Chapter Six
332
‘Crops and Rocks’: The Queensland Economy During the 1920s
The immediate post-war years found Queensland’s principle markets unstable, while
domestically the endemic unemployment problem worsened as service personnel returned
home from the war, and unfavourable climatic conditions wreaked havoc on the state’s
primary industries. Politically, the reformist Labor government, led first by Theodore
(October 1919 — February 1925), then William Gilles (briefly until October 1925), and
William McCormack (until May 1929), struggled to find a balance between its ideological
objectives and its responsibilities as a broadly representative government. It was in the arena
of economic policy that Labor would find its greatest challenges, and ultimately its temporary
demise with the election in May 1929 of a conservative Nationalist Party government led by
Arthur ‘Boy’ Moore. Moore’s election proved to be less than fortuitous for Queensland as it
became abundantly clear that the conservatives were ill-equipped to deal with the great
challenges associated with the depression. Moore’s economic and social policies made a bad
situation much worse because of an ideological compulsion to do little or nothing to
ameliorate conditions for the working class. Moreover, Labor’s program of establishing state
enterprises after the war corresponded with a general economic malaise that virtually
guaranteed their failure. These enterprises added to an already mounting public debt
accumulated from borrowing to fund railway construction and ill-considered rural
development schemes. This debt, and the political fall-out associated with other bad state
investments, hung like a millstone around the neck of the government; a weight that gradually
wore down the momentum of Labor’s social and economic reforms.
This loss of momentum mirrored in many ways the overall performance of Queensland’s
economy. The growth trend in the economy that is evident from an examination of the
industrial production statistics available from 1911,1 demonstrates that from 1925-26 this
upward trend was reversed. Indeed, it is clear that Queensland’s economy began to slide into
the depression much earlier than did the nation as a whole.2 Relative prosperity was only
1
Estimates of the gross value of production for all the major industrial sectors in Queensland are not available until
1911.
2
There is some debate about the timing of Australia’s slide into the depression, for some perspectives on this debate
see W.A. Sinclair, 'Economic Development in Australia in the 1920s', Economic Record, 51, (1975), pp. 411-13. & E.A. Boehm,
'Economic Development and Fluctuation in Australia in the 1920s: A Reply', Economic Record, 51, (1975), pp. 416-19. For the
timing of Queensland’s slide into the depression see Brian J. Costar, Labor, Politics and Unemployment: Queensland During the
Great Depression, Ph.D., University of Queensland, 1981, p. 2.
Chapter Six
333
enjoyed in Queensland in the first half of the decade, after which the economy stumbled along
into the depression. The gross value of industrial production in Queensland increased from
£52.6 million in 1920 to a peak of almost £70 million in 1924-25. However, the collapse
between 1925 and 1927 was dramatic with production falling to just over £54 million in
1926-27 (with a slight recovery in 1927-28) and production declined steadily through to the
depression (£54.4 million in 1930-31).3 Queensland’s economic difficulties were
fundamentally related to the economic conditions that prevailed in the domestic markets of its
major trading partners, principally Britain and its European neighbours, and the global
economic impact of isolationist policies of the United States.4
Post-War World Trade and Australia
The years immediately after the World War I were characterised by worldwide economic and
political instability. War debts fuelled the inflationary trends that arose during the war and
contributed to greater market volatility after the war. The effect on currency values had longterm implications for global trade patterns as pre-war exchange rates could not be sustained
and this triggered a destabilising balance of payments’ problem. European economies stalled,
because of the ill-considered punitive economic measures forced upon Germany under the
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles signed on 29 June 1919. The reparations required under
the Treaty, paid in gold, manufactures, raw materials, and machinery, severely restricted
Germany’s ability to rebuild its economy and therefore effectively reduced economic activity
across all the European nations.5 On the other side of the Atlantic the adoption of sharp
protectionist policies by the United States exacerbated these problems as the debtor nations
found it more difficult to expand trade and therefore to service their war debts owed to the
United States.6 In Europe, industrial production faltered and it was not until the mid-1920s
that the European economies were again able to achieve pre-war levels of production. In fact
exports from Europe failed to grow beyond the 1913 level until after 1927, which illustrates
the level of difficulty these nations faced in earning foreign currencies. In most cases, growth
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) among the European nations was less in the 1920s than it
3
4
‘Production of Queensland Industries - Estimated Gross Value 1920-1931', ABCQS, 1929, p. 199. & 1932, p. 234.
Allan Lougheed, Australia and the World Economy (Melbourne: McPhee Gribble/Penguin Books, 1988), pp. 16-7.
5
John Kenneth Galbraith, The World Economy Since the Wars: A Personal View (Cambridge: Sinclair-Stevenson,
1994), p. 38.
6
Ibid., pp. 28-31.
Chapter Six
334
had been between 1900 and 1913. Trade liberalisation fell victim to renewed economic
nationalism where changes in domestic production saw a general shift towards greater selfsufficiency in production, combined with raised tariff barriers and an oversupply of
commodities. Commodity prices stagnated and then declined in real terms through the mid- to
late 1920s. In effect, these international conditions conspired to limit the potential for growth
in the trade of commodities such as those produced in Queensland and therefore seriously
hampered the state’s economic growth.7
Another significant change, which had a considerable impact on Australia’s trade relations
after the war, was the relegation of Britain from its position as the world’s premier foreign
investor. The United States overtook Britain in this respect when the latter could no longer
sustain the levels of foreign lending it had achieved prior to the war.8 For Australia, and
especially Queensland, this meant that access to developmental finance, so critical to its
economic development, became more difficult. This situation was further complicated in
Queensland by the loans embargo of the early 1920s which were imposed in response to the
Theodore Labor government’s attempt to enforce a more equitable revenue stream from
absentee pastoral leaseholders.9 There was a general lack of confidence in the value of many
currencies and this restricted the flow and availability of finance capital. There was also a
tendency in money markets to offer short-term loans and to encourage direct commercial
investment and a movement away from longer-term fixed interest loans. This meant that much
more capital was residing in securities that were outside the sphere of government control.10
Of all the economically advanced nations it was perhaps in Australia that the negative impact
of these changes to world trading relations were most keenly felt.11 The economic problems
that became apparent after the brief post-war ‘boom’ were the result of the combination of a
collapse in commodity prices, a growth in immigration and its associated costs, overproduction in Europe, heavy public works expenditure by state governments, and the growth
in public debt.12 The economic troubles in post-war Europe gave further impetus to the belief
7
8
9
Lougheed, Australia, pp. 16-7.
Ibid., p. 18.
Bernie Schedvin, ‘E.G. Theodore and the London Pastoral Lobby’, Politics, 6, (1971), p. 28.
10
Lougheed, Australia, pp. 18-19.
11
N.G. Butlin, ‘Some Perspectives of Australian Economic Development, 1890-1965', in C. Forster, ed., Australian
Economic Development in the Twentieth Century (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1970), p. 282.
12
A.G.L. Shaw, The Economic Development of Australia (Croydon: Longmans, 1969), pp. 19-24; R.S. Gilbert, The
Australian Loan Council in Federal Fiscal Adjustments, 1890-1965 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), p.
Chapter Six
335
in industrial self-sufficiency (as the development of new industries during the war
demonstrated) and the need for tariff protection. In broad terms, World War I hastened the
development of the iron and steel industry in Australia, and tended to promote the greater
diversity and sophistication of the manufacturing sector generally.13 It is, however, incorrect
to claim that the war ‘created’ the conditions for the industrialisation of Australia in the
1920s: these conditions had existed prior to the war and industrialisation had already begun
occur. In effect the war altered its course somewhat, creating new opportunities (and denying
others) which had the effect of allowing greater diversity and sophistication in
manufacturing.14 During the 1920s the Commonwealth and several state governments
endeavoured to assist the development of secondary industries. These governments
investigated measures to foster manufacturing, and were also consistently lobbied by industry
groups to do so.15 Nevertheless, all Australian governments supported closer settlement and
rural development despite the reality that this strategy incurred heavy capital expenditure and
had consistently failed to generate viable and wide-spread small-scale rural production.
Evidence of this, in part, can be seen in the stagnation of Gross National Product (GNP) in the
mid-1920s. Loan capital was directed towards government infrastructure projects which
generally failed to provide sufficient returns on the funds invested. Australia’s GNP
stagnated, for example, because capital was wasted on funding rural development schemes of
marginal economic value rather than being directed towards infrastructure spending which
might have assisted existing viable industries to expand production and therefore boost
GNP.16
The economic conditions of the immediate post-war years were at first somewhat favourable
103. & Lougheed, Australia, p. 144.
13
H. Hughes, ‘Federalism and Industrial Development in Australia’, AJPH, 10, 3, (1964), pp. 329-30. & W.A.
Sinclair, ‘Aspects of Economic Growth 1900-1930', in A.H. Boxer, ed., Aspects of the Australian Economy (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1969), pp. 108-9. & P. Cochrane, Industrialisation and Dependence: Australia's Road to Economic
Development, 1870-1939 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980), p. 2.
14
Sinclair, ‘Aspects of Economic Growth’, pp. 108-9.
15
Shaw, Economic Development, p. 144; Papers of W. Massey Greene, Commonwealth Board of Trade on Financial
Assistance for New Industries (1918-20), CP703/6; 47, AA (ACT); Commonwealth of Australia, Third Report on the Activities
of the Bureau Commerce & Industry, 31 December 1919, A6661; 1287, AA (ACT); Resolutions of the Federal Conference of the
Associated Chambers of Commerce, 10 April 1922, A457/1; 547/1/60, AA (ACT); Copy of speech delivered by A. M.
Hertzberg, President of the Brisbane Chamber of Commerce, 2 September 1922, A457/1; AE306/4, AA (ACT); Letter from the
Queensland Timber Protection League to Senator Milen, 6 November 1922, A2487; 1922/16587, AA (ACT); Report of the
Australian Industries Protection League and the Associated Chambers of Manufacturers on Tariffs and the Encouragement of
Secondary Industries, 13 April 1927, CP362/2; 30, AA (ACT); Letter with Resolutions of the Associated Chambers of
Commerce to Prime Minister Bruce, 29 March 1928, A458; 745/1/323, AA (ACT); Letter from Brisbane Chamber of Commerce,
Queensland Chamber of Manufacturers, and the Queensland Taxpayers Association to Prime Minister Bruce, 4 June 1929, A458;
745/1/416), AA (ACT) & Resolutions of the State Conference of the Queensland Federated Chambers of Commerce, Dalby, 2122 September 1931, A458; 745/1/725, AA (ACT).
16
Gilbert, The Australian Loan Council, p. 103.
Chapter Six
336
to Australia’s commodity export oriented economy. However, Australian exports peaked in
1925 at £161 million and then declined through to the depression of the early 1930s.17 This
decline occurred as the contraction in Australia’s export markets solidified in the mid-1920s,
so that a situation of oversupply in commodities on the world market was apparent by 1925.
This situation was accompanied by a significant change in the nature of Australia’s trading
partnerships. After the war Australian exports to Europe declined by almost 20 per cent, while
export markets in Asia, principally Japan, grew from 7 per cent to almost 18 per cent of
Australia’s exports. Similarly, the dominance of British imports to Australia was reduced by
30 per cent between 1914 and 1929. Imports from the United States doubled during this
period to claim 25 per cent of this trade by 1929.18 Although Australia was able to maintain a
mostly favourable commodity trade balance, the nation experienced continuous current
account deficits as the cost of transporting exports, the price of imports, and interest paid on
debt were greater than export earnings.19
Australia’s relative prosperity and high standard of living were largely a facade built upon
growing public and private debt. This situation was exacerbated by the misdirection of public
borrowing towards the construction of railways and rural development projects of marginal
viability that did little to expand the nation’s GDP.20 Unfortunately, the expansion of the local
manufacturing sector could not by itself bridge the fiscal divide. Australia’s growth in real
GDP averaged 2.6 per cent during the 1920s, the worst performance of any ‘advanced’ nation
with the exception of Britain. In the final analysis ‘the growth-generating forces transmitted
to Australia through trade and factor movements were weaker [in the 1920s] than in the
1900s.’21 it can, therefore, be argued that while the war aided the expansion of certain sectors
of the economy, overall it curtailed the existing growth trend, a trend that was not reinstated
during the twenties. This state of affairs was to have a considerable impact upon the health of
Queensland’s economy.
The Queensland Economy in the 1920s
17
18
19
20
21
Lougheed, Australia, p. 20.
Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., p. 22.
Ibid., p. 23. & Shaw, Economic Development, p. 144.
Lougheed, Australia, pp. 23-4.
Chapter Six
337
During the 1920s Queensland’s economy struggled to gain momentum and expand.
Queensland’s primary industries-based economy faired reasonably well at first, until the
decline in commodity prices took its toll in the second half of the decade. The slide into
depression began earlier in Queensland than for the rest of the nation as a whole.
Queensland’s dependency upon its primary industries meant that its economy was more
vulnerable to the vagaries of climate and the volatility of external markets that the rest of the
nation. Queensland led the country in the expansion of its GDP with industrial production
peaking in 1924-25. However, the final years of the decade were characterised by declining
production and an increasing economic malaise.22 The economic recession also can be seen in
the trends in employment and demand for labour through the Government Labour Bureaus.
The level of surplus labour increased after the war and then declined in 1922 and 1923, but
this, however, was followed by an explosion in the surplus labour available which peaked in
1924-25. Surplus labour numbers then declined during 1925 and 1926 prior to another
increase in numbers of those seeking work which accelerated during the latter years of the
decade and into the 1930s. The number of workers seeking employment through the Labour
Bureau increased from 29,963 in 1917-18 to 54,090 by 1921-22, to peak at 117,496 in 192425. The surplus had dropped to 58,761 in the following year, but it then resumed its upward
spiral and reached 107,552 by 1929-30.23 The Queensland economy could not attract
sufficient new capital investment, particularly in the mining, manufacturing and agricultural
sectors, and the combination of bad seasons and low prices, linked to high production costs
and inflation, drove the economy into decline. Across the nation, industrialisation gathered
pace under the guidance of the Commonwealth and several state governments, albeit
increasingly concentrated in New South Wales and Victoria. The Queensland government, on
the other hand, for the most part ignored the manufacturing sector in favour of grand public
works projects directed at rural intensification with a corresponding surge in public debt.24
One significant side effect of this level of debt was that it forced the government to raise the
22
A. Lougheed, The Brisbane Stock Exchange, 1884-1984 (Brisbane: Boolorang Publications, 1984), pp. 90 & 96.
23
‘Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Shops [F&SR], 1919-20', QPP, 2 (1920), p. 688; 'F&SR,
1920-21', QPP, 2 (1921), p. 943; 'F&SR, 1921-22', QPP, 2 (1922), p. 1119; 'F&SR, 1922-23', QPP, 2 (1923), p. 1171; 'F&SR,
1923-24', QPP, 2 (1924), p. 1065; 'F&SR, 1924-25', QPP, 3 (1925), p. 385; 'F&SR, 1925-26', QPP, 2 (1926), p. 1024; 'F&SR,
1926-27', QPP, 2 (1927), p. 1058; 'F&SR, 1927-28', QPP, 1 (1928), p. 1306; 'F&SR, 1928-29', QPP, 2 (1929), p. 120. & 'F&SR,
1929-30', QPP, 2 (1930), p. 118.
24
The accumulated public debt of Queensland in 1920 was £64.2 million, by 1931 this had grown to £112.2 million.
There was also a significant change in the source of this debt. The percentage of this debt owed to Australian investors increased
from 31 to 37 per cent between 1920 and 1931. ‘Finance: Debt & Expenditure from Loan, Queensland’, ABCQS, 1907, p. 15,
1919, p. 14, & 1923, p. 23. & Australian Bureau Of Statistics, ‘Summary of Public Finance Statistics - Queensland’, Queensland
Year Book 1992 [QYB], (Brisbane: Australian Bureau of Statistics Queensland Office, 1991), p. 229.
Chapter Six
338
level of taxation and introduce new taxes which further increased the cost of doing business in
Queensland.
The impact of high taxation and other charges on businesses that increased factor costs has
received little attention from scholars investigating the level of growth in the Queensland
economy. This is surprising when one considers the degree of dissent this issue aroused
within the state’s business community. The Brisbane Chamber of Commerce (BCC) and the
Queensland Employers’ Federation (QEF) consistently attacked the level of taxation borne by
businesses and were also critical of other related issues such as certain tariffs, government
spending, lack of incentives to encourage productivity and economic expansion, and various
other inhibitive factors that slowed Queensland’s economic growth.25 A.M. Hertzberg, an
outspoken and prominent member of the BCC, laid the blame for the state’s economic woes
squarely at the feet of the state government for its fiscal irresponsibility.26 Members of the
chamber consistently advocated means by which the government could assist in the growth of
Queensland’s economy. Some of their ideas were contradictory. For example, on one hand
there were calls for the greater development of north Queensland through expensive mass
agricultural immigration, while on the other hand they advocated strict government economy
to reduce the burden of taxation on individuals and businesses. Indeed, it was the structural
weakness of the economy, and government’s neo-socialist engagement within the economy,
that the BCC felt had contributed to the early recession from 1926.27
Whereas the business interests represented by the BCC were justifiably critical of elements of
the state’s industrial and fiscal policies and machinery, there were other crucial factors to
consider. For instance, the problems that beset the pastoral sector during the latter part of the
war until 1921, were largely the result of widespread droughts. Moreover, growth in
agricultural crop production, with the exception of sugar, was slow despite the huge sums of
money committed to boost this sector. Crop production also failed to decentralise in a broad
divisional sense as the south-east clearly dominated agricultural pursuits with 90 per cent of
production occurring in that region of the state. The saving grace for agricultural production
25
A.L. Lougheed, A Century of Service: History of the Brisbane Chamber of Commerce 1868-1968 (Brisbane:
Brisbane Chamber of Commerce, 1969), p. 25;‘President’s Annual Report to the Annual General Meeting, 19 August 1915',
Queensland Employers’ Federation [QEF] - Minutes of Meetings, Film 0090, V2/C1, 1915-1928, JOL; ‘Executive Meeting’, 22
October 1917, QEF - Minutes of Meetings, Film 0090, V2/C1, 1915-1928, JOL. & BCC, QCM, and Queensland Taxpayers
Association to Prime Minister Bruce, 4 June 1929, A458; 745/1/416, AA (ACT).
26
Copy of Speech delivered by A.M. Hertzberg, August 1922 to Prime Minister W. Hughes, 2 September 1922, p. 2,
A457/1; AE306/4, AA, (ACT).
27
Lougheed, A Century of Service, p. 27.
Chapter Six
339
in central and north Queensland was, of course, sugar. This was fortunate as the decline of the
mining sector, a key industry along the central coast and especially in the north, meant there
was a potential alternative source of income for these areas. The expansion of sugar
cultivation, however, had the effect of changing the economic-geography and demography of
central and north Queensland as this promoted the increased concentration of economic
activity and population growth along the coastal strip rather than in the interior.28
The expansion of the sugar industry is a case in point which illustrates the paradox of a
general desire, politically and publicly, to populate the interior through the promotion of
decentralised agricultural activity. The contradiction between concentration and
decentralisation permeates Queensland’s economic and political history. The coastal strip and
the south-east corner continued to attract a concentration of activity despite all attempts to
balance this with development in the broader hinterlands.
Capital was inevitably attracted to the metropolis. The patterns of investment and capital
flows are complex and reflect the economic uncertainties associated with the high inflation
experienced during this period. In this environment investors naturally enough were attracted
to high yield capital stable investments, such as bank securities and government bonds, that
benefited from high interest rates driven by the inflationary cycle and tight money market.
The effect of these conditions can clearly be seen in the trading patterns on the Brisbane Stock
Exchange where the decade was characterised by a shortage of capital in the market. In the
early 1920s, Commonwealth bonds and Queensland government securities soaked up most of
the available surplus capital which meant that the private sector was left undercapitalised.
Investors were cautious of the return of ‘normal’ trading conditions after the war: a caution
based primarily upon concerns over the impact that the extension of the role of the state in the
peacetime economy would have on the private sector. Perhaps investors felt that if
governments were going to engage more openly in the economy, and therefore threaten the
viability of some private enterprises, then their capital was probably safer in guaranteed high
yield government stocks. As the decade progressed the trend of small investors was to stick
with the solid returns of government script, and it was only after 1928 as the economy
temporarily grew that investors began to shift back into industrial shares that were producing
higher yields.29 It is difficult to quantify the actual impact this tendency towards government
28
G. Lewis, A History of the Ports of Queensland: A Study in Economic Nationalism (St. Lucia: University of
Queensland Press, 1973), pp. 187-9.
29
Lougheed, Brisbane Stock Exchange, pp. 98-100.
Chapter Six
340
securities had on the overall growth of private sector production. Nevertheless, it is not
unreasonable to deduce that the sustained redirection of capital into government treasuries
must have, to a greater or lesser degree, restricted the level of productive expansion in the
Queensland economy because of an insufficient level of capital available for productive
investment.
Table 6.1
Trade, Exports & Imports, 1920-1930
Year
Imports
Exports
TOTAL
£
£
£
1920
7,218,694
14,403,922
21,622,616
1921
11,840,442
15,171,884
27,012,326
1922
8,639,446
17,573,103
26,212,549
1923
10,782,906
15,782,072
26,564,978
1924
11,605,668
14,628,305
26,233,973
1925
12,833,375
24,441,600
37,274,975
1926
13,772,854
26,384,916
40,157,770
1927
13,479,759
14,721,176
28,218,935
1928
11,760,214
21,854,945
33,615,268
1929
11,594,348
23,251,716
34,846,064
1930
11,540,083
18,821,824
30,361,907
1931
5,556,434
16,756,413
22,312,847
Source: ‘Summary - Imports & Exports’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 20-3k.
The somewhat chequered performance of Queensland’s economy during the 1920s is clearly
evident in the trends of the state’s trade activity (see Table 6.1 and Fig. 6.1). Total trade
achieved reasonable growth in the immediate post-war years before slackening off in 1922
and remaining static through to 1924. Trade recovered spectacularly in 1925 and continued to
expand in 1926, on the back of good seasons. However this was followed by a steep decline
in 1927 to about the 1924 level of trade. From this point a slow recovery was experienced
through to 1929 before trade collapsed once again in 1930. Queensland’s trade was valued at
£21.6 million in 1920, almost doubling to over £40 million by 1926. The depressed conditions
that followed undermined the value of trade, falling back to £22.3 million by 1930. Despite
these gloomy figures Queensland was, nonetheless, able to maintain positive terms of trade
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341
throughout, with the value of imports only approaching the value of exports in 1921, 1924
and 1927. Export growth was modest until 1923 when trade declined to the 1920 level.
Exports took off again in 1924 and 1925. The pattern to the end of the decade then mirrors the
trend in the overall trade figures. Queensland’s exports were valued at £14.4 million in 1920
and peaked at £26.4 million in 1926, and finished just short of £17 million by 1930 (see Fig.
6.2). Imports, on the other hand, recorded a more modest growth trend through to 1926
remaining stable until the collapse in 1930. In 1920 Queensland’s imports were valued at £7.2
million, this almost doubled to £13.7 million by 1926, prior to plummeting to £5.5 million in
1930.30
30
‘Exports & Imports - Summary of Queensland Statistics’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 22-5k.
Chapter Six
342
The trends in total trade and industrial production demonstrate almost opposite results during
the 1920s. The value of production of Queensland’s industries overcame a decrease in 1921 to
expand rapidly between 1922 and 1924, whereas trade patterns were flat to 1924 followed by
a strong increase to peak in 1926. The boom in production between 1922 and 1924 was
followed by an equally dramatic decline in production in 1925 and 1926, with another
temporary rise in production during 1927. Trade, on the other hand, decreased markedly in
1927 and only a weak recovery was present through to 1929, whereas production recorded a
steady decrease after 1927. The latter years of the decade were characterised by a steady
contraction in production and culminated in a rapid collapse from 1930.
The total gross value of production in 1920 was estimated at £52.6m, peaking at almost £70m
in 1924-25, and declining to £54.4m in 1930-31. Of all the industry sectors, manufacturing
returned the best result in percentage terms with an increase of 26.5 per cent on the value of
production in 1920, or a crude annual average of 2.65 per cent. The aggregate increase was in
fact 38.5 per cent over the period with aggregate annual increases of 3.85 per cent per
annum.31 The scale of its growth is better illustrated when one considers that manufacturing
31
This average is derived from calculating each annual increase individually and then aggregating them . This figure is
then divided by the corresponding number of years to achieve an average of the aggregate figure. The difference between the
value of production in the years 1920 [£11.7 million] and 1930 [£14.8 million] represents a crude increase of 26.5 per cent or
2.65 per cent per annum. However, when each yearly movement is aggregated a different figure is arrived at. The yearly
percentages were 0.9, 9.5, 24.2, 17.4, -3.9, -0.9, 11, -.08, -3.4, and -15.5 for an aggregated figure of 38.5 per cent, divided by 10,
gives an aggregated average of 3.85 per cent (compared to the cude average of 2.65 per cent). This is a more representative figure
than an annual average derived from a crude division of the overall percentage growth for a given period as the latter does not
truly reflect the actual positive and negative movements that have occurred over the entire period.
Chapter Six
343
production increased by over 60 per cent between 1920 and 1924-25. Agricultural crop
production also posted a good result overall, primarily due to the improved position of the
heavily subsidised sugar industry (the result of the adoption of the CommonwealthQueensland Sugar Agreement of 1923),32 achieving an overall increase of 23 per cent on the
1920 figure by 1930, or an aggregate average increase of 3 per cent per annum. The best
result recorded was 39 per cent in 1927-28. The pastoral sector posted almost identical values
in 1920 and 1930 despite an increase of 58.5 per cent in the value of production by 1924-25.
The aggregate average growth rate achieved was 1.5 per cent per year. Dairying delivered a
13 per cent increase in 1921, but dairy production declined to minus 6.5 per cent below the
1920 level in 1930 (an aggregate average growth rate of 0.32 per cent per annum). Similarly,
timber and miscellaneous industries gained 19 per cent in 1923 but recorded a deficit of 44
per cent in 1930. The worst performer was the mining sector which experienced a prolonged
decline and produced only 40 per cent of its 1920 value in 1930.33 In fact, production in the
mining sector declined by an average of 5.3 per cent per annum over the decade (see Fig. 6.3).
Clearly, the 1920s was a decade of fluctuating fortunes for Queensland’s industries and the
trends highlight the failure of the government’s attempts to focus growth in the industrial
sectors based on the production of ‘crops and rocks’.
Queensland’s public debt continued to grow strongly throughout the 1920s, despite the loans
32
33
Costar, Labor, Politics and Unemployment, p. 9.
‘Production of Queensland Industries - Estimated Gross Value 1920-1931', ABCQS, 1932, p. 235.
Chapter Six
344
embargo of the early years of the decade. Queensland’s accumulated public debt increased
from £55 million in 1914 to £63.2 million by the end of the war (1918), to £71.8 million in
1920 and ballooned to £82.7 million by the following year.34 However, of the £10.9 million
increase between 1920 and 1921, £6.2 million was derived from the instalment inscribed
stock and deposit receipt issued under the Commonwealth Bank Agreement and State
Advances Act of 1920.35 Debt continued to accumulate at an alarming rate to £97 million by
1924-25, to £112.9 million in 1928-29, and then stabilised through to £112.7 million by 193031 (see Fig. 6.4).36
Between 1920 and 1931 the Queensland government ran budget deficits in seven out of
eleven years, and in every financial year after 1924-25 with the exception of 1927-28. Total
government expenditure grew from £11.3 million to a peak of £16.9 million between 1920
and 1929, and then declined slightly to £15.9 million by 1931. State revenues also increased
from £11.3 million to £16.7 million over the same period, but declined to £15 million by
1931.37
34
‘Finance, Queensland - Debt, Public, & Aggregate Expenditure from Loan & Surplus Revenue’, ABCQS, 1925, p.
101.
35
‘Finance - Debt, Public, Queensland, Amount Sold’, ABCQS, 1923, p. 26-7. See note “C” in the ABCQS table.
36
‘Finance, Australia - Debt, Public’, ABCQS, 1926, p. 84. & 1930, p. 138; ‘Finance, Australia - Debt, Public, &
Interest Payable at 30th June 1930', ABCQS, 1931, p. 148. & ‘Finance, Australia - Debt, Public, & Interest Payable at 30th June
1931', ABCQS, 1932, p. 154.
37
‘Finance - Debt, Public, Funded and Unfunded, Australia’, ABCQS, 1923, p. 28. & 1924, p. 29; ‘Finance - Australia
- Debt, Public’, ABCQS, 1926, p. 84; 1928, p. 108; 1930, p. 138. & 1931, p. 148; ‘Expenditure: Revenue & Expenditure (with
Chapter Six
345
Table 6.2
Queensland: Miscellaneous Fiscal Statistics 1920-1930
[NB: * = Total Public Debt includes funded and un-funded debt. For example funded debt for 1920 totalled
£64,162,946 while the total public debt amounted to £71,787,535 for the same year. The latter figures are used
from 1913 onwards in these tables]
Year
1920
Total Public Debt* Expenditure
£
£
71,787,535 11,266,910
Revenue
Deficit/Surplus Interest on Debt
£
£
£
11,293,743
26,833
2,665,548
1921
1922
82,697,645
86,446,394
12,591,201
12,499,970
12,601,031
12,311,378
9830
-188,592
2,930,703
3,286,096
1923
1924
89,634,596
91,128,596
12,784,382
13,415,332
12,599,403
13,428,039
-184,979
12,707
3,589,714
3,761,140
1925
1926
1927
97,001,712
102,449,916
106,479,916
14,880,288
16,154,404
16,490,954
14,897,256
15,599,718
16,147,787
16,968
-554,686
-343,167
4,246,533
4,577,650
4,831,250
1928
1929
1930
1931
111,733,969
112,862,049
112,623,979
112,231,189
16,707,564
16,902,145
16,721,055
15,914,696
16,718,070
16,736,188
15,997,870
15,072,652
10,506
-165,957
-723,185
-842,044
5,079,570
5,170,948
5,181,116
5,283,080
Source: Finance, Australia - Debt, Public’, ABCQS, 1926, p. 84. & 1930, p. 138; ‘Finance, Australia - Debt, Public, &
Interest Payable at 30th June 1930', ABCQS, 1931, p. 148. & ‘Finance, Australia - Debt, Public, & Interest Payable at 30th
June 1931', ABCQS, 1932, p. 154; ‘Finance - Debt, Public, Funded and Unfunded, Australia’, ABCQS, 1923, p. 28. & 1924,
p. 29; ‘Finance, Queensland - Debt, Public, & Aggregate Expenditure from Loan & Surplus Revenue’, ABCQS, 1925, p. 101;
‘Finance - Australia - Debt, Public’, ABCQS, 1926, p. 84; 1928, p. 108; 1930, p. 138. & 1931, p. 148; ‘Expenditure: Revenue
& Expenditure (with particulars of Trust Fund Receipts & Expenditure from Trust & Loan Funds)’ & ‘Revenue &
Expenditure, Gross’, ABCQS, 1926, p. 106. & 1932, p. 169.
During the 1920s, railways continued to be the government’s largest item of expenditure
followed by interest payments on public debt, and education (see Fig. 6.5). Expenditure on
interest payments increased by 98 per cent from £2.66 million to £5.3 million per annum
between 1920 and 1931. This represents an annual growth rate of 8.9 per cent, three times the
growth rate during the period 1900 to 1913. Expenditure on railways rose from £4.3 million
to £5.9 million between 1920 and 1930. This represents an annual increase in expenditure of
3.7 per cent, which indicates that expenditure on railways had peaked in the previous decade
(10.8 per cent per annum).38 Between 1920 and 1931 another 724 miles of railways were
constructed, increasing Queensland’s rail system to 6460 miles of track. The accumulated cost
of establishing this network increased from £45.7 million to £64.2 million between 1920 and
particulars of Trust Fund Receipts & Expenditure from Trust & Loan Funds), ABCQS, 1932, p. 169. & ‘Revenue & Expenditure,
Gross’, ABCQS, 1926, p. 106, & 1932, p. 169.
38
‘Finance - Expenditure, Gross, Queensland', ABCQS, 1923, p. 31. & 1932, p. 169.
Chapter Six
346
1931.39 Expenditure on education also increased from £1 million to £1.5 million, or an annual
average increase of 5 per cent, half the rate of growth that occurred during the war years.40
Queensland government revenues increased from £11.3 million to £16 million. Revenues
derived from railways remained the most important source of liquidity for the Queensland
Treasury; £4.9 million in 1920 to £7.4 million by 1930. State taxes brought in £3.3 million in
39
‘Summary - Railways’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 32-3k. & ‘Finance: Debt & Expenditure from Loans Queensland’, ABCQS, 1923, p. 23. & 1932, p. 169.
40
‘Finance - Expenditure, Gross, Queensland', ABCQS, 1923, p. 31.
Chapter Six
347
1920 and £4.3 million by 1930 (see Fig. 6.6). Other revenues were derived from
miscellaneous sources, principally interest charged on loans made to local government bodies
and utilities. Revenue derived from these sources increased marginally from £1.7 million to
£1.9 million between 1920 and 1930.41 The rate of growth in the level of taxation as a source
of revenue slowed in this period (down to 29.3 per cent between 1920 and 1930 from 185 per
cent between 1914 and 1919), falling back behind the overall average (41.6 per cent) and
railways (49 per cent).
The Performance of Queensland’s Industries During the 1920s
The Pastoral Sector: 1920s
The 1920s was a decade of mixed results for the pastoral sector and was characterised by
strong growth in the early years followed by four years of drought and reduced production.
Despite of these difficulties the pastoral industry maintained its dominant position in
Queensland’s economy although falling behind the manufacturing sector in terms of gross
value of production between 1926 and 1928. The causes contributing to the malaise in
pastoral production during the twenties included instability in overseas markets, strong
external competition in those markets, and largely unfavourable climatic conditions. Drought
played a key role in restricting the expansion of the sector with particularly dry seasons in
1922-23 and from 1925 and 1927. Indeed, four out of ten years were severely affected by
drought and several regionalised dry spells were experienced around the state during most of
the other years. Industry commentators again raised the spectre of the 1902 drought and
claimed the timing and impact of the 1922-23 drought was more severe.42 Regional droughts
were experienced in north Queensland in the winter and spring of 1923, in the Mary Valley
(especially around Gayndah), the South Burnett, Maranoa, Darling Downs, West Moreton,
upper Brisbane Valley, and south coast regions during 1925 and 1926. During the 1925-26
drought central Queensland was less affected than most other regions, as was most of the
tropical north, although the more arid pastoral districts to the west and south of Townsville,
41
42
‘Finance - Queensland, Revenue & Expenditure, Gross', ABCQS, 1926, p. 106. & 1932, p. 169.
‘Report of the Director of Agriculture’, in ‘Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture and Stock [A&SR],
1923-24', QPP, 2 (1925), p. 347. & ‘A&SR, 1926-27', QPP, 2 (1927), p. 361.
Chapter Six
348
prominent beef cattle country, suffered badly.43 The drought was also accompanied by low
prices and very heavy competition in the European markets from North and South American
producers. The threat was taken very seriously by the Commonwealth and state governments
and moves were made to establish alternative markets in Asia and elsewhere.44 Fortunately
for Queensland’s beef producers imports of Argentinean chilled beef to Britain were
interrupted by an outbreak of foot and mouth disease which provided some market relief from
the competitive advantages enjoyed by Argentina.45
The difficulties experienced in this industry during the twenties are clearly reflected in the
statistical performance during the decade. Production declined from £18.6 million in 1918 to
£15.3 million by 1921. The 1919 drought was the main culprit, and the eventual recovery was
slow to materialise. An increasingly strong growth pattern began to emerge in 1922, which
continued despite another drought in 1923, and production peaked in 1924-25 at £26 million.
An equally steep decline was apparent between 1925 and 1926, when production fell to the
1922 level. This was primarily the result of a market contraction overseas and the impact of a
severe state-wide drought in 1925-26 and more regional droughts in 1926 and 1927.46
Production improved in 1927, but it then tapered off into the depression, when the level of
production was reduced to that recorded a decade earlier.47
Exports accounted for approximately two-thirds of pastoral production throughout the 1920s,
although trends in production and exports did not always work in concert. A similarity can be
seen between the trend in production and exports until 1922 after which there is a clear surge
in production, while exports remained static. This situation was reversed in 1925 and 1926 as
exports recorded moderate growth with a simultaneous collapse in production. The collapse
was due, presumably, to shortages in supply because of the drought. Pastoral exports which
were valued at almost £13 million in 1920, peaked at £17.8 million in 1925-26, before
collapsing to £9.7 million in 1930 (see Fig. 6.7).48 Wool exports decreased from £9.2 million
43
44
45
‘A&SR 1925-1926', QPP, 2 (1926), p. 405.
‘A&SR 1922-1923', QPP, 2 (1924), p. 3. & ‘Argentine Meat: Enormous Works’, QIG, 11, 3, (1926), p. 269.
S. M. Hopkins, Townsville Chamber of Commerce Annual Report [TCCAR], 1927-28, (Townsville: TCC, 1928), p.
12, JOL.
46
Dan Daly, Wet as a shag, Dry as a bone: drought in a variable climate (Brisbane: Department of Primary Industries
Queensland, 1994), pp. 117-8; ‘F&SR, 1922-1923', QPP, 2 (1924), p. 3; ‘F&SR, 1925-1926', QPP, 1 (1926), p. 405 & 419. &
‘F&SR, 1926-1927', QPP, 2 (1927), p. 361.
47
48
‘Production of Queensland Industries - Pastoral, 1919-1931', ABCQS, 1932, p. 235.
‘Value of Principal Articles of Export (livestock, wool, tallow, meat, hides and skins) 1919-1930', in ‘Summary of
Queensland Statistics - 1930-31’, QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 24-5k. & ‘Production of Queensland Industries - Pastoral, 1919-1931',
Chapter Six
349
in 1919-20 to £6.2 million in 1920-21, peaked in 1925-26 at £12.9 million, before another
collapse in 1926-27 to £8.5 million which heralded a general decline into the depression,
when wool exports declined to £6.9 million. Meat exports demonstrated a somewhat different
pattern with moderate growth from £3 million to £3.7 million between 1919 and 1921 before
slipping back to £1.3 million in 1923-24. This trend was reversed in 1924-25 when a result of
£4.2 million was achieved, but exports again contracted to £2.6 million in 1929-30.49 These
figures also demonstrate clearly the importance of the wool clip to the value of pastoral
exports accounting for between two-thirds and three-quarters of total exports from this sector.
Drought had a significant impact on livestock numbers during the twenties, more so on cattle
stocks than on sheep. Beef cattle numbered 6.4 million in 1920 and peaked at 7 million the
following year. Stock gradually decreased to just over 5 million in 1928 with a mild recovery
to 5.5 million by 1930. Sheep numbers generally improved, except for the dry seasons in
1926 and 1927 (16.6 million), growing from 17.4 million in 1920 to 22.5 million by 1930 (see
Fig. 6.7). Queensland was the cattle capital of the Commonwealth, accounting for almost half
of the nation’s cattle, whereas in sheep grazing Queensland ran second to New South Wales,
which led with around 80 per cent of the nation’s sheep population.50 The slaughtering of
ABCQS, 1932, p. 235.
49
50
‘Value of Principal Articles of Export 1919-1930', QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 24-5k.
New South Wales dominated wool growing, sheep numbers increasing from 37 million to over 53 million and
whereas Queensland dominated the beef sector as cattle numbers declined in New South Wales from 3.4 to 2.8 million between
1920-30. Production of greasy wool in New South Wales increased from 124,839 tons to 193,751 tons between 1921-1931.
‘Livestock & Pastoral Production - New South Wales’, New South Wales Year Book 1996 (Sydney: A.B.S. New South Wales
Chapter Six
350
livestock for domestic and export markets showed some interesting trends. The slaughter of
sheep took a downward trend to 1922 before a slow increase through 1924 and remained
stable in 1925 and 1926 prior to a great upswing from 1927 onwards. Cattle slaughtering
increased steadily to peak in 1924, remaining above sheep slaughtering numbers during 1923
and 1924. The performance after these years was less than satisfactory as slaughtering
remained static and then declined after a short upswing in 1927.51
Table 6.3
Pastoral Activity & Production 1920-1930
Year
Cattle
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924-25
1925-26
1926-27
1927-28
6,455,067
7,047,370
6,995,463
6,396,514
6,454,653
6,436,645
5,464,845
5,225,804
1928-29 5,128,341
1929-30 5,208,588
1930-31 5,463,724
Sheep
Wool Clip
17,404,840
18,402,399
17,641,071
16,756,101
19,028,252
20,663,323
16,860,772
16,642,385
114,809,963
132,579,733
134,971,150
121,913,075
140,862,541
140,862,541
146,985,689
119,847,967
Wool
£’s
9,166,416
6,216,848
10,861,403
10,428,712
10,159,014
11,992,952
12,943,988
8,493,393
Meat
Runs
£’s
5,289,717
1975
4,620,080
1932
2,749,345
1884
3,398,996
1973
6,564,770
1950
5,361,638
1897
3,180,107
1858
5,421,269
1825
18,509,201 126,429,938 9,820,028 5,522,605
20,324,303 138,988,930 9,801,129 5,091,046
22,542,043 161,087,873 6,914,819 5,091,046
Area
acres
209,248,960
201,010,760
185,348,400
189,353,840
188,975,840
183,918,080
186,382,240
196,024,320
1799 192,894,240
1913 203,842,480
1948 200,716,960
Source: ‘Summary - Crown Lands', QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 32-3k; ‘Production - Table XXIV’, QSS - 1920, QPP, 2
(1922), p. 21k; ‘Production - Table LXVII’, ABCQS, 1930, p. 138; ‘Lands, Crown - Area in Occupation, Queensland’,
ABCQS, 1923, p. 42; 1927, p. 66. & 1932, p. 109. & Table XLI, ‘Live Stock Slaughtered for Preservation as Food...,
1920-1929-30', ABCQS, 1930, p. 168.
While the pastoral sector maintained its place as the cornerstone of Queensland’s economy,
the promising growth in the first half of the decade could not be sustained. Although the
manufacturing sector temporarily usurped the pastoral industry in value of production in the
late 1920s the latter reasserted itself and remained the dominant sector until the late 1950s.
From 1958 manufacturing consistently outperformed the pastoral industry, and from 1970
manufacturing eclipsed the combined production of the pastoral and agricultural sectors.52
The predominance of corporate ownership and control of the pastoral sector, which had its
Office, 1996), p. 289; Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, ‘Table No. 160 - Cattle, Number of - Australia, 1920-30'
& ‘Table No. 161 - Sheep, Number of - Australia, 1920-30', in ‘Summary of Australian Production Statistics for the Years 192021 to 1930-31', Production Bulletin No. 25, (Canberra: CBCS, 1932), pp. 143-4.
51
‘Number of Cattle & Sheep Killed for Export & Home Consumption, 1920-30', in ‘Summary of Queensland
Statistics - 1930-31’, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 31k.
52
‘Gross Value of Production Statistics - Queensland’, QYB 1992, p. 256.
Chapter Six
351
origins in the financial restructuring of the late 1860s, has remained to the present with the top
ten pastoral corporations controlling 70.1 million hectares of pastoral holdings and the top ten
privately owned holdings totalling 16.8 million hectares in 1996.53 In 1993-94 the total value
of pastoral production was estimated at a little over $2 billion (beef $1.8 billion, mutton and
lamb $27.3 million, and wool $179.6 million) this represents less than 4 percent of the state’s
GDP of $61.118 billion for that year.54 During the 1920s the value of pastoral production
accounted for approximately 24 per cent of total industrial production in Queensland which
demonstrates how this sector has diminished in its overall importance to the state’s economy.
The Agricultural Sector: 1920s
Aside from the political machinations associated with the enactment of the Pastoral Leases
Amendment Act 1920, the most significant activity in the political economy was that directed
towards the agricultural and mining sectors. The Labor government’s corporative rural
reorganisation and development push dominated the political process during the 1920s.
During this decade the greatest sustained political effort was made towards fostering an
agricultural revolution in Queensland. This revolution had, at best, mixed results and did not
live up to the popular expectations of the period, and the long-held dream of an agricultural
utopia failed to materialize. Outside the political arena several problems plagued the sector.
There were persistent concerns among agriculturalists about the effect frequent droughts had
on production and uncertainty surrounding the reinstatement of free market conditions after
the cessation of war-time price controls. These factors certainly encouraged farmers to
seriously consider the benefits of adopting the government’s proposed neo-socialist
commodity pooling arrangements. The government openly expressed its concern over the
relative lack of progress made in the agricultural sector since separation in 1859, especially in
relation to what had been achieved in New South Wales, Western Australia and South
Australia, all of whom shared similar conditions with Queensland. The lack of progress was
blamed predominantly upon a lack of suitably skilled labour, high production costs, and
53
Michael Bachelard, The Great Land Grab: What every Australian should know about Wik, Mabo and the Ten Point
Plan (South Melbourne: Hyland House, 1997), Appendix 2, pp. 130-3.
54
‘Table 84 - Major Agricultural Commodities (a): Gross Value of Production, Queensland, 1987-88/1993-94' &
‘Table 4 - Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost by Industry and Principal Components, Queensland, 1987-88/1993-94',
Government Statistician’s Office [GSO], Queensland Statistics - Compendium, (Brisbane: GSO, 1997),
http://www.gso.qld.gov.au/compend/tab84.htm. & /tab4.htm.
Chapter Six
352
produce traders making excessive profits at the expense of fair returns to producers. The
implications of Queensland’s mostly arid climate and marginality of its soils to the viability of
small-scale agriculture were ignored.55 This is even more significant when one considers the
constant complaints about the ‘abnormal’ dryness of conditions experienced throughout much
of the twenties. Drought or dry spells that had a significant impact on agricultural production
figure prominently in the annual reports of the Agriculture and Stock Department for the
years 1919-20, 1922-23, 1925-26, and 1926-27.56
Nevertheless, better seasons were experienced in the other years, particularly between 1927
and 1930, although too much rain and the inevitable floods, occurred in 1924-25 (followed by
a major mice plague on the Darling Downs and low prices for the principle grain crop,
maize). The high point of the decade was during 1929-30 when the advance in agriculture was
deemed ‘remarkable’, although the depression virtually erased the progress already made. The
seasons 1927-28 and 1930-31 were also notable for being especially wet. During 1927-28
central Queensland suffered bad flooding, and in 1930-31 similar conditions were
experienced, although this time in the Northern and Southern Divisions. The rainfall in the
Southern Division during the summer of 1930-31 was described as varying from ‘abnormal’
to ‘phenomenal’.57 Consequently, climatic conditions were generally more advantageous for
the pastoralist than for the farmer during the twenties. The reaction to these climatic extremes
illustrates a general lack of understanding, or indeed, willingness to consider these cycles as
being the norm. To be fair to the farmers of the period it is only since the late 1980s that
agriculturalists, agronomists, and governments have begun to consider these long-term
climatic variables (such as the El Nino effect) and to implement agricultural practices and
systems that take these into account.58
The agricultural sector of the 1920s was also structurally unbalanced and much of its overall
growth can be attributed to the relative success of sugar cultivation. The progress of the sugar
industry, the backbone of Queensland agriculture, came at the price of heavily subsidising
sugar growers, their employees, and an entire industry that was grossly inefficient compared
55
‘A&SR, 1920-1921', QPP, 1 (1921), pp. 1057 & 1065.
56
‘A&SR, 1920-21', QPP, 1 (1921), p. 1057; ‘1923-24', QPP, 2 (1925), pp. 273 & 347; ‘1925-26', QPP, 2 (1926), pp.
405 & 416. & ‘1926-27', QPP, 2 (1927), p. 361.
57
‘A&SR, 1920-21', QPP, 1 (1921), p. 1057; ‘1924-25', 2 (1925), p. 451; ‘1927-28', QPP, 2 (1928), p. 295; ‘1928-29',
QPP, 2 (1929), p. 581; ‘1929-30', QPP, 2 (1930), p. 619. & ‘1930-31', QPP, 2 (1931), p. 469.
58
‘El Nino drought brings big rural sector loses’, Queensland: A Special Report, AFR, 3 October 1997, p. 68.
Chapter Six
353
to its foreign competitors. The transition of the sugar industry from a plantation model based
on the exploitation of Pacific Island slave labour to one reliant upon a more highly paid, and
predominantly white, working class and small-scale family farming, was a master-stroke in
political economy that stroked economic nationalist sentiment and mirrored Australia’s racist
attitudes. The original sugar scheme, implemented as a Commonwealth rebate of ‘the excise
tax for all cane-sugar produced only by whites’, and was then replaced with a Sugar Bounty
in July 1903,59 was a keystone of the White Australia Policy.60 The cost of white labour was
underwritten by these subsidies and the system of government intervention took on greater
scope during World War I when the Queensland government bought the entire crop from
1916 on behalf of the Commonwealth under the provisions of the Sugar Acquisition Act
1915.61 The Commonwealth also acquired all the sugar imports required to make up the
deficit between local production and domestic consumption. The cost of the local and
imported sugar was averaged so that the price of sugar to Australian consumers was stabilised
and returns to producers guaranteed. These arrangements continued after the war, but from
1923 the situation was reversed as world prices collapsed and Queensland produced a surplus
which could only be exported at a loss.
Responding in part to the sugar price crisis of 1923, the Commonwealth-Queensland Sugar
Agreement was introduced. The Sugar Agreement, as it has become known, prohibited the
importation of foreign sugar and empowered the Queensland Government, through its agent
the Queensland Sugar Board, to bulk purchase cane sugar and then wholesale it through two
companies, the Colonial Sugar Refining Limited and the Millaquin Sugar Company, who then
retailed the refined product at a fixed price. Prime Minister Bruce claimed that the
Agreement secured a high level of economic security for all Australians and had important
implications in the on-going defence preparedness of the nation (as a stable industry promoted
population growth in the north), and assisted in underwriting the principles of the White
Australia Policy.62 Under the Agreement the domestic price was raised to cover the deficit
59
The rebates cost the Australian public approximately £5 per ton, while tariffs of £6 and £10 per ton were applied to
imported foreign cane and beet sugar respectively. Shaw, Economic Development, p. 125; F.K. Crowley, Modern Australia in
Documents: Vol. 1, 1901-1939 (Melbourne: Wren Publishing, 1973), pp. 43-5. & W. Ross Johnston, The Call of the Land: A
History of Queensland to the Present Day (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1982), pp. 131-2.
60
Shaw, Economic Development, p. 125. For an analysis of the relationship between the sugar industry and the origins
of the White Australia Policy see Adrian Graves, Cane and labour: the political economy of the Queensland sugar industry,
1862-1906 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993) & Kay Saunders, Workers in Bondage: The Origin & Basis of Unfree
Labour in Queensland 1824-1910 (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1982).
61
62
Ryan, QPD, 120 (1915-1916), pp. 224-5.
Costar, Labor, Politics and Unemployment, p. 9. & E.T.S. Pearce, ‘The Queensland Sugar Industry’, in Queensland
Chamber of Manufactures, The Queensland Chamber of Manufactures Year Book, Vol. 2, 1948 (Brisbane: The Strand Press,
Chapter Six
354
accumulated from the losses derived from export sales. In 1925-26, sugar was sold for £27 per
ton on the Australian domestic market while the 44 per cent of the crop which was exported
(mostly to Britain under the Empire tariff preference) was sold for £11.6.0. per ton. On
average, raw sugar cost £19.10.0 a ton to produce, and growers therefore were subsidised by
Australian consumers for export losses to the tune of £2,175,000 during the year 1925-26.63
Sugar exports expanded rapidly after the 1923-24 season. Exports grew from an insignificant
£49.0.0 in 1921-22 to £5.2 million by 1929, prior to collapsing to £1.8 million, in 1930-31.64
A scheme similar to the sugar cross-subsidy was introduced to underwrite butter and dried
fruits exports; the former to the advantage of all the eastern states and the latter principally to
New South Wales and Victoria.65 The sugar subsidy was, of course, a major point of
contention with southern manufacturers (New South Wales and Queensland) who were
adamant that the high cost of sugar threatened the viability of many jam, biscuit and other
food manufacturing enterprises.66 Other sections of the community, most notably the labour
movement and labour press, singled out CSR’s monopoly over sugar refining as the main
reason for high prices.67 Under these circumstances the success attributed to the sugar
industry must be measured by the considerable cost the Australian consumer had to bear in
order for the industry to flourish. Indeed, without the financial contribution from the pockets
of all Australians which underwrote the growth of the sugar industry, the overall performance
of Queensland’s agricultural sector would have been quite unsatisfactory.
The total value of all agricultural production was estimated to be in excess of £18 million in
1920 (42 per cent of this figure came from dairy and poultry production), and after peaking at
£21.4 million in 1927, the sector managed production of just over £20 million in 1930. In
aggregated terms the value of production in this sector increased by 34.2 per cent over the
decade or an aggregate average of 3.42 per cent. Agricultural crop production, valued at £10.4
million in 1920, remained stagnant in the early twenties and grew slowly throughout the rest
1948), pp. 209-11.
63
Shaw, Economic Development, pp. 140-1.
64
‘Trade - Exports Oversea, Home and Foreign Goods, 1924-25 to 1930-31', ABCQS, 1926, p. 167; 1927, p. 193;
1928, p. 191; 1929, p. 217; 1930, p. 229; 1931, p. 239. & 1932, p. 249.
65
Shaw, Economic Development, p. 141.
66
For some examples of this debate see ‘Jam Makers Anxious’, DS, 27 August 1921; ‘Canning Industry’, DS, 3
September 1921, p. 7; ‘Canned Fruits and Jams’, DS, 5 October 1921, pp. 5-6. & ‘Jam Makers Threat’, DS, 25 October 1922, p.
4.
67
Edward Swayne, QPD 137 (1921), pp.448-50. & ‘Sugar industry reaction’, DS, 2 July 1924.
Chapter Six
355
of the decade, with good seasons only recorded in 1924, 1927 (best return of £14.5 million)
and 1929. Production was valued at £12.8 million in 1930 which represents a 23 per cent
increase on the value of production in 1920 (see Fig. 6.8).68 During the 1920s the value of
agricultural exports finally overtook imports in 1924-25 (see Fig. 6.9). Between 1920 and
1930 all the major crops experienced increases in production, with the exception of tobacco
which decreased by over 52 per cent.
The best performer proportionally was cotton production where a great expansion in acreage
resulted in a boom from 57,065 lbs ginned in 1920 to 3,068,143 lbs by 1930. Next was sugar
cultivation (an increase of 209 per cent), followed by bananas (156 per cent), wheat (37.7 per
cent), maize (26.8 per cent), and pineapples (21 per cent).69 The total area under crop in
Queensland increased by almost 47 per cent between 1920 and 1930 with the greatest
increase, in overall acreage, coming from the expansion in sugar cultivation, from just over
160,000 acres to almost 300,000 acres, or an increase of 82 per cent for the decade. The
cotton boom was smaller in overall acreage, increasing from 166 acres in 1920 to 35,500 by
1930. This, however, represents an increase of over 2000 per cent. Cultivation of bananas
increased by over 100 per cent, wheat by 53.5 per cent, maize 48.6 per cent, and pineapples
by 41.8 per cent. Tobacco acreage was reduced by almost 70 per cent. Only the producers of
pineapples, sugar and cotton were successful at bettering their increased acreages with greater
percentage gains in production.70
68
69
70
‘Production of Queensland Industries, 1920-30', ABCQS, 1932, p. 234.
‘Summary - Produce of Crops, 1920-30', QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 39k.
‘Summary - Land Under Crop, 1920-30’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 37k.
Chapter Six
356
Chapter Six
357
The dairy industry, another success story of the agricultural sector, increased production
considerably without the level of subsidy that supported the expansion of the sugar industry.
Dairy production recorded strong growth during the twenties with milk production almost
doubling from 104 million gallons to 205 million gallons in 1930. Butter production increased
from 40.7 million pounds (lbs) to over 90 million lbs by 1930. Cheese production
demonstrated a more modest trend from 11.5 million lbs to 14.2 million lbs (with a peak of
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15.2 million lbs in 1921) over the same period. The production of bacon and hams was also
impressive, growing from 11.3 million lbs in 1920 to over 20 million lbs by the end of the
decade.71 Butter and cheese exports followed similar trends with a short boom in the early
years of the decade, but both collapsed in 1923-24, with depressed conditions continuing
through to the depression (with the exception of two good years in 1924-25 and 1927-29).
Butter exports were valued at £469,135 in 1920, and peaked at £3.3 million in 1930-31.
Cheese exports climbed from £126,102 to £427,725 between 1920 and 1921, falling off to a
low of £96,595 in 1923-24 before two periods of growth in 1924-25 and 1927-28, with a
collapse in 1926 and remained flat through to 1929-30 prior to an upswing to £213,731 in
1930-31 (see Fig. 6.10 and Fig. 6.11).72 The dairy industry therefore was in no small measure
crucial to the overall development of the agricultural sector in the early twentieth century, and
was one of the more successful branches of the sector in attracting new settlement and
providing a viable livelihood for many immigrants until after World War II.
One of the more important structural changes that occurred during the twenties was the trend
towards larger more economically viable farm lots. The consolidation towards larger
71
‘Summary - Production, Butter & Cheese Made, Milk Obtained, Bacon & Hams, 1920-30’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), pp.
30-1k.
72
‘Summary - Value of Principal Exports, 1920-30', QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 22-3k.
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properties is evident when one compares the 30 per cent increase in the total area of land
under cultivation (a 47 per cent increase in crop area) with the more marginal 14 per cent
increase in the number of individual agricultural holdings between 1920 and 1930.73 The
number of farms grew from 26,921 in 1920 to 33,533 in 1925 before declining to 30,790 by
1930 (see Fig. 6.12). The 1925 figure represents an 88 per cent increase on the number of
holdings recorded in 1904, when figures were first collected. This increase had been reduced
to less than 73 per cent by 1930 as the depression began to take hold. This trend indicates,
when considering the increase in the area under cultivation and crop, that the consolidation of
larger farms was accompanied by a reduction in the number of smaller holdings, presumably
as farmers were forced to leave uneconomic farms, this was especially the case in the wake of
the drought years of 1925 and 1927. Indeed, the average size of each holding increased from
37.8 acres to 43.2 acres over the decade.74 The area under cultivation grew by 30.7 per cent,
from 1 million acres to 1.3 million acres, while the area under crop showed stronger growth of
almost 47 per cent from 779,497 to 1.1 million acres between 1920 and 1930 (see Fig. 6.13).
It is worth noting that the area under sugar cultivation increased by 82 per cent over the
decade, and the increase of 133,451 acres comprised almost 37 percent of the overall increase
in the area under crop. The area of land under cultivation and crop as a percentage of the total
land occupied increased marginally from a mere 0.29 per cent to 0.39 per cent for cultivation
and 0.22 per cent to 0.35 per cent under crop.75
73
‘Lands, Crown - Area in Occupation, Queensland, 1920-30’, ABCQS, 1923, p. 42; 1927, p. 66. & 1932, p. 109.
74
‘Table C', in ‘Report of the Registrar-General on Agricultural & Pastoral Statistics, 1913-14’ [R-GAPS], QPP, 2
(1914), p. 788; 'Table VI I - Return Showing Progress of Holdings & Area Cultivated - Return for Ten Years', in ‘R-GAPS’,
1922-23, QPP, 2 (1924), p. 133, & 'Table VIII - Return Showing Progress of Holdings & Area Cultivated - Return for Ten
Years’, in ‘R-GAPS’ 1930-31', QPP, 2 (1931), p. 577.
75
‘Production - Table XXIV', QSS, 1920, QPP, 2 (1922), p. 21k; ‘Production - Table LXVII', QSS, 1930, QPP, 1
(1931), p. 138. & 'Lands, Crown - Area in Occupation, Queensland', ABCQS, 1910, p. 21; 1912, p. 21; 1917, p. 20; 1923, p. 42;
1927, p. 66. & 1932, p. 109.
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Table 6.4
Agricultural Sector: Holdings, Employment and Area of Cultivation, 1920-1930
Year
Holdings
Employment
Cultivation (Area)
Acres
Average Acres All Land Occupied
Acres
Acres
1920
26,921
64,728
1,018,444
37.8
351,535,354
1921
28,122
71,630
1,045,342
37.1
342,454,167
1922
29,390
71,917
1,090,816
37.1
328,044,542
1923
31,464
71,121
1,198,166
38.1
332,360,210
1924
32,359
77,524
1,275,039
39.4
334,227,309
1925
33,533
80,474
1,241,118
37
328,895,932
1926
32,051
79,668
1,288,518
40.2
330,581,747
1927
30,414
82,114
1,205,992
39.6
341,642,064
1928
30,586
80,523
1,268,475
41.5
339,871,248
1929
30,701
86,277
1,269,242
41.3
342,160,683
1930
30,790
87,352
1,331,513
43.2
340,980,919
Source: ‘Table Ca - Returns of Labour Employed including Owners or Occupiers Working on Holdings’ — ‘Report of the
Registrar-General on Agricultural Statistics’, in ‘Agriculture & Stock Department Report, 1920,’ QPP, 1. (1921), p. 1165;
VIII, 1925, QPP, 2. (1926), p. 546. & IX, 1930, QPP, 2. (1931), p. 578; 'Table VII - Return Showing Progress of Holdings
& Area Cultivated - Return for Ten Years', in ‘R-G Report, 1922-23,’ QPP, 2 (1924), p. 133, & 'Table VIII - 1930-31,
QPP, 2 (1931), p. 577. & ‘Summary - Crown Lands’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 32k.
Employment in the agricultural sector remained relatively static through the early twenties
with strong growth shown in the latter years. Estimated agricultural employment grew from
64,728 in 1920 to 87,352 by 1930 (see Fig. 6.14), an increase of 35 per cent between these
years. In aggregate terms the growth achieved over the decade was 31 per cent or an
aggregate average of 3.1 per cent per annum. In terms of intra-sectoral employment growth,
crop farming recorded a 36.2 per cent increase, while dairying achieved a 33.6 per cent
increase.76 While female employment in agriculture improved from 15,226 to 17,711 over the
decade the growth in male employment far outpaced the growth in female employment. The
‘recorded’ participation of females in crop farming during the decade grew slightly from 3 per
cent to 3.3 per cent of the total workforce (998 to 1566), but in dairying the trend moved the
76
In crop farming male employment grew by 35.5 per cent and females by 57 per cent, in dairying these figures were
50.3 and 13.5 per cent respectively. For the agricultural sector overall male employment grew by 40.6 per cent and females by
16.3 per cent. ‘Table Ca- Returns of Labour Employed including Owners or Occupiers Working on Holdings, & the Capital
Invested in Farm Machinery’, in ‘R-GAPS’, 1920, QPP, 1 (1921), p. 1165; ‘Table VIII’, in ‘R-GAPS’, 1925, QPP, 2 (1926), p.
546. & ‘Table IX’, ‘R-GAPS’, 1930, QPP, 2 (1931), p. 578.
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361
other way with a decline from 45.3 to 38.5 per cent participation. Overall female employment
in agricultural vocations declined from 23.5 per cent to 20.3 per cent over the decade.77
It must be stressed that these figures are somewhat problematic; they tend to obscure the true
contribution of female labour on family farms where their work was not officially recognised
in the statistics. It is difficult to accurately gauge this contribution but it is fair to contend that
77
Ibid.
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362
it was incredibly significant to the viability of the industry as a whole since unpaid female
labour (and that of male youths) effectively subsidised the growth of the sector. The reduction
in female employment in the dairy sector, traditionally an area of high female employment,
can be attributed, in part, to the introduction of milking machines from the 1920s which
reduced the need for hand milking, a task which was usually the preserve of females.78
While it is clear that agriculture was the golden child of government economic policy, the
reality was that it largely failed to live up to the inflated expectations placed upon it. The state
and Commonwealth governments injected vast sums of money into rural development with
varied results. The plethora of difficulties that faced primary producers were considerable,
and for many, insurmountable. The combination of insufficient capital for investment, high
labour and machinery costs, fluctuations in extremes of climate and markets, and the
problems related to the adoption of suitable agricultural practices, seriously hampered the
expansion of the sector. Nevertheless, it is a tribute to the tenacity and commitment of those
who sacrificed something of the relative ‘comforts’ of the urban life for the hard work and
uncertainty of a farming life that a relevantly vibrant agricultural sector was eventually
created. In 1993-94 the total value of agricultural production, excluding pastoral production,
was valued in excess of $3 billion and exports, including pastoral, were valued at $382
million.79 It is apparent that even today many of the same problems that beset the
agriculturalists of the 1920s continue to threaten the viability of farmers in the 1990s.
The Mining Sector: 1920s
From the 1970s onwards the mining sector has become a fundamentally important component
of Queensland’s economy. This is a far cry from the state of the industry in the 1920s. By
1930 the mining industry had declined from its peak in the late 1890s and early 1900s to
become the basket case of the economy. By the late 1920s the future prospects of the mining
industry looked very bleak indeed. The mining sector returned the worst result of all the
industrial sectors in the Queensland economy during the 1920s. The unstable conditions
experienced in the mining sector during World War I flowed over into the twenties, and with
78
Sally Bligh, Meredith Blomfield & Ann Merson, eds., Cecil Plains ... Station, Selection and Settlement (Cecil
Plains: Cecil Plains ‘88 Committee, 1988), p. 15.
79
‘Table 84 - Major Agriculture Commodities (a): Gross Value of Production, Queensland’ & Table 16 - Exports by
Industry (a), Queensland’, Compendium, GSO Website URL - http://www.gso.qld.gov.au/compend/tab84.htm & /tab16.htm.
Chapter Six
363
the exception of a temporary upswing in world metal markets in 1922 and 1923, mining
activity in Queensland declined steadily in both output and value of production. A
depreciatory trend was dominant in metals prices with major declines in the market value of
copper, tin, wolfram, bismuth, molybdenite and lead. This trend had predictably disastrous
results for the bulk of Queensland’s mineral production. The value of Queensland’s mineral
production more than halved from £3.5 million in 1920 to £1.4 million by 1930. This equates
to a 57 per cent reduction over the decade (see Fig. 6.15), or an average depreciation of over 5
per cent per annum.80
The market instability that arose out of the war was further exacerbated by the British
government’s dismantling in March 1920 of price controls on wolfram, molybdenite and
bismuth — minerals of some importance to Queensland’s mining industry.81 A world-wide
surplus saw the market for these minerals collapse and which had its greatest impact in the
metal mining centres in the North.82 World metal markets remained depressed throughout the
early 1920s, with many mines were forced to close or drastically cut back production
(including the great Mount Morgan gold mine which closed for a year from March 1921).83
80
‘Minerals, Principal, Value’, ABCQS, 1919, p. 25; ‘Minerals, Principal, Production for Ten Years, Value’, ABCQS,
1927, p. 167. & 1932, p. 224.
81
‘Annual Report of the Under-Secretary for Mines, 1920 [Mines, 1920]', QPP, 2 (1921), p. 679.
82
‘Mines, 1920', QPP, 2 (1921), p. 679. & ‘Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Mines for 1920 [ARCIM]', in
‘Mines, 1920', QPP, 2 (1921), p. 795.
83
‘Mines, 1921', QPP, 2 (1922), pp. 567-8. & ‘Mines, 1922', QPP, 2 (1923), pp. 791-2.
Chapter Six
364
There were, however, some encouraging signs as the mining sector began to diversify into oil
exploration during the twenties with activity in the Roma, Tewantin and Beaudesert districts.
Oil exploration was stimulated by the rapid growth in use of oil-based fuels and other
petrochemical products in the industrial and domestic spheres. The Petroleum Act of 1923
repealed all previous legislation and stipulated that all oil and helium were the property of the
Crown. In line with the state interventionist temper of the period the Act also allowed the
state to establish its own prospecting and production ventures.84 The government expended a
great deal of energy and financial assistance on the industry, ranging from freight subsidies,
advances for exploration and mining machinery, an expanded geological survey program, and
its own experiments in mine and smelter ownership.
Despite the government’s intervention and encouragement the downward slide continued, and
were it not for the strong performance of tin prices, and too a lesser degree in lead, the
performance of the mining industry would have been much worse. The same changes in
production, consumption and technology that drove the oil boom also increased the demand
for tin as it found new uses in the manufacture of automotive and electrical components.85
Successes were few and far between, however, as the vagaries of international metal markets,
so long the factor primarily blamed for the industry’s woes, were eventually considered by
industry observers as being less problematic than the lack of capital investment and the
obsolescence of Queensland’s mining plant and treatment processes. In short, the structure of
the industry at this time was not significantly different from what it had been at the turn of the
century.
During the 1920s the industry finally conceded that industrial relations and labour costs were,
in fact, quite favourable and there were no shortage of resources for the industry to exploit.
What the industry required was a program of sustained heavy investment in new machinery
and the adoption of the latest technical processes. As the experience in the United States had
proved, such investment would have significantly boosted production and reduced costs even
further and, therefore, would have assisted the industry to become more internationally
competitive.86 The lack of strong capital investment in the industry was most probably due to
the instability in prices and the deficit of capital available as investors moved into government
84
85
86
1285.
‘Mines, 1923', QPP, 2 (1924), p. 827.
‘Mines, 1925', QPP, 1 (1926), p. 1167.
‘Mines, 1926', QPP, 1 (1927), p. 1273; ‘Mines, 1927', QPP, 1 (1928), p. 1035. & ‘Mines, 1928', QPP, 1 (1929), p.
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365
securities, effectively locking away funds from the private sector. The relative backwardness
of the industry compounded the negative effect of low prices and later in the decade, when the
price of tin collapsed, the state of the industry was described by the Under-Secretary of Mines
as a ‘regular debacle’. Nevertheless, the sector’s survival demonstrated something of the ‘grit
and perseverance’ of an industry that was able to continue in the face of such difficult
conditions.87 For the officers of the Mines Department, many politicians, business people,
and the miners themselves, an unfailing faith in the potential revival of Queensland’s mining
industry sustained them.
The intra-sectoral performance of the mining industry varied considerably. Of the five major
minerals (copper, coal, gold, tin, and silver), copper and gold experienced the greatest decline
in relative values of production. Copper production collapsed in the early years of the decade
while gold production declined more gradually. The value of copper production fell from £1.5
million to £73,591 by 1926, only recovering slightly to around £175,000 by 1930. The value
of gold production declined from almost £500,000 to below £34,000 between 1920-1930. Tin
production decreased from £252,054 to £49,708 and silver from £70,461 to £5527. The value
of coal production, on the other hand, increased from £841,551 to over £1.2 million in 1929.
With most minerals the decline in the value of production was generally worse than the trend
in output. Only gold and coal production performed against this trend. The decline in the
value and output of gold was virtually the same. The price of gold remained relatively stable
in a band of between 4s 9d to 4s 11d per fine ounce. Queensland’s gold mines had, however,
largely exhausted the easily winnable ores, and this combined with high production costs and
lacking the stimulation of high prices, forced the industry into decline.
In coal mining output was relatively stable but an increase of over 13 percent in the value of
production was recorded due to the increased price of coal during the period. The story for
copper was quite different with the price collapsing from £122 per ton to £65 per ton between
1920 and 1921. The price of copper then fluctuated in a band of between £60 and £75 per ton
for the remainder of the decade. The price of tin fluctuated more wildly, falling from £481 per
ton in 1920 to £165 per ton at the close of 1921. Tin prices then improved slowly to reach
£319 per ton early in 1927 prior to a sustained decline to a low of £118 per ton by the end of
1930.88 The statistics speak for themselves: it is clear that, with the exception of tin and coal
87
88
‘Mines, 1930', QPP, 1 (1931), p. 949.
‘Mines, 1920-30', QPP, 2 (1921), p. 679; QPP, 2 (1922), pp. 567-8; QPP, 2 (1923), pp. 791-2; QPP, 2 (1924), p.
827; QPP, 3 (1925), p. 57; QPP, 1 (1926), p. 1167; QPP, 1 (1927), p. 1273; QPP, 1 (1928), p. 1035; QPP, 1 (1929), p. 1285;
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mining, the performance of the industry was less than satisfactory.
Not surprisingly employment in the mining sector reflected the unsatisfactory trends in
production. There was a collapse in mining employment prior to 1922, followed by a slight
recovery to 1924, before another steady decline until 1928. Total employment across the
industry decreased from 10,531 in 1920 to a low of 3200 between 1924 and 1926. There was,
however, a lift in mining employment that coincides with the depression as employment
climbed back to just over 7300 by 1930 (see Fig. 6.16).89
It is of much interest that Geoffrey Blainey has suggested that there is a consistent linkage
between depression, and indeed drought, and the renewal of mining activity in Australia.90
There does appear to be a greater incidence of prospecting and tributing in tough times,
particularly for gold, as well as a corresponding increase in new mining ventures. The
employment figures tend to support Blainey’s suggestion, however, the linkage to new mining
ventures is more difficult to confirm as the statistics on the number of existing and new mines
operating at the time are incomplete. The number of miners employed declined from 6905 to
QPP, 1 (1930), p. 1087. & QPP, 1 (1931), p. 949.
89
‘Table - Number of Men Employed in Connection with Mines, Mills, and Reduction Works', in ‘ARCIM 1920',
QPP, 2 (1921), p. 795; 1921, QPP, 2 (1922), p. 666; 1922, QPP, 2 (1923), p. 884; 1924, QPP, 3 (1925), p. 160; 1925, QPP, 1
(1926), p. 1253; 1926, QPP, 1 (1927), p. 1357; 1927, QPP, 1 (1928), p. 1123; 1928, QPP, 1 (1929), p. 1367; 1929, QPP, 1
(1930), p. 1171. & 1930, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 1031.
90
Geoffrey Blainey, The Rush That Never Ended: A History of Australian Mining (Melbourne: Melbourne University
Press, 1969), p. 106.
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367
5534 over the decade with only silver/lead and coal mining recorded increased participation.
Gold mining did show an increase after 1929, but as noted previously, this largely was due to
the increase in the number of prospectors as the depression deepened. The structural
composition of the mining workforce was dominated by the miners, the second largest group
was general labourers (from 1736 to 1195, with a low of 257 in 1928), followed by skilled
trades (741 to 479), smelter workers (850 to 45), and finally ore reduction works employees
(299 to 91) between 1920 and 1930.91
Table 6.5
Mining Sector: Employment by Division, Value of Production & Exports, 1920-1930
[Total employment includes miners and all other ancillary employees]
Year
Divisions
SQ
CQ
TOTAL
Miners
NQ
Value
Exports
£
£
1920
3207
2541
4783
10,531
6905
3,461,975
71,432
1921
2904
1368
3149
7361
5847
1,456,436
194,868
1922
2858
2302
2492
7652
5633
1,825,280
66,385
1923
2725
2465
2762
7952
5776
2,200,782
157,792
1924
2867
2626
3276
8769
6355
2,266,461
345,740
1925
2608
2159
3063
7830
5815
2,012,677
190,661
1926
143
814
2229
6206
5124
1,608,741
185,828
1927
323
780
1671
5616
4914
1,645,991
34,192
1928
432
574
1674
5699
5283
1,386,916
56,565
1929
275
323
2454
6032
5069
1,707,179
66,020
1930
377
626
2795
6738
5534
1,263,236
235,826
Source: 'Table E - Approx. Number of Miners, other than Gold Miners, Employed during the Year...', & 'Table F - Approx.
Number of Miners Employed in Gold Mining on 31st December....', & ‘Table - Number of Men Employed in Connection
with Mines, Mills, and Reduction Works’, in ‘Mines’, 1920, 2, QPP, (1921), pp. 707-8 & 795; 1921, 2, QPP, (1922), pp.
589-90 & 666; 1922, 2, QPP, (1923), pp. 811-2 & 884; 1923, 2, QPP, (1924), pp.849-50; 1924, 3, QPP, (1925), pp. 82-3 &
160; 1925, 1, QPP, (1926), pp. 1187-8 & 1253; 1926, 1, QPP, (1927), pp. 1295-6 & 1357; 1927, 1, QPP, (1928), pp.
1059-60 & 1123; 1928, 1, QPP, (1929), pp. 1309-10 & 1367; 1929, 1, QPP, (1930), pp. 1111-2 & 1172. & 1930, 1, QPP,
(1931), pp. 973-4 & 1031.
The mining industry was the only industrial sector that received anything like the level of
91
‘Table E - Approximate Number of Miners, other than Gold Miners, Employed during the Year’ & ‘Table F Approximate Number of Miners Employed in Gold Mining on 31st December 1920-30', in ‘Mines, 1920', QPP, 2 (1921), pp.
707-8; 1921, QPP, 2 (1922), pp. 589-90; 1922, QPP, 2 (1923), pp. 811-2; 1923, QPP, 2 (1924), pp.849-50; 1924, QPP, 3 (1925),
pp. 82-3; 1925, QPP, 1 (1926), pp. 1187-8; 1926, QPP, 1 (1927), pp. 1295-6; 1927, QPP, 1 (1928), pp. 1059-60; 1928, QPP, 1
(1929), pp. 1309-10; 1929, QPP, 1 (1930), pp. 1111-2. & 1930, QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 973-4.
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368
attention and enthusiasm the government demonstrated towards agricultural development.
Queensland Premier Robert Philp was certainly enthused with the potential of the mining
sector in the early 1900s as were later Labor governments. In the latter’s case this perhaps
reflected the personal experiences and prejudices of several senior Labor ministers, such as
Theodore, Alfred Jones, and William McCormack, all of whom had been miners and were
involved in private investment in mining ventures. State involvement in the mining sector
eventually led to the government controlling several mining ventures including state coal
mines at Warra and Bowen, the vast Chillagoe copper mines and smelters, the Irvinebank
treatment works, an arsenic mine at Jibbinbar, several state crushing batteries, and a diamond
drilling operation on the Roma oil field.92 The state’s involvement in the mining sector was a
priority of the government, especially under Theodore’s stewardship.93 Theodore was
consistent in his advocacy of the great economic potential of mining, especially in north
Queensland.94 Theodore’s focus on the development of mining in the north should come as no
surprise when one considers his close association with mining and that the electorates he
represented, first in Woothakata (1909-1912) and then Chillagoe (1912-1925), were both
north Queensland mining districts.
The government’s ill-fated massive investment in the Chillagoe smelters, and the scandalous
political repercussions of the Mungana leases affair, did little to promote the popular image of
the mining sector beyond its general reputation as the realm of the speculator. The
complexities of the Chillagoe/Mungana affair will not be discussed here in detail, suffice to
say it is clear that the government’s plunge into copper smelting, prompted by temporarily
high copper prices during the war, was ill-considered, to say the least. In fact the Chillagoe
Company had failed to operate profitably from the time of its establishment in the late 1890s.
It is also clear that Theodore, McCormack, F.M. Morgoraity (Attorney-General), and A.D.
McGill (Chairman of the Country-National Party) had seriously miscalculated the political
cost they would pay after it was revealed they had a financial interest in mining leases at
Mungana. The link between this and the Chillagoe purchase was most certainly a conflict of
interest and perhaps indicates high level political corruption.95 The drain on the state’s fiscal
92
Ross Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland: From 1915 to the Early 1980s (Brisbane: University of Queensland
Press, 1984), pp. 50-4.
93
Under-Secretary for Mines to Premier Theodore, 13 December 1920, MIN/G174, 6864, QSA.
94
Theodore to Brisbane Chamber of Commerce, Reply re; enquiries with regard to Government action in support of
mining sector, 12 March 1923, and associated correspondence between BCC and Premier Theodore, 4 August 1923, PRE/A772,
74122, QSA; ‘North is Prosperous’, DS, 4 October 1923 & ‘Rich North’, Daily Mail, 5 October 1923.
95
K.H. Kennedy, The Mungana Affair: State Mining & Political Corruption in the 1920s (St. Lucia: University of
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369
resources used to prop up the Chillagoe operations further exacerbated the impact of the loans
embargo and forever sullied the prospects of any government involvement in large-scale
industrial enterprise. However, in fairness to the ideals of T.J. Ryan and Theodore, Labor’s
willingness to directly engage in the mining industry was a genuine political response to the
endemic unemployment problem in the north. Theodore, with Ryan’s support, had worked to
have the Chillagoe/Mungana mines re-opened from 1916 and finally overcame the objections
of the Legislative Council in 1919.
The government committed a vast sum in purchasing the Chillagoe smelters (£700,000) and
also to developing the fields in the district, as well the Irvinebank treatment works and several
coalfields. The linkage of the Bowen coalfields development to the proposed Bowen Iron and
Steel Works (which included a coke works to supply the Chillagoe and Cloncurry smelters),
illustrates the audacity of the government’s drive to develop mining and manufacturing in the
north.96 While this plan had some merit it was also clearly an exercise in political pork
barrelling: it is not just a coincidence that the Labor cabinet, dominated as it was by MLAs
holding electorates in the north, would have chosen to direct so much of the government’s
developmental effort into north Queensland. Regardless of the demonstrable failure of the
Chillagoe smelters, the performance of the state coal mines, batteries and the arsenic mine
were not unsatisfactory and they proved to be useful ventures that, in some small measure,
assisted the development of the state’s economy. The state crushing batteries, for example,
were of both political and practical value as they enabled the ‘small man’ to get his ore
processed without having to accept the suspect prices offered by the large mining companies.
This, of course, made their small operations more viable and it was a policy that was popular
among the independent miners and the communities in which they lived.
Despite the government’s best efforts to aid the mining sector, and because of its unfortunate
experiences with direct engagement in the industry, the sector’s importance to the Queensland
economy became more marginal. The impact of its decline was most keenly felt in the north
of the state where metals mining had been so instrumental in the development of the region.
Although many senior members of the Labor government equated the miners’ vocation most
favourably with that of the agriculturalist, many farmers and their urban counterparts did not
share this adoration. Many sections of the community found the non-reproductive basis of the
Queensland Press, 1978), pp. xiii-xiv.
96
Fitzgerald, From 1915 to the Early 1980s, pp. 51-2.
Chapter Six
370
mining process, the speculative nature of its economic foundations, and the militancy of its
workforce, somewhat distasteful and perceived it as an occupation less than worthy of the
serious task of social formation. Throughout the 1920s the mining industry reeled under the
pressure of collapsing primary metals markets and a corresponding lack of investment in new
mining technology, and as a consequence suffered from increased costs that further eroded the
sector’s profitability. Indeed, the mining sector did not re-emerge as a major force in the
Queensland economy until the late 1960s and would ultimately overtake all other primary
production by the late 1980s.97 By the mid-1990s the mining industry accounted for 5.4 per
cent of the state’s GDP by cost factor or $3.3 billion out of a total GDP of over $61 billion.98
The gross value of mining production (including oil and gas) for the year 1994-95 was $5.3
billion.99 The ultimate success of mining in the north and north-west of the state has
vindicated Theodore’s faith in the future of the industry in these regions. The rapid growth of
the central Queensland coalfields also demonstrates the vast resources available to
Queensland, and the recent demise of coal mining in the West Moreton region around
Ipswich, again illustrates the ever-changing shape of Queensland’s economic geography.
The Tertiary Sector: 1920s
While the governments of the 1920s increasingly focused industry policy towards the
promotion of production of ‘crops and rocks’, the tertiary sector demonstrated reasonable
growth across the state. The general expansion in the state’s economy, although not uniform,
promoted growth in the related service industries. Increased trade buoyed the commercial and
mercantile markets, while government spending on education, health and other community
services created a certain dynamism within the public sector despite the shortage of loan
capital in the early part of the decade. Higher wages fuelled consumer demand; indeed mass
consumerism began to play a significant role in the demand side of the economy. This had an
immediate impact on the retail and wholesale trades, and had spin-offs in the financial
97
‘Gross Value of Production Statistics - Queensland’, QYB 1992, p. 256. In 1997 the mining sector’s share of Gross
State Product (GSP) was 4.55 per cent; agriculture (including pastoral, forestry, fishing etc) was 4.56 per cent, tourism at 7.57
per cent and manufacturing contributed 12.41 per cent. Paul Fennelly, ‘It’s more than ‘rocks ‘n crops’ says metals group’, in
Queensland: A Special Report, Australian Financial Review [AFR], 3 October 1997, p. 72.
98
‘Table 4 - Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost by Industry and Principal Components, Queensland, 198788/1993-94', Compendium, http://www.gso.qld.gov.au /compend /tab4.htm.
99
'Table 101 - Metallic Minerals Produced by Type & Value at Mine, Queensland'; 'Table 103 - Fuel Minerals
Produced by Type & Value at Mine, Queensland' & 'Table 105 - Other Non-Metallic Minerals by Type & Value at Mine,
Queensland', Compendium, http://www.gso.qld.gov.au/compend/tab101.htm; /tab103.htm & /tab105.htm.
Chapter Six
371
services and commercial sectors. New forms of popular entertainment, such as films and
radio, together with changes in popular culture, fashion and tastes promoted new growth
industries and employment, particularly for females. Changes in office practices and the
introduction of office machines saw a shift in the skills based status of many occupations.
Many tertiary vocations were considered low status and/or jobs suited to female employment
and, moreover, during this period many jobs in the tertiary sector experienced a dilution of
status and, as a result, these occupations tended to became feminised.100 The changes did not
necessarily mean the work had been deskilled, the opposite was frequently the case. The
seemingly menial tasks performed with the aid of machines meant efficiency savings and
therefore lower wages, thus opening up many new vocations to the more wage ‘efficient’
female workforce.101 Also gender stereotypes ensured that the new service vocations would
have to be performed by females in line with the dominant social construction of the female
as servant and responsible for the more menial service sector occupations.
The trend toward the feminisation of many tertiary occupations is demonstrated in the
statistics. The percentage rate of growth of female employees in the tertiary classifications
between the Census years of 1921 and 1933, demonstrates that female participation clearly
outperformed the level of growth in male employment in this sector. The classifications in
order of the rate of growth were: Transport and Communications (female employment
increased by 57.2 per cent and males by 5 per cent); Commercial (40 per cent and 25.5 per
cent); Government and Professional (39.4 per cent and 13.5 per cent); and Domestic (23.8 per
cent and 2.8 per cent). In the Transport and Communications sector female employment
increased from 1170 to 1839 between 1921 and 1933. However, male employees clearly
outnumbered females, increasing from 28,620 to 30,041 during the twenties.
The changes in technology and work practices in the commercial sector is also apparent as
female participation increased from 9475 to 13,261, whereas male employment growth was
proportionally slower, expanding from 33,617 to 42,201 over the same period.102 Indeed, the
percentage growth rate in female employment in the Commercial classification (40 per cent)
100
For an examination of this and other issues related to the vocational gender segregation see Joanne Scott’s section
“Gender Segregation in the Queensland Economy”, in ‘Generic Resemblances’?: Women and Work in Queensland, 1919-1939,
Ph.D., University of Queensland, Brisbane, 1995, pp. 135-51.
101
H. Hamley, The Limits of Choice: White Women, Their Work and Labour Activism in Queensland Factories and
Shops, 1880s to 1920, M.A. Qual., University of Queensland, Brisbane, 1992, p. 14.
102
‘Tables 19 & 20: Queensland - Occupations of Males/Females, 1921', Census of the Commonwealth of Australia,
v.1, pt.7, 1921, pp. 896-901. & ‘Tables 17 & 18: Queensland - Industry of Males/Females, 1933', Census, v.1, pt.3, 1933, pp.
314-8.
Chapter Six
372
shadows similar trends in the growth in the number of retail shops and employees in
Queensland. Shop numbers boomed from a slump of 5191 in 1919 to 7880 in 1920, then
increased to 11,122 by 1930 (an increase of 41 per cent between 1920 and 1930). Retail shop
employees increased from 21,821 to 30,980 (42 per cent growth) over the same period.103
Female employment in the Government and Professional classification was more impressive,
increasing from 11,006 to 15,339, with male occupations growing from 15,034 to 17,063. In
the domestic sphere, female employment lifted from 22,487 to 27,845, male employment
virtually stagnated between 6297 and 6479. Overall, female employment in the tertiary sector
(44,138 to 58,284) grew by 32 per cent and males by 14.6 per cent (83,568 to 95,784)
between 1921 and 1933. Moreover, female participation in Queensland’s workforce as a
whole increased by 70.7 per cent (57,329 and 97,861) with males recording a more modest
31.1 per cent increase (267,302 to 350,452). In 1921 females comprised 17.7 per cent of the
state’s 324,631 strong workforce, and by 1933 this had grown to 21.8 per cent of the total
workforce of 448,313.104
Employment in the four main tertiary classifications all recorded increased participation.
Commercial employment increased from 43,092 to 55,462 (28.7 per cent); Domestic from
28,784 to 34,324 (19.2 per cent); Government and Professional from 26,040 to 32,402 (24.4
per cent); and Transport and Communications from 29,790 to 31,880 (7 per cent). Total
employment in the tertiary sector increased from 128,600 in 1921 to 158,300 by the time of
the 1933 Census, an increase of 23 per cent (see Fig. 6.17).105 It is worth noting that as the
Census was taken during the worst year of the depression this increase would have been
greater if the survey had been conducted earlier. The south-eastern division experienced the
greatest share of this growth, rising from 64,300 to 84,600 (an increase of 31.6 per cent).
However in terms of percentage growth and divisional distribution it was north Queensland
which demonstrated the greatest proportional increase with 36 per cent (21,400 to 29,100)
whereas central Queensland’s larger tertiary workforce (42,800 to 44,800) experienced a
more marginal 4.7 per cent increase.106 As a percentage of the total workforce the tertiary
sector recorded only a modest increase from 39.6 per cent to 40.3 per cent. Despite the strong
103
‘F&SR, 1919-1920', QPP, 2 (1920), p. 684. & ‘F&SR, 1929-1930', QPP, 2 (1930), p. 112.
104
‘Tables 19 & 20: Queensland - Occupations of Males/Females, 1921', Census, v.1, pt.7, 1921, pp. 896-901. &
‘Tables 17 & 18: Queensland - Industry of Males/Females, 1933', Census, v.1, pt.3, 1933, pp. 314-8.
105
106
Ibid.
‘Table 5.A - Estimates of Labour Forces of Queensland by Industry and Division’, in C.P. Harris, Regional
Economic Development in Queensland 1859 to 1981 with particular emphasis on North Queensland (Canberra: ANU Centre for
Research on Federal Financial Relations, 1984), pp. 92-3.
Chapter Six
373
growth in the size of the tertiary workforce in north Queensland, the sector slipped back
proportionally compared to the other industrial sectors, from 34.7 per cent to 34.4 per cent.
Likewise, in central Queensland there was a reduction from 33.9 per cent to 33.2 per cent.
Only in the south-eastern division did the proportion of tertiary sector occupations make
headway into the overall composition of the workforce, increasing from 47.3 per cent to 49
per cent.107 This, of course, reflects Brisbane’s position as the seat of the state’s commercial,
financial, manufacturing, and governmental activity.
While it is difficult to fully quantify the growth of the tertiary sector as an individual
component of the economy, it is clear that the service industries of Queensland, both public
and private, experienced significant expansion during the 1920s. Growth in public sector
tertiary employment was reasonably strong during the twenties. For example, the number of
hospitals increased from 102 to 122, and the consolidation of the larger ones underwrote the
expansion in health workers from 1758 to 3173 over the decade.108 The number of schools
also increased from 1771 to 1897 over the same period.109 The tertiary sector certainly gained
from the advances made in manufacturing and agriculture, and the general growth in services
linked to the expansion of Queensland’s population (see Fig. 6.18).
107
‘Table 5.3 - Estimates of Inter-Industry Distribution of Labour Forces of Queensland by Division’, Harris,
Regional Economic Development, pp. 70-1.
108
109
‘Summary of Welfare and Health Statistics (1920-30)’, QYB 1992, p. 239.
‘Summary of Law, Order, and Education Statistics (1920-30)’, QYB 1992, p. 231.
Chapter Six
374
Private sector growth was considerable as is reflected in the commercial employment
statistics. Expansion in other areas such as entertainment and tourism also boosted the
prospects of this sector. The public sector growth trend, albeit somewhat restricted in the
early years, centred on improved health, education and other community services. This
growth trend was at least, in part, spawned by the Labor government’s wholesale adoption of
rural corporatism and penchant for developmental policy that drove increased activity in the
political economy. However, the Labor government’s activities within the economy outraged
many on the conservative side of politics. Labor’s quest for greater state involvement in
economic affairs, further seduced by the use of extraordinary powers during the war,
emboldened the likes of Theodore to push further along the road to state socialism. The 1920s
was a watershed in the grapple for power between capital, organised labour and the state; a
conflict of vested interests against forces which urged a more democratic and egalitarian
society engaged each other during this decade. The most dramatic stand-off occurred between
1920 and 1924 when conservative interests took their fight against Labor’s ‘socialist’ policies
to the money markets of London and, in effect, essentially crippled the state’s capacity to
generate the loan capital sufficient to sustain Queensland’s developmental urges.
‘To queer the pitch’ — Developments in the Political Economy
Chapter Six
375
On Friday, 10 September, 1920, Premier Theodore addressed a public meeting in Brisbane to
open Labor’s 1920 election campaign, having arrived back that day from a trip to raise new
loans in London. Theodore had hoped to secure an initial loan of £4 million of a projected £9
million required to fund Labor’s development schemes.110 Theodore addressed the assembled
Labor supporters and journalists, outlining how his mission to secure loans from the City had
been sabotaged by a simultaneous visit to London by a delegation of Queensland capitalists
who were successful in securing what Theodore claimed was ‘an extraneous political
authority — a financial junta in London’.111 In the political rhetoric, typical of Labor
sentiment of the time, Theodore claimed that the Philp delegation arose out of a Tory
determination ‘to continue their malign influence in Queensland politics, [they had] devised a
new scheme of campaign more sinister in its character, and infinitely more hurtful in its effect
upon the State, than they ever attempted before’.112 Theodore claimed that the purpose of the
delegation was not only to protest to the Colonial Secretary on Labor’s appointment of a new
and partisan Lieutenant- Governor, rather its primary objective was to ‘queer the pitch’ by
intervening in the government’s financial negotiations in London, thereby subverting the
democratic process of the parliament. The crux of the whole issue was that vested interests
were not content to give up their political hegemony over Queensland to what they perceived
as a wayward democracy being led down the path towards socialism.
The actual power that pastoralists (the pastoral companies in particular) and certain sections
of the business elite enjoyed in the state’s political economy was clearly demonstrated during
the subsequent loans crisis. The dispute was triggered in January 1920 by the appointment of
former Labor parliamentarian William Lennon as Lieutenant-Governor of Queensland.
Lennon’s appointment occurred, ostensibly, as an interim measure to ensure the continuity of
constitutional governance between the departure of Governor Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams in
January and the arrival of the new Governor Sir Matthew Nathan in December 1920.113
Lennon’s appointment infuriated conservative circles who were angered at such an obvious
partisan appointment. Their own hypocrisy of failing to acknowledge the partisan nature of
the previous conservative appointees to the position was ignored. Nonetheless, their fears
110
Tom Cochrane, Blockade: The Queensland Loans Affair 1920 to 1924 (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press,
1989), p. 9.
111
112
113
‘Foul Conspiracy Exposed’, Worker, 18 September 1920, p. 14.
Ibid.
Cochrane, Blockade, p. 54. & R. Fitzgerald & H. Thornton, Labor in Queensland: From the 1880s to 1988
(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1989), p. 98.
Chapter Six
376
appeared justified when Lennon duly approved the swamping of the Legislative Council with
Labor appointees in February. Conservative indignation rose to fever pitch with the
subsequent passage through the Labor-dominated Legislative Council of the Land Act
Amendment Act 1920 on the 24th of February.114 This Act was seen by the conservatives as a
direct threat to the material interests of pastoral investors and business people as, in their eyes,
it represented a breach or repudiation of contract by the government in allowing the state to
raise pastoral rents and enforce other conditions upon pastoral leaseholders, contrary to the
conditions set out in the original lease.
115
The conservative reaction was spearheaded by
pastoral interests associated with the Queensland Employers’ Federation who brought
together numerous conservative political, business, and citizens groups, galvanised around the
Constitution Defence Committee (CDC), to protest against Lennon’s appointment and, more
significantly, the provisions of the Land Act Amendment Act. The CDC had been established
in 1917 to combat Labor’s proposal to abolish the Legislative Council, and was headed by
Philp with support from his old allies Alfred Crowley and P.J. Leahy.116
When assessing the motivations of Philp’s delegation it is crucial to consider that the wellpublicised meeting of prominent citizens held in Brisbane in early March 1920 was preceded
by two more significant private meetings. The first was held on 9 January for members of the
QEF; the second, also convened by the QEF, involved twenty-one employer organisations and
was held on 24 February 1920. Dissent over Lennon’s appointment and fears of Labor
swamping the Legislative Council were raised at the first meeting. Lennon’s subsequent
action of appointing Labor nominees sufficient to give Labor a majority in the Legislative
Council proved their fears to be valid and his action was denounced strongly at the second
meeting.117 The QEF executive cabled their protest against Lennon’s appointment to Prime
Minister Hughes in the hope that he might be able to block the appointment. The second
meeting, attended by thirty-two delegates representing twenty-one employer groups across
Queensland, was called to discuss possible action to overturn Lennon’s appointment of Labor
representatives to the Council. The meeting resolved to cable the Colonial Office to protest
114
For examples of the conservative diatribe on these issues see the BC, 5-7, 9, 13-5 January 1920 p. 6 & 13 & 25
February 1920, p. 6. ‘Premier’s Dramatic Report to the People’, DS, 11 September 1920; ‘Special Meetings on the Appointment
of W. Lennon to the Governorship’, 9 January & 24 February 1920, QEF - Minutes of Meetings, Film 0090, V2/C1, 1915-1928,
JOL, and Schedvin, 'Theodore', pp. 28-9.
115
Cochrane, Blockade, p. 54. & Fitzgerald & Thornton, Labor in Queensland, p. 98.
116
G.C. Bolton, ‘Robert Philp’, in Murphy et. al , eds., The Premiers of Queensland, Rev. edit. (Brisbane: University
of Queensland Press, 1990), pp. 217-8.
117
‘Special Meeting of the Executive’, 1 January 1920 & ‘Special Employer Organisations Conference’, 24 February
1920, QEF Minutes, Film 0090, V2/C1, 1915-1928, JOL.
Chapter Six
377
against Lennon’s partisan appointments which the delegates regarded as ‘a flagrant violation
of the unwritten constitution [of Queensland]’. Moreover, it was decided that a delegation
comprising J.F. Maxwell (President of the QEF) and J.J. Knight go to London to take up their
protest personally with Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for Colonies.118
As the scale of protest grew, another ostensibly more broadly representative ‘public’ meeting
was called by C.J. Worth (General Secretary of the QEF) and William Muir (industrial officer
with the Queensland Pastoralists’ Association), and was held in the wool auction rooms at
Parbury House, Brisbane, on 9 March 1920.119 The meeting was, in fact, quite exclusive
involving as it did only those members of the public who were leaders in business and
conservative politics and others of similarly prominent social status. The eighty people who
attended the meeting represented the United Graziers’ Association, Brisbane Woolselling
Brokers’ Association, twenty-five other organisations and fifteen companies, and included
several conservative MLCs. The meeting passed a resolution, moved by MLC A.J. Thyme
seconded by Robert Philp, to send a delegation to London to protest against the trend of
Labor’s legislation which, in their view, was ‘injurious to Queensland’s relations with Empire
and industries of this state’. A committee was elected to cooperate with the executive of the
CDC to select the delegation.120 Maxwell and Knight stood aside to allow an alternative
delegation, comprising former premier Robert Philp (Chairman of the CDC), Sir Alfred
Cowley, (CDC executive, Chairman of the Bank of Queensland, and a former speaker of the
Queensland Parliament), and solicitor John Walsh (QEF executive and legal council), to
travel to London and persuade the City to boycott the Queensland government.121
The Philp delegation left Brisbane in March and arrived in London on May 16, just two days
before Theodore’s arrival there, and moved quickly to harness support for their cause.122
London financiers and pastoral investors had already voiced their concerns directly to
Theodore about changes in the level of pastoral rents after representatives of fifteen banks,
118
‘Special Employer Organisations Conference’, 24 February 1920, QEF Minutes, Film 0090 V2/C1, 1915-1928,
JOL.
119
‘Foul Conspiracy Exposed’, Worker, 16 September 1920, p. 14.
120
‘Brisbane Citizens’ Meeting on Constitutional Crisis’, 9 March 1920, QEF Minutes of Meetings, Film 0090,
V2/C1, 1915-1928, JOL. This meeting, chaired by James Maxwell president of the QEF, was recorded in the QEF minute book
by C.J. Worth, general secretary of the QEF, who acted as secretary for the meeting.
121
Walsh’s firm Fitzgerald and Walsh Solicitors joined the QEF in May 1912. 30 May 1912, QEF Minutes, Film
0090 V1/C1, 1886-1914, JOL & Schedvin, ‘Theodore’, p. 29.
122
Clem Lack, Three Decades of Queensland Political History, 1929-1960 (Brisbane: Queensland Government
Printer, 1960), pp. 7-8.
Chapter Six
378
and financial and pastoral companies met on 9 February 1920, claiming investor confidence
had been eroded by the passage of amendments to the Land Act.123 Not surprisingly, the
London financiers accepted the delegation’s arguments, and citing the Land Act Amendment
Act as evidence of the government’s repudiation of contract, the financiers downgraded the
state’s credit rating. The action effectively raised the cost of the loans, beyond the Queensland
government’s capacity service the debt.124 Moreover, Theodore claimed the financiers were
resolved that the government should unconditionally withdraw the Land Act Amendment Act,
abandon the Unemployed Workers’ Bill, modify the Tramway Act to suit the needs of the
Brisbane Tramways Company, change insurance legislation, and also amend the Succession
Duties Act in line with the wishes of English companies.125
Although the London financiers had effectively embargoed Theodore from borrowing the £4
million in 1920, the financial ‘blockade’ was not absolute.126 Theodore was successful in
raising a temporary loan of £1 million from the Bank of England in May 1921, and his foray
into the capital markets on Wall Street secured £4.4 million from two loans at the expensive
interest rates of 6 and 7 per cent. These loans, however, were little more than quite costly
stop-gap measures that did little to assist the government’s capacity to fund its developmental
program. The situation was further complicated by the expiry of two loans, one for £13
million, which matured in mid-1924, and one for £12 million, which matured in mid-1925.127
The political desire to borrow heavily to fund large-scale and broad-based economic
development and public works programs was shared universally across the states. Pent-up
demand after the years of fiscal restraint associated with the war emboldened Labor in
Queensland into launching an extensive program of expensive developmental schemes. The
fiscal restrictions of the war years had seen accumulated state debt in Queensland increase by
approximately 18 per cent between 1915 and 1920. However, Labor’s contribution to the
accumulation of public debt was initially considerably less than had been case under the
Kidston and Denham administrations between 1911 and 1914. Nevertheless, in the longer
term Labor governments were responsible for gross state debt doubling between 1915 and
123
Ross Fitzgerald, "Red Ted": The Life of E. G. Theodore (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1994), p. 126.
124
Schedvin, ‘Theodore’, p. 32. Colonial governments were entitled to special status as trustees for loans under the
Colonial Stock Act 1900, any question on a government’s contractual obligations would immediately call its credit standing into
question and therefore lead to an increase in the interest rate applicable to new loans.
125
126
Ibid., pp. 33-4. As Schedvin notes there is no ‘independent’ evidence that these demands were in fact made.
Cochrane, Blockade, p. 9.
Chapter Six
379
1930, whereas debt had grown by only 50 per cent between 1900 and 1915.128 Queensland
was not, however, out of step with the broader trend in state debt accumulation across
Australia. The Commonwealth had assisted the states in borrowing through direct loans to the
states and by securing other loans in London on their behalf. In the period prior to 1920 the
combined borrowing of the states totalled approximately £14 million per annum. In 1920 this
doubled to £28 million and accounted on average for approximately £35 million per annum
during the 1920s. Indeed, total state government debts had increased from £400 million in
1920 to over £700 million by 1930. The extent of this orgy of debt is obvious when one
considers that the states/colonies took fifty-six years to accumulate £320 million in debt and
in just one period of seven years added another £280 to that total.129
Through the early 1920s Theodore government’s bold development plans suffered a slow
fiscal strangulation which had the effect of further strengthening Labor’s resolve not to
capitulate. Finally, the impasse was resolved by Theodore during another visit to London in
March 1924. When Theodore successfully negotiated a compromise with London financiers
that ensured a renewed line of credit and fresh loans in return for his assurance that pastoral
rents (the subject of protest over the Land Act Amendment Act 1920) would not increase
beyond those applied in May 1924.130 Any other demands the City might have made of
Theodore were not mentioned. While it may be debated whether the pastoral lobby or
Theodore was the final victor, it is certain that the Labor government was the big loser
inasmuch as the embargo effectively curtailed Labor’s developmental policy, and sealed the
fate of the State Iron and Steel Works project.131 In any event, the pastoralists continued to
expand their operations in the early twenties as the increased rents imposed by the Land Court
between 1920 and 1924 had little or no impact on the viability of their businesses. As
Theodore originally argued, the main purpose of Philp’s delegation to London was to
sabotage the Labor government’s loans negotiations to put pressure on the government to
abandon its socialist inspired legislation.132 The Philp delegation convinced the London
127
Ibid., p. 36.
128
‘Finance: Debt & Expenditure from Loan, Queensland’, ABCQS, 1907, p. 15, 1919, p. 14, & 1923, p. 23. &
‘Summary of Public Finance Statistics’, QYB 1992, p. 229.
129
130
Lack, Queensland Political History, p. 65.
Ibid., pp. 36-40.
131
Ibid., pp. 40-1. & Cochrane, Blockade, p. 146. Schedvin is uncertain about who the victor was is this battle because
the tangible benefits/losses on either side are virtually impossible to calculate. However, Cochrane argues that the affair
demonstrated the limitations placed upon the government by internal and external financial power, and ‘there can be no doubt of
the victory of capital’.
132
Cochrane, Blockade, pp. 7-9.
Chapter Six
380
financiers that Labor’s program of socialist legislative reform was contrary to the best
interests of British investors. It was this scare campaign that prompted the implementation of
the London loans embargo, whereas Lennon’s appointment and questions of constitutional
propriety, useful for providing a moral justification, were of little consequence.
Rural Development Schemes
The rural sector was to have been the greatest recipient of the loan money Theodore had
hoped to raise in London in 1920, and his failure to do so was a serious setback to the
developmentalists eager to usher in a new grand era for agriculture in Queensland. The
reorganisation of the agricultural sector, through state-assisted cooperative marketing
schemes, was one of three key elements of the Labor government’s rural development
strategy. The second element was the development of scientifically based agricultural
education and training programs and horticultural research and development. The third, and
most ambitious element, consisted of various rural infrastructure and settlement schemes
aimed at promoting agricultural intensification through new and existing agricultural activity.
These schemes varied in their scope and scale, ranging from small-scale soldier settlement
projects, such as pineapple growing at Beerburrum and fruit growing in the Stanthorpe
district, to larger sugar cane irrigation projects like the Inkerman scheme based at Ayr/Home
Hill on the Burdekin River delta in north Queensland, and the more grandiose schemes, such
as the Dawson River Valley, Burnett River Valley and Callide Valley settlement and
irrigation projects in central and south-eastern Queensland.133
Theodore is notable for his commitment to these types of schemes and for the shear breadth
and audacity of his developmental vision. As Minister for Works and Treasurer, and later as
Premier, Theodore was in a unique position to press his influence upon Labor government
developmental policy. Theodore believed that large-scale settlement, combined with
commodity-based marketing bodies and new rail links through the south-west and north-west,
was the most suitable strategy with which the government could address Queensland’s
endemic unemployment problem.134 High structural unemployment in Queensland at this time
133
For details on the Burnett and Callide Valley schemes of the 1920s see Ross W. Johnston, A New Province? The
Closer Settlement of Monto (Brisbane: Boolarong Publications, 1982).
134
110-1.
R.F. Fitzgerald, "Red Ted": The Life of E.G. Theodore (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1994), pp.
Chapter Six
381
was due to the spatial dispersement and seasonal nature of its primary industries, a series of
serious droughts, and a surplus of labour in urban areas as a result of local industries not
keeping pace with urban population growth. Theodore’s developmental dreams never
deserted him and the various settlement schemes he devised or supported must be understood
as components of a much larger vision of northern development.135
Theodore promoted his grand schemes with an evangelical zeal at a time when agricultural
production was expanding rapidly in Australia (see Fig. 6.19 and Fig. 6.20) and had hoped to
lure the Commonwealth and British governments to commit large sums of money to a mixture
of soldier and assisted immigrant settlement projects. To this end Theodore claimed that the
Burnett scheme would employ around 2000 returned servicemen and provide re-settlement for
another 3000 and their families.136 Early in 1921 Theodore tried to enlist the support of Prime
Minister Hughes for his vision of a great agricultural region based in central Queensland: he
envisaged that 10,000 families could be settled and linked to Asian and European markets by
a new railway line connecting the region to Darwin via Camooweal. A similar project is once
again being touted as a catalyst to promote a rural revival in regional eastern Australia.137
Hughes, one of Theodore’s more significant political adversaries, would have nothing to do
with this scheme,138 as he was plainly intent on fleecing the British government for loans
funds meant to assist and encourage British settlers in coming to Australia. Hughes, who had
total control over these loans, found it more politically astute to spend the British
government’s money in employing Australians through various rural development schemes
that did little or nothing to assist the British settlers. These schemes were initiated in all the
states with the exception of Queensland.139
135
Fitzgerald, Red Ted, pp.162-3; J.M. Powell, Plains of Promise, Rivers of Destiny: Water Management and the
Development of Queensland, 1824-1990 (Brisbane: Boolarong Publications, 1991), pp. 114-5; Cochrane, Blockade, 1989, pp.
38-9. & I. Young, Theodore: His Life and Times (Sydney: Alpha Books, 1971), pp.40-2.
136
137
138
139
Theodore, 25 October QPD, 138 (1921), pp.1798-9.
‘Rail reform at the crossing’, AFR, 3 October 1997, p. 30.
Young, Theodore, pp.41-2.
For an insightful treatment of the machinations behind the Commonwealth’s rural development policies of the
1920s see Kosmas Tsokhas, People or Money? Empire Settlement and British Emigration to Australia, 1919-1934 (Canberra:
Department of Economic History, Australian National University, 1990), pp. 1-3, 7-9, & 17-8.
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382
After Hughes’ rebuttal, Theodore then endeavoured to enlist the support of the other states at
the Premiers’ conference in January 1922, where he presented his vision of northern
development, based upon the creation of a new northern state encompassing most of the
Northern Territory and north Queensland. The Premiers agreed with Theodore’s claim that
the scheme had been sabotaged by Hughes’ unwillingness to support any project involving
the Queensland Premier. This claim is supported by the evidence of H.S. Gullet, the former
Superintendent of Commonwealth Immigration, who later revealed that Hughes had not even
taken the time to look at Theodore’s comprehensive plans for the scheme. Theodore
demonstrated his total commitment to the scheme when he indicated he would resign from
parliament to oversee the project from outside the political sphere if this was necessary to
gain Hughes’ support.140 Unfortunately for Theodore, all this effort proved to be of no avail.
Defeated, Theodore turned his energies to the more manageable micro-economic reform of
reorganising the agricultural sector.
140
Young, Theodore, p. 42.
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Theodore’s attempt to attract Commonwealth support for his rural development schemes was
largely the result of his government’s inability to secure sufficient funds during the loans
embargo. Hughes’ outright dismissal of Theodore’s scheme, however, was not without some
foundation when one considers the record of failure of Queensland’s settlement schemes,
particularly in soldier settlement. Even the more logical attempts at fostering the production
of crops believed to be most suited to Queensland’s climate were failures ... ‘thus pineapples
at Beerburrum, bananas at Mt Nebo fared as badly as corn in Atherton, or poultry at Mt
Gravatt.’141 The failure of the soldier settlement schemes must have contributed to the sense
of betrayal and bitterness felt by many of the men who returned from the war only to
experience the privations of the selectors lot with little or no assistance or hope of success. It
was sentiment such as this, and the difficulties these farmers faced in securing sufficient
capital to invest in their farms, that spurred a political insurrection in Queensland during
1939. This extraordinary event in Queensland’s political history, the so-called Pineapple
Rebellion, occurred when aggrieved farmers from Canungra, Redcliffe and Kingaroy took the
entire Forgan Smith Labor Cabinet hostage in the parliament demanding that their grievances
be addressed.142
141
142
Cochrane, Blockade, p. 38.
‘37 Charged After Raid on Labour Caucus’, Courier-Mail, 5 August 1939, p. 1. The men claimed to be members of
the League for Social Justice, part of the Right-wing Social Credit movement. Their demands were neo-socialist in temper
including: stabilised prices for primary produce; a 40-hour week; cooperative control of all primary industries; full-time work be
provided for the unemployed; removal of all road and bridge tolls; lower taxation, public fiancé without debt and (perhaps most
importantly) no alteration of the legal hotel hours without a referendum. The rebels were eventually tried and acquitted by a
sympathetic jury in late 1939 and this extraordinary chapter in Queensland’s political history was forgotten in the wake of World
War II.
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384
Regardless of the setbacks, Theodore persevered in the hope that, whatever the scale of
schemes, he was able to establish, they would then evolve into something much larger of
permanent benefit to the state. Sensibly the schemes that did eventuate focused upon what
was perhaps the greatest restrictive factor on the growth of agriculture in Queensland: the
need for permanent and predictable water supplies. The vagaries of rainfall on the potential
for crop production was a constant threat to the progress of rural development. The huge
volumes of rain water that did fall from time to time in Queensland, especially during the
more regular wet season downpours in the north, were a wasted resources in the minds of the
developmentalists. Ignorant of the complexities of arid landscape ecosystems, the planners
and farmers saw the wild torrents running off their land as pure waste, a natural occurrence
that required the intervention of human ingenuity and technology. Dams, pipelines,
powerhouses, pumping stations, and large-scale irrigation were considered the key to
overcoming this problem. The Irrigation Act of 1922 encapsulated these ideals in the form of
three large irrigation schemes, the Inkerman Scheme (south-east of the sugar towns of Ayr
and Home Hill which sit astride the Burdekin River), Burnett Valley scheme (on the Burnett
River south and west of Bundaberg), and the Dawson River scheme in the Lower Dawson
Valley (Theodore district) in central Queensland.143 The Dawson scheme was as audacious as
any scheme Theodore had ever contemplated. The project consisted of five settlement zones,
of about forty to fifty thousand acres, each to be serviced by a custom-designed township, one
being the present day rural centre of Theodore.144 The scheme made provision for 5000 farms
(of between 10 to 20 acres for intensive vegetable irrigation and 80 to 500 acres for grazing
farms) and a population of 50,000, all to be serviced by the huge Nathan Dam.145 It was hoped
the district would produce vegetables, cotton, tobacco, dairy products, and bacon and lamb for
the consumers and manufacturers in Brisbane. The Dawson scheme was to eventually cost
over £1 million or approximately £8,492 for each settler.146
The vision and the reality of these schemes were poles apart as the lessons unlearned from
earlier schemes were repeated and basic planning fundamentally flawed. The problems faced
143
Fitzgerald, Red Ted, p. 63.
144
The first township of this section of the scheme was originally called Castle Creek but was renamed Theodore in
honour of its creator. Queensland Irrigation Commission, ‘Plan of the Dawson River Irrigation Scheme, Castle Creek Section,
Proposed Township of Castle Creek, 1922-23’, QPP, 2, 1923, p. 975.
145
The Nathan Dam project has been revived by the Queensland government in the late 1990s. Fitzgerald, Red Ted, p.
63.
146
Powell, Plains of Promise, pp. 114-5 & 128.
Chapter Six
385
by the unfortunate soldier settlers growing sugar at Innisfail, pineapples at Beerburrum, and
fruit in the Stanthorpe and Cecil Plains districts, were virtually ignored. Of the 20,000 settlers
envisaged by early 1919, fewer than 1000 returned servicemen had taken up holdings by
1919. Eventually 2577 would do so by 1921, but by 1929, when the scheme was finally
abandoned, a great many had been forced to give up their farms owing to a lack of
government assistance, insufficient training and skills, fluctuating prices, marginal soils, and
the dry climatic conditions.147 One notable exception was the successful Inkerman scheme in
north Queensland which was established prior to Labor winning office. Closer settlement
around Ayr and Home Hill began with the resumption of the Inkerman estate in 1910 and
selectors moved in from 1911. Theodore was an enthusiastic supporter of the project and
considered large-scale irrigation projects as the logical answer to the disappointing results of
most previous closer settlement schemes.148 The Inkerman Irrigation Scheme was opened in
1922 to irrigate sugar, vegetable and other crops though a series of underground concrete
pipes using electric pumps supplied with electricity from the scheme’s own powerhouse.149
While sugar cultivation was linked to the Inkerman scheme, quite successfully as it turned
out, most of the inland schemes were associated with fodder crops, vegetables, and more
significantly, cotton farming.
Cotton growing had been a long-held dream in Queensland, first and most clearly enunciated
in John Denmore Lang’s vision of a yeomanry Queensland supplying the needs of Britain’s
textile mills. A mini-boom occurred in Queensland during the mid-1860s as a result of British
demand for an alternative source of cotton during the North American blockade of
Confederate cotton during the American Civil War. Cotton production in 1870 had reached
1.7 million pounds (lbs), however this had declined to just over 5300 lbs by 1890 and the
industry had ceased to exist by the turn of the century. Production was sporadic until the war
when production increased from 20,000 to 57,000 lbs by 1920. With government
encouragement, through the Cotton Industry Act of 1923 and the cotton irrigation schemes in
the Upper Burnett and Callide Valley, cotton production catapulted to over 19.5 million lbs by
1925. By this time cotton had appeared to have finally lived up to its promise.150 A number of
147
148
Fitzgerald, From 1915 to the Early 1980s, p. 57.
‘Irrigation’, Daily Mail, 26 January 1917.
149
Townsville Chamber of Commerce, Advance Australia: Townsville Chamber of Commerce Jubilee Brochure,
1882-1932 (Townsville: Townsville Chamber of Commerce, 1932), pp. 52-4. & ‘Inkerman Scheme Views’, QPP, 2 (1923), p.
975.
150
‘Table 85 - Principal Agricultural Crops (a): Area, Production and Yield, Queensland, 1986-87 to 1993-94',
Compendium - Agriculture, Forestry and Water Resources, (Brisbane: Government Statistician’s Office (GSO), 1997), GSO
Chapter Six
386
agreements were made between the government and the Australian Cotton Growers’
Association to erect ginneries and seed oil plants as part of the Dawson Valley scheme.151
However, the 1920s cotton boom was short-lived, based once again upon a reduction in
supply from the United States, and production had declined to 3 million lbs by 1930. The
Cotton Industry Act was devised to help reorganise the industry and to give growers more
control over the marketing of their cotton. Unfortunately, a piece of legislation and its
attendant bureaucratic instrumentalities could not control climatic conditions, market demand
and prices, and the industry once again went into decline and stagnated through to the late
1950s.152 The Queensland cotton industry grew steadily during the 1960s and 1970s and has
experienced a remarkable resurgence since the mid-1980s with the success of capital intensive
broad-acre farming and strong market demand. By the mid-1990s cotton production had
expanded to between 80,000 and 100,000 tons (approximately 37-46 million lbs) per annum
valued at over $200 million per year.153
Cooperative Corporatism and the Agricultural Reorganisation
During the 1920s agriculture slowly but steadily advanced throughout Australia with largescale rural development schemes linked to mass immigration foremost in the minds of many
governments. In Queensland, these rural schemes were also linked to a major reorganisation
of how rural industries were managed and how primary produce was to be distributed and
marketed. The success of some sections of the agricultural industry after the war can, in part,
be attributed to the cooperative and corporative support schemes introduced by the Ryan and
Theodore Labor governments. Commodity pooling and cooperative marketing allowed the
returns necessary to support small family holdings. The government, through various
legislative and organisational measures, encouraged the establishment of cooperative
monopolies in commodity supply that effectively underwrote more equitable returns for
producers.154 This system was also intended to create employment and reduce the cost of
Website URL - http://www.gso.qld.gov.au/compend/tab85.htm.
151
152
Australian Cotton Growing Association to Premier Theodore, 6 December 1922, PRE/A746, 11480, QSA.
Fitzgerald, From 1915 to the Early 1980s, p. 65-6.
153
‘Table 85 - Principal Agricultural Crops (a): 1986-87 to 1993-94', Compendium, GSO Website URL http://www.gso.qld.gov.au/compend/tab85.htm.
154
‘A&SR, 1921-22', QPP, 2 (1923), p. 3. Commodity pooling had been introduced during the war and afterwards
voluntary pools were established in the dairy industry. The first post-war compulsory pool was the initiated under the Wheat Pool
Act of 1920.
Chapter Six
387
living to all Queensland consumers. These were the ideals and structures that were to
characterise the ‘Queensland System’ as it was to become officially known.155
These institutionalised arrangements, linked to decentralised processing and manufacturing,
won great political kudos and electoral support for the Labor government among small
acreage farmers and those urbanites sympathetic towards rural development.156 Theodore
identified four areas of rural reorganisation he believed were central to solving Queensland’s
endemic unemployment problem. The first was political, promoting action in the political
economy that could assist the growth of agriculture. Linked to this was the idea of raising the
social status of farmers in order to attract more people into the sector. Third, the whole
industry needed to be reorganised so that producers could run their own statutory bodies in
order to create the conditions with which they could exert greater control over markets and
therefore enhance their returns. Finally, the new farmer was to be assisted in adopting the
latest scientific methods to maximise productive potential and which could be realised
through various educational programmes. To this end, Theodore appointed Lewis R.
MacGregor as Director of Agricultural Organisation.157 Theodore, wary of rural suspicions of
socialist centralism, went to great pains to convince farmers that there was a real need for a
farmers’ organisation to work with the government on the direction and content of rural
policy. The ‘Queensland System’ was born and found its realisation in the establishment of
the Council of Agriculture and the Queensland Producers’ Association.
The Queensland System: The Queensland Producers’ Association and
the Council of Agriculture
Agricultural progress was the catchcry of Queensland politics during the twenties, as it had
been to a greater or lesser degree in the previous decades. However, it was during the 1920s
that the government placed the greatest priority upon the development, indeed the wholesale
reorganisation, of the agricultural sector. The teleology and structure of Theodore’s ideology
of progress, where a manufacturing epoch is envisaged in some distant future and the
155
Fitzgerald & Thornton, Labor in Queensland, pp. 98-9.
156
Cochrane, Blockade, p.39; Brisbane Chamber of Commerce to Premier Theodore, 4 August 1923, PRE/A772,
74122, QSA & ‘Inter-State Commission Farm Products Group, Report No. 3', A2-1918/871, AA, (ACT).
157
Young, Theodore, pp. 182-3. MacGregor was Director of Agricultural Organisation from 1922 and he latter took
up the post of Director of marketing for the Queensland Government in 1926.
Chapter Six
388
centrality of agriculture firmly planted in the present, was clearly enunciated in a speech he
made in early 1922:
... In Queensland we have passed the gold era, and have not yet begun a manufacturing era;
but we are on the threshold of a great agricultural era. We have been endowed by providence
with a wonderful heritage — a land which is richer in natural resources, climate and fertility
than any other underdeveloped country on earth. It is to agriculture, and to the industries
dependent on agriculture, that we must turn our attention in formulating future policies.158
Theodore’s plans for the reorganisation of the agricultural sector are clearly outlined in the
Queensland Producers’ Association Scheme, a document he co-authored with William
Gillies.159 The ideology that informs this work, infused with the themes of a fear of Asian
invasion, the need for greater Anglo-Celtic virility, white racial superiority, and the moral
righteousness of a life on the land, clearly resonate throughout this document. Theodore and
Gillies argued that agricultural reorganisation was absolutely necessary because
... The problem that looms above all others in Australia, and in Queensland particularly, is
how to obtain a larger virile population, and the solution of that problem is believed to be
largely in the development of agriculture. Agricultural development alone can bring about
closer settlement on which the safety and wellbeing of Australia must depend. One of the sure
ways by which this object may be attained is by making farming more profitable to the
farmer. Undoubtedly he derives profit in body and character from living the most healthy of
lives, but he must have something more than that. He must be able to gain sufficient to enable
him to establish a good home, to bring up a family as they should be brought up, and to secure
for himself in old age, if not opulence, at any rate reasonable comfort and wellbeing.160
This statement clearly articulates the linkage between moral considerations and material
advancement, a critical combination to exploit if Labor was to be successful in bringing the
farmers into the Labor fold. Theodore and Gillies, ever cautious of the independent nature and
anti-socialist attitudes of most farmers, carefully considered their wording, opting for the
more politically palatable term of cooperation for what was in reality an exercise in neosocialist corporatism. The speculative nature of the farming economy required cooperation
between farmers and the government:
Co-operation can reduce the difficulties arising from fluctuations of particular markets and
keep down the charges which accumulate between the cow and the counter, the field and the
factory. It can improve produce and so heighten its value, and it can raise the producers'
standard of living and so heighten their enjoyment of life.161
158
Queensland Agricultural Journal, April 1922, p. 4.
159
E.G. Theodore & W.N. Gillies, Queensland Producers' Association - Scheme for the Organisation of the
Agricultural Industry of Queensland: Presented for the Consideration of the Farmers of Queensland (Brisbane: Queensland
Government Printer, 1922).
160
161
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid.
Chapter Six
389
Altruism was not central to this ideal: the scheme was sold to the farmer as an exercise in selfinterest meant to encourage their greater material prosperity. Moreover, the scheme was also
designed to help foster greater success in new settlement and, perhaps most significantly, to
bolster the ranks of the farmers as a social and economic class. Labor had another, more
powerful, motivation to strengthen the social and political power of the agriculturalists to
counter the hegemony of the pastoralists, and thereby drive a wedge through the rural
constituency with the balance loyal to Labor. Perhaps Theodore’s master-stroke was in
averting the suspicions of farmers about state intervention by arguing that because the
government was already heavily involved in the sector the ‘effective organisation among the
farmers themselves’ was a priority. The establishment of the Queensland Producers’
Associations (QPA), encompassing all agriculturalists and small-scale graziers, was the key
instrument with which a broad-based rural credit system could be introduced. The promise of
access to cheap government loans and other subsidies was another enticing carrot dangled
before the often capital-poor farmers.162
The scheme was pitched with the clear understanding that the QPA was not to be a
government organisation; rather it was to be a democratic organisation controlled by the
farmers themselves:
The scheme is an expression of a willingness and determination on the part of the Government
to back co-operative enterprise in the production, manufacturing, and marketing of primary
products. Its objective is to bring the producer and consumer closely together, giving to one
the fullest reward of his labour and enterprise and to the other necessary commodities at
reasonable rates, laden as little as possible with intermediate charges. It is not a Government
scheme in the accepted sense, but the means and machinery by which the producers will
control their own industry along tested lines; lines which have proved successful in countries
where the co-operative idea has been extended to cover the whole range of rural industry. The
method of control will secure the full co-operation of every producer. It gives to the producers
themselves, through their local associations, the organisation and control of their own
industry, clothing them, where necessary, with statutory power. With tangible and attainable
gains it makes provision for a powerful impetus to State-wide rural co-operation, and for
encouragement of organised effort in directions never before followed in Queensland.163
The key phrases in the passage above relate to the objective of bringing together the ‘producer
and consumer closely together’ so that the farmer should be ‘laden as little as possible with
intermediate charges’. This, of course, draws attention to the farmers’ common complaint that
their returns were unfairly reduced owing to the low prices they received from having to sell
162
163
Ibid., pp. 5-6.
Ibid., p. 7.
Chapter Six
390
their commodities through produce wholesalers. The latter, it was argued, made healthy
profits through the process of on-selling to retailers at the producers’ expense. The
government moved to alleviate this problem by establishing the State Produce Agency to act
as a bulk handling agent on behalf of the producers at a reduced cost. The SPA was instituted
under the State Produce Agency Act 1917 and was intended to streamline the marketing and
bulk storage of produce, and to establish shops and factories, and to cut out the ‘middle-men’
from the transactions in order to boost returns to the producer and reduce prices for the
consumer.164 The Act was amended in 1918 to allow the government to extend these
arrangements to any product, good or service it might deem suitable.165 The Act, and its
subsequent amendments, drew the ire and protest of various industry bodies including the
BCC, the Brisbane Wholesaler’s Association, and the QEF, who saw this as a socialist
intrusion into the business affairs that rightfully belonged to the private sector.166 The SPA
put into place an administrative model and the practical infrastructure necessary to get the
QPA and the broader pooling system off the ground.
The QPA was formed after Theodore hosted a conference of dairy farmers in March 1922. At
this conference it was decided to establish the Dairying Advisory Board (DAB).167 The dairy
farmers were also fully supportive of the broader scope of Theodore’s plan centred on the
establishment of a Council of Agriculture (COA). The Council was to be the first of its kind
in Australia.168 The COA was the central supervisory body to which the associations, (local,
district, regional and state-wide) of each agricultural classification would be affiliated. The
Local Producer Organisations (LPA) consisted of at least fifteen members and were the
grassroots branches of the QPA. The QPA District Councils (QPADC) comprised elected
representatives drawn from the LPAs within various defined regions, the QPADCs would
then elect delegates to the Queensland Council of Agriculture (QCA), this being the peak
body of the of the QPA structure. Membership of the QPA was open to all mixed, dairy,
poultry and pig farmers, all grain, sugar, fruit, cotton and vegetable growers, and grazing
farmers.169 It specifically excluded pastoralists and pastoral capital. The objective of the QPA
164
‘State Produce Agency Bill 1917’ QPD, 126 (1917), 30 August 1917, pp. 870-5. & 6 September 1917, pp. 1000-
20.
165
‘State Produce Agency Act Amendment Bill 1918’, QPD, 129 (1918), pp. 366-7.
166
Queensland Employers’ Federation, Monthly Meeting, 12 September 1917, QEF - Minutes of Meetings, Film 0090,
V2/C1, 1915-1928, JOL.
167
168
169
Theodore & Gillies, Queensland Producers’, p. 7.
‘A&SR, 1921-22', QPP, 2 (1923), p. 3.
Theodore & Gillies, Queensland Producers’, pp. 7-8.
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391
was to cooperate with government instrumentalities in order to foster:
•
•
•
The development of the rural industries.
Investigate and deal with problems relating to the rural industries.
Advise agriculturists with regard to matters which require scientific knowledge and
training.
Research subjects pertaining to the rural industries.
Secure effective action for the controlling of diseases and pests generally.
The securing of additional markets for the disposal of produce, and of improved means of
distribution.
The watching of markets and the commercial side of the rural industries generally.
The securing of improved means of transport.
The general policy of standardising.
Extending the usefulness of the professional staff of the Department of Agriculture.
Matters in relation to agriculture and production which may be referred to the
Council by the Minister.
Generally advising and assisting in all matters pertaining to the rural industries.170
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The conference of dairy farmers in March 1922 had supported the establishment of an interim
QCA consisting of appointees who were to stand aside after one year to make way for
representatives elected by the District Councils. The provisional QCA comprised appointees
who represented the various industry classifications of dairy, sugar, fruit, wheat and general
farming, with several government representatives and W.N. Gillies, the Minister for
Agriculture, as the first acting President.171
The QPA and numerous producer bodies which followed have undergone several changes
and exist today in the form of statutory and quasi-statutory bodies under the supervision of the
Queensland Department of Primary Industries. The trend in more recent times has been for
these organisations to become autonomous marketing bodies or corporations, or indeed
privatised corporations or cooperative companies.172 It is somewhat ironic that
the
agricultural and pastoral sectors, so long vocal bastions of free enterprise, owe much to the
socialist inspired organisational and marketing structures which underwrote much of the
viability and prosperity of these sectors during this century.
170
171
172
Ibid., p. 9.
Ibid, p. 11.
Australian Department of Primary Industries & Energy, Rural Industry Directory (Canberra: ADPIE, 1997),
http://dpie.gov.au/rural/industry-directory/cr/fc-026.html. These organisations include the Queensland [QLD] Cane Growers’
Council, QLD Dairyfarmers’ State Council, QLD Pork Producers’ State Council, QLD Commercial Fishermens’ State Council
(all established under the auspices of the Primary Producers’ Organisations and Marketing Act 1926), the QLD Fruit &
Vegetable Growers’ (under the Fruit Marketing Organisations Act 1923), other bodies include the QLD Dairy Authority, QLD
Abattoir Corporation, QLD Sugar Corporation, and Grainco. Grainco, for example, was formed during 1992 with the merger of
Bulk Grains Queensland, the Barley Marketing Board of Queensland, the Central Queensland Sorghum Marketing Board and the
State Wheat Board of Queensland. Grainco's main functions are grain handling and grain marketing.
Chapter Six
392
Conclusion
The 1920s were, economically, politically and socially, years of uncertainty and instability in
Queensland. From a political-economic perspective this was characterised by sustained efforts
to expand the role of the state in economic affairs. The Labor government directly intervened
in the Queensland economy on several fronts: institutionally, through the implementation of
various governmental agencies; organisationally, in the form of industry based organisations
and commodity marketing bodies; and with the establishment of state enterprises in all the
industry sectors. Labor’s programs were encumbered by hostile responses from the
conservative side of politics and the business community, and a general lack of funds to
support the desired scale and scope of their schemes. The progress made by the late 1920s
was in no means uniform as many of Labor’s policies proved unworkable. However, the
reorganisation of the agricultural sector met with some success and has continued in one form
or another to the present day. The state enterprises largely proved to be failures, generally
because of bad planing, mismanagement, high levels of debt, and a lack of consideration for
the greater forces of capitalist enterprise. The victory of the conservative Nationalist Party in
the 1929 elections led to the dismantling of much of the surviving state enterprises, and of
many social welfare programs, a situation further exacerbated by the economic hardships
associated with the depression. The Moore government’s inexperience, and its obvious
inability to deal effectively with the large-scale social and economic problems during the
depression, meant that the suffering of a great many Queenslanders was perhaps exacerbated,
and the failure to provide support for its citizens in this time of crisis ultimately led to the
government’s demise in 1932. Queensland voters did not forget this and Labor was reinstated
to government for the next quarter of a century. The dramatic political circumstances of the
period directly reflected the performance of Queensland’s economy where the growth in
economic activity and production in the early twenties had all but evaporated by the end of
the decade. For all its efforts, the Labor government could not sufficiently divorce the
processes of the Queensland economy from those of the global fluctuations of industrial
capitalism. It is an economic reality that the internal dynamic of Queensland’s economy has
always been stimulated by, and is beholden to, the vagaries of market demands from beyond
its borders: a situation that has not changed in any fundamental way to the present day.