INSIDE NRC
Volume 37 / Number 21 / October 19, 2015
NRC region says TVA’s Watts Bar-2 meets operating license criteria
NRC’s Region II office has concluded that the
Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts Bar-2
meets the requirements for receiving an
operating license, and the agency could issue
the license in “a couple of weeks,” NRC said
in a letter and statement October 15.
In the letter to TVA, NRC’s Region II acting
regional administrator Leonard Wert said
construction of Watts Bar-2 has been
substantially completed, the unit complies
with the permits and applications filed by
TVA, and it is likely to be operated in
accordance with regulations.
That letter was one of the the final NRC
steps before the director of the agency’s Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation can issue the
operating license.
The decision on whether to issue the
operating license “is expected within the next
couple of weeks,” NRC said in a statement
October 15.
Work on Watts Bar-2 began in 1972 and was
suspended in the 1980s; it resumed in 2007.
TVA said in 2012 the unit was expected to enter
commercial operation in December 2015.
The Region II NRC letter “is validation of
what we have built at Watts Bar-2 and that it
meets all these readiness requirements,” TVA
spokesman Jim Hopson said in an interview
October 15. TVA does not have a firm date for
when NRC might issue an operating license,
he said.
NRC said in the letter there have been 64
inspections of Watts Bar-2 during
construction that closed out most of 560
items requiring verification. About 20 items
have not been fully closed by the agency, but
they did not affect the decision that Watts
(continued on page 9)
Pilgrim decommissioning fund is ‘adequate,’ says Entergy executive
Entergy has “adequate funds” set aside to
meet NRC’s minimum requirements for
decommissioning its single-unit Pilgrim plant
in Massachusetts, a company executive said
October 13.
William Mohl, president of the Entergy
Wholesale Commodities business segment,
said at a press briefing that day the company
will permanently shut the 728-MW BWR no
later than June 1, 2019.
An evaluation of Pilgrim’s operating costs
and revenues begun earlier this year made it
“clear” that “Pilgrim is simply no longer
financially viable," Mohl said. The evaluation
concluded the plant would sustain “losses of
revenue of over $40 million annually” for the
foreseeable future, he said.
The company has not decided whether it
will permanently shut Pilgrim in spring 2017 or
mid-year 2019, Mohl said.
The Wholesale Commodities business
segment includes Entergy's merchant nuclear
units.
Responding to a reporter’s question about
Entergy’s decommissioning plans for Pilgrim,
Mohl said the company has "adequate funds of
Inhofe drafting bill to revise NRC fees
The Republican chairman of the Senate
committee that oversees NRC said October 7
that he is developing legislation that would
revise the way the agency calculates and
collects annual fees from its licensees.
Senator James Inhofe, an Oklahoma
Republican, said in his opening statement at
a hearing of the Environment and Public
Works Committee that the agency's workload
has been declining in recent years, due in
part to fewer applications for new reactor
licenses than had been expected.
Also, Inhofe said in his written statement,
www.platts.com
despite the fact that the US nuclear power
industry has spent more than $4 billion on
actions taken in response to the Fukushima I
accident in Japan, "NRC staff has repeatedly
sent proposals to the Commission, which they
admit are not safety-significant or costjustified. I believe this shows the NRC's
bureaucracy has grown beyond the size
needed to accomplish its mission."
Inhofe also criticized "the NRC's extreme
level of corporate overhead costs; reactor
oversight spending increasing despite the
decline in operating reactors; over-budgeting
about $870 million that exceeds NRC’s
minimum requirements.” The agency’s
“minimum or site specific cost estimate” of
the decommissioning trust fund requirement
for Pilgrim is $627.9 million, according to an
NRC 2015 decommissioning funding status
report for all units issued by the agency
October 15.
The report, which was based on estimates
as of December 31, 2014, and which assumed
Pilgrim would shut at the end of its current
license in June 2032, stated there was about
(continued on page 9)
INSIDE THIS ISSUE
Cyber security rule implementation
by 2017, says NRC official
2
Southern Nuclear seeks approval
of alternate simulator at Vogtle
4
NRC requires security improvements
at Energy Northwest's Columbia
5
NRC delays rulemaking on spent fuel
and waste storage security
5
Taiwan to decide on Chinshan's fate in 2016 6
Japanese regulator to consider
revising fire safety regulations
NUCLEAR
7
INSIDE NRC
OCTOBER 19, 2015
for New Reactors work that no longer exists; and persistent carry-over
funds."
Inhofe said he does not "have confidence that the agency will
diligently address the need for reform on its own. I believe it's time for
Congress to step in. I intend to draft legislation to reform the NRC's
budget structure and fee collection in an effort to instill fiscal discipline
in the agency and ensure that resources are properly focused on
safety-significant matters and timely decision-making."
Inhofe did not provide details about what might be included in the
legislation, or when it might be introduced.
Asked after the hearing whether Inhofe has definite plans to
introduce such legislation during the current session of Congress,
committee spokeswoman Kristina Baum said in an email October 7
that Inhofe "is developing legislation on the topic. However, we’ll keep
you posted in regards to timing."
NRC is required by law to recover 90% of its annual budget from
licensee fees. The Nuclear Energy Institute has told the agency several
times in recent years, in comments on the annual fee recovery rules,
that the US nuclear power industry believes that the agency's annual
fees are increasing at an excessive rate.
NRC Chairman Stephen Burns and the other three commissioners
said during the hearing October 7 that the agency's ongoing Project
Aim 2020 will increase NRC's efficiency and better tailor the size of its
staff and budget to the type and amount of work expected in the next
few years.
"A central element of the Project Aim effort is the rebaselining
process," Burns said in his written testimony. "In our direction to staff,
my colleagues and I made clear that the focus should be on identifying
INSIDE NRC
Volume 37 / Number 21 / October 19, 2015
ISSN: 0194-0252
Senior Managing Editor
William Freebairn ([email protected])
Editor
Benjamin Leveau ([email protected])
Managing Editors
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Elaine Hiruo ([email protected])
Editor, Asia
Yuzo Yamaguchi ([email protected])
Senior Editor
Jim Ostroff ([email protected])
Contact the editors:
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Shelley Kerr
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Sarah Cottle
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2
what work is most important to the safety and security mission of the
agency, and what activities can be shed, deprioritized, or performed
with a less intense resource commitment."
— Steven Dolley, Washington
Cyber security rule implementation by 2017,
says NRC official
US nuclear power plants are scheduled to complete by 2017 the
implementation of cyber security requirements posited by NRC
regulations, an agency official said October 13.
James Andersen, director of NRC's Cyber Security Directorate, said
in a post that day on the agency's blog that power reactor licensees are
implementing requirements of a 2009 cyber security rule in two
phases. "During Phase 1, they implemented controls to protect their
most significant digital assets from the most prevalent cyber attack
vectors," he said. "This phase was completed in December 2012, and
our inspections of Phase 1 actions will be done late this year."
Andersen said: "During Phase 2, which will be completed in 20162017, licensees will complete full implementation of their cyber security
programs. They will add additional technical cyber controls, cyber
security awareness training for employees, incident response testing
and drills, configuration management controls, and supply chain
protection."
He added that "cyber security involves 'defense in depth.' Crucial
safety- or security-related systems (both digital and analog) are
isolated from the Internet, giving them strong protection. Such 'air
gaps' are important, but not sufficient. Licensees must also address
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INSIDE NRC
OCTOBER 19, 2015
wireless threats, portable media such as discs or thumb drives, and
other avenues of attack. Physical security and access controls,
including guarding against an insider threat to the plant, also add to
cyber security, as do cyber intrusion detection and response capability."
Andersen said: "NRC will soon publish a new regulation requiring
nuclear plant licensees to notify the agency quickly of certain cyber
attacks."
Report warns of cyber security threats
A new report by the UK’s Chatham House think tank warned that a
combination of increased online activity by criminals, states and
terrorist groups, combined with the relatively recent digitization of
many nuclear installations, means that the danger of a cyber attack on
a civilian nuclear facility has increased.
The October 5 report, "Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Installations:
Understanding the Risks," said that “recent high-profile cyber attacks,
including the deployment of the sophisticated 2010 Stuxnet worm,
have raised new concerns about the cyber security vulnerabilities of
nuclear facilities.”
Stuxnet was a 2010 computer “worm,” or malware program, that
attacked Iranian computer software and was responsible for
damaging a significant number of Iran's nuclear centrifuges,
according to media reports at the time, which linked the program to
the American and Israeli security services.
The Chatham House report said that “even a small-scale cyber
security incident at a nuclear facility would be likely to have a
disproportionate effect on public opinion and the future of the civil
nuclear industry.”
A spokeswoman for the UK's Office for Nuclear Regulation, or
ONR, said in an October 7 email that "ONR recognises the thrust of
the recommendations in the Chatham House report. As the nuclear
safety and security regulator we licence sites and approve their
security plans on the basis of a range of defence in depth measures,
which includes cyber security."
The spokeswoman added that "cyber risks are always
developing and no one can afford to be complacent. In addition to
our robust inspection regime, ONR is constantly reinforcing the
importance of cyber security to senior figures across the UK nuclear
industry. We agree with the Chatham House report that significant
attention must be paid to these issues now and in future."
NRC and US nuclear industry officials said that many of the
report's criticisms do not apply to US nuclear power plants, which
have in place robust cyber security measures and are adding more.
The report says that “the cyber security risk is growing as
nuclear facilities become increasingly reliant on digital systems and
make increasing use of commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ software, which
offers considerable cost savings but increases vulnerability to
hacking attacks.”
Caroline Baylon, a cyber security expert at Chatham House and the
report’s lead author, said in an interview October 5 that there are seven
cyber incidents at nuclear facilities cited in the report.
She added that there was "not a lot of incident disclosure" in the
nuclear industry, but that “one of my sources has documented as
many as 50 industrial control systems incidents at nuclear facilities.”
Baylon said that recent digitization of nuclear plant systems is
Copyright © 2015 McGraw Hill Financial
3
“basically an industry-wide trend. Digitalisation tended to happen
later in the nuclear sector [compared to other industries] because
of initial regulatory restrictions.”
The report notes that the risks of cyber attack increase with the
increased use of digital systems at generating stations, both
because computer systems are more prone to cyber attack, but
also because some stations are also increasingly using "off the
shelf," or commercially available, software that is more vulnerable
to attack.
The report said that “the conventional belief that all nuclear
facilities are ‘air gapped’ (isolated from the public internet) is a
myth. The commercial benefits of internet connectivity mean that a
number of nuclear facilities now have VPN connections installed,
which facility operators are sometimes unaware of.”
The report noted that “search engines can readily identify
critical infrastructure components with such connections,” adding
that “even where facilities are air gapped, this safeguard can be
breached with nothing more than a flash drive.”
The report said that “supply chain vulnerabilities [at civilian
nuclear installations] mean that equipment used at a nuclear
facility risks compromise at any stage.”
The report also said that a "lack of training, combined with
communication breakdowns between engineers and security
personnel, means that nuclear plant personnel often lack an
understanding of key cyber security procedures.”
Asked what would be the best way to improve cyber security
internationally at civilian nuclear installations, Baylon noted that
insurance against cyber attack was starting to be “more of a trend,
it will create a greater following,” adding that regulation in the area
of cyber security at nuclear installations was “developing
organically.”
Report makes generalizations, NRC says
NRC spokesman David McIntyre said in an email October 6 that the
Chatham House report "makes numerous questionable generalizations,
and addresses the 'nuclear industry' globally, rather than by country.
The NRC has been very forward-thinking in developing cyber security
requirements for commercial nuclear facilities and we are confident
that these requirements provide protection and flexibility to respond to
evolving threats."
William Gross, senior project manager, engineering, at the Nuclear
Energy Institute, said in an interview October 6 that the Chatham
House report has "some very valid recommendations," but many of the
concerns expressed in it are not security problems at nuclear power
plants in the US.
The US nuclear industry implemented comprehensive cyber
security programs in 2008, and regulatory requirements issued by NRC
in 2009 are being implemented, Gross said. While some elements are
still being implemented, "the key technology countermeasures are
substantively in place," including controls on portable devices such as
smart phones and portable media such as USB drives, he said.
Some of the security measures in place at US power reactors
include data diodes, network hardware that allows data to be sent from
a particular system but not received, effectively precluding cyber
attacks on such assets, Gross said. Air gaps are also in widespread
INSIDE NRC
OCTOBER 19, 2015
use, he said.
Also, Gross said, cyber security training is required for all personnel
with access to US nuclear power plants, including contractors.
The US Department of Homeland Security's Office of Cyber and
Infrastructure Analysis said in a paper dated October 6, provided by
Gross, that "NRC does not direct industry on how to achieve the
requisite security. Operators can find the approach most suitable for
their plant."
The DHS office said: "Some cybersecurity experts have noted
that each alternative approach to enforcing security among network
security levels has its own limitation. The standard of care used in
the commercial nuclear power industry is comparable to that used to
protect U.S. Government classified networks. Thus, while it is not
perfect, it represents the best known approach."
The DHS office concluded: "At this time, based on what has been
implemented, the overall operational and regulatory requirements of
the nuclear industry substantially avoid the possibility of a
cybersecurity incident having a significant effect outside of the plant."
— Steven Dolley, Washington; Oliver Adelman, London
Southern Nuclear seeks approval of alternate
simulator at Vogtle
Southern Nuclear Operating Co. has requested NRC permission to use
alternative criteria for approving the plant simulator for testing reactor
operators for the Vogtle-3 and -4 units being built in Georgia.
Reactor operators must be tested on either a so-called plant
reference simulator or one approved by NRC under alternative criteria.
Because of delays in a verification process for simulators at the four
AP1000 units under construction in the US, they are not yet designated
plant reference simulators.
As a result, South Carolina Electric & Gas, which is building two
AP1000 units at its Summer station, applied in January for NRC
approval of its simulator under the alternate criteria. That review has
been on hold while SCE&G provides additional information, NRC said
this summer.
Southern Nuclear’s similar request was made public by NRC
October 8. In a letter dated September 18, Southern Nuclear asked that
NRC approve the simulator by December 18 “[t]o support the operator
licensing schedule.”
The first groups of potential AP1000 reactor operators are waiting
to complete the simulator portion of the NRC-administered exam that
determines whether they will receive a license. SCE&G’s first class of
reactor operators took the written exam in May, but the simulator
portion of the exam had to be postponed as a result of the lack of a
reference plant simulator or a commission-approved alternative.
Southern Nuclear postponed planned reactor operator exams
scheduled for November, in part to provide additional time to meet a
requirement relating to development of job performance measures,
Georgia Power, the largest utility owners of the Vogtle plant, said in an
August filing with Georgia’s Public Service Commission.
The delay will not have an impact on the commercial operation
dates for Vogtle-3 and -4, which are June 2019 and June 2020,
respectively, Georgia Power said. Georgia Power and Southern
Nuclear are both subsidiaries of Southern Company.
Copyright © 2015 McGraw Hill Financial
4
NRC regulations require that a plant reference simulator, meaning
one that mirrors plant behavior in every significant way, be used for
NRC-administered operator licensing tests. Alternately, if a site wants
to use a simulator that has not yet been accepted by NRC as a plant
reference simulator, a request can be made to use a commissionapproved simulator that meets certain criteria.
Such a commission-approved simulator is intended as a
temporary measure until the simulator is verified through a process,
known as integrated system validation, as being a plant reference
simulator.
Because the AP1000 units being built in South Carolina and
Georgia are the first of that reactor type in the US, verifying that they
match a reference unit is difficult before construction is completed,
company officials have said. The simulator at Summer may not
receive plant reference status until sometime in 2018, the South
Carolina Public Service Comission staff said in a July 30 status report
on construction at the site. Westinghouse and SCE&G are working to
expedite that date, the report said.
The review of the application for an NRC-approved simulator
instead of a reference plant one at Summer has been held up by legal
questions raised by NRC staff, James Kellum, a senior reactor
operations engineer in the agency’s Office of New Reactors, said during
a meeting April 22 in Chattanooga, Tennessee (Nucleonics Week, 7 May,
8). He said the agency’s Office of the General Counsel had reviewed
issues related to the use of draft emergency action levels, how updates
to procedures relating to control room alarms would be handled, and
some procedural questions about the test results.
The response from the general counsel’s office was received in
early April, but raised some additional questions and the issue is
being discussed by senior NRC management, Kellum said.
NRC told SCE&G in a letter July 2 that it was suspending its safety
evaluation of the simulator approval request because of a lack of
information. While some issues were resolved during meetings
between March and June, "several significant technical issues remain
unresolved," NRC said.
SCE&G must provide information on a series of technical and
corrective action items before NRC can resume the review, the
agency said. Also, NRC staff must write a safety evaluation report
supporting the approval of an alternative to a reference plant
simulator.
The South Carolina PSC staff report said July 30 the safety
evaluation for the commission-approved simulator for the site was
expected to be completed in the third quarter of 2015.
The state PSC staff said in the report that because of delays in
approving the simulator, candidates to be reactor operators could
only take the written portion of the NRC exam in May. Preliminary
results indicated a lower-than-expected number of candidates
passed the written exam, the PSC staff said. A group of SCE&G,
Southern Nuclear and Westinghouse personnel, along with industry
experts, are reviewing the results to determine the cause of the low
passing rate, the report said.
A second class of reactor operator candidates had their exams,
originally scheduled for November, delayed until the second quarter
of 2016, the PSC staff said.
— William Freebairn, Washington
INSIDE NRC
OCTOBER 19, 2015
NRC requires security improvements at Energy
Northwest's Columbia
NRC has issued a confirmatory order to Energy Northwest's Columbia
in Washington state, requiring improvements in the security program at
the 1,173-MW unit, NRC said in a Federal Register notice October 13.
The order is the result of a mediated settlement negotiated
between the federal regulator and the utility after a 15-month
investigation by NRC's Office of Investigations found that two security
officers at the plant "willfully violated" regulations "on multiple
occasions" between 2012 and 2014, the notice said.
NRC said the investigation was initiated to determine whether
security officers at Columbia "were willfully inattentive while on duty"
— a phrase which in previous investigations has referred to a range of
infractions, sometimes including sleeping on duty.
NRC said in the notice that the two officers "were not available at all
times inside the protected area for their assigned response duties," but
did not elaborate.
The agency does not release details about most security-related
incidents at nuclear power plants because it considers them sensitive
information, and it did not provide details on the two officers' alleged
violations in this case or identify them by name.
The confirmatory order requires EN to conduct a common cause
evaluation of the event within three months and incorporate the results
in Columbia's corrective action program as appropriate.
Within six months, annual training for Columbia employees will be
revised to enhance its coverage of "deliberate misconduct" and its
consequences, NRC said. Within 18 months, the utility will install wideangle cameras in bullet-resistant enclosures at the plant, which will be
monitored by security supervisors at least twice per shift, it said.
EN spokesman John Dobken said in an email October 13: "This is an
issue we take very seriously. We have already implemented several
corrective actions to prevent a recurrence."
Dobken said that "[t]he individuals involved are no longer employed
with Energy Northwest. The events referenced in the Order are by no
means representative of the highly trained, professional security force
we have on site."
— Steven Dolley, Washington
NRC begins special inspection at Dominion's
Millstone-2
NRC began a special inspection October 13 of Dominion's 918-MW
Millstone-2 in Connecticut to review issues associated with water
leakage from the reactor's shutdown cooling system October 4, the
agency said in a statement that day.
Dominion declared an unusual event, the lowest of NRC's four
categories of emergencies at power reactors, because the leakage
exceeded 25 gallons per minute, the agency said. The leak from a relief
valve was repaired and the emergency terminated later that day, and
"all of the leakage was contained within other plant systems, as
designed," NRC said.
The leakage occurred as Millstone-2 was being shut for a refueling
and maintenance outage, which is ongoing.
NRC Region I Administrator Dan Dorman said in the statement: "Our
Copyright © 2015 McGraw Hill Financial
5
initial review of the event has raised questions regarding operator
performance. We have determined that the use of a Special Inspection
is appropriate in this case to help the NRC better understand
Dominion's response to the event."
A report on the inspection team's findings will be issued within 45
days of the inspection's conclusion, NRC said.
Millstone spokesman Kenneth Holt said in an email October 13 that
Dominion is "conducting an investigation to ensure we understand all
of the contributing factors to the Unusual Event."
The company "will be working with the NRC’s Special Inspection
Team and sharing information about what happened," Holt said. "We
look forward to any insights that they may provide as we take steps to
prevent recurrence."
— Steven Dolley, Washington
FUEL AND WASTE REGULATION
NRC delays rulemaking on spent fuel and
waste storage security
NRC commissioners voted October 6 to approve staff's
recommendation to delay for five years the start of a proposed
rulemaking on security for spent fuel and waste storage facilities.
Chairman Stephen Burns and Commissioners Kristine Svinicki and
William Ostendorff voted to approve the recommendation.
Commissioner Jeffery Baran approved in part and disapproved in part,
saying the rulemaking should be delayed for only 12 months.
The commission said in an October 6 staff requirements
memorandum, or SRM, that "[a]t the end of the five-year period, the
staff should re-evaluate whether rulemaking in this area is warranted.
However, the staff notes several scenarios, including its evaluation in
the context of the Project Aim re-baselining, under which the staff
would accelerate this rulemaking."
The commission added that if staff determines such an
acceleration is warranted, it "should provide the Commission with its
basis for that determination before it reinitiates the rulemaking."
In 2007, the commission approved staff's proposal "to apply a
radiological dose-based regulatory approach to all independent spent
fuel storage facilities (ISFSI) using release-fraction values specified by
the NRC," staff said in a paper to the commission, Comsecy-15-0024,
dated September 11 and released October 6.
"Specifically, this dose-based approach would require licensees to
demonstrate that the security at ISFSIs or monitored retrievable
storage installations could effectively protect against releases, if any,
resulting from specific security events bounded by the design basis
threat for radiological sabotage," staff said. Security measures
developed under such an approach "should be sufficiently robust that
the estimated dose at the site boundary would not exceed 0.05 Sievert
(5 rem)," staff said.
The commission also ordered staff "to develop new, risk-informed
performance-based security requirements applicable to all ISFSIs to
enhance existing security requirements, and to develop ISFSI-specific
regulatory guidance supporting the implementation of the new
regulations," the paper said.
After further review and stakeholder input, "staff conducted proof-
INSIDE NRC
OCTOBER 19, 2015
of-concept testing to determine if certain postulated security scenarios
were credible," the paper said. Ongoing analysis by staff of scenarios in
which radioactive materials might be released, using the Melcor
software package, is projected to be completed in December, it said.
Staff said in its paper that the rulemaking could safely be
postponed because existing security orders and inspections already
provide adequate protection of Isfsis. Postponing the start of the
rulemaking, it said, would allow staff to complete its Melcor analysis of
release scenarios, take into account progress made on a related
rulemaking on power reactor decommissioning (INRC, 12 Jan, 1) and
achieve "further clarity on the development of the domestic spent
nuclear fuel management strategy," including potential construction of
one or more consolidated interim storage facilities that have been
proposed.
Also, expenditures on the rulemaking, including development of
guidance, "need[s] to be evaluated in light of competing agency
priorities," staff said.
Staff proposed in its paper that completion of the technical basis
being developed to support the rulemaking be postponed from
December 2015 to December 2020 and that issuance of a final rule be
postponed from December 2018 to December 2023.
Burns said in comments attached to his vote sheet that he agreed
with staff's proposed revised schedule. He also said he agreed with
staff's assessment that current security orders and inspections provide
adequate protection, a point that Svinicki and Ostendorff also made in
their comments.
Baran said that "[w]hile delaying this security rulemaking ultimately
may make sense, I disapprove a five-year delay at this time." He said
that "it would be better to consider such proposals in the context of"
the agency's ongoing Project Aim 2020, which seeks to increase NRC's
efficiency and tailor the size of staff to the workload expected over the
next five years.
Baran said he supports a 12-month postponement of the
rulemaking, adding that any staff request for further postponement
should be included in a "re-baselining assessment" of all agency work
being conducted as part of Project Aim that is due to be delivered to
the commission in April.
The Nuclear Energy Institute said in comments filed with NRC this
summer that it considers the proposed rulemaking unnecessary
because security of US nuclear facilities is already adequately
protected and agency and industry resources could be better used on
other tasks.
"It is unclear why any new or revised regulation is needed in this
area," John Butler, senior director, strategic programs at NEI, said in the
July 20 comments. "Security orders currently in place provide adequate
protection for facilities storing SNF and high-level radioactive waste
and should be codified with no additional requirements."
— Steven Dolley, Washington
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
Taiwan to decide on Chinshan's fate in 2016
Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs and the state-owned Taiwan
Power Co. will decide next summer whether to extend the life of the
Copyright © 2015 McGraw Hill Financial
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Chinshan nuclear power plant or proceed with its decommissioning,
Atomic Energy Council Chairman Tsai Chuen-horng told the Education
and Cultural Affairs Committee of the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's
parliament, October 8.
Taipower submitted an application December 2013 to extend the
operating license for the first of two 636-MW BWR units at the
Chinshan plant, also known as Nuclear One.
The AEC's review will consider issues such as the age of the facility
and its components, the availability of fuel, and the safety of
equipment that has been operating for 40 years, Tsai said.
The commission expects to complete its review by June or July, he
said.
"Assuming that the application is approved, it will be up to Taipower
or the Ministry of Economic Affairs to decide whether to actually extend
the period of operation," Tsai said.
The government controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Party —
Kuomintang, or KMT — has not said whether it supports life extension
for the Chinshan units.
During a question period in the Legislature October 6, KMT
Legislator Wu Yu-sheng, who is running for re-election in the district
including Chinshan, urged KMT Premier Mao Chih-kuo to make a clear
statement on whether the facility would be decommissioned on
schedule in 2018 and 2019.
Mao replied that there were "several times" in the past year in which
reserve capacity of Taiwan's central electricity grid was only 2%.
Taiwan faces the possibility of power restrictions "at any time," he said.
Development of other power sources cannot fill the supply gap in
the two or three years before the reactors are scheduled to shut, Mao
said.
The decision on whether to extend the operation period or
decommission Chinshan would take place "at the end of next year," he
said.
Tsai told legislators that Taipower must submit its
decommissioning plans by December 5. Operators are legally required
to submit such plans three years before the expiration of their 40-year
operational license.
Under the present schedule, Chinshan-1 is scheduled to be retired
in December 2018 and Chinshan-2 in May 2019.
Taipower will also submit applications for the decommissioning of
the two reactors at the Kuosheng plant, also known as Nuclear Two, by
the end of 2018 and 2019, respectively.
However, Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Cheng Li-chun, a
co-convenor of the Educational and Cultural Affairs Committee, said
Tsai's statement was incorrect.
In an interview October 12, Cheng said: "AEC cannot issue a
decision on Taipower's application for a license renewal for Nuclear One
before the Ministry of Economic Affairs publically expresses its
intention."
Cheng cited an agreement reached by all the legislative party
caucuses in January to attach a binding rider to the 2015 budget of the
Atomic Energy Council, requiring that AEC ask MOEA to clarify whether
the operating life of the Chinshan units will be extended (Nucleonics
Week, Jan. 29, 1).
The rider said that AEC cannot grant a new operating license to
Chinshan before MOEA clarifies this question, and instructs AEC to
INSIDE NRC
OCTOBER 19, 2015
deliver a report to the committee before granting any such license.
"The statement by [AEC] Chairman Tsai contradicts the conditions
of this rider," Cheng said.
However, AEC Vice Chairman Chou Yuan-ching said in an interview
October 12 that the AEC had fulfilled this condition.
"We have sent an official document that has already notified the
MOEA that it would have to report to the legislature before the AEC
announces its decision and the MOEA has returned a document stating
that it was preparing for both options," Chou said.
"This preparation includes our reviews of the applications," said
Chou.
Chou said MOEA would be required to deliver a report on its position
to the committee and that AEC would also present a report on its
decision next June or July.
Chinshan-1 has been out of service for more than nine months
since a fault was discovered in an Areva-made Atrium-10 fuel assembly
during a refuelling outage in December.
In his report, Tsai also asked the committee to schedule a meeting
to review the AEC's report on the incident in which a connecting bolt
broke in a fuel assembly at Chinshan-1.
The committee approved a resolution March 12 requiring AEC to
deliver a report on the incident before the regulatory agency can permit
Taipower to restart the 636-MW BWR.
Even though AEC had completed its review of the root cause
reports submitted by Taipower and Areva in April, the committee has
yet to schedule a time for the AEC to deliver the report.
Chou said AEC had issued 10 requests to the committee since the
review was completed in April.
DPP Legislator Cheng Li-chun said an interview October 12 that
"there is no reason to rush to schedule this report due to a short-term
situation or scare tactics about power shortages."
"Even if its operation was restored, Chinshan-1 can only operate for
15 months before its space in its spent fuel pool will be exhausted," said
Cheng, who added that "it would be less risky simply to decommission
it earlier."
Cheng also stated that she accepted the findings of the TaipowerAreva report, which was conducted by "an independent third party."
She said: "The potential risks of a start-up after such an
unprecedented incident justify an independent study by a third party
agency not affiliated with Taipower or the government."
Cheng also stated that questions regarding Chinshan's future
operation — including decommissioning, restart of Chinshan-1 and
spent fuel storage — "should be addressed in a comprehensive and
deliberative process."
KMT Legislator Chen Pi-han, the other co-convenor of the
committee, said in an interview October 12 that it was unlikely she
would schedule AEC to deliver the report on the fuel assembly incident
during the current session.
Chen also urged the Executive Yuan, which is Taiwan's Cabinet, and
the Legislative Yuan "to have mutual respect and the Executive Yuan
should not take any action on Chinshan before the Legislative Yuan has
approved the special report."
Chen said her committee has several tasks to complete, including
its review of AEC's proposed budget, before the last session of this
Legislative Yuan ends December 15.
Copyright © 2015 McGraw Hill Financial
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Lawmakers will end the session early to campaign before the
January 16 national elections, in which voters will choose a new
president and legislators.
"I doubt whether there will be time to schedule a meeting on
controversial issues," Chen said.
— Dennis Engbarth, Taipei
Japanese regulator to consider revising fire
safety regulations
Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority, or NRA, might develop
regulations to address the risk of fires caused by high energy arc faults,
or HEAFs, because such fires can be associated with earthquakes, Gyo
Sato, NRA’s director for regulation planning, said at a press briefing in
Tokyo October 7.
The US NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, RES, said in an
August 2013 report on its research activities in fiscal years 2012 through
2014 that "[c]atastrophic failures of energized electrical equipment
referred to as high energy arcing faults (HEAF) have occurred in nuclear
power plant (NPP) components throughout the world. HEAF typically
occur in 480V and higher electrical equipment and cause large
pressure and temperature increases in the component electrical
enclosure. These increases in pressure and temperature could
ultimately lead to serious equipment failure and secondary fires and
could put the NPP at risk."
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's
Nuclear Energy Agency, or NEA, has identified 50 HEAFs that have
occurred at nuclear power plants worldwide, Kunio Onisawa, NRA's
supervisor for systems safety, said in a statement to the comissioners
at the regulator's October 7 meeting.
Two of the four HEAFs in Japan occurred after a magnitude 9
earthquake on March 11, 2011, Onisawa said in his statement. One of
these fires occurred at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Fukushima I-1
reactor.
In the second event that day, two high-voltage switch gear systems
simultaneously caught fire at Tohoku EPC’s Onagawa-1 BWR. The fire
subsequently spread to 10 other switch gear systems via power cable
ducts. As a result, a pump in the residual heat removal system was
inoperative for a short period, NRA said in an October 7 statement.
RES said in its 2013 report: "Most recently, the United States has
experienced events at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in 2013,
H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant in 2010, and Columbia Generating
Station in 2009. Discussions at the OECD Fire Incidents records
exchange meetings indicate similar HEAF events have recently
occurred in Canada, France, Germany, and most recently at Japan’s
Onagawa NPP during the earthquake and tsunami of 2011."
Japan's NRA has concluded that the Onagawa-1 HEAF was one of
the most risky of such events that have occurred in Japan, according
to a staff report submitted to the NRA commissioners October 7.
Another HEAF occurred at Tepco’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-3 BWR in
July 2007, when an electrical transformer caught fire after a magnitude
6.8 offshore earthquake struck the unit.
NEA is conducting tests on the issue at the US National Institute of
Standards and Technology, or NIST, in Maryland, Onisawa said. NEA has
said that its HEAF research program is scheduled to be conducted
INSIDE NRC
OCTOBER 19, 2015
from July 2012 to December 2015. NEA's multinational program includes
France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Spain and the US.
RES said in its report that the main objective of the NIST testing
project — known as Joint Analysis of Arc Faults, or Joan of Arc — "is
to perform experiments to obtain scientific fire data on the HEAF
phenomenon known to occur in NPPs through carefully designed
experiments. The goal is to use the data from these experiments and
past events to develop a mechanistic model to account for the failure
modes and consequence portions of HEAFs. These experiments will be
designed to improve the state of knowledge and provide better
characterization of HEAF in the fire probabilistic risk assessment and
National Fire Protection Association 805 license amendment request
applications." About one-third of US power reactors are or will be
transitioning to a voluntary alternative risk-informed set of fire
protection requirements, known as NFPA 805 after the standard on
which they are based.
Before incorporating the new safety requirements into NRA
regulations, NRA Chairman Shunichi Tanaka, during the October 7 NRA
meeting, instructed Sato to first interview engineers at Japanese
power companies to find whether they have developed any new antiHEAF measures.
Onisawa told the NRA commissioners October 7 that his team had
noted that there is a risk of HEAF event occurrence after major
earthquakes.
NRA intends to conduct its own research, including analyzing test
results from NIST, until March 2017, when Japan’s fiscal 2016 ends,
Onisawa said, adding that NRA intends to publish test results and
analyses, including some of those conducted by NRC.
— Shota Ushio, Tokyo
Blayais-3 and -4 reactors restarted after ASN
10-year reviews
Two reactors at the Blayais nuclear power plant have restarted after
being approved by regulator ASN to resume operation, having
completing their scheduled ten-year inspections, ASN said in
statements October 7 and October 15.
Blayais-3 was shut from July 2014 to September 29 for the
inspection, ASN said in a statement October 7.
Blayais-4 was shut from May 23 to October 14, the regulator said in
a statement October 15.
ASN considers a reactor to have restarted when it reaches 100% of
its capacity.
Environmental regulation in France requires nuclear operators to
conduct a review of the reactors’ safety every ten years. The operator
must submit a final safety review to ASN, which will then make a final
decision on the reactors future operation.
ASN said in both its statements: “In the next six months, EDF will
send to the government and ASN a report containing the conclusions
of the safety review .... ASN will analyze the report and then take a
position on the continued operation” of Blayais-3 and -4.
Pressure tests were conducted on the reactors’ primary circuits
during the outages.
The operator also tested the containment buildings and assess the
integrity of the reactor pressure vessels by verifying the vessels'
Copyright © 2015 McGraw Hill Financial
8
welding quality.
While a final safety report has not been submitted, ASN said the
results of the inspection of the primary circuits were “satisfactory," and
they were requalified for an additional 10 years.
ASN said the reviews went “smoothly," although there had been
“difficulties in the supply of material and human resources” given both
reactors were inspected simultaneously.
Blayais-3 was shut for 14 months, 9 months longer than Blayais-4.
ASN said a delay in the reviews occurred at the end of 2014 when
Areva did not provide “all the required safety justifications” on the new
steam generators to replace the original ones at Blayais-3. Notably,
ASN said it required further testing to prove the mechanical properties
of some materials and that it said it needed to verify the control
methods in place to detect potential defects in the generators.
ASN said in July that it had authorized EDF to install new steam
generators.
In addition, ASN said it noted a number of incidents at both plants
during the shutdown, with three INES-1 anomalies at Blayais-3 and one
INES-2 incident at Blayais-4 with the accidental exposure of a worker to
an ionizing radiation dose. (INRC, 7 Sep, 6).
INES-1 is the lowest level of incident on the International Nuclear
and Radiological event scale. It is characterized as an anomaly, as
opposed to an incident (INES-2) or a serious incident (INES-3). The
scale rises to 7, which represents a major accident.
— Benjamin Leveau, London
Watts Bar-2...from page 1
Bar-2 is ready to operate, NRC said in the letter to TVA.
Among the items remaining open are fire protection deficiencies,
which will be addressed during additional inspections, NRC said. The
agency will also check to ensure that TVA has properly implemented an
emergency lighting system and pre-operational test programs, it said.
An operational readiness assessment inspection in June and July
concluded that the Watts Bar plant was prepared for dual-unit
operation (INRC, 10 Aug, 1). The operational readiness inspection
reviewed management oversight, control of safety-significant
activities, operator training and readiness, and corrective action
program implementation for Watts Bar-2, NRC said in slides prepared
for a July 27 meeting. The inspection was required before NRC could
issue the readiness letter.
If issued, it would be the first operating license for a US power
reactor under NRC's traditional two-step licensing process since
February 1996, when the agency approved the operations of Watts Bar1. NRC has since issued five combined construction permit-operating
licenses, or COLs, under alternate licensing regulations; four reactors
with COLs are under construction in Georgia and South Carolina. Those
reactors are expected to come online between mid-2019 and mid-2020.
— William Freebairn, Washington
INSIDE NRC
OCTOBER 19, 2015
Pilgrim ...from page 1
$896.4 million in the Pilgrim decommissoning trust fund at the end of
last year and projected a fund balance of about $1.27 billion prior to
decommissiong the unit after 2032. It also estimated that about $787.9
million would remain in the Pilgrim trust fund "after decommissioning."
“We don’t have a cost estimate associated with [decommissioning]
Pilgrim,” Mohl said.
The company estimates the cost to complete decommissioning of
Vermont Yankee, a 635-MW BWR, will be “about $1.25 billion," he said.
Vermont Yankee was shut permanently at the end of December,
about 16 months after Entergy said the plant was unprofitable to
operate in the New England market. Under the Safstor
decommissioning option being used at Vermont Yankee, a plant is
placed in a safe, stable condition for as long as 60 years until
decommissioning work is completed.
Entergy has pledged it will "seek NRC approval to commence major
decommissioning activities within 120 days after it has made a
reasonable determination that the funds in the nuclear
decommissioning trust are adequate to complete decommissioning
and remaining spent nuclear fuel management activities," the company
said in a December 19 statement.
Martin Cohn, a Vermont Yankee spokesman, said in an October 16
email that the unit's decommissioning trust fund totaled about $599
million as of September 30.
Mohl said during the press conference that Entergy will decide by
the first half of 2016 whether to carry out refueling and maintenance at
Pilgrim that is scheduled for the spring of 2017. If a decision is made not
to refuel Pilgrim, Mohl said the unit would be permanently shut and
placed in Safstor, which can last for up to 60 years. He did not specify
when the unit would be shut if it is not refueled in 2017.
Entergy will announce by month's end whether it will shut its 849MW FitzPatrick in New York, which "is facing similar economic
situations" as Pilgrim, Mohl said.
Pilgrim began operating in 1972. Its license was renewed in 2012,
allowing it to operate until 2032.
Patricia Kakridas, an Entergy spokeswoman, said in an October 14
email “it is premature” to discuss when the company will file a postshutdown decommissioning activities report, or Psdar, with NRC. “Once
a decision is made in terms of the timing of the shutdown, we will have
a better idea of what filings and corresponding deadlines we must
meet,” Kakridas said.
NRC Region I spokesman Neil Sheehan said in an October 14 email
that “Entergy will have to file a notification with the NRC once the
reactor is permanently shut down and another once the last fuel is
removed from the reactor.” He added that “Vermont Yankee did both in
one submittal.”
In addition, he said, Entergy is required to file a Psdar with NRC
“within two years after the unit ceases operations. In the case of
Vermont Yankee, that plan was actually filed prior to the plant’s
shutdown.”
Mohl said during the press conference that another factor in the
company's decision to shut Pilgrim was the estimated cost of $45
million to $60 million that would be required to bring the plant into
compliance with NRC requirements to remediate issues that prompted
Copyright © 2015 McGraw Hill Financial
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NRC earlier this year to move Pilgrim to the agency's highest level of
oversight — short of forcing the plant to shut until safety issues are
addressed — as a result of recent operational issues.
Entergy “is fully responding to the column 4 performance gaps that
resulted in the downgrade by NRC,” he said. Plants are subject to
increasingly greater oversight as they move to higher-numbered
columns in NRC's five-column reactor oversight process.
Pilgrim was moved to column 4 from column 3 due to a white
inspection finding that "highlights the continuing weaknesses in the
implementation of Entergy's program for identifying, evaluating and
resolving problems" at the unit, NRC Region I Administrator Daniel
Dorman said in a September 2 statement announcing the increased
agency oversight.
The unit, which has received additional oversight since 2013 due to
unplanned reactor shutdowns, was moved to column 4 in the agency's
reactor oversight process, retroactive to the first quarter, Dorman said
in a September 1 letter to Entergy.
Senator Edward Markey, a Massachusetts Democrat and member
of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, which has
oversight of NRC, said in an October 15 letter to NRC Chairman Stephen
Burns the agency “must ensure that Entergy has, and is spending,
resources sufficient to guarantee the safe and secure operation” of
Pilgrim.
Markey, a long-time nuclear power critic, said that “especially if the
reactor will be continuing to operate until 2019, Entergy must work
diligently to resolve the safety issues that caused NRC to place it” in
column 4. The letter was cosigned by Massachusetts’ other Democratic
Senator, Elizabeth Warren, and all nine of the states’ House members,
who are Democrats.
Sheehan, in an October 15 email, said: “Entergy has emphasized to
the NRC its commitment to safe plant operations until Pilgrim shuts
down by sometime in 2019. The company has also told us it intends to
get ready for and support NRC inspection activities associated with the
plant’s recent transition” to column 4.
Sheehan added: “NRC will ensure that Pilgrim abides by its safety
commitments. In the near term, we will conduct inspections and
provide oversight consistent with that required of a plant in its current
status. The agency will keep close watch on Pilgrim’s performance
through the end of its operational life.”
Lauren Burm, Pilgrim's spokeswoman, said in an October 15 email,
in response to Markey's letter: "We are continuing with the safe
operation of the plant under the watchful eye of independent
inspectors at the NRC. We will remain compliant with all regulations and
inspections, up to and including all requirements of the
decommissioning process." Burm added: "We remain confident that
Pilgrim continues to be a safely operated plant with highly professional
and well-trained employees."
— Jim Ostroff, Washington
INSIDE NRC
OCTOBER 19, 2015
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