)
4.2.1.5.
Declarative questions
Declarative questions are similar to moodless questions in that they also lack an interrogative
structure, and in their variety of meanings. For ease of understanding the categories that are found
within moodless questions are repeated in the declarative questions when they ask for the same
type of answer. So there are declarative yes-no questions and declarative clarification questions.
Example of a declarative yes-no question with an affirmative reply:
D:
yes so it’s the whole of what Christians call the Old Testament
G:
correct
Dawkins’ question could easily be rephrased as a yes-no question: ‘is it the whole of the Old
Testament?’ That Gluck interprets it as a yes-no question is clear from his affirmative answer.
Example of a declarative clarification question:
D:
yes but you still haven’t explained what that’s got to do with being Christian I mean I
mean-
Here Dawkins points out to Hawkes that he has not answered the previous question yet, and at the
same time asks him to complete and further clarify the answer. He is asking for further explanation,
or clarification.
In addition to those two categories, some ‘questions’ are declarative utterances trying to actively
provoke a response. These were called declarative reaction questions, since they ask for a reaction to
the statement given. Of course this could be said about all the utterances in this type of interview
which is in many ways similar to a debate. That this is not the way the category is meant in this case,
was already mentioned in section 4.2.1.
The utterances differ from ‘regular’ declarative statements in a debate in that they put forward a
statement or feeling that is up for discussion in the debate/interview. These questions are part of a
topic shift where Dawkins wants to address a new topic and looks for a reaction from the interviewee
from where the discussion can develop. It is a device deliberately used to contrast Dawkins’ opinions
and feelings with those of the interviewees. A declarative which is not classified as a question is
usually a reaction of answer to an utterance by Hawkes or Gluck. Observe the difference between
17
the following examples of a declarative reaction question (1) and a regular declarative statement not
classified as a question (2).
Declarative reaction question:
1. D: I did not feel reading that pamphlet that it was a very open minded way to teach in
the middle of a science thing to suddenly say something about Noah’s ark or something
about what Jesus taught or- it seems to me that ought to be kept separate in a in a in a
religion class perhaps
Here two thoughts are expressed by Dawkins that are part of a new topic. Dawkins puts a personal
view forward, which is also indicated by the way in which he phrases his opinions: I did not feel and it
seems to me preface the statements, making them personal and giving the interviewee, Hawkes in
this case, the opportunity to disagree with them. Hawkes does not reply to the first statement of
whether or not it is an open minded way of teaching (for an analysis of the first part of the utterance,
see section 4.2.2.3.7.), but does take the opportunity to disagree with the second statement. His full
response is shown below.
H:
yeah I I would just leaving that one on one side I would hate the idea of keeping
things separate cause that to me is is just a th- I don’t see life like that I see life as a
whole nothing is separate I I get very irritated um when we want to put things in little
compartments I don’t think human beings live in little compartments really I and Ithere’s part of me I mean I I know that it happens and it’s the law of this country part
of me sometimes gets a little bit frustrated about religious education in the normal
schools because I suppose what I feel is there’s enough inoculation of untruth there
to prevent you from ever knowing about the real thing
Hawkes also puts a very personal opinion forward, contrasting it with Dawkins. The personal nature
is again obvious from the language in which Hawkes uses a lot of verbs describing affect and a lot of
self reference. In the discussion there are now two contrasting views expressed. For Dawkins this is a
starting point from where to continue the discussion on this topic.
The following is an example of two declaratives which were not classified as questions.
2. D: I think I got a conscience too and I’mH: (I’m sure you have) I’m sure you have but it’s a weird thing how it works isn’t it
D: well I think one can give an account of why it works (I think it’s difficult)
H: (yeah well I agree yeah) but it it is strange
18
Since the interview often has more characteristics of a debate than an interview, Dawkins responds
to questions of his interviewees as well. These questions and replies have not been categorized and
do not fall under the category of declarative questions, as was previously mentioned.
4.2.1.6.
Rhetorical questions
Rhetorical questions are difficult to indentify. It is however important to set them apart from regular
questions because of the lack of expected reply (Quirck et al., 1985). Since the goal of this paper is to
investigate the replies to Dawkins’ questions, these rhetorical questions are a necessary category
since the lack of expected reply means that they are not taken into account when talking about
equivocation. The examples in the data have an exclamatory function, Dawkins uses the questions to
add weight to his statements. Especially in 1 and 3 below this was also indicated by a rising
intonation. Quirk et al. have a category of the exclamatory question which ‘is interrogative in
structure, but has the illocutionary force of an exclamatory assertion’ (1985: 825). However, the
examples they provide are exclusively yes-no questions, mostly negatively phrased, used to express a
positive assertion. Since the interpretation of this category thus seems rather limited, I have opted
for the term ‘rhetorical questions’ as it is most commonly used.
In the interview with Rabbi Gluck only two of Dawkins’ questions were classified as rhetorical, in the
interview with Hawkes there was only one rhetorical question. For the sake of completeness all three
are given below. In the examples, the rhetorical questions are the turns that are underlined:
1. G:
(that is one of the things I’m saying) science has its purpose when it comes to
empirical issues Judaism has tremendous respect for science as far as this issue is concerned
we do not see this as being empirical we see this as as science trying to gob itself in the
religion
D:
but how can it not be empirical when we’re talking about the age of the earth what
could be more empirical than the factG:
but the the fact the fact is that neither you or I were present when the world came
into being
In this example Dawkins is not looking for a literal answer to the question of ‘what could be more
empirical’, he is making the point that it just is empirical.
2. G:
D:
(a few million years) is also nothing to be trifled with
no no but you’re making a very facile point if I may say so aren’t you and you you
know it because because when you’re dealing with these huge (rate distances)
19
G:
(wh- wh- what) what we’re dealing with here is that one one can’t say that science
has knowledge about it that it has an empirical view on it it’s a theoretical view on it
Dawkins again is not asking whether the rabbi feels that he is making a facile point. He follows the
questions with and you know it, clearly indicating that there is no missing information which he is
trying to discover. The question could be regarded as an attack on the rabbi’s previous utterance.
Dawkins accuses Gluck of making a facile point, although he softens his statement with if I may say
so. Also note that Dawkins uses you three times directing his message very strongly at the rabbi.
3. D:
do you realize what you’ve just said I mean what you’ve essentially just said is that
the only reason you’re a good man is that you’re frightened of god finding out whereas a
moral philosopher would say I don’t rape and I don’t pillage and I don’t steal because I
worked it out that the society in which we would live if we did that would be a very nasty
society in which to live for example the consequences the consequences of raping would be
unpleasant or we have empathy with other people we feel sympathy for the victim of a crime
soH:
why would I feel that
As in the previous example, Dawkins immediately moves on after his question, in this case answering
it himself. The question is a way of expressing surprise and drawing attention to the importance of
Hawkes’ utterance. In this utterance, also note the strong dichotomy between first and second
person references. Dawkins accuses Hawkes of behaving morally for the wrong reason and contrasts
this with what a moral philosopher would say. The opinion of the moral philosopher is expressed
through first person pronouns, creating an ‘I’ versus ‘you’ and later a ‘we’ versus ‘you’ dichotomy.
This function of accusing or criticizing through a rhetorical question is also recognized by Clayman &
Heritage (2002).
4.2.2. Responses
The word ‘response’ is used in this dissertation to indicate any utterance that follows a question. It is
employed rather than ‘answer’ or ‘reply’ since a response does not necessarily answer the question
at hand. It is only used to describe verbal forms of communications, since nods and similar nonverbal signs were not significantly used during the interviews.
Again the terminology used in categorizing responses is mostly Bull’s (2003). He indicates a main
distinction between replies and non-replies. What exactly the features of these categories are,
depends on the questions they respond to. A reply to a yes-no question could, for instance, be a
mere ‘yes’ (Bull, 2003). But ‘yes’ might also indicate an acknowledgement of the question and be
followed by a non-reply (Bull, 2003) and ‘no’ can indicate the attack on a question instead of a
negative reply (Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008).
20
4.2.2.1.
Replies
Bull describes a reply differently depending on which type of question it is a response to (2003). I will
give an explanation and example per category of questions, mostly following Bull’s indications.
Moodless and declarative yes-no questions were included in the description of yes-no questions
since they require the same type of response to constitute a reply. The same goes for question-tag
questions which also require either affirmation or negation. With question-tag questions, there could
be discussion about which part of the question should be agreed with to form an affirmation or a
negation. The distinction is however not relevant to this dissertation since both responses form a
reply. Whether it is a positive or a negative reply has nothing to do with evasion.
The easiest form of a reply to a yes-no question is a simple yes or no, hence the term of this category
of questions. There are however many different ways to offer a reply to a yes-no question. Sure,
absolutely and correct are alternatives to yes and also form an affirmation of the question.
The following is an example of a yes-no question answered directly with a negation of the question.
Both what was counted as the question by Dawkins and what constitutes the reply by Hawkes, is
underlined. This is also an example of how utterances contain much more than just a question or a
reply. Even when questions are answered with a reply, this is often followed by extra information or
a further explanation of that reply. In the example, Hawkes first answers the question but then
rephrases his answer and moves away from the question by shifting the focus of the topic from
whether it is more moral to do good without believing, to how the human conscience works.
D:
I regard myself as a very moral person I don’t steal I don’t rape I consider the feelings
of other people I feel deep sympathy for people in grief I feel deep sympathy for the
victims of natural disasters crimes etcetera don’t you think that that somebody who
feels all those things without a lawgiver is in some rather deep sense a more moral
person than somebody who requires a lawgiver in order to obey the law
H:
no not particularly I suppose I would answer that from a Christian perspective . my
Christian perspective is you see from my understanding of what- from my theological
understanding of what god says is that he says he says that to every man who’s come
into the world he’s put light within them so there is a moral understanding within all
of us to a to an extent so I would think that that is true that doesn’t surprise me … so
everyone of us has got a conscience and when you start to philosophically look at
conscience and how it works is a really weird thing
The following utterances are an example of a declarative yes-no question with an affirmative reply.
D:
but in terms of the books that I’m familiar with like Genesis Exodus Leviticus
Deuteronomy it’s all all those books
21
G:
yes
As a third illustration of a reply that is either an affirmation or negation of a certain statement, is a
question-tag question with, again, a reply.
D:
but it doesn’t say that does it (it just says it just says)
H:
(well it will in some places yeah you will come)
As said before, replies can also be given to other types of questions. Bull (2003) starts off by
mentioning the interrogative word questions. He identifies a reply to an interrogative word question
as a reply that fills in the ‘missing variable’ (Bull 2003: 105). Where refers to a location, concrete or
abstract, and a reply would need to make a mention of this location. The different types of
interrogative word questions were explained in section 3.1.1.2. The following is an example of an
interrogative word question with a reply.
D:
yes well then where do you think those bombers got their fanatical xxx to Islam from
G:
I think from from being marginalized from being from not being in touch with
themselves not having a clear identity when the person is fragmented within
themself they tend to cause fragmentation within society so therefore I think to have
a clear idea of identity is is so important for a person to succeed in life and to
integrate with others
When discussing declarative or moodless questions, Bull (2003) suggests treating them as a form of
yes-no questions, disjunctive questions or interrogative word questions. I have however come across
moodless and declarative questions that could not be interpreted as any of those. I have given them
the label ‘clarification’ or ‘reaction’ questions. Below is an example of a declarative clarification
question with a reply by Hawkes.
D:
yes but you still haven’t explained what that’s got to do with being Christian I mean I
mean-
H:
no I haven’t but of course the reality is that Christianity encompasses everything
about life Christianity is life so it’s it’s about everything it touches education politics
care social services everything you see
The reason this response constitutes a reply is that it gives a further explanation to the question that
Dawkins put forward before. The response is in line with the topic of the utterance by Dawkins. The
use of of course and the reality is will be dealt with further in section 4.4.
22
Being in line with the topic is also the main criterion for accepting a response to a declarative
reaction or moodless reaction question as a reply. The following utterances are an example of such a
question and reply:
D:
(I know you do I know you do) but it it is true that that that children of course take in
in by I use the word osmosis all sorts of things however when it comes to truths
fundamental truths you were you were talking about scientists disagreeing just a
moment ago now of course they do but a scientist would never say I believe that the
world is five billion years old because I belong to the tradition of professor so and so
who believed it’s five billion and another one says I belong to the tradition of
professor so and so (who says it’s four million)
G:
(but but is but is) there are differences between between looking at the world
through biology or through astronomy or through various branches of science
regarding the age of the world
4.2.2.2.
Intermediate replies
Bull uses the term ‘intermediate replies’ to classify those responses that fall in between replies and
non-replies (2003). He describes three main categories: responses in which the speaker implies what
the answer is, responses that answer to part of the question or responses that are interrupted by the
interviewer, and for which it is thus hard to say whether or not the interviewee would have given a
full reply (Bull, 2003). As was explained in section 2, the data for this paper is particular in that it is a
mix between an interview and a debate. Interruptions were frequent in those parts of the
conversations that were most typical of a debate, in which both parties defended their own
viewpoints and attacked those of the opposition. Dawkins did not interrupt his interviewees as much
during those parts that were mainly in an interview-style, therefore the category of interrupted
intermediate replies was not adopted in this paper. There were also no instances where the
interviewee gave a partial or fractional reply. The interviewees either replied, by implication or
directly, or failed to do so. So it is made clear that all of the intermediate replies found during the
analysis contained an implication of the answer. Bull calls this the ‘answer by implication’ (2003).
Below are two examples of intermediate replies with implication, the first one is an implied ‘yes’, the
second example has ‘no’ implied in the answer. In both examples the question and the intermediate
reply are underlined.
1. D:
G:
but couldn’t you say that the story of Genesis the story of Adam and Eve and the
serpent is some sort of symbolic account of a a war between good and evil for
example (it didn’t have to-)
(there is that) element to it as well
23
2. D:
I was interested in wh- what you said about learning something wrong from science
and that that the moon was catapulted out of the pacific ocean I suppose what a
scientist might say to that is that’s no longer taught because it’s now known to be
wrong whereas you’re still teaching what has been taught in Christianity for centuries
I mean does that change as well
H:
does it change I think probably our understanding of Christianity changes rather than
the story or the you know how can I put that I suppose it depends how you see the
bible I sup- and how I see the bible is (…)
As Simon-Vandenbergen (2008) points out, implicit meanings can carry much more than the implicit
answer to a question. In the following example, the implicit reply to the question is yes. But Gluck is
also implying that Judaism has a very long tradition yet should not be regarded as outdated since the
rabbis constantly innovate within the tradition.
D:
and that’s passed down from rabbi to rabbi is that (is that how it is)
G:
(that I) I mean the Talmud is actually committed to writing it was committed to
writing about fifteen hundred two thousand years ago and and then it- we study it
we innovate in it we find new concepts new perspectives within it
4.2.2.3.
Non-replies
Since a non-reply is the lack of a reply, most of the features of a non-reply are the opposite of those
of a reply. A non-reply to a yes-no question will, for instance, neither affirm nor negate the question.
Naturally there are several ways of not replying to a question. Under what he calls ‘equivocation
typology’ Bull (2003) gives a very detailed overview of ways in which politicians in the data he
analysed avoid answering questions. Intermediate replies as described above in section 3.1.2.2. are
part of equivocal communication in Bull’s typology (2003). Because of the difference in data, not all
of the categories Bull distinguishes are relevant to this paper. The ones that were used are discussed
and sometimes changed to make them more suitable to the material. For example, the category of
‘makes political point’ (Bull 2003), was changed into ‘making a religious point’, since there are
similarities between Bull’s data and the data at hand, but also differences due to the topic of the
interviews. There was also one category added, namely ‘answering a different question’, which did
not fit in any of the categories found in other research, but was remarkable enough to be included in
the analysis.
There are also references to Fetzer (2007). in the analysis of the different categories She uses the
term ‘challenge’ when an interviewee objects in some way to a question or statement by the
interviewer. There are many similarities between her definitions and those by Bull (Bull, 2003; Fetzer,
2007), but there are also nuances in her descriptions that are useful to the analysis of the data at
24
hand. To Fetzer the act of challenging an utterance by someone ‘is intrinsically connected with
denying its truth and/or rejecting its appropriateness and sincerity. A communicative contribution
[...] can be denied, and other contextual references can be non-accepted, such as its agree of
politeness or its sequential status’ (Fetzer, 2007: 169). The term ‘challenge’ is also used by Harris, but
she uses it to indicate the category of attacking
an utterance which is based on a false
presupposition (1991). See a) under section 4.2.2.3.1. for more on Harris’ category of challenges.
Fetzer indicates a wider variety of responses with her use of the term. She distinguishes three
different worlds to which these challenges may be connected: the objective world when the
statement is not true, the subjective world when the statement is not sincere, and the social world
when the statement is not appropriate. The social world is further subdivided into a textual system,
an interpersonal system and an interactional system depending on the way in which an utterance is
inappropriate (Fetzer, 2007). Where it is relevant these categories are also included and further
explained in the classification.
Overall it is useful to keep in mind that because of the spontaneous nature and flow of speech, and
the elaborations that come with many of the questions and replies, failing to give a full reply to a
question may or may not be intentional. Dawkins himself rarely seems to pick up on the lack of reply,
which is in great contrast with political interviews (Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008).
The different equivocation strategies that were used during the interviews are discussed in the order
of frequency: attacking the question was most frequent and reflecting the question back to the
interviewer and acknowledging the question without answering it were least frequent.
4.2.2.3.1. Attacking the question
Bull (2003) lists no less than eight different ways in which the political interviewees attacked the
question put forward by the interviewer. In the small number of responses in the data for this
dissertation, only six of those strategies were used and only two of them more than once. In general,
Bull’s categories were adopted when deemed appropriate to the analysis.
a) The question is based on a false presupposition
The main strategy of attacking the question was claiming that the question was based on a ‘false
premise’ (Bull, 2003). Harris (1991) calls these non-replies challenges, “responses which challenge
one or more of the presuppositions of a question” (p. 85). I have adopted the term ‘presupposition’
for ease of comparison with other research. The use of presupposition and further research on the
topic are discussed in section 4.4. Bull (2003) only gives an example to illustrate what he means by
25
this (see also Bull and Mayer, 1993), but for the clarity of the analysis I will further discuss two
examples to show how they criticise the starting point of the question.
In the following two examples, the part of the utterance by Dawkins that makes up the question, and
the part of the utterance by which the interviewee attacks the presupposition, are underlined.
1. D:
let me ask about another thing in the booklet which was about aids and HIV I think
somewhere it talks about I mean it’s sort of health education class obviously very
sensible but then it’s something about it’s not the exact words but something about
aids being the wages of sin or something like that I mean is that kind of mixing health
education with moralistic preaching
H:
[laughs] I I suppose the only other- the flip side of that is that that sometimes it
frustrates me that we want to teach health education outside of any moral
framework at all which I I find very frustrating I mean I I let me let me put my cards
on the table and say that another thing that I find frustrating is (...)
2. D:
(…) obviously where I’m coming from on the one hand and the tradition on the other
I mean couldn’t you preserve the customs the traditions the history without
somehow imposing upon the children views about the universe which modern
science would say are simply false
G: I would say impose upon the Jew anything I would say that’s something which is
impossible I think scientifically impossible Jews are very independent by our nature
for various reasons I would say that that the the Jewish gene is very much a a gene
which swims against the current
In the first example, Hawkes criticizes Dawkins’ underlying presupposition that it is unfavourable to
mix health education with a moralistic perspective. That Dawkins sees mixing the two subjects as a
negative approach is marked by his negative yes-no question and the use of the phrase moralistic
preaching. Hawkes does not copy this phrase but uses moral framework instead, which is more
neutral. He challenges the fact that the mixing of these two is a negative, but rather sees it as a
positive. Hawkes reverses the argument that Dawkins made. At the same time he has of course not
answered the question Dawkins put forward.
In the second example Dawkins again uses a negative yes-no question. The interviewee, Gluck, does
not challenge the whole of the question but picks out one element to object to: the word imposing.
He therefore also fails to answer the question of whether or not it would be possible to preserve the
traditions aside from the literal teaching of the Bible.
The category of attacking a false presupposition ties in with Fetzer’s challenge of a question based on
the validity of the content. Content relates to the objective world, a challenge indicates that the
26
previous utterance is perceived as being untrue in some form. She states that these challenges are
often succeeded by a ‘negotiation-of-validity sequence, in which the challenged presuppositions are
made explicit’ (Fetzer, 2007: 175). This was however not the case in the data analysed. The one
example of a negotiation-of-validity sequence is a short negotiation where Dawkins rather quickly
agrees with the challenge by Gluck. The full negotiation sequence is given below.
1. D:
let me come back to education and my- the point I made a while ago that it’s a sort of
accident that this child happens to have been brought up in a Jewish household that
child in a Christian that child in a Muslim- why should children be victims of the
particular tradition in which they happen to have been born rather than choosing for
themselves by being shown all the evidence that’s available
2. G:
I think we’re all- with a- I wouldn’t use the word victim necessarily unless someone
wants to choose that word but we’re all to a certain extent affected by our
surroundings there’s no such thing as a person living in a vacuum
3. D:
indeed
4. G:
we’re all affected by our parents by our family by our surroundings by various
experiences that we have over the years so therefore to say that you know that we
we do we type of were born and cloned and put in a groove and that is who we are
and what we are and we have no choice I think (that is)
5. D:
(no you’re) clearly right I mean that that we we we get our taste in music our taste in
in football teams or whatever it might be
6. G:
which football team do you support
7. D:
[laughs] I I don’t I’m not interested in football
8. G:
(not interested in football)
9. D:
(I know you do I know you do) (...)
In turn 1 Dawkins asks a question of which Gluck challenges the presupposition that it would be
possible for children to choose which tradition they prefer to follow and for an environment to be
completely neutral and give children these opportunities to choose for themselves. Dawkins takes
Gluck’s point in turn 3 and even provides examples of how a child is influenced by its environment in
turn 5. Turns 6 to 8 mark an at first sight rather odd diversion in the conversation, for which there
however might be a reasonable explanation. Caffi has stated that challenging a presupposition can
be ‘highly polemical and aggressive’ (Caffi, 1998). In conceding his point so quickly however, Dawkins
moves away from the confrontational tone of the argument. In his reference to an expected common
interest between Dawkins and himself (football), Gluck recognizes and confirms the new tone. Both
27
Dawkins and Gluck smile and nod during this four turn segment indicating positive emotions and
intentions. Afterwards, Dawkins continues the interview.
b) The question is objectionable
Bull (2003) only gives one example for this category making it difficult to interpret what exactly his
criteria are for classifying a non-reply in this way. In this paper the two non-replies which were
classified as attacking the question as being objectionable, both object to the phrasing of the
question.
In the following example, Gluck objects to the words Dawkins uses by calling them very disturbing.
The question by Dawkins was classified as a declarative question trying to provoke a reaction. The
response was classified as a non-reply because Gluck chooses to respond to the form and not the
content of Dawkins’ utterance.
D:
but you you realize that the children are being taught they’re being brought up in a in
a world and they’re being taught that the entire world began after what
archaeologists would recognize as the agricultural evolution I mean these children
are being brought up in a very distorted world indeed it’s nothing to do with Judaism
this is this is true of fundamentalist Christians in the United States it’s true of
fundamentalist Muslims all over the Muslim world children all over the world are
being taught something which is manifestly false as anybody who looks objectively at
the science can tell you and I worry about children being victims of this kind of what I
can only describe as miseducation
G:
I find the the terms distorted and miseducation rather disturbing I think that Judaism
has its tradition I think there are various scientists who have their tradition and I
think to to get on a high horse and to say that only my tradition is correct without
really exploring (the other tradition-)
c) The question contains a misquotation
There was only one example of an attack on a question because it contained a misquotation in the
data, and it is given below. The question by Dawkins was classified as a declarative yes-no question.
Hawkes objects to the way Dawkins interpreted and paraphrased his previous answers, and then
moves on to questioning what is meant by factual history.
D:
(…) much of the bible was reinterpreted very heavily in the nineteenth century to be
no longer taken as factual history but as something else and theologians would need
to explain what they mean by that something else but it sounds as though you think
it’s still factual history
28
H:
I didn’t say that I think that where the bible is saying things it’s telling the truth but
the the the difficulty when people talk like that f- factual history what do we mean by
that I mean there- if you go back to sort of genesis and exodus and numbers it’s
spends a whole book talking about not a whole book but almost a whole book talking
about one man Abraham (…)
d) The question fails to tackle the important issue
Again there was only one example of a response which attacked the question for not tackling the
important issue. In the following example, the question by Dawkins, which is underlined, was marked
as a yes-no question. Gluck responds to the question by pointing out what he believes is the relevant
issue: the difference between being born in a minority versus majority culture.
D:
right okay does it strike you as odd that you happen to have been born into a Jewish
family and the children that you instruct were as well and I happen to have been
born into a Christian family and somebody else’s been born into a Muslim family so
we tend to as children we tend to believe the traditions of the society into which we
happen to have been born which are different from the other traditions could
something so accidental as that be true
G:
I think I think it’s further than that I think there’s a the concept of osmosis as well
that there is the conscious acceptance or or acknowledgement of tradition but then
there there’s also what we learn without noticing from our surroundings from the
society in which we grow up and I think there’s a basic difference between growing
up in a majority culture or minority culture in a majority culture one takes from
granted in a minority culture since we are different we have to think why am I
different what is going on why am I as I am which a person in a majority culture very
often doesn’t have that luxury
e) The question is factually inaccurate
By the example Bull gives, he makes clear that by ‘factually inaccurate’ he means the facts as
everyone knows them or could find them out (2003). In the interviews that are discussed here
however, there is a discussion going on about what is and what is not factual information. The one
instance of a response that attacks a question because it is factually inaccurate, actually deals with
what the interviewee believes is not factual information. The example is given below.
1. D:
yes well I can I I mean that’s an interesting observation but it when when you’re
educating a child and you’re trying to tell a child not to cheat not to steal I would say
to to the child well don’t do that because how would you like it if he did it to you I
mean don’t don’t don’t do something unpleasant to somebody else because can’t
you (feel can’t you-)
2. H:
(it’s a) very nice way of thinking about (it)
29
3. D:
(well) it is isn’t it (and what’s wrong with it)
4. H:
(it is a very nice way) well because it’s just wrong that’s that’s what’s wrong with it I
had a friend actually who became a Christian and this friend of mine I said well you
know what what is your background he said oh my background he said we are all we
are all thieves and my sisters are prostitutes (…)
In the first utterance, Dawkins explains his idea of what would be a correct way to teach moral
behaviour to a child. Hawkes confirms that it is a possible alternative to teaching morals based on the
Bible. In 3, Dawkins poses two questions, the first one is rhetorical and serves to show agreement
with Hawkes’ interruption, the second question asks for any argument that Hawkes could give
against Dawkins’ view of teaching morality. Hawkes gives a positive response to the first question,
but when Dawkins asks him what precisely is wrong with that viewpoint, he says that it is just wrong.
He does not provide an argument for why it is wrong, and thus fails to answer the question. He goes
on to give an example about his own life, which does not supply a reply to the question either.
This category is related to Fetzer’s category of challenging the appropriateness of a validity claim’s
content. It is similar to the category of attacking a question for being based on a false presupposition,
because in both cases the truth value of the utterance is being challenged (2007). In this case it is not
only being challenged but also negated. It is a much stronger objection than in the case of false
presuppositions. For a previous discussion of that category, see a) at the beginning of this section.
f) The question is hypothetical
Again Bull only provides an example to illustrate the category where a question is attacked for being
hypothetical or speculative (2003; Bull and Mayer, 1993). The one example that fit within this
category is listed below. That part of the answer that serves as an attack to the question is
underlined.
D:
(…)don’t don’t you think it’s actually quite likely that if with a wave of a wand you
could abolish sectarian schools in Northern Ireland and have all the children going to
the same schools it would take a generation but don’t you think that after that
generation you would no longer have the hideous conflicts that you have in Northern
Ireland
G:
I think after 7/7 that this argument is rather facile excuse me saying so because the
bombings on 7/7 were actually people who went to state schools Muslim kids who
went together with Christian kids together with people from all different
backgrounds and it didn’t seem to prevent the terrible scenes that we saw so I don’t
think the issue is going to a different school
30
Dawkins argues that if sectarian schools were abolished and all children of opposing religious groups
went to the same school, any conflicts between those groups would be resolved in a time-span of
one generation. Gluck argues that the children who bombed the underground in London on July 7th
2005 actually went to a state school -assuming that state school are neutral when it comes to
religion- but still committed acts because of an opposing religious belief. He thus argues that the
hypothesis on which Dawkins’ question is based, is no longer valid.
4.2.2.3.2. Ignoring the question
This was the second most frequent strategy of avoiding answering a question. Bull (2003) says that
when he applies the category, the politician that is being interviewed does not even acknowledge the
question. This happened once in the interview with Hawkes as is shown in the example below.
Hawkes just repeats his first answer in the second utterance and explains it further.
H:
I wish that was true
D:
well maybe you should teach some moral philosophy and learn some moral
philosophy
H:
well yeah I wish that was true though on on a world stage and it’s just not true what
you’re saying is just not true it’s- you look at the world in which we live and it’s it’s a
frightening place
In the interview with Gluck there are three instances where Gluck ignores the questions by Dawkins,
one example again is given below. Gluck, like Hawkes, just goes on with the point he was making in
the first turn. Since Dawkins’ question could be taken as an interruption however, ignoring the
question may not have been Gluck’s intention.
G:
(but then xxx) when it has different answers that in itself shows that this isn’t a
foolproof way of dating something because it gives different answers
D:
(how accurate would you wish it to be)
G:
(I mean if you if you have if you have) all of us in this room all giving different
accounts of what happened five minutes ago we’re gonna start asking questions hang
hang on a second what actually did happen because they all have different views
Fetzer (2007) calls this technique ‘challenging the appropriateness of a validity claim by avoiding the
question’ (p. 181). The category as she defines it could also include the category that is described in
section 4.2.2.3.7., acknowledging the question without answering it. Fetzer explains that these
challenges are often followed by lengthy negotiation sequences when the interviewer does not
accept the interviewee’s evasiveness and keeps coming back to the question. She recognizes a very
31
strong face-threatening character in these sequences (Fetzer, 2007). In the data at hand, there were
however none of these face-threatening negotiation sequences (one example which comes close is
discussed under a) in section 4.2.2.3.1. This ties in with another point that Fetzer makes, which is
that the interviewee can easily get away with ignoring the question, if the interviewer is not
persistent. Dawkins is rarely a persistent interviewer but moves on quickly to cover a wide range of
topics within the debate between religion and science and their positions on education.
4.2.2.3.3. Answering a different question
When analyzing the data I was confronted with responses which neither fit the mould of direct or
intermediate reply, nor any of the categories of non-replies. They were replies to questions that were
either accidentally or deliberately misunderstood. Therefore they answered a different question than
the one that had been asked. In the example below, Gluck more so replies to the question ‘how do
you decide’ than ‘by what criteria do you decide’. Dawkins picks up on this and repeats his question
after which Gluck gives a more satisfactory reply.
D:
right and what criteria do you use when innovating to decide whether it’s a good
innovation or a bad innovation
G:
one discusses it with others and if if people can’t show that it’s wrong so then it- and
it’s accepted so then it becomes part of the Jewish tradition
D:
wrong by what criteria by (by-)
In the second example, Hawkes does not answer the question ‘what’ but ‘how much’.
D:
(yeah okay) but say I mean in in one section of the science thing I suddenly I was sort
of taken aback because I suddenly start reading about Noah’s Ark and what’s that
gotta do with a science lesson
H:
well I suppose that depends on your opinion it could have a lot if you believe in the
story it it could have a lot to do with science
Dawkins does not comment on the fact that his question has not fully been answered, and in fact
only does this once in both interviews combined. In all the other cases he either ignores the lack of
reply or interprets it as a misunderstanding. That a misunderstanding might be the reason for the
inappropriate reply is of course very well possible. This, however, also means that it makes a good
equivocation strategy since the interviewer is less likely to pick up on it, or to challenge the
interviewee’s response. Compared to Fetzer’s framework, it could be argued that it is the
interviewees here who make an inappropriate response by violating the Gricean maxim of relation.
The response is not directly relevant to the reply (Fetzer, 2007).
32
4.2.2.3.4. Making a religious point
Bull uses the category ‘makes a political point’ to create a tool to analyse political interviews (2003).
In the data analysed for this paper there are no political points to be made. There are however
instances where Hawkes and Gluck seem to use a similar strategy for religion. They make a
recognizably religious statement. This can be a phrase from the Bible or a general rule of their
particular religion. These statements are not only used to avoid responding to questions but also as
regular turns during the parts that are more like a debate, as can be seen in the following example
which is the end of the interview with Hawkes. The religious point is underlined.
D:
well no you don’t exactly) say that you say you say that we’re we’re struggling
towards the truth and as new evidence comes in we refine it
H:
and in the middle of that Jesus says I am truth that’s the hard one
D:
okay well I think we better leave it at that thank you very much
There are various possibilities why Dawkins decides not to take the interview any further after
Hawkes’ response. It could have to do with time restrictions or with the fact that Dawkins feels he
has already gathered enough material for his documentary. It could however also be related to the
response: it is not inconceivable that Dawkins chooses not to continue the interview because
Hawkes does not provide the full replies he is looking for.
Bull states that attacking the opposition is also a way to make a religious point (2003). Of course in
these debates there is no political opposition. There are however two opposing mentalities present:
the religious point of view versus the scientific point of view. Dawkins’ documentary is in part an
attack on religion, and this is reflected in the interviews. It is hence no surprise that the interviewees
sometimes respond in the same way and attack science, or secular society. When this is done in
response to a question, it is often a form of reversing the argument, and of course counts as a nonreply. The following example is from the interview between Dawkins and Gluck. When Dawkins
accuses the Hasidic Jewish culture of not giving children a choice, Gluck reverses the argument by
accusing Western culture of doing the same thing but worse.
D:
(…) wouldn’t it somehow seem more sensible if children as it were looked them all
over and then made their choice when they grew up rather than this automatic
assumption that a child shall be brought up in the tradition of its forefathers
G:
I think the automatic assumption is much more true within let’s call it western
culture being the dominant culture it’s taken for granted that this is a normal way of
behaving that this is the way how all people behave (…)
33
4.2.2.3.5. Pleading ignorance
For Bull this type of non-reply is a subtype of a group he calls ‘declines to answer’ (2003). The only
subtype that was used in this data is where the interviewee pleads ignorance and is thus unable to
answer the question. When an interviewee claims not to know something, usually about God, this
does not have the same effect as a politician pleading ignorance to something he should be aware of.
It is a good strategy to equivocate because at the same time it shows respect and humbleness
toward God. In the following example for instance, where Hawkes claims insufficient intelligence to
know whether Genesis is an accurate record of history.
D:
quite but do you also believe that Genesis is an accurate record of history even
though nobody was was around to-
H:
I don’t know if I’m clever enough to know the answer to that one if if let me put the
question a slightly different way cause I think sometimes we have the wrong
question- we ask the wrong question we get the wrong answer I think if you ask me
really what do I think about that my answer would be do- cause what you’re really
trying to ask me is do you think the Genesis story was true and that god created the
world in seven days that’s what you would really like to ask me right [D: nods] my
answer to that is I don’t know (…)
Hawkes claims he does not know whether God created the earth in seven days. He then says that to
give the right answer he needs to put the question in a different way. He rephrases the question but
gives the same answer as he did before. In rephrasing the question he replaces the word believe that
Dawkins uses, with think. These two cognitive verbs often fulfil a similar function in conversation, but
in the case of religion, belief has a strong connotation of religious faith. It does not mean ‘being of
the opinion that’, but that the believer is convinced of the truth of what s/he believes in. The
prevalence and function of cognitive verbs is further discussed in section 4.3.
As Beach and Metzger (1997) point out, claiming insufficient knowledge might also be a way for an
interviewee to change the subject to something he feels more comfortable with. As can be seen from
the following few utterances, the fact that Hawkes claims not to know anything about the topic
forces Dawkins to move on to something else since otherwise he would be having a conversation
with himself. In that way, pleading ignorance not only serves as a way of not replying, but can also be
seen as a method to move on to another topic (see Beach & Metzger, 1997).
D:
well yes but but I mean we we were talking about Noah’s ark and and a modern
theologian would say that there never was a man called Noah who had an ark and
the animals went in two by two those children are being taught I (gather that there
was)
34
H:
(I’m not so sure as-) yeah but I don’t know wh- you you say that (maybe in fifty years
time well I mean I don’t know)
D:
(well we don’t have one here)
H:
well I mean I don’t know
D:
okay well . one other question the the word education as you know from Latin means
a leading out leading out leading the children to develop their potential
Dawkins does not receive a reply to his question and thus moves on to another question as indicated
in the last utterance of the example.
4.2.2.3.6. Reflecting the question back to the interviewer
In Bull’s classification ‘reflecting the question back to the interviewer’ is a subcategory of ‘questions
the question’ (2003). As with the previous category however, this subcategory was the only one to
appear during the analysis of the data. It is similar to the previous category in that responses
qualified as reflecting the question back to the interviewer, often also reverse the argument that
Dawkins made. This technique was only used by Hawkes. Below is an example of a response by
Hawkes which reflects the question back to Dawkins. The question by Dawkins was labelled as a
declarative probing for a reaction.
D:
I mean as a science educator myself I did wonder a bit about this because you might
think that science would be kept on one side and they would learn the science and
then they would go into a religious education class or something like that or a
sociology class or something-
H:
why would you separate it
Instead of discussing Dawkins’ comment and giving arguments to contradict or support it, Hawkes
reverses the argument. He does not only reverse the question back to Dawkins but turns it around as
well, to question the underlying assumption. The category is in that way similar to attacking a
question because it is based on a false presupposition, as was discussed in section 4.2.2.3.1.
4.2.2.3.7. Acknowledging the question without answering it
Acknowledging the question without answering it is closely linked to ignoring the question, the only
difference being that the interviewee in this case does acknowledge that a question has been asked
(Bull, 2003). In the following example, Dawkins in fact puts forward two questions. Hawkes chooses
to acknowledge the first question but not answer it for the time being and moves on to the second
question. The first question and the acknowledgement are underlined.
35
D:
I did not feel reading that pamphlet that it was a very open minded way to teach in
the middle of a science thing to suddenly say something about Noah’s ark or
something about what Jesus taught or- it seems to me that ought to be kept separate
in a in a in a religion class perhaps
H:
yeah I I would just leaving that one on one side I would hate the idea of keeping
things separate cause that to me is is just a th- I don’t see life like that I see life as a
whole nothing is separate I (...)
Both utterances exhibit many references to affect. The sequence is discussed in more detail in
section 4.2.1.5.
4.3. Commitment
Commitment to a statement can be expressed in various ways (Berlin, 2008). It is closely linked to
evidentiality, a label for a number of ways by which speakers can express their attitude toward their
statement concerning its degree of certainty (Chafe & Nichols, 1986). The reason for special
attention for the topic in this paper, is that the subject of the interview – the battle between science
and religion – leads to two different kinds of commitment. Berlin (2008) makes a clear distinction
between truth and belief when it comes to commitment to the truth value of an assertion, and urges
others to make the distinction “ for a discussion of belief could quickly devolve into an irresolvable
argument” (pp. 375-376). Simon-Vandenbergen (2000) marks a similar distinction between verifiable
and unverifiable propositions. She refers to Stubbs (1986) and Persson (1993) and their distinctions
between respectively ‘modal meaning’ versus ‘psychological meaning’ and ‘belief’ versus ‘pure
truth’. Preisler (1986) makes a distinction in the meaning of I think between the expression of a
personal attitude (as in I find) or an expression of belief (as in I believe). Fetzer (2008) relates
expressions of commitment to the ‘subjective world’, and lists cognitive verbs, among other linguistic
devices, as being a typical means to refer to this personal subjective world. Aijmer (1997) uses the
term ‘non-factive verbs’ based on the distinction between factive or presuppositional and nonfactive predicates (Kiparsky, 1970). Holmes (1995) also recognizes many different uses of I think in
conversations, as a hedge or a booster or ‘an epistemic device expressing primarily referential
meaning’ (p. 93), referring to the degree of commitment to the truth value of an utterance.
In this paper the analysis of commitment will focus on the frequency and function of I/we think, I/we
believe and I suppose. There were no instances of I assume and only two instances of I guess which is
why they are not included in the analysis, even though they have been added to the list of cognitive
verbs that express commitment (Fetzer, 2008; Chafe 1986). An overview of the rates of these
pragmatic particles is given in Table 3 below. It should be kept in mind that the rates for Dawkins
represent the rates found in both interviews. Naturally the interviewees only participated in one of
36
the interviews. The interviews with Gluck and Hawkes were similar in length (7904 and 7695 words
respectively) so rates between the two interviewees are comparable.
Table 3: rates of I think, I/we believe & I suppose of both interviews combined.
Gluck
Hawkes
Dawkins
Totals
per 10.000 words
I think
tentative
deliberative
total
I/we believe
I suppose
0
38
44
7
0
0
32
39
4
8
5
16
24
6
5
5
86
107
17
13
3.2
55.1
68.6
10.9
8.3
We think only appeared three times in both the interviews combined (2 instances by Hawkes, 1 by
Gluck) and always carried the literal meaning of think as cogitate (Aijmer, 1997). The example below
illustrates this use perfectly as it is followed in a list by reflect which has a similar meaning.
G:
(we’re born) within- each one of us was born into a certain family into a certain
group but at the same time we have a choice to stay or otherwise and that is and
because we think and we reflect and we struggle with ourselves each one of us
hopefully and then we make choices in life (...)
Also note that think is not followed by a proposition which it modifies but is used as a full verb
indicating mental activity. The few instances and literal meaning of these occurrences are the reason
they are not represented in Table 3. These cognitive verbs will now be discussed individually in terms
of used and meaning in the data.
That these different pragmatic particles often have the same function or express similar meanings
has been established in various other research (Berlin, 2008; Simon-Vandenbergen, 2000; Fetzer,
2008; Chafe, 1986). The label ‘cognitive verbs’ refers to the reference these verbs make to a
psychological state (Fetzer, 2008), in the data at hand it is the psychological state of the speaker (e.g.
I think) or a group of people which the speaker belongs to (e.g. we think).
The first particle to be discussed is I/we think. A lot has been written on the topic of I think over the
years, research that mostly focuses on the various meanings and functions it can take (SimonVandenbergen, 2000; Berlin, 2008; Fetzer, 2008; Holmes, 1995). In some cases I think is used as a
representative of several similar particles (Simon-Vandenbergen, 2000) or grouped with I believe
(Fetzer, 2008). In this analysis, it is treated separately from I believe for reasons that were already
stated above.
37
Aijmer (1997) provides some insight into the history of the verb think, and explains that at the roots
of the word are two different Indo-European words with a different meaning that became
indistinguishable in later developments of the English language. ‘The meaning of þyncan can be
paraphrased by ‘seem’ (me þuhte ‘it seemed to me’) in present-day English while þencan expresses
opinion (= ‘believe’)’ (p. 11). That these different meanings have however persisted in the one word
think is clear from the references above. Aijmer (1997) even goes as far as calling the word
polysemous, recognizing three different meanings – belief, opinion and intention – with one meaning
that encompasses all of these: cogitation. The intentional meaning of I think (as in I think I’ll go home
now) did not play a relevant role in Dawkins’ interviews, and will not be addressed in the analysis.
The first distinction made in this paper is between the use of I/we think with a deliberative function
(Aijmer, 1997) comparable to its function as a booster, paying attention to positive face (Holmes,
1995) and the tentative function (Aijmer, 1997) comparable to its function as a hedge, paying
attention to negative face. The secondary but more relevant part for this paper is between which
type of knowledge is expressed how. The goal here is to find out whether a belief in religion will be
expressed differently from a believe or opinion which is based on verifiable facts (SimonVandenbergen, 2000; Chafe, 1986).
In the interview with Gluck, there were a total of 57 instances of I think, 44 by Gluck and 13 by
Dawkins. There was only one instance in which I think was used tentatively, by Dawkins. The
tentative used of I think in the analysis in based on position either at the end of the utterance or
immediately before or after the phrase about which uncertainty is expressed. The deliberative use
was marked by emphatic stress and initial position focussing on personal authority (SimonVandenbergen, 2000). Other instances that were not analysed as either tentative or deliberative
were used to refer to reported speech. An example of the tentative use is given below.
D: that would be true of Islam as well wouldn’t it I think
I think is in the final position of the turn and thus takes the function of an ‘afterthought’. SimonVandenbergen (2000) describes this use as follows: ‘after having stated something, the speaker adds
his or her reservations, thus weakening the force of the assertion’ (p. 48). Fetzer (2008) refers to this
as the minus-commitment expression of I think. In this case however, Dawkins does not appear to be
less sure of his proposition. He adds the particle to make the question appear less aggressive. Aijmer
uses the term ‘softener’ by Crystal & Davy (1975) to describe this use of I think to reduce the force of
an utterance.
38
In the interview with Hawkes, I think appeared 50 times, 39 instances by Hawkes and 11 by Dawkins.
Again it was only Dawkins who used I think tentatively (four times). One of those utterances is given
below as an example.
D:
(…) I mean there are hundreds thousands of origin myths all over the world and the
Noah’s ark myth happens to be I think an ancient Sumerian myth originally and it
was taken up by the Jews and that’s why it comes into the bible there’s lots and lots
of other myths I mean why teach the children that myth rather than a Nigerian myth
or an Indian myth or a-
I think here serves to show Dawkins’ uncertainty about the exact origin of the myth. He indicates this
uncertainty by putting the particle right in front of that which he is uncertain about (SimonVandenbergen, 2000). This is comparable to what Berlin (2008) calls the ‘attenuating’ use of I think.
There were also a few instances where I think was not deliberative nor tentative but performed
another function, such as in the following utterance by Dawkins in the interview with Gluck, where it
refers to the opinions of others in a form of reported speech:
D:
(...)if you were trying to use biblical methods to date the origin of the universe then
you might say I think it’s five thousand whatever it was you said and some some
other teacher might say well I think it’s a little bit less (...)
Most of the time however, (in 47 of the 57 instances in the interview with Gluck, 39 out of 50 times
in the interview with Hawkes) I think was used deliberatively to express authority, conviction and
certainty. By making a self reference, the speakers boost their commitment – or apparent
commitment – to their assertions (Berlin, 2008). Gluck used I think in this function of booster 38
times, Hawkes used it 32 times while Dawkins subscribes to 9 uses in the interview with Gluck and 7
instances in the interview with Hawkes. In the example below, I think is followed by that which
Aijmer (1997) sees as a mark of prominence in the clause, and therefore always analyses as being
deliberative.
H:
because I I think that the reality is I mean let let me just correct one thing that I think
I I wouldn’t regard myself particularly as religious I regard myself as a Christian cause
I think Christianity is about relationships so my first relationship is [moves hand up
and down and points upwards] to god and my relationship is next with human
beings and other people and both are very very important so that when you love god
you’re not doing things right because you’re frightened of what god will do in terms
of punishment you are doing things right because you care it’s like in a love
relationship you don’t- you’re not doing things (right-)
39
Also note how Hawkins follows his I think with the phrase the reality is, representing his assertion,
that was at first personal because of the first person pronoun, as seemingly more factual by referring
to the reality. He moves his utterance from a subjective perspective to an objective perspective,
because what could be more objective than reality. The use of this phrase will be addressed in
section 4.4. Simon-Vandenbergen (2002) points to the words accompanying I think in utterances that
can further boost the certainty or authority of the statement. The grading of the relationships as very
very important makes the assertion ‘unverifiable in any case’ (Simon-Vandenbergen, 2002: p. 53),
since a degree of importance is highly personal and thus not verifiable as objective truth. Hawkes
expresses his authority in stating what is important in a way that is not up for debate.
Look at the following example by Gluck:
G:
(...) every single Jewish kid knows about evolution and and has thought about it and
has studied it and has looked at it and has thought what’s going on here so therefore
I think it’s a much healthier situation and a situation which which opens up ones mind
and engages one with these issues
Gluck uses much healthier to add weight to his opinion. The collocation of therefore also points to a
deliberative planning of I think in the beginning of the assertion to express authority on the topic
(Simon-Vandenbergen, 2000).
Next we take a look at the particle I/we believe. Where we think only represented less than 3% of the
total counts of I/we think, we believe appears about as much as I believe (8 versus 9 occurrences
respectively). But however evenly those numbers seem to be distributed, there are remarkable
differences between who uses which form. In the interview with Gluck, for instance, Dawkins is the
only one to use I believe. He uses it four times, each time referring to a type of reported speech,
similar to the use of I think above. The following is an utterance by Dawkins which features two of
these occurrences of I believe.
D:
(they’re not) like traditions though are they they’re they’re- it’s true that
astronomical evidence may give a slightly different answer from biological evidence
and then we would have to look at them and say well which one is is is right but
what we don’t say is I believe so and so because I belong to the astronomical
tradition you say I believe so and so because I looked at the evidence and-
The verb say indicates that Dawkins is expressing the opinion of someone else. In this case he refers
to a group of scientists including himself. We and you refer to the same group of people in this case.
In the same interview, Gluck uses we believe seven times, and does not use I believe once. The roles
are reversed in the interview with Hawkes, where Dawkins uses both I believe and we believe once,
40
both times referring to religious belief (cf. below) and Hawkes only uses I believe four times. Except
when I/we believe is used in reported speech, it is always used with a religious connotation. Even in
the following example, where Dawkins uses it to refer to what he believes in, which is based on
evidence, the ‘belief’ he refers to is a feeling or knowing which he equates with religious belief, but it
is based on a different source. Dawkins uses the word to contrast the kind of believing that Hawkes
refers to in the preceding utterance.
H:
I care about what’s true well I I find you almost an evangelist (for a particular
religion)
D:
(well a lot of people say that to me) but but that that actually is is unfair because of
course what I believe is based on evidence it’s it’s not based on a holy book I don’t I
don’t I don’t say it is written in the works of saint Darwin-
A more obvious example of how believe refers to religious belief, is in the utterance by Gluck below.
G:
- and in the oral law as well because we believe that God gave simultaneously the
oral law and the written law he gave the written law as as a general points and the
oral law to explain exactly what is meant by these points
Gluck refers to one of the beliefs of Judaism that is passed on through religious education. As stated
above, Gluck only uses the first person plural with believe whereas Hawkes mostly uses first person
singular. Berlin (2008) comments on Condoleeza Rice’s use of we thought where she speaks on
behalf of the whole administration under George W. Bush. It adds to Rice’s credibility as a speaker,
that she can refer to a group of people with the same beliefs. Similarly, it adds to Gluck’s credibility
that he can refer to the Jewish people in the broad sense, or his fellow rabbi’s in the narrow sense,
when referring to personal beliefs. This plural reference can be compared to Fetzer’s (2008) notion of
a ‘collective identity’ which she recognizes in political parties (p. 389). The following is another
example of this reference to a group of believers.
G:
we believe that was 5765 years but of course we’re coming from a from a starting
point that God created the world let’s- like he created man he didn’t create man as
an atom we believe that he created man and woman as mature human beings we
believe that God created a mature world I mean even Darwin believed in God but he
believed that God started off with with a a with a basic world and then God wanted it
to evolve what we’re saying is that God started it from from the point it was it’s like
for example a theater set you can say that in order to have a- to have Hamlet one
needs to have a graveyard in order to have the graveyard one needed a generation to
live and to die or you can say start- you start with the set as it is
Also note the use of the booster of course, a device which will be discussed further in section 4.4.
Similar to the use of we believe Gluck also uses we’re saying, where he is referring to either Jewish
41
Orthodox people in general or rabbi’s in particular. Fetzer (2008) points to the difference between I
think, which is a ‘private domain reference’ and I say, which is a ‘public domain reference’. The latter
makes it ‘explicit that the speaker has uttered the proposition before and is uttering it again to
reassert her or his claim’ (Fetzer, 2008: 387). From a pragmatic point of view, the phrase even Darwin
believed in God could also be seen as a booster in this context, because it means to strengthen the
argument against Dawkins, who is, apart from a famous atheist, also a renowned evolutionary
biologist1.
I have no explanation for the difference between Gluck’s use of we believe and Hawkes’ use of I
believe, but consider the following hypothesis: Orthodox Judaism is a minority religion very much
segregated from Western society. People within the congregation will adhere to the same belief
system much more so than Christians, who are more integrated in Western society and follow
different kinds of Christianity. This might explain why Hawkes stresses his own beliefs and does not
refer to the belief of others. Orthodox Jews in London make up a much more cohesive group than
Protestant Christians, so Gluck can refer to we with a much stronger confidence that he is indeed
expressing the beliefs of Orthodox Jews combined.
As a third pragmatic particle, I suppose was the least frequent of the three. There were 13 instances,
all in the interview with Hawkes. Dawkins used I suppose 5 times and Hawkes 8 times. Suppose is
similar to assume in meaning, it is more tentative than I think (Aijmer, 1997) which might explain why
it is used less in the data. As was mentioned before, most of the instances of I think have the function
of boosting the assertion. I suppose has more in common with the tentative function of I think.
Below are two examples, one by Hawkes and one by Dawkins, that illustrate this use.
1. D: I was interested in wh- what you said about learning something wrong from science
and that that the moon was catapulted out of the pacific ocean I suppose what a
scientist might say to that is that’s no longer taught because it’s now known to be wrong
whereas you’re still teaching what has been taught in Christianity for centuries I mean
does that change as well
2. H: [laughs] I I suppose the only other- the flip side of that is that that sometimes it
frustrates me that we want to teach health education outside of any moral framework at
all which I I find very frustrating
1
For an overview of Dawkins’ publications on both atheism and evolutionary biology, see the website
www.richarddawkins.net
42
In the first example, Dawkins is not in doubt about what a scientist would say, since he is a scientist
himself. He uses I suppose and the modal verb might to soften his assertion (Aijmer, 1997). In both
examples, leaving out I suppose would result in a more straightforward and direct way of phrasing.
The second part of the analysis of commitment focuses on what type of information the speakers
commit themselves to and in what degree. Here I found it useful to adopt Chafe’s (1986) distinction
between four different ‘modes of knowing’. Table 4 gives an overview of these ‘modes of knowing’,
what the ‘source of knowledge’ is and how reliable or unreliable the knowledge is.
Table 4: sources and modes of knowledge on the scale of reliability. Table adopted from Aijmer (1997: 17,
based on Chafe, 1986: 263).
Source of knowledge
Mode of knowing
Reliability
???
hypothesis
evidence
language
belief
deduction
induction
hearsay
high
low
It should be kept in mind that the degree of reliability depends on the speaker’s opinion and that the
positions of each of the modes of knowing can vary depending on cultural or personal convictions
(Chafe, 1986). This also implies that what the hearer and speaker recognize as being a reliable mode
of knowledge, may be very different. In this research, this is most certainly the case since it is this
distinction between what religion and science base their knowledge on that Dawkins constantly
emphasizes. Compare Dawkins’ utterance below with the one by Hawkes, which is a response to a
question by Dawkins asking him why he teaches the myth of Noah’s ark instead of other myths2.
D:
(well a lot of people say that to me) but but that that actually is is unfair because of
course what I believe is based on evidence it’s it’s not based on a holy book I don’t I
don’t I don’t say it is written in the works of saint Darwin(...)
H:
because it comes from the bible I guess
Dawkins directly refers to what his belief is based on: evidence. The word evidence appears six times
in the interview with Hawkes, and no less than 22 times in the interview with Gluck. Dawkins even
specifies what his knowledge is not based on (a holy book by saint Darwin), to clearly indicate the
2
‘myth’ is the word used by Dawkins in the question.
43
difference with religious belief. The following is again a clear example of the contrast between
evidence-based knowledge and religion-based knowledge.
D:
(they’re not) like traditions though are they they’re they’re- it’s true that
astronomical evidence may give a slightly different answer from biological evidence
and then we would have to look at them and say well which one is is is right but
what we don’t say is I believe so and so because I belong to the astronomical
tradition you say I believe so and so because I looked at the evidence and-
His use of the term belief is unfortunate in this instance because it does not correlate with Chafe’s
(1986) use of the term. As is show in Table 4, the source on which belief is based, is problematic
(Chafe, 1986; Aijmer, 1997). To avoid confusion about what is meant by the term belief and its
weaker form opinion for the purpose of this analysis, the following words by Chafe provide a clear
explanation:
Belief is a mode of ‘knowing’ in which concern for evidence is downgraded. People believe things
because other people whose views they respect believe them too, or simply because, for whatever
reason, they want to believe them. There may be evidence to support a belief, evidence which a
believer may cite if pressed for it by a nonbeliever, but belief is always based on something other than
evidence alone. (Chafe, 1986: p. 266)
Aijmer (1997) states that I believe ‘also conveys that the speaker has some evidence for what he
says’ but ‘that the evidence is incomplete or non-specific’ (p. 17). It is however clear from the
definition by Chafe that there is no real need for evidence to support belief. The mode of knowledge
that Dawkins adheres to, is ‘induction’ as it is based on evidence (Chafe, 1986). On the scale of
reliability, Dawkins interprets any knowledge based on evidence as far more reliable than belief for
which the evidence is either non-existent or incomplete. For Hawkes and Gluck, on the other hand,
belief is undoubtedly more reliable than induction since to them what they believe is the
unquestionable truth on which they have built their lives.
As was mentioned before, I/we believe almost always refers to the mode of knowledge that Chafe
marks as belief. The following utterance by Hawkes is a illustrative example of such an utterance.
H:
I would hope so I mean I don’t think- I obviously am a Christian I believe in God I
don’t think God is afraid of my questions
I think rarely refers to this type of religion-based knowledge. Only Hawkes uses it in this way (5
times), as is shown in the example below:
H: I didn’t say that I think that where the Bible is saying things it’s telling the truth but the
the the difficulty when people talk like that f- factual history what do we mean by that I
44
mean there- if you go back to sort of Genesis and Exodus and Numbers it’s spends a
whole book talking about not a whole book but almost a whole book talking about one
man Abraham (…)
If Hawkes were to have said I believe the Bible is telling the truth, the utterance would have been no
different in meaning. An interpretation of these results will be given in section 5.3.
4.4. Presupposition
Presuppositions are ideas we have in our mind based on an assumption of what something or
someone will be like. This is the meaning of the term as it is commonly used in conversation, as in the
following exchange between Hawkes and Dawkins.
H:
(...) and the other thing that bothers me when we think about truth people like to
about truth and facts but actually facts are always filtered through the grille of our own
experience and culture and presuppositions aren’t they I mean I guess you’ve got
presuppositions
D:
we’ve all got presuppositions
Presuppositions as a linguistic phenomenon have already been mentioned in section 4.2.2.3.1. as one
of the bases on which an attack on a question can be built. Simon-Vandenbergen, White & Aijmer
(2007) distinguish two types of linguistic presupposition: a semantic and a pragmatic interpretation.
In this paper the term presupposition will be used denoting the pragmatic interpretation, which ‘is
defined in terms of common ground or background knowledge’ (Simon-Vandenbergen, White &
Aijmer, 2007). There are various ways to presuppose something in a conversation, or to ‘take things
for granted’ (Simon-Vandenbergen, White & Aijmer, 2007; Schmid, 2001)). In this analysis there will
be a special focus on the adverb of course and the N-be-that-construction to express presuppositions
(Schmid, 2001).
Of course is a typical booster and tends to occur more often in formal discourse such as TV interviews
than in informal conversation (Holmes, 1995). It can be a device that expresses presupposition since
it ‘shows that something is in line with the expectations’ (Chafe, 1986: 270). Simon-Vandenbergen,
White & Aijmer (2007) recognize two different groups of rhetorical functions of of course. One is the
use as a mechanism to express politeness. It is a way for the speaker to indicate that he knows a
piece of information is so self-evident that it does not need to be mentioned explicitly – and
apologize for mentioning it anyways – but that s/he needs it as a part of the relevant co-text of a
previous or following utterance. A second use of of course is as an ‘announcement of self-evidence’
(Simon-Vandenbergen, White & Aijmer, 2007). The speaker puts a statement forward boosting it
45
with of course as if it has already been dealt with before and does not need to be questioned further.
In the following example, Hawkes uses of course twice, once for each of those functions.
H:
and of course even in- even if we think in terms of science it was the Christians who
were encouraging that research xxx of course it was a day and an age I understand
that when Christianity was the predominant- and particularly in the west western
Europe but they were the ones that were encouraging some of them with great
stress sort of-
The first of course is used to express the idea that Christians encouraged scientific research with a
strong force of assertion. The adverb leaves no room for doubt and thus puts the statement forward
as presupposed. The second instance of of course is apologetic in nature. Hawkes actually
acknowledges a previous utterance by Dawkins where he makes the note that part of the reason
why Christians have done more good for the world, is that there are many more Christians than
humanists. Hawkes acknowledges the fact that most people in the west were Christian at the time,
but still expresses this explicitly because in the second sentence he focuses on the Christian
encouragement of science despite the fact that religion was predominant. He uses the word but to
announce this contrast. This second use of of course as a ‘put-down’ can either accuse the previous
speaker of understating or overstating a point (Simon-Vandenbergen, White & Aijmer, 2007). In this
case Hawkes is indirectly accusing Dawkins of understating the role that Christianity has played in the
development of science. Simon-Vandenbergen, White & Aijmer (2007) interpret these two uses of
the adverb as either ‘solidary’ (as in the first use by Hawkes) or ‘oppositional’ (as in the second case)
in nature (p. 42). Utterances where the speaker agrees with the previous speaker and uses of course
to express his agreement more fervently were also analysed as being solidary for the purpose of this
paper. The utterance by Hawkes below is an example of this.
D: I can see you wouldn’t need it
H: no of course not absolutely
Of course serves as an explicit agreement to Dawkins’ previous utterance. Compare this to the
following example where Dawkins also agrees with Gluck, but which was analysed as an oppositional
use for the reason given below the example.
G:
(no but but is but) there are those who look at it from a biological view as you just
said and those from an astronomical view and many other views in other words there
are various mindsets within the scientific community based on which part of the
scientific community one comes from
D:
well of course there are they are very different from traditions though
46
Dawkins agrees with Gluck but also uses of course because it ‘construes it as so evidently the case as
to be irrelevant to the issues which are actually under consideration’ (Simon-Vandenbergen, White &
Aijmer, 2007). What Simon-Vandenbergen, White & Aijmer (2007) also point out is that these types
of agreement are usually followed by but or yet. In this case the contrastive device is though at the
end of Dawkins’ utterance.
Of course appeared a total of 19 times in both the interviews. Gluck only uses it three times, Hawkes
eight times and Dawkins six times in the interview with Gluck and only twice in the interview with
Hawkes. In the interview with Hawkes, the numbers were divided evenly between the solidary and
oppositional use of of course, even between the two participants. In the interview with Gluck, both
the rabbi and Dawkins used the oppositional function more than the solidary function (Gluck two out
of three times and Dawkins four out of six times). Table 5 below gives an overview of the uses of of
course by each of the participants. Again the rates represent both interviews, so Dawkins’
occurrences of of course in the separate interviews are combined.
Table 5: rates of of course and the N-be-that-construction of both interviews combined
Gluck
Hawkes
Dawkins
Totals
per 10.000 words
of course
solidary
oppositional
total
N-be-that-construction
1
2
3
4
4
8
3
5
8
8
11
19
2
5
0
7
5.1
7.0
12.2
A second form of putting forward new knowledge as if it were presupposed is the use of the N-bethat-construction as it is described by Schmid (2001). The construction is based on a pattern with a
noun, usually abstract, which is followed by a form of to be and that, as in the thing is that... . It is
mainly Schmid’s (2001) notion of ‘evidential upgrading’ through bluff that is relevant to the analysis
of the data at hand. In a case of upgrading, the noun in the construction is a noun which expresses
certainty, as in the truth is that ... . It is contrasted with ‘evidential downgrading’ where the noun
expresses a subjective state, as in my feeling is that ... (Schmid, 2001: 1529). Schmid’s classifications
were based on corpus research. The data for this paper however was small enough to be searched
thoroughly for constructions of this type. In this search I came across phrasings that were similar, and
have therefore also been included in the counts. An example of such a phrasing is below.
G:
I think the automatic assumption is much more true within let’s call it western
culture being the dominant culture it’s taken for granted that this is a normal way of
behaving that this is the way how all people behave if someone behaves different
47
they’re seen as eccentric they’re seen as oddballs they’re seen as marginal and I think
that to contend with that with the weight of that cultural .
Gluck uses the same construction except for the fact that the slot usually filled by a sing is now filled
by a past participle phrase. That may also be deleted in some cases as in the following example.
H:
(I know that it’s in every) I know that it’s in every religious literature that- around the
world I do know that yes but wh- the trouble is sometimes we we call a thing a myth I
mean the stuff that I was taught when I was a kid at school in science now you would
laugh at and say it was a myth but that’s what I was taught (was factual)
Including all these varying forms of the construction there were two appearances in the interview
with Gluck and five in the interview with Hawkes, as can be seen in Table 5. Both times only the
interviewees used these constructions. Nouns used in the construction are: issue, idea, trouble and
reality. Especially the use of reality stands out because it is a typical example of evidential upgrading
(Schmid, 2001). Hawkes uses it three times and often in combination with other expressions that
enforce the strength of the assertion, as in the following example.
H:
I’m not so sure cause the reality is that actually you’re very much in the minority if
you look at the world as a whole in terms of spirituality and whether it’s Christianity
or Hinduism or Buddhism they are at the moment in the majority aren’t they it’s very
small people that would take your-
The adverbs actually, very and much make the assertion much stronger than it would be if Hawkes
only said the reality is that you’re in the minority. Hawkes focuses the attention on reality again when
he says if you look at the world. The word reality is used twice by Gluck in the same utterance to
refer to the difference between a symbolic and a realistic interpretation of the Bible. Hawkes
however, uses the word eight times, always referring to the reality of the outside world, as in the
following example. There are no uses of the word by Dawkins.
H:
(I don’t know if you live in our reality but to me that is reality)
Hawkes uses the word true or truth in a similar way in utterances like the following.
H:
and although it is true to say in our culture at the moment there’s a real
disillusionment with science isn’t there
Truth in the N-be-that-construction is also recognized as an exemplary evidential upgrader, a typical
way to express presupposed knowledge (Schmid, 2001). In the example above it is used outside of
this construction but still expresses knowledge with a strong commitment to the truth value of the
statement, even though it may only be the speaker’s opinion (Schmid, 2001).
48
The two analyzed strategies, of course and the N-be-that-construction, can of course reinforce each
other as well, and in that way create an even more forceful presupposition. This occurred once in the
interviews. The utterance by Hawkes is given below.
H:
no I haven’t but of course the reality is that Christianity encompasses everything
about life Christianity is life so it’s it’s about everything it touches education politics
care social services everything you see
Despite the limitations of the data, I will offer a tentative interpretation of the use of presupposition
in section 5.4.
5. Interpreting the results
5.1. Questions
As mentioned in section 4.1.1. and as can be seen from Table 1 in that section, in both the interviews
combined there were a total of 86 questions. About 2/3 of those questions took an interrogative
syntax. That number is significantly higher than in Bull (2003) (21.1% total) and SimonVandenbergen(2008) (3 out of 20, or 15%). This is most likely due to the mixed nature of the data
which is, as was mentioned before, something in between an interview and a debate. Although from
the adversative nature of the interview Dawkins would be expected to use a lot of negative
questions, the numbers show that of all yes-no and question-tag questions, only about 40% are in a
negative form. This is roughly the same as what Simon-Vandenbergen (2008) found in the political
debates she analysed.
An overview of the question rates based on interrogative and non-interrogative syntax compared to
Bull (2003) and Simon-Vandenbergen (2008) is given in Table 6 below.
Table 6: question rates compared to previous research (based on Bull (2003: 104) & Simon-Vandenbergen
(2008: 349) Numbers represent percentages of total amount of questions.
Bull
Simon-Vandenbergen
current data
Interrogative syntax
78.8
85.0
65.1
Non-interrogative syntax
21.1
15.0
34.9
Overall the rates are divided evenly between the two interviews, but there are some exceptions. In
the interview with Hawkes, Dawkins only used two types of interrogative word questions, namely
‘why’ and ‘what’ questions. In the interview with Gluck he uses all of the five listed interrogative
words to preface questions.
49
It is also in the interview with Hawkes that Dawkins uses 10 of the 12 declarative questions probing
for a reaction. What the reason for this variation is, could make an interesting topic for future
research. It might be related to the interviewer’s perception of the interviewee and how the
conversation between them develops. Interviewer and interviewee do pick up certain words from
each other and use them in other utterances. This was most remarkable in the case of the word
facile which Dawkins used in his interview with Gluck. The rabbi then used it later in the interview in
a similar way. Below are both the utterances.
D:
no no but you’re making a very facile point if I may say so aren’t you and you you
know it because because when you’re dealing with these huge (rate distances)
(...)
G:
I think after 7/7 that this argument is rather facile excuse me saying so because
If the word usage of one can trigger usage of the same words in the other, that could explain the
similarities between interviewer and interviewee in the interviews. Of course this hypothesis calls for
testing through more extensive research.
5.2. Responses
The numbers for the responses were already included in section 4.1.2. Graph 1 below shows a
visualization of the overall response rates of both interviewees combined.
Graph 1: Reply rates combined
Replies
Intermediate
replies
Non-replies
These numbers are comparable to Bull’s (2003) findings, except for some slight differences. The rate
of intermediate replies is higher (21% versus 14%) and there were more non-replies than replies
found in the analysis of the data (41% non-replies, 38% replies). Simon-Vandenbergen (2008) finds a
lower number of replies (only 4 out of 16, or 20 %), and a much higher number of responses that
equivocate in some way (80% which includes both intermediate replies and non-replies) (p. 349). She
explains this higher rate of equivocal responses by the situation of the right-wing politicians in the
50
data. They had recently been condemned for being a racist party and could not risk further
condemnation by answering the question of whether they abandoned their views negatively, but
would also not risk losing voters by answering it positively (Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008). In the
analysis by Harris (1991: 94), 39.28% of the responses were qualified as ‘direct answers’, or ‘replies’
in the terminology used in this paper. That number includes the replies by Margaret Thatcher and
Neil Kinnock who, according to Harris, were particularly evasive. The percentage of indirect answers
is much higher than the one found in the data here or in Bull (2003) and Simon-Vandenbergen (2000)
(37.88% in Harris, 21% in the data at hand), but this can easily be explained by looking at her
definition of the term. She describes two types of indirect answers. One is similar to Bull (2003) and
entails the possible inference of an answer, the other is described as a response ‘from which neither
‘yes’ nor ‘no’ (nor a value for a missing variable) can be inferred but which maintain cohesion,
presuppositional framework and illocutionary coherence’ (Harris, 1991: 94). In the framework
employed for this paper, these responses were counted as direct replies in the case of
declarative/moodless reaction questions (see section 4.2.2.1.) and as non-replies in the case of other
questions (see section 4.2.2.3.). Table 7 below gives an overview of the rates found by Bull (2003),
Simon-Vandenbergen (2008) and Harris (1991) compared to the rates found in this data.
Table 7: reply rates compared to other research (based on Bull (2003: 113), Simon-Vandenbergen (2008: 349) &
Harris(1991: 94). Numbers represent percentages of total number of responses.
Bull
Simon-Vandenbergen
Harris
current data
39.28
38
14.0
37.88
21
Non-replies/ challenges*
43.0
22.84
41
Intermediate/indirect &
non-replies/ challenges*
57.0
60.72
62
replies/ direct answers
45.6
intermediate replies/ indirect answers*
20
80
*indirect answers and challenges as defined by Harris (1991) are different from Bull’s (2003) categories. More information
can be found above.
All these numbers are noticeably higher than the numbers found for other types of communication
(Harris, 1991; Bull, 2003; Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008). The sample of data for this paper is limited in
size and participants, but the response rates follow the same tendency. It can thus safely be stated
that in this case, the interviewees equivocate at the same average rate as the British politicians
analysed by Harris (1991) and Bull (2003). The question of why they equivocate so much is difficult to
answer. Consider the following hypothesis however: the interviewees are subjected to two kinds of
pressures in the interviews with Dawkins. On the one hand they are confronted with the questions of
51
a scientist who is pressing them with scientific arguments on the issues of a literal interpretation of
the Bible and the religious educating of children, and on the other hand they are faced with the
truths and values of their religious beliefs on which their lives are based. Responding in a direct way
to challenges of their faith that are based on reason, would result in a response which either denies
reason but recognises religion, or denies religion but recognises reason. Since these interviews were
taken with the intention of broadcasting parts of it, responses had the chance of becoming public,
giving the interviewees either the public appearance of being unreasonable about or of not believing
in a particular part of the Bible. This could be considered an avoidance-avoidance situation in which a
non-reply may be preferred over a reply (Bavelas et al., 1990; Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008).
How the interviewees chose to equivocate was also analysed in this paper. There are various ways of
not answering a question, an overview of which was given in section 4.2.2.3. Graph 2 below shows
the use of each of these techniques. The absolute numbers that are represented in this graph can be
found in section 4.1.2. The different types of attacks on questions were described in section
4.2.2.3.1.
Graph 2: Non-reply rates
Attacks question
Ignores question
Makes religious point
Answers different question
Pleads ignorance
Acknowledges question without
answering
Reflects question back to
interviewer
As can be seen from the graph, attacking the question in some way or another was by far the most
prevalent type of non-reply. Responses which attack the question in some form account for 14% of
the total amount of responses. This number is still lower than the number of challenges found in
52
Harris (1991): 22.84%. Bull (2003) lists percentages of attacking the question between 25.9 and 36.8
depending on which politician is responding. These differences might be accounted for by the highly
polemic nature of political discourse. Challenging or attacking a question can be perceived as very
threatening (Fetzer, 2007). In political interviews, these kinds of face threatening questions and
responses are common (Bull, 2008), but in the interviews between Dawkins and the two principals,
the situation was different. The purpose of the interviews was an exchange of viewpoints, not the
eliciting of potentially harmful information as was the case in the interviews with the Flemish
politicians in the data of Simon-Vandenbergen (2008). The participants were more congenial toward
one another than politicians position themselves toward journalists.
In Bull’s (2003) data, making a political point was the most common type of non-reply that the
politicians used (64.8% to 76.0%, depending on the politician). As was explained in section 4.2.2.3.4.,
the data under examination can be said to contain responses that are similar but make religious
points instead of political points (14% of all non-replies). Obviously the fact that two of the three
politicians who’s responses Bull analysed were running in a General Election at the time the data was
gathered, should be taken into account. The interviewees in this case are not trying to gain voters,
and use religious points mostly to attack the opposition. It is a strategy to discredit the opposing side
of the argument.
The category of ‘answering a different question’ is new in the framework of analysing non-replies. It
appeared five times (14% of all non-replies). I interpret these non-replies as mostly being the result
of a misunderstanding of the question. They form a reply to a question which is slightly different
from the one that was asked, but still similar in topic. In cases where the response had nothing to do
with the question, it was labelled as ‘ignoring the question’ (also five occurrences in the data). It is
impossible to establish whether a question was honestly misunderstood or deliberately
misinterpreted. Such reservations should be taken into account when interpreting reply rates.
Not counting instances where the interviewees plead ignorance (three instances in total), there were
no cases of refusing to respond to a question. The technique was often used in political interviews
(Bull, 2003; Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008; Fetzer, 2007). Again the difference must lie in the different
situations and genres. In politics, the ‘no comment’ response is often used and does not appear at
odds with our expectations of how politicians respond to questions. In an interview in which two
opponents agree to exchange opinions, it is however less appropriate. Apart from that there of
course also has to be cause for an interviewee to feel as if refusing to answer the question is the best
response available, because any reply they may provide would be face-damaging (Bull, 2008).
53
Until this point, the numbers have been reflective of both interviewees. There were however slight
differences in the reply rates of Gluck and Hawkes. Graph 3 and Graph 4 below show a visualisation
of the rates of the individual interviewees.
Graph 4: Reply rates Hawkes
Graph 3: Reply rates Gluck
Replies
Replies
Intermediate
Replies
Intermediate
replies
Non-replies
Non-replies
Gluck uses a significantly higher percentage of equivocal responses than Hawkes (66% versus 58%
respectively). We must leave room here to allow for personal styles (Bull, 2003), but there might also
be other factors that can trigger a higher number of evasive answers. The interviewer could be, or
appear to be, more offensive to some than to others. Gluck is part of a minority within Western
civilisation and within the world as a whole. Judaism has had to deal with criticism in the past which
Gluck also refers to:
G:
but but at the same time I think that that they- that the Jewish people have always
had- we’ve always had our critics and we’ve always had our difficulties
Gluck perceived the previous utterance by Dawkins as a critique of Judaism specifically. That it was
not intended that way is made clear through the utterance by Dawkins that followed Gluck’s
comment.
D:
this is nothing to do with Judaism this is this is fundamentalist Christianity
fundamentalist Islam all the Abrahamic religions in their fundamentalist wing are
saying the same thing and it’s flat contradictory to scientific evidence I (I’m not really
talking-)
How the amount of utterances that are face-threatening or perceive to be face-threatening can
influence the reply rates and the interaction as a whole, would provide another interesting topic for
research.
54
5.3. Commitment
The main focus in the analysis of commitment was on the expression of belief. It is remarkable how
the word believe in every instant referred to a form of religious belief, whether direct (as in an
expression of that belief) or indirect (as in a contrastive comparison with religious belief). It was only
Hawkes and Gluck who uses believe to express their religious beliefs, which is to be expected since
Dawkins does not have any religious beliefs. There was a noticeable distinction between the two
interviewees as well between the use of the personal pronouns. Gluck only used we and Hawkes
used I four out of five times. As was explained in section 4.3., this distinction might be related to the
positions of Judaism and Christianity in Western society, a position that is marked by seclusion in the
first and integration in the latter. Chafe (1986) puts belief at the top of the scale of the speakers
perception of reliability. It can thus be said that when the interviewees express personal belief, this is
to them the most reliable knowledge. Of course to Dawkins the reliability of this knowledge is nonexistent since it is not based on evidence. This discrepancy between the perceived reliability of
knowledge from the speaker’s point of view versus the hearer’s point of view needs to be
investigated further as, to my knowledge, there has been no research done on the topic thus far.
Special attention was also given to the use of the pragmatic particles I/we think and I suppose. It was
found that they were most often used in a deliberative instead of tentative manner, boosting the
commitment of an assertion, which is comparable to what Simon-Vandenbergen (2000) found to be
the case in political interviews. The number of instances of I think is noteworthy since it is similar to
the frequency found by Simon-Vandenbergen (2000) in political interviews. She finds 61 instances of
I think per 10.000 words, whereas the data at hand displayed 65 instances in the interview with
Hawkes and 71 in the interview with Gluck (each time per 10,000 words). Fetzer (2008) finds less
instances in the Corpus of Political Discourse, where in the dialogues there were only 30.04 instances
per 10,000. The number of occurrences of I/we believe are similar to what I found with 6.13
instances per 10,000 words in Fetzer (2008) and 7.5 in the interview with Hawkes and 13. 5 in the
interview with Gluck. An overview of these numbers combining both interviews is given in Table 8
below.
Table 8: rates of I think & I/we believe per 10,000 words, compared to previous research on political discourse
(based on Simon-Vandenbergen (2000: 47) & Fetzer (2008: 390-392).
I/we think
I/we believe
Simon-Vandenbergen
Fetzer*
current data
61
/
30.04
6.13
68
10.5
*numbers were calculated from absolute frequencies and word counts given by Fetzer.
55
Simon-Vandenbergen (2000) also provides a possible explanation for the high frequency of cognitive
verbs which could serve in this case as well. She states that ‘in political interviews, questions and
hence answers typically have to do with political viewpoints of speakers and their opponents, so that
inevitably talk will centre around what they and others think’ (Simon-Vandenbergen, 2000: 58). Both
political interviews and debates and the interviews that were analysed centre around opposing
viewpoints, only the topic which they disagree on is different. It is thus not surprising at all that
commitment to opinions and to truth is expressed in a similar way and with a similar degree of
commitment.
5.4. Presupposition
In the analysis of presupposition in the data, attention was focused on two ways of expressing it: the
adverb of course and the N-be-that-construction. Apart from those, remarkable expressions of what
was true or real, have also been mentioned as a possible incentive for future research, but were not
extensively analysed due to the limitations of the data both in size and number of participants.
Presupposition is expressed through a wide array of different linguistic devices, the ‘monoglossic’
statement being the most obvious one (Simon-Vandenbergen, White & Aijmer, 2007). When
something is stated, it is put forward as truth or fact, even if it is only the speakers’ opinion. In the
case of political discourse, politicians ‘do present highly controversial judgements in a monoglossic
way by expressing them as bare unmodalised statements’(Simon-Vandenbergen, White & Aijmer,
2007). Both Dawkins and his interviewees used this technique, and it would be interesting to
investigate when and how it is employed by both sides of the argument.
In the case of of course, the results were mostly evenly divided between the participants. In the
interview with Gluck there were twice more uses of the oppositional than the solidary functions of
the particle, but the numbers are too small to indicate more than a tendency. It is remarkable that
Hawkes uses of course four times as much as Dawkins does in the interview, especially in the light of
the other expressions that were found to be more prevalent with Hawkes than either Dawkins or
Gluck. One of those is the N-be-that-construction which, again, appeared in a small number but was
used significantly more by Hawkes than by Gluck or Dawkins. Dawkins did not even use it once. In the
analysis I also briefly mentioned some other words and phrases (such as reality and truth) that were
mostly prevalent with Hawkes and appeared less in utterances by Dawkins and Gluck, if at all.
Naturally these numbers are too small to draw any firm conclusions. They do however indicate that
different speakers either rely more or less heavily on the use of presuppositional devices, or have a
preference for different forms which were not analysed in this paper. Schmid (2001) points out that
56
the use of these devices does not necessarily reveal an intention to deceive but might also just be a
way of putting forward a convincing argument. He also makes the note that speakers do not
necessarily have to be aware of which construction they use and the effect it has. ‘It is possible that
speakers may be familiar with the manipulative potential of the N-be-that-construction, and thus be
able to exploit it, without actually being aware of it’ (Schmid, 2001: p. 1545). Thus one should always
be careful when assigning meaning and intent to these types of constructions.
6. Conclusion and suggestions for future research
Any conclusions drawn from this paper must be regarded as preliminary. The limitations of the data
do not allow any definitive conclusions but they can and have indicated tendencies and similarities
with political discourse.
It was shown that the interviewees displayed a high degree of equivocal responses to Dawkins’
questions. The results were similar to political data, except for the fewer occurrences of non-replies
that made religious/political points, and the lack of ‘no comment’ responses in which the
interviewees refused to answer. It was suggested that the context of the interviews was responsible
for those differences. There were small differences between the two interviewees, but those could
be related to various reasons such as a difference in style or the difference in their interaction with
Richard Dawkins. Although the context is different than that of a political interview of debate, there
appear to be many similarities between these interviews and political interviews.
There were also similarities with political discourse when looking at the choice of words. The high
number of I think was for instance comparable to the numbers that are found in political interviews.
There was however a distinction between the use of I believe in this data compared to other data. It
was used exclusively to refer to a religious belief. The results indicate that in debates on this topic a
distinction between believe and other cognitive verbs is necessary. Further research would however
need to confirm this.
The use of of course was also similar to political discourse in its most prominent function as an
oppositional device. I also discussed the N-be-that-construction and its function as a construction
that presupposes knowledge without leaving room for doubt. It became clear in the analysis
however, that there are many other ways of presupposing in discourse that should be taken into
consideration as well, but were not prevalent enough in the data to be analysed thoroughly.
This dissertation aspires to be the first step in a journey of research on interviews and debates that
feature the ongoing argument between science and religion. There has been a resurgence of the
57
argument lately, inspired by the spreading of Islam and the growth of Evangelical Christianity on one
side and a series of atheistic books that have made the list of best sellers (such as The God Delusion,
by Richard Dawkins, Letter to a Christian Nation, by Sam Harris and God is not Great, by Christopher
Hitchens)3 on the other. Spokespersons for both sides now publicly debate each other, which
provides a wealth of data that was previously hard to find or perhaps even non-existent.
A second opportunity for research arises within the field of evidentiality. It was already mentioned in
section 5.3. that on the scale of reliability proposed by Chafe (1986), the speaker’s perception and
the hearer’s perception of what constitutes reliable knowledge may be, and in the case of this data
must be, very different. Whether this is expressed and how, and what the implications are, if any,
needs further attention.
3
Listings and reviews of these books can be found on www.nytimes.com
58
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