Logistics for
Joint Operations
Joint Warfare Publication 4-00
JWP 4-00
JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 4-00
LOGISTICS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS
Joint Warfare Publication 4-00 (JWP 4-00) dated April 2003,
is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff
Director General
Joint Doctrine and Concepts
CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
1. This information is Crown copyright and the intellectual property
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authorised by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate.
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to a recipient Government for defence purposes only. It may be
disclosed only within the Defence Department of a recipient
Government, except as otherwise authorised by the MOD.
3. This information may be subject to privately owned rights.
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AUTHORISATION
The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) is responsible for publishing
Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs) and maintaining a hierarchy of such
publications. Users wishing to quote JWPs as reference material in other work
should confirm with JDCC Doctrine Editor whether the particular publication and
amendment state remains extant. Comments on factual accuracy or proposals for
amendment should also be directed to the Doctrine Editor at:
The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre
Ministry of Defence
Shrivenham
SWINDON, Wilts, SN6 8RF
Telephone number:
Facsimile number:
E-mail:
01793 314216/7.
01793 314232.
[email protected]
DISTRIBUTION
Distribution of JWPs is managed by DSDC(L), Mwrwg Road, Llangennech, Llanelli,
Carmarthenshire, SA14 8YP. Requests for issue of this publication, or amendments to
its distribution, should be referred to DSDC(L).
Telephone number:
Facsimile:
01554 822368
01554 822350
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PREFACE
1. Background. This second edition of Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) JWP 4-00
‘Logistics for Joint Operations’1 builds on the fundamental precept, identified in the
first edition, that sensible and appropriate combination of logistic assets, made
available to the Joint Task Force Commander from within the Front Line Commands,
can provide the most efficient and effective support to an operation. Since publication
of the first edition, significant changes have occurred within the logistic environment.
For example, steps have been taken to refine and validate the Joint Force Logistic
Component (JFLogC) Concept; the Defence Logistic Organisation (DLO) has
evolved; opportunities for the use of Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO)
have increased and experiences on operations within a multinational context have seen
the development of multinational doctrine and procedures.
2. Purpose. The purpose of this publication is to draw together, in a single document,
the various and sometimes disparate elements of national and multinational logistics,
so that both planners and operators can recognise their significance, interdependence
and influence within a joint campaign. Whilst recognising that specific functions such
as supply and distribution, medical, infrastructure and other services often have quite
different constraints and procedures, this publication identifies how the logistic output
of these functions interact and contribute to the whole spectrum of operational Combat
Service Support.
3. Scope. JWP 4-00 retains a high level focus, describing why a joint logistic
framework, such as the JFLogC, may be needed and how it can most effectively be
employed when required.2 Furthermore there has been no intention to enter into
details on specialisms: the generic logistic estimate, for example, simply provides a
logical framework and general headings for further specialist input, rather than
detailing every question for consideration.
4. Target Audience. The publication is primarily targeted at Joint operational staff
(particularly J1/J4), JFLogC staff, Component logistic staff, logistic staff in the Front
Line Commands and DLO, medical, infrastructure and personnel support staff. As the
capstone J4 document, Parts 1 and 2 are particularly relevant to the Joint Task Force
Commander. JWP 4-00 is also intended as the primary logistic document for students
at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) and other training
establishments.
5. Structure. This JWP comprises four parts, each with a number of chapters and
Annexes. At the end of each chapter key messages are highlighted:
1
2
Logistics, which may be singular or plural, is used throughout the text in its singular form.
See especially paragraph 405.
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a.
Part 1 - Fundamentals. Part 1’s purpose is to describe the essence of
logistics and to place it in the joint context. Discussing the principles and
precepts, the emphasis is on influencing the thought processes both of
professional logisticians and of commanders and staffs.
b.
Part 2 - Organisation. Part 2 identifies the framework within which
logistic operators must work. It explains the joint approach achieved through
the Defence Logistic Organisation (DLO), the Surgeon General’s Department
(SGD) and other agencies in the strategic Base; how it is fundamental to the
joint pipeline across the coupling bridge into the Joint Operations Area (JOA);
and how the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) can optimise his force’s
operational capability through judicial employment of logistics. Whilst
describing the strategic environment, the emphasis is on the operational and
tactical levels, incorporating guidance for a Joint Force Logistic Component
(JFLogCC). Where the Lessons Identified process has uncovered gaps or
inconsistencies in the Command and Control (C2) and responsibilities of
organisations involved with, or directly influencing, logistics on operations,
JWP 4-00 provides guidance.
c.
Part 3 - Planning. Part 3 provides guidelines for operational planning.
Generic templates for planning are included. Force generation options, such as
multi-nationality and contracting, are included chronologically within the
planning process as they will continue to feature in future operations. The
emphasis remains on guidelines rather than prescription.
d.
Part 4 - Conduct of the Campaign. Guidelines on the conduct of
logistic operations, within the framework of pre-deployment activity and
deployment, sustainment operations and redeployment. Redeployment is
favoured over simple recovery, reflecting the need to continue to provide
forces at suitable readiness for future operations.
Linkages
6. Related Publications. The following publications are associated with JWP 4-00,
and are regularly referred to:
a.
NATO Publications: AJP-4 ‘Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine’. JWP 400 should be read in conjunction with AJP-4; often it may be used to provide
additional interpretation of NATO doctrine. Other relevant NATO joint
publications which are referred to in the doctrine and should be consulted
when additional specific procedural detail is needed include:
(1)
AJP-4.4 ‘Movement and Transportation Doctrine’.
(2)
AJP-4.5 ‘Allied Host-Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures’.
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(3)
AJP-4.6 ‘Multinational Joint Logistic Centre’ (MJLC) doctrine.
(4)
AJP-4.9 ‘Modes of Multinational Support’.
(5)
AJP-4.10 ‘Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine’.
(6) ALPs-4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, which set out NATO Maritime, Land and
Air Component logistics in a joint framework.
b.
UK Publications. In addition to the logistics chapters of JWP 0-10
‘United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations’
‘UKOPSDOC’ and JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations’,3 J1/J4 staff should note
linkages with JWP 1-00 ‘Joint Personnel Administration’ (draft),4 which is the
only support publication to fall outside the ‘4’ series. Other support elements
described in JWP 4 are developed further in the following doctrine
publications:
(1)
JWP 4-03 ‘Joint Medical Doctrine’.
(2) JWP 4-05 and associated Joint Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures publications (low-level JWPs) - ‘Infrastructure Management
on Joint Operations’.
c.
Interim publications. Two Joint Doctrine Pamphlets (JDPs) were
produced subsequent to the first edition of JWP 4-00 Their status is now as
follows:
(1)
JDP 1/01 ‘Multinational Logistic Planning’. JDP 1/01 is
superseded.
(2)
JDP 4/01 ‘Contractors on Deployed Operations’. Whilst both
new terminology (e.g. CON LOG) and important planning elements of
JDP ‘CONDO’ have been incorporated into this document, CONDO
remains an evolving capability and the JDP will be updated or converted
to a JWP in due course. The JDP 4/01 is a lifed document as advised by
the CONDO Policy Unit (DLO).
d.
Joint Tactical Publications. A series of short low-level JWPs covering
‘Joint Logistic Capabilities’, such as water supply and fuel, will be developed
under the umbrella document of JWP 4-01.
3
‘UKOPSDOC’ and JWP 3-00 will be subsumed into one overarching document, JDP 01 ‘Joint Operations’, containing
the most descriptive/enduring elements of mil-strat & operational level doctrine, with the more prescriptive/dynamic
elements remaining in JWP 3-00 and a new JWP 5-00 ‘Joint Operations Planning’. The new publications are due to be
promulgated in late 2003.
4
JWP 1-00 ‘Joint Personnel Administration’ is due to be published in 2003.
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JOINT LOGISTICS
CONTENTS
Title Page
Authorisation and Distribution
Preface
Contents
Joint Warfare Publications
Record of Amendments
i
ii
iii
vii
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xii
PART 1 – FUNDAMENTALS
Chapter 1
Joint Logistics
Introduction to Logistics in Support of Joint Operations
Logistics and Fighting Power
Sustainability
Chapter 2
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1-4
1-6
Logistic Principles and Precepts
Principles and Precepts of Logistics
Logistic Planning Tools – The Four ‘D’s
Logistic Risk and Protection
Logistic Features of Multinational Operations
2-1
2-4
2-6
2-8
PART 2 – ORGANISATION
Chapter 3
The Strategic Environment
The UK Logistic Concept
Logistic Command and Control – The Strategic Framework
Logistic Information and the Joint Logistic Picture
Defence Planning Assumptions and Operational Stocks
Chapter 4
3-1
3-4
3-7
3-9
Operational Level Logistic Command and Control
– Joint Task Force Headquarters
The Operational Level
Deployed Command and Control Arrangements for Joint
Operations
JTFHQ Joint Logistic Command and Control
Configuration and Tasks
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Chapter 5
Tactical Level Logistic Command and Control
– Joint Force Logistic Component
Joint Tactical Logistics – Fundamentals
5-1
Determining the ORBAT of the Joint Force Logistic
5-3
Component
Joint Force Logistic Component Capabilities
5-9
Annex A – Generic Tasks for the Joint Force
Logistic Component Commander by Phase of Operation
PART 3 – PLANNING
Chapter 6
Planning
The Planning Framework
The Decision Process
Force Generation and Multinational Planning
- National Assets
- CONDO and CON LOG
- Multinational Opportunities
- Host Nation Support
- In Country Resources
- Multinationality - Coalition or Alliance-controlled
Arrangements
- Lead and Role Specialist Nation
- Multinational Integrated Logistic Units and Multinational
Integrated Medical Units
- Contracting on the International (non-UK) Market
- Force Generation Activities
Annex A – Example of Logistic Input Joint to the
Joint Estimate
Annex B – Logistic Annex to CDS Directive
Annex C – Illustrative Sustainability Statement
Annex D – Campaign Planning – Logistic Influences
Annex E – Planning Factors for CON LOG within
the CONDO Concept
Appendix E1 – CONDO Deployment and
CON LOG
Annex F – Host-Nation Support Principles
Annex G – Implications of Lead Nation or Role
Specialist Nation Responsibility
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6-15
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PART 4 – CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN
Chapter 7
Preparation and Deployment
Pre-deployment Activity
Deployment
Chapter 8
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Conducting the Operation
The Joint Logistics Battle Rhythm
Organisation and Methodology
Joint Tactical Control of Operations
Rehabilitation
Component Frameworks
Budgetary/Financial Considerations
Annex 8A – NBC Considerations in Logistic
Operations
Chapter 9
8-1
8-7
8-10
8-11
8-13
8-16
Concluding the Campaign
Post Conflict Activities
Exit
Annex 9A – Redeployment Flow
9-1
9-3
Glossary of Terms and Definitions
Glossary of Abbreviations
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JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS
The successful prosecution of joint operations requires a clearly understood doctrine
that is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national
doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology
and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected
not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop
national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or at all, by NATO
doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the
development of a hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).
Interim Joint Warfare Publications (IJWPs) are published as necessary to meet those
occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a
foreshortened timescale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or
to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur
when a more comprehensive ‘parent’ publication is under development, but normally
well in advance of its planned publication.
The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is
explained in DCI JS 16/2002.
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RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
Amendment No
Date of Insertion
xii
Initials
2nd Edition
Part 1 Fundamentals
PART 1
Fundamentals
JWP 4-00
CHAPTER 1 – JOINT LOGISTICS
‘Throughout the struggle, it was in his logistic inability to maintain
his armies in the field that the enemy's fatal weakness lay. Courage his
forces had in full measure, but courage was not enough.
Reinforcements failed to arrive, weapons, ammunition and food alike
ran short and the dearth of fuel caused their powers of tactical
mobility to dwindle to the vanishing point. In the last stages of the
campaign they could do little more than wait for the allied advance to
sweep over them.’1
SECTION I – INTRODUCTION TO LOGISTICS IN SUPPORT OF
JOINT OPERATIONS
101. Logistics and Fighting Power. Logistics is fundamental to every military
activity in all environments. This chapter defines joint and multinational logistics,
then covers logistics and sustainment in relation to fighting power.
102. The Right Support. Forces involved on operations, wherever they may be,
require the right levels of support at the right time, in the right place. The challenge
lies in the identification of ‘right’ and its most effective, economical and efficient
delivery. In the past each Service has been responsible for delivering its own support.
This arrangement has provided commanders with sound guarantees but comes at a
price: heavy resource costs,2 duplication of effort and an unwieldy logistic tail. The
UK logistic philosophy must make best use of the limited resources available and be
responsive to the critical importance of rapid deployability. It must also be prepared to
operate logistically within a multinational environment, in which it may be necessary
both to provide support to, and draw from, other nations.
103. Philosophy. Conduct of logistics in support of Joint Operations demands a
pragmatic approach to the individual needs of the force elements to be supported and
an awareness of the need to eliminate unnecessary duplication or inefficiency in the
Line of Communication (LOC). An overview of joint force logistic requirements is
necessary because the discrete elements of capability which form the environmental
Components of Maritime, Land, Air and Special Forces will normally identify their
own tailored support organisations to enable independent operations. As a Joint Force
is constructed, opportunities for economy will occur and must be intelligently
exploited. As an operation progresses, resources will become increasingly
constrained, requiring careful prioritisation by the highest level of command.
1
General Dwight D Eisenhower. Post VE Operational Report 1945.
In line with wider Government policy, Defence is output-based; the implications are that logistic resourcing may be a
significant restraining factor.
2
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Definitions
104. Military Definition. This joint publication is primarily concerned with
logistics – defined as ‘the science of planning and carrying out the movement and
maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, logistics comprises those
aspects of military operations which deal with:
a.
Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,
maintenance, evacuation and disposal of materiel.
b.
Transport of personnel.
c.
Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of
facilities.
d.
Acquisition or furnishing of services.
e.
Medical and health service support’.3
105. Logistics and Combat Service Support. Use of differing logistic
terminology can lead to confusion, so it is further defined here. ‘Logistics’, originally
a solely military term, has been accepted into everyday language meaning ‘the detailed
co-ordination of a large and complex operation’.4 In military parlance logistics5 is
considered an enabling function for operations and can have loosely defined
boundaries, particularly in the provision of ‘services’. To reflect the diversity of these
enabling functions, operational support is often referred to as ‘Combat Service
Support’ (CSS), incorporating both logistics and administration. Administration will
be covered in JWP 1-00 ‘Joint Personnel Administration’6 and deals with both
personnel support and support to the military ‘system’. The components of CSS lie
within the primary responsibility of J1/J4 staffs and are often mutually dependent.
Balancing Logistic Economies
106. Integration, Economy and Efficiency. The delivery of effective logistics is
the prime consideration and early inefficiencies may be inevitable in order to support
an operation, for example where redundancy is required. Nevertheless logistic
efficiency is a secondary goal and can be achieved by identifying and exploiting
economies in operational logistic processes. Many different specialisations contribute
to the delivery of logistics – not just in terms of operator skills, but also in knowledge
3
AAP-6.
Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th Ed, 2001).
5
Whilst ‘logistics’ and ‘logistic support’ can be interchangeable, ‘Logistic Support’ often specifically refers to RLCprovided support to the Army. ‘Sustainment’ and Sustainability’ are specific elements of capability that are covered in
Chapter 4.
6
JWP 1-00 is due to be promulgated in 2003.
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and experience at staff level. In the joint arena the specialisations are yet more
diverse. Identifying the correct mix of logistic knowledge and skills for joint
operations is the key to success. Integration of Service – and multinational capabilities offers great potential for logistic efficiency but requires careful and
detailed planning. Delivery is often reliant on a change of culture amongst
commanders, staff and operators who must recognise, for example, where other
Service and multinational logistic capabilities can benefit them and vice-versa.
107. Structural Logistic Efficiency. Logistic efficiency can be achieved through
either permanent or task-organised joint structures:
a.
Permanently Structured Organisations. An example is the Defence
Logistic Organisation (DLO) that provides a single, integrated focus for all
Services’ logistics in the Base and, where appropriate, can stretch along the
LOC to the Joint Operations Area (JOA), to interface with single-Services and
contribute to economy of support. Benefits of permanent structures are
continuity, preparedness and the development of well-defined working
practices.
b.
Task-Organised Logistic Structures. The scope for optimising
deployed joint support mechanisms is driven by the situation, with the
structure decided as a result of the estimate prior to deployment. It requires
engagement at an early stage by planners with knowledge of Component
support needs and must be controlled by commanders and staff who are
trained, organised and well-rehearsed in drawing together task organised
logistic structures from the single-Services. The object is to identify common
logistic tasks that can be resourced by a single organisation on behalf of other
deployed assets and implement a plan to execute them. Joint logistic tasks
may be time or phase specific, or may be permanently in operation throughout
a campaign, with flexibility the watchword. Support to operations of this
nature will be referred to as Joint Logistics.
Joint Logistics
108. Joint Logistics. Within a JOA the Maritime, Land or Air Component
Commanders7 bear a responsibility to ensure their own units are effectively supported.
However this support need not be provided only from within Component resources
and implementation of a joint logistic plan will always be considered. At this level
Joint Logistics, or the co-ordinated mutual logistic support of two or more Services,
can bring efficiency and speed through leveraging logistic assets towards a common
objective. Nevertheless, ‘jointery’ in logistics should not be a foregone conclusion - to
7
‘Joint Logistics’ refers to activities shared by UK components, controlled by the JFLogC (see chapter 4), or carried out
by UK forces in the preparation, mounting or Forward Mounting Base areas. Whilst the JFLogC is not common to all
other nations, special arrangements can allow multinational cross-component support.
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function most effectively joint logistics must make good operational sense and is
entirely dependent on the situation. It must deliver more for the same or the same for
less. Sound single-Service practice will often be the benchmark against which a joint
logistic capability is tested.
109. Tri-Service and Joint Logistics. A distinction needs to be drawn between triservice logistics, in which the demands of the deployed Components are simply coordinated by a single staff organisation and joint logistics where logistic capabilities
are centrally marshalled and used proactively to achieve Decisive Points8 (such as
RSOI) and further the Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC) campaign plan. This
issue is explored further in Chapter 6.
110. Multinational Logistics. As with joint logistics, any decision to pursue
multinational logistic arrangements must also make operational sense. Whilst initial
national self-sufficiency is normally the minimum deployment standard, there will
often be scope for negotiating mutual support in the form of Role Specialisation, Lead
Nation arrangements and other bilateral agreements. In NATO, where considerable
multi-national logistic doctrine has been developed, there is more scope for
interoperability than in ad hoc coalitions. Multinational logistic planning is covered in
more detail in Chapter 6.
111. Operations of an Expeditionary Nature. Expeditionary operations are: ‘the
projection of military power over extended LOC into a distant area of operations to
accomplish a specific objective’,9 and it is by their logistic features that they are
defined as ‘expeditionary’. Logistics provides reach. Reach enables greater
manoeuvre at all levels - strategic, operational and tactical - conferring both physical
and psychological advantage.
112. Force Multiplier. It is not enough to amass resources; their timely and
balanced application to the prevailing operational need is paramount. Effectively
applied, logistics is a force multiplier and can contribute positively to the achievement
of tempo. On the other hand, too much in the wrong place, with limited visibility,
control and distribution, can have a severely limiting effect. Logistics may also
influence the selection of the Course of Action and the approach and rate at which it
can be achieved.
SECTION II – LOGISTICS AND FIGHTING POWER
113. Fighting Power. Fighting Power defines armed forces’ ability to fight and
achieve success in operations,10 and comprises three inter-related components:
8
See ‘UKOPSDOC’, para 330.
AAP-6 agreed proposal.
10
British Defence Doctrine, Chapter 4.
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conceptual, moral and physical. Logistics makes a vital contribution to fighting power
which will now be explained.
Conceptual
114. Doctrine. Successful support to operations is enabled through a responsive
logistic system based on a judicious mix of established, well rehearsed and resourced
procedures on the one hand, and innovation on the other. The logistic philosophy as
published in ‘UKOPSDOC’,11 the principles in this JWP and other related UK
publications describe the practices and procedures of logistics.
115. Concepts. Defence conceptual thought is generally marshalled along the
seven lines of the Defence Capability Framework (DCF) incorporating Command,
Inform, Prepare, Project, Protect, Operate and Sustain. Whilst logistic implications are
implicit in each of these capability areas, they are the main drivers in the areas of
Prepare, Project and Sustain.
Moral
116. The moral component is about persuading people to fight. Logistics
contributes to the motivational and management aspects of the moral component by
providing the resources to enable the training, medical support and general well-being
of individuals both routinely and on operations. Using these resources the serviceman
can be better prepared, more resilient and more intensely motivated to meet the
demands of operations.
Physical
117. Logistic influence inevitably features highly on the five elements of the
physical component (Manpower, Equipment, Collective Performance, Readiness and
Sustainability). As with the moral component, the management of people and
resources is vital to the preparation and delivery of the first four elements. Coherent,
jointly orientated education and training packages, such as for logistic staffs and
augmentees, as well as for operators, are key to developing readiness. Sustainability
involves the maintenance of sufficient resilience and depth within the Defence
organisation to continue to fulfil the demands of a force well beyond the initial
deployment and engagement. As it is the essence of this work it is now considered in
detail.
11
JWP 0-10, Chapter 8.
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SECTION III – SUSTAINABILITY
118. Sustainment and Sustainability. Crucial to the understanding of logistics is
the ability to distinguish between the terms Sustainment and Sustainability:
a.
Sustainment. Sustainment refers to the actual process of maintaining a
force (as resources are being used). It is often considered to be a specific
phase within the conduct of an operation (the four recognised phases being:
Pre-Deployment Activity, Deployment, Sustainment and Redeployment).
b.
Sustainability. Sustainability refers to the potential resilience of a
force: it is ‘the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat
power for the duration required to achieve its objectives’.12 At the operational
level sustainability is a key consideration for commanders and staff alike. A
commander can ‘only fight the battle he can sustain’13 and he must therefore
always be fully aware of the constraints to his freedom of action which
logistics may impose. Insufficient sustainability will lead to a force reaching
its culminating point before achieving its objective. Sustainability is affected
by a number of interdependent factors:
(1)
The expenditure of men and materiel.
(2)
Equipment availability.
(3)
Timeliness and availability of resources.
(4)
The ability of the force to restore14 itself.
(5)
Command support - essentially visibility of assets.
In simple terms sustainment consists not just of logistics but also the manpower,
equipment and organisation which in combination deliver sustainability. It is achieved
through the deployment of correctly balanced forces as determined by the estimate
process and therefore shapes the whole campaign. It is not simply the application of a
‘teeth to tail’ ratio attempting to describe an apparent relationship between combat
elements and military effectiveness.
119. Sustainability and the Readiness Cycle. In addition to the general definition
above, ‘Sustainability’ also technically covers the requirement to support the full Force
Readiness Cycle, including bringing Force Elements (FE) to, or holding them at, a
12
AAP-6.
Lt Gen Rupert Smith; HCSC, Mar 02.
14
Restoration may consist of: Rehabilitation - an operational/tactical level post combat phase of
refurbishment/replenishment; Regeneration - strategic activation of existing force structures and dormant capabilities or
Reconstitution - a strategic level force raising/expansion activity above existing structures.
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specific Readiness level (Rx), increasing the level (to R0) on deployment and
sustaining the Force Element during the campaign. The requirement continues as the
FE is redeployed, is recuperated, then brought back up to the necessary Rx.
Sustainment has a discrete role within this wider context.
Sustaining Personnel
120. ‘Sustaining the Man’.15 JWP 1-00 will deal in detail with sustaining
personnel, embracing both the physical and moral components.16 It brings the human
dimension to logistics and provides the tie between J1 and J4 functions. Fighting
strength is preserved by attending to the individual’s physical needs to combat the
environment and survive physical degradation, whilst supporting his psychological
needs to preserve morale and the will to fight. For a commander this implies a duty of
care.
121. Maintaining the Fighting Strength. Reducing numbers of non-effective
service personnel by adequate nutrition, shelter, clean water, clothing, sleep,
immunisation, health education and dental health is a key consideration for a
commander. Key drivers within the J1/J4 area include:
a.
Medical. Joint Medical Doctrine is published in JWP 4-03. The
principal task of the medical services is to maintain fighting strength by
preventing disease and tending to the sick and wounded in order to return them
to operational service. The underlying disease and non-battle injury rate is
critical over time. Combat creates battle casualties and these, both physical
and those related to stress, must be treated and evacuated as quickly as
possible. Medical treatment and environmental health are inextricably linked
to effective provision and evacuation - similar to supply and transport, but
dealing with live individuals and requiring continuity of care back down the
LOC.
b.
Maintaining Morale. It is universally accepted that maintaining high
morale is the best way of overcoming combat stress. One of the major
determinants of a serviceman’s morale is faith in a reliable and functioning
casualty evacuation and logistic system. Morale is further underpinned by
good personnel administration including the provision of the best possible
operational welfare package when deployed, as well as a robust system of care
and information for dependants.
c.
Non-Combatant Support. In addition to medical personnel, other J1
staff (for example WVRS, chaplains, etc) are non-combatants. The logistics
commander must be aware that, in planning logistic installations and
15
16
‘Man’ is a gender free term.
This is currently covered in JDP 3/01 ‘Welfare Support for Joint Operations’.
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infrastructure, allowance may need to be made for separate casualty routes and
signing of buildings, locations, etc.
Sustainment: Materiel and Equipment
122. Availability of Resources. The quantity and nature of strategic assets
available to support an operation are acquired against Defence Planning
Assumptions.17 Military resources can be conserved, and deployment overheads
reduced, by using other viable sources of support especially In Country Resources and,
where available, Host Nation Support (HNS).
123. Reliability. Equipment is vulnerable to both failure and battle damage. The
overall sustainability of a force is influenced significantly by the capacity of the
equipment support system. Availability relies on an equipment’s design and inherent
reliability. A Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Durability (RAM-D)
assessment is therefore a key element in the acquisition process. On operations the
anticipated situation and usage need to be analysed against the equipment’s designed
reliability. The sustainability statement, in the Joint Commander’s Directive, lays
down the repair priorities and the utilisation rates for vehicles, aircraft and main
equipment. The availability of mission essential equipment is also specified.
124. Alternative Support. Increasingly equipment is being acquired with
Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) packages, sometimes involving non-military
support. ILS is the methodology used to identify the most appropriate support
solution for a new equipment entering service. ILS may advocate the use of a novel
support solution involving non-military support. In these instances command and
control complexities, particularly within the JOA, will often limit such support
arrangements to benign areas. Chapter 6 explores the options in more detail.
125. Forecasting Attrition. The attrition rate of both equipment and materiel plays
a significant part in the management of the Support Chain. Resources are finite and
there will be system limitations. It is possible that rates of wear and tear will exceed
the rate at which materiel can be regenerated/repaired. For example, main battle tank
and aircraft availability during a campaign is likely to fall steadily, due partly to losses
from enemy action, but also from failure of the regeneration loop to match attrition
and disrepair. It is the rate of this decline that is important and the logistician’s
objective is to keep the rate as low as possible, but to forecast critical attrition. He
must ensure that the Commander is aware of, and has programmed in his campaign,
any requirement for logistic operational pauses. These pauses are used to restore
combat power, particularly where operational activity and attrition has exceeded
routine maintenance capacity. Such pauses may be rehabilitation operations in their
own right.
17
See paragraph 315.
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126. Rehabilitation Ability. The ability of the force to restore itself (i.e.
rehabilitation18) is dependent on 2 prime inputs: the speed at which new resources can
be manufactured or obtained and the capacity of the logistic system to treat, repair,
service or recover men and materiel.
The Joint Logistician’s Responsibility
• Consider logistics in its widest form, ensuring coherence of support.
• Ensure effective provision of logistics through all campaign phases.
• Identify scope for economy and efficiency in the delivery of logistics to a Joint
Force on operations.
• Assist the Commander in identifying and prioritising the risks and benefits, in terms
of fighting power, associated with the many possible methods of delivering support.
• Forecast, identify and inform the Commander where sustainability will be a critical
constraint to the operation, and the means of compensating for this.
127. Chapter 2 examines the enduring principles of logistics and draws conclusions
on shorter-term precepts to enable the logistician to meet his responsibilities.
18
Rehabilitation is covered in more detail in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2 – LOGISTIC PRINCIPLES AND PRECEPTS
‘Logistics help determine which side will be able to mount the
type of warfare it is best fitted to win. Thus logistics takes its place
in strategy as an arbiter of opportunity’.1
SECTION I – PRINCIPLES AND PRECEPTS2 OF LOGISTICS
201. The Five Principles of Logistics. The UK recognises five principles of
logistics: Foresight, Economy, Simplicity, Co-operation, and Flexibility. As with all
principles, they tend to be ‘truisms’, but have stood the test of time and provide
valuable parameters against which to measure logistic activity. Definitions and
implications published in JWP 0-01 ‘United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and
Multinational Operations’ (UKOPSDOC) (Chapter 8) are expanded in the following
paragraphs, drawing further precepts for all levels of operation.
Foresight
Predicting and circumventing critical logistic constraints to the Commander’s
freedom of action.
202. Logistic planners, at all levels, must analyse the probable course of future
operations and forecast the likely requirement for personnel, materiel, services and
equipment, and their movement and provision. This is the primary input to the
assessment of sustainability.
203. Close liaison between J3/J5 staffs and J4 is essential to achieve realistic
forecasts of future logistic effort - which will often provide its own strategic,
operational or tactical signature. By employing foresight, and activating all sources of
support, logisticians must ensure that future intentions are not inadvertently exposed or
operational security prejudiced.
204. Foresight identifies the need to deploy a particular asset, as well as the timing
of its deployment. In the case of infrastructure – just one example among the logistic
enabling functions - the knowledge of the expected location of deploying troops and of
the anticipated environmental conditions will assist in the correctly balanced
incorporation of infrastructure assets on the Detailed Deployment List. This will
ensure that essential facilities are actually in place in the Joint Operations Area (JOA),
on time, to assist the reception of the force. Likewise, foresight and knowledge of the
available resources in theatre will enable the optimum balance to be struck between
the movement of bulky temporary deployable accommodation (TDA) and the
1
2
Thomas M Kane ‘Military Logistics and Strategic Performance’.
Precept – A general rule for regulating behaviour and thought – Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th Edn, 2001).
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deployment of infrastructure and labour resource specialists to maximise opportunities
in the JOA.
205. Foresight is fundamental to predictive, and therefore directed, logistics, which
seeks to ensure that optimum efficiency is achieved by delivering exactly the right
levels of support, with a reserve as appropriate, only to where it is needed. In this case
it is essential to ensure that accurate means of predicting the outcome of the
adversary’s manoeuvres and engagements - key J2 as well as J3 feeds - are available.
As foresight becomes more dependent on enemy activity, rather than simply the
friendly forces’ campaign plans, so predictive accuracy is reduced and there will be
greater dependency on ‘pull’ from the user.
Economy
Achieving more with the same, or the same for less: maximising available support.
206. Logistic resources must be used effectively, efficiently and economically to
deliver coherent logistics in a joint context on operations. It should be assumed at the
outset, for example, that there is scope for a jointly resourced National Support
Element (NSE) or joint logistic component and headquarters (see Chapter 5 for Joint
Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) options).
207. Further consideration of economy and effectiveness will ultimately determine
the most appropriate organisation, in some cases employing alternative (non-military)
support mechanisms. In consideration of logistic structures for operations, maximum
opportunity to create ‘bricks’ of capability should be taken, ensuring that, for smaller
scale operations, the requisite support capabilities can be deployed – able to integrate
with other single-Service or joint structures - rather than complete units with
superfluous capabilities.
Co-operation
Sharing responsibilities to optimise the logistic footprint.
208. Joint and Multinational Operations are often best served through a
corresponding logistic approach. Achieving this requires co-operation at all levels,
from planning to execution. The opportunities for – and level of - international and
inter-component co-operation will often be determined by the PJHQ or JTFC based on
the options considered in detail in Chapter 6.
209. Lead Service Responsibility. It is a fundamental national logistics principle
that services and commodities of common usage in the Services should be provided by
one for the use of others. Maximum use should be made of support within the DLO,
such as through the Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) for provision of this common
support.
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210. Visibility of Information. A prerequisite for co-operation is the assimilation
and exchange of relevant information, or data. Information concerning the status of
logistic assets is essential for the efficient management and co-ordination of support to
joint and multinational forces. In order to enable co-operation between components –
or multinationally - the information exchange requirements (IER) need to be registered
and enabled early. Fundamental to the planning of any operation, therefore, is a
logistic information plan, incorporating personnel, equipment and sustainment flows.
Resourced (with available communications and IT assets), the logistic information
plan must be matched to a common, achievable system of J3-linked prioritisation.
Once in place, such a system will provide a formal mechanism on which to base cooperative logistics.
Simplicity
The broad and complex span of logistics demands a simple framework to keep it
manageable.
211. Although the actual detail of supporting joint and multinational forces is a
complex undertaking, the underlying logistic plan must remain as simple as possible.
It must be easy to understand and implement.
212. Simplicity is enhanced by common logistic processes amongst Services, Allies
and other organisations. Where systems are incompatible, liaison and interfaces
should be implemented to aid common effort.
213. It is important that simplicity of control is maintained along the Line of
Communication (LOC) and in the JOA. A logistic commander must have sufficient
overview and control of the relevant support arrangements within the JOA (at least)3 to
ensure freedom of action.
Flexibility
Proactively, to seek the optimum solution to logistic problems; responsively, to have
the resources to meet unexpected demands.
214. Flexibility encapsulates resourcefulness in logistics. Whilst ‘simplicity’
demands commonality of systems, a flexible approach best harnesses the
unconventional, or way best suited to unique circumstances. A balance must be found
between rigid systems and structures (which can ease co-operative measures) and
functional flexibility. Education of logistics personnel, and understanding by those
who receive support, is the ideal way to enhance co-operation whilst maintaining
flexibility.
3
With novel support arrangements, these may extend beyond the JOA, throughout the LOC.
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215. Flexibility demands that a holistic approach to the provision of logistic support
be adopted. This will ensure that optimum use is made of the best resources, whether
they take the form of a land LOC, an air-bridge, the Joint Sea Base (JSB) or any
combination of the three.
216. It is axiomatic that environmental Component Commanders (CC) need to be
flexible throughout an operation. So, as an operation develops, the logistic structure
and the support it must provide can change. At times, it may prove necessary to divert
resources from one Service (or nation) to another, depending on the joint or
multinational commander’s priorities. The Joint Task Force Commander and the CCs
should remain prepared to encourage adjustment of logistic structures and changes in
logistic C2 responsibilities4 in line with the Main Effort. The principal criterion is that
a JTFC must have sufficient authority over his logistic resources to enable him to
sustain the forces assigned to him, including the ability to secure Host Nation Support
(HNS) and In Country Resources (ICR) where appropriate.
SECTION II – LOGISTIC PLANNING TOOLS – ‘THE FOUR Ds’
217. The Science of Logistics. In order to deliver the sustainability that a
commander needs the logistician must combine (in the thought process) the five
fundamental principles with the application of logistic planning tools. Whatever
support is provided (Personnel, Medical, Infrastructure, Supply, Distribution or
Services) the requirement must first be determined. To predict that requirement four
fundamental issues have to be addressed; known as the ‘Four Ds’, and as applicable to
men as to materiel, they are:
Destination
Determines the nature
of the requirement
Demand
Determines the magnitude
of the requirement
Joint
Operational
Logistics
Structure
Distance
Determines the shape
of the LOC
Duration
Dictates the necessary
robustness and need for
investment in the
support requirement
Figure 2.1 – ‘The 4 Ds’ - Logistic Planning Tools
4
Such as re-designating logistic assets from an environmental component to a JFLogC, or vice versa.
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Whether carrying out a snap assessment for a small logistic task or producing the
logistic input to a full operational estimate,5 consideration of these headings, and their
influence on each other, will facilitate the thought processes. They are expanded
below.
218. Destination. The nature of the requirement. Destination focuses on the
overall environment in which the operation is to take place. The environment
determines the conditions for the pattern of wear and tear on equipment, and the
physiological demands on personnel. The destination will help to define the strategic
LOC, based on the knowledge of resources available for exploitation in the JOA or
nearby. Issues ranging from language, climate and culture to austerity of infrastructure
or attitudes of Host Nation authorities, provide their own specific deductions or
influence the deductions of the other Ds. For example, the benign nature – or
otherwise – of the JOA will influence the scope for using civilian resources through
the PJHQ Contract for Logistics (CON LOG).
219. Distance. Distance and accessibility factors are fundamental to force
projection and, following advice of the movement staffs, will drive not simply the
logistic ORBAT, but that of the whole force and, based on sustainability, the nature of
the campaign. Distance determines the shape of the Line of Communication.
Logistically, all LOC distances at the strategic, operational and tactical levels need to
be considered; furthermore, potential LOC routes should be assessed before, during
and after the operation. The length (expressed both in time and distance), capacity and
topography of the LOC will determine the size, shape, structure and balance of logistic
resources committed to it. It will also determine the volume of resources committed to
operating stock within the regeneration loop,6 the time in transit and the requirement
for forward mounting bases (FMB) or intermediate staging bases. Strategic movement
resources, timing, speed of deployment and reaction, execution of subsequent
operational plans and risk will be critically influenced by the distance to, and within,
the JOA.
220. Demand. Demand determines the magnitude of the requirement. It is not
simply the aggregate consumption of materiel or usage of medical facilities and other
services, but also the pattern, rate of change and variability across the operation.
Demand stems directly from the concept of operations - including post-conflict
activity - and is the sum of 3 elements:
a.
Steady State. The steady state represents daily maintenance needs that
have little variation, for example the consumption of rations or routine use of
5
Guidelines for this can be found in Chapter 6.
The ‘Regeneration Loop’ is a logistic term used to describe the process of restoring men and materiel to combat forces.
For example, in the case of an engine requiring repair, it is the process and time taken to take the assembly out, recover it
to a repair site, put it back into the supply system and subsequently deliver it forward ready for reuse. It is a continuous
cycle, and the amount of resources within the loop determines the responsiveness of the overall system.
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services. Determined easily and accurately from historic records, it is the
easiest to pre-plan.
b.
Cyclical. Cyclical demand represents additional demand over and
above the steady state, caused for example by training activities, or seasonal
conditions. It tends to be predictable with good management enabling
economic use of assets. Specialist functions’ cyclic activity will often be at
different speeds and independent of other functions (demands on training as
opposed to welfare facilities for example).
c.
Surge. Surge demand is driven by the pattern of operations. It creates
the greatest logistic problems because it is least easy to predict and most
susceptible to variation, for example in response to an adversary’s activity.
There will be peaks and troughs and differing rates of demand will often occur
with little warning time. It is surge demand that will stretch the logistic
organisation. It demands a highly responsive system either by having
immediate reserves, rapid delivery means, or the ability to switch priorities
quickly. Assets will sometimes need to be surged into the JOA, or to the
critical area, to meet it. By its nature surge cannot be maintained indefinitely
and time for recuperation will be needed.
221. Duration. Duration dictates the necessary robustness and need for investment
in the support requirement. The length of operations and rate of demand will
determine the overall volume of materiel and concentration of support. It will set the
endurance requirements and the need to rotate or replace equipment and men. The
commander will need to assess the risks involved in a short, sharp, lightly supported
operation against those of a fully resourced, more deliberate, and possibly better
prepared operation that takes longer to mount. There will invariably be a middle
ground. Duration also determines available preparation time and the capacity for
flexibility. It is, however, not always straightforward to predict the duration of an
operation and support functions, such as the provision of infrastructure, is normally
dependent on these decisions. Where possible, early enabling decisions on
infrastructure should be made to ensure that extensions to short predicted operational
lengths are catered for. 7
SECTION III – LOGISTIC RISK AND PROTECTION
222. Robustness. Operations rarely develop as envisaged or intended. Operational
success is underpinned by a logistic system that is robust enough to absorb disruption
without collapse and which enables rather than constrains. An effective balance needs
to be struck between the principles of economy and flexibility against the need for
operational endurance.
7
Robust TDA is needed in the event that political commitment to building more permanent structures is not forthcoming.
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223. Risk. Risk assessment is a cost versus gain analysis of a course of action
weighed against the desired end-state. In general, two elements of risk need to be
considered: first, the minimum level of support required by our own forces; and
second, the adversary’s capabilities and their likely effect. Understanding the
implications of the four Ds - as well as the campaign planning tools (e.g. the estimate)
and how the Commander applies them to his own situation - helps to quantify the
logistic risks:
a.
Minimum Support. Risk in the provision of support is as applicable to
strategic logistics as to the tactical:
(1) Strategic Risk. Decisions on outsourcing support capabilities
rather than retaining them under military control, represents risk that,
irrespective of penalty clauses, can ultimately only be carried by
Defence. When risk is identified, levels of assurance must be
ascertained to ensure that the risk taken is understood by all, while
proactive risk-management is undertaken. Risks taken in the short-term
can have additional and undesired long-term effects.
(2)
Operational Risk. The operational-level commander must
prioritise support to one environmental component rather than another,
usually in accordance with his main effort. Similarly, there is risk in the
commitment of logistic reserves to capitalise on success rather than
maintaining them as insurance. This will normally hinge on the LOC’s
performance and global stock availability, as well as likely future
operational requirements. Where there is a shortfall in sustainability,
any risk taken must be hidden from the adversary, whether by deception
measures or otherwise.
(3) Tactical Risk. At the tactical level, the results of risk-taking are
more immediate, and must be balanced against the potential success of
seizing and exploiting an opportunity. Commanders and logisticians
should aim to identify realistic levels of support needed for a particular
action, short of which risk-taking becomes too dangerous.
224. Force Protection. Germane to the success of logistics is overcoming the
threat to logistic systems. The logistician must be aware of threats - from the enemy
or otherwise8 - and be proactive in highlighting potential vulnerabilities to the
operational staff. Force Protection is a key operational driver which gains in
significance the further away from the home base the JTF is projected. In tactical
circumstances logistic assets, including vehicles, need protection from detection and
8
The force also needs protection from other threats however, and the role of a health strategy and preventive medicine in
force protection should also not be overlooked.
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physical attack. Along strategic lines of communication, J3 staffs must recognise the
importance of overcoming logistic vulnerability in the planning process, as FP will
inevitably be resource-intensive. To ensure logistic disruption does not affect the
JTFC’s scheme of manoeuvre, FP needs to be part of the overall Operations Security
(OPSEC) plan with close J2 co-ordination. Conversely FP also has a role in the
deception plan. FP can be achieved by enhancing the integral defence and
concealment capacity of logistic units, including afloat support, and by reducing their
footprint. There will often be a need to conform to a multinational FP profile.
SECTION IV – LOGISTIC FEATURES OF MULTINATIONAL
OPERATIONS
225. Multinational Operations. The UK has gained much experience in
multinational operations, indeed Alliance and coalition operations are becoming the
norm. Detailed multinational logistic issues are covered in the force generation
section of the planning chapter (Chapter 6). This section describes some of the
general influential features of logistics in a multi-national environment, specifically
command arrangements. It should be noted that not all nations have the structural
capacity to undertake joint logistics, and would need to rely on multinational
arrangements to effect this. Furthermore, the difficulties of achieving effective
multinational logistic co-ordination during the pre-deployment (Force Generation),
deployment and sustainment phases of an operation should not be underestimated.
226. NATO Principles. Further to the five principles of logistics described in
section 1 of this chapter, NATO has developed additional principles, published in AJP4(A).9 They include the nations’ and NATO’s collective Responsibility for logistic
support of multinational operations; contributing nations’ Provision and Sufficiency of
support for their own forces; acceptance of the need for Co-ordination of
multinational support, and, most importantly the NATO Commander’s Authority to
prioritise (and if necessary redistribute) support within his responsibility. These
additional principles give extra meaning to the principle of ‘economy’. It is often
difficult to achieve the most economical and efficient method of support for the whole
of a large coalition force.
227. Logistic Assets in Multinational Operations. It is generally accepted that
force elements for multinational operations are allocated (subject to Transfer of
Authority to a Coalition Force by Troop Contributing Nations. However logistic
assets are often transferred by nations to a multinational commander at more
restrictive levels of command authority than combat forces (or not at all), due to
differences in national priorities, support structures and logistic capabilities. A nation
will often wish to support its own combat forces with its own logistic assets and the
9
See also paragraph 644.
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level of sustainability (and infrastructure) may vary from between nations. In some
cases there are national legal requirements to do so. Logistic assets are therefore
normally assigned, in the first instance, to a National Support Element (NSE), where
they are controlled nationally. Structures, such as the Multinational Joint Logistic
Centre10 may be set up for the co-ordination of the multinational effort, however,
unless there is firm control during the force generation process, there is a danger that
logistic functions will be duplicated amongst nations. This inevitably leads,
collectively, to disproportionately large logistic force structures compared with the
multinational combat forces.
228. Command Authority. Although Operational Control will often be the
preferred command state, the coalition commander will need at least Co-ordinating
Authority (via the NSE) over logistic assets supporting forces allocated to his
command. In multinational operations the principles of co-operation and coordination are as relevant to forces deployed by participating nations are as they are to
UK’s jointly deployed components. Thus the coalition logistic architecture must
reflect this, with UK staffs participating fully at all appropriate levels. In general,
although riskier from a national perspective, the higher the level of Command and
Control that is transferred with the logistic capability, the more effective the assets will
be to the coalition. As procedures and equipment become standardised amongst
coalition nations there will be increased scope for allocation of logistic assets to the
force commander, however UK will need to retain assurance that allocated combat
forces will be granted the necessary support through multinational means before
signing over such authority. Bilateral or multilateral arrangements can facilitate this
process.
229. Redistribution. Where higher levels of control are allocated to the
multinational commander, these may include authority (such as in NATO) to
redistribute logistic units and material between different nations’ forces.
Redistribution is a logistic measure, for a specific objective, within a finite time frame,
in response to a critical operational need, whilst not jeopardising the donor nation.
The ability to transfer assets within a multinational grouping offers the operational
commander greater flexibility but will require much co-ordination, prior co-operation
and the agreement of the contributing nations. Stocks and materiel redistributed
during an operation will require replacement or recompense; the mechanism for this
must be agreed before the authority to redistribute is given.
230. Standardisation. Poor standardisation between nations (in terms of
compatibility, interoperability, interchangeability or commonality) can be an inhibitor
to multinational logistics. In particular it will limit the areas of commonality –
probably to major bulk commodities and certain services. Of more importance
however, is the acceptance of common procedures. Within the logistic area there are a
10
See Chapter 6 and AJP-4.6 ‘Multinational Joint Logistic Centre’ (NATO).
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multitude of NATO-brokered Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs) – including
higher-level logistic doctrine. These procedures are easily exported beyond NATO
and, when sufficiently practised or developed in training, will increase the scope for and confidence in - multinational logistics.
Principles, Planning Tools and Multinationality
• Underlying principles for logistics are Foresight, Economy, Co-operation,
Simplicity and Flexibility.
• The tools for determining sustainability requirements for an operation are the ‘Four
Ds’ - Destination, Distance, Demand and Duration.
• Where sustainability falls short, risk is taken. Such risk must be hidden from an
adversary.
• Multinational logistics represents a risk in itself, but one which can be minimised
through the development of trust, through practice and experience, with Alliance
and prospective coalition partners.
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CHAPTER 3 – THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
SECTION I – THE UK LOGISTIC CONCEPT
301. Outline Concept. An outline schematic of joint logistics is at Figure 3.1. The
principal elements are explained in the remainder of this chapter. The Military
Strategic Estimate (with the Sustainability Statement) determines the preliminary
logistic ORBAT and concept of operations (discussed in more detail in Chapters 6 and
7.)
UK Base
DLO
FLEET
LAND
STC
DSF
PJHQ
Contractor
Support
(benign areas)
ALSS
Direct,deploy,
Sustain,
Recover,
Prioritise
COUPLING
BRIDGE
SPOE
SPOD
Force
Rear
Support
Area
JFLogC
Commands, Integrates
Forwards, Tracks, Returns,
Recovers
FMB
xx
(as necessary)
APOD
APOE
UK NCC (BRITFOR)
Manage,
Track,
Consign
JFACC
JOA
DOB
FLS
FSG
DOB
MCC
Afloat
support
SHF
x
LCC
Component Logistic
Support Methods
SF
Figure 3.1 – Joint Logistics Concept of Operations
302. The Strategic Base. The Strategic Base (often referred to as just ‘The Base’)
is made up of the Military Base supported by the NHS hospitals, civilian contractors
and industry from within both national and allied infrastructures. The Military Base
has components owned by all the Commands and the Chief of Defence Logistics
(CDL) in particular, who commands the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO), many
of whose assets are managed as Defence Agencies. The military logistics system is
underpinned by static depots, repair workshops, naval bases, garrisons and airfields
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located within the UK and abroad. Collectively the whole ‘Base’ area is sometimes
referred to as the 4th line. Today, operations are likely to make some use of
Contractors on Deployed Operations, CONDO, or CON LOG1 - deployed civilian
contract support. Consequently, the support chain should be considered as an entity
rather than as separate elements. However, it should be realized that the support base
remains predominately civilian and is driven by commercial, rather than military,
practice. The size, nature and duration of an operation will govern the scope of
industrial/commercial involvement.
303. Lines of Communication. Maintaining Lines of Communication (LOC) is a
key element in all campaigns. This places demands on personnel (e.g. liaison staff,
slip crews, movements and port operators) and materiel (e.g. aircraft fuel, handling
equipment) and involves much more than simply establishing Air, Rail and Sea Ports
of Embarkation/Disembarkation (A/R/SPOE and A/R/SPOD). LOCs and their
associated command arrangements are a complex mix of joint, allied, civilian and
military assets operating in both directions. They are vulnerable and need both
maintenance and protection. LOCs across the ‘Coupling Bridge’, and into the Joint
Operations Area (JOA) are likely to be joint in nature – responsibility for the Coupling
Bridge rests with Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). This jointness will be
maintained as far forward to the Components as is feasible and efficient. In one
direction the LOC acts as an artery to carry personnel and materiel into the JOA. In
reverse, it is a vein returning casualties for treatment and unserviceable/repairable
stocks for replacement or refurbishment. In the UK a web of military and commercial
suppliers meet demands from the JOA, and their activities need to be co-ordinated to
maximise Coupling Bridge effectiveness. It will frequently not simply be an option to
expand LOC capacity by contract as a commercial concern would. In these
circumstances use of available capacity is optimised by joint prioritisation of cargo
movement, based on the JTFC’s requirements, between the PJHQ and the Defence
Transport and Movement Agency (DTMA) (see Chapter 7).
304. Logistic Priorities within the Joint Operations Area. Within the JOA
overall logistic priorities are set by the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ).
Prioritisation can include the allocation of assets (either stocks or support services) to
a Force Element (FE) or group, the determination of movement priorities to stocks or
FE and the identification of FE which have priority call on logistic assets. In
determining priorities, the staff, or any theatre logistic co-ordinating HQ (see chapters
4 & 5) must maintain 2 distinct perspectives; one looking backwards towards the base,
the other looking forward to the combat components who manage their integral
logistics.
305. The Maritime Component. RN logistic support is based on unit self
sufficiency. When operating in a Task Group, sustainability is gained with support
1
CONDO Doctrine is covered in more detail in JDP 4/01 ‘Contractors on Deployed Operations’.
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from Royal Fleet Auxiliary support shipping. High priority stores support not held
organically is demanded from the UK base and thence forwarded via intermediate
Advanced Logistic Support Sites (ALSS) and Forward Logistic Sites (FLS) or civilian
agent nodes. Once within range, transfer afloat is effected by Vertical Onboard
Delivery (VOD) using ships’ organic helicopters or other suitable aircraft or by
Replenishment at Sea. The ALSS is an integral part of NATO’s Maritime Logistics
doctrine, supporting all units within its dependency. If major battle damage is
anticipated the RN may have to resort to shore-based repair facilities if the one RN
Forward Repair Ship (FRS) or STUFT2/charter FRS is unavailable. Deployments of
Mine Counter Measures Vessels are likely to be sustained by a Forward Support Unit
where Level 2 maintenance is required. Whether embarked or operating ashore, an
amphibious landing force is supported by the Amphibious Task Group (ATG). When
deployed independently of the ATG as part of a conventional land component, 3 Cdo
Bde RM elements derive their support through the Joint Line of Communication or, if
operating as part of a Divisional structure, its CSS component.
306. The Land Component. The Army works broadly on a support continuum
from organic unit support (1st line) through formation support (2nd line), through Force
level (3rd line) to the UK Base. Force level support may be included within the Joint
Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) assets or may be provided as extended rear
support solely to the land component, depending on the scale of operation and the
situation. In general terms the brigade is the basic all arms manoeuvre formation
while the division presently remains the optimum level at which to control land force
logistics and achieve economies of scale. Formation logistic units are thus organic to
their division and normally affiliated to brigades while Force level units are assets
usually commanded by a Logistic Brigade HQ. Mission types will dictate logistic
force groupings but, transportation functions apart, Land logistic units normally need
to be static (hospitals, workshops etc) to fulfil their primary function. Some
duplication of facilities - especially medical – is required to ‘keep one foot on the
ground’. There is thus a balance to be struck between productivity, forward risk and
the need to keep pace with operations.
307. The Air Component. The activation package for Deployment Operating
Bases (DOBs) to enable the operation of air assets includes a broad range of phased
logistic support elements. The preliminary aim is to achieve an Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) followed by progressive increments to Full Operating Capacity
(FOC) which provides first and second line support to the deployed Force Elements.
Force Element sustainment of Class 2 aircraft spares is based around 10 day pack-ups
in-theatre with frequent resupply outlets. Other elements are supported by 30 day
pack ups. Most of the RAF’s deployable logistic support is brigaded as Air Combat
Ships Taken Up From Trade is distinct from chartered shipping in that the former involves the obtaining of
waivers/exemptions from normal peacetime legislation, and the assumption of formal Powers of Direction to support the
requisition of strategic movement assets.
2
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Service Support Units (ACSSUs), which are augmented with Non-Formed Unit
manpower and Reserves. The focal point for the ACSSUs is the STC A4 Ops Plans
staff. This framework provides a modular, output-driven approach to deployed
support that includes everything except Ops Support/Force Protection functions,
aircrew, integral aircraft/Rapier 1st/2nd line support and HQs. In addition, various Land
capabilities are required to support DOB infrastructure, e.g. infrastructure enabling,
fuel and water, Postal and Courier Support, Airfield Damage Repair. Bed-down and
sustainment support to Air Component Force Elements is provided by the A4 Division
in the Joint Force Air Component HQ.
308.
Joint Aspects.
a.
Defence Logistic Organisation and Integrated3 Logistics. The
formation of the DLO has brought a joint approach to Service logistics.
DLOHQ Ops Division, a commitments-focussed directorate within DLO,
provides strategic level advice to the Defence Crisis Management
Organisation, and facilitates operational logistic support to PJHQ and Front
Line Commands (FLC) through its links to the (functional) Business Units
within DLO. The DLO embodies an integrated approach to logistics by coordinating and combining the provision of supplies and services from the UK
Base to the deployed forces. There must be close liaison between DLO and
staff in the JOA. Under certain circumstances a DLO presence may be
required in the JOA. Furthermore, DLO’s influence extends to Industry and
Other Government Departments (OGDs). Through the DLO, strategic
planning can be conducted with logistics considered as a single entity, and
delivery of support to a JOA can be effected through consolidated logistic
operations (such as a rationalised Supply Chain using a single Defence
Inventory of materiel).
b.
Surgeon General’s Department. Health support is likewise a joint
process from point of injury/incapacitation to definitive NHS treatment. Coordination at the commitments levels and the policy level is effected though
the Surgeon General’s Department (SGD) and benefits from a Deputy Chief of
Defence Staff (Health) (DCDS(Health)).
SECTION II – LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL – THE
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
309. The Tools of Logistic Command and Control. Logistic command and
control is effected through the assessment, preparation and communication of
instructions to logistic staffs and to the formations (including contractors) responsible
for carrying them out. In an effort to maintain a high level of responsiveness, allowing
3
The term ‘integrated’ is used to describe the involvement with organisations beyond the Services, such as industry.
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a greater range of tempo, instructions need to be founded on the reliable exchange of
logistic information between the user and the Base, via the staff. This section
considers the formal command and staff chain.
UK Logistic Command and Control
310. UK Crisis Management.4 The diagram5 at Figure 3.2 gives an overview of
the command and control organisations involved in the planning and execution of
operations. It also shows the interface between the Defence Crisis Management
Organisation (DCMO), the Commands and the DLO at the strategic planning stage.
Grand Strategic
Military Strategic
Prime Minister
Cabinet
OGD
COS
MOD
DLO
Ops
Legend
Command
Co-ordination
Linkage
DLO
DCMO
Cs in C
CJO/Jt Comd
PJHQ
SGD
Med Capacity
Operational
UK JOA
Tactical
D Med
Ops
JTFC
JTFHQ
Components
CDS Chief of the Defence Staff Jt Comd Joint Commander
COS Chiefs of Staff Committee PJHQ
Permanent Joint
CJO Chief of Joint Operations
Headquarters
JOA
Joint Operations Area
JTFC Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ Joint Task Force Headquarters
Fig 3.2 – UK’s Logistic C2 Chain for Operations
a.
Grand Strategic. Military representation within the Cabinet Office
provides an early opportunity for the MOD to identify issues of relevance to
OGDs as a potential crisis unfolds. Interaction with OGDs is considered
essential, particularly in Complex Emergencies where OGDs may have the
lead (e.g. Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations which is led by the
Department for International Development – DfID).
4
5
See JWP 0-10 ‘United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations’ (UKOPSDOC) paras 304-315.
Drawn from JWP 0-10.
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b.
Military Strategic - MOD. Whilst the MOD is concerned with policy
direction, it is also the focus for strategic planning through the Strategic
Planning Group (SPG) within the DCMO. At the inception of operations the
Chief of Defence Staff's (CDS) Directive provides overall logistic direction to
the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) (See Chapter 6). A forward element of
DLOHQ Ops is embedded and is responsible for identification and release of
strategic resources. It provides the focus for Memoranda of Understanding,
including Host Nation Support (HNS) and Mutual Support arrangements and
inter-governmental negotiation.
c.
Military Strategic/Operational - Permanent Joint Headquarters.
The PJHQ (incorporating the Joint Force Headquarters staff who form the
basis of a deployed JTFHQ) operates at the Military Strategic/Operational
interface. The SPG, in conjunction with PJHQ, conduct the detailed strategic
estimate leading into the logistic planning process. Use of the strategic Line of
Communication is accessed via PJHQ, who are responsible for allocating
priorities, and operated through the DTMA who assign military and civilian
lift.
d.
Operational - Joint Task Force Headquarters. The JTFHQ monitors
and develops the Joint Logistic Plan and staffs specific issues via PJHQ. It is
important that JTFHQ and component logistic staffs are robust enough to
assume full logistic responsibility in theatre, thus relieving PJHQ of as much
of the lower level detail as possible. In the JTFHQ operational, theatre level
issues, forward planning and immediate priorities are resolved and logistic
command exercised (see Chapter 4). The J1/J4 staff may be assisted in this
task by the JFLogC HQ.
e.
Tactical - Component Headquarters. Detailed execution at the
tactical level lies either with logistic units organic to the combat components or
the JFLogC Commander under whom logistic units may be grouped. The
rationale, role and composition of his HQ are covered in Chapter 5, however
its importance as a Command and Control node, with or without allocated
assets, should be recognised.
f.
Other Headquarters – Supporting Commands, Defence Logistics
Organisation and Surgeon General. The FLCs, DLO and Surgeon General
(SG) are integral to logistic planning since they are the source of Service
expertise, detailed knowledge and resources. Their roles in the planning
process are co-ordinated through PJHQ but their expert input is essential
throughout. On operations, DLO has a flexible linkage with deployed
Components for routine support and can provide invaluable advice from its
organic agencies, where suitable communications exist. Where surge activity
or scarce resources are involved, however, the formal line of communication is
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through the JTFHQ and PJHQ. Whilst each operation may have a different
organisational structure, the principle remains that HQs should not delve into
detailed logistic management that is more properly the responsibility of
subordinate formations and units. This will avoid the duplication and
confusion that would otherwise result.
311. Strategic, Operational and Tactical Interfaces. The overlap between the
strategic, operational and tactical level delivery of logistics requires integrated logistic
planning, defined processes, separation of function, mutual understanding, speed and
accuracy. These are ultimately more important than the ‘level’ at which operations are
described as being effected.
SECTION III – LOGISTIC INFORMATION AND THE JOINT
LOGISTIC PICTURE
312. Information. Logistic information is as much a part of situational awareness
as conventional J2/J3 information/intelligence. It is as relevant to know that
ammunition is exhausted as that an enemy force is approaching because it directly
conditions the response. It is through information that the logistic inventory can best
be managed, demands most quickly met and the logistic services and footprint
optimised.
a.
Asset Visibility. Creation of a Joint Logistic Picture (JLP) (i.e. the real
time disposition and status of assets, materiel in transit and forecast re-supply)
requires Total Asset Visibility (TAV). The ability, through information, to
match supply to demand accurately, to predict, pre-plan and drive down
logistic support requirements offers significant savings for resource reallocation. TAV assumes resource intensive Information System support, but
it is also an extension of the accounting system. The deciding factors in
enhancing logistics performance are speed and accuracy of asset information,
which in turn offer higher standards of confidence and greater latitude to
accept risk. Components and DLO use a number of inventory management
systems; deployable systems include OASIS, Global and USAS/DUSAS,
however optimum flexibility is gained only when the information from
differing systems can be collated, either by human or computer interface.
b.
In Transit Visibility. Where TAV cannot be achieved, logisticians
must have as a minimum, the opportunity to track assets as they are moved, via
nodal points, up and down the Supply Chain. This is classed as In Transit
Visibility (ITV). Whilst ITV’s effectiveness and performance can be enhanced
by Information Technology, ITV is also a process which can be performed
with the barest of resource essentials providing that its importance and
relevance is recognised throughout the Line of Communication. When stores
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or containers are packed and subsequently distributed, each person in the
support chain needs to ensure that the next user can access relevant transit
information easily – often in difficult conditions. This fundamental principle
applies as much to re-deployment as it does to deployment and sustainment
operations and is essential to prevent overburdening the supply chain with
unnecessary demands. However ITV is especially challenging during
deployment when Force Element Tables are subject to short notice changes.
An ITV matrix (part of the logistic information plan) must be prepared during
the planning phases and ITV enablers need to deploy early to the JOA – as
well as to the APOE and SPOE. Main component level systems include
RIDELS and VITAL, however air cargo and personnel systems such as
SACS/DCTS and MMARS/AMIS are also in use, requiring human interface.
313. Information Systems. Dedicated Information Systems (IS) and assured
bearer communications are essential to the functioning of the logistic system at
maximum capacity. The delivery of effective logistic C2 requires adherence to 4
precepts:
a.
That accurate, timely information is key.
b.
That all logistic data is corporate information.
c.
That common IT information exchange standards must apply.
d.
That mere automation of existing systems is insufficient. The maximum
advantage from digitisation lies in system integration and re-routing not in
mere upgrading of old wiring (e.g. simplistically, using ‘swiped’ bar codes on
ID cards to manifest flights rather than doing so manually on a word
processor.)
The volume and complexity of logistic information ideally lends itself to automated
data handling with much low-cost Commercial Off The Shelf equipment being
suitable for military use. Considerable logistic data storage and transmission may
need to be secure.
314. An Information Approach for Operations. Recognition of the importance of
information to the logistician must lead to a consciousness of, and demand for, the
right information. At all levels, logistic force elements must consider how their
operations can be improved through correct information linkages. Operational staffs
have a responsibility to enable and control information to ensure that, at the tactical
level, support demands are met and the logistic information acted upon, whilst an
improved deployed JLP allows the Base to initiate the support in a timely manner.
Single Service information, such as air loading details, need to be available to the joint
staffs. Time must be made for the identification of Information Exchange
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Requirements (IER) and the production of a Logistic Information Plan early in the
preparation for operations so that Communications and IS (J6) support can be
resourced, allocated and provided.
SECTION IV – DEFENCE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AND
OPERATIONAL STOCKS
315. Defence Planning Assumptions. Risk is an inherent element of national
inventory planning, which seeks to minimise capital outlay and balance high risk/low
probability requirements against low risk/high probability operations. The MOD
Departmental Strategic Plan is based on a FCO/MOD consensus of the strategic
environment and subject to annual and ongoing review. The principle is that the UK
only holds what cannot be procured in Readiness and Preparation Time (RPT) – the
time between the authorised start of preparations (i.e. the issue of a Warning Order)
and when formations/units are capable of commencing planned operations. RPT is
therefore the sum of Readiness, deployment and Readiness in Theatre (RIT) (i.e.
having completed all preparations and any in-theatre training) with initial sustainment
in place.
316. Stock Acquisition and Holding Assessment. Operational Stocks,6 as with
other equipment and materiel procurement, are subject to a six-step resource allocation
process as modified by: military/industrial policy and capacity, potential 3rd party
(allied) sourcing, and Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR)/Urgent Maintenance
Requirement (UMR) procedures. The six steps are:
a.
Clear, approved and unambiguous planning assumptions/management
plans (i.e. what do we need to be able to do?)
b.
Assessed sustainability requirements for agreed generic tasks (how
much do we need to do it?)
c.
The application of military judgement and operational analysis to Full
Scale requirements (how should we do it?)
d.
Assessed industrial capacity to regenerate to the planned requirements
and within RPT (what can we get when we need it?)
e.
The reassessment of current holdings in the light of the above (is there a
difference between what we have, what we need and when we can secure it?)
f.
Amending stockholdings/the programme accordingly (aligning all the
variables).
6
See also paragraph 714 for more detail on Operational Stocks (formerly War Reserves).
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317.
Sources of Support. There are generally five available sources of support:
a.
Military controlled assets, owned or leased, organic to the deployed
forces or made available to them from supporting elements of any of the
three Services or from within the strategic base.
b.
National civil contractors, operating in support of the strategic base or
deployed forward to benign areas, where CON LOG support can be
undertaken safely and effectively.
c.
In Country Resources (ICR) or HNS, contracted or requisitioned.
d.
Coalition assets, on a lead Service or nation basis.
e.
Resources contracted from the international market place.
A balance from all sources is likely. Initial limited self-sufficiency may
progressively give way to increased levels of HNS/ICR and multinational support
as an operation matures. These issues are explored further in Chapter 6.
The Strategic Environment
• Logistic activity projects from and reaches back to the strategic base. However, as
the combat components employ lines of support which are tailored to their specialist
methods of operation, it must be coherent from front to rear.
• Lines of communication are controlled jointly as far forward as is feasible normally through a JFLogC.
• Logistic effort should integrate with the multinational environment with an
emphasis on streamlined procedures.
• A key enabler of coherent joint logistics is sound, accessible information, building a
Joint Logistic Picture and interfacing with the Joint Operational Picture.
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CHAPTER 4 – OPERATIONAL LEVEL LOGISTIC
COMMAND AND CONTROL – JOINT TASK FORCE
HEADQUARTERS
SECTION I – THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
401. Operational and Tactical Joint Logistics. Operational level logistics
involves the consideration of logistic influences on the Campaign Plan, identification
and planning of specific joint logistic operations (e.g. Reception, Staging, Onward
Movement and Integration (RSOI), Redeployment) and the subsequent orchestration
of those plans. The interface between the (joint) operational and the tactical is not
always clear cut. It is normally the scale and nature of an operation which determines
the boundary between operational and tactical logistics. The operational logistic staff
identify the likely constraints to the Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC’s) concept
of operations and issue direction for maximising freedom of action.
a.
The Operational Level. It is operational joint logistics which plans the
sequence, priority and general support objectives for elements of the Campaign
Plan, monitoring the tactical level success, adjusting where necessary and
looking forward to ensure the correct force posture can be achieved for future
operations.
b.
The Tactical Level. Tactical level joint logistics refers to the detailed
in-theatre execution of logistic plans such as the running of a reception centre,
the conduct of an outload or the activation of a casualty handling unit. Tactical
level joint logistics is the subject of Chapter 5.
402. Span of Responsibility. The extent of the Line of Communication (LOC),
with its differing support mechanisms, dictates that operational logistics is not limited
to the Joint Operations Area (JOA) or Theatre, especially in the light of the Base’s
increasing responsibility to support operations directly. It is therefore not the sole
preserve of the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and operational issues are
routinely dealt with by Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and Supporting
Commands as well.
SECTION II – DEPLOYED COMMAND AND CONTROL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS
403. Background. The deployment of UK forces assumes the appointment of a
Joint Commander (Jt Comd) exercising Operational Command1 (OPCOM) and a JTFC
1
OPCOM is defined in AAP-6 as ‘the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate
commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be
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- normally with Operational Control2 (OPCON) over assigned forces. CinCs of the
Supporting Commands retain Full Command of their forces assigned to an operation.
The JTFC is responsible for planning and executing the theatre campaign and will
normally direct operations, including logistic support, from a JTFHQ in theatre. He
will have a designated DCOS (or Chief J1/J4) to direct logistic planning and to
provide logistic advice.
404. Component Commanders. For small-scale operations the JTFC may elect to
exercise command directly over assigned forces through his JTFHQ Staff. However,
if circumstances demand, he has the option to appoint individual component
commanders to discharge this responsibility on his behalf. These will include
Maritime, Land and Air Component Commanders (JFMCC, JFLCC and JFACC)
together with Logistics and Special Forces. Component commanders are normally
delegated Tactical Command3 (TACOM) of forces under command, although in
certain circumstances the JTFC may elect to re-assign OPCON, subject to the
agreement of the Jt Comd. The JTFC will establish the command relationships and
division of responsibilities between component commanders.
405. The Requirement for a Joint Force Logistic Component Commander. The
requirement for a Joint Force Logistic Component (Commander) (JFLogCC) is not a
foregone conclusion. Fundamentally a JFLogC provides a means of co-ordinating
logistic activity entering or within the Theatre4 or JOA. It is the optimum means of
controlling logistic assets thinly spread between the Services. A JFLogC can also
provide an additional staff planning function. Where the existence of a JFLogC is
likely to assist the provision of coherent support, or where there are likely to be joint
logistic issues beyond the span of the J1/J4 staff of JTFHQ, a JFLogC should be
employed to deal with tactical issues and permit the JTFHQ DCOS to concentrate on
the critical logistic factors affecting the Campaign Plan. If obvious benefits at the
joint tactical level are to be gained (as determined in the estimate) a JFLogCC should
be nominated early and drawn into the planning process as soon as possible. This
chapter continues by describing the JTFHQ’s general Command and Control
relationships, then its relationship and interaction with the tactical level - whether a
JFLogC is employed or not - and finally its more detailed roles and responsibilities.
deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote
the forces assigned to a commander’
2
OPCON is defined in AAP-6 as ‘the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the
commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy
units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate
employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
3
TACOM is defined in AAP-6 as ‘the authority delegated to a commander to assign forces under his command for the
accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority’. In this context, TACOM is the level of command normally
delegated by the JTFC to his component commanders.
4
There may be more than one JOA in a Theatre. An example is where a NATO Regional Command has control of more
than one operation in its area of responsibility.
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Chapter 5 describes the responsibilities and utility of a JFLogC once the decision has
been taken to employ it.
Joint Task Force Headquarters Logistic Command and Control Relationships
406. Scope. JTFHQ logistic (J1/J4) staffs are concerned with the key battlewinning issues and critical constraints of a campaign. This involves directing support
to meet the requirements of the campaign plan and subsequent operations. They are
not concerned, other than by exception or in small scale operations, with the detailed
management or control of logistic assets which provide the routine unit or formation
level support within the components.
407. Role. The role of the JTFHQ logistic staff is therefore to direct all logistic
activity at the operational level. DCOS JTFHQ (or Chief J1/J4) is not fighting ‘the
contact battle’ but monitoring performance and shaping support for future tasks. He
must consider not only broad logistic issues (including medical) but also personnel and
welfare.
408. Responsibilities. PJHQ is responsible for the logistic aspects of the planning,
deployment, sustainment and redeployment of the force in accordance with CDS’s Directive (see Chapter 6). DLO will also respond to joint and single-service
requirements for logistics support or manpower in support of CDS’s Strategic
Directives to the Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Joint Operations. Command and Control
of logistic support within the JOA is delegated to the JTFHQ. Logistic C2
relationships are shown at Figure 4-1. Arrangements with the SF component are
broadly similar albeit on a smaller scale.
PJHQ
JTFHQ
SF
JFMC
JFLC
DCOS
Air Log Cell
JFAC
JFLogC
RFAs etc
Land
Component
Log Units
Air
Component
Log Units
Joint Force Log
Component
Units
GLC
Key
Command
Co-ordination
Figure 4.1 - Logistic C2 Relationships
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409. Surge Units. In addition to logistic units integral to components there are also
likely to be minor logistic units deployed for surge purposes only (not least roulement
or special tasks). Their C2 arrangements will vary according to the formation
supported and time on task but will rarely be less than TACON the JTFHQ.
The Joint Task Force Commander and Tactical Level Joint Logistics - Is a Joint
Force Logistic Component Required?
410. Operational Logistic Coherence. Normally a decision to use a JFLogC (or
not) depends on the scale and complexity of identified joint tactical logistic tasks,
recognising that a JFLogC offers both functional capability and specialist staff effort.
Where there is more than one Operation running within a JOA, the JFLogC could
provide logistic synergy between the operations. DCOS JTFHQ needs to be in a
position to increase the effectiveness of logistic capability - and therefore reduce the
sustainability constraints on the JTFC - by maximising logistic assistance to the
supported commander or organising the diversion of resources to bolster a weaker
component when necessary. Certain phases of operations are entirely logistic in nature
and benefit from centralised or joint direction. Some capabilities will inevitably be
provided by one service on behalf of others. DCOS JTFHQ’s staff resources are
limited, however, to the ability to advise, plan and monitor. To achieve operational
logistic coherence, there is a need for responsive, unfettered control of some tactical
level logistics. A JFLogC can meet this remit, although, as described below, there are
other methods depending on circumstances.
411. Concept of Joint Force Logistic Component. In concept the JFLogC HQ is
a task-organised, joint logistic Command and Staff element, the exact composition of
which is determined by PJHQ during the estimate process – its organisation and the
rank at which it is commanded being scaled against the operation at hand. As the
JFLogC HQ is task organised, so too are the range of units placed under command. In
a UN or multinational operation Joint Logistic Staff or JFLogC HQ are likely to form
a substantial part of the HQ UK National Support Element (see paragraph 631).
412. Differentiating Roles for Joint Task Force Headquarters and Joint Force
Logistic Component. There is no single JFLogC HQ ‘model’; instead the range of
anticipated tasks and responsibilities are likely to dictate its size, cell structure (see
paragraph 514) and relationship with the JTFHQ. Indeed, a small JTFHQ staff
retaining a high degree of centralised control may well be able to support small scale,
short duration operations particularly with augmentation by a small number of
specialist advisers, thus obviating the need for a JFLogC. Low volumes of re-supply
make this feasible. But, as volumes rise and add to the complexity, detailed logistic
management ceases to be appropriate or feasible JTFHQ business. Most operations
require a separation between the JTFHQ (operational) logistic planning staff and
devolved, tactical level logistic C2. Broad examples of possible methods of
commanding and controlling tactical level support on Joint Operations are shown at
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Operational
JFLogC
JFLogC
Tactical
Possible HQ Span of Responsibility
Figure 4.2. The aim is to illustrate that the span of responsibility at different deployed
HQ levels is dependent on the anticipated logistic planning and activity requirements.
Thus it is not necessarily linked to the scales of an operation (Small, Medium, Large
Scale, etc) as a Small Scale operation may still involve the management of a complex
and demanding LOC. Expertise to conduct the necessary staff functions may be found
from:
HQ Options (eg.):
A
B
C
D
Minimal
Key:
E
Heavy
Expected Logistic Planning and Activity in JOA
JTHQ-J1/J4(
Augmented with Special Staff)
Combat Component Staff
JFLogC HQ Staff
Unit Logisticians (or small Formation Staff)
Figure 4.2 - Possible Permutations of deployed Joint Logistic C2
a.
Joint Task Force Headquarters J1/J4. In most scenarios the JTFHQ
standing J1 and J4 staffs will be augmented by trained specialist staff from
across the 3 Services. Staff from tactical logistic headquarters, such as the
Commando Logistics Regiment, Army logistics regiments and RAF ACSSUs
could provide part of a logistic component HQ. Ideally such units would also
form part of a logistic component. In Figure 4.2, Option A assumes a small
operation with a deployed JTFHQ in which J1/J4, with augmentation, plans
much of the tactical logistics, along with unit logisticians. Option B involves a
single-component-heavy operation in which J1/J4 consider only operational –
perhaps coalition - planning, leaving the component staff and their unit
logisticians to organise and conduct tactical level logistics).
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b.
Lead Component. Logistic Staff from a Single (Lead) Component
could assume specialist tactical level logistic responsibility, particularly where
other component contributions to the operation are minimal. In option C, a
joint operation which offers little scope for tactical logistic efficiency, J1/J4
staff provide operational level and limited tactical level planning, allowing
components to manage their own tactical logistics within J1/J4’s guidelines.
c.
Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters. As the scale of an
operation, or scope for efficiency increases, a formation sized headquarters
could be utilised:
(1) Co-ordinated Components. Where co-ordination (rather than
the execution of joint operations) by a Joint Force Logistic Staff is called
for – such as in option D - Component Staffs may be given specific
responsibility for tactical logistics in the JOA within their normal area of
expertise, supporting other Components when necessary. Under these
circumstances, the JFLogC might have only minimal force elements
under command, although the Logistic Component could be activated at
any time by allocation of additional resources by the JTFC.
(2) Full Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters
Responsibility. When a full JFLogC HQ is formed, its size and
influence will be dictated by the activity levels anticipated in the
estimate. Whilst its focus, with appropriate resources, is on the tactical
level, a robust JFLogC HQ – Option E - could assist the J1/J4 staff with
operational planning.
413. Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters versus Component
Logistics. Formation of a JFLogC HQ only fundamentally affects component logistic
C2 in so far as the JTFC can re-brigade assets to or from a JFLogC depending on his
priorities for specific phases of the operation. Otherwise, Component Commanders
will continue to exercise C2 over their organic logistic units in accordance with the
JTFC’s delegated command authority. Component logistic staffs co-ordinate and
develop their elements of the JTFC’s campaign plan in conjunction with JFLogC HQ.
Where forward – i.e. unit level and normally formation - support (afloat, 1st/2nd Line,
1st and most 2nd level repair) is required (and there is no inherent benefit in interposing
joint logistic organisations) logistic C2 remains organic to the combat components.
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SECTION III – JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS JOINT
LOGISTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL CONFIGURATION AND
TASKS
414. Detailed Roles of the Joint Task Force Headquarters Logistic Staff. Within
the JTFHQ, the logistic staff set logistic policy in the JOA, and possibly also the
theatre, (based on the strategic guidance issued by the PJHQ), contribute to the
estimate process and the campaign plan, and monitor the Joint Logistic Picture (JLP)
which is updated by the component logistic staffs. The JLP is the aggregation of
logistic data on quantities, location, condition and transit status to provide a near real
time disposition of logistic resources which can be compared with rates of demand and
replenishment to inform logistic planning. When plans are first being crafted, it is the
JTFHQ J4 Staff’s responsibility to write the operational logistic plan and to ensure that
logistic issues are represented with appropriate weight in order to:
a.
Determine the logistic feasibility of operations.
b.
Inform the JTFC where his logistic vulnerabilities lie and where he can
take associated risks.
c.
Exploit logistic strengths and minimise weaknesses arising from the
ORBAT or assets, taking remedial action as necessary.
d.
Develop future plans. This includes preparation of logistic contingency
plans (normally in the form of branches and sequels to the Campaign Plan5)
and logistic input to redeployment planning.
415. Detailed Joint Task Force Headquarters Logistic Staff Responsibilities.
The detailed responsibilities of the JTFHQ Logistic Staff, at the operational level, are
summarised below:
a.
Setting theatre logistic policy and priorities, including auditable
authorisation of high priority demands for materiel in accordance with JSP
336. (See paragraph 416).
b.
Contributing to the military strategic estimate.
c.
Configuring logistics (including medical support6) in accordance with
the JTFC’s intentions.
d.
Negotiating HNS/ICR in consultation with Civ Sec and Civil-Military
Co-operation (CIMIC) staff and in accordance with any Memorandum of
5
6
Campaign planning is described in Chapter 6 and explained further in ‘UKOPSDOC’ Chapter 7.
Medical Support is covered in JWP 4-03 ‘Joint Medical Doctrine’.
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Understanding (MOU) which may have been drafted/arranged by MOD with
the Host Nation. Where no MOUs are in place, MOD will direct which
logistic staffs are the most appropriate to negotiate and draft the necessary
over-arching HNS arrangements.
e.
Avoiding competition within the JTF and between allies for scarce or
crucial resources.
f.
In conjunction with the PJHQ, avoiding unnecessary duplication of
capability or effort.
g.
Writing the operational level logistics plan, including policy in the JOA
for common-user resources, such as fuel, food and water - usually on a lead
Service7 or even Lead Nation basis.
h.
In conjunction with PJHQ, setting priorities for movement into the JOA
and subsequent use, maintenance, repair and redeployment of resources to
accord with the campaign plan - including the military estate (infrastructure,
works, etc.8)
i.
Developing the JLP and reporting on the logistic resource state within
the JOA. This includes collating reports from the component logistic staffs,
particularly the JFLogC HQ (or receiving consolidated data for the whole
theatre from the JFLogC HQ).
j.
Many support tasks will extend across the JOA as continuous processes;
for example, the medical support chain. To ensure effective use of resources,
speed, and flexibility in the face of changing circumstances, the Commander’s
directives to all his components must clearly define what, when and where the
JFLogC delegates or takes over responsibility for a task. Detailed management
of this task allocation is the responsibility of the JTFHQ staff. It is important
to note that the specifics of each task will determine the most effective division
of responsibility for that task. Although, in order to be assigned force
protection responsibilities, or for other reasons, the JFLogC may have a
specified AO,9 this should not be seen as a single geographic boundary at
which responsibility for other logistic tasks is handed off.
416. Prioritisation of Support. Prioritising demands is most important where
there are substantial constraints in the LOC (such as access only by air-bridge) or
accessible stocks are insufficient to meet the demands of all the components. The
JTFHQ is not normally required to become involved in routine supply, other than to
7
See Glossary.
Covered in JWP 4-05 ‘Infrastructure Management on Joint Operations’.
9
For example, from the entry point to the JOA up to the rear boundary of the deployed Land Formation.
8
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ensure that unequivocal policy on the Standard Priority System and Codes (SPS/SPC)
is set. By exception, where conflicting demands exist, the JTFC is required to advise
PJHQ of his desired priority. PJHQ, on behalf of the Joint Commander, will then
direct DLO and the supply organisation to deliver according to his priorities. Correct
prioritisation decisions are dependent on information from many sources, including for
example (in the case of a major demand for mission critical equipment support): the
end-user of the equipment, the component’s maintenance and supply organisation, the
component’s operations staff for relevance to tactical plans, other components and the
Base for availability and delivery issues. Depending on the nature and volume of
prioritisation requirements the J1/J4 staff may draw on expertise within the JFLogC to
co-ordinate the information before working with the J3 staffs to establish the
significance on the JTFC’s campaign plan. Effective asset tracking and visibility can
ease the decision process.
417. Resourcing Joint Task Force Headquarters. JFHQ staff integral to the
PJHQ provide the core of JTFHQ with Chief J1/J4 and his staff supplemented from
Augmentee Manning Lists (AML) as necessary. Where different models of JFHQ are
used,10 or where a 2* JTFC is appointed, the full scope of responsibilities will need to
be covered, with resources identified and allocated as the Headquarters begins its
planning routine.
Coalition Operations - The National Contingent Commander’s Operational
Headquarters.
418. UK Logistics in a National Contingent Headquarters. Where UK operates
as a (perhaps smaller) partner in a Coalition Force, a National Contingent Commander
(NCC) will be appointed. Whilst components will normally remain within the overall
UK command system, he may not have detailed planning authority over contingents
embedded within larger coalition components. His headquarters will normally have a
J1/4/8 cell to oversee UK logistic arrangements, which may differ substantially from
those of other nations. Depending on the situation, the J1/4/8 cell is likely to be
responsible for:
a.
Briefing the NCC on operational logistic issues.
b.
Interfacing with other J-Branches.
c.
Providing Direction and policy to a UK JFLogC and UK logistic
elements of embedded contingents.
d.
10
Interfacing with Coalition partners at the operational level.
See JWP 0-10 ‘UKOPSDOC’ paragraph 535 and footnote for details.
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Joint Logistic C2 in the Joint Operations Area - The Operational Level
• DCOS JTFHQ and his J1/J4 Staff plan and monitor operational level issues to
identify and exploit potential freedoms for, and reduce constraints on, the JTFC’s
Campaign Plan.
• Responsibility for operational level support requires delineation between PJHQ
and the JTFHQ, given that prioritisation is required within the JOA, across the
coupling bridge and in the Strategic Base.
• In complex operations, or where scope for joint logistic functions exists, the
JTFHQ J1/J4 staff may require additional resources to command and control joint
logistic activity at the tactical level, allowing them to concentrate on their
primary role of policy and planning. Options range from augmentation to a full
JFLogC.
• A key role of the JTFHQ staff is to prioritise the allocation of support between
components and along the LOC.
• There must be sufficient flexibility to undertake joint planning tasks in a
multinational environment, with the formation of a National Support Element
(NSE) modelled on the JFLogC concept.
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CHAPTER 5 – TACTICAL LEVEL LOGISTIC COMMAND
AND CONTROL – JOINT FORCE LOGISTIC
COMPONENT
‘To my surprise I found on being briefed at Headquarters British
Forces Middle East that the Force Maintenance Area (FMA) was to
be under my command. The Headquarters was of this view because
the FMA was not in fact supporting all the UK forces but only the
Division. I believed then, and now, that such an arrangement was
wrong in principle; it leads to a lack of economy of logistic effort and
competition for scarce transport resources into theatre. However, I
had a more pressing concern. I could not see how I, as a tactical
commander, charged with attacking deep into Iraq or Kuwait could be
responsible for the command of an essentially static organisation
based on the port of Jubail.’1
SECTION I – JOINT TACTICAL LOGISTICS – FUNDAMENTALS
501. Introduction. Chapter 4 identified the areas of logistic responsibility in the
Joint Operations Area at the operational level, noting that Joint Task Force
Headquarters (JTFHQ) J1/J4 staffs devote effort to planning and reducing the logistic
constraints on the Joint Task Force (JTF). Whilst key drivers for the tactical level of
joint logistics will continue to be complexity, scale and scope for joint logistic activity,
this chapter describes in more detail how benefits can accrue and be exploited if a
JFLogC is deployed. Implicit is the close relationship between DCOS Joint Force
Headquarters (JFHQ), the Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) and the
Permanent Joint Force Headquarters (PJHQ) J1/J4 staffs.
502. Ethos. In its most basic form, tactical level joint logistics within the Joint
Operations Area (JOA) refers to the execution of co-ordinated logistic tasks as
economically and efficiently as possible, commensurate with the Joint Task Force
Commander’s (JTFC) priorities. Successful Joint Logistics is founded on a common
ethos among component logisticians which recognizes the advantage of mutual
support, whilst appreciating the specific requirements of their components.
Operational experience and close training affiliations provide the basis of this
understanding, particularly as there has been no single standing organisation with a
permanent remit to conduct joint logistics at the tactical level. Force structures can
differ so substantially from scenario to scenario that single Service planners need to
recognise a responsibility to contribute proportionately to the collective benefit of
deployed forces when it falls within their capability. At the same time there must be a
high degree of trust that the system will deliver the required support.
1
Major General R A Smith GOC 1 (UK) Div Op GRANBY.
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503. Tactical Level Support to Joint Operations. The primary feature of Joint
Tactical Logistics is the involvement of a single commander, the Joint Force Logistic
Component Commander (JFLogCC), to oversee coherent logistics in the JOA. The
JFLogCC’s role is described at paragraph 508. First, however, generic characteristics
are considered. Tactical level methods of executing co-ordinated logistics in support
of joint operations can be categorised in terms of ‘Staff’ and ‘Component
Resources’:
a.
Staff. Tactical level staff with a broad range of specialist expertise can
take responsibility for specific activities of obvious common benefit to two or
more environmental components. The nature of the tasks, always based on the
policy direction of J1/J4 JTFHQ, may involve Tri-Service2 Co-ordination
and/or the planning and execution of Joint Tactical Logistic Operations:
(1) Tri Service Co-ordination. In this model, the staff provides a
co-ordinating function, monitoring routine logistic operations of single
components, providing prioritisation advice to the JTFHQ when
required and facilitating the execution of tasks common to more than
one Component. This is particularly relevant where components may
operate different supply chain processes for the same item (such as for
‘B’ vehicle spares or combat supplies (for example small arms
ammunition, fuel and rations)).
(2) Joint Tactical Logistic Operations. The JTFC’s Campaign Plan
may identify specific joint logistic Decisive Points (DPs).3 These can
best be covered by joint logistic operations. Examples include
Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement and Integration (RSOI),
rehabilitation of a formation or logistic realignment in the context of a
redeployment. A single command structure capable of planning and
controlling joint tactical level logistic operations, and with appropriate
authority over tasked assets, is often needed to deliver these effects. The
benefits of the joint staff accrue from the ability to plan across the
components’ logistic system boundaries in order to leverage resources
(ranging from the provision of services to tactical Air Transport) and
enhance the force’s capability.
b.
Logistic Component Resources. Unity of effort can be achieved by
combining theatre level logistic units under a single commander. Units,
2
As opposed to ‘Joint’. The understanding is that some low level logistic systems continue to operate between
components and, for example DLO in the strategic Base.
3
‘UKOPSDOC’, Glossary definition: - paragraph 330 – ‘…a series of co-ordinated actions … to neutralise [the
adversary’s centre of Gravity] …’ ‘…A DP is not necessarily a battle; it may be the elimination or denial of a capability
or an achievement such as obliging an adversary to engage in formal negotiations.’ paragraph 332 – ‘Lines of Operation
are the link between DPs in time and space on the path to the Centre of Gravity.
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complete with a suitable internal command structure, may be assigned to a
single logistic command focus, or component - the JFLogC - from the outset of
an operation. At the decision of the JTFC, units may be re-assigned to or from
this Logistic Component in accordance with the campaign phase priorities,
although there is benefit in maintaining stability within the formation,
particularly where there are specific logistic Lines of Operation in the JTFC’s
plan. Logistic Component resources are intended primarily to carry out tasks
of common benefit to the environmental Components, as well as being a
responsive, formed, force-multiplying asset to the JTFC.
504.
Joint Force Logistic Component. A JFLogC is defined as:
‘An organisation, based on an existing framework HQ for command and
control, charged with executing the Joint Logistic Plan on behalf of the JTFC.
Its purpose is to achieve maximum logistic efficiency in common areas for all
components, in order to optimise the logistic footprint, prevent undue stress on
the Coupling Bridge and leverage logistic capability in the JOA’.
The JFLogC does not need to have integral units under command, but will invariably
have units assigned, particularly for fulfilling common support functions for the
benefit of the whole force. Whilst it can be used as a tool of the JTFC to execute
changes of priorities using assets detached from environmental Components for
specific purposes, it does not routinely deliver the close logistic support required by
each of the environmental components.
Component Command. The JFLogCC is a component commander in his own right,
subordinate to the JTFC and on a par with combat component commanders.
SECTION II – DETERMINING THE ORBAT OF THE JOINT
FORCE LOGISTICS COMPONENT
505. Influence of the Estimate on Tactical Level Joint Logistics. The strategic
and operational estimate processes identify the Sustainability Statement, primary
logistic tasks, generic and specific capabilities required for an operation. In allocating
resources to tasks a logistic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is developed which
seeks to provide the economies of scale and scope necessary to balance an optimum
ORBAT (including C4I) with the demands of the operation. This CONOPS will take
account of the anticipated phases of a campaign, which may have differing levels of
logistic activity and has a direct influence on the development of both the Force
Element Table and the size and composition of a logistics contribution to the
operation.
506. Logistic ORBAT. Whilst combat components are necessarily focussed on
forward logistics, we have already identified that the JFLogC has a dual role, looking
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both forwards to the components and rearwards to the Strategic Base. Factors such as
the environment, enemy, friendly forces, time and space, surprise and security and the
mission will all define the shape of the logistic ORBAT. In particular, geography and
span of command will frequently argue for a separate logistic command at relatively
modest scales of effort. The campaign plan will identify at any given time and in the
context of particular operations, the combat component commanders that are
Supported by or are Supporting other components. A component commander may
be supported and supporting concurrently for different operations.
507. Selection of the Joint Force Logistic Component Commander. Selection of
the JFLogCC is determined within the strategic estimate by reference to the relative
weight of tasks arising and their bias towards land or air operations. It is likely that the
Commander, his deputy and other senior personnel will be from different Services in
order to provide balanced experience and authority.
Role of the Joint Force Logistic Component Commander
508. Role. The role of the JFLogCC is to deliver coherent, co-ordinated logistic
support, within the JOA or at theatre level, to the joint force in accordance with the
JTFC’s priorities.
509. Responsibilities of the Joint Force Logistic Component Commander
during Preparation and Planning. The JFLogCC must be influential in the predeployment planning, and it is particularly important to involve the JFLogCC and his
staff early in logistic planning at the operational/tactical interface. Early on in an
operation, planning will fall to PJHQ staff until the core of a JFLogC staff can be
assembled. The reversionary setting for this phase is a small planning team led by
DCOS JFHQ. This team will be made up from PJHQ-JFHQ J1/4/8 staff augmented by
pre-nominated N/G/A4 staff, made available from the Front Line Commands (FLCs).
As an operation develops a formed HQ staff4 is likely to take command of the JFLogC
task, augmented by appropriate members of the initial planning team to ensure
continuity. Other than in an LO function, JFHQ staff will not normally remain within
the JFLogC beyond the early stages of planning.
510. Responsibilities of the Joint Force Logistic Component Commander when
Deployed. The JFLogCC’s primary responsibilities are to:
a.
Exercise C2 (at least TACOM) of all logistic assets and capabilities
assigned to him by the JTFC in the JOA.5
4
Normally the higher readiness Log Bde would provide the core of this HQ – but other formations could provide the core
in particular circumstances.
5
Each Component will retain command of logistic assets deployed as an integral part of its units/formations, unless
otherwise directed by the JTFC. However, to ensure economy of effort, standardisation, and to maximise integration, the
JFLogC will normally be given at least co-ordinating authority over all logistic assets in the JOA. Generally this includes
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b.
Co-ordinate in-theatre logistic support in accordance with the JTFC’s
priorities by activation and maintenance of robust LOC within the JOA.
c.
Provide point and access security to all maintenance areas under
JFLogCC control.
d.
Control in-theatre logistic support in accordance with the JTFC’s
priorities by activation and maintenance of robust LOC within the JOA.
e.
Maximise logistic efficiencies and economies of scale.
f.
Exercise TACOM of any AO6 allocated to him by the JTFC, primarily
for Force Protection purposes, and of Force Elements (FE) allocated to execute
this task. Prerequisites are good J2 feeds and close liaison with HN and
coalition partners.
g.
Contribute to the JTFHQ J1/J4 staff’s operational estimate process
where necessary.
h.
Conduct Liaison, as required, with coalition partners.
511. Functional Control. The JFLogCC must control and manage the full range of
force-level logistic support, including whole-force supply and distribution,
movements, maintenance, infrastructure (including provision of fuel, water, electrical
power and Temporary Deployable Accommodation), medical and personnel/
administration support. This support may be from UK or multinational military
sources, from the Host-Nation, from contractors or from other in-country resources.
Where the JFLogCC does not have TACOM of assets or control of procedures, (such
as those owned by components), close liaison and coherent hand-over is necessary to
ensure continuity of support. His generic functional tasks include:
a.
Force Supply and Distribution. He is responsible for local
procurement, asset tracking, reception, storage, control, maintenance and
distribution of joint theatre stocks and single-Service stocks held in the Force
Rear Support Area (FRSA) or in transit. This requires the fusion of all data to
achieve Total Asset Visibility and In Transit Visibility (which may be
achieved through the establishment of a Tracking Cell in the JFLogC HQ).
Specific Joint operational tasks include the Rehabilitation of a force.
units and systems described as 1st and 2nd line, that are fully integrated, administratively and functionally, with the
formation they support.
6
Subject to a rear area threat assessment, the JFLogCC could be allocated an AO. If the JFLogCC is not responsible for
FRSA security he would need to liaise closely with the HQ performing this function in order to ensure co-ordination of
the security effort with his support functions.
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b.
In-theatre Movement and Life Support. He is responsible for the coordination of movement of the joint force, into, within and out of the Theatre
including the arrangement of necessary life support. These operations
normally require joint control to ensure optimum use of transport assets. His
responsibilities in this respect include:
(1) Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement and Integration. This
complex joint operation7 is very much a command and control issue best
controlled through a single Headquarters to draw together the
movements and administrative functions necessary to move, process,
accommodate and provide life support functions to a transiting force.
Close liaison with JTFHQ is necessary to enable timely response to late
FE Table changes. ‘Integration’ can involve a training package with
input from environmental components as well as the JFLogC.
(2) Control of Main Supply Routes to the components and intratheatre transport.
(3)
Redeployment planning, in conjunction with the JTFHQ and
PJHQ staff, incorporating recovery movement and the preparation of
equipment and stores for future use. A separate organisation may be
formed as part of post conflict activities
c.
Maintenance. He is responsible, at the force level, for repair, recovery,
backloading, and modification of equipment. He is also responsible for setting
force policy on cannibalisation and salvage.
d.
Infrastructure. He must control, manage and maintain logistic
facilities, routes and the required infrastructure and Lines of Communication.8
e.
Medical. He is responsible for control and management of JFLogC
Role 1 and 2 medical facilities, Theatre level Role 3 and aero/surface medevac.
Dependent upon geography and the operational situation, some JTFHQ
Medical planning cell functions may be embedded in the JFLogC HQ (for
access to communications and physical proximity to the majority of medical
units) but remaining part of the operational level parent HQ (JTFHQ).9
f.
Personnel and Administration Support. He is responsible for:
(1) Control and administration of personnel arriving in and departing
from theatre.
7
NATO limits the scope of this task in terms of movements. Consequently AJP 4.4 covers only Reception, Staging and
Onward Movement (RSOM) RSOI, however, is a much broader task. See also paragraph 720.
8
See JWP 4-05.
9
See JWP 4-03.
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(2)
Maintenance of force theatre personnel records.
(3) Control and administration of theatre Prisoners of War (PW) and
interrogation centres and their guard forces.
(4)
Casualty reporting and disposal of bodies.
g.
Provost. He is responsible for the necessary provost support in order to
ensure military effectiveness.
512. Battle Rhythm and Specific Tasks. Generic tasks for the JFLogCC and his
staff, summarised by phase and related to an output, are at Annex 5A.
Composition and Resourcing of the Joint Force Logistic Component
Headquarters
513. Functional Composition of the Joint Force Logistic Component
Headquarters. The JFLogC HQ consists of the staff and their communications and
life support personnel. The breadth of operations undertaken by JFLogC HQ may well
(in a large operation) result in a full range of staff and functional cells as shown at
Figure 5.1. It will be for the JFLogCC to organise his headquarters as appropriate to
the operation. The balance of responsibility between the COS and DCOS will
normally reflect the demands on the Headquarters to conduct joint planning for the
Force, to deliver internal support for the logistic component and to provide functional
staff expertise. The key is to collocate cells which have the highest levels of
interaction (such as Engr, Med, Mov, Fin, Log Ops, etc). The Engineer and
Infrastructure staff in the JFLogC HQ are grouped together under a CRE, who is the
single focus for all engineer advice to the CC. Figure 5.1 illustrates the depth of
functions found within an HQ co-ordinating Theatre-level logistics, although it does
not explore the C2 requirements to support the JFLogC HQ if it is also required to
function as a Rear Area Operations HQ.
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Figure 5.1 - Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters Composition
514.
Staff. Staff are found from the FLCs as follows:
a.
Royal Navy. There is no logistic HQ in the Navy able to undertake a
full JFLogC HQ role ashore, however the HQ of the Cdo Log Regt, could
provide the nucleus or contribute to a Joint organisation). The Force Logistic
Co-ordinator/Group Logistic Co-ordinator is the focus of Joint Force Maritime
Component logistics afloat. Individual augmentees, as required, would join a
JFLogC HQ and create on shore Advanced Logistic Support Site/Forward
Logistic Site (FLS) structures TACOM and TACON to the JFLogC HQ to
support maritime operations.
b.
Army. The Army has 2 deployable Logistic Brigades (Log Bde) to
provide extended support behind the formation(s) (3rd Line) in Land
operations, each commanded by a brigadier. Each has limited RN (1) and
RAF (4) personnel to assist with JFLogC HQ tasks in addition to the 30 Army
staff and clerical posts on the establishment. A third, non-deployable Logistic
Support Brigade provides port, movements and pioneer support, which are key
enablers in the reception and staging process, during sustainment operations
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and on redeployment. A Log Bde HQ, with its limited functional span,
requires augmentation to be fully effective in most JFLogC HQ roles. At
larger scales of effort a 2nd Log Bde would probably need to be deployed
concurrently, with one Log Bde HQ in the JFLogC HQ role and the other
dedicated to support of the land component. In this scenario C2 arrangements
are not fixed and would reflect the estimate as to whether a 2* Rear Area HQ
was required based on threat, LOC, geographic, span of command
considerations etc.
c.
Royal Air Force. The HQ Staff of Expeditionary Logistics Wing, RAF
Stafford, form the core RAF element in a JFLogC HQ. The remaining air
elements of the ACSSU/JFLogC HQ are found from non-formed support units
as required.
515. Communications and Life Support. Both Log Bdes have established HQ &
Signal Squadrons for communications and life support, but are not currently fully
equipped with the strategic bearers and information systems required to integrate into
the Joint Force.10 If deployed as the JFLogC HQ, there will need to be appropriate
augmentation to enable communications to RAF and RN logistics units or
installations. In the event of an augmented ACSSG forming the basis of a JFLogC,
life support, organic and strategic communications would be provided from assets
including the Log Bde HQ and Sig Sqns, 11 Signal Brigade and Tactical
Communications Wing.
SECTION III – JOINT FORCE LOGISTIC COMPONENT
CAPABILITIES
516. Delivery of effective joint support, in line with his tasks and responsibilities,
depends upon the JFLogCC having co-ordination authority over all in-theatre logistic
assets as well as command of those units which provide that joint support. Taskorientated groupings, providing the functions described below, may under certain
circumstances be set up as jointly formed and administered units, such as Port of
Disembarkation (POD), life support or composite intermediate units (e.g. Convoy
Support Centres), where jointly contributed assets are involved.
517. Theatre Activation. The Theatre Activation Party is a tactical level advance
party involving specialist logistic expertise capable of conducting reconnaissance and
implementing initial in-country arrangements for the receipt of a larger enabling force
and JFLogC HQ. Its size will be consistent with the specialisation required. It should
be based on formed units (HQ Log Bde/RAF ACSSUs/JFHQ Augmentation Manning
List11 (AML)) trained and at high readiness. Its composition should supplement the
10
These strategic assets generally come from 11 Sig Bde. See JWP 6-00, paragraph 245 for further details.
AML. A comprehensive list of nominated specialists drawn from the 3 services who are available to augment the core
JTFHQ Staff as and when required.
11
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range of skills contained within the JTFHQ reconnaissance party including as
appropriate: food services, fuels, Host-Nation Support (HNS), labour resource,
environmental health, movements, local resources/supply (including military contracts
staff), port and maritime and appropriate engineer specialists. Civil Secretariat
(Finance and Contracts) staff are likely to be included in the Party and are essential to
overcome budgetary delay. Their tasks will include:
a.
Identification of availability and suitability of HNS/In Country Resource
(ICR) in order to develop clear planning parameters within both the PJHQ and
JTFHQ, and to secure resources as approved.
b.
Co-ordination of recce and advance party reception including
accommodation, transport and all aspects of life support.
c.
Operating as the advance element of JFLogC HQ, as necessary.
d.
Establishing systems for asset tracking/in transit visibility as early as
possible.
518. Forward Mounting Base Support.12 Responsibility for the selection and
activation of a Forward Mounting Base (FMB), if required, rests with PJHQ. Assets to
run an FMB are not identified in peacetime but are task organised to meet emerging
requirements. Forces deploying into the JOA need to remain intact for future
operations. The FMB task should therefore only fall to the JFLogCC if geographically
appropriate; nevertheless it should be constituted as a discrete element within the LOC
and the JFLogC HQ will require a degree of control over its logistic assets. The status
of an FMB needs careful consideration during planning to ensure integrity and
continuity of support over PJHQ’s coupling bridge into the JOA (or JOAs) is
maintained.
519. Force Field Admin Office. A Joint Force Field Administrative Office is
required to perform Force Cashier and Force Field Records functions for the
maintenance of records for all UK elements of the Joint Force. It also has
responsibility for supporting formation and Deployed Operating Base (DOB) pay and
personnel staffs. Its duties are as follows:
12
A secure base, port or airfield, from which an operation may be launched. It is normally, but not necessarily, external
to the JOA and may be an essential stepping-stone into the theatre. A FMB should have the capacity for an insertion
force to form-up within it and subsequently to be able to handle reinforcements, reserves and evacuees. Depending on
the scale of an operation, the FMB may also be required to provide Force Support functions, requiring logistic C2,
communications and functional units. It may also provide a hub for intra-theatre airlift, therefore both JFAC and JFLogC
HQs will need to arrange clear control arrangements with PJHQ to ensure flexible logistic capability in the JOA is not
compromised.
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a.
Indenting and accounting for, and supplying, cash to formation and
DOB Imprest Account holders.
b.
Maintaining Field Records – The Field Records Section is responsible
for accounting for all manpower in the JOA, including ship-to-ship movement
of personnel, using the Field Record Support System, the Operational
Manpower Information System or AP3/OPLOC. The section must be capable
of deploying at least one data capture team for each POD/POE as well as a
reserve. Practical personnel tracking difficulties should not be underestimated
and plans for ensuring the collation of correct information need to be
considered before the arrival of any personnel in the JOA.
520. Logistic Detachments. In any joint operation there are likely to be JFLogC
units or groupings of units positioned in areas geographically separated from the
FRSA (e.g. FMBs, FLSs, SH units). The JFLogC HQ needs the capability to establish
logistic detachments which can provide the minimum range of essential logistic
support functions at dispersed locations.
521. Movement Control. The JTFHQ Movement Staff are responsible directly for
intra-theatre transport and movements policy and priorities and, in conjunction with
PJHQ, for inter-theatre movements. Therefore there is a close relationship with the
JFLogC HQ which has the closely aligned role of conducting force
reception/redeployment and the co-ordination of movement. In general terms the Joint
Force Movement Staff (JFMS) will deploy early. As the JFLogC becomes mature
there may be a transfer of responsibilities to enable JFHQ elements to be available to
re-deploy on other operations. The minimum JFLogC HQ elements are:
a.
Force Movement Control Centre. The Force Movement Control
Centre (FMCC), in the HQ, plans and co-ordinates in-theatre movements
within JFMS guidelines. The FMCC is tri-Service and based on an established
nucleus augmented from the JFHQ maintained AML. This ensures that the
FMCC has sufficient experienced staff to function effectively and also
provides it with movements and container tracking C2 capabilities at key
nodes. The FMCC necessarily maintains close links with the aeromed
organisation.
b.
Force Movement Control Unit. A Force Movement Control Unit
(FMCU) groups tri-Service theatre movements elements under a unit
Headquarters dealing with detailed reception/embarkation at PODs, as dictated
by the requirement. This unit would be TACOM the JFLogCC and deploys
them to best effect e.g. formed APOE/APOD clearance organisations with
designated commanders and appropriate specialists (Army Port and Maritime
operators, Army and RAF armament specialists/Authorised Representatives
(ARs), Army movements and RAF supply/movements personnel, RN
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POD/POE clearance teams). The FMCU co-ordinates its activities with
supply, transportation, engineering and pioneer units of the JFLogC.
522. Medical. Whilst medical support is increasingly joint (and multinational) in
its delivery, Roles 113 and 2 remain integral to all components. Land based Role 3
support is primarily provided by the Army Medical Services including land
evacuation. The construction of Role 3 facilities for the Land Component and the Air
Component is an Engineer, and sometimes Pioneer, responsibility. The provision of
medical stocks, equipment and drugs on operations is a ‘supply’ responsibility.
Aeromedical evacuation, whether tactical from forward areas or strategic out of theatre
is provided by the RAF. The Maritime Component (afloat) tends to be medically selfsufficient through to Role 3 and may be able to offer Role 3 facilities to other
components, depending on the operational circumstances. While it would rely, where
it can, on subsequent strategic aeromedical evacuation, it must be prepared for slower
evacuation by sea. Medical staffs will need to identify the capability of HN facilities
for the provision of essential specialist capabilities. In practice the medical plan is
closely co-ordinated and joint.14
523. Inventory Control, Prioritisation and Distribution. Inventory control and
prioritisation is fundamental to the economic and efficient operation of the LOC.
Whilst routine individual demands will not normally pass through the HQ, but rather
be extracted using the appropriate supply systems, the JFLogC HQ staff must monitor
the flow against theatre requirements. Supply and distribution units within the
JFLogC will be responsible for receipt, control, accounting, and distribution of
operational logistic stocks to the components, in accordance with JTFHQ’s priorities.
Potential shortfalls or choke points in the system must be visible to the JFLogC staff
who, in turn, request the desired priority from the JTFHQ. J4 staff at JTFHQ will
advise PJHQ directly or via the JFLogC of the priorities for stock to be outloaded.
The PJHQ will direct the order of loading of these stocks from the Base, via the
Defence Logistics Operations Centre or other method as determined by the PJHQ.
Representatives of each Service should be on hand and empowered with compatible
Log IT systems, at Base Depots and at the point of loading to interpret PJHQ’s
instructions, with links to the JFLogC. They represent the JFLogC Rear, ensuring
continuity of the support chain across the Coupling Bridge. The aim is to ensure
visibility, whether through information technology or by human interface, of stocks in
theatre, including stocks held in RFAs.
524. Rear Operations. A wide range of artisan, engineer, pioneer and other force
support tasks exist in the FRSA. There is a requirement, therefore, for a task-
13
The medical Role generally corresponds to the echelon/line of the forces to which the medical unit is assigned; e.g. a
medical unit with a Role 3 capability may also be a third echelon/line unit.
14
For more information, including detailed definitions, see JWP 4-03 ‘Joint Medical Doctrine’.
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organised composite Rear Operations Unit (perhaps based on the HQ of an existing
unit) to undertake the following probable tasks:
a.
Development of force reception, assembly and staging areas including
the provision of operational infrastructure, bulk water and fuel storage as well
as electrical power generation and distribution, maritime re-stow areas and life
support services. Required expertise is likely to include the construction and
maintenance of transit camps and associated facilities using Temporary
Deployable Accommodation and other Expeditionary Camp Infrastructure.
b.
Key point security in the FRSA including security of the JFLogC HQ
itself. The JFLogC HQ and assigned units will need to provide basic levels of
self-protection. Where the threat dictates the need for additional force
protection resources, this will be a matter for the JTFC.
c.
Establishment, control and administration of a force PW cage, where
necessary. It is likely that a separate PW guard force would be required.
d.
Provision of a nucleus of capability to deal with refugee contingencies
where the normal agencies are unprepared and logistic operations are
threatened.
525.
Theatre Postal and Courier. A force PCS unit is essential to:
a.
Receive and distribute courier bags and mail by land and air.
b.
Move Maritime Component courier bags and mail to the FLS.
c.
Provide Post Office counter facilities.
526. Provost. Provost assets will be required to provide the necessary Joint
capability in order to ensure military effectiveness throughout the FRSA up to the
divisional or brigade rear boundary and to support Deployed Operating Bases (DOBs).
Assets may include RMP, centred on a Military Police Line of Communication
Regiment (MP LofC Regt), Military Provost Staff, RAF Police, including elements of
the Tactical Provost Wing, RN Regulators and RM Police. The Commanding Officer
of the LofC MP Regt may also be designated Provost Marshal JFLogC. It is essential
that the Provost Support throughout the Operational LofC and the interface with the
Tactical LofC should remain seamless.
527. Equipment Support. Equipment Support (ES) is often peculiar to Services
and components, with resources held in at first and second line. However, depending
on the nature of the deployment and the commonality of equipment and practices, coordination of ES resources (staff, units and contractors) may be required at the JOA
level. Such support is likely to be best met in the JFLogC HQ.
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528. Personnel Information. A Joint Force Orientation and Briefing Unit is a Joint
unit composed of RN, Army and RAF education staff, supplemented by other experts
that is based initially at the Air Mounting Centre and subsequently at APODs or the
JFLogC HQ for:
a.
Pre-deployment orientation and in-theatre ‘top-up’ briefings.
b.
Orientation handbooks and language cards as appropriate.
c.
A forces newspaper or news sheet where required.
d.
Host-Nation liaison, security and force protection tasks as directed.
529. Force Safety. A grouping responsible for the maintenance of the general
safety of the force may include environmental health, a transport safety, J2 and police
elements. This would contribute to force protection and assist the commander in the
management of environmentally-related operational risk.
Joint Tactical Logistics - Joint Force Logistic Component
• JFLogC marshals scarce resources for the benefit of the whole force.
• It is configured as determined during the estimate and tailored to suit the
operation. JFLogC both co-ordinates tri-service support activity (routine
unit/formation support within a combat component often remains discrete,
reaching back to the strategic Base) as well as controlling joint logistic
operations (RSOI, rehabilitation, redeployment).
• JFLogC incorporates both joint staff expertise (which can also assist JTFHQ)
and component units for actual delivery of joint support in the JOA (or theatre).
• JTFC can reassign units between components, including JFLogC to achieve
maximum effect on his main effort.
• Some tactical activities rely on a joint organisational framework as embodied in
a JFLogC– especially Medical, Finance, Movements, Provost, Supply and
Distribution, Infrastructure and some equipment support.
• Trained and experienced staff are key to delivering an effective JFLogC.
• JFLogCC requires sufficient authority over contributing assets to deliver
effective and efficient support.
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ANNEX 5A – GENERIC TASKS FOR THE JOINT FORCE
LOGISTIC COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS BY PHASE
OF OPERATION
Phase
Task
Output
JTFC Directive
+ Logistic Annexes
+ MEDPLAN.
Advise JTFC on the support elements place in Detailed Deployment Plan
the Desired Order of Arrival (DOA).
(DDP).
Review and refine the support elements of the JFET.
JFET, measured against the specific
operational context.
Activate LOC in JOA.
OPLAN - LOC Build up.
Pre-deployment
Monitoring preparation of force elements to
DOA Amendments to the
meet DOA.
DDP.
Create JFLogC HQ.
Trained C2 structure
Produce Asset Tracking/Information Plan.
CIS + Life Spt.
Integrate JFLogC with other Components and JFLogC Directive
JTFHQ.
Staff Rhythm; R2; Tasks.
Deployment
Theatre Activation. Force Protection.
SUPLAN – LOC.
Operate LOC in the JOA.
RSOI of the Force. Asset Tracking.
SUPLAN – RSOI.
Field Records.
Provost.
Sustainment
Supply. Asset Tracking.
SUPLAN – SUSTAIN.
Equipment Maintenance.
Intra-theatre movement. Provost.
Infrastructure development.
HNS and ICR liaison/management.
Contracts management. Medical Support.
Cash Accounts + Banking.
Post and Courier.
Redeployment
Planning.
SUPLAN – JOA Exit.
De-bombing. Packing.
Movement control. Provost.
Asset Tracking.
Closure of JOA
Accounts. Contracts closure.
Statement of accounts.
Make good infrastructure.
Survey of infrastructure.
Hazardous waste.
Audit of waste disposal.
Hand back
Return/Recovery of Husbandry.
Assessment of remaining
Assets
Refurbishment.
Operational Capability.
Repackaging.
Lessons Identified
Submit Lessons Identified to JTFHQ.
Adjust doctrine or procedures
for future operations where
necessary.
Planning
Reconnaissance.
Support the JTFC estimate.
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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
5A-2
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Planning
Part 3 Planning
PART 3
JWP 4-00
CHAPTER 6 – PLANNING
‘To provide the resources which strategy requires, logisticians must
participate in the making of strategy, not only in the planning phase of
a campaign, but every step of the way’.1
SECTION I – THE PLANNING FRAMEWORK
601. Constituents of Planning. In essence logistic planning is about determining
the ‘art of the possible’. Logistic planning and subsequent operations must be
versatile, complementary to the mission aim, fully integrated within all phases of the
combat planning process and conducted in a joint and combined environment. The
planning process is described below and diagrammatically at Figure 6.1; it is not a
wholly sequential process and a substantial degree of concurrent planning takes place,
given the complex interfaces involving multiple agencies. In scope the chapter will
deal with:
a.
Overview of the logistic Planning Process.
b.
Decision-making – Mission Analysis and the Estimate.
c.
The Sustainability Statement.
d.
Generic Options for Delivery of Support.
Overview of the Planning Process
602. Planning Teams. As the crisis develops, key planning teams, including
logistics representatives, are formed as follows:2
a.
MOD: Reporting to the Contingency Operations Group (COG), attended
by Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) HQ D Ops and Director Medical
Operational Capability, are:
(1) A Strategic Planning Group (SPG) to take a long term view of the
crisis, identifying and evaluating strategic options.
(2) A Current Commitment Team (CCT) to monitor the crisis and
issue strategic planning guidance to the Permanent Joint Headquarters
(PJHQ). The CCT will usually operate out of the Defence Crisis
Management Centre (DCMC).
1
2
Thomas M Kane ‘Military Logistics and Strategic Performance’.
JWP 0-01 ‘United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations’ (UKOPSDOC), paras 513-516.
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b.
Permanent Joint Headquarters:
(1)
A Contingency Planning Team (CPT) led by J5 to monitor
events and develop operational level plans.
(2)
An Operations Team (OT) is set up if an operation receives
political assent and is activated, with the CPT J3 representative leading
the OT.
CRISIS
MOD
Form CCT
MOD HQ:
Multinat Logs
HNS MOUs
Input to Strategic
Estimate
Strategic Est
Sustainability
Statement
Log ORBAT
Log C2
PJHQ
JTFHQ
Form CPT
with J4 incl
Mov & Med
m
Deve lop
Distance
Destination
Demand
Inf
or
Duration
m
JSOR
Supporting
Commands
emen
ility Stat
ustainab
en t of S
t
DLO
SG
DLO HQ rep
within CCT
DTMA
Logistic input to Strategic Estimate
s
Resources
Sources
C2 & LoCs
Orbat
CONOPS
Operational Est
Campaign Log
Policy & Pris
FET
JFET
Command and
CDL/DTMA/SG
Input and Advice
throughout
DOA
DOAST
DDP
Mounting
Reception, Staging, Onward Mov & Integration
Resupply/Evac Ops
Figure 6.1 – The Logistic Planning Process
603. CDS Planning Directive. Planning3 begins with warnings from the Defence
Intelligence Staff (DIS) and from J2 in PJHQ, but the formal process actually starts
when CDS issues a planning directive, including fundamental assumptions influencing
logistics, to PJHQ and the Supporting Commands. This normally requires MOD jointly with PJHQ and relevant single Service Commanders – to conduct a military
strategic estimate followed by a detailed Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ)
estimate. In parallel, a Sustainability Statement will be developed. The JTFHQ
estimate, whilst focussed at the operational level, will often require consideration of
detailed joint tactical logistic issues as well.
3
Described in detail in JWP 0-10 ‘UKOPSDOC’ Chapter 5 & 7.
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604. Joint Commander’s and Joint Task Force Commander’s Directives. MOD
draws on PJHQ and Service advice to produce the CDS Directive to the Joint
Commander. This is interpreted by PJHQ which produces the Jt Comd’s Mission
Directive to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) detailing the mission, scale of
forces, type of operation and command arrangements. He, in turn, issues his own
directive (the JTFC’s Directive) to component commanders outlining the Campaign
Plan. In addition to the concept of operation and forces involved, key issues requiring
definition in the directives are:
a.
Sustainability Statement. Each level of directive contains a
Sustainability Statement which becomes progressively more detailed as
information and the level of command permits/requires (See paragraph 621).
b.
Finance and Audit Trail. A section on finance should identify Unit
Identification Numbers and a Special Operation Code to provide an audit trail
for operational expenditure. It should also outline accounting procedures
(noting that pre-deployment costs normally lie where they fall as authorised
overspends).
605. Reconnaissance. Strategic and Operational reconnaissance takes place,
sometimes concurrently, with representatives from J4 PJHQ, J1/J4 JTFHQ Staff, and
the Commands as circumstances permit. Early identification of resources available in
the Joint Operations Area (JOA) can be of great utility for future operations, although
the situation can sometimes change between the reconnaissance and the actual
deployment, so close monitoring of such resources – by logistic specialists where
necessary and feasible – should be maintained. Information requirements include (but
are not limited to): topography, climate, entry points, infrastructure including electrical
power, water, waste & sewage disposal, indigenous economic and industrial capacity,
sources of food, materiel, transport, fuel and utilities, medical standards and facilities,
storage facilities, endemic disease, demography (including indigenous workforce
skills), cultural, ethnic or religious restrictions and possible psychological features
arising from the operation. Good logistic reconnaissance will identify major shortfalls
and influence planning.
SECTION II –THE DECISION PROCESS
606. ‘UKOPSDOC’4 describes the outline Joint Estimate, with guidelines for the
Mission Analysis as applicable for the SPG’s high level political analysis, PJHQ’s
Military Strategic Estimate (MSE) and the JTFC’s estimate. The estimate format5
incorporates elements of relevance to logistic staffs, however, it is important that a
4
‘UKOPSDOC’ Chapter 7, with an outline Joint Estimate at Annex 7B.
The seven stages of a Joint Estimate are: Review of the Situation; Mission Analysis; Evaluation of Factors;
Commander’s Guidance; CoA development; Consideration of CoA and the Commander’s Decision.
5
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comprehensive logistic estimate is carried out in parallel with the Commander’s
estimate (see Figure 6.2) to:
a.
Provide the information needed for the Commander’s estimate at each
level of estimate and particularly for the stages ‘evaluation of factors’,
‘Course(s) of Action (CoA) Development’ and ‘consideration of CoA’.
b.
Identify the optimum means of meeting the Commander’s support
requirements for his plan.
Joint Estimate
Log Input (Jt Log Estimate)
- Strat Mil - DCMC/PJHQ J5
- JFTC’s Estimate - JTFHQ
- Strat Mil - J4 (also J1 and Med)
Directive
Mission Analysis
Mission Analysis
Factor Analysis
Factor Analysis
Log
Implications
COA
Log
Direction
COA
Direction
Next estimate Level
Fig 6.2 – Logistic input to the Joint Estimate.
607. It will often also be necessary to refine and update detail as the Commander’s
estimate is developed. Supporting Figure 6.1, this section offers general guidance and
provides (at Annex 6A) a generic logistic estimate format, with mission analysis,
which may be adapted to suit the level required.
608. A logistic estimate, should be completed for each of the strategic, operational6
and tactical levels. This way, the mission, specific tasks and constraints for the next
level can be formally established. Although it is a separate formal process, it must be
completely in line with the Commander’s estimate as logistic factors are likely to be
6
Where a single staff (such as PJHQ) is charged with producing a logistic estimate at the strategic and operational levels,
the estimates should normally be completed separately and sequentially.
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fundamental to the overall plan. The process has no neat boundaries, however, as
higher-level estimates can also require tactical inputs – such as to identify where
tactical logistics can be carried out jointly through ad hoc ORBATs or arrangements.
The Estimate: Mission Analysis
609. General. The aim of the logistician’s mission analysis should be to identify
the focus of staff effort, by logical means. Its output will be direction on the detailed
study of limited options, so it is important that care be taken to ensure these are right.
The process allows the ACOS J1/J4 at PJHQ, DCOS JFHQ or the logistic commander
to concentrate on the single operational end-state, the Logistic main effort (there may
be more than one) and the elements of the plan which are likely to become Decisive
Points.7 Most importantly it should consolidate the logisticians’ Critical Information
Requirements which, in turn, may feed into the Commander’s Critical Information
Requirements (CCIR) and are required for the evaluation of factors. The gathering of
logistic CCIR should be conducted in parallel and equal priority with the operational
intelligence effort. Whenever the situation changes, in light of fulfilled CCIRs or
otherwise, the mission analysis should be rechecked for continued relevance.
610. Analysis Elements. Whilst such specified tasks as ‘deploy’, ‘receive’,
‘sustain’ and ‘redeploy the force’ will be common to all operations, individual
constraints will normally differ each time. Implied tasks may demand the majority of
logistic effort. The line of communication will need to be robust and continuous,
however identification during Mission Analysis of key logistic considerations - the
likely logistic main effort and associated critical conditions, capability requirements
and vulnerabilities – will help to ensure that potential choke points receive special
attention. The logistics mission analysis should serve to highlight areas, particularly in
terms of security or force levels to be utilised, where support from other force
elements may be required in order to overcome likely constrictions. These points can
then be fed in early to the formal estimate process.
611. Logistic Main Effort. The Log Main Effort may not necessarily prove to be
the same as the operational main effort, although all logistic activity must contribute to
achievement of the operational endstate. For example, noting the importance of
foresight, while initial Gulf War combat arm effort was directed towards training, the
logistic main effort was pre-positioning stocks and hospitals to support the next phase
in the campaign.
The Estimate: Consideration of Factors and Courses of Action
612. Consideration of Factors. Detailed analysis of the specific areas identified in
the Mission Analysis normally leads to identification of logistic Courses of Action
7
These will often include: Forces Ready In Theatre; Establishment of Stable Sustainment; Rehabilitation; Redeployment.
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(CsoA) for wider consideration within the Commander’s estimate, and ultimately to
the logistic plan. Inevitably, logistic input will identify broad options and constraints
at an early stage, then refine the detail as logistic intelligence clarifies what really is
possible. The aim is to provide clear and balanced input to the Campaign Plan.
Outputs should be in terms of capabilities required, be they troops to task, services,
communications, liaison and IT or stocks.
613. The Four ‘D’s. In addressing the logistic estimate, factors should be
considered in terms of the fundamental elements of determining the logistic capability
requirement, as described in Chapter 1: the ‘Four Ds’. As applicable to personnel as to
materiel and services they are: Destination, Distance, Demand and Duration.
Analysis of these and the generation of the Sustainability Statement identify required
lead times, costs and the national ability to make available sufficient resources. The
latter includes: the requirement to activate, open or reconstitute industrial
infrastructure, manufacturing lead times for top up stocks or Urgent Operational
Requirements8 (UORs), the potential speed of deployment and the need for additional
strategic movement resources, the establishment of the Lines of Communication
(LOC) and the rate at which combat power can be built-up. Above all, the commander
must consider the implications of indecision and delay in committing resources.
Unless bold investment in preparatory action is taken, downstream operational delays
will result – it is normally very difficult to make major alterations to the plan,
particularly involving the relocation of assets.
614. Logistic Courses of Action. There may be a limited number of variations to
the Courses of Action as analysis of each of the many factors in conjunction with the
Sustainability Statement, will often produce a preferred method of action. These
Logistic CsoA must be integrated with the Commander’s estimate process, either
before or during development of his own campaign CsoA. Substantial variations are
likely to revolve around different LOC options, whether or not to use a Forward
Mounting base (FMB) and the extent of multinational or non-UK military support to
be undertaken. In prioritising the logistic CsoA in order of preference the logistic staff
must identify the unique benefits afforded by each CoA, in terms of benefit to the
specific operation as well as to wider support commitments such as concurrent
operations.
Joint Estimate at the Strategic Level
615. Strategic Input to CDS Planning Directive. MOD, in preparation of CDS’
Planning Directive to the Joint Commander (Jt Comd), must consider certain
fundamental issues to ensure that Permanent Joint Headquarters planning parameters
are set. Whilst unlikely to be in the form of a detailed estimate, the logistic input to
this should be a distillation of the SPG’s assessment of the duration of the operation
8
These include the stocks, spares publications, training and special tools needed to support new equipment.
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(from a geo-political perspective) as well as the expected levels and degree of intensity
of effort. Sufficient early strategic assessment should be undertaken to fulfil the needs
of the CDS Planning Directive which should include a statement of logistic capability.
This will include information on the limitations on, and requirements for, critical
logistic assets, the need to plan for in-theatre training, concurrency with other
operations, movement constraints and guidance on the use of pre-existing
arrangements, such as MOUs. Early cost and resource implications will inevitably be
called for at this stage.
616.
Military Strategic Estimate. PJHQ lead (with MoD input) on production of
the Military Strategic Estimate (MSE), which identifies the capabilities required from
the Supporting Commands and warns DLO HQ staff of the pending resource uptake.
The output is used both for the production of the CDS Directive (the generic Logistic
Annex template, normally ‘F’, can be seen at Annex 6B) and to inform the JTFC’s
estimate. In developing logistic considerations, an expansion of the ‘Four D’s’
approach is required, and appropriate elements of the generic logistic estimate (Annex
6A) may be used. At this level, the emphasis will be on:
a.
Joint Issues. Early assessment of the type of force which may deploy
and the options for a joint logistic structure. A key output will be the decision
on the scope for use of a JFLogC and timely nomination of a JFLogCC.
b.
Movements. Strategic movement – including availability, loop times,
an FMB or other staging/basing opportunities.
c.
Sustainability. Sustainability issues (as determined in the sustainability
statement) focussing on:
(1) Logistic influences of the climatic and other physical geographic
conditions.
(2) The status of critical equipments, stocks and other ‘service’ assets
relative to the possible levels of activity.
(3) Commodities which are preferably acquired on behalf of the
complete joint force from commercial sources or closer to the region of
the JOA, such as bulk fuel, water and rations. These commodities are
often subject to the fluctuating dynamics of the markets. Rapid
identification of sourcing is required.
d.
Multinational Issues. The logistic influence and potential benefits of
coalition operations, including the scope to assist other nations, or receive
support from them.
e.
Affordability. The likely cost of supporting the operation.
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617. Incorporation of Supporting Organisations into Decision Process. The
information needed to satisfy all the sustainability demands of the MSE are unlikely to
be available to PJHQ staff directly. For reasons of operational security it will often be
desirable to minimise involvement in the process, however, in order to ensure that a
complete picture is achieved, suitable linkages should be arranged not simply with the
Directors of Operations, but also with:
a.
Defence Logistics Organisation Headquarters. By involving DG
Ops, a complete picture of sustainability can be achieved and constraints on
the operation identified before planning advances too far. DG Ops staff
replicate the J5 contingency planning area of DLO for operations and are
therefore in a position to co-ordinate and provide the strategic advice necessary
from with DLO. This co-ordination becomes necessary as Front Line
Commands (through the Directors of Operations) become involved in elements
of the planning, and will seek information from sub-ordinate environmental
pillars. At an agreed point – often on completion of the MSE – DLO HQ will
pass co-ordinating responsibility to DG Defence Supply Chain (Def SC) in the
way that PJHQ J5 passes planning responsibility to J3 as an operation is
activated.
b.
Surgeon General’s Department. In order to optimise the medical
capability embedded within the Services, Director Medical Operational
Capability in the Surgeon General’s Department (SGD) should be involved.
Close liaison between SGD and DLO HQ will be required to ensure that
Medical Supplies (a DLO responsibility) can meet likely requirements.
c.
Director General Service Personnel Policy. Director General Service
Personnel Policy (DG SP Pol) should be involved to advice on issues
concerning Sustainment of Personnel.9
Joint Estimate at the Operational Level
618. Logistic input to the Joint Task Force Commander’s Operational
Estimate. The Strategic Estimate leads to the JTFC’s Operational Estimate and the
Supporting Commands identify the forces required. Component commanders,
including a JFLogCC if the operation warrants it, should have been nominated by this
point. The logistic estimate, now providing information for the JTFC’s operational
estimate, is a development of that produced for the MSE, and remains an iterative and
consultative process that cannot be undertaken in isolation. The estimate and
assessment of courses of action leads to the formulation of the logistic plan which
becomes part of the Joint Commander’s Directive and subsequently the JTFC’s
9
See JWP 1-00 ‘Joint Personnel Administration’ due to be promulgated in 2003.
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Campaign Plan. The estimate must be conducted so that sufficient time for
preparatory action is allowed.
619. Scope. It is essential that the operation is examined as an overall system
incorporating Maritime, Land, Air, Special Forces components, the Base and the
essential integration of Communication and Information Systems (CIS), most likely
within a Coalition environment. All must be analysed and the implications for logistic
support identified and matched against available resources.
Estimate at the Joint Tactical Level.
620. Joint Force Logistic Component Commander. Where practical the
JFLogCC will have been consulted before or during the operational level estimate.
Following a similar form of logistic estimate appropriate at the joint tactical
(component) level, he and his staff will consider the practical issues of meeting the
JTFC’s remit. As described in Chapter 5 his input to the wider planning process and
the scope for joint logistic activity and co-ordination will be determined by the nature
of the operation.
621. Sustainability Statement. A Sustainability Statement confirms the overall
logistic resources available and, if not given before, provides the authority for the
release and commitment of finance and materiel. Where demand can be quantified
accurately, it is easier to design an economic, effective and efficient system for
delivery. An estimate, by definition, is inexact, and circumstances will often change as
time goes on. Anticipated demand must therefore be predicted by an iterative analysis,
perhaps incorporating formal Operational Analysis, the aim of which is to produce a
progressively more accurate estimate out of which falls a Sustainability Statement.
The more accurate the analysis during the initial estimate and planning stages, the
better will be the operational sustainability baseline. Sustainability Statements are
issued by the superior commander at the strategic and operational level in consultation
with lower commanders. Sustainability statements fulfil two purposes crucial to
mission success. First, the Statement is the commander’s direction to staff planners
and resource allocators on what needs to be delivered. Secondly, it defines the level of
resources made available to the campaign from the finite quantities made available
through the Departmental Plan or UOR/HNS action.
622. Modification. Statements will normally be modified in the light of experience
as the campaign progresses and individual operations or phases within the campaign
may require their own statement (at the tactical level being a part of formal orders).
Long manufacturing lead times and the momentum of the initial Statement may make
significant short notice changes in direction difficult to accommodate. Time spent on
careful analysis and prediction is invariably well spent; it may not always be available.
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623. Production. Production of the Statement is an integral part of the operational
planning sequence. Whilst the commander need not know the detail of how to
construct a Statement, he should be broadly aware of the process and factors by which
it is obtained. An illustrative example of a Sustainability Statement is at Annex 6C.
Statements will normally include:
a.
Theatre climatic, environmental, topographical and human factors which
influence logistic requirements.
b.
The mission essential equipment and availability requirements.
c.
The level of self-sustainment required in theatre.
d.
The expected duration of the operation.
e.
The anticipated battlespace daily usage, with the anticipated high and
low levels of utilisation of materiel.
f.
The predicted casualty rate for men, either from battle or disease and
non-battle injuries, and equipment.
Implications of the Estimate Process
624. Synchronisation. Decisions arising from the estimate process must be
integrated into tactical planning so that the tempo of support matches that for battle.
To maintain operational balance and tempo, foresight is key. Logistic effort must be
synchronised with combat and combat support effort such that the right effect is
produced at the right place at the right time. The use of a synchronisation matrix
covering operational and logistic issues can be of use at this stage.
625. Joint Task Force Commander’s Campaign Plan. JWP 3-00 ‘Joint
Operations’10 describes in detail the preparation of the Campaign Plan. As it is
produced, there may be a requirement to incorporate Logistic Lines of Operation with
sequenced DPs. See Annex 6D for details.
626. Notice to Move and Readiness in Theatre. It is a ministerial prerogative to
reduce Notice to Move (NTM) – an essentially tactical time line. Preparatory activity,
particularly in the Base Area, depends on early decisions. On reduction of NTM,
PJHQ/JFHQ staffs the Augmentee Manning List (AML) and the JTFC and component
commanders can conduct preparatory activity. Reduction of NTM, therefore, governs
the start of events. Readiness in Theatre (RIT) is arrived at through a reverse time
estimate. It sets the JTFC’s earliest possible commencement of operations (normally
10
JWP 3-00 Chapter 4, with an outline Campaign Plan at Annex 4D. This will be included in JWP 5-00 ‘Joint
Operations Planning’ due to be promulgated in 2004.
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the assembly of a balanced force) and is politically and militarily more instructive
since it is of direct operational and possibly strategic use.
627. Planning the Deployment. Following the estimate, the deployment planning
is taken forward, incorporating production of the Joint Force Element Table (JFET),
Desired order of Arrival (DOA) and the Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP). The
process is described in more detail at the beginning of chapter 7.
SECTION III – FORCE GENERATION AND MULTINATIONAL
PLANNING
628. We have seen that there is an increasing tendency for UK forces to become
involved in operations as part of a larger, multinational force. The potential for local
efficiencies and economies of scale to be made by reducing national logistic
stovepipes and by sharing responsibility between contributing nations is attractive. In
particular, scarce resources can be acquired and controlled with the minimum of
conflict and at a reasonable price. Nevertheless, other nations’ methods of operation
and support can be sufficiently different to those of UK, to demand scrutiny of the
value of a multinational approach to operations. The end result may be common but
detailed support arrangements are often uniquely national.
629. It is common practice to plan the UK support required for a UK contingent
first, and then identify opportunities for Multinational Support, with a detailed
Statement of Requirement (SOR). However, successful planners will adopt a flexible
approach to multinational potential as the situation develops. Opportunities for
providing support within a multinational framework can involve the use of:
a.
National Assets. These may be military assets organic to the deploying
forces, or national civil facilities and services in the home base or deployed
forward to benign support areas under the CONDO11 contract CON LOG or
other contracted arrangements.
b.
Host-Nation Support. Host-Nation Support (HNS) is support obtained
from the civilian and military governmental resources within the country in
which a force is deployed. The assumption is that it has been pre-arranged, if
only in principle.
c.
In Country/In Joint Operations Area Resources. This is support
normally acquired through competitive tendering directly from market sources
in the JOA, rather than through a host government.
11
CON LOG is the single over-arching Contractors on Deployed Operations logistic contract.
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d.
Coalition or Alliance-Controlled Arrangements. There are a broad
range of multinational support arrangements which may be employed. Whilst
some may be appropriate for warfighting operations, yet more will be
appropriate for peace support.
(1)
Force Co-ordinated or Controlled Support through a
Multinational Joint Logistic Centre.12 Whilst support remains a
national responsibility mechanisms exist for co-operative logistics. The
most appropriate co-ordination body may be a Multinational Logistic
Centre (MJLC).
(2)
Lead Nation and Role Specialist Nation Logistic Support.
Certain logistic responsibilities are undertaken by one nation on behalf
of one, or more other nations.
(3) Multinational Units. Nations contribute assets to provide
capabilities under an agreed level of control of the Force Commander,
such as Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILU) or Multinational
Integrated Medical Units (MIMU).
e.
Mutual Logistic Support. Where appropriate, support can be
exchanged with coalition partners or Allies operating from the same base or in
the same JOA either on a bilateral or multilateral basis.
f.
Contracting on the International Market. Contracts can be let for
support services to operations such as food supply, provision of transport
(including strategic lift), bulk water, POL, accommodation, and storage.
Contracting may be undertaken collectively or by UK alone.
National Assets
630. Military Assets. The first force-planning stages will naturally consider
national military logistic assets for provision of an optimum force-element mix to suit
the joint nature of the operation. Within the estimate process the ‘Troops to Task’ will
have a number of potential options based on the differing balance or approach
required. Political considerations may influence these decisions. Having established
which logistic tasks require assets and which constraints prevail, PJHQ can then
identify support from other sources (as discussed below) or request specific force
package contributions and advice from, amongst others, HQ FLEET, HQ LAND, HQ
STC, DLO and SGD. Logistic forces will primarily be part of the Maritime, Land, Air
or Logistic Components (where all Components are required). Whilst there will be a
tendency to over-insure, greatest cohesion of the joint force will be achieved where it
12
NATO Doctrine for an MJLC is set out in AJP-4.6A, ‘Multinational Joint Logistic Centre’. Arrangements based on
this doctrine may be used even in non-NATO situations where all participants are in agreement.
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has been possible to pre-empt excessive overlaps or duplication of capability between
collocated Components. Whilst the planning remains at the operational level, the
involvement of a JFLogCC at this point will assist in identifying the potential for
economy of scale, whilst recognising readiness criteria and the individual support
needs of each Component.
631. National Support Elements. Command of national logistic elements within
the Maritime/Land/Air components is likely to be retained by National Contingent
Commanders (NCC) and exercised through National Support Elements (NSEs). The
senior UK logistician in theatre will command the UK NSE and perform a function
analogous to that of the JFLogCC in national joint operations. In addition, Comd UK
NSE may be required to command an Area of Operations (AO) if so directed. The
size and composition of the UK NSE will be dependent on the scale and complexity of
their operation.
632. Call-out of Reservists. One of the key decisions to be made is on the use of
Reserves, particularly considering the operational timelines. This is a Ministerial
decision and under the Reserve Forces Act 1996 call out, for peacekeeping,
humanitarian and disaster relief operations as well as warlike operations, is permitted.
Ideally, early-deploying critical logisticians’ appointments should not be filled by
reservists, however, two new categories of Reserve have been established which may
increase flexibility:
a.
High Readiness Reserve. High Readiness Reserve consists of
individuals who voluntarily, and with their employer’s consent (if applicable),
accept an increased call out liability. They are specialists in their field and few
in number.
b.
Sponsored Reserves. Sponsored Reserves are MOD contractors
retained to provide an identical capability - if mobilised.
CONDO and CON LOG
633. CONDO. Inherent in virtually every operation has been a requirement for
deployed contractor support. Historically this has been under the auspices of existing
contracturual arrangements or on an ad hoc basis. In either case common standards
have been applied to contractor conditions of service, preparation and training. The
way in which we have contracted support at short notice also raised the question of
whether value for money is achieved. The CONDO initiative addresses these issues in
2 parts. CONDO personnel policy seeks to harmonise a number of personnel issues in
existing and future contracts. The harmonisation process will take some time to
complete (via contract re-let or amendment for existing contracts) but should ensure
both the Operational Commander and the contractor has a common understanding of
how contractors will work in the unique conditions in operational theatres.
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634. CONLOG. The term CONLOG is used to describe a non-exclusive enabling
contract with a single Prime Contractor, administered in the PJHQ J4 Division by the
CONLOG Planning Team. Designed to make better use of contracted support, it will
be a draw on a Prime Contractor’s capabilities by embedding his staff into the PJHQ
planning process. The prime contract has been designed to be wide ranging and
reduce or remove the need to compete services at an early stage of an operation when
speed is often a key factor. In the execution phase of any operation a contractor
management team will be deployed to theatre to co-ordinate the delivery of contracted
support.
635. Policy. The CONDO Policy Unit, within the DLO, is responsible for the
development of CONDO policy, while the CONLOG Planning Team leader is
responsible for the development of CONLOG procedures.
Multinational Opportunities
636. The scope for multinationality (including the use of HNS) must be directly
linked to the question: ‘Can UK’s overall capability be enhanced by the involvement
of HNS or logistic arrangements with other nations in the scenario under
consideration?’ Other nations will be asking themselves a similar question and
identifying where multinational arrangements will conflict with their national interest,
forcing them to veto or ‘red card’ specific issues. To assist the estimate process,
understanding a number of benefits and constraints help:
a.
Benefits.
(1) Resource Husbandry. Sourcing support from another nation can
reduce the strain on the UK’s organic military support system,
particularly in terms of manpower and equipment. This allows greater
potential to meet additional or more challenging commitments.
(2) Reduced Deployment Package. Where deployment resources
are at a premium, strategic lift space can be allocated to other assets,
potentially advancing the UK Force’s Readiness in Theatre time.
(3) Exploitation of Others’ Unique Capabilities. Where a specific
UK function, capability or expertise is unavailable, provision from
elsewhere may be the only option available.
(4) Optimising the Logistic Footprint. Optimising the logistic
footprint of all participating nations can make for a substantially reduced
resource demand, particularly as each coalition member’s support
elements will often exceed the supported units.
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(5) Increased Interoperability. As multinational or alternative
support methods are employed, so interoperability and trust, through
learning and experience, is enhanced.
b.
Constraints.
(1) Availability, Capability and Standards Interoperability.
Provision or supply of support services from sources other than military
may not be of an acceptable standard or guaranteed to be adequately
available. Small risks in this area could be managed through close
monitoring of a provider’s capability and service delivery processes,
with fallback options, however serious concerns over critical services
are likely to cancel out any multinationality benefits.
(2) Willingness of Provider. Adequate access to support will
depend on the willingness and priorities of the provider.
(a) Unforeseen political drivers, legal constraints or the need to
support own forces, may prevent access to key elements of
support that had been previously agreed. Close liaison between
UK logistic staff and the providing nation or agency will be
essential, as will the capability to generate sufficient contingent
capacity to replace any shortfall – for example in HNS or other
forms of support.
(b) In a Mutual Logistics Support context, the effectiveness of
an arrangement can be limited if the flow of support becomes a
one-way street in which one nation seeks to exploit another.
Host-Nation Support
637. Scope. HNS relies on the government of a nation providing support from its
own resources to one or more nations operating in or through that country. The
assistance may be free of charge, loaned or provided on a repayment basis and may
range from generating the political framework to ensuring forces are not hindered in
their deployment, or to the provision of facilities and equipment. At its most basic, it
can cover the standard classes of supply including food and water, fuel, and
ammunition; but it can also extend to the use of equipment, services, training areas,
force protection, port, airfield, movement co-ordination and medical facilities13 as well
as other major items of the HN’s infrastructure and resources such as electrical power,
waste & sewage disposal, barracks and railways. HNS does not include direct
13
Significant national standards apply to the use of certain commodities and services, for example the grade of fuel used
for aircraft, the quality of medical facilities and hygiene procedures in the provision of foodstuffs. Commanders will
need to balance the requirements of UK Health and Safety regulations with the operational circumstances.
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contracting by the deploying force (termed In Country Resources (ICR)), but it can
cover situations where the HN acts as an agent to obtain logistic support from
commercial sources on behalf of the deploying Force.
638. Host-Nation Support in NATO and Beyond. The HNS concept and
associated procedures have been developed over time amongst Allied Nations in
NATO. A specific definition,14 planning framework and templates are published in
AJP-4.5 ‘Allied Joint Host-Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures’. Nevertheless,
HNS has relevance beyond NATO and is applicable to any nation, although its likely
success is linked to the extent and flexibility of pre-arranged agreements between the
Sending Nation and the Host Nation.
639. Host-Nation Support Arrangements. Where the opportunity exists, such as
with NATO, other international organisations or prospective Host Nations with which
there are frequent dealings, Host-Nation Support Arrangements (HNSA) can be drawn
up using an agreed process. Such a process is most appropriate to larger scale
operations/exercises and (as detailed in AJP-4.5, for example) includes the drawing up
of an overarching MOU of principle, with a Technical Arrangement (TA) and any
number of Implementing Arrangements (IA) to cover procedures. As a number of
other nations or Headquarters structures may be involved, the provision of a clear
hierarchy of agreements can be essential, however a significant time factor may be
involved.
a.
Memorandum of Understanding. An MOU is the umbrella document
providing a framework for lower level documents. It is normally concluded
between the HN and the SN, but for multinational operations can be between
the HN and an international organisation such as NATO, the EU or the UN.
Once signed it implies an intent or willingness of the HN to support the force
on its territory. An MOU will generally cover the principles of support and
address aspects such as responsibilities, finance, and claims. Jurisdiction may
be covered in the MOU or in a separate Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
For small-scale operations or exercises, an MOU might be a standalone
document addressing both the principles and procedures with detailed
requirements dealt with in Annexes.
b.
A Technical Arrangement. A TA is a subordinate document to an
MOU. Its specific purpose will depend upon the scale of the support
requirement. In larger scale operations, the TA is likely to be a generic,
intermediate document addressing the broad procedural aspects of support of
an operation and providing the vehicle for the development of lower-level
implementing arrangements. For smaller scale operations, the TA would act as
14
NATO definition: ‘Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other
forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation’s territory’.
AAP-6 4/10/2000.
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an implementing document focussing on detailed support issues. The TA is
widely used in NATO and could be a bilateral or multilateral document.
c.
An Implementing Arrangement. An IA is the lowest level of
subordinate document to either an MOU or a TA and could be used to execute
the support requirements for a specific operation. The IA will incorporate the
detailed information of the SN’s Statement of Requirements (SOR) for HNS
that have been validated by site reconnaissance visits. In larger scale NATO
operations and exercises, the document would be called a Joint Implementation
Arrangement (JIA), supplementing a generic TA by covering functional or site
specific issues such as base support requirements and procedures, payment
terms etc. The implementation of HNS plans should be managed and coordinated by a single in-theatre authority (JFLogC HQ) on behalf of the JTFC.
640. Figure 6.3 shows an example of an HNSA structure for a large-scale NATO-led
operation.
Between either
NATO/SN & HN
Memorandum
Understanding (MOU)
Between either
NATO/SN & HN
Technical
Arrangement
Between
NATO, SN & HN
JIA
JIA
Principles of
support
Generic
procedure
JIA
Function or
Site related
Figure 6.3 – HNSA Structure for a NATO-led Operation
641. Control of UK Host-Nation Support Issues. HNS co-ordination and control
is exercised at the different levels as follows:
a.
Strategic. DLO HQ Ops provides overall co-ordination of the
international Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and associated
Arrangements, and can provide templates. A range of MOUs already exists
between UK and other nations, and between UK and Alliance partners. These
may cover general support agreements or be limited to certain areas, such as
assistance with overseas exercises. MOUs are recorded in DLO’s ARTEMIS
database which identifies the nature of the support arrangement and the
custodian of the MOU, and should be the first step in the process of
establishing HNS options.
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b.
Operational. Using the linkages and opportunities identified at the
strategic level, PJHQ will normally control the development of operational
MOUs and production of the more detailed TA or IA in consultation with
JFHQ or the deployed JTFHQ. HNS information to support the estimate can
be gleaned from NATO nations’ HN Capability Catalogues (where they exist),
Defence Attachés, Regional Joint Planning Guides, commercial databases and
J2-sponsored documents. PJHQ J4 co-ordinates single Service HNS
requirements with JTFHQ J4 leading the Operations Liaison Reconnaissance
Team (OLRT).
c.
Tactical. It will often be the JFLogC staff who are best placed to coordinate detailed adjustments to HNSA, although these will normally need to
be made directly between MOD and the Host Nation.
d.
Host-Nation Support within a Multinational Operation. Within a
multinational operation the Force Commander may be involved in coordinating and prioritising HNS requirements in order to achieve greater
flexibility, mobility and efficiency for his force. NATO’s procedures15 (AJP4.5) are well advanced and the EU has specific guidelines also. For coalition
ventures the importance of bi-lateral arrangements remains high, but use of
principles agreed within a NATO framework could be made to ensure that no
key elements are missed. The fundamental principle is that nations should not
be competing for the same resources, particularly where forces are collocated
at the same base. Co-operation should prevail over competition and a (NATOstyle) MJLC - when deployed sufficiently early - could co-ordinate SN forces’
Strategic Reconnaissance visits on a combined and joint basis to ensure
openness and visibility in the sharing of infrastructure and support facilities.16
642. Financial and Funding Considerations. HNs will generally expect to be
reimbursed for whatever support they provide. In principle, UK forces should not be
charged any more than the HN’s own armed forces would normally pay for the same
support. It is important that the financial aspects concerning the provision of support
are agreed before forces deploy, and that adequate records are kept of the transactions
for financial management and audit control purposes.
643.
Checklist. A checklist of HNS factors is at Annex 6F.
15
NATO - MC 334/1 gives NATO Commanders authority to co-ordinate HNS requirements, to initiate and participate in
bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and where appropriate, to conclude HNS arrangements with the HN on behalf of
SNs, subject to their prior concurrence. If, as a potential SN, UK wishes to participate in a NATO-led operation, MOD
would be asked to ‘accede’ to an overarching NATO/HN MOU and subsequently to develop a bilateral TA and/or JIAs
with the HN. Accession involves the signing of a Note of Accession. Where UK is willing to participate in the operation
but has difficulties with the content of the MOU that cannot be resolved prior to its conclusion, a Statement of Intent
could be completed. This provides the opportunity to identify any reservation(s) and places the onus on the HN to
consider whether it can accept such qualification(s).
16
See AJP-4.5.
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In Country Resources
644. In certain circumstances, it may be necessary to rely on the local economy of a
country to which the force has deployed to provide logistic support. This may be to
supplement existing HNS such as the hire of additional transport, or where the level of
support from host government sources is limited, where the host government is not in
control or does not exist. This will normally be in the form of direct contracting with
local suppliers for goods and services through competitive tendering to achieve best
value for money.
645. Unless there is sufficient lead-time to negotiate local contracts prior to
deployment of the main operational force, this method of support is more appropriate
to smaller tactical level requirements or for additional support during the bedding-in or
roulement phases. It is reliant on reasonable levels of confidence in the provision and
should not, where possible, be allowed to have a detrimental effect on the local
population (which might undermine a parallel CIMIC campaign.)
Multinationality - Coalition or Alliance-Controlled Arrangements.
646. NATO and Allied Joint Publication -4(A). Although multinationality in
logistics should not be an end in itself, the potential advantages of reducing the size of
National Support Elements (NSE) for both the multinational force and the individual
nations should not be underestimated. As with the levels of ‘jointery’, the extent to
which national support is entrusted to other nations or co-ordinating bodies should
only be that which is appropriate and helpful (either in terms of practicality or to aid
the cohesion of a coalition). NATO continues to plan for both Article 5 operations
(reaction to attack on a member state) and Beyond NATO Area of Responsibility
(BNAOR) operations. Whilst developed HNS arrangements exist for the former, the
expeditionary nature of the latter involves more flexible arrangements. The NATO
doctrine, AJP-4(A) ‘Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine’ sets out the principles, concept,
rationale and expectations of NATO commanders and Sending Nations. AJP-4(A)
should be read in conjunction this JWP.
647. Key NATO Tenets. AJP-4(A) highlights 12 fundamental principles17 on
which the NATO Logistic Doctrine is based. The key principles of Responsibility,
Authority and Provision are repeated in part, for clarity, below:
a.
Responsibility. In accordance with MC 319/1,18 Nations and NATO
authorities have a collective responsibility for logistic support of NATO’s
multinational operations. This principle builds on the General Principles of
Unity of Effort and having a Common Objective on which all operations and
17
The principles are Primacy of Operations, Responsibility, Authority, Co-operation, Co-ordination, Provision and
Sufficiency, Flexibility, Simplicity, Timeliness, Economy, Visibility and Synergy.
18
The NATO policy document for Logistics, agreed by all NATO nations.
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efforts must be focussed. However, nations retain ultimate responsibility for
logistic support of their deployed units, and may elect to maintain full
responsibility for such support.…. Collective responsibility also implies that
NATO commanders assume responsibility for the logistic support of assets
under their authority.
b.
Authority. NATO commanders must be given sufficient authority over
logistic resources to enable them to employ and sustain forces in the most
effective manner. Authority must be aligned with responsibility. Thus, if a
NATO commander has been assigned responsibility for operations in a
particular theatre or area of operations, he must also be given the authority to
prioritise his support so as to ensure he maintains the ability to accomplish his
mission. These same authorities and responsibilities should also apply to nonNATO commanders participating in a NATO led operation. Nations may be
expected to limit the extent to which they are prepared to authorise the
commander to control national resources, due to either national imperatives or
legal restrictions. The extent to which nations limit this authority will depend
on national considerations and the type of operation.
c.
Sufficiency and Provision. …... Nations must ensure, either
individually or through co-operative arrangements, the provision of adequate
logistic resources to support their forces allocated to or operating with NATO
during peace, crisis and conflict….
648. Command and Control. Given these principles, NATO doctrine allows for a
broad range of logistic C2 arrangements, based on national confidence or concerns
over the operational situation and political will for multinationality. Within the
logistic sphere, the tighter the command and control arrangements, the more likely it is
that assurance of delivery can be maintained. Furthermore the need to operate
multinationally without full exchange of logistic information or IS data transparency
amongst nations and Headquarters is likely to be a reality. The use of purely national
C2 may offer the tightest control from a national perspective. Here, the National
Contingent Commander (NCC) would have direct control of the full range of support
through a UK NSE. However multinational arrangements can be made to work
providing plans are agreed in sufficient detail in advance – specifically in the Force
Generation process. A generic Multinational-Joint C2 framework within a CJTF could
be as follows, where the Combined Joint support (CJ4) staff will be responsible for intheatre logistics policy and overall direction:
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CJTFHQ
J4
UKNCCHQ
MJLC
UK NSE
MN Maritime Component
MN Land Component
MN Air Component
MNLC(M)
MNLC(L)
MNLC(A)
UK ELM
MN Log Elements (M)
Legend
Command
Co-ordination
UK ELM
MN Log Elements (L)
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
NCC National Contingent Commander
UK ELM
MN Log Elements (A)
MJLC Multinational Joint Logistics Centre
MNLC Multinational Logistics Centre
ELM
Element
Figure 6.4 –C2 Arrangements Applicable to Logistic Support of NATO-led
Operation
649. Force Generation. Successful implementation of MN Log from an early
stage will be dependent upon the type of operation, with a greater scope for economy
of effort likely in smaller scale operations (as the breadth of facilities can be more
easily shared). The key to effective delivery of support will always be the approach
taken in Multinational Force Generation conferences. Agreement on detailed
statements of requirement are the only means with which to guarantee that support, to
the requisite UK standard, will be delivered through MN means. It will also be
important to determine whether national self-sufficiency is required until MN
arrangements can begin. It is a feature of crisis management and national reaction
speeds that few in-place accords will exist to enable multinational logistics to function
from the inception of operations. Involvement in the planning and Force Generation
process of a UK tactical Joint Logistic Commander (the appointed JFLogCC and most
likely Commander of the UK NSE) will substantially aid the delivery of guaranteed
multinational support arrangements. The ability to foresee potential low-level joint
and multinational support will usefully supplement the operational level approach,
normally assumed by PJHQ.
650. Force Co-ordinated or Controlled Support through a Multinational Joint
Logistic Centre. The NATO doctrine publication AJP-4.6A ‘Multinational Joint
Logistic Centre’, gives details of the NATO mechanism for co-ordinating
multinational support in the JOA. The MJLC is a flexible organisation, resourced by
cadres of permanent staff from within the Strategic Commands of SHAPE and
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SACLANT, bolstered by national augmentees. When activated, the Director of the
MJLC answers to the head of CJ4 within a NATO CJTF structure. Although any
command relationship may be agreed during the Force generation process, by default
the MJLC’s command authority is limited to:
a.
Co-ordination of ad hoc logistic arrangements between national NSEs.
b.
Co-ordination and prioritisation, on behalf of the Force Commander, of
formal multinational arrangements, such as Lead Nation & Roles Specialist
Nation (LN & RSN) – see paragraph 654.
c.
Control of logistic assets assigned to the Force Commander as MILU or
MIMU – see paragraph 660.
651. In order to function most efficiently, an MJLC should be deployed to the JOA
sufficiently early to be able to capitalise on the opportunities for efficiency and
synergy brought about by multinationality, whilst giving nations confidence that there
is an efficient, reliable support structure in place. Without this confidence nations are
likely to extend their own support base, taking valuable real estate and increasing
competition for local resources. Therefore, UK planners should ensure that national
interests are well represented in a MJLC.
652. Organisation. Multinational arrangements in the MJLC’s JOA may comprise
up to six staff cells as follows:
DIRECTOR MJLC
Executive
Group
RACO
contracting
HNSCC
Host Nation
Support
MTCC
Movement
& Transport
LSCC
Logistics
MEDCC
Medical
ICC
contracting
RACO - Regional Allied Contracting Office
CC
- Co-ordination Cell
Figure 6.5 – Multinational Joint Logistic Centre Structure
653. Multinational Logistic Centres – Maritime, Land and Air. Each
environmental component may form a Multinational Logistic Centre (MNLC) in
which support is co-ordinated at Component level, with the MNLC under command of
the MN Component Commander. Whilst the MNLC (Maritime)(M) has been
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developed and used with success in operations and on exercises, MNLCs (Land) and
(Air) are rarely formed with these components relying on the CJTF HQ’s MJLC.
Lead Nation and Role Specialist Nation
654. This Section provides guidance on the benefits and constraints in the use of
Lead Nation19 (LN) and Role Specialist Nation (RSN) functions for logistics,
considering UK’s position both in the lead role and as a recipient of services provided
by other nations. Details of the definition, concept, responsibilities, funding and
associated legal issues for these two organisational functions are contained in NATO
doctrine AJP-4.9, ‘Modes of Multinational Support’, (Chapters 2 and 3).
655. Differentiation. These two processes for the delivery of multinational
logistics may have similar implications both for the user and the contributing
elements, however the fundamental differences between the two multinational
concepts are:
a.
Lead Nation. One nation covers an agreed range of logistic
responsibilities on behalf of another/others. (It is assumed that enabling assets
and resources, at least, such as the HQ and integral support, are provided by
the LN, but other nations may contribute assets also).20
b.
Role Specialist Nation. One nation assumes responsibility for
provision of one service on behalf of most or all of the others. (Unless
specifically arranged, one RSN may be expected to supply all assets).21
656. Bilateral Arrangements Framework. The framework for these modes of
multinational support is based upon a set of bilateral arrangements between the LN or
RSN and the assisted (the ‘supported’) nation. These need to include appropriate
provisions on levels of service expected and methods of operation in terms of Standard
Operating Procedures.
657. Planning Scope for Lead Nation Support. Early identification by MOD
(including DLO input) and PJHQ of potential international coalition members in the
build up to an operation is fundamental to the successful production of an efficient LN
arrangement, although commodities under consideration are likely to be limited to:
19
The terms LN can also be used with much wider applicability within a MN force: here ‘LN for Logistics’ is
understood.
20
AJP-4.9’s definition reads: ‘A Lead Nation for Logistic Support assumes overall responsibility for co-ordinating and/or
providing an agreed spectrum of logistic support for all or part of a multinational force, including headquarters, within a
defined geographical area. This responsibility may also include procurement of goods and services. Compensation
and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved.’
21
AJP-4.9 defines RSN as: ‘One nation assumes the responsibility for providing or procuring a particular class of supply
or service for all or part of the multinational force. A Role Specialist Nation’s responsibilities include the provision of
assets needed to deliver the supply or service. Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreement
between the parties involved.’
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Commodity/Service Suitable for …
Fresh Rations.
Water (bulk and bottled).
Fuel and Lubricants.
Port and APOD Support.
LN
P
P
P
P
P
Ammunition.
Maintenance (limited) and Recovery.
Transport.
Provost.
Bath and Laundry.
Printing.
Postal.22
Electrical power.
Waste and Sewage Disposal.
Medical support, including medevac
and certain medical supplies.
RSN
Remarks
P
P
For RSN, bulk only.
P
P
P
P
Other Nation contribution
needed.
Only where there is weapon
compatibility.
Standardisation limitations.
P
National discipline codes
apply.
P
(P)
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
(P)
RSN most economic.
National security
regulations.
MEDEVAC as RSN by
exception.
As an operation progresses it should be possible to streamline the logistics element
even further, particularly as a combat or peace support operation is down-scaled
during a return to normality, or where a steady state is achieved.
658. Command Relationship. Within a coalition operation and specifically within
NATO, the LN or RSN, on assuming responsibility for agreed services, will normally
answer to the MN commander for provision of those services through the MJLC. The
UK National Support Element (NSE) and the National Contingent Commander (NCC)
must always be in a position to maintain suitable command and control of UK logistic
assets, as decided prior to the operation. Relationships between user nations will be
ones of customers-provider, based either on formal arrangements or on cross-servicing
agreements (STANAG 2034).
659. Lead and Role Specialist Nation Planning Factors. Annex G contains UKspecific planning factors for LN/RSN planning, which should be read in conjunction
with AJP-4.9.23
22
23
Certain reservations exist on the MN handling of mail, particularly for the Maritime Component.
AJP-4.9 is due to be promulgated in mid 03.
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Multinational Integrated Logistic Units and Multinational Integrated Medical
Units.
660. Concept. A Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILU) or Multinational
Integrated Medical Units (MIMU) may be formed when one or more nations agree to
provide logistic support to a multinational Force under the operational control
(OPCON) of a Force Commander at Theatre or Component level. For optimum
functionality the MILU (or MIMU) should be built round the C2, Communications &
Information Systems and administration structure of a Lead Nation unit. Other
Nations, as agreed during Force Generation, would contribute assets, normally (but not
exclusively) at not less than sub-unit strength. Whilst retaining Full and Operational
Command (OPCOM) of their contributions, nations provide the Force Commander
with the means to prioritise and effect logistic tasks in direct support of his design
(rather than for the nations’ primary benefit). This is most appropriate where there are
shortfalls of capability within the force.
661. Mechanism. AJP-4.9 Chapter 4, describes the mechanism agreed by NATO
for the formation of MILU/MIMU, provides guidance on legal and funding aspects
and expands on generic C2 arrangements. A generic template for the development of
an agreement is included at Annex to Ch 4, AJP-4.9, and this provides a useful
framework with which to plan UK participation, or lead role in any MILU. Within the
framework of the Force Generation process, MILU/MIMU negotiations are likely to
be conducted by national representatives in a MILU Co-ordination Group (MCG).
The UK MCG representative would most likely be found from MoD or PJHQ.
662. Utility of Integrated Units. From a national perspective, MILU may provide
desirable assets from multinational sources which are not normally available within
UK’s inventory. However it should not be anticipated that they will be available for
national benefit. As control is exercised by or on behalf of the multinational Force
Commander, assets may be considered additional to a UK NSE requirement, unless
tight control is exercised over nations’ logistic information. Nations can be reluctant
to divulge such logistic information, so a minimum necessary exchange of information
would need to be agreed during Force Generation. Detailed, realistic tactical level
planning should be undertaken before UK support tasks are entrusted to a
MILU/MIMU, however experience and usage can improve and refine the concept,
increasing the potential for future economy of effort.
Contracting on the International (non-UK) Market
663. International Contracting. Where feasible, UK contracting of support
services should be carried out through a single prime contractor, making use of CON
LOG arrangements as described previously. Where such prior arrangements do not
exist or are deemed inappropriate, direct contracting in theatre, or from a nearby
source, may be required. Whilst this may be an inevitable ‘hot planning’ requirement
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to take advantage of opportunities or cover unforeseen gaps early in a deployment
(probably during a RSOI phase), the adverse potential for proliferation of contracts
should be recognised – and limited at the earliest reasonable opportunity.
Components’ Local Resource Sections, in concert with deployed J8/Civ Sec assets will
be in a position to streamline such contracts.
664. Collective Arrangements. NATO describes pre-planned collective
contracting as ‘Third Party Logistic Support Services (TPLSS)’. AJP-4.9, Chapter 5,
covers the benefits and potential in greater detail and identifies the risk management
requirements. The primary advantages of collective contracting are the efficiencies
made through economies of scale and scope (such as greater unified management,
knowledge and reduced competition between coalition nations for scarce resources).
Risks include the increased vulnerability of all participating members to failure in the
contracting system or reduced standards in delivery. Where a MJLC is activated, the
Regional Allied Contracting Officer (RACO) can provide essential co-ordination of
arrangements between the contractor, nations and the NATO Force Commander.
665. Non-NATO Coalition Operations. Coalition operations may involve
contributions from non-NATO nations. NATO procedures are a useful benchmark
against which coalition multinationality can be modelled. This is particularly so in the
difficult areas of legal, financial or reimbursement arrangements.
666. United Nations and Operations. Whilst the UN has tended to become less
involved in the military aspects of Other Operations (OO) than was the case prior to
1995 in the Balkans, a mechanism still exists for UN to co-ordinate or control military
contributions to an operation. The UN operates a system in which a Troop
Contributing Nation (TCN) is reimbursed for providing troops, equipment and
services to a UN peacekeeping operation.24
667. UN, UN Agency and Non Governmental Organisation Influences in an
Operational Area. However active a role the UN has in an operation, it is likely to
have an impact on operational logistics. The UN, UN Agencies and Non
Governmental Organisations (NGO) will be working in the JOA to different priorities
to those of the deployed Force, but their presence has implications for the military
logistician. Whilst detailed operational co-ordination by the military force may be
best conducted by J3(CIMIC) staff, these organisations may provide a useful
knowledge base for logistic issues, particularly where NGOs have been operating for
some time prior to the military deployment. Where a UN Joint Logistic Centre exists
to provide a focus for NGO and Agencies’ (often logistically demanding) operations,
informal contact is likely to be mutually advantageous.
24
Procedures replacing ‘In and Out Surveys’ and depreciation of equipment methodology came into effect in July 1996
and are contained in the UN’s ‘Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning Reimbursement and Control of
Contingent Owned Equipment of Troop Contributing Countries Participating in Peacekeeping Missions’.
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Force Generation Activities
668. Force Generation – The Logistic Concept. Having considered all the
options PJHQ’s force generation process is only complete once it has confirmed and
activated the overall force package, the logistic concept and specifically the logistic
force package. Having agreed the access to MN strategic lift and co-ordination
arrangements, other LN/RSN responsibilities, including the level of self-sufficiency
required must have been confirmed.
669. National Forces. The requirements of readiness and preparedness would
normally dictate that those logistic assets on the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF)
roster should be deployed first. However, circumstances sometimes dictate that other
units or headquarters are selected. Where this is the case, logistic planners need to
ensure that those units receive prioritised training, and are properly equipped to
support deploying formations, to be able to interact effectively with other national
components, with joint organisations and with other nations. In particular, CIS
infrastructure needs to be matched against the demands of the Logistic Information
Plan and made available.
670. Multinational Process. The multinational planning considerations described
above are reliant on effective negotiations during the Force Generation process and
logistic planners should be present at conferences to determine multinational
operational (and sometimes tactical) force contributions and take an active part in
logistic multinationality negotiations.
671. Planning for Longer-Term Development. During the Force Generation
process arrangements need to be made to cover duration of multinational
commitments, the scope for further development of co-operative logistic support
arrangements and any issues regarding the hand-over of responsibilities during the
operation. Suitable points of contact with other nations both in theatre and within
nations’ Ministries of Defence should be determined.
Joint Logistic Planning – The Decision Process and Force Generation
• Logistic implications must influence decision-making at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels – the primary emphasis is on identifying
constraints and freedoms.
• At all levels of planning the logistic decision process must be integrated with
the Jt Comd’s and JTFC’s estimates – the logistic estimate should identify the
art of the possible across all fields of support.
• The logistic estimate process should be evolutionary as Courses of Action are
refined.
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• Where logistic risk is accepted its effects should be actively minimised and
screened from an adversary.
• Decisive Points in the Campaign Plan, such as achieving RSOI, Rehabilitation
and Redeployment should normally be undertaken jointly.
• Consistent with the joint operations approach, logistics should be fundamentally
joint in nature, employing JFLogC as necessary.
• UK’s joint approach will needed to be blended for MN ops and the JFLogC will
need to be adaptable to operate as a National Support Element when required.
• Force generation should start with national capabilities as a benchmark, then
allow for CON LOG, HNS, Multinational and ICR adjustments to enhance
operational capability – delivering more for the same or the same for less.
• Clear and robust logistic command and control arrangements are required,
consistent with the Campaign Plan.
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ANNEX 6A – EXAMPLE OF LOGISTIC INPUT TO THE JOINT ESTIMATE FOR
OPERATION ……
(THE JOINT LOGISTIC ESTIMATE)
Tactical (T)
Operational (O)
Strategic (S)
At ….Z Jun 0*
File Ref:
References:
Zone used throughout: ZULU
Factor
X
X X
REVIEW OF SITUATION
X
X X
MISSION
Consideration/Deduction
CCIRs/Staff Guidance/Comds
Guidance/Task
PRELIMINARIES
Extraction of log relevant issues, making use of SITREPs, Staff Guidance:
J2 Feeds and exploitation of functional logistic
Compare Ongoing/Concurrent Tasks.
information sources. terrain, local conditions, facilities
and resources.
As given.
MISSION ANALYSIS
X X
COMMANDER’s INTENTION
1. 2 levels up.
X
X X
2. 1 level up.
X
X
3. The Strategy and Logistic Intent.
Include all log elements from directives – at operational
level, CDS Dir and Jt Comd Dir.
Include log implications from Wng O and draft Directive
as available.
A brief assessment of the proposed log. strategy to
support the intent and the Jt Comds operational level
plan. What is the longer term logistic goal?
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X
X
SPECIFIED TASKS
(In addition to detailed specified tasks,
key logistic tasks will normally be as
shown.)
4. Generate the Force.
X
X X
5. Build the LOC.
X
X
6. Deploy the Force.
X
X X
7.
X X
8. RSOI of the Force.
Sustain the Force.
Identify key logistic issues that will impact on Force
Generation.for further development in the evaluation of
factors, to include:
• Critical conditions.
• Critical vulnerabilities.
• Critical Capabilities.
Identify key factors for consideration in the estimate with
DLO HQ.
Note opportunities for linkage with other extant LOC or
possible need for FMB.
Log issues will include: Mounting HQ, Commercial
charter, DIPCLEAR for ac and shipping & RSOI issues
(see below).
CCIR:
What MOUs/agreements exist with
coalition members, in the JOA and
neighbouring countries?
CCIR:
What are effects of coalition members’
deployment activities; what MN co-ord
mechanisms in place?
Need for co-ord and integration of plans at environmental Staff Guidance:
component, JFLogC, DLO and SGD levels.
Determine sustainability requirement in
terms of demand duration, destination
and distance
Dependent on circumstances at the JOA point of entry.
CCIR:
Personnel and materiel arriving as part of the force build- What HNS/ICR facilities can be made
up will be received at the PODs under co-ord of JFLogC. avail for RSOI?
Tasks will include:
Staff Guidance:
Include Temporary Deployable
• Life support whilst unloading and processing.
Accommodation (TDA) in the DOA/
• Enabling onward movement.
Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP) if
• Estb cross-load and holding areas.
reqd. & construction and operation
• POD Enabling/Infra requirements including
group
TDA/ECI.
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IMPLIED TASKS
9. Provide Economy and Joint Svc
Efficiency.
X
X X
X
X X
10. Produce Logistic Information
(and Communications) plan.
X X
11. Create suitable log infra fwd of
PODs.
X X
12. Liaison Requirement.
X X
13. Identify LOC protection issues.
X
•
•
•
Staff Guidance:
Join MN general and log conferences.
Co-ord bilateral arrangements as
necessary.
Collate the requirements for force logistic connectivity to CCIR:
ensure optimum in-transit visibility and access within the Availability of comms facilities for
JOA.
sole/shared log use.
Staff Guidance:
• Routes, staging areas, airfields, TDA, etc.
Incorporate Engineer Construction units
requirements in the wider plan
Link liaison requirements to C2 plan. Where is liaison
Staff Guidance:
required; how best implemented; what specialist skills
Incorporate Log liaison requirements in
required? How can best use be made of other/existing
the wider liaison plan.
liaison arrangements.
Establish threat.
CCIR:
What multinational arrangements are in
place to protect the strat/op/tac LOCs?
Staff guidance:
What Security Engineering/
Fortifications measures are required?
Identify joint framework – JFLogC – early.
Incorporate CON LOG
Scope for Multinationality.
CONSTRAINTS
X
X X
14. Time:
A time estimate must be completed – consider Decisive
Points on critical path.
X
X X
15. Pol/mil:
Estb limitations to freedom of action along LOC.
X
X X
X
X X
X X
Has the situation changed?
CHANGES TO OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
COMMANDER’S DIRECTION
16. ‘My guidance is therefore that we should prioritise logistic planning effort
as follows’.
6A-3
Staff Guidance:
Force Gen; prep; RSOI; Sustainability;
Redeployment.
Staff Guidance:
What are critical log vulnerabilities?
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What are log priorities?
Where should risk be taken – and how
masked?
X
X X
ENEMY (as reqd)
X
X X
OP INTENTIONS
X
X X
RECCE AND INT (as reqd)
X
X X
DESTINATION
The nature of the requirement.
EVALUATION OF FACTORS
Consider the effects and risk of en deep ops on logistics
and the LOC. En intentions and capabilities will influence
the degree of robustness and reserves reqd, the degree of
additional protection, the need to move log stocks/units
and the level of risk being taken. Deploy and disperse?
Or reachback?
Information on en logistics, e.g. Main Effort and
vulnerabilities, may also be used to enhance the campaign
plan.
The character of own planned and future ops and the
comds intent critically influence the pattern of demand.
The sy and protection of logistics should be integrated
into the force OPSEC plan and deception plan if used.
Own Rates of Effort.
E.g. - Geographic information, Geological information,
Routes, Waterways, Railways, Airfields and landing sites,
Obstacle information Sources for water supply, fuel,
Engineer materiel, Local infrastructure facilities
available in theatre of operations including power, water,
waste & sewage disposal and civil transport, Forces’
capabilities and NBC
Sets the overall environment in which the op takes place.
Determines the conditions for the degradation of eqpt and
demands upon personnel. It will define the strat LOCs, the
shape of the regen loop and resources needed to prime it.
Strat mov resources, timing and deployment speed will be
critically influenced .
6A-4
Capabilities:
• Force Protection.
• Surge Redundancy.
• Nature & Mobility of UK forces.
• Scope for non-UK/mil Logistics.
Capabilities:
Essential specialist functions.
Detailed Information Requirements.
Capabilities:
• Level of self-sufficiency.
• Force Protection.
• Scope for integration/use of intheatre. facilities and resources.
Input to Sust Stat:
• Geo, cultural & climatic
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X
X
X
X X
17. Contingency Plans.
Are there any Contingency Plans for this destination?
What are the variations?
What other logistic intelligence is available?
X
18. HNS:
X X
19. In-Country Resources (ICR):
X X
20. Environment:
X X
21. Defence/Security/safety of
Logistic Sites.
X X
22. Tac LOCs (capacity, seasonality,
robustness etc).
23. PODs to in-theatre LOCs.
24. POD Analysis.
In-place MOU, TA, MSA
Commonality of eqpt.
Availability/Access/Quality
Contracts & Co-ord.
What are prevailing cultural conditions/ constraints?
• Specific constraints.
• Additional equipment services needed.
What are Effects of Climatic/Geographic conditions? On:
• Personnel.
• Eqpt.
APOD/SPOD/MA/Ammo Pt/CSA/CA/C2/LOC.
Own key logistic vulnerabilities. Alternate PODs.
Requirement for battle area/ EOD clearance?
HSW issues.
Benign? Use of CONDO/CON LOG.
Rear Area security issues beyond JFLogCC capacity?
Tpt/road/rail/power/med/comms; Roads/Rail/Inland
Waterways.
Identify potential PODs.
Evaluate advantages and disadvantages in terms of:
General:
secure real estate; Fuel; workshops and engineering
support; logistically & medically supportable; transit
accommodation, electrical power supply, water, waste &
sewage disposal; C2 Infrastructure for deployed HQ
functions; Pol friction-usage by Other Nations; Degree of
UK Control; Cost.
X X
X
6A-5
implications.
Staff Guidance:
Develop potential branches or sequels
to the Campaign Plan.
Staff Guidance:
Security engineering and fortifications
Capabilities:
• Flexible, guaranteed, secure POD
access.
• Effective, responsive joint C2 and
ITV arrangements.
• Secure conduit for RSOI (see para
**).
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X
X X
X
X
X
X
25. FMB requirement.
X
X
26. Strategic Time and Distance
Matrix – (Movements).
DISTANCE
Determining the Shape of the LOC.
STRATEGIC LOC
APOD
Strat and civ air access; fixed and rotary wing facilities;
Fast jet usage.
SPOD
Secure port and anchorage; Stevedoring facilities; Secure
land marshalling area; Ammunition holding and handling
facilities; proximity to other enabling facilities.
RPOD
State of infrastructure; rolling stock; access; specialist
skills availability.
Incl detailed analysis of strategic LOCs (including length
(time and distance) and capacity) and condensed analysis
of theatre LOCs. This will determine the size, structure
and balance of log resources and determine the volume of
stocks committed to priming and operating the regen
loop.
Compare likely LOC against utility of PODs, consider
need for FMB and conduct time-distance analysis.
Consider use of the Sea Base. (HN infrastructure)
If required an FMB analysis will be completed. It should
compare relative qualities of various FMB locs and use
criteria similar to that for the selection of POD (above).
Calculate the time/distance taken to move between each of
the possible nodes, e.g. POE to FMB 1, 2 or direct to
6A-6
Capabilities:
• Determine assets required for
strategic and intra-theatre lift.
• Achieve flexibility in Strat and Op
level LOC.
• Appropriate C2/LOC management
arrangements at nodal points for coord of strat lift (e.g.
JFLogC/APOD).
Input to Sust Stat:
• Loop times.
• Redundancy levels.
Capabilities:
• Secure LOC.
• Economy of effort.
• Visibility of forces/stocks in LOC.
• LOC responsive to new priorities.
Capability:
• Safe Logistic Base
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X X
27. Theatre LOCs: What is the length
and vulnerability of the theatre
LOCs.
X
X
28. Movements.
X
X X
29. Redeployment Planning.
X
X X
X X
DEMAND
The magnitude of the requirement.
30. RSOI.
POD. Use info to influence consideration of routes and
need for intermediate bases. Test for air, sea or other
relevant route.
Time/Distance from APOE/SPOE
Potential Choke Points on intra LOC: road/rail/air.
Pipeline - bulk water and fuel
Staff Guidance.
Route maintenance and repair
requirements, incl engineer assets to
execute.
JTFC’s DOA request, Critical Mov risks? Mov C2.
Staff Guidance:
• Prep DOA, DDP & MovPlan
• Detail Mounting Responsibilities.
Consider implications of options for redeployment,
Staff Guidance:
however redeployment will normally be a self-contained
Redeployment Plan – to include:
part of the campaign plan (J3 led). Ensure assets
• Rehabilitation/Recovery (extraction)
sufficient to conduct recovery planning are sequenced in
from ops.
the initial deployment. Key factors will include: the
• Post Conflict Activities.
desired op and log endstate, surge requirements for
• Theatre Draw-down plans.
enablers); real estate; gifting and disposal; roulement;
• Recovery movement (extraction
residual UK commitments, use of FMB/Staging Posts, C2
from JOA).
and costs.
• Posture in new location.
Capabilities:
What is the Scale of Force Deployment and what type of
op is it likely to be by phase (warfighting/ PSO/HDR)
• Range of services to be provided.
To include expected pattern, rate of change and
• Levels and range of stocks to be
variability. Thus demand stems from comds intent and is
held.
sum of 3 elms: Steady state, cyclical and surge. It should • Reserves needed/regeneration
also include trg after deployment but prior to cbt ops.
requirements.
Input to Sust Stat:
• Anticipated scale and usage/wear
and tear of assets/resources
RSOI places immediate demand on resources, affecting
Capabilities:
the DOA/DDP. Involvement of joint tactical planner
• Robust, timely, efficient, joint RSOI
(JFLogC rep) to consider:
organisation.
• Reception: TRC(s), CMA, life/med support,
Staff Guidance:
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•
•
•
X
X X
31. Sustainment – Supply
Prioritisation and LOC
Management.
X
X X
32. Confirm Standard Priority Code
system.
X
X X
33. Commodities analysis.
Staging: Real estate, infrastructure,
• RSOI requirements to be fed into
Force Element Table (FET) and
Onward Mov: Tpt, Convoy Sp, (CSCs).
DDP.
Integration: What support do the components need to
integrate their forces? (e.g. training).
Determine support/supply information management
Capability:
mechanism: Joint processes/procedures for prioritisation • Effective joint (PJHQ, DLO,
of movement (pax & freight).
JFLogC & CCs) prioritisation
Asset Tracking & Visibility (ITV), Log IS – inter Service
system for sustainment support
c-ordination.
through potential choke points.
Supported by current IT and
sufficient assets (personnel) to
provide integration.
Produce Supply Chain Processing Matrix
Input to Sust Stat:
including the relationship between Standard Priority
For each SPC, determine:
Codes (SPC) and Supply Chain Processing Time (SCPT) • Demand Processing Time.
applicable to the op.
• Material Processing Time.
• Distribution Processing Time.
• SCPT to FMB.
• FMB to Unit SCPT (Days).
Identify means to differentiate between
supply chain items which all have the
same high SPC.
Collate, in tandem with Sust Stat, steady state (incl
Capability:
training), surge and cyclical demand, across all
• Knowledge of, and ability to deploy
components, for key commodities:
sufficient sustainment stocks.
• Class 1 – Rats and water.
• Acquisition of (joint usage)
• Class 2 – Spares & Scaled eqpt.
commodities in JO region, eg bulk
fuel, rations, water etc, noting
• Class 3 – Fuel & Lubs.
market dynamics.
• Class 4 – Engr materials.
• Class 5 – Ammunition.
• Medical Supplies.
6A-8
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
X
X X
X X
34. Services.
35. NBC.
X
X X
36. Medical issues.
X
X X
X X
37. UOR/UMR
38. Scope for support other than by
UK military means.
(Multinationality/Contractors)
PCS.
Linked to the threat. What are the CASEVAC procedures
for NBC casualties? Are there any equipment/clothing
limitations?
Is the Force medically prepared to enter the JOA? What
are the expected Casualty Rate – Battle Cas; Disease &
Non-battle injuries (DNBI)? Environmental health issues
– sanitation, water? What are CASEVAC / MEDEVAC
arrangements And what scope as reverse function of
supply. Is there SH on the FET for med role?
Requirements at Role 3 and specialists? Medical force
protection? Implications of refugee/DP/PW population?
Are there specialist arrangements for burden sharing with
other nations for CASEVAC/MEDEVAC?’ and ‘What are
the arrangements for the provision of equipment for
handling and repatriation of deceased.
Early consideration.
What is to be gained/risked by using alternative means of
support? What is the capacity for independent logistic
action?
CONDO/CON LOG – Is there a suitable benign
situation? Will prime contractor be able to produce
support for deployment, or only at later stage? (See
CONDO/CON LOG decision flow chart). Political
affiliations/risk with contractors?
HNS. Can HNS satisfactorily meet demand?
Multinationality. What preparation needs to be
undertaken before use of MN Log? Can UK enhance its
deployed capability or make significant footprint
economies by being LN/RSN? Other bi-laterals?
Is C2/co-ord sufficiently strong?
6A-9
Capability:
• A jointly co-ordinated medical
capability matched to the expected
task.
• A force with minimised medical risk
and confidence in the evacuation
and treatment system.
Capabilities:
• Effective provision of support in a
benign area (CON LOG)
• Judicial use of available HNS.
• UK contribution to Multinational or
Coalition support arrangements (as
lead or receiver of support).
• Purchaser of other In Country
Resources.
• Establish NSE
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
X
X X
39. Financial & contractual
considerations.
X X
40. Mission Essential Equipment
(MEE).
X X
41. Humanitarian/Refugees.
X X
42. PW.
X X
43. Rehabilitation.
X
X
44. Personnel (J1).
X
X X
X
DURATION
Determines the robustness and
investment in the requirement.
Identify suitable linkages between J1/J4 and J8, with
appropriately delegated letters of Authy. Knowledgeable
interface between local Contracts staff and larger
initiatives, e.g. CON LOG Prime Contractor.
Establish and prioritise MEE for Op and consider threats
to maintainability.
Capability:
Responsive, co-ordinated organisation
to facilitate economical acquisition of
support in JOA.
Staff Guidance:
Produce Jt MEE reporting and tracking
system.
Establish likely impact, eg Rats/Accom/Med/ Tpt
demands.
Establish likely impact, eg Security
structures/Rats/Accom/Med/ Tpt/ demands.
Consider methods of restoring JTF elements to optimum
fighting power after engagement – planning for likely
rehabilitation packages.
Consider Imposed Manpower ceiling; augmentation to
JTFHQ/JFLogC/Jt Capabilities; Reserves; essential
deployed civilians; Liaison posts; Pers tracking; briefing
Theatre Admin Office; ITRs/BCRs.
Burials/ Mortuary/Repatriation of the dead; OWP
requirement.
Capability:
PW Cage infra
Staff Guidance:
Branch, sequel or contingency to
Campaign Plan.
Capabilities:
• Augmented Staffs.
• RSOI – Theatre reception.
• Theatre Admin Office.
• IT Support/comms (eg AP3)
• PW/Refugee Handling Plan.
• Provost.
• OWP.
The length of ops and rate of demand will determine the
Capabilities:
overall volume of materiel necessary or the size of the log • Accommodation/Infrastructure
problem.
levels – minimal or well developed.
• Longer term solutions.
• Roulement potential.
Input to Sust Stat:
• Degradation factors.
Staff Guidance:
• Transfer/handover arrangements
within MN log environment.
6A-10
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
X
X
45. Duration of phases of Op:
X
X X
46. J4 Infra Implications
X
X X
ASSESSMENT OF LOG TASKS
X
X X
C2
SUMMARY OF DEDUCTIONS
X
X X
Preparation/warfighting/stabilisation phases. What are
implications for support levels? Surge?
Requirement for War Res (WR); Requirement for TDA/
activation of ECI modules.
Engr Enabling/STRE. Electrical power generation, Well
drilling, Water supply, Route maintenance and Security
engineering.
Should consider the log tasks derived from the estimate in
terms of the required capability, the subsequent
requirement for phasing (if necessary), main effort and
logistic risk. The FLCs will be responsible for nominating
‘troops to task’ to achieve the required capability.
Are the C2 plans (and information/decision tools)
appropriate to the delivery of logistic capability at all
levels.
For input to Sust Stat, main estimate and transfer to
Op/campaign Plan.
J4 (Log Sp & Infra)
Movements
Medical
J1
J8
CCIR
Staff Guidance
Comd’s
Guidance
Capability:
• Appropriate, robust infra.
• Security Engineering
Capability:
Robust, coherent Log C2 and
responsive interface with Jt Ops C2.
Capabilities.
• Jointly-matched log Force Elements.
• Tonnages of stocks/eqpt for
movement.
• LOC primed.
• UORs progressed.
Constraints
List of Additional Log Deductions
(With CoA Caveats)
6A-11
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
6A-12
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
ANNEX 6B – LOGISTIC ANNEX TO CDS DIRECTIVE
ANNEX F TO CDS DIR **/** TO JT COMD OP ****
DATED ** *** **
OP **** - LOGISTICS DIRECTIVE
1. LOGISTIC CONCEPT.
a. Context of operation – MN, etc? Log implications of climate, Terrain,
Culture.
b. How mounted and Sustained?
c. How long, Op & redeployment. Specific/Unusual requirements for
deployment.
2. TASKS.
a. CJO.
(1).
Multinational.
(a) Lead nation.
(b) MJLC.
(c) MOUs/Technical Arrangements
(d) Explore potential for efficiencies through MN/Other activities.
(e) Guidance on MN Sust Statement (if reqd).
(2).
National.
(a) Co-ord requirements for national plan (Jt arrangements)
(b) Identify & Co-ord Mov Co-ord arrangements
(c) Identify Supply Chain
(d) Infrastructure Plan.
b. FLCs.
(1).
(2).
(3).
(4).
(5).
Provision of Log Support including procedures.
Staff Tables & org to POE.
Requests for Op Stocks.
Notify PJHQ & DLO of any Log Constraints as they arise.
Identify Recuperation opportunities.
6B-1
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
c. DLO.
(1).
(2).
Specific Support Activities necessary, based on situational factors.
Movements support.
3. SUSTAINABILITY.
a. How long to plan for, in what conditions.
b. With what key sustainability constraints or provisos.
c. With what priorities.
4. ACCOUNTING.
a. With what accounting arrangements.
b. Using what UIN or Special Operations Code (SOC).
5. MEDICAL.
a. Reference to Medical Direction (elsewhere).
6B-2
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
ANNEX 6C – ILLUSTRATIVE SUSTAINABILITY
STATEMENT
Introduction
6C1. The Sustainability Statement is based on RN CB 2002 Vol 2 Naval Manual of
Logistics for Operations, Army Planning Assumptions (APAs) and RAF Planning
Assumptions (RAFPAs). Force Levels have been drawn from the Medium Scale
Warfighting option. Due to the unclassified nature of this document the figures in
italics are for illustrative purposes to provide a guide to the level of detail. Actual
figures are to be found at the references:
6C2.
References:
Joint
Maritime
Land
Air
JWP 0-10
FLOO (Arts 11401 & 31401)
CB 2002 Vol 2 – Naval Manual of Logistics for Operations
Army Sustainability Planning Guidelines (ASPG)
STANAG 2115 (FCU, DAER. WCU …)
A6901 – Compendium of War Reserve and Peace Stocks
A6606 – Army Dept Ammo Rates and Scales
Materiel Regulations – Scale of NBC Eqpt
A5702 – Army Dept Rates for Wastage of Eqpt in War
RAF Planning Assumptions 2003 (RAFPAs 2003)
General
6C3. This sustainability statement applies to forces deploying on a Medium Scale
Warfighting Operation.
6C4. MOD/PJHQ/Spt Cmnd/JTFHQ inputs to the Sustainability Statement
are.……..
6C5. Force Composition. The major force elements that will be deployed to the
Theatre of Operations for Op XXXXXXX is as follows:
6C-1
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
C2/SF
MARITIME
Force Elements
JTFHQ
SF TBN
LAND
AIR
LOGISTICS
1 CVS
6 FF/DD
1 SSN
1 LPD
1 LPH
2 LSL
CDO Grp (+)
AOR
AOL
AFSH
Div (-)
(e.g.)
XX F3
XX GR4
XX Jag
CH47*
Puma*
VC10
Tristar
C130
Nimrod
HS 125 E3D
* - From JHC
JFLogC
6800
includes EMF of
(1650)
16500
6000
4450
Personnel Totals
1070
(includes SF)
Total
34820
Distance
6C6.
The worst case LOC is assessed to be as shown in the following table:
Length of Strategic LOC
In JOA/Theatre 1st LOC
In JOA/Theatre 2nd LOC
Strat Loop Time – Air
Strat Loop Time – Sea
Loop Time — Land
In Theatre Loop Time — Air
Threat:
Air:
Local:
Regional:
8 000km see RAFPA Annex J
700km
TBD
48 hrs (ASPG) after 10 days
32 days (ASPG) after 28 days
48 hrs (APAs)
12 hrs (APAs)
TBD
TBD
Medium against 3 rd Line
Duration
6C7.
Timeframes (Days).
PERIOD COMBAT
180
90 (1)
INTENSE
COMBAT
TRG
ROULEMENT
14 (2)
14
Nil
6C-2
REMARKS
Note:
1. National
Sustained Rate.
2. National Max
Rate.
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
Destination
6C8. Deployment of suitably equipped forces at operational scaling rates for up to 6
months in desert conditions.
CRITERION
Environment
Infrastructure
Host Nation
Support
APODs
FMB
SA2
SA3
SPOD
Secondary SPOD
DOB C
DOB D
SOB 2 (Hub)
FMB 2
SF Base
FLS plus FSU
NBC Threat
CATEGORY
REMARKS
(e.g.) Desert /Semi Desert (Hot Dry
— Cat A1 to A2), high levels of solar
radiation, dust and sand storms . Max
Temp ranges; +49C to
—16C. RH 8-74%. Rainfall DecMar 130mm
Key routes: TBD
100,000km of motorable roads and
tracks, of which 30 000 km are
tarmac surfaced.
Good
Nil 1 st Line (RAFPA p18)
Austere
Austere
Well Found (Akrotiri)
Unsupported Transit
Well Found
Austere
Army Focus
Staging Airfield
Staging Airfield
Max depth 3 metres (Lighterage
only)
Austere
Bare
Well Found
Austere
(Nil Tornado at Bare Bases)
Support Operating Base
AAR/SF AT
Joint Service
FLS at APOD, FSU at SPOD
Austere/Well Found
Med)
6C-3
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
Demand
6C9.
CLASS I. (Uniform Rate Consumables).
COMMODITY
RATIONS
TRAINING/STEADY
STATE
OPS/SURGE
Fresh:
HNS or MOD Food Supply
Contractor to provide fresh rations
daily for...... 28,020 personnel (3
meals per man/day - additional
1650 when EMF landed) subject to
balanced risk assessment.
Stockpile:
30 days ORP including theatre reserve
of 15 days.
Mar Force to carry 30 DOS of ORP for
EMF iaw CB 2002 Art 0806.
Warships to store for war and
maintain levels as far as
practicable to max FLOO Art
31401/CB 2002 Art 0302 levels.
RFA (AOR/AFSH) to hold 3000
man-months in accordance with
CB2002 Art 0304.
ORP:
Mar Force to hold 14 DOS trg
ORP for EMF.
ORP rations to be held as follows:
nd
5 DOS at 1st Line, 2 DOS at 2 Line
Remainder to be held by JFLogC
Land Component is to hold 14
days ORP for trg for Combat and
CS units.
Assumed availability of HNS is
detailed in para 46 of RAFPAS
6C-4
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
COMMODITY
TRAINING/STEADY
STATE
Requirement (e.g.) See JWP 401.1 (draft) for details
WATER
OPS/SURGE
Requirement
Notes:
Provision of water
to Air is under
ASOS
arrangements:
Expeditionary Campaign
Infrastructure (ECI) Tier 1
(Including Temporary Deployable
Accommodation (TDA)):
70 Litres/Man/Day
Joint Services
Water Supply
Committee
(JSWSC)
guidelines:
(Draft) JWP 4-01.1
Jt Log Capabilities
– Water
Initial rate:
10 Litres/Man/Day.
Normal rate:
25 Litres/Man/Day.
ECI Tier 2:
150 Litres/Man/Day
Reference:
Troops Field Conditions:
Fd Hosp with Special FST:
400 Litres/Patient/Day
Fd Hosp 150 Litres/Man/Day:
150 Litres/Patient/Day
Packaged water:
Provided for operations at a rate
determined by the Staff. A capability to
supply (at least) 2 Litres/Man/Day
should be provided.
Reserve Holdings:
Initial rates:
3 x DOS at 1 st Line
2 x DOS at 2 nd Line (One on
wheels)
5 x DOS at 3 rd Line (2 on wheels)
Normal rates:
3 DOS ECI
RAF Reserves:
5 x DOS Bare Bases
3 x DOS Well Found and Austere
Bases
6C10. CLASS II. (Scaled Equip).
STEADY
STATE/TRAINING
Aircraft
OPS/SURGE
Ac Spares. Units are to deploy
with:
Fixed Wg - 10 days PEP, resup in 5
days
Rotary Wg - 15 days PEP, resup in
5 days
GBAD – 10 days PEP
Fd Sqn – 10 days PEP
Re-sup estab in 5 days.
6C-5
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
STEADY
STATE/TRAINING
Land Veh
Replacement
Attrition
Flying hours
per day
(examples
only)
True Sortie
Rates for RAF
aircraft are
contained in
Annex H to
RAFPAs
A replacement pool of vehs is to be
held as follows:
A Vehs — 5% total ORBAT
B Vehs — 10% total ORBAT
C Vehs — 10% total ORBAT
Ac attrition is not assumed; the
force-in-being will be maintained.
Maritime:
TBC by JMCC
Hels: SEA KING — XX hrs per
mth.
Lynx/Gazelle XX hrs per day
Sea Harrier: TBD
OPS/SURGE
Maritime:
Intensive rates as per CB 2002 Vol2 para
0603
TBC by JMCC
Hels: SEA KING — X hrs per mth.
Lynx/Gazelle X hrs per day
Sea Harrier: TBD
Land:
Land:
Avn Hels: X hrs per day
SHF: CH47: XX sorties per day
Avn Hels: X hrs per day
SHF: CH47: Max X, Intensive X sorties
per day.
Air: (RAFPAs Annex F-1)
Air: (RAFPAs Annex F-1)
Fast Jet: X sorties per day.
Fast Jet: Max X sorties per day, Intensive X
sorties per day.
E3D: Max X, Intensive X sortie per day.
E3D: X sortie per day.
Med Stores
Air Transport: X sortie per day.
30 DOS DNBI of which 7 days are
at intense rates
6C-6
Air Transport: X sorties per day
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
6C11. CLASS III. (Fuels and Lubricants).
STEADY STATE/TRAINING
Fuel Utilisation
OPS/SURGE
Land & JFLogC Component:
A&C Vehs: 1 FCU/Day.
st
B Vehs: 1 x FCU/Day at 1 and 2
Line.
nd
rd
B Vehs 3 x FCU/day 3 Line task
vehs.
Static Equip: 1.5FCU.
Fuel Usage/Stockpile
MARITIME
Fuel Usage/Stockpile
LAND
Hels: 1.2 FCU/Day.
F44- TG should hold not less than
85% F76 in individual units on
arrival in theatre with not less than
70% bulk supplies in support ships.
Bulk Fuel
st
6 FCU 1 line
2 FCU 2nd line
rd
2 FCU on wheels at 3 line
6 FCU in BFI at 3rd line
Up to 14 FCU as Theatre reserve
3rd Line is to be able to re-sup bulk
fuel at a rate of 1 FCU/Day.
Peak usage is 2 FCU per day
Packed Fuel Reserve
The force is to hold and maintain 1
FCU of F-57 (5,000 cans) and F-54
(40,000 cans) (for grd veh use) at 3rd
Line.
Oils and Lubricants
Land forces are to deploy with 30
OCU of specialist oils and lubs (600
tonnes) distributed as follows:
5 OCU at 1st Line, 2 OCU at 2nd Line
23 OCU at 3rd Line
Oil & Lubs equate in volume to 4.5%
of an FCU.
6C-7
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
STEADY STATE/TRAINING
Aviation Fuel
Stockpiling
5th Draft RAFPA.
JSP 526
OPS/SURGE
Aviation Fuel Stockpiling
Medium Scale (Warfighting)
Methodology is based on combat
sorties being conducted for 90 days
in support of ground operations at the
national sustained rate, followed by
XX days at the national maximum
rate in support of the ground
operations. Outside of the period
covered by the air campaign, air
policing and training sorties without
weapon expenditure, will be
conducted at the national sustained
rate.
DOB C – Austere
MDO = XX m3.
DRR = XX m3.
On-Base Storage = XX m3.
(50% in HN storage; 50 % in SN
storage)
DOB D – Bare
MDO = XX m3.
DRR = XX m3.
On-Base Storage = XX m3.
+ 1 DRR FOB (SHF) transit storage.
(100% in SN storage)
Packed POL Products
30 DOS of specialist packed POL
products are to be deployed to each
ac operating location.
Terminology
MDO – Maximum Daily Offtake is
quantity of fuel consumed daily at
national maximum sortie rates.
DRR –Daily Receipt Requirement is
quantity of fuel required daily to
maintain at national intensive sortie
rates.
FOB (SHF) – Bare
MDO = XX m3.
DRR = XX m3.
On-Base Storage = XX m3.
MRA (F) On-Base Storage = XX m3.
(100% in SN storage)
++
SOB 2 – Well Found
MDO = XX m3.
DRR = XX m3.
On-Base Storage = XX m3.
(90% in HN storage; 10% in SN
storage)
FMB 2 – Well Found
MDO = XX m3.
DRR = XX m3.
On-Base Storage = XX m3.
(90% in HN storage; 10% in SN
storage)
Quantity of 32 m 3 capacity
General Service Tanker (GST),
Tanks fabric Collapsible (TFC) and
associated Tactical Fuels Handling
Equipment (TFHE) to be provided by
the SN are calculated using the above
principles.
Aviation fuel for SH Force deployed
to FOB will be supplied through
JFLogC.
6C-8
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
STEADY STATE/TRAINING
Army Air
Maritime Air
A Veh Mileage per
day
RAFPAs/APAs
LOX/LIN:
Army aviation is to hold sufficient
operating stocks of fuel to maintain 6
hrs flying per ac per 24 hr period.
F44-Martime force should hold not
less than 80% bulk supplies in
theatre.
IFV — 35 kms
MBT — 30 kms
AS 90 — 25 kms
MLRS — 25 kms
Other — 30 kms
OPS/SURGE
IFV — 90 kms
MBT — 100 kms
AS 90 — 50 kms
MLRS — 30 kms
Other — 75 kms
All figures are estimates based on
type of manoeuvre/task vehs may
undertake.
Fuel utilisation figures above are
based on these distances being
undertaken in high intensity
manoeuvre.
Op Analysis (OA) is required to
confirm these estimates.
B Veh mileage per
day
E.g. 30 x 100km + 150 x 10 km div
by 180 to give ave km rate.
nd
2 Line Task vehs (incl Tk Tpr).
100kms
DROPs and Fuel Vehs — 300 kms
Domestic Vehicles — 50kms
C Vehs — 10 hrs
C Veh/Generator
Utilisation/Electronic Generators — 23 hrs
Static eqpt — 23 hrs
eqpt rates per day
Electronic Eqpt — 24 hrs
6C-9
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
6C12. CLASS IV. (Non-Scaled supplies).
STEADY
STATE/TRAINING
Defence Stores
OPS/SURGE
One complete PW Holding Camp
(5,000 PWs). (To include 10km of
triple concertina fence).
APOD/SPOD/Static HQ
1 Protection Pack ea.
ECI
Combat and CS units
1 x Dig( for Trg)
Combat and CS units
3 Digs
HQs and CSS
1 Protection Pack ( for Trg)
HQs and CSS
2 Protection Pack
DOBs may require additional
equipment depending on HN
protection level
5000 man tented camp — in 250man blocks to be held by JFLogC.
TDA
TDA
Tier 1: 30 days-9 months
Tier 1: 30 days-9 months
Tier 2 (Via CONDO): 8 months –
3 years
Air
DOB C – 2 Maintenance Hangars
and 20 Aircraft Environmental
Shelters.
DOB D – 5 Maintenance Hangars
and 40 Aircraft Environmental
Shelters.
Engr Resources
Tentage for 5950 required across
DOBs
1 x RE Construction pack
6C-10
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
6C13. CLASS V. (Ammunition/Ordnance)
STEADY
STATE/TRAINING
Maritime &
45 Cdo RM Gp
Land & JFLogC
Air
Ships to be stored with full war
outfit (100% war arsenal with
enhancements in AFSH iaw
CB2002)
EMF to carry equivalent to 14
SPG days of trg ammo for nonArty natures, 7 SPG days for Arty
natures.
Trg & Non-Combat Ammo
usage
Equivalent to 14 DAER at the
following rates:
SAA 0.25 SPG Day
Arty/Mortar 0.05 SPG Day
AFV/Armour 0.25 SPG Day
Others 0.25 SPG Day
Wpns trg completed by
deployment
OPS/SURGE
See below
Ammo usage/Stockpile
Deploy with 7 DAER
Reserve of 7 DAER
Max Resup up to 16 DAER
Expenditure
Combat 1 SPG Day
Intense 2 SPG Day
Holdings
30 SPG days in theatre held as follows:
st
5 SPG days at 1 Line
nd
2 SPG days at 2 Line
rd
23 SPG days at 3 Line
Resup from 3rd Line 1 SPG day per
day normal rates, 2 SPG days per day
at intense rates.
JSP 526 Rates of effort apply.
XX Standard Combat Loads (SCL) to
be deployed and maintained by ATF.
50% follow-on stocks immediately
deployed by sea. Once in theatre,
balance of stocks then deployed by sea.
DOBs will hold sufficient stocks for
XX days at max rate, the remainder will
be stored in the Rear ESA and
resupplied to DOBs at intensive rates.
Rapier 50% of missiles to be deployed
initially by air, remainder to be
deployed as ‘follow-on’ stocks.
6C-11
2nd Edition
JWP 4-00
Medical
6C14. Daily Battle Casualty Admission rates are for the worst case.
ROYAL NAVY/
ROYAL MARINE
ARMY
Declared Orbat = 7100
(% are examples only)
DNBI = 1.4% Constant
D = 1.35%(90% RTD,
10%Admitted)
NBI = 0.05% (40% RTD,
60% Admitted)
Total Battle
Casualties (TBC)
= 5%
KCMIA = 58%
WIA = 38%(8% RTD, 92%
admitted)
Battleshock (BS) = 4%
(80% RTD, 20% Evacuated)
ROYAL AIR FORCE
Declared Orbat = 26500
Declared Orbat = 7520
DNBI = 1.40% Constant
D = 1.35%(90% RTD,
10%Admitted)
NBI = 0.05% (40% RTD,
60% Admitted)
Total Battle
Casualties (TBC)
= 3.6%
KCMIA = 25%
WIA = 58%(10% RTD, 90%
admitted)
Battleshock (BS) = 17%
(90% RTD, 10% Evacuated)
DNBI = 1.40% Constant
D = 1.35%(90% RTD,
10%Admitted)
NBI = 0.05% (40%
RTD, 60% Admitted)
Total Battle
Casualties (TBC)
= 1.7%
KCMIA = 25%
WIA = 58%(10% RTD, 90%
admitted)
Battleshock (BS) = 17%
(90% RTD, 10% Evacuated)
NB: EMF use Army figures
when ashore.
Miscellaneous
STEADY
STATE/TRAINING
NBC
IPE/NAPS/Combo
Pen
Base Capability
Equipment
/Task Essential
Enhancement
Sufficient stocks to sp an
appropriate NBC Defence posture
are to be deployed for 14 days trg.
Chem Detector consumables for 2
days trg, 28 days pre-ops standby.
All land based personnel to deploy
with:
1 x trg set NBC IPE.
3 x sets of NBC IPE at 1st Line
nd
1 x suit 2 Line
2 suits at 3rd Line.
COLPRO to be provided under
single-Service arrangements.
OPS/SURGE
Sufficient stocks to sp an appropriate
NBC Defence posture are to be
deployed for 30 days ops.
Chem Detector consumables for, 28
days ops.
Stocks to include categories of NBCD
equip: detection/identification,
monitoring/warning and
reporting/contamination control.
Medical; countermeasures (i.e. NAPS,
Combopens).
See Med Directive for Med Ctr
Measures and vaccines/innoculation
routines.
All maritime units to be fully
fitted.
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6C15. Mission Essential Equipment. Mission Essential Equipment together with
the maintained minimum operation percentage or number held. Availability is
determined by J3, but will be similar to the following table.
MARITIME
EQUIPMENT
FA2
SK4 Helicopters
LAND
%AVAL
EQUIPMENT
70
SATCOM
66
Helicopters
AIR
%AVAL
EQUIPMENT
80
Aircraft
66
Uninstalled Aero
Engines
80
TIALD Pods
%AVAL
70%
55
Single Ship
Helicopters
Lynx
Wpns Systems
100
Bulk Fuel/Water
Carrying Vehs
100
A Vehs
80
RM A Vehicles
80
Artillery Systems
80
Ship Systems
Propulsion/Radar
80
AD Systems
80
Sky Shadow PODS
95%
(min
75%)
25
STA Equipment
DROPS
Engr Plant
MHE/Generators
CIS Systems
TDA
80
80
80
80
80
80
Drop Tanks
Rapier FSC
Gen Spt Tanker
Cargo Vehicle
90%
90%
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LOROP/VICON
Pods
Priming Equip
Packs
8
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ANNEX 6D – CAMPAIGN PLANNING – LOGISTIC
INFLUENCES
Political
Direction
Military
Directive
WAYS
(Mission and Guidance
on use of resources)
ESTIMATE
Mission Analysis
Evaluation of Factors
Consideration of CoA
Commanders Decision
MEANS
(Resources)
ENDS
(End-state, Military Strategic
Objectives and Exit Strategy)
CAMPAIGN PLAN
PHASE 1
Line of Op
PHASE 2
DP
3
PHASE 3
DP
Op pause
Logistic Decision
Points (DP) may
include Readiness
in Theatre,
Rehabilitation and
Redeployment
S Line of Op
p
a
c
Line of Op
e
DP
Culminating
Point
Ops
CoG
Operational
End-state
Strategic
CoG
DP
Sequel
Line of Op
DP
DP
Branch
Time
DP
DP
Other
Lines of
Operation
DP
Strategic
End-state
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ANNEX 6E – PLANNING FACTORS FOR CON LOG
WITHIN THE CONTRACTORS ON DEPLOYED
OPERATIONS CONCEPT
6E1. Introduction. This Annex describes the key planning factors relating to the
decision to provide deployed contracted support through a single prime contractor(s) –
CON LOG. It specifically refers to the operational level choices open to the Joint
Commander and the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) in preparing or revising the
Force Element Table, rather than to Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) mechanisms
which have been procured with new equipment and systems. Beginning with a
definition of ‘benign conditions’ (a possible limitation to use of CON LOG), the CON
LOG planning process and key factors are described. Finally, at Appendix 1, the CON
LOG deployment algorithm is included.
6E2. Benign Conditions. Benign conditions are found at different geographical
locations and at different times as an operation develops. In order to ensure safety and
security for the workforce, Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO) provision
should normally be made only in benign conditions. The implications of the key
factors of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ will define ‘benign conditions’ and these will vary
between operations. All parties must understand these definitions and implications,
and agree them before a CONDO deployment is authorised. Whilst legal
documentation may contain more specific definitions, from a CONDO perspective,
these variables are likely to include the following characteristics:1
a.
Safety. This implies an operating environment in which there is
minimal risk of personnel and equipment sustaining injury or damage through
the effects of external influences, whether natural or induced by hostile
activity. The assumption for this variable is that effects may be induced either
by conscious third party intent or by accident.
b.
Security. This variable has direct links to safety, but also implies that
adequate means are in place to ensure safety, whether they be passive and
physical, involving buildings and equipment, or active, in terms of orchestrated
protective measures.
CON LOG Planning
6E3. Planning Objective. During the planning phase of an operation, or as the
situation changes, the objective of CON LOG planning should be to determine:
1
These guidelines are not intended to be rigid, but provide a start point for further negotiation.
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a.
Where gaps in Combat Support2 or Combat Service Support (CSS) may
exist in the short or medium term.
b.
Where military overstretch may become acute in support areas if the
operation continues over a longer term.
c.
Whether and how gaps may be filled or overstretch relieved, through use
of CON LOG in the short, medium or longer term. This will involve
consideration of the ‘benign’ nature of the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
d.
How CON LOG activities should be measured for value for money and,
ultimately, funded.
e.
Suitable mechanisms for activating, delivering and monitoring CON
LOG support.
f.
A plan for replacing the CON LOG facility in the event that the
environment ceases to be appropriately benign.
6E4. A method of drawing down CON LOG on normalisation of the situation.
6E5. Commanders’ Guidelines for Consideration of CON LOG Usage. The
decision to use military or CON LOG facilities is dependent on a wide range of
factors, many of which need exposure during the logistic estimate process at both the
strategic and operational level. Although tempered by resource issues, it remains
fundamentally a Command decision. A decision matrix on CON LOG Deployment,
including a checklist in the form of an algorithm, is included at Appendix 6E1. It
covers some realistic factors and risks and provides a framework for detailed estimate
work - each decision box on the deployment and withdrawal algorithm needs objective
assessment. While not prescriptive, the algorithm can assist staff in the decisionmaking process. As articulated in paragraph 6E2, the assessment of the environment
as ‘benign’ or otherwise is a fundamental limitation, however other issues requiring
consideration - primarily an assessment of the operational suitability of the differing
characteristics of CON LOG contractors and their military equivalents - are given
below.
6E6. Contractor Characteristics. The characteristic differences between
contractors and their military equivalents delivering a supporting function in the
battlespace are:
a.
Self Defence/Fall-back Reserve. While CSS, engineers and
communications force elements are providing their services, they are also able
to defend themselves against light attack, to be situationally aware (within
2
Those areas of Combat Support which may also fall under the CSS umbrella, such as engineer infrastructure and certain
communications.
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current C4I constraints) and to organise themselves as a fall-back local reserve
if necessary. Contractors are unable to provide any of these functions.3
b.
Flexibility. Whilst contracts should allow as much flexibility as
possible to switch contractor effort to aligned functions, it is likely that issues
of liability, risk and insurance will mean that military personnel will often be
more flexible in use. Nevertheless, contractors may offer depths of expertise
and training that the military system has difficulty in maintaining in sufficient
numbers.4
c.
Reliability. No battlefield function can be guaranteed as 100% reliable,
whether delivered by contractor or the military. Security, political or other
constraints may further limit the ability of a contractor to deliver.
d.
Responsiveness. Certain contractors may be able to provide specific
task capabilities in response to a crisis anywhere in the world in times that the
large military force structures may not be able to meet.
e.
Additional Capability. Contractors may be able to provide additional
capability to meet military surge requirements.
6E7. Employment Factors. Taking the above characteristics into account, the
following factors influence the estimate concerning employment of contractors on
deployed operations.
a.
Time. As a campaign gets underway and its nature is better understood,
it will become more obvious where military skills are most needed and, where
stretched, force elements can be relieved by contractors. Also, as time
progresses operations should become more stable and benign allowing greater
potential for contractorisation.
b.
Space. Relatively benign areas are needed through which to channel
Lines of Communication.5 There will be less risk attached to the employment
of contractors in the more benign rear areas, especially if this were to be in
another country outside the immediate area of conflict, or even in the mounting
base using ‘reachback’ principles.
3
Unless the contractor’s personnel are employed as Sponsored Reserves in formed military units. Upon deployment,
however, Sponsored Reserves will come under direct military command, apart from a lower level of training, will be
indistinguishable from Regular soldiers on the battlefield. For the purposes of this JWP, Sponsored Reserves are not
considered as contractors.
4
Contractors will often face the same trade/skill shortages as the military. Increased flexibility in and Communications
and Information Systems (CIS) is almost always available at a cost. CIS force elements will usually provide an initial
capability followed by a secure back up, but often with a reduced capability.
5
It should be borne in mind that an adversary will see these benign areas as attractive targets. This will mean force
protection is required.
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c.
Function. Certain military tasks on deployments lend themselves more
to contractorisation than others.
6E8. Aggregation of Risk. The logistic estimate will need to take into account the
impact of the aggregation of risk. It may well be that taken in isolation a large number
of functions could be covered separately by contractors. However, if a wide range of
functions were to be immediately undertaken by contractors, then the military
flexibility to deal with the unexpected could be seriously limited. The converse is also
true in that contractors can relieve military forces to be flexibly employed elsewhere.
6E9. The Deployment Plan. The complete planning process is dependent on a CON
LOG Enabling Arrangement and should result in a CON LOG Deployment Plan.
Detailed responsibility for the management of the CON LOG Deployment Plan falls to
the CON LOG Planning Team.
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Military/Civil
Service Manning
Yes
Can these only
be provided from
uniformed sources
?
Mil Training or
Specialist Mil Skills
Required
?
Yes
See Note 1
6E1-1
Balance of Forces
No acceptable for
the operation
?
No
No
No
TO ORBAT
Uniformed
Personnel/
Formed Units
Military Manning
Activity Required
to supplement
deployable manpower
by backfilling
?
Yes
POTENTIAL
RESOURCE ISSUE
Define Requirement
Liaise with Industry
Continue to Contract
See Note 6
Yes
Will MOD
accept Op Risk
using CONDO in Sp in
certain areas?
Will CONDO See Note 4
offer VFM?
?
Re-define
requirement/availability
of uniformed
personnel
See Note 3
Yes
Balance of Forces
acceptable for
the operation
?
Yes
Are
uniformed
personnel available
?
Yes
No
TO ORBAT
(TO PROVIDE STRATEGIC SPT?)
Military/Civil
Service Manning
Yes
Other Core Military
Logistics Function
?
NON-BENIGN
See Note 3
Yes
Re-define See Note 4
requirement/availability
of uniformed
personnel
See Note 6
Yes
Will MOD
accept Op Risk
using CON LOG
?
Yes
Yes
No
No Are uniformed
personnel available
?
POTENTIAL
RESOURCE ISSUE
Yes
Is CON LOG an Option
i.e Is task suitable to be
carried out by contractors
with MOD training if
necessary and is it VFM?
No
Must the task be
carried out by
uniformed personnel
?
Yes
BENIGN
Benign/Steady
State
?
See Note 2
No
No
CON LOG
DEPLOYED
OPS
(CONDO)
PRIVATE
SECTOR
LOGISTIC
SUPPORT
No
STRATEGIC
BASE
PRIVATE SECTOR
LOGISTIC SUPPORT
/CONDO POTENTIAL
1. ‘Uniformed’ includes Regular Military, Reserves including SRs, Military Guard Force, EFI etc.
2. Consider at what point along the LOC can CON LOG be used if LOC Benign but OP area not?
Consider also the various states of war and theatres of operation - i.e. can CON LOG be used at any of the states as an alternative to mil forces?
3. MOD to assess overall requirement for balance of forces to ensure correct mix for initial deployment and with the potential through roulement to
continue to provide that mix as dictated by the operational environment.
4. The term ‘MOD’ includes PJHQ, and Operational Commands. Finance Director’s staff likely to be involved in VFM decision.
5. Use of SRs will have already been considered as an option prior to deployment if the task requires them.
6. Main Gate approval to be obtained for use of new equipment by CON LOG and/or Sponsored Reserves.
Notes:-
Non CON LOG
Application
No
No
TO ORBAT
See Note 5
Regular Personnel to
includes CS, CSS (and Also consider option provided for Follow On Forces
SRs if included in the
ORBAT)
No
No
No
FOLLOW ON &
ENDURANCE &
SUPPORT TO LOC
Yes
Benign/Steady
State
See
Note 2
?
Yes
Initial Entry
(R1-4?)
?
Yes
Deployable
Logistics Function
?
START
APPENDIX 6E1 – CONDO DEPLOYMENT AND CON LOG
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ANNEX 6F – HOST-NATION SUPPORT PRINCIPLES
6F1. Whilst Chapter 6 describes the nature of Host-Nation Support (HNS), this
Annex explores the potential advantages and disadvantages of its use on operations, in
place of, or alongside, other support methods. The doctrine is then distilled into
principles, in the form of a checklist, which are relevant to all levels of HNS planning.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Host-Nation Support
6F2. Strengths. The strengths of HNS can be summarised as follows:
a.
Host nation governmental personnel have the best knowledge of
available sources.
b.
HNS provides significant potential to reduce the overall military logistic
effort and manpower required.
c.
HNS is usually the least costly method of support.
d.
HNS is usually the most available resource.
e.
HNS assists in the development of mutual trust and confidence which
meets J3/CIMIC aims.
f.
The use of HNS usually creates a common provider for all forces which
can reduce potential competition between and within HNs and other nations.
6F3. Weaknesses. The weaknesses of HNS can be summarised as follows:
a.
Delays can arise from need for detailed justification of HNS
requirements, particularly during deliberate planning, which may subjugate
operational need to political/financial expediency (including monopolising
limited supplies). The complete technical process may be lengthy.
b.
Lack of flexibility where changes in the requirement must be coordinated through the HN.
c.
Language, social and cultural differences between Sending Nation (SN)
and HN can cause confusion and broader communication problems.
d.
A degree of risk to the operational plan is introduced, particularly in the
areas of force protection and assurance (and quality) of supply, especially
where the HN uses contractors to provide HNS. This requires the provision of
extensive tiers of security and quality control within the force.
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Planning Principles
6F4. General. The sustainment of its forces is ultimately a UK responsibility even
when participating in multinational operations.
6F5. Planning.
a.
HNS is integrally linked to logistics and impacts on logistic planning.
The use of HNS should therefore be taken into consideration in the overall
planning process for operations and exercises. For operations, HNS must be
evaluated as a factor in the Strategic Logistic Estimate conducted by PJHQ.
b.
Relevant procedures for HNS should be developed and maintained to
inform UK forces.
c.
In the interests of operational effectiveness, HNS planning, development
and implementation must be properly co-ordinated.
d.
The HNS planning process must be flexible and able to deal both with
generic and specific planning assumptions.
e.
Planning and implementation of HNS must reflect the most
operationally effective, efficient and economic means of delivering support.
f.
The quality standard of support, supplies and services expected of the
HN, should be established, verified and ultimately recorded in HNS
Agreements (HNSA). The level of support obtained should, where possible,
be at least equivalent to the support the HN provides to its own forces.
g.
In the early stages of mounting an operation, the availability and
potential for HNS should, as a matter of urgency, be explored with HNs and
cost/burden sharing formulae agreed.
h.
Where contingency plans are drawn up for possible future operations, it
will be appropriate to consider in advance whether HNS may be available and
the terms under which it would be provided.
i.
As HNS negotiations can often take a considerable time, it is essential
that the relevant staffs involved in drawing up HNSA are made aware, at the
earliest opportunity, of any operation and exercise planning with potential
HNS implications, to ensure either an existing HNSA can be utilised or that
appropriate cover can be put in place.
j.
Where more than one Service is to participate in an exercise requiring
HNS, co-ordination should take place at an early stage in the planning process
between respective Command HQs (and where necessary PJHQ and HQDLO)
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to establish the appropriate lead organisation to develop an HNSA on behalf of
all UK participants.
k.
The extent and value of HNS received should, where practicable, be
recorded both for comparison purposes for future operations and exercises and
to provide an adequate audit trail.
l.
HN infrastructure should not be jeopardised, particularly in austere
environments, either by requiring too large a proportion of a given commodity
or service or by allowing the HN to commit to provide support which it is clear
they cannot provide.
6F6. Arrangements.
a.
The provision or receipt of HNS should, where practicable, be covered
by an HNSA. Where this is not possible, UK forces in the JOA will need to
establish local, ad hoc procedures with the HN based upon templates and
advice provided by PJHQ.
b.
Responsibility for negotiation of HNSA will be in accordance with the
policy paper on the ‘Future Management of HNS Planning and
Implementation’.
c.
The staffing of HNSA must be properly co-ordinated within the
Department with the relevant policy and specialist branches being consulted in
good time.
d.
Inter-governmental arrangements involving the deployment and support
of UK forces overseas or the hosting of foreign forces in the UK should, where
appropriate, include either suitable HNS provisions or mechanisms for the
development of lower level HNSA, such as Implementing Arrangements (IAs).
e.
Unless there are over-riding national reasons to the contrary, the UK
would normally expect to follow agreed NATO/EU policy and procedures for
HNS when participating in NATO/EU multinational operations or exercises.
f.
In the case of a NATO or EU-led operation or exercise HQDLO should
co-ordinate allocation of responsibility to:
(1) Authorise the NATO/EU Commander to negotiate HNSA with
the HN on UK’s behalf, and
(2)
Sign a note of accession/statement of intent to an HNSA.
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6F7. Finance.
a.
Financial aspects of support, including issues of taxation, should be
agreed with the HN before forces deploy.
b.
Records of transactions should be maintained for financial management
and audit control purposes.
c.
The amounts charged to UK forces for support from the HN should be
no more than the armed force of the HN is charged for the same or similar
goods and services.
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ANNEX 6G – IMPLICATIONS OF LEAD NATION OR
ROLE SPECIALIST NATION RESPONSIBILITY
6G1. This Annex provides guidance on the implications for UK of accepting
multinational responsibilities on operations, either with a leading role or as a
supported nation. The arrangements concerned are Lead Nation (LN) or Role
Specialist Nation (RSN).
SECTION I – UK AS LEAD NATION
6G2. Tasks. As the name implies, the LN provides the local Command and Control
(C2) of the specific support service and, where appropriate, contributes the major
functional assets making use of nationally well-developed skills and resources. Within
the Joint Commander’s planning cycle, scope for the most effective provision of
support to UK Jt Forces will be considered, however geography and assessed freedom
of action may determine that a LN responsibility may be limited to a single
component. Examples of LN activity in which UK has experience include the joint
operation of running of an Air Port of Disembarkation (APOD). The following
paragraphs describe the steps that UK planners may need to take prior to accepting a
LN role.
6G3. Planning Framework. Responsibility for strategic planning of the LN
function lies primarily with MOD. During the planning phase of a coalition operation
MOD will establish contact with other contributing nations, exchanging information
on their requirements (their Statement of Requirements (SOR)). DLO HQ will
normally provide a MOD focus for advice within the Defence Crisis Management
Organisation (DCMO). As part of the planning process PJHQ J4 should identify the
broad scope and content of the specific support service that the UK is to provide either
as LN or RSN. Following the necessary detailed reconnaissance of the area of
operations the UK Joint Logistic Plan will be formulated and the scope for multinational co-operation identified.
6G4. Negotiation. In considering whether to assume a LN role, negotiations under
MOD (DLO) guidance are conducted with each participating nation requiring support
to determine the exact span of responsibilities, ensuring that the SOR will provide
sufficient freedom of action to carry out the MN Commander’s plan. These should
include the identification of a supported nation’s contingency to support itself if
necessary, and at what point that contingency would be activated. UK will then
determine the best method of providing support and will co-ordinate an ‘asset
generation’ process.
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6G5. Standard Operating Procedures. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) will
be required to ensure that any repayment based on usage can be properly reclaimed,
either during or after the operation. It would normally fall to PJHQ to produce these
SOPs (in conjunction with the lead Supporting Command, DLO and the National
Support Element (NSE) Command). These should also include arrangements for the
provision of reports and returns.
6G6. Arrangements. DLOHQ/PJHQ will lead on the production of individual
Arrangements which will be negotiated on a bilateral basis and should contain
reference to specific SOPs, funding and legal arrangements. In a NATO operation it is
important to ascertain to what extent common MN funding may be available.
6G7.
Specific Considerations. Elements requiring specific consideration include:
a.
Legal. Dependent on the legal background as drawn up in an
Arrangement. To be defined bi-laterally and concluded between nations and (as
required) by NATO HQ.
b.
Duration. When a nation assumes LN responsibility, the agreed
duration of the task will be set by either a formal Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between the LN and the relevant Strategic Command
(SC) (or Command), or as part of the NATO Force Generation process
(FORCEPREP). Planners should identify the manner in which the
responsibility is to be transferred to another nation and, on later termination or
rotation of the responsibility between nations, how the process should be
completed.
c.
Command and Control. Units participating in the LN functions are
normally under national control. However, the MN commander should be
awarded appropriate authority (which may be OPCON or TACON) over the
functions and tasking authority should be granted to the LN functional
authorities.
d.
Quality and Level of Support. With the required standards carefully
identified in the SOR and subsequent arrangement, the level of service provided
as LN should be no less to other nations than to UK forces. Details should be
incorporated in MN OPLANs or SUPLANs and may be based on STANAGs.
6G8. Contracts and Funding. On completion of the bilateral arrangements for
each nation, negotiation and the awarding of contracts, where required, can proceed.
This may involve the provision of advanced funding by UK.
6G9. Priorities on Activation of the Lead Nation Support Facility. On
deployment and activation of the LN facility, NSE (or JFLogC) staff and executive
units will need to allocate resources to:
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a.
Co-ordination and deconfliction of national and NATO or MN
requirements.
b.
Liaison with other nation NSEs.
c.
Management of budgets and funds.
d.
Management and maintenance of infrastructure and facilities.
SECTION II – UK AS A SUPPORTED NATION
6G10. Planning Considerations. On entering a negotiated agreement to accept
support from a multi-national organisation which takes LN status, UK planners will
need to consider the following issues carefully:
a.
The potential for reducing (or enhancing) UK’s freedom of action at the
political and strategic level.
b.
The potential for reducing (or enhancing) the UK NCC’s freedom of
action at the operational level within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
c.
Confidence in the proposed organisation and the options open to recover
support to UK forces in the event of a crisis.
d.
The foreseeable benefits resulting in multinational collaboration both to
national and multinational interests. These may be in terms of:
(1)
Making best use of scarce resources. This is particularly
important where sources of supply are limited or may be open to
competition between contributing nations.
(2)
Making use of other nations’ facilities, which may be more
appropriate to the situation.
(3)
Making best use of multinational co-ordination techniques.
e.
The perceived political benefit of the UK’s statement of intent to take
part in a multinational organisation, demonstrating coalition mutual trust.
6G11. Detailed Planning. The procedure for planning and negotiating participation
in support provided by another LN is similar, with alternative emphasis, to that
discussed at paragraphs 6G3-5. It is likely to require a resource commitment, such as
provision of early funding or assets, to contribute to the capability. During the
negotiation and completion phase it will be important for MOD to ensure that:
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a.
All UK’s requirements are covered, either multi-nationally or by
contributory UK forces. UK’s SOR, identifying precise details of quantity and
quality of service, will be produced by J4 PJHQ in consultation with Services
and DLO HQ, prior to or during the reconnaissance phase.
b.
SOPs are drafted and agreed, ensuring that procedures for materiel and
funding accountability are satisfactory.
Following agreement, release of the necessary resources at the earliest opportunity will
assist in the successful completion of preparations.
6G12. Status Reports. In the JOA, the NSE must remain appraised of the status of
the multinational facility and of relevant critical resources. Suitable arrangements for
the passage of information, by reports and returns, should be made to ensure that the
UK NCC would be able conduct appropriate national planning.
Transition to Lead Nation Provision during a Draw-down.
6G13. Rationalisation Scope. As an operation progresses, the deployed logistics
commander (NSE or JFLogC), PJHQ and MOD may see opportunities for
rationalising deployed UK assets by transferring to LN arrangements. By this stage it
is likely that a high level of knowledge of facilities and resources in the JOA will have
been gained; however, principles should still be applied as if the arrangement was a
new phase of the operation.
SECTION III – UK AS ROLE SPECIALIST NATION
6G14. Planning. Planning and preparation for UK activity as an RSN follow
similar lines to those for LN (i.e. under bilateral arrangements between provider and
each user nation). As role specialist, UK would lead on preparation of input to
relevant supply elements of the multi-national operational or support plans.
Responsibilities will also include the production of associated SOPs, detailed
infrastructure requirements and the definition of methods of
compensation/remuneration. Planning arrangements should, however, make provision
for explicit property and resource accounting, in the event that another nation is
required to take over responsibilities during an operation or between phases.
Agreements on the length of commitment to a task should also be clarified at the
outset.
6G15. Responsibilities on Activation. An RSN can expect to carry out the
following functions during the operation:
a.
Co-ordinate customer requirements.
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b.
Provide personnel to man the relevant cell in a multi-national HQ (such
as an MJLC).
c.
Provide units and assets.
d.
Provide initial funding (reimbursement is normally based on STANAG
2034).
e.
Provide limited security, noting that security is a local responsibility.
Therefore, when deployed outside its national area, the local multinational
commander could be expected to provide security for RSN units and their
facilities.
f.
Carry out a pre-occupation survey of sites and facilities to be used. This
is often essential, particularly in PSO environments, with a view to eventual
hand-over to other nations or the host nation. In certain framework operations,
such as UN, an accurate In-Survey and Out-Survey is mandatory.
6G16. Funding. Funding and compensation are the responsibility of the RSN. In
NATO, some common funding for strategic infrastructure could be sought. If some
part of funding is to be shared between nations, it is the RSN responsibility to
negotiate with the receiving nations on a bilateral basis.
UK as Supported Nation
6G17. Customer Role. The key difference from UK’s responsibility as the
customer of a LN is that assets, in terms of troops and equipment, may not be required.
Dependent on the agreed SOPs and bilateral arrangements, UK’s responsibility may be
limited to ensuring adequate accounting and providing appropriate funding
contributions. The UK’s participation is otherwise as a customer.
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6G-6
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PART 4
Part 4 Conduct of
the Campaign
Conduct of
the Campaign
JWP 4-00
CHAPTER 7 – PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT
701. Force Projection. Strategic projection of rapid reaction forces, a corner stone
of British Defence Policy, provides the military capability, on which political
credibility depends, for rapid resolution of a geographically remote crisis. Projection
demands adequate, short notice strategic lift, and is most important where delayed
arrival would require despatch of a greater force to achieve the same effect. The
means and the method of mounting a deployment are thus central to the speed of
execution. While the deployment plan is J3 led, most of its key functions and
expertise are logistic, moreover, logistic enabling units will often ‘front load’ the
Desired Order of Arrival (DOA). Logistic factors within the deployment plan
condition what is possible and thus the courses of action that are feasible and their
respective merits.
702. Preparation and Deployment. The first two phases of an operation are predeployment activity including coherent and comprehensive planning and the initiation
of early measures to meet the demands of a potential operation followed by
deployment itself. These phases are followed by Sustainment and Redeployment.
SECTION I – PRE-DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY
703. Deployment Planning. The planning and estimate process, as described in
Chapter 6, provides the background for pre-deployment activity. It includes definition
of the Line of Communication (LOC), initial support packages and the required level
of sustainment for both initial and full operating capability. The next step is to
identify the Mounting Headquarters (see paragraph 711) and to construct the Detailed
Deployment Plan (DDP).
704. Detailed Deployment Plan. The DDP is the product of a lengthy distillation
of Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ),
Supporting Command1 and Defence Transport and Movement Agency (DTMA)
inputs. Having concluded the Military Strategic Estimate, PJHQ issues a statement of
required capabilities to the Commands (the Joint Statement of Requirement (JSOR))
who produce their single Service Force Element Tables (FET). These are consolidated
by PJHQ into a Joint FET - the JFET. The DOA2 to support the operational plan is
concurrently worked up by the JTFHQ staff and this, combined with the JFET,
produces the DDP. DTMA, J4 Mov, the Operations Team (OT) and JTFHQ consult
throughout this process, responding, where necessary to any change in operational
priorities. On the strength of the DOA, important early bids for strategic movement
1
A description of the terms Supporting Commands and Front Line Commands is published in Joint Doctrine Note
002/02.
2
US forces use the term Time Phase Force Deployment List (TPFDL); phonetically the ‘tipfid’.
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assets are made and the DDP pieced together. By this means the force is mounted and
deployed in a manner consistent with the operational plan.
705. Time Implications. Amongst the most important questions, asked at the
highest levels, is ‘how long will deployment take’ or ‘how soon can an effect be
achieved’? The availability of appropriate strategic lift assets will determine the
response.
706. Strategic Lift Options. Commercial charter or, rarely, requisition (Aircraft
and/or Ships Taken Up From Trade (ATUFT/STUFT)) will be used for all but the
smallest deployments and early phases of a Medium Scale deployment. Allied, charter
or ATUFT/STUFT takes time to acquire by DLO’s DTMA and whilst frequently of
sub-optimal configuration, can sometimes offer greater payload than Service air
transport.
a.
Shipping. The diagram at Figure 7.1 shows the time advantage that
organic MOD shipping can have over charter vessels. Factors affecting a
decision on use of shipping include the nature of the load (size and
characteristics), the required delivery date and cost. Acquisition lead times
and slower loading/discharge times need to be taken into account when
calculating overall deployment timelines. Careful consideration of lift
resource availability and the destination may lead to less obvious shipping
choices:
(1) Acquisition. NATO Planning assumptions on acquisition times
are: 30 days for Roll on/Roll off ships (RO/RO) or Roll on Container
ships (ROCON) and 10+ days for less useful container ships or break
bulk Lift on/Lift off (LO/LO) vessels.
(2) Relative Speeds. Whilst charter of outsize airlift may be
achieved at shorter notice than sealift, some 80% of loads may arrive
sooner by sea than if they were accorded medium/low priority for air
freighting - a simple case of volume versus speed. However, this very
bulk adds another vulnerability that must be considered as part of the
deployment criteria for shipping; the Force Protection aspects of choke
point passage must be taken into account. This 80/20 split also broadly
reflects the overall volumes moved respectively by surface and air for all
but the smallest air-delivered operations.
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4000 nm
LOC
(Cyprus)
ORGANIC MOD
SHIPPING
Preparation/
Preposition
Load
Deploy
RO-RO CHARTER
SHIPPING
D - 12
D + 26
(via Suez)
Typical Aquisition Time Load
Deploy
30 + days
No approach to
market without
financial authority
Warning
(Variable)
8000 nm
LOC
(Gulf)
Initial RIT in
Theatre
before first
charter
vessels leave
UK
D + 30
Time
Decision
Point
Figure 7.1 - The Time Advantage of Organic MOD Sea Lift
b.
Air Lift. Enabling arrangements allow 10-14 days for the acquisition of
outsize aircraft. The imperative for air transport will normally be the rapid
deployment and sustainment of early-entry forces and the deployment of
troops to marry up with heavy, surface delivered equipment. Air transport will
be allocated to high priority equipment and until such time as the Sea/Surface
lines of Communication can be established for the movement of more routine
sustainment requirements. The selection of air and sea/surface resupply modes
must always balance speed of response against volume and cost. As part of the
deployment process, it may be necessary to obtain waivers/exemptions from
normal peacetime legislation and take formal Powers of Direction to support
the requisition of strategic lift (ATUFT/STUFT), should the operational
circumstances require it. However, requisition remains very much an option of
last resort. The reliance on commercial strategic lift to deploy the JRRF will
reduce with additional MOD ROCONs and outsize aircraft.
c.
Rail. Rail has significant capacity, although the passage of freight will
normally be more difficult to predict over extended strategic LOC. Due to its
vulnerability, rail is likely to be dependent on protection or maintenance. It is
dependent on transfer equipment.
d.
Road. Road is increasingly being used to sustain operations over
strategic distances – particularly by contractors. However, for deployment, it
is likely only to be used within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
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707. Availability of Resources. Where there may be an industry lead-time or, for
example, a need to earmark sponsored reserves for deployment, pre-deployment
activity includes the initiation of measures to ensure stocks and supplies are acquired
and available. All this can be undertaken, within the required Operations Security
(OPSEC), before the order to move is given.
708. Urgent Operational Requirements/Urgent Maintenance Requirements. It
is not always possible to have all the equipment required for an operation on hand or
sufficiently stocked; equally there may be a requirement to alter current equipment to
respond to a new threat or environmental factor. Urgent Operational Requirements
(UOR) processed through the operations staffs and DEC or CD branches procure new
items for the inventory while Urgent Maintenance Requirements (UMR) are made on
existing equipment managers to procure new stock. UOR/UMRs are raised by Front
Line Commands (FLCs) and are authorised on the basis of operational need by PJHQ,
funded in consultation with MOD Finance Policy Branch and passed to the acquisition
community.
709. Framework. In tandem, medical requirements or other personnel-related
issues will be assessed and pre-operational training planned and conducted as
necessary. Budgetary structures must be established, and the early deployment of
CON LOG or other contracts experts organised. A further essential element is the
negotiation of Diplomatic Clearance with any nation having physical interests in the
deployment.
710. Diplomatic Clearance. The requirement for timely diplomatic clearance
(DIPCLEAR) to avoid delay should not be overlooked. Aircraft, in particular, need to
secure overflight permissions as well as landing rights (when appropriate) in the
destination country. 2 Gp RAF are responsible for clearing flights for military aircraft
while commercial operators must clear their contracted aircraft. Shipping is cleared
through RN SOPs for Royal Fleet Auxiliaries (RFAs) and via DTMA and Shipping
Agents for chartered vessels.
SECTION II – DEPLOYMENT
711. The deployment phase, which includes mounting, the strategic deployment and
the Reception, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) of forces in-theatre,
involves the delivery of troops, equipment and stocks to the JOA, and their preparation
for operations.
Mounting
712. Definition and UK Context. Mounting is defined as ‘all preparations made
in areas designated for the purpose, in anticipation of an operation. It includes the
assembly in the mounting area, preparation and maintenance within the mounting
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area, movement to loading points, and subsequent embarkation into ships, craft or
aircraft if applicable’.3 In a UK context mounting refers to the practical co-ordination
of tasks dictated by the DDP such as the identification and preparation of forces, their
equipment and stores, including briefing, transportation to 'the Joint Air Mounting
Centre (JAMC) or Sea Mounting Centre (SMC).
713. Mounting Headquarters. Mounting headquarters have a vital co-ordination
function to perform and must be formed at a sufficiently high level to be able to deal
with a complex mix of civilian and military infrastructure. In all but the smallest
operations the FLCs4 are normally best placed to mount the elements that they
contribute to a deployment. Because it is important that the mounting commander
works hand in hand with the operational commander the overall co-ordination
interface is at the PJHQ. PJHQ is not a mounting HQ per se but the PJHQ J3
Deployment Cell (which includes J4 Movements representation co-ordinates air, sea
and land movement into the JOA to match reception capacity and the JTFC’s DOA of
men and materiel. The PJHQ/Mounting HQ interface is managed within PJHQ by the
Deployment Cell. This is an extension of the Operations Team specifically focussed
on deployment and by which the Jt Comd and JTFC are kept up to date with the build
up in theatre. Keeping accurate track of this flow of forces and key equipment is
essential to successfully amending the DOA in response to unfolding events and
changing requirements as articulated through the JTFHQ. Utilising separate mounting
headquarters allows operational commanders to concentrate on in-theatre activities
and preparation for operations.
714. Personnel and Equipment. Personnel issues and medical preparation are
detailed in JWP 1-00.5 Mounting Instructions (MI) and movement orders are the tools
used to co-ordinate the mounting of the personnel and equipment. Personnel tracking
systems should be activated early in the mounting process. Administrative preparation
of personnel includes the issue of special clothing, fitness screening and the
administering of inoculations and prophylactic drugs. In the case of the latter, time
may be needed before they become effective; clearly the earlier they are given the
better. They may additionally contribute to the signal of military intent – or,
conversely, loss of OPSEC.
715. Out-loading Operational Stocks. The materiel support of operations,
including the initial issue from base depots, of unit regeneration and force sustainment
stocks is a DLO function in the Strategic Base but requires operational direction.
Sustainment stocks will normally be deployed to a Forward Mounting Base (FMB) or
the JOA, keeping enough regeneration materiel in UK. Equipment and stock has to be
prepared for movement and possibly for the local climatic, topographic and
3
AAP-6.
HQ Fleet does not have the ability to be a mounting HQ although personnel are supplied to HQ Land or STC (as the
mounting HQ) to support LF (RM) moves.
5
JWP 1-00 ‘Joint Personnel Administration’ is due to be promulgated in 2003.
4
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operational conditions. Pending manufacture of new stocks, the initial out-loading
will utilise Operational Stocks (previously known as War Reserves) which fall into 2
categories:
a.
Special Purpose Operational Stocks. Special Purpose Operational
Stocks (SPOS) consist of computer earmarked (but not necessarily preconfigured or pre-packed) stocks to meet high readiness requirements for the
purposes of regeneration or sustainment of a force. The SPOS will be located
in depots within the Strategic Base, with day-to-day management being
exercised by the Supply Chain Operations Centre Current Operations Group
(SCOC COG); some stock may be located afloat or overseas. SPOS is
earmarked to meet particular operational contingencies. Ammunition and
rations are not pre-packed because of peacetime storage constraints. Release is
an MOD (Commitments Area) prerogative set against the PJHQ operational
priority. Double earmarking stocks creates a regeneration requirement when
they are committed to an operation.
b.
General Purpose. General Purpose Operational Stocks (GPOS)
includes other liabilities such as unit and task-specific GPOS. The availability
of GPOS is calculated item by item, tempered by affordability, the planned
Readiness and Preparation Time (RPT) available and the lead-time required by
industry to manufacture new stock. The basic maxim is ‘Hold what we have
determined against planning assumptions and acquire the balance during RPT’.
Strategic Deployment
716. Desired Order of Arrival. The DOA determines the sequence and loading
patterns of departure and is fixed by the JTFHQ Staff logistic input. The critical path,
or sequence, must be identified early on to ensure that arrival in the JOA meets the
commander’s intent. The DOA must take account of the requirement for training and
battle preparation. In order to support the RSOI task it may be necessary to deploy
logistic resources (enabling assets) to facilitate ‘theatre activation’. This deployment
must occur in advance of the RSOI task. The desired posture of forces on arrival in
theatre must be clearly defined as this will also affect the way cargo is stowed.
717. Movement Co-ordination Centres. Establishing movement priorities is
essential and the commander requires an effective support organisation to co-ordinate
activity and produce a coherent plan in accordance with the DOA. The formation of
Movement Co-ordination Centres (MCCs), both in the JOA and outside it is essential
to smooth the flow through choke points and maximise route capacities.
718. Passage of Information. The key to a smooth deployment, particularly the
RSOI, is the availability of accurate information regarding departures, delays, rerouting and arrivals. Technology exists to ensure that freight, equipment and
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personnel are tracked during the deployment. Knowledge of their identity and arrival
can precipitate their Readiness in Theatre (RIT) and considerably ease the burden on
the reception organisation which is unlikely to be resource rich. AJP-4.4 ‘Movement
and Transportation Doctrine’ gives details of information exchange requirements and
systems (such as ADAMS)6 necessary for Alliance operations.
719. Protection. Deployment will almost certainly have Force Protection
requirements. The control of this may be delegated to a designated rear operations
commander, possibly the JFLogCC, dependent upon the DOA. Protection areas must
include the initial disembarkation areas, ensuring that the force is able to launch from
a secure platform and one which maintains OPSEC. Force Protection doctrine needs
to be given weight appropriate to the high vulnerability of a force in a state of
transition. The need for Security Engineering to enhance existing facilities should be
considered.
720. Flexibility. The deployment should be the natural, ordered result of the
execution of the DDP. In reality the ‘fog of war’ and inevitable changes in
circumstances will require considerable flexibility in the deployment plan. The
components need to marry up quickly with their stocks and equipment, and orientate
themselves at the destination, so it is vital that the POD is benign. Otherwise, an FMB
(such as Ascension during the Falklands Campaign) may be used to buy valuable time.
721. Forward Mounting Bases/Forward Operating Bases. A FMB may be used
to launch an operation; usually as a stepping stone into the JOA, but also as a discrete
Staging Area. FMBs often reflect, on a smaller scale, the organisation and
responsibilities of the main Logistics establishment within the JOA, including
concurrently receiving, sustaining, (possibly training), mounting and recovering forces
en route to and from the Theatre of operations. The FMB may also be used as a
logistic hub in its own right. FMB commanders require local liaison capabilities and
the J1-J9 range of staff functions commensurate with the operation being supported
and passing through the FMB and the domestic/life support needs of the FMB itself.
They also have the same communications link requirements back to PJHQ and the
Commands and forward into the JTFHQ and JFLogC. Command arrangements will
vary, depending on the location and extent of the JOA. Where an FMB is located
outside a JOA, it will normally answer directly to PJHQ, however workable C2
arrangements with the JTFC and the JFLogCC are essential for the seamless support
of an operation. Forward Operating Bases (FOB) may also be used to support the
main deployment.
722. Hostile Deployment. During a hostile deployment the JFLogC HQ is likely to
remain at a FMB until the in-theatre bridgehead is sufficient to allow establishment of
APOD/SPODs for reception of follow-on forces. Even when JFLogC HQ and its units
6
Allied Deployment and Movements System.
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are conventionally echeloned in this way it may be advantageous to utilise JFLogC
resources to launch combat components complete with their immediate stocks.
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
723. The Functions. RSOI is a joint operation, the completion of which is
normally the formal RIT of a force. The function then changes to one of Sustainment.
The largely self-explanatory terms refer to the capabilities of:
a.
Reception. This function involves preparation of facilities, initial
administration and briefing of personnel and their subsequent transport away
from the point of disembarkation. The flow of incoming resources must be
smooth and continuous so as not to obstruct subsequent arrivals. It is primarily
a movements and administration activity.
b.
Staging. Staging is a life support function which at its simplest feeds
and accommodates arriving personnel in a benign or protected environment.
More importantly it also manages and organises large build-ups of troops,
requiring significant capacity to act as the deployed base from which forces
may reconfigure and train. Convoy Marshalling Areas afford the opportunity
for marrying up personnel with equipment and operational stocks. In Theatre
Reinforcements may be held in the staging base until required: where
reservists are involved, they may require additional equipping, and specialist
training and administration.
c.
Onward Movement. Following Reception and Staging there is
normally a requirement for onward movement to operational locations.
Movements staff require total visibility of the operational situation across all
components, ensuring that the individual (or equipment) is transported to his
unit or operating base location, along protected routes, with Convoy Support
Centres and medical and control points as necessary or using intra-theatre air
lift. Movement may be to any of the components, including to vessels at sea.
d.
Integration. Integration refers primarily to the process of getting the
troops properly orientated to the operational theatre. This includes
acclimatisation, training, tactical configuration and situational awareness.
Whilst it is a J3 rather than J4-led function, it is likely to demand logistic
resources over and above those designated for operations. In multinational
operations, the integration of UK forces into the Alliance or coalition
framework is a further task. From a logistic perspective, this includes the
detailed tactical level agreement of Mutual Support Arrangements which may
have been negotiated at higher level.
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724. Benign v Hostile Conditions. The circumstances at the JOA point of entry
will determine the manner of force reception. It is axiomatic that a secured area in the
JOA will enable a more rapid build up of combat power than one launched from a
more remote FMB. Hostile entry will almost invariably require a formed FMB or
support from the Joint Sea Base as the means of sustaining the entry forces until a
secure logistic base can be built in the JOA.
725. Enabling Capabilities. The requirement to co-ordinate RSOI, for any but the
smallest of operations, demands the skills and expertise of a bespoke joint tactical
level staff with resources to carry out the function. A JFLogC would normally
perform this task, with composite unit assets7 including joint movements at operator
and staff level (the Force Movement Control Centre), port and airfield clearance units,
engineers, infrastructure, labour, supply, transport, medical, provost, administrative
and J8/J9 elements. The JFLogC and enabling assets should therefore feature early in
the DOA. Where facilities (such as the APOD and SPOD) are significantly
geographically dislocated, additional C2 structures may be required.
726. Logistic Infrastructure. The establishment and maintenance of appropriate
A/R/SPODs, routes, staging areas, CIS, and an appropriate supply and movements
pipeline are necessary to move personnel and materiel forward from the Ports of
Disembarkation (POD) and should be a key feature of the theatre infrastructure
preparation. In addition to the use of in-theatre resources, infrastructure can be
obtained from Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure (ECI). ECI consists of two
levels of field infrastructure, as follows:
a.
Tier 1. A temporary standard of infrastructure, based on a modular soft
walled system, that is designed to provide an early-entry accommodation
capability from as soon as it can be deployed to the 8 month point of an
operation and exceptionally up to the 18 month point. This capability is held
as equipment packages by DLO and will normally be constructed and
maintained on operations by military personnel. Tier 1 currently consists of 4
capabilities, which are:
(1) Domestic Accommodation. There are currently 2 systems, held
by DLO, to provide troop domestic accommodation; transport
limitations will normally dictate that this is available for use after about
30 days:
(a) Interim Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure.
Interim ECI is based on the Improved Tented Camp (ITC).
7
Assets may be under joint control permanently, temporarily or under surge circumstances. There are some 150 key
logistic skills within the UK armed forces. Most of these will, in some way, need to be provided for within the overall
enabling package.
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Currently, Interim ECI does not include power generation,
cooling and sewage disposal.
(b)
Temporary Deployable Accommodation. A new system
known as Temporary Deployable Accommodation (TDA) will be
in addition to the Interim ECI. The initial tranche is likely to
provide accommodation for 5,250 men configured as 125, 250
and 500 man camps.
(2) Medical Role 3. A utility service enhancement to the current
Med Role 3 facilities includes power generation and distribution, water
storage and distribution, environmental control and insulation as well as
improved shelters and flooring, medical waste disposal and an oxygen
production plant.
(3) Staff Working Environment. A new system of Staff Working
Infrastructure for Joint and Formation HQs.
(4) Deployable Technical Accommodation. A system of
Deployable Technical Accommodation to enhance the current technical
facilities.
b.
Tier 2. A semi-permanent standard of infrastructure to replace Tier 1 on
longer deployments, nominally at the 8 month point. Tier 2 will be
predominately hard walled and be designed to remain in place for up to 5
years. This capability will be provided, constructed and maintained by a Prime
Contractor under the umbrella of Contractorised Logistics (CONLOG).
727. Movement and Development in the Joint Operations Area. Key factors
affecting onward road movement are capacity and conditions. The demand for
capacity will be greatest during the force deployment and routes need to be carefully
planned and controlled. Road conditions and geography are important factors when
routes and capabilities are limited or extreme environmental conditions prevail.
Conditions can be improved through better equipment, by engineer operations or by
careful balancing of demands for strategic and tactical Air Transport. Both take time
to procure and fit or construct. In addition, the use of in-theatre routes and facilities by
civilians must be accounted for. Liaison with the civil authorities will be required to
ensure freedom of movement and to de-conflict military and civilian use. It is
essential that single-Service capabilities and priorities are subordinated to the joint
requirement.
728. Integration. Integration activities should be accounted for in the Campaign
Plan, with correct allocation of controlling staff and resources. Other than to
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consolidate multinational logistic issues, it is not a usual JFLogC function, although
opportunities may exist to provide co-ordination of support and resources.
729. Transfer of Authority. Transfer of Authority (TOA) may take place for land
forces once emplaned and, for maritime and air forces, once they have arrived in the
JOA (however, timing of TOA is a national prerogative).
Pre-Deployment Activity and Deployment
• A mounting headquarters must be nominated in order to orchestrate the predeployment activity.
• Operational stock, which is key to a JTF’s sustainability, needs to be available
at the right readiness and visible to the mounting headquarters.
• The need to obtain strategic movement assets both signals intent and introduces
a delay to operational readiness in theatre.
• JFLogCC needs to be involved with pre-deployment planning as early as
possible.
• JFLogC enabling elements require early entry to theatre and robust
representation on early recces.
• Diplomatic clearance is an essential element of deployability.
• Reception, Staging and Onward Movement are fundamental joint logistic tasks;
Integration (making RSOI) is the business of all components.
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CHAPTER 8 – CONDUCTING THE OPERATION
‘You can fight the battle only that you can supply and sustain.
Resource allocation is the Commander’s decision and is where the
biggest compromises are to be found’.1
801. We have seen that conduct of the effort within the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
is the responsibility of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and his J1/J4 Staff
who co-ordinate the logistic effort of the environmental components, including the
Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC). Once the Command and Control (C2) and
joint logistic responsibilities have been clarified, the JFLogC can assume
responsibility for most of the joint tactical level logistics, as described in Chapter 5.
This chapter summarises the conduct of an operation from the logistics perspective.
SECTION I – THE JOINT LOGISTICS BATTLE RHYTHM
The Planning Routine
802. Joint Task Force Headquarters Logistics Planning Cycle. Joint Task Force
Headquarters (JTFHQ) logistic planning must remain integral to campaign planning
and the J1/J4 staff are likely to be represented in the key established battle-rhythm (or
staff-rhythm) planning meetings. JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations’ describes these
meetings in detail.2 The aim of the meetings is to enable timely decisions to be made,
orders to be issued and appropriate actions directed. Although there may be variation
depending on the specific circumstances, the battle-rhythm over a 24 hour period is
likely to include some or all of the following:
a.
The Commander’s (the JTFC) Brief - A situational brief.
b.
Joint Command Group (JCG) Video Teleconference (VTC).
c.
Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) - the daily planning
conference.
d.
Joint Force Command Group VTC.
e.
Joint Fires Element (JFE). A targeting and joint fires conference.
f.
Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB). The confirmatory operations
conference, co-ordinating component activity and the joint fires plan.
1
Lt Gen Rupert Smith, HCSC keynote address Mar 02.
JWP 3-00 paragraphs 534-548. This will be included in the new JWP 5-00 ‘Joint Operations Planning’ due to be
promulgated in 2004.
2
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803. Where the JTFC establishes a Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG), J1/J4
staff will be required to consider the logistic implications of planning options within
the following time framework:
a.
24-48 Hours Ahead. J4 staff will be expected to confirm that all
necessary logistics arrangements are in place to support imminent operations.
b.
48-72 Hours Ahead. J4 will be expected to have carried out all
necessary staff checks and issued suitable warning orders to the components
(particularly JFLogC HQ) to ensure that future operations have been allocated
sufficient logistic support.
c.
Beyond 72 Hours Ahead. Operational plans (other than for specific
operations and normal sustainment) are primarily the responsibility of the J5
staff with J4 expert input. Campaign amendments and contingencies are likely
to take the form of Branches or Sequels. If these are on a logistic line of
operation it will be J1/J4’s responsibility to produce and brief the options, for
other contingencies J1/J4 will need to ensure that:
(1) Formal plans take full account of the logistic impact of a
particular branch or course of action. There may be implications both
during the branch operation, and also the sequel to bring line of
operation back on track. Planning should aim to play on logistic
strengths and limit the impact of weaknesses.
(2)
Modified or new plans are ‘flagged-up’ to JTFHQ and JFLogC
HQ logistic staff at the earliest opportunity.
804. Joint Task Force Headquarters Staff Contingency Planning. There are
three themes along which logistic contingency planning can be developed:
a.
Application of Foresight. Foresight is essential as the first and most
time consuming preparations for an operation are frequently administrative and
logistic. The ability to conduct contingency operations will be considerably
enhanced if resilience has been built into the foundations of sustainability.
b.
Use of Reserves - Directed Logistics. The JTFC needs a reserve to
reinforce success or as insurance against unexpected adverse events. As much
as knowing when to commit logistic reserves (whether they are reinforcements
or additional operational stocks), commanders must consider, phase-by-phase,
what is logistically sufficient - including a reserve. This is the principle of
directed logistics.
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c.
Restoration of Combat Power. Rehabilitation, the restoration of
combat power following an operation, pre-planned or otherwise, is likely to be
a Decisive Point (DP) within the campaign plan.
805. Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters. When a JFLogC HQ is
deployed, it must, of necessity, establish a rhythm that mirrors the JTFHQ and
component HQs. This involves aligned briefings/shift changes and effective, vertical
and lateral liaison. Equally important are the rear links to the Permanent Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ), Commands and key components of the Defence Logistic
Organisation (DLO) such as Defence Transport and Movement Agency (DTMA), the
Defence Catering Group, the Defence Fuels Group, and the Defence Storage and
Distribution Agency (DSDA). The JFLogC HQ may also be required to control an
assigned Area of Operations (AO), including C2 of all force elements, as well as coordinating security and force protection. Where there is no JFLogC deployed, such
tasks will need to be covered by the JTFC, other components or another organisation,
perhaps multinational.
Current Operations - the Joint Pipeline
806. Whilst J1/J4 staff’s work concentrates on forward planning and the provision
of logistic operational staff work to future campaign or contingency plans, there is also
a current operations task to monitor and control the Lines of Communication (LOC)
into and (where appropriate) back out of the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The routine
elements of this task may be delegated to a JFLogC, but J1/J4 must maintain executive
command overall as the JTFC remains ultimately responsible.
807. Strategic Re-supply. Demand for re-supply lift - especially airlift - routinely
exceeds capacity. The ongoing operational need is to ensure that the fastest movement
means are used to transport the highest priority requirements. The majority of resupply is routine and requires the minimum C2 input consistent with delivery of the
operational requirement. PJHQ/JTFHQ must actively manage only the real, mission
critical priorities. Equally they must have a sufficiently refined logistic picture to
judge the effects of any particular course of action and its downstream effects. It is for
supporting/subordinate HQs to give effect to these operational priorities.
808. Process. The Standard Priority System3 (SPS) provides an initial indication of
urgency of need, from the perspective of the demanding unit. When the capacity of the
Joint Pipeline to or from the theatre of operations is exceeded, whether due to the
volume of demands or shortage of strategic movement assets, additional control will
be exercised by PJHQ in order to ‘prioritise the priorities’. In particular, PJHQ must:
3
JSP 336.
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a.
Maintain and update, in conjunction with the JTFHQ, a detailed
overview of operational priorities. Where there are concurrent operations,
MOD HQ/PJHQ will make any necessary de-conflictions. The JFLogC may
act as the JTFHQ’s agent in this task.
b.
Manage by exception the operation of the Pipeline and provide the level
of detailed operational direction required by DTMA when Pipeline capacity is
exceeded.
809. Movements Focus. DTMA will provide a single focus for movements, and
the point of contact for other DLO agencies. In particular, the DTMA will:
a.
Monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of re-supply movement and, if
necessary, influence the overall flow between static bases (including
Garrisons) and the theatre, or theatres, of operation. It is important that liaison
personnel are deployed to Air Ports of Embarkation/Sea Ports of Embarkation,
and that they are in a position to interpret the PJHQ and JTFC priorities.
b.
Track consignments by Standard Priority Code and, where necessary, by
Required Delivery Date (RDD). Implicit in this is redirection of freight from
air to surface means if RDD can still be met.
c.
Anticipate movement requirements and capacity, including the clearance
of choke points.
d.
Refer conflicting priorities, which it cannot reconcile, to PJHQ.
This process is mirrored in theatre between JFLogC HQ and the JTFHQ for returning
aircraft and ships. Amongst other means of communication, the installation of Video
Tele-Conferencing facilities in HQ DTMA enables direct communication between
PJHQ and DTMA who are, in effect, an extension of the Defence Crisis Management
Organisation (DCMO).
810. Information/Awareness. In the reconciliation of priorities, exchange of
information is as important as the physical movement. While small scale operations
generate modest overall volumes for movement, highly accurate information is
required to ensure effective loading of each movements asset. Visibility of movements
information is key. It must be available to PJHQ, JTFHQ and the JFLogC at all times
to ensure that priorities are being adhered to.
811. Key Decision Point. The key decision point in the delivery of sustainment
occurs when DTMA/JFLogC HQ allocates movement resources. This must accord
with PJHQ J3 direction on prevailing priorities. Where a conflict of priorities is
brought to the attention of the PJHQ, the staff need to:
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a.
Exceptionally and only when appropriate, challenge a demand’s stated
RDD.
b.
Be capable, with DTMA and DLO, of tracking key consignments and
reprioritising consignments in transit.
c.
Maintain an accurate ‘mission essential equipment’ list included within
the Sustainability Statement
d.
Maintain a detailed overview of specific high-priority demands and
other movement priorities.
e.
Identify clashes in single-Service priorities and broker solutions
acceptable to the JTFC.
f.
Represent national priorities in a combined/multinational operation.
g.
In conjunction with DTMA, anticipate movement requirements and
capacity, including the clearance of choke points, to smooth the transport flow.
812. Prioritisation Procedure. All movement bids, however arising, are compiled
within JFLogC HQ, who are responsible for ‘pulling’ materiel into the JOA, and
Defence Logistics Operations Centre (DLOC) who match demand liabilities to assets.
Where there is a conflict of interests between components within the JOA, the JFLogC
seeks priority guidance from the JTFHQ. Where no solution is achieved in this way,
and in the absence of up-to-the-minute PJHQ direction to effect a solution, the JTFHQ
or DLOC refer the conflict to PJHQ. DLOC concurrently informs all interested HQs,
normally the Commands, DLO, JTFHQ and JFLogC HQ (and possibly SG). Ideally, a
time-based silence procedure follows. PJHQ considers the issues and any
representations arising and adjudicates direct to DLOC who verify feasibility and issue
a movement order. Ongoing J3 liaison between JTFHQ and PJHQ will ensure
consistency between the Jt Comd’s and JTFC’s priorities. The freight allocation cycle
is attuned to each operation and overall freight volumes and the available lift.
Real Estate Management
813. The JTFC/JFLogCC will need to de-conflict routes and site use in the Force
Rear Support Area (FRSA) between competing demands, including the multinational
dimension, and permit both the passage of other Components and allied personnel.
COS JFLogC HQ can expect to co-ordinate on behalf of the JTFC/JFLogCC: routes,
security, area defence (possibly including Ground Based Air Defence), area allocation
and command arrangements including alternative HQs etc.
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Medical Operations
814. J1/J4 Issues. Detailed Medical Joint Doctrine is contained within JWP 4-03.
The medical staff within JTFHQ J1/J4 provide medical policy for the JOA, whilst the
JFLogC co-ordinates its execution. Key constituents of the medical plan include:
maintenance of health and prevention of disease, treatment and evacuation of sick and
wounded. There must be close co-operation with DLO regarding the resupply of
medical/health service support materiel. Treatment must be progressive and
continuous, from point of injury/sickness through the echelons of care leading to
definitive treatment and rehabilitation - in the UK if necessary. Sufficient medical
resources will be made available to effect the treatment policy in accordance with the
estimates on casualties and non-Battle Injuries shown in the Sustainability Statement.
815. Duty of Care and Liability. The JTFHQ must be aware of the media and
public expectation that the best quality of realistically affordable medical care is
achieved in the JOA. Furthermore casualty tracking and notification of casualty
incidents now take a high priority. Epidemiological health surveillance to inform
commanders of medical problems as they arise and assist subsequent enquiries into
association and causation of disease states identified after an operation.4 The removal
of Crown Immunity and an increasingly litigious population indicate the need to
collate comprehensive human information system, including morbidity surveillance as
well as detailed personal medical records and environmental mapping.
Infrastructure
816. Facilities. The importance of sustaining infrastructure, both in the support and
deployed formation areas should not be underestimated. Logistic and Security
engineering support could involve design, construction, modification, repair and
maintenance of essential facilities and services, including camps, depots, ports,
railways, roads, bridges, airfields, fuel storage, electrical power and water. CJO will
have declared a Military Works Area at the onset of the operation. Dependent on the
situation and the time available, essential works will be carried out by military
manpower or contractors working under military direction. Military engineers, under
the co-ordination of the Joint Force Engineer who has an overview of all (Army)
engineer capability in the JOA, must be capable of improving the survivability of the
force by tailoring works to meet a developing threat. When conditions permit,
infrastructure logisticians should make maximum use of locally available resources,
such as contractors and materials suppliers, and their facilities.
817. Planning and Control. Military Works staffs require appropriate financial,
contractual and possibly lands delegations to function effectively. Whilst components
4
The requirement for this is exemplified by the debate over the alleged ‘Gulf War Syndrome’ post the Gulf War of
1990/91.
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and the JFLogC should manage the layout of the tactical level logistic functions,
JTFHQ must maintain a detailed interest in the JOA’s infrastructure plan. Clear
direction on priorities from JTFHQ, normally set out in the Infrastructure Management
Policy Statement via dedicated engineer operations staff in the JFLogC HQ, is
essential if effective procedures are to be put in place and time and resources are not to
be wasted. Infrastructure normally has the longest lead-time for provision and will
often incorporate mission critical elements, such as water and electrical power, fuel
pipelines and waste and sewage disposal. The provision and movement of
infrastructure stores must be controlled by the JTFHQ.
818. Infrastructure Development Plan. Methods of providing infrastructure range
from the use of Expeditionary Deployed Accommodation to the building of more
permanent facilities using local labour. JWP 4-05 ‘Infrastructure Management on
Joint Operations’ details the mechanism for delivering operational infrastructure using
the Infrastructure Development Plan. The plan should be scrutinised by other staff
branches, such as J2 and J6, especially where headquarters accommodation is involved
to ensure that opportunities to fit suitable electrical power and communications
facilities are taken.
SECTION II – ORGANISATION AND METHODOLOGY
Logistic Layout
819. Logistic Structures. There are a variety of options for constructing logistic
support structures. Organisation can be by function, geography or echelon. By
function, support will be aligned to the specific service provided with, for example,
equipment support provided at one location and medical at another. A geographical
support structure may group all services at convenient locations, whilst an echelon
system will provide different levels of service along a line of support.5 Though the
commander need not know the detail, knowledge of the key characteristics will enable
him to better assess logistic plans offered by his staff.
820. Networks. The logistic network is normally comprised of a number of nodes
and connecting links. A node can be either a unit or sub-unit; it may stock materiel or
provide a functional service but it will have a communications and command support
function. It will act in an intelligent capacity, either providing the service itself or
directing action. Links can be via a combination of air, sea, or land and will operate in
both directions. The distance between nodes will be affected by travel time, the
availability of resources and the capacity of the system. The pattern of nodes and links
must be superimposed on the overall campaign plan and there will be a requirement to
protect and service the network. Nodes and links are usually organised in one of 2
ways:
5
NATO uses the term ‘Role’. Role 1 equates to first line etc.
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a.
Hub and Spoke. In a ‘hub and spoke’ network, combat operations can
be undertaken around the support network. A number of logistic groups
arranged in a cluster of hubs provide localised support. Such a layout has been
suitable for where operations are conducted in a highly dispersed fashion, but
within geographical constraints. It is most appropriate where components are
operating in distant, discrete areas
b.
Line of Communication. A more linear arrangement, with supplies,
services and materiel operating along extended LOCs may be more appropriate
to higher intensity operations. This will almost always be most appropriate in
manoeuvre phases of operations.
821. Logistic Concentration. Collocation of large service installations (such as
Field Hospitals) and the dumping of stocks on the ground permits the concentration
and accumulation of resources to support protracted operations or provide a reserve.
At the operational level, planning must be related to the sustainability statement, but at
the tactical level it should be considered in terms of accessibility and security and
freedom of operation. Dumping of some stocks can be a necessary feature of airfield
operations (but, due to mobility requirements, less so for SH or Harrier sites) however,
in the ground environment, the inherent lack of mobility from stocks dumped in a
‘forward’ area may tend to fix the JFLCC and is more a feature of attritional tactics
than manoeuvre warfare. Dispersion of stocks can provide both redundancy and
protection.
822. Stocks on Wheels. For ground forces, including forward support to
helicopters and VSTOL aircraft, maintaining a self-sufficient force, or operating a
‘stock on wheels’ policy offers flexibility and can help maintain tempo. It is generally
more applicable to a short operation and is inherently inefficient in the use of
transport. (Transport, by definition, is productive only when it is moving freight.
Highly productive assets such as DROPS6 vehicles should not normally be tied-up in
holding stocks on wheels.) It will usually be advantageous at first line as an
immediate reserve. When all stocks are carried, a disproportionately large logistic tail
can become a liability. To implement a full ‘stocks on wheels’ policy, support units
require mobility and protection comparable to combat units. This requires new
equipment (such as the US tracked load carriers procured early in the Gulf War) to
improve stock mobility and protection but this brings with it major new support costs.
Stocks on wheels can enable consumption of 3rd line wheeled stocks at the beginning
of an advance, leaving 1st and 2nd line stocks forward and intact thereby maximising
tempo and logistic endurance.
823. Offshore - The Joint Sea Base. Support, including climate-controlled storage
and hospital facilities, may be maintained outside the JOA or afloat – the Joint Sea
6
See Glossary.
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Base – providing they are readily accessible. This may be either alongside at an
SPOD as a floating warehouse, or within a maritime task group, possibly beyond the
horizon. The flexibility of the JSB means that it can swing between these locations at
very short notice, reducing the footprint, being sensitive to HN considerations and
reflecting changing FP environment. The utility of such an option should fall out from
a thorough estimate process and will clearly depend on the available storage capacity,
Ship To Objective Manoeuvre asset availability as well as the security situation.
The System
824. Operating Methods. There are 3 basic methods of operating a logistic
system:
a.
Push. When consumption is predictable, for example, from routine or
standard patterns of behaviour, or there is a conscious decision to keep units
permanently topped up to a predetermined level, the logistic organisation can
operate a ‘push’ system. The minimum of control is exercised, but the
commander should not allow action to be taken by default. A push system is
one aspect of the application of a ‘just-in-case’ policy. Risk is minimised, but
logistic drag and large stockpiles may be created and there could be
duplication of effort.
b.
Pull. A ‘pull’ system operates on a ‘just-in-time’ principle.
Theoretically, assuming perfect knowledge and supply and distribution
systems, support or services could be made available as the need arises. In
more static, firm base deployments such a system offers economic advantages,
but when contact with the enemy is imminent a less risky approach may be
needed. There is also the potential that logistic drag is transferred further back
into the logistic system in respect of over insurance against future demand.
c.
Directed. Where there is uncertainty and peaks and troughs of demand,
the commander may need to direct a more pro-active logistic system. The
imprecise nature of demand can be overcome by better analysis of an
operation, good synergy between the operational and logistic planners and the
effective use of technology. Use of information systems reduces the quantity
of materiel needed, effectively substituting information for excess inventory.
There will always be a need for a reserve. Guaranteed data communications
are key enablers for directed logistics. Conversely, where there are critical
shortfalls in stocks or resources they may be better applied.
825. Optimisation. In practice an amalgam of all frameworks and methods
described above will be used, and will vary with each campaign and phase of
operations. Industry often favours the pull system but it is the most perilous when
unpredictable factors are introduced. It is likely to be more appropriate for Other
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Operations rather than intensive Warfighting. Nevertheless, the fluidity of the
manoeuvre battlefield will demand ever-greater flexibility and inventiveness.
Commanders will have to adapt and compromise, creating an efficient supply chain
and an effective regeneration loop.
SECTION III – JOINT TACTICAL CONTROL OF OPERATIONS
826. Location of the Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters. The
JFLogCC is likely to position his headquarters on the re-supply axis. Dependent on
the operational situation this may be coincident with the JTFHQ but, initially, it will
more probably be at the SPOD/APOD. Certain scenarios may require the JFLogCC to
deploy a Forward Support Group (FSG) to provide closer support to components when
required. However if the requirement is limited to support for the Land component it
may be allocated to, or found directly from, the Land component. (Assets may be
passed between components at the JTFC’s direction, depending on the situation as
shown in Figure 8.1).
827. Rear Area Security/NBC. Where the JFLogCC is tasked with Rear Area
Security, this must be co-ordinated with the JFLCC. Sufficient assets must be made
available, and the J2 and J3 cells in the JFLogC appropriately staffed. Normally
responsibilities would be limited to Force Protection (FP) within the JFLogCC’s area
of responsibility, nevertheless use of logistic service personnel to conduct security
duties will inevitably reduce the available logistic effort and a balance must be struck.
Further information on FP is contained within JDP 1/99 ‘Force Protection’. More
details on the conduct of joint logistic operations in an NBC environment can be found
at Annex 8A.
828. Air Port of Disembarkation/Sea Port of Disembarkation Considerations.
PJHQ, the JTFC or other Components may need to exercise influence over Air Ports
of Disembarkation (APODs)/Sea Port of Disembarkation (SPODs) outside the JOA
(possibly at a Forward Mounting Base (FMB)), or within the JOA but remote from the
FRSA/JFLogC HQ. These will all need their own control and operating organisations.
Additionally, where combat aircraft are operating out of the APOD, the Joint Force Air
Component Commander (JFACC) has primacy over airfield operations and coordinates incoming Air Transport (AT) arrivals in accordance with the JTFC’s
priorities.
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FSG HQ
JFLog HQ
JFLCC HQ
FOB
LOG
Force Rear Support Area
SPOD
APOD
Other Component
Elms
Figure 8.1 - The JFLogC HQ/FSG Relationship (National)
829. Assigned Units. The JFLogCC would probably be assigned TACOM of the
following organisations:
a.
Advanced Logistic Support Site (ALSS) and Forward Logistic Site
(FLS) within the FRSA.
b.
Extended support (3rd Line) logistic assets.
c.
Appropriate deployed RAF Air Combat Service Support Group/Units
(ACSSG/ACSSUs) and functional capabilities.
d.
Exceptionally, Support and other helicopters for VOD and Casualty
Evacuation (CASEVAC) tasks.
From these units a pattern of deployment and operations is then established to deliver
the most effective support to the combat components.
SECTION IV – REHABILITATION
830. Rehabilitation. Rehabilitation, a tactical level operation following battle
attrition, (to be distinguished from Regeneration, Recuperation and Reconstitution at
the Strategic levels - see Glossary) occurs as a deliberate operation or phase within a
larger operation. The aim of rehabilitation is to restore combat power, rebuild cohesion
and minimise the disruption and dislocation caused by combat. The process is largely
logistic in nature, but can involve a period of training. Whatever the reason for
rehabilitation, there are a number of significant characteristics of which the
commander should be aware:
a.
The removal of a unit or formation from operations is a command
decision influenced by an assessment of risk, the acceptability of loss, the
urgency of re-employment and the availability of reserves.
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b.
To be conducted effectively, rehabilitation requires a designated
commander, command support and a specific support organisation.
c.
A target level of restoration of combat power must be set, resources
calculated and allocated, and a time for completion given.
d.
There is an essential morale dimension. Speedy rehabilitation can
reduce trauma, restore confidence and tempo, and help regain the initiative.
831. The Rehabilitation Process. The process of rehabilitation involves coordinated and concurrent activity in 3 areas: manpower, equipment and materiel. The
majority of the process involves assistance and injection of external resources,
although reorganisation is largely an internal process, conducted within the unit or
formation. If combat effectiveness is to be restored quickly, rehabilitation needs to be
well prepared and trained for - involving both the supporting organisations and the
supported formations.
832. Activities. In preparing rehabilitation orders the commander should consider
the following issues:
a.
Command of the operation and the grouping of support elements.
b.
Life Support including guarding, shelter, resting, sleeping, eating,
administration and welfare. (See JWP 1-00).7
c.
Casualty care, including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and evacuation;
d.
Reinforcement of units through the allocation of In Theatre
Reinforcements (ITR) to replace battle casualties.
e.
Replenishment of unit stocks and replacement of lost materiel.
f.
Repair, recovery and servicing and preparation for movement.
g.
The physiological and morale implications of battlefield administration
such as burial or honours and awards.
h.
Ongoing collective training to enhance skills and engender formation
cohesion.
7
Until JWP 1-00 ‘Joint Personnel Administration’ is due to be promulgated in 2003, some supporting detail can be
found in JDP 3/01 ‘Welfare Support for Joint Operations’.
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SECTION V – COMPONENT FRAMEWORKS
Combat Component Logistics and Rearward Links
833. Component logistics overwhelmingly reflect the practices of their lead Service
but the composition of components in which the CVS may have Joint Force Harrier
embarked, or where Support Helicopters are embedded within the JFLCC, will
engender a more joint approach to logistic support. At present many equipment
systems remain Service specific, nevertheless, single Service logistics remain
conditioned by joint support systems to the rear – especially the management of the
strategic re-supply link which is inherently joint.
Joint
834. The JFLogCC will be responsible for the provision of logistic support for all
reinforcing/transiting forces moving through his AO/FRSA as well as those based
within it. Cross-servicing of demands between components will be permitted where
authorised by their component materiel support staff and the JFLogC Log Cells. The
JTFC has redistribution authority within the AOR and will arbitrate in the event of a
dispute. The role of the JFLogC is dealt with in detail at Chapter 5. For local
purchase all Components will need contract/purchase delegations exercised under
overall JFLogC HQ J4/J8 control to maintain the audit trail.
Maritime
835. Afloat Support. Dependent on the size of the maritime force, a Force Logistic
Co-ordinator or Group Logistic Co-ordinator (GLC) will oversee the logistic activity
and requirements of all deployed maritime units. The GLC co-ordinates the logistic
activity and requirements of all deployed RN/RFA/Chartered shipping in the Group
and will have particular responsibility for the monitoring of mission critical/limiting
logistics issues. On deployment, RN and RFA ships will be strategically stored in
accordance with the sustainability statement for the operation. The JTFC needs to be
informed of deficiencies to outfits, at the latest, on arrival in the JOA. Those ships
previously deployed and subsequently re-tasked to the JOA will be required to signal
shortfalls and deficiencies in sustainability statement holdings to Commander in Chief
Fleet (CINCFLEET). It will be for CINCFLEET in discussion with the Jt Comd and
JTFC to agree the action necessary to rectify these shortfalls.
836. Joint Sea Base. By definition the JSB is the use of the sea as a base within
joint operations in order to contribute to an optimum footprint ashore.8 A Landing
Force (LF) can be sustained from a Joint Sea Base as it undertakes ‘Ship To Objective
Manoeuvre’. This has the advantage of optimising the logistic footprint ashore and
8
JWP 0-0.1 ‘UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Definitions’.
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thus the potential drag on the combat/combat support elements. The LF will be of a
limited scale (for example an RM brigade), when solely supported by the JSB, but
could be equally be drawn from RM or Army assets. The LF supported by JSB could
be part of a larger force ashore, and illustrates the JSB’s ability to contribute to a larger
joint operation. Its successful execution requires robust C4I including asset visibility
and consignment tracking, the allocation of sufficient ship to shore movement assets
and tailored support shipping.
837. Deployed Maritime Support Arrangements. Organic, or first line support is
integral to maritime units. Second line support is held within the maritime Task
Group/Task Force and provided primarily by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) but may
occasionally be delivered by chartered or (more rarely) Ships Taken Up From Trade.
The integration of second line support in RFA ships deployed with naval forces
enables long periods of independent operations. Third line support for receipt and
onward movement of Personnel, Mail and Cargo (PMC) and the return of high value
category stores is co-ordinated by a contracted worldwide shipping agent (currently
Inchcape Shipping Services) and, where deployed for operations or exercises, by an
ALSS and one or more FLS, ideally collocated with the APODs/SPODs. When these
are located within the FRSA they are TACOM/TACON the JFLogC HQ. The task of
PMC movement to and from the ALSS and FLS is completed by surface vessels
(locally chartered as required), HM Ships’ helicopters, SH, chartered or requisitioned
helicopters (Helicopters Taken Up From Trade). For specific logistic operations,
TACOM of helicopters, less organic maritime helicopters, may be vested in the
JFLogCC with TACON delegated to the JFMCC to ensure safety and to meet Task
Group operational requirements. Afloat Role 3 medical support is provided by the
Primary Casualty Receiving Ship. This is normally TACOM the JFMCC but may be
placed TACOM the JFLogCC when supporting operations ashore. The amphibious LF
is configured to sustain itself afloat, and ashore (from the Sea Base) for up to 30 days
operations until a LOC has been established. The LF is tactically loaded in specialist
amphibious ships together with its CSS.
Land
838. Deployed Land Support Arrangements. The JFLCC is responsible for
organising logistic support for land component forces within his AOR. Integral
formation level (2nd line) support to the Land Component is provided by the Brigade
or Divisional Support Groups (BSG or DSG) depending on the scale of the
deployment. BSGs and DSGs come under command of the Land Component HQ and
their activity is directed by the appropriate DCOS. Extended (3rd line) support to the
Land Component may be provided by forces up to a Log Bde, as necessary. This
capability may be TACON or TACOM the JFLogC, if appropriate. Unit (1st line) and
formation level Land Component units encompass the fullest range of Logistic
Support, Equipment Support and other functions (e.g. Joint Helicopter Support units to
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support manoeuvre in the ground environment. However, Role 3 medical support
(field hospitals) will normally be TACOM the JFLogCC. Hospitals are also likely to
be echeloned and a medical forward control cell, probably within the FSG but possibly
within the Land Component Rear HQ, will be required. This Role 3 medical support
also covers the Air Component although elements deployed into DOBs may be
TACOM the JFACC. Aeromedical evacuation, both tactical and strategic, needs to be
unified TACOM the JFLogCC.
Air
839. Joint Force Air Component Commander. The JFAC will be established
within theatre and within its command structure has integrated A4 staffs. The
DOBs/FOBs will be established within or around the JOA and stocked in accordance
with the sustainment/sustainability statement. The forces operating from the
DOBs/FOBs within the JOA are normally TACOM the JFACC. The JFLogCC has
primary responsibility for the provision or arrangement of the necessary services and
facilities to support the DOB/FOBs, HNS agreements and contract support except
where geographic or single Service solutions commend themselves. The movement of
personnel, mail, cargo, repair parts and subsistence stores from the POD to the
DOB/FOBs will also normally be the responsibility of the JFLogCC. Where the DOB
and APOD are one and the same, some fusion of function will need to be agreed
between the JFACC and JFLogCC although flying operations will be commanded by
the JFACC and the JFLogCC will need to have appropriate control over Movement
Operations (Mov Ops) and tasking authority over intra-theatre airlift in order to deliver
the JTF movement plan. Notwithstanding the rapid deployability of front line air
assets, the requirement for the provision of adequate resources during the early stages
of the operation will necessitate the steady build up of sustainment stocks throughout
the deployment phase of an operation or exercise.
840. Deployed Air Component Support Arrangements. RAF units operating at
DOBs rely on priming equipment packs - scaled for an initial 10 days sustainment for
fixed wing aircraft and 15 days for rotary wing at intensive rates of effort (the latter
reflecting the use of dispersed operating sites). These are supported by highly
responsive re-supply arrangements using Express Chain Management techniques to
ensure speedy provision of replacement parts and the prompt recovery of repairables.
DOBs are provided with support drawn together as required from ACSSUs, and Force
Element organic capability supplemented by Non-Formed-Unit personnel.. Further
logistic support is provided by ACSSUs committed to theatre level tasks and normally
TACOM/TACON the JFLogCC.
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SECTION VI – BUDGETARY/FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
841. Accounting Procedures. In accordance with National Audit Office
requirements, peacetime accounting regulations will not normally be relaxed. In the
event of there being a requirement to relax some accounting regulations the details and
scope of the relaxation will be issued by the JTFC in terms specified by MOD and
PJHQ. J8 need to ensure early and appropriate delegation of authority to contract
services and effect local purchase in accordance with the operational directive’s
finance annex. Mature non-warfighting operations will also be subject to periodic
inspections by Command-based staff and technical inspections teams focussed on
budgetary and logistic/resource management issues.
842. J8. In the AOR J8 will exercise vote management, financial control and
financial scrutiny over all expenditure in theatre or in connection with the operation, in
accordance with the JTFC’s delegated authority. The JTFC/JFLogCC must ensure the
essential bureaucracy of budgetary discipline does not itself become an impediment to
the conduct of operations.
843. Directive. Operation-specific financial direction is contained within the Jt
Comd’s Directive and will be reproduced in subordinate directives as appropriate.
These will specify accounting procedures in detail. Observance is mandatory, as audit
is inevitable.
Conduct of the Operation
• At the operational level the logistic planning cycle is conducted within the
JTFHQ battle rhythm.
• Logistic contingency planning normally involves the production of branches
and sequels to the Campaign Plan, executed as necessary through the JFLogC.
• Prioritisation of support between components and of key supplies entering the
JOA, along discrete LOC are essential tasks at the operational level.
• JOA-based support methods include traditional LOC, Hub and Spoke and Joint
Sea Basing opportunities: joint and component logistics should be mutually
beneficial.
• Rehabilitation encompasses broad tasks, but will normally be co-ordinated by
J1/J4.
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ANNEX 8A – NBC DEFENCE CONSIDERATIONS IN
LOGISTIC OPERATIONS
8A1. This Annex addresses the NBC defence considerations required for a Joint
Force Logistic Component (JFLogC). If a JFLogC is not constituted, the
considerations will apply for any organization conducting logistic activity at the
theatre level. These considerations will also be relevant for logistic activity within
components. Specific issues on the logistic support to NBC defence are also
addressed.
General
8A2. The general principles of NBC defence and the immediate protection
requirements for logistic and medical units and activities are identical to those for
other organizations and functions, in many cases accentuated by logistic assets’
relative immobility and detectability, with consequent relative ease of targeting.
Where logistic activity occurs on land, elements of the considerations for NBC
defence for the land component will also be relevant, as addressed in an earlier Annex
to this Chapter.
8A3. Aside from the immediate destructive effects of nuclear weapons, the most
significant sources of potential disruption to logistic activity are from constraints on
movement due to enduring surface contamination by radioactive material and certain
biological and chemical agents. This might arise from NBC attack, Release Other
Than Attack (ROTA) or Environmental and Industrial Hazards (EIH). In some cases,
airborne (inhalation) hazards will also be present. Even light contamination levels
may lead to significant vapour hazard levels from off-gassing in an enclosed space
(e.g. in the back of vehicle, in a tent, building or workshop). The key to maintaining
the effectiveness of the logistic system in the face of such challenges will be risk and
hazard management measures, especially where decontamination capability is limited
in quantity or effectiveness. Key issues in ensuring the successful conduct of logistic
activity in an NBC environment will include:
a.
NBC Defence as a Factor in the Estimate. If an NBC threat, or risk of
ROTA or EIH is present, it should, from the outset, be considered as a factor in
the estimate. Some decisions which will have a major effect on logistic
effectiveness in an NBC environment will be taken early in the planning
process; including redundancy, sources of supply, siting of logistic force
elements and assets, allocation and routeing of transport, and/or the transfer of
assets and physical protection. In particular, the threat or risk will need to be
balanced against the additional time and diversion of manpower which
adoption of NBC defence measures will require. To arrive at an appropriate
balance, commanders will require appropriate NBC defence knowledge as well
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as specialist NBC defence advice; staff structures and procedures must provide
for this.
b.
Co-operation. A ‘joint’ overview must be taken of the NBC defence
requirements of the Joint Force and mutual support between components may
be necessary, particularly where there are disparities in NBC defence
capability. Carefully prioritised use must also be made of any specialist NBC
defence assets, as well as any allied or Host Nation support units or facilities
which are made available.
c.
Dispersion and Redundancy. Dispersion and redundancy should be
achieved wherever possible, for example by having key stocks (including NBC
defence items), vehicles and personnel each dispersed to a number of
locations, and thus unlikely to become contaminated by the same attack. This
will need to be balanced with other logistic, communications, control and
security issues. Sea-based facilities (such as storage, workspace or medical
support) may be able to assist in this regard, but capacity will be limited, ships
are vulnerable to attack, and delivery ashore will still be required at some
stage.
d.
Forward Holdings. If the likely implications of NBC events would be
to seriously degrade resupply (by affecting one or more elements of the logistic
process), it may be appropriate to increase holdings of stocks forward (other
factors permitting).
e.
Manpower. Diversion of logistics personnel to NBC defence tasks
(whether personnel are dedicated to NBC defence tasks or dual-roled), which
could require significant effort, will detract from logistic activity, and may,
therefore, affect the tempo of operations. The protection, handling and
decontamination of stores, equipment or casualties in a contaminated
environment will be time-consuming and will demand additional manpower if
tempo is to be maintained.
f.
Hazard Management. The key element of hazard management will be
the avoidance of contamination. Priority should be given to protecting stocks,
essential equipment and vehicles from contamination by the use of overhead
cover or protective materials (e.g. Chemical Agent Resistant Material
(CARM)) and by prevention of their inadvertent entry to contaminated areas.
Plans should address control of movement into, within and out of contaminated
areas; marking and monitoring of contaminated stores, equipment, vehicles
and ground (routes); separation of contaminated and uncontaminated stocks
and equipment, delaying issue of contaminated stocks for as long as possible to
allow passive decontamination by weathering; allocation of contaminated
stocks to contaminated transport and units wherever possible.
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g.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) will
be crucial for the passage of NBC Warning and Reporting (W&R) data, which
in turn will inform the control of movement of personnel, vehicles, equipment
and supplies in order to minimize spread of contamination. This will be
particularly important with Directed Logistics when a greater proportion of
stocks is held in the rear. These matters should be improved by more effective
situational awareness and logistic tracking in transit systems.
Rear Area Force Protection and NBC Defence
8A4. Force Protection. The JFLogC will be responsible for the force protection of
personnel and equipment of the land and air components during deployment, from the
Points of Disembarkation (POD) (by sea (SPOD), air (APOD), and/or rail (RPOD)),
along the Line(s) of Communication (LOC) to the Forward Support Area (FSA), as far
as the Concentration Area (CA) and Deployed Operating Base (DOB) respectively.
The JFLogC may also be assigned area force protection responsibilities. Maritime
component logistic assets (including Advanced Logistic Support Sites (ALSS) and
Forward Logistic Sites FLS)) must also be incorporated into the force protection plan,
and particular issues may arise from amphibious operations. Force protection
arrangements must include measures to address NBC attack or deliberate ROTA event
by means such as special forces, sponsored terrorists etc. Many of the defensive
measures against such attack (e.g. control of entry, vetting of locally employed
civilians, searching of contractors and vehicles etc) are appropriate to force protection
in general.
8A5. Warning and Reporting. The JFLogC must establish a W&R structure across
the area for which he is responsible, and embracing all the assets therein, to enable the
reporting of all NBC, ROTA and EIH events and subsequent hazard assessment.
Situational awareness will be crucial and the W&R system must inform this. In the
rear area, such information will be vital in limiting the impact of NBC hazards on
civilian support to the logistic effort. The provision of timely and accurate
information will exercise a calming effect, reducing panic and the consequent
movement of large numbers of displaced persons. Effective integration of W&R will
be essential, embracing both coalition members operating in the area and the Host
Nation. Wherever possible, UK W&R cells should be unified or collocated with those
of other nations operating at the same levels and in the same areas.
Host Nation Liaison
8A6. The Host Nation may be able to provide information on the following: incountry Toxic Industrial Material (TIM) sites (such as nuclear facilities, bio-research
laboratories and chemical plants and storage sites); transport capability to assist in the
evacuation of mass casualties; heavy equipment to augment engineering support (e.g.
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in the construction and operation of decontamination sites); car/lorry/train wash
facilities and fire services; medical treatment facilities and assets to help handle mass
casualties; infrastructure facilities into which transportable Collective Protection
(COLPRO) can be deployed; supplies of uncontaminated food and clean potable
water; disposal of contaminated waste and the expertise to handle hazardous materials.
Information on these subjects may also be available on the Internet. These
requirements should, if possible, be identified at the reconnaissance stage and the
measures to address these issues should be included in the Technical Arrangement for
Host Nation Support.
Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC)
8A7. Logistic HQ staff are likely to be required to liase with Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) and possibly Other Government Departments, to provide
humanitarian assistance to displaced persons. There may also be a need to assist in
minimising panic in local populations caused by NBC and/or EIH events. Information
operations and PSYOPS, informed by the output from the NBC W&R structure, will
have specific roles to play in such situations, resulting, for example in the
development of a ‘stay at home policy’, or controlled evacuation arranged with the
Host Nation. NGO personnel might themselves become casualties in an NBC
environment. Similarly, they might be part of the obstacle to free friendly use of the
LoCs in the event of panic following NBC weapon use. JFLogC tasks may include
control of population movement, including keeping LoCs open and restriction of
movement of civilians (which may include local people, media or NGOs) in order to
limit the spread of disease. Such activity will minimise the risk of displaced persons
constituting cover for special forces, terrorist or other elements to conduct operations
in our rear area, which might include covert release of NBC agents. In such cases,
close liaison with the Host Nation authorities will be required. Significant issues will
also arise if large numbers of civilians become NBC casualties, with resultant pressure
to assist the Host Nation in the treatment and evacuation of casualties.
Movements and Transport
8A8. NBC agents (particularly persistent chemical) might deliberately be used to
attempt to deny routes, particularly at choke points. The NBC threat must be borne in
mind if civilian assets are being considered for movements and transport, since
civilian operators will not be trained in NBC defence. Such personnel may need to be
declared to be Essential Civilians (see below).
8A9. Movements. The Forward Mounting Base (FMB), SPODs, APODs and
RPODs (and for amphibious operations, the beachhead) might be lucrative targets for
NBC attack, particularly during Reception, Staging and Onward Movement. They
would be relatively easy to target as they are likely to be fixed and well defined; they
would be crucial to the friendly deployment and would contain a concentration of
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personnel, comprising a significant proportion of Joint Force resources in transit.
Civilian ships will not be fitted with NBC defence equipment such as pre-wetting, or
citadels (although in some cases they may be retro-fitted with limited unhardened
collective protection facilities). Plans should be produced for the use of alternative
locations and facilities should crucial primary sites be contaminated (e.g. a SPOD).
Movements personnel are likely to be the first friendly forces to meet arriving aircrew
and personnel; movements personnel must, therefore, take responsibility for the
immediate force protection of aircrew and passengers, providing at least information
on any immediate threats, hazards and actions required, drawing that information from
the force protection agencies at that POD.
8A10. Transport. Specific NBC defence issues will arise depending on the nature of
transport used (ship, boat, road, rail, aircraft or helicopter). Routeing should seek to
avoid NBC hazards; this may require the selection of alternative routes and drop-off
sites. Arrangements must be made to pass W&R information to convoys en route
(Convoy Support Centres) will have a key role in this regard and must brief convoy
commanders on arrival and departure). Convoy commanders must also pass alarms
and warnings to individual vehicles within convoys en route. Convoys may encounter
hazards without warning, so at high NBC threat levels, consideration should be given
to drivers and passengers adopting respiratory protection (which will bring an
associated increase in fatigue, delay and risk of traffic accidents).1 This might be of
particular advantage in the face of a biological threat where personnel might
unknowingly be exposed to a BW agent en route and the infection might have reached
the end of the period during which it could successfully be treated before the
individual reaches the destination. If any vehicle (or helicopter, train or ship) is
suspected of having been exposed to radioactive or chemical contamination en route, it
must be checked (downwind) before entering a logistic site or other area. Where
biological contamination is suspected, isolation will be appropriate until such time as
the process of decay and passive decontamination are judged to have been achieved.
Contaminated vehicles (or helicopter, train or ship) will spread contamination, so if it
is potentially contaminated, it should be checked on arrival and departure, as should
backloaded items coming in and stores going out.
8A11. Distribution could continue with NBC contamination present, but at reduced
tempo. The need to avoid identified hazards on routes and the effects of casualties
will increase resupply times and may lead to shortages; early ground dumping may
have to be considered to compensate for increased supply times. If an area becomes
contaminated, it may be necessary to establish a shuttle using contaminated vehicles,
to get from one edge of the contaminated area to the other prior to decontamination,
pickup and onward movement of the stores. At the strategic and operational levels, it
will be necessary to determine any limitations imposed by Host or other nations on the
1
This is addressed for Aircrew and Passengers in Aircraft and Helicopters in JWP 3-61.1, Chapter 2.
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movement of contaminated vehicles or equipment beyond certain points or national or
other boundaries.
Supply
8A12. LOC, FSA and CA could constitute attractive targets for NBC attack, due to
the importance of such sites, their relative immobility once deployed and the number
of personnel concentrated there. If stocks are contaminated, and unless the risk of
spreading contamination along the supply chain and to the receiving unit is accepted,
they will either have to be forfeited until they are free from contamination by passive
decontamination (weathering) or actively decontaminated. Therefore, priority should
be given to protecting stocks from contamination by overhead cover or covering (e.g.
using CARM), but this is unlikely to be achievable for all stocks. Impervious outer
packaging may prevent the direct contamination of stores, but removal of such
packaging may generate additional problems for onward shipment. There is also a
possibility that liquid chemical contamination may permeate or become trapped inside
covering materials not specifically designed to resist this. Particular attention will
need to be paid to water under NBC conditions (due to additional demands for
drinking and decontamination), rations (as fresh rations are easily contaminated), NBC
equipment, both common user and specialist, engineer stores and medical stores (as
demand will increase). In the face of these increased demands, there will be a
particular need to prevent contamination of mechanical handling equipment (by use of
cover or covering it with CARM) to ensure its continued availability and to avoid
spreading contamination.
8A13. Rations and Feeding. Fresh rations are open to contamination as they will be
locally procured and delivered by local transport. In establishing the feeding and
rationing contract(s), sources of supply should be as secure and reliable as possible,
and rations and water must be checked for contamination or tampering before being
accepted for use. A reserve of Operational Ration Packs will be maintained against the
possibility of contamination of in-use food. If force elements undertake feeding from
more than one kitchen for local reasons, this will provide the benefit of redundancy.
8A14. Fuels. Where fuel is stored in above-ground temporary storage, it may not be
possible to avoid contamination of containers (e.g. chemical agents may soak into the
material of collapsible tanks), with the subsequent risk of off-gassing. However,
covering with CARM should prevent the direct contamination of manifolds and
associated pipework which operators need to handle and which could crosscontaminate fuel recipients (i.e. refuelling couplings), as well as essential ancillary
equipment. If these manifolds and pipework become contaminated, decontamination
should be undertaken. There will be a particular need to guard against contamination
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of NBC Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) by fuels, as this degrades performance
of the suit.2
8A15. Water. In the field, water can be found from surface sources (lakes and rivers)
or from groundwater (wells and boreholes). The latter provides considerable
protection from NBC contamination. The use of reverse osmosis purification methods
removes the majority of biological and chemical contaminants. Water is usually stored
in above ground storage and it may not be possible to avoid contamination of
containers (e.g. chemical agents may soak into the material of collapsible tanks), with
the subsequent risk of off-gassing. However, covering with CARM should prevent the
direct contamination of manifolds and associated pipework which operators need to
handle and which could cross-contaminate water recipients (i.e. water hose couplings),
as well as essential ancillary equipment. If these manifolds and pipework become
contaminated, decontamination should be undertaken.
8A16. Logistic Support to NBC Defence. NBC defence will require substantial
logistic support. Key issues in this regard include:
a.
The re-supply of replacement NBC protective equipment, consumables
for NBC equipments, decontaminants, and medical supplies.
b.
The requirements, priorities and procedures for the decontamination of
contaminated assets, in consultation with J3 for priorities.
c.
The need for support from local resources.
d.
High consumption rates of decontaminants, consumables, water,
protective equipment (including CARM and packaging materials), vaccines
and/or other medical countermeasures are features of NBC defence operations.
8A17. There may be circumstances (e.g. widespread requirements, high consumption
or high attrition) in which sufficient NBC items (e.g. COLPRO, CARM) may not be
available to meet all demands; in such cases, the JTFHQ should prioritize the available
assets. Some NBC defence stores require cold storage (e.g. COMBOPENs). Others
require storage away from sunlight or heat. The Jt NBC Regt has specific logistic
requirements, which also have cold storage requirements.3
8A18. Postal and Courier. Postal and courier deliveries to personnel in
contaminated areas and personnel subject to restriction of movement should continue,
using similar procedures to those for routine resupply in such circumstances.
2
POL operators may be issued with additional fuel-resistant clothing to overcome this. There will be an increase in the
risk from heat degradation when such clothing is worn with NBC IPE.
3
See JWP 3-61.1, Chapter 7.
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8A19. Firefighting. Firefighting personnel and equipment may be able to play a
significant role in decontamination, particularly of large equipments. In addition
firefighting agencies may have experience and equipment pertinent to EIH. If
radioactive sources are involved in a fire, the contaminated smoke particles can
present a major dispersion hazard.
Medical
8A20. While NBC creates challenges for the medical services, the principles of
medical operations continue in NBC environments. The key challenges would be
contamination of conventional wounds, NBC weapon effects (which, in the case of
BW is the use of diseases as weapons), and the burdens of operating in an NBC
environment. Issues would arise from:
a.
Casualty Rates. NBC weapons are likely to produce far higher casualty
rates than conventional weapons.
b.
Injury Patterns. Injury patterns will be different from conventional
weapons. NW will produce burns and radiation sickness, some well after the
event. BW can produce lethal or non-lethal, contagious or non-contagious
diseases. CW will produce a range of effects unfamiliar to non-specialist
medical staff. The combination of conventional and NBC injury will often
produce complex handling and management problems.
c.
Indirect Injuries. Unless actively managed by commanders,
dehydration and heat illness will arise from prolonged wearing of IPE and will
increase the risk of road traffic and weapon handling accidents due to
performance degradation. Medical countermeasures may be inappropriately
used. Psychiatric casualties may arise.4
d.
Operational Constraints. NBC defence measures may hinder medical
staff in performance of their tasks. IPE will impose limitations on examination
and treatment. Decontamination of casualties is time-consuming and
equipment and manpower intensive. Further constraints will arise from the
requirements to operate COLPRO5 and from the effects such equipment has on
the mobility of medical units. Medical activities may also be constrained if
medical personnel are subject to restriction of movement (if they are believed
to have been exposed to a transmissible BW agent).
4
Operations in an NBC environment may lead to significant stress on individuals, which might manifest itself in adverse
psychological reactions and the possibility of stress disorders, which may be delayed in presenting, must be considered.
In such cases, suitable medical advice must be obtained and appropriate counselling arranged.
5
Field hospitals are generally allocated COLPRO due to their forward siting to meet casualty treatment timescales.
COLPRO will require erection, outer protection from the elements and battle effects (tentage, building etc), personnel
with specific skills to operate it, and transportation.
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8A21. Medical CONOPs for an NBC environment will be broadly similar to that for a
conventional environment with a number of additional considerations including:
a.
Medical Intelligence and Casualty Estimation. Determine the threat
and estimate the numbers of potential casualties (conventional/NBC/PW),
employ medical countermeasures, deploy and use medical units.
b.
Prevention of Casualties. Prepare the force before deployment, devise
the most effective policy for use of medical countermeasures, and undertake
health surveillance and environment monitoring.
c.
Immediate Treatment. Immediate treatment by self aid, buddy aid and
first aid; followed by decontamination and triage by medical services.
d.
Restoration of Individual Protective Equipment. Restoration of
physical protection by IPE if it is damaged (e.g. by attaching sealing material
or use of casualty bags made from IPE material.
e.
Subsequent Treatment. Treatment by medical services involving
casualty management, casualty reporting, casualty transfer/evacuation, receipt
and treatment in UK, rehabilitation, and return to duty.
f.
Logistic Considerations. Logistic considerations for NBC medical
issues include casualty handling and transfer procedures, restriction on
movement, equipment and manpower requirements, resupply, vehicle
maintenance, water and food supplies and disposal of the dead.
8A22. In NBC defence, close liaison is essential between NBC staff and medical
staff, including Environmental Health (EH) personnel. Medical staffs must monitor
illness and symptoms across the force in order to contribute to an assessment of
whether a BW attack has occurred; this will be particularly important at locations
where specialist BW detection systems are not available. Medical staffs must also
investigate incidents and outbreaks of disease (including using epidemiological
techniques), in order to determine whether the disease was contagious, whether other
cases could be expected, and advise the chain of command accordingly. Medical
records must be maintained for all personnel in the force, both with regard to
precautionary measures (e.g. vaccinations, taking of prophylactics or treatments) and
particularly if they have been exposed to NBC hazards or TIH. Such records are
essential to support treatment and long-term medical screening. Procedures must be
established for NBC events involving very large numbers of people; such plans should
include arrangements for screening, treatment and backloading of mass casualties,
addressing issues of infectious disease, a contaminated environment, conventional
injuries, NBC injuries, and combinations of these.
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8A23. Environmental Health. Provision of EH advice is a medical responsibility,
but EH staff should be closely integrated with NBC and J2 staffs, particularly in their
role in EIH management. EH personnel must test drinking water supplies to ensure
they are potable and free from contamination. Common-sense personal and communal
field hygiene measures (e.g. provision of safe food and water, and measures for field
sanitation and maintenance of personal cleanliness, especially hand washing before
preparing or eating food) will contribute significantly to maintenance of the Force and
are the responsibility of commanders at all levels. EH personnel should be made
available to provide specialist advice and assistance with maintaining high standards
of hygiene during all phases of deployment.
Equipment Support6
8A24. Key repair equipment should be protected from contamination as far as
possible, as its subsequent use would result in cross-contamination. Recovery and
repair times will be increased when personnel need to wear IPE, particularly when a
hazard is present. Certain trades will have specific requirements when in IPE (e.g.
fuel handlers, welders). Equipment support commanders should conduct risk
management in chemical vapour hazard environments in terms of controlled removal
of gloves (outer and/or inner) to achieve repair tasks requiring a high level of manual
dexterity. Maintenance units will need to check vehicles, equipment and stores on
arrival and set aside large areas for passive decontamination (weathering) of
contaminated equipment and stores (such planning must assess whether a change in
wind direction while equipment is weathering could place personnel at risk).
Contaminated equipment must be decontaminated in detail before backloading for
action out of theatre. Some equipments and surfaces (e.g. optics, Perspex aircraft
canopies) can be damaged by decontaminants.7 Even apparently uncontaminated (or
decontaminated) equipment may harbour contamination (especially chemical) in
enclosed spaces within equipment or trapped behind rivets, joints etc, and this may be
released when the item is opened. Items to be backloaded which might harbour such
hazards should be decontaminated as far as possible and backloaded with care, as well
as being marked, and vehicle/shipping paperwork annotated, to warn the rearward
logistic chain of the potential hazard.
Civilian Support
8A25. It is UK policy that personnel designated as ‘Essential Civilians’8 will be
provided with NBC equipment and training; Contractors on Deployed Operations
(CONDO) may be declared as Essential Civilians and this issue would need to be
covered in contracts. Consideration will also need to be given to locally employed
contractors and labour (e.g. interpreters, dockworkers, airport staff, warehousemen,
6
In RAF terminology this is termed ‘Engineering’.
Special procedures, and possibly materials to be used, may have been detailed by appropriate technical authorities.
8
E.g. MOD civilians, equipment support, DSTL/QinetiQ, BFBS/SSVC.
7
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drivers, train operators, plant operators, labourers, clerks, cooks, cleaners, laundry
staff etc). Plans and arrangements should be produced to minimize the likelihood of
locally employed personnel being deterred from working, and plans should be made to
introduce substitute labour if such arrangements are not fully successful.
Personnel
8A26. J1 staff conduct personnel Operational Location (OPLOC) tracking, casualty
reporting (including reporting of the dead) and arrangements for provision of battle
casualty replacements, all of which are likely to be demanding areas if NBC events
occur. OPLOC aims to provide information on where individuals are and where they
have been, in order to identify those who might have been exposed to NBC hazards
and EIH, both during and after operations. J1 should develop plans with J3 for the
maintenance of morale in the face of large numbers of casualties caused by NBC
weapon effects, particularly BW. J1 also conduct management, burial (possibly
temporary) and repatriation of the dead.
8A27. Operational Welfare. Expeditionary Forces Institute personnel will receive
NBC defence equipment and training.
8A28. Contaminated Human Remains and Clinical Waste. The possibility of
friendly or adversary contaminated human remains or clinical waste (radiologically or
chemically contaminated, or having been infected with an infectious disease) will
complicate in-theatre burial procedures and repatriation of the dead. Such decisions
will be emotive and will probably need to be made at the strategic level. The handling
of contaminated human remains is a logistic function (including medical and
administrative) and there may well be a requirement for in-theatre emergency burial
procedures.9 Where the capability exists, human remains should be decontaminated
and handled in a conventional manner. However, if they cannot be decontaminated,
they will need to be buried at the site of recovery and the site clearly marked. All
graves must be registered.
8A29. Prisoners of War. Prisoners of War (PW) must be permitted to retain their
NBC protective equipment, or if they have none, it should be provided. PW should be
removed from the threat area at the earliest opportunity.
8A30. Provost. Provost traffic control units can assist in NBC W&R within their
primary tasks on LoCs and within their own areas of responsibility by disseminating
NBC Threat Level, Dress State and hazard warning information;10 by conducting
chemical reconnaissance (in co-operation with other units, host nation and coalition
forces); by monitoring vehicles for contamination at halts; by controlling the
movement of military forces, local populations and displaced persons into, through
9
STANAG 2070 refers.
See JWP 3-61.1, Chapter 2.
10
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and out of contaminated areas; and appropriate reporting. Provost personnel may also
be required for support of hazard management measures, including imposition and
maintenance of restriction of movement measures to control the spread of disease, and
support to Sampling and Identification of Biological, Chemical and Radiological
Agents (SIBCRA) activities.11
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
8A31. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel are equipped and trained in
dealing with incidents involving NBC agents and their subsequent disposal. Key to
the effective deployment of the most appropriate EOD assets is swift and accurate
reporting, through the chain of command. Unexploded NBC munitions may either be
marked and abandoned (location recorded); rendered safe; removed from the area
(requires the establishment of transportation procedures); or destroyed in place
(including neutralisation of the agents or their emptying from the munition into the
appropriate storage and transport containers). During such procedures, priority must
be given (without compromising SIBCRA missions) to minimising the risk of release
of NBC agents and the appropriate disposal of NBC munitions once they have been
rendered safe. EOD arrangements, co-ordinated through the JTFHQ Jt EOD Cell,
must include all agencies involved (e.g. RN, RLC, RE, RAF, coalition and Host
Nation EOD assets).
Engineer Support
8A32. General Support Engineers may be called upon to advise or assist in the
construction of locations for transportable COLPRO (which would include a
requirement for electrical power) and decontamination facilities. Key considerations
include maximum use of existing structures for protection and the availability of water
supplies for decontamination, provision of which may require engineer support. Water
supplies must be tested to ensure they are free from contamination; this function is
carried out by medical (Environmental Health) personnel. Post-hostilities, there may
be a requirement to consider more permanent facilities if a significant contamination
problem is identified.
8A33. Decontamination Sites. Engineer support would be required to establish
Thorough Decontamination and Clearance Decontamination sites. Such sites would
require considerable space, hardstanding, water supplies (which could be grey) and a
means of dealing with contaminated runoff. Other factors will include the extent and
geographical limits of local contamination, and availability of specialist
decontamination assets/advice.
11
See JWP 3-61.1, Chapter 4.
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Coalition Aspects
8A34. Members of the coalition for a particular operation are likely to have different
capabilities. It may, therefore, be possible to invite individual states to contribute
particular NBC defence capabilities. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to allocate
roles and tasks to coalition members according to their capabilities. It will be
important for HQs, and units alongside other nations’ units, to be aware of the NBC
defence capabilities of allies’ units and individuals (particularly detection), and to
establish interface and information-sharing procedures (particularly W&R).
Notwithstanding this, it is essential that all involved contribute to theatre-wide W&R
arrangements. Procedures will need to be agreed across the breadth of coalition
logistic activity to prevent cross-contamination, decontamination standards will need
to be agreed and an inspectorate may need to be established to oversee these issues.
Post-Conflict Activities
8A35. Sensitive Site Exploitation, to investigate adversary NBC facilities, weapons
and/or assets, may continue for an extended period and military forces may be
required to conduct tasks in this regard, or to support civilian specialist agencies.
NBC-related tasks for EOD or engineer assets may also continue. Additional NBC
casualties may arise well after combat operations have ceased. Disposal of
contaminated human remains, both on the battlefield and elsewhere, may continue to
be required. Restriction of movement may need to persist for personnel exposed or
potentially exposed to infectious disease. Military assets may be required to either
conduct or make arrangements for local police to restrict movement of local
populations (e.g. after BW events); combat forces may also be required to assist in
this. Monitoring of contaminated locations will also be required to assess the progress
of agent decay by weathering.
Rehabilitation
8A36. Rehabilitation is a tactical level activity within an operation, to restore combat
power, rebuild cohesion and minimise the disruption caused by combat; NBC weapon
effects may necessitate this. Rehabilitation may either occur at a specified
rehabilitation site, or at the force element’s location (determined by issues of tempo,
protection and site suitability). A balance will need to be achieved between the greater
effectiveness of early decontamination in place, set alongside the higher throughput of
equipment at a fully developed site. The creation of decontamination sites en route to
a rehabilitation site may offer the most suitable solution. In either case, factors will
include timely provision of specialist assets and advice, and engineer support.
Abandonment, or even protracted passive decontamination (weathering), may not be
an option if the equipment is expensive or scarce, and may not be acceptable to the
host nation.
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Redeployment and Recovery
8A37. Redeployment is the complete operation involving preparation and relocation
of units and stocks to a new destination, which may be to a new deployment area or to
peacetime locations, where units will need to achieve appropriate readiness levels.
Recovery is the extraction of units. There will be crucial differences between
rehabilitation to prepare a contaminated unit for subsequent operations as part of the
same campaign in the same theatre (where a certain amount of residual contamination
may be acceptable provided it is insufficient to detract from the unit’s operational
utility), and its redeployment or recovery at the end of the conflict (where residual
contamination, at even minimal levels may not be acceptable, due to the transport of
such equipment across international borders and its handling by civilian personnel).
8A38. Clearance Decontamination. The most detailed and extensive NBC
decontamination, which might be required as part of redeployment or recovery prior to
international transportation, is termed ‘Clearance Decontamination’. However,
achievement of this would take considerable time and effort, and would be extremely
difficult due to problems including the lack of agreed standards of cleanliness to be
achieved, and the lack of means to effect such decontamination.12 In the case of
biological contamination and analogous EIH, this activity should take place as part of
the overall bio-security plan addressed below. Specifically, contamination by
biological warfare agents will present particular difficulties due to the lack of a near
real-time monitor to assess the requirement for, and efficacy of, BW decontamination.
8A39. NBC Aspects of Redeployment Planning. Specific NBC defence measures
should be considered during redeployment planning:
a.
Specific Equipments. It is likely that specific equipments, particularly
those of which MOD only owns a few or which are urgently required
elsewhere, will have an increased priority for decontamination.
b.
Waste Disposal and Remediation Works. The requirement for waste
disposal and remediation work on contaminated sites should not be
underestimated and might delay full redeployment.
c.
Bio-Security. Equipment and personnel redeploying from overseas
must not carry any biological hazard (including those arising from natural
sources) into UK or any other country. The DLO13 maintains a database of
extant bio-security requirements for recovery from potential theatres of
operations. The JTFC will need to put in place a bio-security operation for
implementation immediately prior to loading on aircraft/shipping/rail/road
12
Particularly for contamination which had soaked into surfaces and paint, and seeped by capillary action behind rivets,
joins and into enclosed spaces within equipment.
13
Currently DLO Ops.
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transport out of theatre. Responsibility for completion of bio-security
measures to the required standard rests with unit commanders (not with
movements staff).
8A40. Personnel Aspects of Redeployment Planning. At the end of combat
operations, there will be an inevitable feeling of euphoria. The constraint of
operations will be lifted and the psychological release, may, if not properly controlled,
result in some breakdown in discipline and adherence to appropriate procedures. The
chain of command will need to pay attention to this. Some NBC defence items,
particularly medical countermeasures, must be recovered from personnel. It will be
essential to maintain appropriate records (addressed under Personnel and Medical
above), both in theatre and on return to UK.
Recuperation
8A41. Recuperation is the replacement of resources (following the use of military
forces) in preparation for further operations. Certain NBC assets may only be held in
limited numbers and will require replacement as soon as they are used or rendered
unusable. However, they may be subject to long production lead-times, due to the
specialist nature of the equipment. MOD and DLO will, therefore, need to prioritize
their provision and supply during the recuperation process. To support this, staff in the
JOA will need to provide reports on usage of such equipment.
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CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUDING THE CAMPAIGN
901. New Main Effort. The termination of a campaign is a phase which must be
anticipated and planned for. This Chapter expands on the logistic implications of what
can be a chaotic and complex phase with many parallel and simultaneous actions,
many conflicting, where again logistic activity may well become the main effort.
902. Early Planning. This final, concluding phase must be seen as much a part of
the military operation as the preceding phases. It must be properly planned,
commanded and conducted in a manner consistent with the broad political aims of the
campaign itself. Lack of control may compromise future missions, reduce public
confidence, endanger our forces or even give rise to litigation.
903. Concluding the Campaign. In concluding the campaign, logistic effort will
centre upon Post Conflict Activities1 and the operations to meet the Exit Strategy.
SECTION I – POST CONFLICT ACTIVITIES
904. General Logistic Implications. Depending on the nature of the deployment
and the circumstances, the original campaign plan should take account of post conflict
activities, and UK forces involvement relative to the desired end-state. As such, early
logistic operational planning must be carried out within the context of the Joint Task
Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) battle rhythm. Post conflict activities are likely to be at
least as logistically challenging as the provision of support to combat, however the
emphasis is likely to be quite different. Whilst support to forces, possibly including
rehabilitation as well as routine sustainment, remains the primary task, other
administration and life-support demands may be made. Logisticians at all levels may
be required to plan and provide emergency support for the population, refugees or
Prisoners of War (PW), and may need to be prepared to work alongside (and, if
appropriate, hand over responsibilities to) UN agencies and Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGO) as well as contractors.
905. Rehabilitation. Rehabilitation, involving restoration of units following
combat or arduous duty, (see paragraph 830) will be necessary in the Joint Operations
Area (JOA) as routine preparation for further operations or when it is intended to redeploy immediately to a new JOA rather than via unit home locations.
906. Formal Activities. Post conflict activities tend to be focussed on
normalisation, the civil population and repairing damage to the JOA infrastructure.
The scope of activities will include disarmament, demilitarisation and re-integration of
warring factions, civil administration, humanitarian relief, including the return of PW
and battlefield or environmental clearance.
1
JWP 3-50 ‘Peace Support Operations’ covers this area further.
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907. Responsibilities for Adversaries. Upon cessation of hostilities, a ceasefire
may have to be supervised. This could involve wide dispersion of forces, placing a
strain on the logistic infrastructure. The processing and collection of enemy PW, their
repatriation, guarding, feeding, clothing, and investigation of war crimes will place
further demands and require legal, linguistic and provost specialists.
908. Legal Implications of Belligerent Occupation. Whenever the Armed Forces
are in control of foreign territory, and find themselves face to face with the inhabitants,
some or all of the provisions of the law on belligerent occupation are applicable.2 The
occupying forces acquire obligations in respect of that territory which are essentially
humanitarian in nature although there are elements of trusteeship. There is a duty to
maintain law and order as well as preventing economic collapse, the existing law is to
be respected, except where the occupying force is absolutely prevented from so doing.
The law on belligerent occupation seeks to strike a balance between:
a.
The military interests of the occupying forces.
b.
Humanitarian protection of the population.
c.
The preservation, pending final settlement, of certain interests of the
displaced power.
Further guidance is given in Service legal publications and full advice should always
be sought from legal officers.
909. Humanitarian Relief.3 The possible rapid requirement to initiate
humanitarian and related operations (such as Battle Area Clearance), will involve
personnel and formations adapting quickly to a non-warfighting stance. Some
operations may themselves be based on a humanitarian relief mission. Either situation
has considerable logistic implications and the provision of humanitarian relief is
particularly susceptible to ‘mission creep’ as requirements expand. The demand for
supplies and services is likely to increase as military resources are required for
defeated enemy and civilians. The type of commodity or functional service required
will alter significantly from warlike stores to that for humanitarian and medical needs.
This change of emphasis will also require adjustments to the logistic ORBATs; for
example bulk ammunition handling will not be required whereas bulk carriers for
food, water and tents will be. Given the inevitable presence of the news media, credit
2
There are three sources of international law that guide the application of belligerent occupation: Hague Rules Articles
42-56; Geneva Civilians Convention, 1949 Articles 4, 5, 27-34 and 47-78; Protocol 1,1977, Part IV. The latter has yet to
be ratified by the UK though a public statement of intent to do so has been made.
3
For convenience this publication has referred to the provision of humanitarian aid as an element within concluding the
campaign. However, some missions may be enjoined solely to provide humanitarian relief. In addition to the principles
discussed in this paragraph, forces providing humanitarian relief will have to archive the state of the infrastructure found
and actions taken; establish environmental standard; provide liaison with the civil authorities and, most importantly, the
media.
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gained by military success could be diminished if there are post conflict support
failures arising from lack of attention or application and a pro-active media campaign
will be needed.
910. Information Campaign. In preparation for an exit of UK forces there will be
logistic input to the information campaign. This is likely to centre on issues such as
the improvements made to in-country infrastructure and support systems, or any
assistance delivered to agencies or Non Governmental Organisations. Any such
support which has not been specifically directed by J3 should be recorded in detail and
made known to J3 (Info Operations).
SECTION II – EXIT
911. Exit Operations. In tandem with stabilisation and normalisation activities, the
UK Forces’ exit strategy will be implemented. Key elements of the operation at this
stage are Draw-down, Redeployment and Recuperation. The first two can run in
parallel or consecutively and are controlled by the JTFHQ. Recuperation is an MODled ongoing process.
912. Draw-down. For enduring operations, or when no Joint Force Logistic
Component (JFLogC) is present, the establishment of a separate headquarters and the
injection of fresh support resources can speed and optimise exit and redeployment. To
provide an appropriate focus, priority and expertise, draw-down teams should be
employed in order to effect orderly withdrawal processes. The Army Theatre Drawdown Unit (TDU) (incorporating a Closed Stores Account team) and its RAF
equivalents, Deployed Operating Base Air Combat Service Support Units employed in
an Eliminated Accounts role, can best undertake the draw-down of non unit
equipment, materiel and combat supplies. Their tasks include the identification,
accounting, possibly refurbishment and dispatch of items to the Base in accordance
with the Supporting Commands’ instructions issued through the Permanent Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ)/JTFHQ. They will include specialists appropriate to the task
and account for non-unit equipment whilst also giving advice to withdrawing units on
accounts closure, equipment identification, materiel, ownership/sponsorship and
correct disposal action. A TDU could also include a Sales or Gifting element for local
disposals and, dependant on the circumstances of the operation and what is in theatre,
could take under command all movement assets associated with relocation of the
force.
913. Forced Exit. The principles described in this section assume that UK forces
have control over the conditions of exit, however there may be times when a forced
exit, or a withdrawal, may be required. Such an operation will be J3-led as Force
Protection will be a key driver. In the contingency planning for a forced exit, J4 staff
at all levels will need to establish the draw-down and deployment requirements for an
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unimpeded exit, and then determine what is feasible by means of risk assessment.
Safe redeployment of personnel will be the primary consideration. However,
components will still be accountable for equipment on their charge, and staff at
JTFHQ, PJHQ and MoD (in conjunction with DLO Ops) will need to set achievable
priorities for movement and produce any necessary policy to cover what cannot be
extracted. Where time constraints prohibit such preparatory measures, equipment
designated mission essential in the Sustainability Statement and high-value militaryspecial equipment is likely to take priority for extraction. The remainder of the
document considers measures for an ‘ideal’ exit.
Redeployment
914. Redeployment. Redeployment refers to the complete process of preparing
and relocating units and stocks to a new destination. This may be to a new
deployment area or to peacetime locations where units will need to achieve
appropriate readiness levels. Whilst ‘recovery’ is simply defined as the extraction of
units, ‘redeployment’ recognises the much broader requirement to restore forces to
appropriate readiness. An operational commander will be primarily concerned with
the safe, swift and secure recovery and return of his forces in which the JTFHQ
assumes the role of mounting HQ for forces leaving the theatre of operations, however
Front Line Commands (FLC) will also be concerned to restore readiness. From a joint
perspective, redeployment is similar to initial deployment but conducted in reverse and
it may be undertaken with less supporting infrastructure. Specialist materiel will be
required to repackage ammunition, stocks and equipment.
915. Priorities. When an operation moves into a redeployment phase the JFLogC
commander should become the supported commander. Depending on the
circumstances this may not always be the case, but if the JFLogCC remains in the
supporting role it may well slow or complicate an orderly redeployment. The
following assumes an orderly redeployment conducted by the JFLogC. A schematic is
provided at Annex 9A.
916. In Theatre Redeployment Planning. The Joint Task Force Commander
(JTFC) and his J1/J4 and J5 staff must consider redeployment issues throughout the
campaign in order to ensure the force is not off-balance when the redeployment phase
is reached. Redeployment planning will include a number of factors which may
reflect conflicting priorities. Resolution of such conflicts is a matter for the JTFC in
consultation with the Commander JFLogC who should conduct a full redeployment
estimate. Factors to be considered may include, but are not limited to, the following:
a.
Desired Order of Departure. The Desired Order of Departure
(DOOD) will be determined by PJHQ and the JTFC in line with
continuing/residual responsibilities and Force Protection requirements.
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However, FLC requirements for repatriation of key equipments should be
considered.
b.
Synchronisation. The run down of in theatre capabilities particularly
communications and camp infrastructure will require careful synchronisation
with the departure of personnel and equipment. A synchronisation matrix will
assist in this evaluation.
c.
Availability of Movement Assets. The availability of movement assets
is likely to have a major influence on the Synchronisation Matrix. It is highly
desirable that a degree of redundancy is built into the provision of such assets.
d.
Redeployment Enablers. In the same manner as they are required
during deployment, specific enablers may well be required to deploy to the
JOA to facilitate both the closure and draw-down of in theatre activities and to
expedite the redeployment. Where stocks, equipment and ammunition have
been broken out of their transit packaging, specialist and resource-intensive
capabilities will need to be provided.
e.
Hand-over of Infrastructure to Host or Follow-On Nation. The
activities necessary to facilitate the smooth hand-over of infrastructure to Host
or Follow-On Nations must be considered at the outset of redeployment
planning. In particular, engineering, lands and contracts capabilities are likely
to be essential.
f.
Closure of Contracts. The closure of in theatre contracts requires
specialist personnel. Their deployment should be as early in the process as
possible, preferably prior to the redeployment estimate. Their duration in
theatre should be planned to exceed the final contract closure date even if this
requires special arrangements to be made for their life support.
g.
Closure of Accounts. The nature of operations makes normal
accounting difficult, particularly during the initial stages. However, this does
not excuse Commanders from their responsibilities. Once redeployment is
considered additional CSS personnel and a Closed Stores Accounts Team,
should be deployed to assist in the closure of theatre accounts.
h.
Sustainability. Even during redeployment the force will require
sustainment. The in-theatre situation and robustness of the redeployment
Lines of Communications will determine to what degree sustainment stocks
can be reduced in line with personnel and equipment departures.
i.
Sensitive/Protectively Marked Items. The redeployment of sensitive
equipment and protectively marked items will require special attention to
ensure handling procedures and security are not compromised.
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j.
Specific Equipments. It is likely that specific equipments, particularly
those of a specialist low population nature, will have equipment support
requirements which may affect their position in the DOD.
k.
Waste Disposal and Remedial Works. The requirement for waste
disposal and remedial work on contaminated sites should not be
underestimated. In past redeployments this has delayed full redeployment
considerably.
l.
Bio-Security. It is essential that equipment and personnel redeploying
from overseas operations do not introduce any biological hazard into the UK or
any other nation. The DLO (Ops 3b) maintain a database of extant biosecurity requirements for redeployments from a wide variety of potential
theatres of operation. The responsibility for the completion of bio-security
measures to the requisite standard rests with Unit Commanders, not with
movements staff.
917. Front Line Command Responsibilities. Although the responsibility for
redeployment planning rests with PJHQ and its deployed commanders, FLCs are
responsible for their own formations, units and personnel once they land in the home
base - UK or UK Support Command Germany):
a.
Personnel. The swift movement of personnel to home locations is a
major J1 activity and should not be interrupted except in the most unusual
operational circumstances. There will be an additional administration
requirement for reserves and augmentees.
b.
Equipment. The movement of equipment once landed is likely to
require the -employment of additional personnel and, depending on the nature
of the equipment, additional assets, e.g. tank transporters. Care must be taken
to ensure that vehicles are returning in a condition in which they can be legally
driven on public roads.
c.
Port Clearance. Clearance of Air Ports of Disembarkation (APODs)
and Sea Ports of Disembarkation (SPODs) is a unit responsibility under the
direction of FLCs. Reception and administrative arrangements should be
flexible enough to allow the effective administration and processing of
personnel and equipment. FLCs may be required to develop contingency
quarantine arrangements and bio security decontamination procedures.
d.
Economy. In line with the principle of Economy of Effort, a pragmatic
management decision may well be required on the relative costs of
redeployment movement activities when set against the cost of new equipment
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or materiel procurement. This decision, which rests with MOD, will be
particularly pertinent with regard to movement using chartered outsize aircraft.
918. Discipline and Stress. At the end of operations there will be an inevitable
feeling of euphoria. The constraint of operations will be lifted and the psychological
release may, if not properly controlled, result in some breakdown of discipline.
Carelessness of weapon handling drills may creep in and lives may be lost. Other
undesirable activities, such as trophy hunting and illegal export/importation, may also
occur and security procedures appropriate to ensure safe air and sea movement will
need to be instituted. A well publicised, provost-led, search regime at Air Ports of
Embarkation (APE)/Sea Ports of Embarkation (SPE) can be a powerful deterrent. At
best, indiscipline is likely to lead to adverse publicity affecting the force image. In
extreme cases, the release of emotion may even lead to acts of retribution as perceived
injustices are settled and the operational gains are undermined. Equally, the effects of
combat stress could manifest themselves in adverse psychological reactions and the
possibility of stress disorders must be considered. Suitable medical advice must be
taken and appropriate counselling arranged.
919. Recuperation. A process of recuperation will begin, primarily in the UK
Base, to replace resources expended on the concluded operation to restore manpower,
equipment and materiel, including Operational Stocks, to their pre-operational levels
or in accordance with revised target levels. Where stocks were double-earmarked and
were deployed, suitable steps must be taken to ensure that other contingencies remain
sustainable, or that they are discounted from consideration as concurrent operations.
These are issues for the Resource Plans and Commitments areas in MOD and for
DLO.
Concluding the Operation
• Once an operation has reached its conclusion the emphasis will shift to post
conflict activities which will require logistic support.
• Redeployment of the force is an operation in its own right, requiring detailed
planning well in advance, based on the desired end-state.
• Draw-down of a JOA/Theatre will normally require the employment of
specialists to supervise account closure, disposals and relocation of assets.
• A key JTFHQ task is the prioritisation and synchronisation of the redeployment,
maintaining the correct balance of capability in the JOA until no longer
required.
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ANNEX 9A – REDEPLOYMENT FLOW
Generic Functions. Redeployment is in effect Reception, Staging, Onward
Movement and Integration (RSOI) in reverse. The following schematics describe the
generic functions required for an orderly move from a theatre of operations back to
unit lines. The circumstances pertinent to each operation may allow particular
functions to be combined.
Holding
Area
In Theatre
Conc
Area
Assembly
Area
Holding
Area
Marshalling
Area
De-ammo
and de-kitting
points
CSC if
required
RPOD
SPOE
APOE
Transit Camp
(if required)
Staging
Area
UK/
Germany
RPOE
Holding
Area
Unit
Lines
SPOD
FLC
Direction
Holding
Area
DLO
APOD
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Administration
1. The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and
strategy. (AAP-6 – PL 02)
2. The internal management of units. (AAP-6)
Area of Operations
That portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the
administration of such operations. (AAP-6) See also JOA.
Area of Responsibility
The geographical area assigned to each NATO Strategic Command and to each
Regional Command of Strategic Command Europe. (JWP 0-01.1)
Asset Tracking
1. The extension of visibility which allows the location and state of individual serially
numbered or uniquely identified items to be determined when required. (See TAV,
Visibility)
2. Within NATO … the capability to maintain visibility of a specific asset, normally
serially numbered or otherwise uniquely identified, throughout the support chain.
(AAP 6 – FSN PL 02)
Availability
Availability is a measure of the degree to which an item or system is in an operable
and committable state at the start of mission when the mission is called for at an
unknown (random) time. It has 2 main components. The intrinsic, or inherent
availability is a function of equipment design and materiel. Operational availability
includes the effects of personnel, training and logistic support. In practice, in
operational formations, availability is often interpreted in a more pragmatic way.
Staffs may define it in terms of whether the equipment is ‘fully fit’ or ‘fightable’, and
availability therefore equals the percentage of equipments that meet the stated criteria,
for example: ‘70% fully fit now, 80% fightable now, 95% fit in 24 hours’.
Base
1. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support.
(AAP-6)
2. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. (AAP-6)
3. Static units of the logistic organisation that provide the necessary level of logistic
support for logistic management in peace and the sustainment of operations.
(JWP 4-00)
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Battle Area Clearance
The systematic clearance of ground over which conflicts have been fought which is
contaminated with mines, submunitions, unexploded ordnance, ammunition, nuclear
biological and chemical weapons and their components, missile fuels, weapons, and
other hazardous debris. This requires Explosive Ordnance Disposal expertise,
although combat engineers and others may work under Explosive Ordnance Disposal
direction. (JWP 4-00)
Civil Military Co-operation
The resources and arrangements which support the relationship between commanders
and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where
military forces are or plan to be employed. Such arrangements include cooperation
with non-governmental or international agencies, organisations and authorities.
(AAP-6)
Classes of Supply
NATO divides materiel; into 5 classes of supply. (Class I uniform rate consumables
e.g. rations, Class II scaled equipment e.g. aircraft, weapons, vehicles, clothing, tools,
spares etc., Class III fuels and lubricants Class IV Non scaled supplies e.g. engineer
stores, field defence packs and Class V Ammo, explosive ordnance of all types). The
US uses 9 and virtually all other NATO member nations use differing, but similar
national groupings. The UK does not divide its materiel into classes or rigid
commodity groups. Instead generic groupings are used for; combat supplies, engineer
materiel, ordnance materiel, medical stores and equipment and canteen supplies.
(JWP 4-00)
Combat Service Support
The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and
logistics. (AAP-6)
Combined Logistics
The pooling of specific logistic functions related to services and/or resources provided
by more than one service of the same nation for common use under a co-ordinating
authority. (SHAPE MJLC Study)
Commodities
Stores are categorised by need rather than type of store so that management and
distribution of resources be targeted more efficiently. Commodities are grouped into:
operational items (Category O); training items (Category T); and the remainder
(Category R). (JWP 4-00)
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Commonality
The state achieved when the same doctrine, procedures or equipment are used.
(AAP-6)
Compatibility
The suitability of products, processes or services for use together under specific
conditions to fulfil relevant requirements without causing unacceptable interactions.
(ISO-IEC) (AAP-6)
CONDO
Contractors on deployed operations. A generic term relating to all civilian contracted
personnel deployed in support of military operations. Such personnel could be
deployed in support of a variety of contracts, including Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEM), Contractor logistic Support (CLS) and CON LOG.
(JWP 4-00)
CON LOG
A specific contract for logistic support. An overarching enabling contract between
MOD and a commercial Prime Contractor, under partnering principles, to provide a
wide range of logistic support to operations. Specific work for support to discrete
operations may be tasked under this Enabling Contract. (JWP 4-00)
Consignment tracking
The capability to maintain visibility of a specific consignment by the use of a unique
identifier, i.e. the serial shipping container code. (AAP 6 – FSN PL 02)
Consumer logistics
That part of logistics concerning reception of the initial product, storage, transport,
maintenance (including repair and serviceability) and disposal of materiel. In
consequence, consumer logistics includes: stock control, provision or construction of
facilities (excluding any materiel element and those facilities needed to support
production logistics activities), movement control, reliability and defect reporting,
safety standards for storage, transport and handling, related training.
(AAP-6 FSN PL).
Control
That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate
organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which
encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of
this authority may be transferred or delegated. (AAP-6)
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Co-ordinating Authority
The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or
commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has
the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, or their
representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of
disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential
agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he
shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority. (APP-6)
Days of Supply
A calculated quantity of combat supplies each formation can be expected to consume
on a daily basis dependent upon the theatre of operations. (JWP 4-00)
Deployed Operating Base
A base, other than the peacetime base, having minimum essential operational and
support facilities, to which a unit or part of a unit will deploy to operate from in time
of tension or war. (see Base above.)
Detailed Deployment List
A list of Force Elements, in the Desired Order of Arrival, ready for, or incorporating,
movement details. (JWP 4-00) In NATO terms the DDL may become a Detailed
Deployment Plan (DDP) (AJP-4.4)
Directed Logistics (See chapter 8)
Dump
A temporary storage area, usually in the open, for bombs, ammunition, equipment or
supplies. (AAP-6) (Note: A dump has minimal C3, security and load handling
resources; it requires activation before use).
Echelon
First Line may be sub divided as follows:
a. F Echelon. F Echelon consists of those vehicles required by a unit to fight
the battle.
b. A Echelon. A Echelon consists of those vehicles required for the hour to
hour replenishment of F Echelon, mainly ammunition and POL vehicles.
c. B Echelon. B Echelon contains the unit transport which is not needed at
short notice in battle. (JWP 4-00)
Equipment
All non-expendable items needed to outfit/equip an individual unit or organisation.
(AAP-6)
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Equipment Support
The staff function concerned with Equipment Support Management, Support
Management and Engineering Support. (JWP 4-00)
Equipment Support Management
The process of controlling the allocation, repair policy, refurbishment, redesign and
replacement of, and resupply of material for, an equipment throughout its service life.
(JWP 4-00)
Estate
Dedicated uniformed J4 Estates Staff supported by representatives from the Defence
Estates Organisation will normally manage estates activities i.e. Works, Lands and
possibly quartering. The staff will have appropriate financial, works contracts and
construction material procurement delegations and will have the expertise to manage
contractors engaged in infrastructure projects and maintenance. (JWP 4-00)
Estimate of the Situation
A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances
affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to the course of action to be
taken in order to accomplish his mission. Also called ‘appreciation of the situation’.
(AAP-6)
Force Support (TBC) (1. NATO Infrastructure; 2. UK logistic descriptor)
Formation Support (TBC)
Forward Mounting Base
A base (also deployed operating base) established within the operational area to
support tactical operations. It will be resourced only to provide minimum services
commensurate with sustaining the required level of air effort. (JWP 0-01.1)
General Purpose War Reserves (See Stock)
Host Nation
A nation which, by agreement:
a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or
transiting through its territory;
b. allows materiel and/or NATO organisations to be located on its territory;
and/or
c. provides support for these purposes. (AAP-6)
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Host-Nation Support
Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO
and/or other forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from,
or in transit through the host nation’s territory. (AAP-6)
Humanitarian operation
An operation conducted to alleviate human suffering. A humanitarian operation may
precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian
organisations. Such operations may be in response to a conflict or natural disaster.
(AAP-6 PL)
In Country Resources
Resources provided to a force from the non-governmental infrastructure of a country.
(JWP 4-00)
Infrastructure
A term generally applicable for all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications or
facilities for the support and control of military forces. (AAP-6)
Integrated Logistic Support
The management and technical process through which supportability and logistic
support considerations are integrated into the design and taken into account throughout
the life cycle of systems/equipment and by which all elements of logistic support are
planned, acquired, tested and provided in a timely and cost-effective manner.
(AAP-6)
Interchangeability
The ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another to fulfil
the same requirements. (AAP-6)
Interoperability
The ability of Alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of Partner and other
nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned
missions and tasks. (AAP-6)
Joint Logistics
The pooling of specified logistics functions related to services and/or resources
provided by more than one service and/or resources provided by more than one service
of the same nation for common use under a co-ordinating authority. (JWP 4-00)
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Joint Operations Area (UK)
An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated
Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a
specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as
time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission-specific. (JWP 0-01.1)
Joint Operations Area (NATO)
An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by a strategic or a regional commander, coordinated with nations and approved by the NAC or MC, as appropriate, and in
accordance with the agreed NATO’s Operational Planning Architecture, in which a
designated subordinate joint commander plans and conducts military operations to
accomplish a specific mission at the operational level of war. A JOA and its defining
parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission-specific
and may overlap Areas of Responsibility. (IMSM-287-97)
Joint Sea Base
The use of the sea as a base within joint operations in order to contribute to an
optimum footprint ashore. (JWP 4-00)
Just In Case
The holding of stocks in the manufacturing process ‘just in case’ supplies are
interrupted. Military stockpiles have traditionally been held JIC of crisis or the nonavailability of crisis resupply in conflict.
Just In Time
Just In Time (JIT) manufacturing seeks to minimise stock levels and to optimise the
manufacturing process delivering stock ‘just in time’. The absence of traditional
buffer stocks requires reliable production of high quality goods to ensure the required
continuous supply of parts to the assembly line or other manufacturing process. JIT
has been adopted in varying degrees throughout the commercial supply chain from the
extraction of raw materials, through manufacturing, storage and distribution, to the
consumption of the finished goods.
Lead Nation
A nation accepting responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of
supply and services for all or part of the multinational force package or for assuming
lead role in a task organised multinational organisation. (MC 319)
Lead Service
Analogous to Lead Nation – where a Service undertakes the procurement and
provision of a range of materiel and services for the benefit of all, e.g. fuel, rations,
common user equipment. (JWP 4-00)
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Lines of Communications
All the land, water, and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or
more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.
(AAP-6)
Lines of Support
Lines of Support are used to describe the boundaries of a specific element of a CSS
function. The Lines are:
a. First Line. The CSS organic to a unit.
b. Second Line. The CSS organic to a brigade, division, station (MOB or
DOB).
c. Third Line. The CSS provided behind the divisional rear boundary and
forward of the Point of Entry (POE). (RAF – in the FRSA or from the Strategic
Base)
d. Fourth Line. The CSS provided from the Strategic Base.
e. Base. It can be seen from the definition of Base that Base and Fourth Line
would normally be synonymous. (JWP 4-00)
Logistics
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In
its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:
a. Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,
maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel.
b. Transport of personnel.
c. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of
facilities.
d. Acquisition or furnishing of services
e. Medical and health service support. (AAP-6)
Logistic Support
That element of CSS provided by the Royal Logistic Corps (RLC). It is
complementary to Equipment Support (ES) and provides for the support of the soldier,
unit and formation, including the distribution of Combat Supplies, general materiel,
Postal and Courier Services (PCS) and labour resources. (JWP 4-00)
Maintainability
The ability of an item, under stated conditions of use, to be retained in or restored to a
state in which it can perform its required functions, when maintenance is performed
under stated conditions and using prescribed procedures and resources. (AAP-6)
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Maintenance
1. All actions taken to retain equipment in or to restore it to a specified condition,
including inspection, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair,
rebuilding and reclamation.
2. All supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its
mission.
3. The routine recurring work required to keep a facility (plant, building, structure,
ground facility, utility system, or other real property) in such condition that it may be
continuously utilized, at its original or designed capacity and efficiency, for its
intended purpose. (AAP-6)
Materiel
The stores and equipment (as opposed to personnel) available or required for an
undertaking. (JWP 0-01.1)
Military Works Area.
A Military Works Area (MWA) is formed when conditions dictate that normal
peacetime estate procedures be subordinated to the immediate operational plan. In an
MWA, a designated RE operational commander will be appointed with responsibility
for all infrastructure engineering although the works may be carried out by other RE
units, directly employed labour under RE supervision, or by contractors. (UK)
Movement
Movement is the activity involved in the change in location of equipment, personnel or
stocks as part of a military operation. Movement requires the supporting capabilities
of mobility, transportation, infrastructure, movement control, and support functions.
(MC 319/1).
Mounting
All preparations made in areas designated for the purpose, in anticipation of an
operation. It includes the assembly in the mounting area, preparation, and
maintenance within the mounting area, movement to loading points, and subsequent
embarkation into ships, craft, or aircraft if applicable. (AAP-6)
Multinational Logistics
The full spectrum of modes used to logistically support operations other than purely
national, such as multinational integrated logistic support, role specialisation support
and lead nation logistic support. (JWP 0-01.1)
National Support Element
A national organisation with a HQ and units responsible for the provision of logistic
support to its national forces. (JWP 4-00)
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Operations Security
The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using
passive or active means to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities
and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6)
Pre-position
To place military units, equipment, or supplies at or near the point of planned use or at
a designated location to reduce reaction time, and to ensure timely support of a
specific force during initial phases of an operation. (AAP-6)
Readiness state
The measure of the capability of forces at a given point in time to execute their
assigned missions. (AAP-6)
Readiness time
The time within which a unit can be made ready/to perform the tasks for which it has
been organized, equipped and trained. This time is amplified or measured by
indicators of the unit’s current personnel, materiel and training state. It does not
include transit time. (AAP-6)
Reclamation
The process whereby materiel declared worn or scrap is restored to a condition which
renders it fit for further use. (JWP 4-00)
Reconstitution
The expansion of force structures and infrastructure beyond existing levels, including
the raising of new units, and the expansion of industrial capacity to support the
procurement of equipment and stocks. (AAP-6 PL)
Recovery
1. In operations, contacting, protecting and extracting personnel, small groups or
units, or materiel.
2. In air operations, that phase of a mission which involves the return of an aircraft to
a base.
3. In naval mine warfare, salvage of a mine as nearly intact as possible to permit
further investigation for intelligence and/or evaluation purposes.
4. In battlefield maintenance, the extrication of an abandoned, disabled or
immobilised vehicle and, if necessary, its removal to a maintenance point.
(AAP-6)
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Recuperation
The replacement of resources (following the use of military force) in preparation for
further operations (BDD, Glossary). Recuperation is used as a Strategic term by UK
with specific manpower, equipment or materiel resource connotations. (BDD)
Redeployment
The complete operation involving preparation and relocation of units and stocks to a
new destination. This may be to a new deployment area or to peacetime locations
such that units can be available for subsequent deployment as quickly as possible.
(JWP 4-00)
Redistribution Authority
The authority given to commanders and normally negotiated in peacetime, to
reallocate in an ‘emergency in war’ national logistic resources controlled by the
combat forces under their command and made available by nations, in order to
influence the battle logistically. (MC 319)
Refugee
Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (AAP-6)
Refurbishment. See Rehabilitation.
Regeneration
The timely activation, in full or in part, or existing force structures and infrastructure,
including the restoration of manning, equipment and stocks to designated levels.
(AAP-6)
Regrouping
A change of task organisation for a particular operation. (JWP 0-01.1)
Rehabilitation
The processing, usually in a relatively quiet area, of units or individuals recently
withdrawn from combat or arduous duty, during which units recondition equipment
and are rested, furnished special facilities, filled up with replacements, issued
replacement supplies and equipment, given training and generally made ready for
employment in future operations. (AAP-6)
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Reliability
1. The ability of an item to perform a required function, under stated conditions, for a
specified period. (JWP 0-01.1)
2. It is a measure of probability and can be defined in 2 ways; Base Reliability (the
probability that an item will complete the specified period without a failure); and the
Mission Reliability (the probability that an item will complete the specified period
without a mission critical failure). (JWP 4-00)
Reorganisation
The internal distribution of personnel and equipment in a formation or unit to render it
battleworthy again, albeit at a reduced size. Formation/integrity remains.
(JWP 0-01.1)
Repair
Technical operation to restore operational functions to an equipment or repairable
damaged parts by adjustment, manufacture or the replacement of defective
components. (JWP 0-01.1)
Repair Loop
The process whereby unfit equipment and assemblies are moved from the unit to the
repair organisation. On passing through the repair organisation, fit items are returned
to unit or to stock. This may involve a forward loop between units and their
supporting maintenance organisation and a rearward loop from the deployed force to
the Base. It embraces the functions of recovery, evacuation, repair, materiel resource
planning and supply management. (JWP 4-00)
Replacement
A phase of Rehabilitation whereby personnel and equipment lost or damaged are
replaced. (JWP 4-00)
Replenish
Re-fill or restock to a predetermined level, pressure or quantity. (JWP 4-00)
Resupply
The act of replenishing stocks in order to maintain required levels of supply. (AAP-6)
Role Specialisation
A nation accepting responsibility for procuring and providing a particular class of
supply or service for all or part of a multinational force package. (MC 319)
Special Purpose War Reserves (See Stock).
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Staging Area
1. An area located between the mounting area and the objective area through which
all or part of the forces pass after mounting, for the purpose of refuelling, regrouping,
training, inspection and distribution of troops and materiel.
2. A general locality established for the concentration of troop units and transient
personnel between movements over lines of communications. (AAP-6)
Standardisation
The development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs
to achieve and maintain the required levels of compatibility, interchangeability or
commonality in the operational, procedural, materiel, technical and administrative
fields to attain interoperability. (AAP-6)
Stock
A generic term covering the quantities of items of materiel held on charge in store as
opposed to materiel in use. There are 2 broad categories of stock in the supply system:
a. Operational Stocks – Special or General Purpose Operational Stocks
(formerly known as War Reserves).
b. Maintenance Stock Stock which is required to maintain the Army in peace
and meet resupply lead-times for operations. Levels of maintenance stock are
determined by: the efficiency with which the Supply Chain can deliver materiel
to where it is required: and the sustainability required for the force without
resupply. (JWP 4-00)
Supplies
All materiel and items used in the equipment support and maintenance of military
forces. (AAP-6)
Supply Area
A field storage area, usually established above divisional level, operated by RLC and
holding a broad range of operating and reserve stocks. These stocks are normally
grounded and there are sufficient C3 and technical resources to service them (e.g.
ammunition inspection). (JWP 4-00)
Supply Chain Management
The supply chain starts with the provision and procurement organisations whose job it
is to determine what is required (after policy direction), the quantities to be procured
and any limitations which may be put on the use of the materiel once received from
industry. It ends with the unit who consumes/uses the materiel passed down the chain.
SCM provides an integrated view of the whole supply chain and without it individual
parts of the chain may operate in compartments and maximise their own efficiency to
the detriment of the overall system. SCM encourages a more horizontal vision and
Glossary-13
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requires a single control organisation for the whole supply chain, and a CIS system to
provide C2, stock visibility and asset tracking. (JWP 4-00)
Supply Management
The responsibility for ensuring the proper receipt, storage and issue of materiel in
accordance with staff policies for equipment. Supply Management functions include
entitlement documentation, inventory control and provision and procurement.
(JWP 4-00)
Sustainability (Strategic)
The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration
required to achieve its objectives. (AAP-6)
Temporary Deployable Accommodation (TDA)
A new system known as Temporary Deployable Accommodation (TDA) will be in
addition to the Interim Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure (ECI). The initial
tranche is likely to provide accommodation for 5,250 men configured as 125, 250 and
500 man camps. (UK)
Total Asset Visibility
A fully integrated logistic IS in which data is input once, used many times; there is
only one terminal per staff officer; and from that terminal the staff officer can access
the whole database. TAV is a principal logistic element of the digitisation of the
battlefield. See Asset Tracking and Visibility. (JWP 4-00)
Transfer of Authority
Within NATO, an action by which a member nation or NATO Command gives
operational command or control of designated forces to a NATO Command. (AAP-6)
Visibility
The ability for management at the various levels of command to know the location,
quantity and condition of any or all of a defined range of equipment and commodities
and where appropriate, the ultimate use to which those commodities are put. (See
Asset Tracking, TAV). (JWP 4-00)
War Reserves (See Stock)
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
A/SPOD
A/SPOE
ACSS(G/U)
ALC
ALSS
AML
AO
AR
AT
ATG
ATUFT
Air/Sea Port of Disembarkation
Air/Sea Port of Embarkation
Air Combat Service Support (Group/Unit)
Air Logistic Cell
Advanced Logistic Support Site
Augmentation Manning List
Area of Operations
Authorised Representative(s)
Air Transport
Amphibious Task Group
Aircraft Taken Up From Trade
BCR
BPU
BSG
Battle Casualty Replacements
Brigade Provost Unit
Brigade Support Group
CAO
CASEVAC
CDL
CDS
CIMIC
CJTF
CoA
CsoA
COE
CoG
COMATG
CONDO
CON LOG
COTS
CPT
CSAT
CSS
Chief Administrative Officer
Casualty Evacuation
Chief of Defence Logistics
Chief of the Defence Staff
Civil-Military Co-operation
Combined Joint Task Force
Course of Action
Courses of Action
Contingent Owned Equipment
Centre of Gravity
Commander Amphibious Task Group
Contractors on Deployed Operations
Contract for Logistics
Commercial off the Shelf
Contingency Planning Team
Closed Stores Accounts Team
Combat Service Support
Abbreviations-1
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JWP 4-00
DCDS (Health)
DCMO
DCOS
DfID
DIS
DLO
DOA
DOB
DOOD
DP
DPA
DPKO
DROPS
DSDA
DSG
DTMA
DUSAS
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Health)
Defence Crisis Management Organisation
Deputy Chief of Staff
Department for International Development
Defence Intelligence Staff
Defence Logistics Organisation
Desired Order of Arrival
Deployed Operating Base
Desired Order of Departure
Displaced Person
Defence Planning Assumptions
(UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Demountable Rack Offloading and Pick-up Systems
Defence Storage and Distribution Agency
Divisional Support Group (Army); Deployed Supply Group
(RAF)
Defence Transport and Movement Agency
Deployable Unit Supply and Accounting System
ECI
FALD
FCO
FET
FFAO
FLC
FLC
FLS
FMB
FMCC
FMCU
FMPU
FOC
FRS
FRSA
FRSS
FSG
FSU
Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure (Now TDA)
(UN) Field and Administrative and Logistics Division
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Force Element Table
Force Field Admin Office
Force Logistic Co-ordinator
Front Line Command
Forward Logistic Site
Forward Mounting Base
Force Movement Control Centre
Force Movement Control Unit
Force Military Police Unit
Full Operating Capability
Forward Repair Ship
Force Rear Support Area
Field Record Support System
Forward Support Group
Forward Support Unit
GPOS
GLC
General Purpose Operational Stocks
Group Logistic Co-ordinator
Abbreviations-2
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JWP 4-00
HDS
HNS
HNSA
HRR
HTUFT
Helicopter Delivery Service
Host-Nation Support
Host-Nation Support Agreement
High Readiness Reservist
Helicopter(s) Taken Up From Trade
IA
ICR
IDP
IER
ILS
IOC
IPE
IPT
IS
IT
ITR
ITV
Implementing Arrangements
In Country Resources
Infrastructure Development Plan
Information Exchange Requirement
Integrated Logistic Support
Initial Operating Capability
Individual Protective Equipment
Integrated Project Team
Information Systems
Information Technology
In Theatre Reinforcements
In Transit Visibility
JCS(Log)
JFAC(C)
JFAmphC(C)
JFET
JFAC(C)
JFFAO
JFLC(C)
JFLogC(C)
JFMC(C)
JFMS
JFOBU
JIC
JIT
JLOC
JLP
JOCS
JOA
JSOR
Jt Comd
JTFC
JTFHQ
Joint Command System(Logistics)
Joint Force Air Component (Commander)
Joint Force Amphibious Component (Commander)
Joint Force Element Table
Joint Force Air Component (Commander)
Joint Force Field Administrative Office
Joint Force Land Component (Commander)
Joint Force Logistic Component (Commander)
Joint Force Maritime Component (Commander)
Joint Force Movement Staff
Joint Force Orientation and Briefing Unit
Just-in-Case
Just-in-Time
Joint Line of Communication
Joint Logistic Picture
Joint Operational Command System
Joint Operations Area
Joint Statement of Requirement
Joint Commander
Joint Task Force Commander
Joint Task Force Headquarters
Abbreviations-3
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JWP 4-00
LOA
LOC
LO/LO
Letter of Assist
Lines of Communications
Lift on/Lift off (ship)
MCC
MCMV
MOOTW
MJLC
MILU/MIMU
MNLC
MOU
MSA
MSE
NCC
NGO
NHS
NSE
NEO
NTM
Movement Co-ordination Centre
Mine Counter Measures Vessels
Military Operations Other Than War
Multinational Joint Logistic Centre
Multinational Integrated Logistic/Medical Unit
Multinational Logistic Commander
Memorandum of Understanding
Mutual Support Arrangement
Military Strategic Estimate
National Contingent Commander
Non Governmental Organisation
National Health Service
National Support Element
Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
Notice to Move
OMIS
OPCOM
OPCON
OPDEF
OPSEC
OT
Operational Manpower Information System
Operational Command
Operational Control
Operational Defect
Operations Security
Operations Team
PCS
PEP
PJHQ
PMC
PSO
POD
POE
PW
Postal and Courier Service
Primary Equipment Pack
Permanent Joint Headquarters
Personnel, Mail and Cargo
Peace Support Operations
Port of Disembarkation
Port of Embarkation
`
Prisoner of War
RAM-D
RAS
RASU
RDD
RFA
RIT
ROCON
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Durability
Replenishment at Sea
Rear Area Support Unit
Required Delivery Date
Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Readiness In Theatre
Roll on Container (ship)
Abbreviations-4
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JWP 4-00
RO/RO
RPT
RSOI
RSOM
Roll on/Roll off (ship)
Readiness and Preparation Time
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (NATO)
SDR
SG
SH
SMC
SN
SPC
SPOS
SPG
SR
STANAG
STC
STOM
STUFT
Strategic Defence Review
Surgeon General
Support Helicopters
Sea Mounting Centre
Sending Nation
Service Personnel Centre
Special Purpose Operational Stocks
Sustainability Planning Guidelines
Sponsored Reserves
Standing NATO Agreement
Sea Transit Centre
Ship To Objective Manoeuvre
Ship(s) Taken Up From Trade
TA
TACOM
TACON
TALCE
TAV
TCN
TDA
TDU
TOA
TPFDD
TPFDL
TLW
TMW
TWACN
Technical Arrangements
Tactical Command
Tactical Control
Tactical Airlift Co-ordination Centre
Total Asset Visibility
Troop Contributing Nation
Temporary Deployed Accommodation
Theatre Draw-down Unit
Transfer of Authority
Time Phased Force Deployment Data (US)
Time Phased Force Deployment List (US)
Tactical Logistic Wing (RAF)
Tactical Medical Wing (RAF)
Theatre Wide Area Communications Network
UKMAMS
UKTG
UMR
UOR
USAS
UK Mobile Air Movements Squadron
UK Task Group
Urgent Maintenance Requirement
Urgent Operational Requirement
Unit Supply and Accounting System
VOD
Vertical Onboard Delivery
Abbreviations-5
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JWP 4-00
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
Abbreviations-6
2nd Edition